Citation
UNCLASSIFIED
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-CONFIDENTIAL
RELEASED IN FULL
EQ9
AD HOC MEETING CN RWANDA AND BURUNDI
DATE: August 22, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:00 a.m. 12:30 p.m.
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AGENDA
I.
Follow-up on Taskings from
8/9 Meeting
II. Proposed Contact Group and Framework for Regional
Conference (30 minutes)
III. Arms Embargo on Burundi (15 minutes)
IV. ' Asset Freeze on Burundian Extremists (15 minutes)
IV. Conclusions, Next Steps (15 minutes)
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UNItED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE/CASE ID: 23 SEP 2009 200103014
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Prison Conditions:
By Friday, August 11, State will provide NSC a report on
availability of funds to assist with construction of
prisons, prefabricated housing and tents (work w/ICRC). (C)
War Crimes Tribunal:
By Friday, August 11, AID will work with State on a plan of
action to remove obstacles to assist with getting the
Tribunal up and running. As part of the plan, AID will work
to resolve issues involving UN reimbursements for personnel
in Bosnia to free up funds to support DOJ personnel for
Rwanda. (C)
Also, State will send to Justice the plan regarding security
for DOJ officials working with the Tribunal. (C)
International Mediation:
•••?• •m.
State will report on a plan of forming a Bosnia-style
contact group as well as a possible regional conference on
Burundi and Rwanda. Indicate plans for regional travel.
(C)
IMET Funds:
State, with DOD assistance, will determine whether and when
there might be an additional $50,000 in /MT funds for
Rwanda. (C)
Refugees:
State/PRM in consultation with the Belgians will push UNHCR
to implement a plan to relocate UNHCR camps from Rwandan
border, (C)
State will develop a prospective plan for engaging Mobutu on
Rwandan issues. . (Cl
Burundi:
•=. 4111P
All agencies will review the situation in Burundi and
whether current efforts are adequate to stem ethnic
violence. We will also review possibilities relating to an
ICITAP program. (C) .
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Following is review of State action items as contained in
Sens-Brill memo of August 14:
prison Conditions•
Geneva 006265 reports that a key meeting hosted by UN DHA
on August 14 called for UN agencies in Kigali and ICRC to
develop an urgent plan of action to relieve prison
overcrowding. Donors will review the plan and consider
contributions. DOD reports that 75 Rubb-Hall tents, enough
to hold 8100 persons, and 352 large tents, which would hold
a total of 11,600 persons, could be made available. The
questions of whether and how to provide aid in the area of
prison capacity, and whether to do so in kind or through
ICRC, are open. This should be taken up at the August 22
meeting at the NSC. State DRL's paper on prison strategy
is attached.
War Crimes Tribunal•
State DRL's paper is attached. DRL reports that we are in
the process of hiring personnel and hope to double the
Tribunal's staff in the near term. NSC pressure would be
helpful for Treasury to spring their four people; DRL has
supplied talking points. Ambassador Albright's staff is
meeting with the. SYG's staff to press for a support office
in the Hague, immediate appointment of the Registrar and
administrative support in Kigali and for movement on direct
UN hires. If necessary, Ambassador Albright will follow
with a meeting with the SYG. Justice needs to give
attention to getting our implementing legislation passed so
we can turn over indicted persons to the Tribunal. DRL has
assured DOJ that they will be reimbursed for their
personnel.
State has sent Justice a thick memorandum regarding
security for its personnel in Rwanda.
International Mediation•
Amb. Bogosian sent the requested document to NSC several
days ago.
IMET Funds:
Two possible pots of money have been identified - $50,000
fallout which DOD has found, and $50,000 leftover from
Chad. AF is preparing the necessary Section 451 waiver
decision memo to get the ball rolling.
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Kpfugepa:
USMission Geneva demarched UNHCR on the relocation issue,
and UNHCR agreed to move forward. They were to have a
meeting with local and national Zairian officials in Bukavu
on August 15 to discuss modalities. We have made it clear
to UNHCR that lack of money will not be accepted as an
obstacle to camp relocation, given the pledge language of
our most recent donation. Kinshasa agreed to camp
relocation, but later threatened to expel all refugees if
the Rwanda arms embargo is lifted, as it was on August 16.
Our Mission briefed UNHCR regarding armed Hutu activities
in the camp region on August 16. The briefing helped
persuade UNHCR of the urgency of moving camps. In South
Kivu, Birava camp has already been closed and 9000 refugees
transferred to a camp 75 kms to the west.
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AF/C has prepared a paper on Mobutu. This will be
finalized after Assistant Secretary Moose returns to the
office on August 21.
Burundi'
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Amb. Bogosian has met with Assistant Secretary Gelbard and
INL officers regarding possibilities of an ICITAP program,
and has raised the matter with the French Embassy, the
French having worked closely with us on a similar program
in Haiti. Funding may be an issue.
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Revised 8/18/95
Edson ReAUCtion___SilategY
Goal* To dramatically reduce the prison population in
Rwanda and start trials of the most serious offenders in
national custody.
Background: Although the GOR has made some noises about
reducing the prison capacity and appears willing to form a
Presidential Commission on the issue, hardliners within the
government have shown little interest in reducing the prison
population, making the jails more humane or beginning trials.
Indeed, the prison population has surged from 30,000 in May to
Although the USG has made various
50,000 at present.
demarches to the Rwandan Government, greater political pressure
is needed to gain a reduction in the prison population.
Pressure is timely given the lifting of the arms embargo. We
may wish to underscore the importance we place on the prison
issue by a visit to Rwanda from a senior State Department
official to lay out our position. We should also seek support
from the ROSG. When appropriate, President Clinton could
follow with a call or letter to President Bizimungu and Vice
President Madame.
Message:
To pressure the GOR, we should tell them that we must see
tangible progress within one month in the areas enumerated
below or the USG will have to review its assistance to the
GOR. Given the level of concern within the Congress and the
USG about prison conditions, we will tell the GOR that it will
be extremely difficult for the US to maintain the level of
support we have (e.g., aid to government ministries). It will
be difficult to authorize new support (e.g., lethal or
non-lethal arms equipment) untill we see tangible improvements
in the prison situation.
To ensure continued USG assistance, the GOR must show
progress in the following areas within the next month: .
1. Work with international humanitarian organizations to
increase the capacity of its prisons and spread out'the
population. (We have given $625,000 to the ICRC to expand
prison capacity but could give more money or equipment for
this purpose).
2. Release the young (over 400 under age 14), the elderly
(over 3,200 age 55 and over), the pregnant and the infirm
on humanitarian grounds.
3. Dramatically reduce the number of arrests (currently at
500 a week) by only making arrests where there is
sufficient evidence of guilt.
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4. Take steps necessary to appoint Rwandan judges and begin
trials in Rwanda.
5. Provide for the security of released prisoners and make
clear that reprisal killings will not be tolerated.
• 6. Give high-level support to a Presidential Commission to
develop a political strategy for reducing the prison
population, triaging prisoners and re-integrating Hiatus.
(AID will provide $300,000 out of the $4 million rule of
law assistance to the Commission, as suggested by post).
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'far Crimes Tribunal
DagkarAUnd: The Tribunal is currently investigating five
targets -- principal masterminders of the genocide -- and
believes it can still deliver some indictments before the end
of the year. Its team of investigators, although small, is
building cases against these suspects in Kigali, as well as
transcribing the tapes of the radio broadcasts alleged to have
helped incite the genocide. With the assistance of USG
demarches to various capitals, the Tribunal has recently
obtained permission from some key European States to interview
important witnesses in those countries. Additional staff
members are slowly beginning to come on board including some of
the investigators promised by the Dutch. Nonetheless, the
Tribunal still faces logistical and . bureaucratic obstacles
which we are seeking to overcome. We are taking the following
actions:
expand Tribunal Staff
-- Adequate Tribunal staff is critical to the enterprise.
We have identified and provided the Tribunal the resumes of
over 50 potential investigators, paralegals and neutral
interpreters. The Tribunal has been interviewing prospects
and has selected a group of investigators and paralegals,
which we plan to hire and deploy.in the next few weeks.
This will significantly increase the Tribunal's
investigative resources.
-- We have provided D00/FBI a memorandum and binder
answering their security and medical concerns and are
awaiting a response as to whether three D00 prosecutors can
be deployed.
-- We have submitted talking points to the NSC for a phone
call to Deputy Treasury Secretary Newman about deployment
of two investigators and two paralegals at Treatury. We
are awaiting the NSC call.
-- Ambassador Albright's staff is meeting with the SYG's
staff to press for movement on direct UN hires for the
Tribunal. If necessary, Ambassador Albright will follow
with a meeting with the SYG.
-- We continue to urge other governments to second staff to
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the Tribunal. We will be in an even stronger position to
pressure governments after the next group of USG-provided
personnel have been deployed.
Obtain Adequate Bureaucratic and Administrative seponrt
-- The Tribunal has suffered from the lack of bureaucratic
support. At a meeting in June, the SYG agreed with
Goldstone that the Tribunal should have a "godfather"
either on his staff or in DPKO to move the Tribunal forward
and cut through bureaucratic obstacles. The Tribunal also
needs a Registrar and administrative support. Ambassador
Albright's staff is pursuing this in NY today and if
necessary, Albright may follow with a meeting with the SYG.
Obtain Support Base Outside Kigali
-- The Tribunal is less efficient than it could be because
it lacks a support office to process and analyze documents
and other sensitive information. The SYG has recently
decided that the Tribunal must operate exclusively in
Kigali. We intend to urge him to reconsider and permit a
small space outside of Kigali. In the meantime, we are
working to make the Kigali office more operational and have
sent a large shipment of computer supplies and other
equipment for this purpose.
Prnvide Logistical Supunrt in the Field
-- Until the Tribunal receives adequate administrative
support, the USG will help provide necessary resources. We
plan to redeploy an administrative expert to Kigali, as
well as to lease and equip housing for Tribunal staff.
-- We will also continue to equip the Kigali Office. Six
DOD vehicles are scheduled to arrive by.October 1, with six
more to follow.
Raise. Pebiinity and COnfidAnce of Rwandans
-- Physicians for Human Rights plans to conduct an
exhumation in Kigali in September. We intend to raise
media attention for this event, which will help to create
the sense of movement on the ground for the Tribunal.
-- Goldstone is also considering holding another pledging
conference in Kigali in the near term, which would also
help to build momentum for the Tribunal.
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DECL:08/08/05
SUBJECT: Revised Zaire Strategy - Engaging Mobutu in Regional
Issues
Summary
The regional nature of the situation in Rwanda and Burundi
suggests we reexamine our Zaire strategy to determine whether
there is merit and possibility for incorporating means to
involve President Mobutu in these issues. Mobutu probably
cannot be helpful in regional negotiation given his difficult
personal relationship with neighboring leaders and his pro-Hutu
inclinations. He might, however, be useful on some issues
related to events on his territory in eastern Zaire. Although
the balance between invoking his support for efforts in eastern
Zaire and keeping him on track for the democratic transition is
a delicate one, these need not be mutually exclusive goals. We
should guard against naming a specific "reward" for Mobutu's
cooperation, as this would hand Mobutu leverage to provoke
further rewards by destabilizing the situation in hopes of
renewing our pleas for assistance. The effort should be framed
as steps Mobutu himself can take to contribute towards la
"normalization of relations." King Hassan of Morocco might be
usefully engaged to lobby Mobutu on eastern Zaire.
Essential Factors
Involving Mobutu on regional issues does not alter the
fundamental thrust of our policy strategy for events internal
to Zaire, as articulated in our July 1994 strategy memo. We
will continue to encourage support for economic accountability
and reform, and realistic preparations for credible and
transparent elections in the agreed time-table (by July 10,
1997). We should continue to encourage Mobutu to support/not
interfere with these efforts by the Kengo government, and
acknowledge in our dialogue with Mobutu his role in allowing
advancement on these fronts as they occur. Given our close
coordination with "the Troika" on Zaire pOlicy, we will
coordinate the concept of approaching Mobutu with the French
and Belgians if this strategy is approved.
We see no overall scope for involving Mobutu in any "elder
statesman" role to resolve tensions between parties in the
region. Mobutu has difficult personal relationships with
neighboring presidents (Museveni, Mwinyi, Moi). His pro-Hutu
inclinations further undermine any possibility of a role as
independent arbiter.
Mobutu probably could, however, induce a better Zairian
performance on things that take place exclusively in Zaire.
Since the situation in eastern Zaire could suffer either from
his meddling or the absence of his blessing, we should explore
specific actions (enumerated in "Plan" below) to channel his
influence. Only such cooperation consistent with Mobutu's
constitutional responsibilities and that does not undercut
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Kengo's authorities will be sought. As Mobutu is the commander
in chief of the armed forces, and national defense and
diplomatic relations are areas of collaboration between the
President and the transitional government, there is probably
broad scope for such cooperation. Some issues will obviously
be taken up with both the Prime Minister and the President.
Several factors may constrain Mobutu's ability to influence the
situation in eastern Zaire. Initiatives such as arresting
perpetrators of genocide and controlling ex-FAR military
activities are resource intensive and could incur Zairian
casualties; Mobutu may therefore be reluctant to take on these
tasks. Sheer logistic obstacles (collapsing infrastructure and
state mechanisms) complicate his ability to assist. (These
same arguments can be made to some extent for any of the
countries in the region.) At the very least, Mobutu can
refrain from being a spoiler on refugee issues (by insisting on
rapid repatriation, for example), and could enhance control of
arms flows and camp security. Ultimately, the military
responds to Mobutu (if paid), and a sufficiently motivated
Mobutu can probably get them to accomplish a wide range of
activities.
Motivatina Mobutu
We should be wary of Mobutu's well-known penchant for
horse-trading. It would be imprudent to offer Mobutu a
tangible "prize" (e.g., the coveted visa) in exchange for his
assistance, because it gives him considerable leverage to
extract future concessions and will weaken the internal
transition process. If we assume Mobutu can play a role in the
pace of the arms flow and ex-FAR activities, it would not
escape his notice that he could facilitate renewed
destabilization of the region in hopes we would again plead for
his intercession. Likewise, providing Mobutu a "laundry list"
of tasks he must fulfill as pre-conditions for "rehabilitation"
would not preclude Mobutu from simultaneously doing several
unhelpful things which counterbalance his positive steps.
The Plan
We will pitch our approach to Mobutu on eastern Zaire as a tool
he can employ to improve his abysmal international image and
work toward a "normalization of relations." Our approach will
contain no specific promises. The sending of an ambassador
probably registers with Mobutu as his first short-term
"reward," even if we did not intend it that way. Although an
unrestricted visa is a possibility we might eventually
consider, it is a distant decision dependent on significant
results from Mobutu and a careful calculation of domestic U.S.
repercussions with the Congress and human rights interests.
Our Ambassador/Charge in Kinshasa will continue to be the focal
point for our dialogue with Mobutu. Mobutu has committed
himself to participating in this fashion in a conversation with
former A/S Cohen. An A/S Moose-Mobutu meeting in New York at
the UNGA celebrations would provide another near-term venue for
our message.
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Our strategy with n.halu on eastern Zaire is not incompatible
with our goal of keeping democratization on track. There is a
marginal benefit in diverting Mobutu's attention from the
domestic agenda. Furthermore, his involvement de-emphasizes PM
Kengo's role in regional issues, thus lessening Mobutu's
jealousy of Kengo's international limelight. We will make
Mobutu's support for Kengo's reform efforts a condition of our
dialogue, and we will recognize Kengo's successes in the
economic and governance spheres with kudos to Mobutu for his
non-interference.
Mobutu should be asked to assist with the following types of
endeavors in. eastern Zaire: o Abandoning the forced refugee repatriations that were
started this weekend in.response to the U.N. Security
Council action in suspending the arms embargo on Rwanda.
Zaire undertook one organized refoulement in the past and
then abandoned that approach, so there is hope of
-convincing Zaire to desist now that it has forcefully
demonstrated its anxiety.
o
Ensuring the continued cooperation of the Zairian military
in putting its best troops at the disposal of the
UNECR-funded Zairian Camp Security Contingent and in
following up quickly and decisively on any instances of
ZSCS misdoings.
o
Cooperating with the International Tribunal by seeking to
arrest those accused of genocide; Mobutu might be convinced
to sacrifice some of the known leaders that he would
otherwise be inclined to protect.
o
Tempering international criticism of the arms flow by
agreeing to low cost (to Zaire) measures such as airport
monitors.
o
Pressuring the Hutu leadership (both Rwandan and Burundi)
in eastern Zaire to negotiate rather than carry out armed
attacks.
o
Exploring how some land could be made available elsewhere
in Zaire for medium-term resettlement of refugees should
that become necessary.
As an alternative or parallel track, we could seek to engage
King Hassan of Morocco on our concerns in eastern Zaire.
Hassan has a personal relationship with Mobutu, a record of
assistance on other issues in Africa in the past, and
sufficient stature and experience to merit Mobutu's respect.
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NSC AD HOC MEETING
OPTIONS PAPER
ARMS EMBARGO AND ASSETS FREEZE FOR BURUNDI?
I. CURRENT STRATEGY OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY
We have pursued preventive diplomacy initiatives designed to
bolster moderate forces and deter extremists from fomenting
violence or overturning the current fragile powersharing
arrangement. Our initiatives have been carefully calibrated to
avoid destabilizing the situation further. Key points of our
current policy are:
o
Active support for the efforts of SRSG Abdallab (e.g., our
AID mission has used Democracy and Governance (D/G) funds
to cover some of the SRSG's cost for confidence-building
exercises.)
o
Regular high-level visits (NSA Lake, Deputy Secretary
Talbott, Assistant Secretaries Moose and Shattuck, etc.) .
o
Regular public statements and appeals (e.g., President
Clinton's mid-February radio message).
o
$300,000 for the activities of the UN Human Rights Center
in Burundi
o
Support for the OAU's monitoring force ($250,000 for
initial deployment in FY-94 plus continuing support for OAU
conflict resolution capacity)
o
Use of development (D/G) funds ($4 million) to support
peace and democracy, including grants to promote dialogue,
reconciliation, and human rights.
o
Planned $400,000 in FY-95 ESF, supplemented by USAID D/G
funds, to strengthen Burundi's judicial system and help end
the problem of impunity for past human rights abuses.
o
Active support for recent efforts by NGOs (e.g., Burundi
Policy Forum) to promote conflict resolution and
peace-promotion activities in Burundi.
o
Unpublicized visa restrictions against extremists.
o
Pursuing a Commission of•Inquiry.
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II pRORT.EMS ANTICIPATED
We will continue to pursue these preventive diplomacy efforts,
along with our key allies. However, even with this vigorous
program, Burundi risks spiralling downward into widespread
violence, as occurred in October 1993. The influence of
extremists, particularly in the Tutsi opposition, is a
disturbing trend. The opposition has extracted a string of
concessions from the Hutu - dominated FRODEHU party and its
allies, and the National Debate has stalled.
While Tutsi extremists have so far proceeded incrementally
through violence and intimidation, they may at some point
attempt a direct coup. The military has already attempted
three coups since the FRODEBU won the elections in June 1993,
and the coup attempt in October 1993 very nearly succeeded.
Hutu hardliners, who have become frustrated with'the
government's continuing concessions to the Tutsi opposition,
have launched attacks on Tutsi civilian or 'military targets.
This has lead to a swift response by security forces, and could
eventually spark a military coup on the pretext of maintaining
order. While Hutu militias and the Palipehutu insurgency group
could pose some danger to the Tutsis, they are no real match
for the Burundi military.
The scenario that played out in October 1993 might repeat
itself. A Tutsi coup attempt or Hutu uprising would spark
widespread inter-ethnic violence, and we would see large
outflows of refugees. (While the death toll could be enormous,
the violence would not play out the same way as in Rwanda in
1994 because of the difference in forces. In Rwanda, Hutus
controlled the government, the military, and the militias and
had effective control over nearly all areas of the country in
April 1994; until the RPF drove out the extremists, the Tutsi
minority was essentially defenseless. Conversely, in Burundi,
the Hutus cannot wipe out the Tutsis because the Tutsis have
the military to protect them, and the Tutsis cannot easily
seize and hold control of the country because the Hutus have
power in their sheer numbers and can inflict serious casualties
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on the Tutsi community, as they did after the October 1993
failed military coup attempt. This counterbalance between
Tutsi military power and Hutu numbers could have some
self-limiting effect on the scale of the violence.)
III.
OPTIONS FOR ARMS EMBARGO/ASSETS FREEZE
On the diplomatic side, we will continue preventive diplomacy
efforts. If a coup occurs, our political response should be
the same as in October 1993: immediate condemnation of the
coup attempt; international isolation of the coup leaders;
punitive measures such as suspension of aid; and OAU, UN, or
other appropriate mission& to facilitate the return to power of
the legitimate government.
Participants in the SVTS group have proposed that USUN should
introduce a resolution which imposes an arms embargo against
Burundi on roughly the same terms as the former embargo against
Rwanda, and also calls for arms monitors in regional airports'
as an aid in enforcing the embargo. Several Burundian (Hutu)
Ambassadors, including the one in Washington, have privately
called for such an embargo.
Participants in the SVTS group have also proposed that we
should introduce a resolution which imposes an assets freeze
against certain named Burundian extremists (the list of 40 whom
we and European countries deny visas), and bars claims against
governments and financial institutions for enforcing such a
freeze. There has not been any proposal that we institute a
unilateral freeze.
10 has already drafted and circulated within State proposed
Security Council resolutions in each of these two areas, so
that the lead time between policy decision and implementation
could be fairly short.
On the questions of whether to impose an arms embargo against
Burundi and Burundians, and whether to impose an assets freeze
against Burundian extremists, options are outlined below. The
recent suspension/lifting of the arms embargo against Rwanda
makes an arms embargo for Burundi problematical. Accordingly,
we recommend that an arms embargo resolution not be introduced
at this time, but rather be held in reserve.
AF/C favors the assets freeze. Reluctantly, State E and EH are
willing to go along with this Burundi assets freeze proposal,
primarily because it is multilateral and not bilateral. State
IO favors holding off on a freeze.
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1 Options Reaardina an Arms Embargo on Burundi
A. Introduce Embargo Now
Pros
o
Aimed at arms flows to extremist Nutus, who are launching
frequent armed attacks in the countryside.
o
Aimed at arms flows to the Tutsi-dominated Army and TUtsi
extremists, both of whom are launching reprisals, often
against civilian populations.
o
No cost.
o
Sends a signal that the international community is appalled
by the continuing violence in Burundi, and wishes to do
something about it.
Cons
o
Given the recent suspension/lifting of the embargo against
Rwandans, which some persons worried would lead to more
arms finding their way to Burundi, the timing is bad.
o
An embargo on Burundi, with none against Rwanda, would not
be effective.
o
Difficult to enforce, and even in enforceable would not
prevent killings by other means not susceptible to
international controls.
o
Over time, likely to affect the Army's ability to fight
insurgencies, while not affecting the insurgents or ethnic
cleansing operations as much.
B. fielding an Arms Embargo in Reserve
.2121 ,
o
As it represents no outward change in status quo, is less
likely to have destabilizing effect or prompt Tutsi
hardliner action.
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We retain the leverage which a threat to impose an embargo
gives us.
o
We avoid the possibility of floating the idea, only to see
it go nowhere at the UN, due to possible European
opposition.
o
If/when we do call for an embargo, it could be used in a
broader context, as part of a concerted series of actions.
Cons
o
The status quo, which is not acceptable as far as the
security situation is concerned, continues.
o
We miss, for now, the opportunity to send a strong signal
about violence in Burundi.
o
Arms continue to flow to the Army and to extremists of both
ethnic groups, fuelling the cycle of extremist attack and
reprisal, as well as providing the materiel for any coup,
attempt.
2. Ontinns Reaardina an Assets Freeze Against Burundians
Adopt Freer. - Resolution
A.
Pros
o
Expresses support of the international community for the
moderates. Sends strong signal that we want to isolate
extremists and break the cycle of impunity.
o
Cuts off extremists' funds, assuming that they don't move
funds as soon as resolution is.broached.
o
A UN resolution supporting an assets freeze provides legal
cover for otherwise unenthusiastic European governments to
take action, an important consideration since the greater
proportion of Burundi assets are in Europe, not the U.S.
o
Low cost in resources expended.
o
More surgical than wide-ranging actions---more calculated
to affect only extremists.
Cans.
o
May provoke panic response by Tutsi extremists.
o
Difficult to enforce due to likelihood that extremists will
move their funds before adoption---mainly symbolic.
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o
Because of above considerations, may be difficult to obtain
enough votes on the Security Council. Europeans are
reluctant to freeze assert. The relevant bank accounts are
more likely to be in Europe than in the U.S., so European
cooperation is key.
o
The difficulties of implementing a freeze in the
circumstances of this case are likely to outweigh the
practical benefits, if any.
B.
Enid Off on
4iSP1'A PIPPZ0
Pros
o
As it represents no outward change in status quo, is less
likely to prompt extremist reaction.
o
We avoid the possibility of floating the idea, only to see
it go nowhere at the UN.
Cons
o
We would cease to commit ourselves to already agreed upon
preventitve measure.
o
The cycle of impunity continues.
o
We miss, for now, the opportunity to send a strong signal
about extremists in Burundi.
o
We miss, for now, the opportunity to send such a message
in what would be a symbolic manner for us, there being few
such bank accounts here.
1
CONFTDENTrik;
UNCLASSIFIED,
.
UNCLASSIFIED
Drafted:AF/C:DHeflin
SECC 6467, 8/18/95
Cleared:
AF/C:ARender(subs)
AF/RCS:RBogosian(subs)
IO/UNP:BBowie-Wbitman(info)
PM/ISP:ALangland(info)
P: SSymington(info)
DRL:JRosenblatt(info)
G:AJoyce(info)
L/AF:TBorek(subs)
EB/ESP:JAHolmes(info)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT
BACKGROUND: The draft NSC Discussion Paper of August 5 outlined
the principal elements of US policy to date as well as several
key assumptions,viz.,
Facilitate refugee return and national reconciliation;
Maintain stability and build confidence;
Ensure accountability for the genocide;
Promote respect for human rights;
Enhance security in the refugee camps;
Coordinate and mobilize the international community.
This summary of broad U.S. objectives remains valid. As noted
in the NSC paper under its key assumptions section, lasting
political reconciliation is unlikely in the short term and may
never be possible. The US is not prepared to send troops but is
willing to take other actions and to play a leading role
diplomatically and as a donor. Any long term solution will
require a concerted, multilateral effort over an extended
period.
In the State Department package prepared for the meeting
originally scheduled for August 17, we provided an initial cut
at what a regional conference would entail. More precisely, we
outlined the peace process as we saw it in general terms. We
have received useful suggestions from IO and PRM, and our ideas
require further. refinement.
THE REGIONAL CONFERENCE: There is a broad consensus
internationally that a regional conference would be timely and
useful. The French feel particularly strongly in this regard.
We need to engage the key actors, solicit their ideas regarding
the conference and provide our own. Prior to that we need to •
have at least a preliminary sense of where we are heading; that
is, we need to have a vision of where the peace process is
leading, but we should be flexible enough to make use of good
ideas others will have. Inevitably, compromises will be
necessary. We also need to have assurances of a USG commitment
along the lines noted above, and that assurance should be in
the form of the Presidential Decision Memorandum. The initial
conference, which will have to be followed by other activities
will address regional and Rwanda and Burundi-specific
objectives.
REGIONAL OBJECTIVES: We want broad commitments from the parties
to support the peace process. AREA GOVERNMENTS should make a
commitment to guarantee peace in the region using the authority
and facilities of the OAU. DONOR GOVERNMENTS should commit
themselves to provide technical, material and diplomatic
UNCLASSIFIED
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- 2 -
support to the peace process, noting that those who are
unwilling to support that process will be ostracized by the
donors. The conference should reaffirm the ROLE of the UN
SYSTEM including how best to modify UNAMIR. It is of crucial
importance that the GOR and GOB endorse the process which will
imply their commitment to pursue political reconciliation. The
regional conference should establish a framework that will
provide for the near and middle-term needs of the REFUGEES
pending long-term solutions.
RWANDA: Over the long-term Rwanda will require arrangements
that resolve the refugee problem, provide adequate security for
the country as a whole and for individuals and tackles basic
administrative and economic reconstruction, with the lifting of
the arms embargo,the focus will shift to monitoring arms flows
and developing a security environment that problably will
require demobilization and military reform. The USG will be
involved and we need to determine'the kind of security
relationship we want to have with the GOR. The other broad
area of activity for the USG and other donors will be .
reestablishing judicial and administrative structures in Rwanda
and the Rwanda Genocide Tribunal and ongoing issues of human
rights performance, notably the urgent prison problem. Beyond that
are more traditional assistance programs. Accelerating, delivery and
disbursement of assistance already promised and getting the French
and Belgians to do more are urgent priorities.
BURUNDI:
The current political environment in Burundi is more sour than in
Rwanda. More-over, policy reform is more urgently needed in Burundi.
It will be necessary to stress the risk that the donor community will
walk away from Burundi (a la Somalia) in the absence of serious
efforts at political reconciliation while offering long-term
assistance as the pay-off for a genuine commitment to reconciliation.
However, reconciliation in Burundi is likely to require military
reform, establishment of a real civilian police force, structurasl
adjustment in economic policy and some form of decentralization,
local autonomy or regionalism within the country as a means toward
power sharing.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS: While democratization remains a long-term
objective and perhaps the only means of resolving the problems of
Rwanda and Burundi, our more immediate objective should be to develop
fairer power sharing mechanisms that protect minority rights and
assure greater stability. Thus, the need for judicial, military and
other reforms. A regional conference is necessary to focus high level
UNCLASSIFIED
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- 3 attention on the Great Lakes region and to secure the commitments
noted above. However, time will be needed to prepare for the
conference, and numerous follow on actions will be necessary. Rwanda
and Burundi are linked onbly up to a point, and we will want to
follow Rwanda and Burundi-specific tracks as well as a regional track
It may develop that we will need a Zaire or even a Tanzania track as
well.
-
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Drafted by: AF/C:DHeflin
8/16/95 ir 7-3139, SECC 6458
Cleared by: AF:PBushnell
AF:WTwaddell(subs)
AF/C:ARender(subs)
G:AJoyce(subs)
AF/RA:SFisher(subs)
DRL:CNix(subs)
PRM:WRada(subs)
IO:BBowie-Whitman(subs)
P:BNichols(subs)
PM:ALangland(info)
IO/pHO:GStettenbauer(subs)
UNCLASSIFIED
