Citation
Human Rights Watch - Home Page
May 1995
Vol. 7, No. 4
RWANDA/ZAIRE
Rearming with Impunity
International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
After a year in exile, the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide have
rebuilt their military infrastructure, largely in Zaire, and are
rearming themselves in preparation for a violent return to Rwanda.
Waging a campaign of terror and destabilization against the new
government in Kigali, they have vowed, in the words of one official of
the former Rwandan government, Col. Theoneste Bagasora, to wage a war
that will be long and full of dead people until the minority Tutsi are
finished and completely out of the country.
[6]1 Several members of the
international community, including France, Zaire and South Africa, have
actively aided and abetted this effort through a combination of direct
shipments of arms, facilitating such shipments from other sources, and
providing other forms of military assistance, including training.
This report, which is based on four months of field investigation in
central Africa, presents evidence of continuing arms shipments and
other forms of military assistance to the forces of the ousted Rwandan
government in Zaire. This assistance has continued despite an
international arms embargo on Rwanda, imposed by the United Nations in
May 1994, and despite the fact that the recipients are accused of the
gravest of crimes, the crime of genocide.
Human Rights Watch calls on the international community to strictly
enforce the existing arms embargo by placing United Nations monitors at
key airports in Zaire; to extend the mandate of the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to include the Rwandan refugee
camps in Zaire; and to disarm the armed forces and militias affiliated
with the ousted government of Rwanda in Zaire. Human Rights Watch also
calls on France, Zaire and South Africa to fully disclose the nature of
their military and security assistance and arms transfers to the ousted
Rwandan government, and to provide full information on training
activity, by their own military trainers and/or at their own military
bases, involving members of the ousted Rwandan government's armed
forces and militias.
Over a horrific period of three and a half months in the spring of
1994, hundreds of thousands of Rwandan men, women and children were
murdered during a violent campaign of genocide led by the Rwandan
government, armed forces and Hutu militias. The victims were mostly
Tutsi, as well as Hutu politicians and community leaders who had shown
a willingness to form a more democratic government that respected the
rights of all Rwandans.[7]2 At the height of the genocide, the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) renewed a military offensive against the
government in Kigali.[8]3 It succeeded in defeating the government
forces and winning control over the country by mid-July, thus
effectively halting the genocide. The defeated government and army, in
fear of retribution for the crimes committed, led a mass exodus of the
Hutu population into neighboring countries, causing a refugee crisis
unprecedented in scale and the speed in which it occurred. The
international community, which had shamefully stood by during the
height of the genocide, shifted into action only after waves of
refugees began sweeping across the border into Zaire in July 1994.
Among the refugee population were the bulk of those responsible for the
genocide.
Ensconced in refugee camps, primarily in eastern Zaire, the
perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide have regrouped, rebuilt their
military infrastructure, and succeeded in asserting their control over
the civilian population in most of the camps during the last year.[9]4
Acting with impunity, these forces rule over the refugee population
through intimidation and terror, effectively preventing the return of
refugees to their homes in Rwanda, while inducting fresh recruits into
the former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and militias.[10]5 Emboldened by
military assistance, including arms, from France and Zaire, among other
countries, they have openly declared their intent to return to Rwanda
and, in the words of one ex-FAR commander, Col. Musonera, "kill all
Tutsi who prevent us from returning."[11]6 Currently, the ex-FAR has an
estimated troop strength of 50,000 men in over a dozen camps, and has
brought the militias more tightly under its control.[12]7 These forces
have launched cross-border raids to destabilize the already precarious
situation in Rwanda and to obtain information and experience for a
future offensive against the current government in Kigali.[13]8 In
addition, the ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militias have aligned themselves
with Hutu militias from neighboring Burundi, inflaming an already tense
situation inside Burundi and threatening to regionalize the
conflict.[14]9
As they prepare to resume fighting, members of the ousted Rwandan
government, ex-FAR and militias continue to enjoy impunity from arrest
and prosecution for their alleged involvement in last year's genocide.
An international tribunal established to try Rwandans for genocide,
other crimes against humanity and war crimes in 1994 has yet to hand
down its first indictments. Rwanda's shattered judicial system is
ill-equipped to prosecute the estimated 30,000 people who clog the
country's jails on suspicion of participation in the killing.[15]10
This lack of accountability has meant the absence so far of an
effective deterrent to a resumption of the genocide, and has fueled the
political and military ambitions of former Rwandan officials and their
extremist Hutu followers. Undaunted by fear of prosecution, they hold
audiences with journalists,United Nations agency staff and
representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the camps
and towns of eastern Zaire, in the Zairian capital Kinshasa, and in
Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, to boldly justify their actions.[16]11
Some have traveled to foreign countries seeking assistance for their
military cause.[17]12 They have been disturbingly successful in this
endeavor.
The ex-FAR and militia auxiliaries have access to sufficient funds to
buy weapons on the open market. Most of Rwanda's hard currency and
financial assets were taken out of the country by officials of the rump
government and officers of the ex-FAR and militias when they fled the
country last summer. Additional money and assets in foreign countries
(including at least Kenya, Tanzania, Zaire and the Netherlands)
controlled by the ousted Rwandan government continue to be available to
its leadership in exile.[18]13 A racket in looted goods, including
Rwandan government vehicles, provides profit for the civilian and
military officials who fled Rwanda to Zaire.[19]14 Cash income
generation schemes run by former Rwandan civil and military authorities
both in the civilian refugee camps and local Zairian communities
provide for the maintenance and salaries of officers and troops.[20]15
The international arms embargo, imposed by the U.N. Security Council
against Rwanda on May 17, 1994, has presented the only nominal obstacle
to the ousted Rwandan government's quest for arms.[21]16 Theembargo has
not been actively enforced, however, and shipments of arms have reached
the ex-FAR in Zaire during the last year, mostly via the airport at
Goma in eastern Zaire. These military supplies have not only enlarged
the ex-FAR's stockpiles for future conflict but boosted its morale.
This report is based on a field investigation by a researcher of the
Human Rights Watch Arms Project in Rwanda, Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi
from November 1994 through March 1995.[22]17 Additional material was
collected in South Africa in January 1995. The researcher gained
regular access to former Rwandan government officials, military
commanders and bases, and was able to observe ex-FAR and militia
training.
On the basis of the evidence outlined below, we conclude that Zairian
forces close to president Mobutu Sese Seko have played a pivotal role
in facilitating the re-emergence as a powerful military force of those
directly implicated in the Rwandan genocide. Zaire has offered the
former Rwandan government armed forces and allied militias shelter and
protection, and rather than arresting those suspected of crimes pending
their indictment for trial by the International Tribunal, has permitted
them freedom of movement. In addition, the government of Zaire has
permitted its territory and facilities to be used as a conduit for
weapons supplies to the ex-FAR (detailed below), and private cargo
companies based in Zaire have acted under contracts with Zairian
officials to transport a large quantity of these weapons.
Zaire has a history of support for the ousted Rwandan leaders.
President Mobutu of Zaire and president Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda
were staunch allies, for example in their political struggles against
president Museveni of neighboring Uganda. Zaire sent troops into Rwanda
to aid the FAR in its fight against the RPF's invasion from Uganda in
1990, and helped train Habyarimana's newly-created Presidential Guard.
Following the ouster of the Rwandan government in July 1994, the
Zairian authorities have been on record as refusing to tolerate the
existence of any Rwandan government-in-exile in their territory, and
have proclaimed Zaire's "political neutrality" in the Rwandan civil
war.[23]18 Nevertheless, Human Rights Watch was able to interview
officials representing the Rwandan "government-in-exile," such as prime
minister Jean Kambanda, in Goma and Bukavu during the course of the
investigation, and officials of the Habyarimana government were still
declaring openly on April 26, 1995 that the "Rwandan
government-in-exile" was based in Zaire.[24]19
Behind Zaire stands France, a former colonial ruler in Africa that
continues to wield enormous economic, political and military power in
the continent. France was the main ally of the Habyarimana government
until July 1994. It sent in 300 troops to support the government after
the invasion by the RPF in October 1990 - a force later reduced to 170
soldiers - and provided military training to the FAR. In early 1993,
after a new offensive by the RPF, France increased its military
presence in Rwanda to 680 troops, ostensibly to "protect French
citizens and other foreigners," although French troops were seen
assisting theFAR in combat against the RPF.[25]20 Even after the
departure of French uniformed soldiers with the arrival of U.N. forces
in December 1993 (under the Arusha Accords), France continued to
provide training to the militias.[26]21 After the start of the genocide
on April 6, 1994, France dispatched 460 troops to evacuate its
citizens, but failed to take action against its allies who had launched
a genocidal rampage against the Tutsi population. Following the defeat
of the Habyarimana government in July 1994, France has continued to
support the ousted leaders in exile, as described below.
Other countries, like South Africa, the Seychelles and China, have also
either provided weapons support to the ex-FAR and militias, or have
facilitated the supply of arms from ostensibly private sources.
The descriptions of arms shipments provided in this report are not
exhaustive but merely indicative of the arms and ammunition which the
ousted Rwandan government forces in Zaire have received during the
post-embargo period of 1994-95.
Human Rights Watch holds that gross abusers of human rights should not
receive arms and other forms of military assistance. The international
community should in particular withhold any form of assistance to the
perpetrators of genocide. Certain allies of the ousted Rwandan
government, however, appear to have been guided more by geopolitical
and financial than by moral or legal considerations during the past
year. While public scrutiny and adverse international opinion may have
discouraged open foreign support of the ex-FAR, clandestine support has
continued. Some of the countries that had armed the Rwandan government
prior to the genocide and international arms embargo[27]22 now operate
through middlemen and rely on false end-user certificates to conceal
the final destination of weapons. While the indirect flow of arms to
the perpetrators of the genocide may have slowed their resupply, the
rapid re-militarization of the ex-FAR and militia that has taken place
underscores the abiding threat of a resumption of the genocide campaign
in Rwanda. Through this report, and the specific recommendations it
makes, Human Rights Watch seeks to contribute to further international
measures aimed at bringing the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide to
justice and thereby preventing a continuation of the bloodshed that
engulfed Rwanda in the spring of 1994.
II. THE ROLE OF FRANCE
Arms flows to the FAR were not suspended immediately by France after
the imposition of the arms embargo on May 17, 1994. Rather, they were
diverted to Goma airport in Zaire as an alternative to Rwanda's
capital, Kigali, where fighting between the FAR and the rebel RPF as
well as an international presence made continued shipments extremely
difficult. Some of the first arms shipments to arrive in Goma after May
17 were supplied to the FAR by the French government. Human Rights
Watch learned from airport personnel and local businessmen that five
shipments arrived in May and June containing artillery,machine guns,
assault rifles and ammunition provided by the French government.[28]23
These weapons were taken across the border into Rwanda by members of
the Zairian military and delivered to the FAR in Gisenyi.[29]24 The
French consul in Goma at the time, Jean-Claude Urbano, has justified
the five shipments as a fulfillment of contracts negotiated with the
government of Rwanda prior to the arms embargo.[30]25 In the view of
Human Rights Watch, these shipments constituted a clear violation of
the U.N.-imposed embargo, and are all the more to be condemned because
the recipients were carrying out a campaign of genocide at the time.
In an interview with the Human Rights Watch researcher, the French
consul also mentioned several other shipments of arms that arrived at
Goma airport for the FAR in the May to July period from sources other
than the French government.[31]26 Despite this, the government of
France is not known to have reported these shipments to the Committee
set up by the U.N. Security Council under Resolution 918 (1994).
In mid-June 1994, as the Rwandan government in Kigali was on the edge
of collapse, the French government announced plans to dispatch 2,500
troops to Rwanda for humanitarian purposes. On June 22, the U.N.
Security Council authorized the French intervention in Rwanda, called
"Operation Turquoise." The next day, an advance team of French combat
troops arrived in Goma and Bukavu to lay the groundwork for the French
intervention. Soon after, the French government, without prior U.N.
approval, declared its intention to carve out a "safe zone" in
southwestern Rwanda. It was to this zone that the rump government and
the majority of the Rwandan armed forces and militias retreated
following the fighting in Kigali and the RPF's military advance. Under
French protection, the FAR and militias were able to exert their
control over the vast population that was quartered in the safe
zone.[32]27 The rump government moved its radio station into the zone
where it continued without interference to incite Hutu to kill Tutsi in
its broadcasts.[33]28
For the duration of Operation Turquoise, the FAR continued to receive
weapons inside the French-controlled zone via Goma airport. Zairian
soldiers deployed in Goma at the time assisted in the
cross-borderdelivery of arms.[34]29 Some of these weapons arrived from
Kinshasa, the Zairian capital, apparently from Zairian stocks, while
others came from outside Zaire.[35]30 It is unlikely that the French
military authorities present in the zone, who conducted regular patrols
at the border post between Goma and Gisenyi, and had a continuous
presence at Goma airport, were not aware of these weapons entering the
safe zone. Yet the French authorities neither made an attempt to
interdict these shipments nor reported them to the Committee set up by
the Security Council under Resolution 918.
After the defeat of the Rwandan government and the subsequent refugee
exodus into Goma in mid-July, French military leaders told the United
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) that French troops had
disarmed the Rwandan forces crossing the border into Zaire and had
handed over their weapons to the Zairian authorities.[36]31 Given
French knowledge of ongoing Zairian arms support of the FAR, the French
decision to hand these weapons over to Zairian authorities was hardly
appropriate.
French forces began withdrawing from Rwanda in mid-August. Local
Rwandan gendarmes and administrators in the Cyangugu area of the
French-controlled zone have told Human Rights Watch that they had
arrested two prime suspects in the Rwandan genocide from that area,
known locally as "Prima" and "Sebastial," in addition to many others,
and handed them over into French custody during Operation Turquoise.
These authorities added that these detainees were then escorted into
Zaire in French vehicles as the French troops withdrew from Rwanda, and
were subsequently released.[37]32 In the Cyangugu as well as the
Gikongoro area of the French-controlled zone, UNAMIR officers claim to
have seen lists, prepared by French authorities in the zone, of persons
accused locally of genocide or other criminal activities, some of whom
had been detained. Departing French troops did not hand over these
lists to UNAMIR forces, however, and they released jailed prisoners
before U.N. replacements arrived to take over from French
command.[38]33
Moreover, Human Rights Watch was able to confirm that French forces
left behind at least one weapons cache in the Rwandan town of Kamembe
in the safe zone for militia and ex-FAR personnel who remained. Our
researcher viewed this cache in Kamembe, which contained over fifty
assault rifles and several machine guns, on two occasions in August and
September 1994, after having been informed of its existence by members
of the defeated Rwandan army and gendarmerie, as well as UNAMIR
officials.
According to U.N. officials, the French military flew key commanders,
including Col. Theoneste Bagasora and Interahamwe militia leader
Jean-Baptiste Gatete, and crack troops of the ex-FAR and militias out
of Goma to unidentified destinations on a series of flights between
July and September 1994.[39]34 HumanRights Watch has received
allegations that Hutu military and militia personnel continued to
receive military training at a French military facility in the Central
African Republic after the FAR's defeat.[40]35 Human Rights Watch
learned from Hutu leaders that on at least one occasion members of Hutu
militias from both Rwanda and Burundi traveled on an Air Cameroon
flight from Nairobi to Bangui, capital of the Central African Republic,
via Douala, Cameroon, between October 16 and 18, 1994, to receive
training from French forces there.[41]36 Based on evidence it had
acquired on its own, in late 1994 the government of Burundi asked the
governments of France and the Central African Republic for official
explanation of the kind of "education" being provided in the CAR to
young Hutu men known to have links to the Hutu militias.[42]37
III. THE ROLE OF ZAIRE
Zairian officials, including military chiefs, have played a key role
both in supplying arms and facilitating arms flows to the FAR, before
but also after the international community imposed an arms embargo
against Rwanda on May 17, 1994.[43]38 Some officials have openly
encouraged arms trafficking by private dealers through Zaire, generally
in return for kickbacks.[44]39
Cargo companies that are ostensibly private and that are either
registered or based in Zaire transport many of the weapons that are
being supplied covertly throughout Africa. Although some air transport
companies may have links with the clandestine agencies of other
countries, these companies operate under contract with Zairian
government officials and senior officers in the Armed Forces of Zaire
(FAZ), usually allied with president Mobutu, to transport the weapons
from locations in Europe or Africa to Zairian regional allies, like the
former government of Rwanda and UNITA.[45]40 According to company
owners and staff,company owners who refuse such contracts are
threatened with cancellation of their companies' registration,
confiscation of their assets, and even deportation. Pilots file false
flight plans, often listing fictitious destinations such as Swaziland,
Gabon, Libya and Nigeria, under pressure from contractual partners to
disguise the true origin or destination of arms cargo; staff at N'Djili
airport in Kinshasa are paid a minimum of $1,000 per flight by the
cargo companies to file these false flight plans. Pilots also supply
false cargo manifests - the documents describing the content of the
cargo.[46]41 The Zairian contracts enabling the covert arms shipments
constitute a form of indirect financial support for those procuring the
weapons.
Human Rights Watch has evidence of a number of cargo flights that
brought weapons into the Goma airport after the international community
imposed an arms embargo against Rwanda in May 1994; most of these
weapons were then delivered to the FAR in Gisenyi. Some of the planes
are known to have been registered in Zaire, Nigeria, Liberia and
Lebanon.[47]42 For example, one shipment in mid-June arrived on an
aircraft registered in Liberia, with a Belgian crew from Ostend, which
picked up arms in Libya, including artillery, ammunition and rifles
from old government stocks.
Several of these planes, which are registered as owned by private cargo
companies, were used in the same period to fly relief supplies into
Goma airport for international NGOs. In at least two instances verified
by Human Rights Watch, planes bearing the logos of NGOs alternately
delivered relief supplies and arms to Goma airport in May and June
1994. One of these NGOs, when confronted with the evidence, immediately
took steps to prevent a recurrence.[48]43
In one important shipment, two planes of Air Zaire, a Zairian state
company, flew weapons, reportedly antitank and fragmentation grenades,
as well as high-calibre ammunition, to Goma from the Seychelles on the
nights of June 16-17 and 18-19, 1994. These weapons were then
transferred to the FAR in Gisenyi. A Zairian government functionary
negotiated and accompanied the shipment from the Seychelles to
Zaire.[49]44 These weapons were part of a stockpile that the Seychelles
government had confiscated from a ship called The Malo. This ship was
intercepted by the Seychelles navy in March 1993, reportedly on charges
of illegally importing military arms and ammunition into the
country.[50]45 The shipment was consigned for Somalia, where an
international arms embargo was in place at the time. According to the
Seychelles minister of defense, James Michel, end-user certificates for
the shipment were provided by Zaire.[51]46 In this instance,end-user
certificates served to conceal the ultimate destination of the weapons
and provide a means of deniability for those involved in breaking the
arms embargo against Rwanda.
Another shipment facilitated by the government of Zaire around the same
time involved an American private arms dealer who allegedly was
previously involved in covert CIA operations in support of UNITA in
Angola, Fred Zeller. In an interview with the Human Rights Watch
researcher, Zeller claimed to have been authorized by the Rwandan
Central Bank to act as a middleman for an arms transfer from private
sources headquartered in Belgium to the FAR in Rwanda via Goma airport.
Zeller said he traveled to Belgium in May 1994 in the company of a
high-ranking military official in the Zairian Garde Civile (Civil
Guard); the government of Zaire issued end-user certificates for the
weapons. The shipment was aborted when Belgian authorities arrested
Zeller and three other Europeans involved in the deal on charges of
attempting to cash American Express traveler's checks that had
reportedly been stolen from the Rwandan Central Bank in Kigali.[52]47
In early July, three planeloads of weapons arrived at Goma airport from
the N'Djili airport in Kinshasa, the Zairian capital. The weapons were
carried by private cargo companies under contract with the FAZ, and
were accompanied by representatives of the FAR. Upon arrival in Goma,
the weapons were loaded onto trucks by Zairian troops and members of
the FAR, and taken across the border into Gisenyi. A fourth planeload
of arms arrived at Goma on July 17. The weapons from this shipment were
unloaded by Zairian soldiers and escorted by Zairian and Rwandan
soldiers to an unknown destination. According to eyewitnesses, the four
shipments included assault rifles, ammunition, mortars, grenades and
landmines, and derived from Zairian stocks.[53]48
In late July and August, four more planes landed at Goma carrying
weapons for the ex-FAR, according to eyewitnesses. The Boeing 707
planes carrying these weapons were not registered in Zaire, and the
origins of the weapons are not known. One shipment arrived on a
Lebanese-registered plane which on previous occasions also had carried
weapons for the ex-FAR. Ex-FAR officers and Zairian soldiers took
delivery of this particular shipment, though onward destination of
these weapons remains unclear.[54]49
Following the retreat of the FAR from Rwanda in mid-July, Zairian
troops made a public display of confiscating weapons from FAR soldiers
and militia members crossing into Zaire at the Gisenyi-Goma border. The
events were widely covered by the international media. By contrast, as
observed by Human Rights Watch, during later border crossings at Bukavu
in August, which took place mostly outside public view, Zairian troops
made no such effort. But even at Goma in July, not all the FAR's arms
were confiscated. A large number of Rwandan troops were allowed to
drive military vehicles and government buses into Zaire, carrying with
them not only military supplies but also goods looted from homes and
businesses during theirretreat. The ex-FAR and militias were able to
take this equipment and goods to the camps that were set up inside
Zaire.[55]50
A vast quantity of weapons confiscated by Zairian troops in July
remains unaccounted for by Zairian authorities, despite oral and
written inquiries by the U.N. and western governments as to their
whereabouts.[56]51 Human Rights Watch was able to obtain information
about the fate of some of these weapons. According to eyewitnesses, at
least one planeload of rifles was flown out of Goma to N'Djili airport
in Kinshasa in July, reportedly for onward shipment to Angola. These
same witnesses said the weapons were handed over to the rebel UNITA
movement that has been fighting a war against the Angolan
government.[57]52 According to Zairian military officers, one stock of
well-preserved weapons is stored and regularly oiled at a Zairian
military base in Goma.[58]53 In addition, many of the heavy weapons and
equipment that the ex-FAR had managed to bring across the border,
including French-made AML 60 and AML 90 armored cars, 120mm armored
mortar carriers, various anti-aircraft guns, rocket launchers,
howitzers, mortars and military trucks, have been kept in good
condition at a second Zairian military base near the center of Goma.
Human Rights Watch was able to view these weapons, and, during a series
of visits to the base in December 1994 and February 1995, witnessed how
ex-FAR soldiers were responsible for routine maintenance of these
weapons and military vehicles.
According to eyewitnesses, several planeloads of arms arrived at Goma
airport for the ex-FAR in February and March 1995. Human Rights Watch
is currently investigating the origins of these shipments and the
countries that enabled them to be made.[59]54
Zaire has not only assisted the ex-FAR in weapons procurement, but also
in setting up both military and civilian camps along the border with
Rwanda, enabling the ex-FAR to regroup and rebuild its military
infrastructure. In addition to the camps sheltering civilian refugees,
Human Rights Watch has identified five types of military camps in
eastern Zaire:
C Land in the North Kivu area was given to the former government of
Rwanda to serve as the military headquarters of the presidential guard
and other uniformed military units. The camp created there is known as
Lac Vert. Human Rights Watch was able to view grenade and ammunition
caches at the camp in December 1994.
C A Zairian army/gendarmerie base near Bukavu, Panzi camp, was given to
the ex-FAR and Interahamwe militias. At the camp, Human Rights Watch
was able to take a brief look into one building that contained a stock
of assault weapons during a visit in March 1995.
C In the South Kivu area, nearly eighty kilometers outside of Bukavu,
the ex-FAR and militias were permitted to set up a covert military
training camp known as Bilongue. Human Rights Watch was able to gain
admission to the camp and observe military training in March 1995.
C Further south in the Uvira region, the ex-FAR and militias, in
collaboration with Hutu militias from Burundi, administer and control
refugee camps recognized as "civilian" camps by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and local Zairian authorities, from
which they launch cross-border raids into both Rwanda and Burundi.
Human Rights Watch visited the camps of Kamanyola, Kanganiro, Lubarika,
Luvungi and Luberizi in the Uvira area in February and March 1995.
C Small guerrilla camps on Idjwi Island in Lake Kivu are used mainly to
train for and launch cross-border raids into Rwanda by commandos from
the other military and civilian camps.[60]55
Despite an agreement, in December 1994, between the UNHCR and local
Zairian civil authorities to consolidate camps in the Uvira region for
logistical and security reasons, the authorities in South Kivu have
insisted that certain clearly military camps near the borders with
Rwanda and Burundi be kept intact, despite clear evidence that they are
being used as launching pads for cross-border raids. For example, when
the UNHCR began consolidating camps in the Uvira area from twenty-six
down to eleven in December 1994, the local authorities insisted on
retaining those camps that were most militarized, such as Kamanyola,
which is only 800 meters from the border with Burundi and a few
kilometers from the border with Rwanda. Furthermore, the local
authorities tried to prevent a strong presence of U.N.-sponsored
Zairian troops in the Uvira area in February 1995, claiming that the
camps shelter not only Rwandans but also Burundians and fall therefore
outside the U.N. mandate.[61]56 The governor of South Kivu, Pasteur
Kyembwa wa Lumona, has appointed administrators in key militarized
"civilian" camps, who supervise these camps in cooperation with the
UNHCR. Militia members have told Human Rights Watch in interviews that
local Zairian authorities have permitted the ex-FAR and militias to
conduct political, military and propaganda activities in the camps as
long as these are kept out of the view of international relief workers.
According to local sources, Zairian civil and military authorities have
threatened local journalists and human rights activists in Goma and
Bukavu, warning them not to report on the activities of the ex-FAR and
militias, or the location of their camps.
Outside the camps, Zairian authorities have permitted full freedom of
movement to both uniformed and non-uniformed ex-FAR soldiers, who often
travel in former Rwandan government buses, and have provided them with
Zairian armed escorts, as Human Rights Watch was able to observe. In
addition, Zairian military and Garde Civile commanders have permitted
elements of the ex-FAR and militias to reside in and conduct training
exercises on some of Zaire's own military bases, both in the Kivu
region and farther into the interior.[62]57
IV. THE ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA
Prior to the international arms embargo, South Africa was one of the
main suppliers of arms to Rwanda.[63]58 After the embargo was imposed,
South African government officials who previously had coordinated arms
supplies to Rwanda helped to organize at least one shipment of arms to
the FAR. Colonel Theoneste Bagasora, a senior official in the Ministry
of Defense of the self-declared Rwandan government-in-exile, has stated
that he met with South African officials at the end of May and early
June 1994 to arrange further shipments of arms to the FAR.[64]59
According to Bagasora, the officials refused to consider direct South
African arms shipments in violation of the embargo, but offered to help
arrange shipments by other parties. Bagasora said that, following the
meeting, he, a Zairian government representative, and Willem Ehlers who
reportedly used to be an aide to the former president of South Africa,
P. W. Botha, flew to the Seychelles on June 4, where they negotiated
the purchase of arms for the FAR, which were subsequently flown to
Goma.[65]60
In February and March 1995, several planeloads of arms were flown
directly from South Africa to Zaire, arriving at an airstrip in the
Kivu region.[66]61 No further details on these shipments are available
at this time
V. THE ROLE OF CHINA
Rwanda's vice-president, Maj. Gen. Paul Kagame, paid a visit to China
at the end of March 1995, in part to dissuade the Chinese government
from selling arms to the ex-FAR via Zaire.[67]62 Kagame's visit
followed a few months after a visit to China by Agathe Kanziga, the
widow of the late president of Rwanda, Juvénal Habyarimana, and her
brother, Séraphim Rwabukumba, in October 1994.[68]63 News reports have
suggested that they placed orders for Kalashnikov rifles, grenades and
rocket-propelled grenade launchers to a total value of $5
million.[69]64 According to The Observer, a Chinese embassy official in
Kigali stated that China "would not discourage the provision of arms to
the Rwandan extremists if that was what the Zaire government was
planning," and that there was no international arms embargo against
Zaire. The paper quoted the official as saying that "China practises
the politics of allowing people to solve their own problems."[70]65
VI. MILITARY CAPACITY OF THE EX-FAR AND MILITIAS
Human Rights Watch has visited many of the ex-FAR and militia bases in
Zaire.[71]66 At the bases - and even in some of the civilian refugee
camps from which they also operate - the ex-FAR has managed to rebuild
its formal military structure since its arrival in Zaire. Military
ranks are recognized and military discipline is observed. Officers meet
regularly with troops to instruct and coordinate activities and issue
pay. In an important development, the militias have been brought more
fully under the command structure of the ex-FAR since October 1994. The
ex-FAR command maintains a direct link with the political establishment
through the self-declared government-in-exile's Ministry of Defense.
The ex-FAR also has an extensive communications network ranging from
walkie-talkies to radio stations. Human Rights Watch was able to see a
major communications center inside Lac Vert camp, near Goma.
The ex-FAR generally keeps its weapons out of public view, insisting
that its troops not carry weapons in the camps and towns, especially
around Goma and Bukavu which are frequented by international relief
workers. By contrast, in the Uvira region of eastern Zaire, which is
farther from the international public view, ex-FAR and militia members
often carry weapons openly in the camps. Human Rights Watch
haswitnessed training by the ex-FAR and Rwandan militias close to
civilian camps and inside military camps, as well as joint exercises
involving both Burundian and Rwandan militias in the Uvira area.
Essential services (food, water, blankets and tents) provided by the
international NGOs to the civilian camps have been pilfered by the
ex-FAR and militias for use at their own military bases. Human Rights
Watch has been able to ascertain that in at least two instances, in
Panzi and Lac Vert, the ex-FAR has kept children, including child
soldiers, on its military bases in order to retain access to NGO
assistance which would otherwise be denied their camps because of their
predominantly military character. In this way, some NGOs appear to be
contributing indirectly to the ex-FAR's attempt to rebuild its military
infrastructure. One international NGO, the relief agency Caritas
Internationalis, has continued to provide food supplies to two
explicitly military camps, Panzi and Bilongue; its staff in Bukavu
claimed that the organization does not wish to distinguish between
civilian and military recipients of its humanitarian aid.[72]67 Another
NGO, the Japanese-based Asian Volunteer Network, provides medical
treatment to sick and wounded soldiers at Panzi military camp, where it
runs a field hospital.[73]68
The ex-FAR also controls many predominantly civilian camps. Human
Rights Watch has observed especially how militias operating under
ex-FAR command have seized control of refugee camps in the Uvira region
with mixed Rwandan and Burundian populations. The militias in these
camps have taken control of food distribution, engage in theft, prevent
the repatriation of refugees through attacks and intimidation, carry
out vigilante killings and mutilations of persons suspected of crimes
or of disloyalty, restrict the movement of persons in and out of the
camps, recruit and train young men for incursions into Rwanda and
Burundi, and actively launch cross-border raids. The U.N. and NGO
community have tended to dismiss these raids as simple banditry. The
ex-FAR and militia officials we interviewed, however, claim that most
cross-border raids are carried out expressly to destabilize the
situation in Rwanda (and Burundi) by creating tensions in local
communities. Regardless of the precise purpose of the raids, they have
enabled the participants to carry out reconnaissance, gain experience
in guerrilla tactics, and steal cattle and other goods to finance the
military build-up.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the evidence collected by Human Rights Watch of continuing
transfers of weapons and other military support by members of the
international community to the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide -
transfers that have taken place in violation of the arms embargo
imposed by the U.N. Security Council in 1994 - Human Rights Watch makes
the following recommendations:
To the International Community:
- To strictly enforce the international arms embargo instituted against
Rwanda under Security Council Resolution 918 (1994) on May 17, 1994,
including the forces and supporters of the ousted Rwandan government,
and to deploy U.N. monitors at Kinshasa, Goma, Bukavu and Uvira
airports in Zaire for this purpose.
- To remove any doubt as to its meaning and scope of application, to
reaffirm Security Council Resolution 918, specifying that the arms
embargo applies to the former Rwandan government forces regardless of
where they are located.
- To enforce Security Council Resolution 978 (1995), which urges states
to "arrest and detain, in accordance with their national law and
relevant standards of international law, pending prosecution by the
International Tribunal for Rwanda or by the appropriate national
authorities, persons found within their territory against whom there is
sufficient evidence that they were responsible for acts within the
jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for Rwanda."
- To secure the necessary funds for the International Tribunal for
Rwanda to investigate and prosecute promptly those accused of directing
the genocide, and to request that the Secretary General of the U.N.
authorize funds for this purpose.
- To enlarge the presence of international observers in eastern Zaire
by increasing the staff of the UNHCR Civilian Security Liaison Group.
- To act to restore security in the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire so
that the rights of refugees are protected, including their right to
life and their right to return home safely and voluntarily.
Specifically, the Security Council must act immediately to extend
UNAMIR's mandate to include the Rwandan camps in Zaire, and to charge
UNAMIR with the task of separating the "government-in-exile's" military
and militias from the refugee population, and to disarm the ex-FAR and
militias. Moreover, to encourage the UNHCR and international aid
agencies to take effective control of relief distribution in the
civilian refugee camps.
- To make future bilateral and multilateral aid to Zaire contingent on
Zaire's full compliance with the international arms embargo against
Rwanda, the cessation of assistance to the ex-FAR, and the directive to
arrest those suspected of participation in the Rwandan genocide.
- To provide Tanzania with the resources to police the Rwandan refugee
camps in the Ngara district and patrol its borders with Rwanda and
Burundi, and to authorize Tanzanian troops to perform this task under
U.N. auspices (just as the U.N. has sponsored Zairian troops to police
the Rwandan camps in eastern Zaire).
- To cease and desist from doing business with cargo companies that are
known to be shipping arms to the ex-FAR as long as these companies
continue to accept contracts to transport arms to the ex-FAR.
To the Government of France:
- Fully to disclose the nature of French military and security
assistance and arms transfers to the Rwandan government after May 17,
1994, including following that government's departure from Rwanda in
July 1994, in light of the fact that such actions have supported a
force that is widely recognized as having committed genocide.
Specifically, but not exclusively, to provide full detail on the five
shipments to the FAR between May 17 and the end of June 1994, which
have been acknowledged by the former French consul in Goma, as well as
by local ex-patriate and Zairian businessmen employed by the French
government in Goma at the time.
- To make public information compiled during Operation Turquoise on the
FAR and Hutu militia composition and individual command
responsibilities, with a view to supporting the work of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda.
- To make public information on the number and nature of arms,
munitions and other military equipment held by the FAR and associated
militias that came under the control of French forces during Operation
Turquoise, and the final disposition of these weapons and equipment.
- To provide information on the precise whereabouts of light and heavy
weapons confiscated from Rwandan soldiers and militias at the Rwandan
border in 1994.
- To inform the international community about all training activity
involving members of the former Rwandan government armed forces and
associated militias by French military and security training teams,
either by trainers on detached duty or at French military bases in
Africa or in France itself. To provide information in particular on
training activities reportedly carried out by France at bases
maintained in the Central African Republic and Zaire between January
1994 and the present.
To the Government of Zaire:
- To end all assistance to the former government of Rwanda, the ex-FAR
and Rwandan Hutu militias, in light of the fact that such assistance
has buttressed a force that is widely recognized as having committed
genocide.
- Fully to disclose the nature of Zairian military assistance and arms
transfers to the Rwandan government after May 17, 1994, including
following that government's departure from Rwanda in July 1994.
- Fully to disclose the nature of the services it has provided enabling
the shipment of arms intended for the FAR/ex-FAR through Zaire after
May 17, 1994.
- To arrest and prosecute all persons in Zaire who are implicated in
arms transfers that are illegal under Zairian national law and
constitute clear violations of the U.N. arms embargo.
To the Government of South Africa:
- Fully to disclose the nature of South African military assistance and
arms transfers to the Rwandan government, including transactions
undertaken by Armscor, after May 17, 1994. This should include
transactions following that government's departure from Rwanda in July
1994, in light of the fact that such actions have supported a force
that is widely recognized as having committed genocide. Specifically
but not exclusively, to provide full detail on the shipment to the FAR
of weapons from the Seychelles in June 1994.
- To request the Cameron Commission to investigate the role of South
African government officials in the Seychelles arms deal of June 1994.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This report was written by Kathi L. Austin, director of the Africa
Project at the Institute for Policy Studies and a consultant to the
Human Rights Watch Arms Project. It was edited by Joost R. Hiltermann,
the director of the Arms Project, and reviewed by Alison DesForges,
Human Rights Watch consultant on Rwanda and Burundi. The report is
based on a field investigation by Ms. Austin in Rwanda, Zaire,
Tanzania, Burundi and South Africa from November 1994 through March
1995.
Human Rights Watch would like to thank Carole Collins and Peter
Rosenblum for reviewing drafts of the report. Human Rights Watch is,
however, solely responsible for its contents. Selamawit Demeke, Arms
Project associate, prepared the report for publication.
Human Rights Watch gratefully acknowledges funding from the Rockefeller
Foundation, New York.
Human Rights Watch Arms Project
Human Rights Watch is a nongovernmental organization established in
1978 to monitor and promote the observance of internationally
recognized human rights in Africa, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East
and among the signatories of the Helsinki accords. It is supported by
contributions from private individuals and foundations worldwide. It
accepts no government funds, directly or indirectly. Kenneth Roth is
the executive director; Cynthia Brown is the program director; Holly J.
Burkhalter is the advocacy director; Ann S. Johnson is the development
director; Gara LaMarche is the associate director: Juan E. Méndez is
general counsel; Susan Osnos is the communications director; and
Derrick Wong is the finance and administration director. Robert L.
Bernstein is the chair of the board and Adrian W. DeWind is vice chair.
Its Arms Project was established in 1992 to monitor and prevent arms
transfers to governments or organizations that commit gross violations
of internationally recognized human rights and the rules of war and
promote freedom of information regarding arms transfers worldwide.
Joost R. Hiltermann is the director; Stephen D. Goose is the program
director; Ann Peters is research associate; Kathleen A. Bleakley and
Ernst Jan Hogendoorn are research assistants; William M. Arkin is
consultant; Selamawit Demeke is associate.
[74]1 Interview with Col. Theoneste Bagasora, Counselor to the Minister
of Defense of the ousted government of Rwanda, and its chief arms
procurer, Goma, November 30, 1994.
[75]2 See Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Genocide in Rwanda, April-May
1994" vol. 6, no.4 (New York: May 1994).
[76]3 The Rwandan Patriotic Front was formed mainly from Rwandan exiles
in neighboring Uganda. Denied their right to return home, the RPF
launched a military invasion into northeastern Rwanda on October 1,
1990. Prior to the genocide, the RPF had signed a cease-fire document
and agreed to a political settlement based on the Arusha Accords of
August 1993.
[77]4 Members of the ousted Rwandan government, armed forces and
militias also reside in or travel for strategic reasons to refugee
camps in Tanzania and Burundi which are designated "civilian." However,
the key members of the ousted government and the largest number of army
and militia members, as well as their commanding officers, reside in
eastern Zaire because of assistance provided by sympathetic Zairian
civil and military authorities, as observed by Human Rights Watch over
the course of the field investigation.
[78]5 In this report, the FAR will be referred to as the "ex-FAR" in
the period after July 1994.
[79]6 Interview with Col. Musonera, Bukavu, March 4, 1995.
[80]7 This figure is based on estimates by international NGO and United
Nations staff, and observations by the Human Rights Watch researcher.
In 1990, the FAR had a troop strength of 5,000. Then, following the
invasion by the RPF from Uganda, new recruitment by the FAR assisted by
French training raised the number of troops to about 30,000. The
further increase to 50,000 in the camps in Zaire since July 1994 should
be credited to two factors: the incorporation of the Hutu militias into
the ex-FAR, and a vigorous recruitment drive among men implicated in
the genocide.
[81]8 See also Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Rwanda: A New Catastrophe?
Increased International Efforts Required to Punish Genocide and Prevent
Further Bloodshed," vol. 6, no. 12 (New York: December 1994).
[82]9 Based on observations by Human Rights Watch in eastern Zaire and
Burundi during the field investigation, and interviews with Rwandan and
Burundian political and militia leaders in Nairobi, February 1995.
[83]10 See Human Rights Watch/Africa, "The Aftermath of Genocide in
Rwanda: Absence of Prosecution, Continued Killings" (New York:
September 15, 1994); and Human Rights Watch/Africa and Fédération
Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme, "Rwanda: The Crisis
Continues," vol. 7, no. 1 (New York and Paris: April 1995).
[84]11 Despite a refusal by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) to meet with the "government-in-exile," UNHCR
officials do meet with some of its leaders, including those implicated
in the genocide, such as François Karera, the former prefect of greater
Kigali, who runs the Katale camp in the Goma area. (Based on
observations in Goma, November 29, 1994).
[85]12 Interviews with senior ex-FAR officials, including Gen. Augustin
Bizimungu, Gen. Kabiligi, and the chief arms procurer for the ex-FAR,
Col. Theoneste Bagasora, during the course of the field investigation.
[86]13 For example, the government that took over in Rwanda in July
1994 was not able to take possession of the Rwandan embassy in Kenya
until December 1994 (because of a delay in recognition of the new
government by Kenya), by which time all embassy assets had been removed
by members of the previous regime, including money in the embassy's
bank accounts. Interviews with Jacques Nziza, chargé d'affaires at the
Rwandan embassy in Kenya (until April 1995), Nairobi, February 3, 1995;
and with Cyprien Habimana, ambassador of the former government of
Rwanda to Kenya, Nairobi, February 4, 1995.
[87]14 As observed by Human Rights Watch and based on interviews with
Zairian military staff, as well as former Rwandan government and
military officials.
[88]15 Income generation schemes include, among others, the sale of
international relief supplies on the open market, taxi and bus
services, the sale of firewood and bamboo, and illegal trade in
wildlife.
[89]16 Paragraph 13 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 918 reads:
"...all States shall prevent the sale or supply to Rwanda by their
nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or
aircraft of arms and related matériel of all types, including weapons
and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police
equipment and spare parts..." (S/RES/918 (1994), 17 May 1994). In the
view of Human Rights Watch, the arms embargo "on Rwanda" applies to
both the current government of Rwanda and the former government, now in
exile in Zaire, Kenya and elsewhere. The embargo was intended as a
measure to stop the genocide in the spring of 1994. A subsequent change
of government should not, in the view of Human Rights Watch, mean that
the embargo would not apply to the "government-in-exile," especially in
light of the evidence that the ousted government is a fighting force
that has committed genocide and has vowed to resume its actions against
the Tutsi population in Rwanda at the earliest opportunity. In a later
resolution, Resolution 6025 of April 27, 1995, the Security Council
invited "States and organizations which have information on the
transport of arms into countries neighboring Rwanda for the purpose of
their use in Rwanda in contravention of resolution 918 (1994) to pass
that information to the Committee established under resolution 918
(1994) and requests that Committee to consider thatinformation as a
matter of urgency and to report thereon to the Security Council."
[90]17 The researcher spent two additional months in the same
countries, as well as Uganda, in a private capacity from August through
October 1994. Some of the interviews conducted during this period have
also been used for this report.
[91]18 As reported by Agence France Presse, April 26, 1995 (Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-AFR-95-081, April 27, 1995, p. 4).
[92]19 Ibid.
[93]20 Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade
and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War," vol. 6, no. 1 (New York:
January 1994), pp. 23-24.
[94]21 Rick Orth, "The Four Variables of Preventive Diplomacy:
Application in the Rwanda Case." Paper presented at the 14th annual
Africa Conference, The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies, Washington, D.C., April 7, 1995.
[95]22 Notably South Africa and France. See Human Rights Watch Arms
Project, "Arming Rwanda."
[96]23 Interviews with airport staff, local businessmen and air cargo
company crews over the period of the field investigation. The precise
dates of two of these shipments are known: May 25 and May 27, 1994.
[97]24 Interviews with airport staff, local businessmen, air cargo
company crews and Zairian officials over the period of the field
investigation.
[98]25 Interview with Jean-Claude Urbano, Goma, February 15, 1995. See
also Chris McGreal, "Paris Stands by as Arms Pour Through Eastern
Zaire," The Guardian (London), June 23, 1994.
[99]26 Interview, Jean-Claude Urbano, Goma, February 15, 1995.
According to Urbano, the weapons were of Israeli, South African and
Soviet manufacture. He also said that he was unaware of who had
supplied the weapons or had facilitated their transfer, but that they
"could have" come from private French arms dealers. Even private
transfers must, however, be licensed by the French government.
[100]27 France declared that, if necessary, it would use force against
any RPF encroachment on the zone. Raymond Bonner, "French Establish a
Base Inside Rwanda to Block Rebels," New York Times, July 5, 1994.
[101]28 Bruno Delaye, Chief Counselor on Africa to the French
Presidency, told Human Rights Watch/Africa in July 1994 that France was
willing to stop the broadcasts but was unable to locate the
transmitter. (Interview, Paris, July 1994). Human Rights Watch finds it
wholly unbelievable that the French military, which had full control
over the zone and had close relations with the FAR, was not in a
position to locate this radio transmitter.
[102]29 Interviews with airport staff, local businessmen, air cargo
company crews and Zairian officials over the period of the field
investigation.
[103]30 Interviews with airport staff, local businessmen, air cargo
company crews and Zairian officials over the period of the field
investigation.
[104]31 Interviews with UNAMIR officials, Kigali, November 1994 and
February and March 1995.
[105]32 Interviews in Kamembe, Gafunzo and Cyangugu, August 1994.
[106]33 Interviews with UNAMIR officials in Gikongoro and Cyangugu,
August 1994.
[107]34 Interviews with U.N. officials, August 1994 - March 1995.
[108]35 Interviews with former Rwandan government officials, ex-FAR
officers and militia leaders, as well as Burundian Hutu leaders,
Nairobi, February 1995, and Uvira and Bujumbura, March 1995. France
maintains a force of 1,200 soldiers, including paratroopers, in the
Central African Republic, divided over two bases, in Bangui and Bouar.
[109]36 Interviews with former Rwandan government officials, ex-FAR
officers and militia leaders, as well as Burundian Hutu leaders,
Nairobi, February 1995, and Uvira and Bujumbura, March 1995.
[110]37 Interview with officials at the Burundian Ministry of Defence,
Bujumbura, February 1995.
[111]38 Determining responsibility for such actions presents a problem
in the Zairian context. Various Zairian military units report to
different authorities in Zaire. Military divisions generally report to
regional commanders, who in turn report to the minister of defense, an
intimate of president Mobutu's. Elite divisions like the Garde Civile
(Civil Guard) and the Division Spéciale Présidentielle (Special
Presidential Division) report directly to military chiefs under
president Mobutu. Often troops must raise funds for their own salaries,
and for this purpose extort or steal from the local population with
impunity, or engage in illegal trade in arms. This has reduced
accountability of troops to the national authorities. Even if it may be
difficult for these reasons to pinpoint precise responsibility for
specific actions by the military, it is clear that ultimate
responsibility for such actions lies with the government of president
Mobutu.
[112]39 The Service National d'Intelligence et de Protection, SNIP, is
the Zairian secret police agency under president Mobutu's direct
control. In Goma, the SNIP agent responsible for immigration from
Rwanda, Danny Bimbo, has been a key player in facilitating arms
transfers to the ex-FAR from Goma airport. In an interview, Bimbo
claimed he had received a number of Rwandan government vehicles as
payment for his services. Interview, Goma, March 11, 1995.
[113]40 The companies operate under contracts with Zairian officials
and military commanders to carry any type of cargo over a certain
period. Cargo may include weapons.
[114]41 Interviews with cargo company staff and crews over the period
of the field investigation.
[115]42 One of the planes was registered in Rwanda until the
Hutu-controlled government was forced to flee the country in the summer
of 1994; it was then registered in Zaire. The information on the cargo
flights presented here is based on interviews with airport staff, local
businessmen, air cargo company staff and crews, the former French
consul in Goma and Zairian officials over the period of the field
investigation.
[116]43 Communication, Goma, February 13, 1995, as well as interviews
with NGO officials, Goma, February 1995.
[117]44 Interview with Col. Theoneste Bagasora of the ex-FAR, Goma,
February 15, 1995; and interview with Fred Zeller, Kinshasa, March 9,
1995.
[118]45 "The Seychelles: Merchants of Death," Indian Ocean Newsletter,
July 2, 1994.
[119]46 Telephone interview, January 26, 1995. According to Michel, the
FAR had paid $300,000 for this shipment of arms. Michel was also quoted
in the local press on this issue. "Pitiful Denial: Sale of Malo Arms,"
Regar (Seychelles), July 8, 1994.
[120]47 The four men were later released. Interview with Fred Zeller,
Kinshasa, March 9, 1995.
[121]48 Interviews with airport staff, local businessmen, air cargo
company crews and Zairian officials over the period of the field
investigation. According to these witnesses, the cargo plane carrying
arms on July 17 came under fire by the RPF as it took off for Kinshasa
later that day.
[122]49 Interviews with airport staff, local businessmen, air cargo
company crews and Zairian officials over the period of the field
investigation.
[123]50 As our researcher was able to observe, many of these looted
goods ended up in markets run by the ex-FAR in towns like Goma and
Bukavu. Interviews with officers of the FAZ and ex-FAR, as well as NGO
staff, Goma and Bukavu, November 1994 - March 1995.
[124]51 Interviews with U.N. officials in Kigali during the period of
the field investigation, and with United States embassy officials,
Kinshasa, March 9, 1995.
[125]52 Interviews with airport staff and air cargo company crews, Goma
and Kinshasa, February and March 1995.
[126]53 Interviews with Zairian military officers, Goma, December 1994
and February 1995.
[127]54 Interviews with airport staff, local businessmen and air cargo
company crews in Goma and Kigali, February and March 1995.
[128]55 This information was obtained from ex-FAR officers in Goma,
Bukavu and Uvira in December 1994 and February-March 1995, and was
confirmed by UNAMIR officials who said they had intercepted commandos
operating from Idjwi Island. Interviews, Kigali and Cyangugu,
February-March 1995.
[129]56 The reason why Zairian authorities in South Kivu want to limit
the deployment of Zairian troops operating under U.N. aegis in these
camps is that this would mean that international observers of the
Civilian Security Liaison Group of the UNHCR would then also be
deployed in greater numbers in these camps. As of April 27, 1995, all
1,500 members of the Contingent Zairois pour la Securité dans les Camps
(Zairian Contingent for Security in the Camps) had been deployed in six
camps and two command centers around Goma and Bukavu. Of the Civilian
Security Liaison Group, twenty-seven officers had been deployed in Goma
and Bukavu by that date. (UNHCR, "Internal Update on Rwanda-Burundi
Operations," May 3, 1995).
[130]57 According to Zairian commanders in Goma and Kinshasa, as well
as ex-FAR officers and Hutu militia members in Goma, Bukavu and Uvira,
interviewed over the period of the field investigation, several of
these bases are used to train other foreign troops as well, such as
"UNITA rebels" and "Sudanese government forces." This point has been
confirmed by expatriates with access to these bases, interviewed in
Goma and Kinshasa, February and March 1995.
[131]58 See Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "Arming Rwanda."
[132]59 Interview with Col. Theoneste Bagasora, Goma, February 15,
1995. These South African officials had been directly involved in the
procurement of arms for Rwanda prior to the U.N.-imposed embargo.
[133]60 Interview with Col. Bagasora, Goma, February 15, 1995.
[134]61 Interviews with airport staff, local businessmen and air cargo
company crews in Goma and Kinshasa, February and March 1995. Since
1993, Zaire has been on a South African Department of Foreign Affairs
list of countries to which the South African armaments industry is
forbidden by law to supply lethal weapons.
[135]62 Interview with an aide to Maj. Gen. Kagame, Kigali, March 29,
1995.
[136]63 Their visit coincided with a week-long official state visit to
China by president Mobutu of Zaire during which China and Zaire signed
an economic and technological agreement. (Xinhua news agency, Beijing,
October 21, 1994, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
FBIS-CHI-94-205, October 24, 1995, p. 24). In January 1995, China and
Zaire signed a cooperation agreement. (Reuters, January 20, 1995).
[137]64 "Bears Guard Honey," Africa Confidential, No. 228 (February 20,
1995). Séraphim Rwabukumba, along with Félicien Kabuga, reportedly is
one of the main financiers of Akazu, an group affiliated with the
Habyarimana family and its allies which has been involved in arms
purchases for the ex-FAR.
[138]65 Mark Hubbard, "UN Alert Urged as Arms Pour in for New Rwanda
War," The Observer (London), March 26, 1995.
[139]66 Unless noted otherwise, the information in this section is
based on observations by the Human Rights Watch researcher, and was
confirmed in interviews with ex-FAR and militia personnel, as well as
with UNHCR and NGO staff involved in the humanitarian relief effort in
eastern Zaire, during the period of the field investigation.
[140]67 Interview with a Caritas official, Bukavu, December 6, 1994, as
well as with staff of other NGOs active in the region. An official at
Caritas Internationalis headquarters in Rome defended his
organization's position by declaring that it had "no choice," because
no one else was prepared to feed these people, who included "former
soldiers and their families," and "they have to eat; they are not all
murderers." He also said that Caritas would feed these people only if
they came for food without their uniforms and their weapons. (Telephone
interview, May 17, 1995). According to Human Rights Watch's
observations, there are families only in Panzi camp, not in Bilongue.
In both camps, all the men wear uniforms (in Bilongue, all belong to
the ex-FAR; in Panzi, there are still militia members as well).
[141]68 Interview with Asian Volunteer Network staff, Bukavu, December
7, 1994, as well as with staff of other NGOs active in the region.
