http://www.contrast.org/truth/html/dulcie_september.html
The Case Of “Dulcie September”
The Truth Commission Files
[DS-report]
Date (murder): 29-03-1988;
Place: Paris (France)
Name Victim: Dulcie September (here called D.S.) Address Victim: Val-de-Marne, France
Sex Victim: F;
Age Victim: 45 years;
Mar.Status: unmarried;
Born: Cape Town (SA)
Position Victim: Chief representative of the ANC in France (and also of Switzerland and
Luxembourg). Arrived in Paris in 1983, head of the ANC Information Bureau in France
[Monde 31/3/88]
Information Victim:
Effective ANC representative (see Crime Motives); in France considered as a member of the
SACP ; Some of D.S.'s friends asserted that she knew she was being followed and threatened and
that she had asked the ministry for protection which was not accorded [Couret:32].
The interior minister Charles Pasqua stated that D.S. never made any request for
protection.[ION-326:2]. However, already in December 1987, the French seem to have been
informed by the Swiss authorities that South Africa was 'up to something', probably killing D.S.
They warned the SA-embassy in Bern (the only European capital where an SA-military attaché was
still permitted to be), that nothing must happen on Swiss soil. This information has been confirmed
by two sources in the Swiss 'Bundesanwaltschaft', but officially denied. The sources also said that
all western intelligence services knew about the SA-plans (FBI-warning Sept. 1987)[G&D;WoZ
31/3/89 & 24/4/92]. It isn't known why the French didn't do anything about it.
Perpetrator: X
Perpetrator Information:
1. SADF Sergeant-Major Joseph Klue [Pauw:208,281], who was positively identified by Godfrey
Motsepe (ANC rep Brussels) as the man who took a shot at him [Roth:47], some weeks before
D.S's murder (4/2/88). I (KdJ) doubt it, if Klue himself fired these shots. But he certainly could have
been involved. (see Notes *1)
Klue was also suspected to be involved in the assassination of D.S. After the attack on Godfrey, the
Belgian secret service informed their French colleagues about three involved SA-agents in
Brussels, one of them has a name that begins with 'K'.[G&D-doc]. The French didn't take any
action.
Josep Klue lives in the Cape (SA) where he seems to be the owner of an ostrich farm.
2. Dirk K. Stoffberg (see Notes *2), arms dealer and a SA agent, was also named as the head of
the 'Z-Squad Incorporated' operating in Europe [Pauw,1991:208]. Stoffberg always admitted to
knowing details of this case. He arrived in France two days before the assassination of D.S.
[Couret:32]. "Z-Squads Incorporated" is alleged to consist of professional highly trained hit men,
with virtually unlimited range of action and operational funds. Created by BOSS, perfected by NIS
[SS].
Later -not long before his death- Stoffberg told Jacques Pauw [Thorny:3; see also the SABC
documentary Guns for September] that "he gave the orders for assassination of the ANC's Dulcie
September (...). He said he paid two former members of the French Foreign Legion L 20 000 each
to kill the ANC's chief representative in France. And Stoffberg said he had no idea why she was to
be assassinated and presumed it was because she held a prominent position in the ANC.(...) He
activated (these) two hitmen through the Adler Group. (...) Intelligence about Dulcie September was
received from the SA Security Police who asked him to facilitate her assassination.
3. Jean-Dominique Taousson:
Some French journals (as "Le Monde" and "Libération") mentioned the involvement of Taousson.
According to the "Indian Ocean Newsletter" [ION-326:1], this Frenchman made name during the
Algerian war, when he was responsible for numerous attacks as a member of the "Delta
commandos" ( a death squad) of the underground anti-independence "Organisation de l'Armée
Secrète"(OAS).
This same newsletter revealed in an earlier issue in 1985 [ION-193] that the Paris bureau of
Pretoria's NIS had "received orders to organise attacks against missions of the ANC and the
South-West Africa People in France and elsewhere in Europe. For this purpose the NIS began to
form hit-squads (as did for example Stoffberg & Klue), recruiting among mercenaries, the security
services of extreme-right movement and veterans of the South African army's own 32nd Battalion,
many of whom were French." According to the ION [326] Taousson had been given the job leading
this recruiting campaign, as well as collecting full information on the targets. Taousson had
extremely good contacts with the European right-wing.
Taousson was bitterly opposed to the ANC: he had been the chief-editor of the pro-South African
newsletter 'Courrier Austral Parlementaire' (published by a Paris based organisation ADERI see
Notes *3). His newsletter was distributed to members of the European and French parliaments and
it was set up with help from the South African authorities. [AC ; Couret :31-32]. In 1981 Taousson
became the head of the photography service in the election campaign headquarters of the RPR, the
Gaullist party of Jacques Chirac and Charles Pasqua. These elections were lost, but in 1986 the
Chirac government took over. Shortly after these legislative elections of March 1986 Taousson was
appointed a technical adviser on the personal staff of interior minister Charles Pasqua, where he
was in charge of highly-sensitive matters like New Caledonia and relations with Algeria. [ION-326]
Taousson being opposed to the ANC having a representation in France, is said to have given 'strict
orders' to the relevant service not to renew Dulcie September's residence permit which would
expire in October 1987. However, DS succeeded in having it extended for a further year by applying
not to the authorities in Paris but to those in the suburban "département" of Val de Marne, whose
prefect had been appointed while the previous socialist administration was in power.(ION-326:1)
When French newspapers [G & D-doc: 5] wrote that Taousson had also been the recruiter for the
murder of Dulcie, he sued them with success. But it is known that DS was harassed from the
moment that the Pasqua government (1986) came into power in France: Taousson threatened DS
that she would be expelled if she wouldn't cease public activities and he had the new ANC-office
monitored [see Notes *4]. But, there is no evidence that Taousson him self has contacted people
for attacks on ANC. It seems unlikely, that a publicly known SA-propagandist working officially with
the French government, would be directly involved in an undercover-operation, but he certainly
plaid a role in the harassing of Dulcie on an official level and probably also passed on intelligence
information.
4. Heine Hüman (+/- 45), is allegedly a Swede of SA origin (or the other way round). He could be
an interesting witness. According "Vrije Weekblad" [VW] he said: "I helped to murder Dulcie"and
claimed to have participated in the planning of D.S.'s murder. Hüman told them that he had worked
for the Security Branch of the SAP (section A1: external security operations) and that he had
fetched Dulcie's hitman at Heathrow-airport. After Dirk Coetzee's revelations he got afraid and
contacted the Swedish Embassy in Harare (Zimbabwe). The Swede and his then 8 years old son
took refuge in the Nigerian Embassy in Harare on the 1st of Dec. 1989. ANC intelligence officers
interviewed him during this period. Hüman came to Sweden in the beginning of the 80's [Interview
Tor Sellström]. His name was later also mentioned in relationship with the murder of the Swedish
prime-minister Olof Palme [see Palme-case]. During the time of Palme's murder in 1986 Hüman
lived in a small place outside Uppsala (Sweden) where he had a car repair shop. Fourteen minutes
after the murder of Palme an elderly couple in Stockholm (Bromma) received a mysterious
phonecall with the message: "The job is done, Palme is dead". With the only difference of one digit
in the area code (Stockholm 08; Uppsala-area 018), their number corresponded to the number of a
telephone in a room of a clubhouse of which allegedly only Hüman had the key. Soon afterwards
Hüman left Sweden in a hurry, without saying goodbye to his neighbours. These neighbours, who
were interviewed by Swedish newspapers, said that there was a lot of funny business going on at
night at his place. Swedish journalist have tracked him down in Florida (USA) where he lives under
another name in a place outside Miamy where a lot of American ex-intelligence people are retired
too [Expressen 29/9/96:12-13]. Hüman denied any involvement in the assassination of Olof Palme
and didn't want to talk about his involvement with the murder of D.S..
5. Eeben Barlow (see Notes *5) seems at the time of DS's assassination to have headed the
CCB's Western Europe region. He operated out of Frankfurt (Germany). D.S. 's assassination was
according to Ellis almost certainly directed by Barlow as CCB desk officer for Europe.[Int.Ellis]
Eeben Barlow seems to deny this, although an informant told me that Barlow allegedly once
received an order to kill Dulcie September, but that his section refused because DS wasn't a
military target
6. Comoro-link ?? the Comoros were effectively run by mercenaries in close alliance with France
and South Africa:
a) According to 'Actuel' (French investigative magazine) the assassination of D.S. was personally
set up by a French mercenary, Capt. J.P. Dessales, who later served in the Comoros (as a member
of the presidential guard) with Col. Bob Denard [WA].
b) In the beginning of 1988, an ex-Rhodesian mercenary based in Paris, goes to the Comoro
Islands to undergo some kind of training for 'special operations'. There is talk about more mercs
going the same way. [G&D-doc]
c) A much more complete picture about the Comoros-link is given in the official French document
"Ordonnance de Non-Lieu" [Non-Lieu]. According to this document, the French police (Brigade
Criminelle) suspected at a certain moment that a French mercenary, named Richard Rouget
could have plaid a role in DS's murder, but no hard evidence could be produced to arrest neither
him nor other members of his group who alledgely had been working for the South Africans .This
Rouget directed a group doing reconnaissance missions on the ANC in Europe. [Notes *6]
7. ?? Pitha Assesso, Angolan (self-declared president of the PDLA) and a draft-resisting South
African refugee (Martijn van Geems) were arrested for the murder of D.S. together with their
partners All were released the following day.[SS; Monde, 9-10/4/88]. False track!
8. ?? Italian link: involvement of Mario Ricci, former confidante of Seychelles president Albert
René. Ricci now lives in SA where he has a business partnership with former SA superspy, Craig
Williamson [TB]. Ricci ran Italian mercenaries at the Seychelles [G&D]. It was said that Ricci was
linked to GAL also [G&D-doc], but this is probably a false track [TB].
Crime Activity:
Five bullets from a .22-calibre weapon (22 Long Rifle, with a silencer or "canon lisse" ) hit D.S. in
the head as she stood, mail in hand, opening up the ANC office. Time: between 09.45 and 10.00 h.
28 Address: Rue des Petites-Ecuries, 4th floor, Paris-10)"[Pauw:207]. Work of professionals,
probably silencer used (nobody heard anything) [Breyten; Pauw:207; Non-Lieu:2].
Crime Result: murder
Crime Motives:
1. Answer probably related to military links between France and RSA (Armscor particularly)
[Notes *7]. France important illicit supplier of essential parts and materials to Armscor. Fact that
France almost alone of major western European countries had no powerful anti-apartheid
movement facilitated these clandestine links. There were signs that September was putting together
an effective anti-apartheid lobby. Thus a threat; thus a hit [Ellis].
The reality was probably a bit more complex:
From Oct.1986 - Sept.1987 the Albertini affair dominated the diplomatic relationship between
France and South Africa. Pierre André Albertini worked in South Africa (as part of the French
Government's Foreign Exchange Programma) where he was employed as a lecturer in French at
Ciskei's University of Fort Hare. He became politically involved and was imprisoned for
collaboration with the ANC. President Mitterrand didn't want to accept the credentials of SA's new
Ambassador to France before Albertini had been released from his Ciskei prison and allowed to
return home. To improve the relationship between the two countries negotiations were initiated with
a prisoner swap in mind (especially between the SA captain Wynand Du Toit, caught during an
commando action in Angola, and Albertini).
The main negotiator became the French businessman Jean-Yves Ollivier, a representative of
Thomson-CSF (electronics), the French arms-company. Ollivier admitted that he did it "because I
have business interests in the region (...)" [Soule:284]. This matches with what Craig Williamson
told an investigative journalist [E.G.] that during the 1987 negotiations about this case
(l'opération "Condor") also some weapon deals were settled. This was also confirmed by
French investigators. Ollivier worked especially through some senior officers in the SADF
[Glaser:154; Soule:285] and had the support of Defence Minister Magnus Malan and General
Jannie Geldenhuys (Chief of the SADF). He also became well accepted by the new goverment,
as can be deduced from the fact that Ollivier got decorated by President Mandela. According to this
investigative journalist Dulcie September probably heard something about these weapon
transactions from somebody inside a French arms industry (we don't know who, yet). Just before
her death she phoned Aziz Pahad (then ANC-HQ and the actual SA deputy minister of Foreign
Affairs) in London, asking him to come to Paris for a very sensitive matter. Aziz thought that
Dulcie "had stumbled on something nuclear". Dulcie had also said that she feared for her
life.[E.G.]
We have to remember that since 1986 the arms-trade between SA/ Armscor and France
became privatised and continued only in clandestinity through arms dealers (see for
example the "Blowpipe" scandal).
Antoine Glaser, a French investigator and co-author of the books Ces Messieurs Afrique (I and II)
wrote about Operation Condor and the persons involved: Besides Ollivier himself, there was his
assistant, a French former para colonel and former head of "service action" of the DGSE Jacques
Rigault (who wrote a book called Démantèlement de l'apartheid). Ollivier was also helped by the
experienced French diplomat Fernand Wibaux (member of the Africa network of Jacques Chirac &
Jacques Foccart).
Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, the son of the French president (nickname "papamadit") who headed
his father's Africa-network didn't know about the whole negotiation process until it was finished,
although he was the President's main adviser for African Affairs [Gaillard:326]. Later
Jean-Christophe befriended Ollivier and they became very close [Gaillard:326]. Another person
mentioned as somebody who could have been linked to this whole affair, was Alain Guenon
(Notes*8).
According to Glaser (discussion Dec.1996) was Pasqua's Africa-network probably also involved in
these arms deals. Pasqua, at the time of DS murder minister of interior, ran an important political
and economical Africa-network, in which public and private interests are closely entangled. Pasqua
Pasqua managed to turn the "Service de Coopération Technique Internationale de la Police"
(SCTIP= Department of international technical development-aid of the Police) into his own private
department, completely devoted to him. This department is known to have organised some strange
deals and some of its members were accused to have killed some French development workers
[Dossiers:27-28].
During the period 1987-88 some secret top-level summits took place between French and
South African intelligence chiefs: General François Mermet (director of the French DGSE
Secret Service) , General René Imbot and the French diplomat and Africa specialist Fernand
Wibaux had a meeting with General C.J. van Tonder (head of the South African Directorate
of Military Intelligence/DMI) in June 1988. Before that -on the 9/10/87- Pik Botha, SA minister
of Foreign Affairs, had visited Paris to see members of the Chirac government (President
Mitterrand didn't know about its) and again on March the 12th of 1988 (in transit at Rossy)
where he met Fernand Wibaux and Jean-Yves Ollivier [CE].
Although there have been suggestions that members of the French secret service were
directly involved in the murder of Dulcie September and especially some belonging to
Pasqua's network (see Jean Taousson above), Glaser doesn't think that the French they
themselves planned or executed this murder. More probably they created in 1988 some
space for SA agents to eliminate DS, as a kind of spin-off of the ongoing weapendeals. But
they probably lend a helping hand (surveillance etc.).
2. ?? Part of "The fifth phase (+/- early 1985 - first quarter of 1988) of South African's regional
policy (...) marked by increased activity of death squads." See:Alby Sachs, Godfrey Motsepe etc.
(Pauw,1991:207]. Like was said before, in August 1985 the Indian Ocean Newsletter (ION-193)
revealed that the Paris bureau of Pretoria's National Intelligence Service, which had a staff of ten
and was headed by a woman (WHO??), had "received orders to organize attacks against missions
of the ANC and SWAPO in France and elsewhere in Europe. For this purpose the NIS began to
form hit-squads, recruiting among mercenaries, the security services of extreme-right movements
and veterans of its own army. Those operations planned in 1985 had to take place in early 1986.
[ION-326:1]. Apparently DGSE (French intelligence) stopped it then, but in 1988 the
1986-scenario was used. [G&D-doc]
3. ?? The killing of D.S. was an 'internal struggle' within the ANC. Opinion stated by the French
minister M. Robert Pandraud (ministre délegué chargé de sécurité) [Monde 3-4/4/88] and by the SA
Minister of Information Stoffel van der Merwe [WoZ:15/4/88] and Pik Botha (SA minister of foreign
affairs)[Boon 13/4/88]. D.S. was a turned South African double agent, and therefore "liquidated by
the militant communist faction of the ANC" [SS]. False track: smear campaign.
4. ?? D.S. could in no way be described as a 'military target'. Though a very active militant, her
effectiveness was often doubtful, although much better than that of her two successor (among them
Solly Smith, see Notes *9 ) . DS seems to have restricted her contacts and connections entirely to
French communists. The CP newspaper l'Humanité (31-1-88) wrote: "in killing her, the South
African secret services have also struck at France's communists. " "For this reason the theory
cannot be ruled out that this murder, arranged as it was by an extremist faction in South African
intelligence, was intended to sabotage the beginnings of a thaw which had begun to appear in the
relations between Pretoria and Moscow" [Breyten; ION-326:2]
Chain of Command:
Must have been cleared at very high levels: SSC or Min.of Def. Malan. Stephen Ellis [Int.Ellis]
believed such an operation in a major western European capital had to be cleared at very
high levels; at least SSC or Ministry of Defence (then Malan). If so, this assassination was
almost certainly directed by Eeben Barlow, according to Ellis at that time the CCB desk
officer for Europe (Notes-3). General Marius Oelschig, as a Senior Military Representative
must have had some knowledge of this affair.
Witness: Mr. De Crepy [Non-Lieu:2]
Witness Information:
Mr. De Crepy (commercial agent) was the only person who saw at about 09H45 two men (whites)
of about 40 years old, coming down the staircase and leaving the building where the ANC had its
office [G&D; Non-Lieu: 2]. De Crepy confronted with photographs of Klue (see later) and Rouget
(see later) didn't recognice none of these two as one of the two men he had seen.
Notes:
*1. Joseph Klue [see photo; Black ; Kent]: Klue, a warrant officer in the SA security police, was a
member of the South African Embassy in London ( under Ambassador Marais Steyn) from August
1980 until 1982. He wasn't mentioned in the official Diplomatic List. As a SA spy he tried to enlist
ex-British soldiers for the SADF in Namibia and to gather information about black activists of the
ANC, PAC and SWAPO. When the British government threatened to expel him for "activities
incompatible with his office" , he was recalled to Pretoria. Klue was named in an Old Bailey trial in
London in connection with a plot to burgle the offices of black nationalist movements in Britain and
steal documents from them [Pauw:208]. In London he seem to have been the assistant of Colonel
C. van Niekerk, then the armed forces attaché who would become, as a General the MID's chief of
operation in France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Benelux countries [WA]. At the time of DS's
murder, it was however General Marius Oelschig who had MI responsibility for France and
Belgium [CV Oelschig]. The Belgian intelligence identified Joseph Klue as the person who shot at
the ANC representative in Brussels, Godfrey Motsepe. Klue could be also involved in the
assassination of D.S. [Intel/PP 88 07]. Belgian authorities issued an international warrant for the
arrest of Klue [Pauw:208]. KdJ: The TRC should ask the Belgians to handover his file.
*2. Dirk K. Stoffberg: South African spy; when questioned by British security officers at London's
Heathrow Airport a list of ANC names had been found.[Pauw:208]. He lived from Dec. 1987 until
July 1988 in Germany (Frankfurt). Later in Luzern (Switzerland). Was mentioned as the head of the
Z-Squad operating in Europe. Although Stoffberg said "Our job was to do the things that the (SA)
government could not be seen to be doing", he denied long time to be the head of a SA'n hit-squad
or to be responsible for the assassination of D.S.[Roth:56,61]. Stoffberg told Roth [61] that "my
people in Johannesburg were responsible for the murder of D.S." He admitted to work for the NIS
and claimed responsibility for the murder of Ruth First in Mozambique [Roth:61]. Stoffberg worked
in Frankfurt as an arms dealer (through "ABComputers and Electronics", an Iranian company and
entertained relations with "Teiger Handels AG" -in St. Gallen, Switzerlandand the "Iran International
Trading Company" in Johannesburg)[Roth:54]. In Switzerland (Luzern) Stoffberg was an authorized
representative of the "Atlantic Bankers Corporation" in Atlanta/USA, an CIA front company.
[Roth:40]. Stoffberg admitted to know Joseph Klue [Roth:67]
*3 ADERI: This "Association for Development of Exchanges and International Relations" in
Paris was an important base of the international right-wing [SS]. Besides the publisher of the
pro-South African (and pro-Unita) newsletter, the "Courrier Austral Parlementaire", ADERI
organized via Christian Morritz a course for UNITA-cadres at Cercottes in France: the headquarters
of the 'Action Service of the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure' (DGSE) secret service.
These UNITA cadres have been trained in sabotage.[AC]
This newsletter was mentioned during the "Muldergate" affair in the late 70s and ADERI was linked
to Stratcom, the SA State Security Council arm specialized in intelligence gathering and dirty tricks
as assassinations, bombings and propaganda against the ANC. ADERI functioned as a SA front
company for Radar (SA Foreign Affairs project no. 319), one of Starcom's special projects in
Europe, set up to boost SA's image. ADERI's chief was Mr. Leon Delbecque, who like Taousson
had headed one of the Delta death squads during the war in Algeria.
*4 Concerning the surveillance of DS and the ANC-Office in Paris by French or/and South
Africans, it could be useful to go deeper into the activities of two companies which were housed in
the same building [information EG]:
- "Sport Eco" an office of a journal about sports articles, at the time at the same floor and next to
Dulcie's ANC-office in Rue des Petites Ecuries 28. Sport Eco occupied this office at the same day
(1/8/85) as the ANC did and it moved out a short time after DS's murder. Its editor in chief was
Pierre Cazeel, who worked previously as an Africa-specialist at "Radio France Internationale"(well
known for its contacts with the French secret service). Cazeel seems to have discovered DS's body
the morning of the murder and he was present when the police arrived.
- Company Donati (house painters from Paris, Rueil): their painters worked in the building during
the period Dulcie was murdered. Especially the whereabouts of two out of 4 painters: Daniel
Storelli (an Italian with a Swiss passport) and Stephane.
*5. Eeben Barlow: was member 32 battalion; served in Namibia; worked in the office DCC
(Directorate of Covert Collection), an MI agency; later run Executive Outcomes/EO, which generally
works from Pretoria, although EO has a presence in England (mansion Hampshire/UK); EO
originally set up as a CCB front company [Ellis].
*6 In the 70s François Richard Rouget (or Sanders) had been active in extreme right-wing
movements like GUD ("Groupe Union Défense", a student union) and PFN ("Parti des Forces
Nouvelles"). Without completing his studies he entered the French Army. He left the army in 1984
with the rank of warrent officer ("sous lieutenant"). In Juin 1985 Rouget became, under the alias of
Sanders , a mercenary officer of Bob Denard's Comorian Presidential Guard. January 1987 he
went to live in South Africa where he worked as a representative for two French companies: Essor
Ingineering (address at the time of the head office of the " Société Essor International
Ingenerie"/SEII in France: 51 Quay de Valmy, Paris 10; the actual address of SEII seems to be: 63
Blvd. du Marechal Joffre, 92340 Bourg La Reine, France; tel. +33.1.40 91 12 47,
fax: +33.1.46 83 95 85) and E.A. Export, ("Europe Afrique Export"; head office in France: 3 rue du
Faubourg Saint-Honoré, Paris 8). In both companies his business partners and friends were two
former mercenary officers of the above mentioned Presidential Guard: Jean-Claude Cabanac
(alias "Barjac") of SEII and Christophe Chabassol at "Eurosept Associés", of which E.A. Export was
a branch. Rouget travelled frequently between South Africa and Europe, making visits to places
like Basel & Zürich; Lyon & Paris; Brussels and London. officially concerning the export of steel to
SA
Some background [Weinberg]: In 1978 the French mercenary Bob Denard established himself with
a group of mercenaries in the Comoros where he became the head of the Guard of President
Abdallah. Since September 1979 Denard worked not only with French secret services who had
always backed him and monitored his activities, but also with South African agents. SA military
intelligence and foreign affairs decided to start funding and training the Denard's PG in return to the
permission to set up a secret listening station on the islands. A handful of SA agents slipped into
the country and blended in with the Presidential Guard. Their job was to keep an ear on what was
happening in the important ANC bases in Lusaka and Dar-es-Salaam and to monitor the war in
Mozambique, in which SA was playing an active role. The Comoros were also used as a base for
"sanctions-busting", particularly in arms. When in 1981 François Mitterrand was elected president
Denard lost the support of the French intelligence service, but he managed to strengthen the link
between SA and the Comoros. Between 1982 and 1989 the SA department of foreign affairs
channelled through the Presidential Guard around R40 million in this country. Besides the Guard,
Denard established his own company SOGECOM, which was in both the security and building
business. He seemed to have made a lot of money. In 1985 Denard tried to raise the quality of the
"European officers" ( also the year Rouget had been recruited) but without much sucess. During
the period 1985-87 the relationship of the PG with the majority of Comorians became worse. At the
end of the 1980s the SAns didn't want to continue to prop up a mercenary regime and France also
wanted to get rid of the mercenaries. Finally, also President Abdallah wanted the mercenaries to
leave. Their response was a coup and the death of President Abdallah in which Bob Denard and
his men were involved. SA suspended further assistance to the PG and all other forms of
co-operation. The SA and the French government forced Denard and his mercenaries to leave the
islands in 1989.
Taking into account the close relationships between the Comorian Presidential Guard and the
South African intelligence services (MI), one can imagine that former mercenary officers as Rouget,
Cabanac and Chabassol started working for South Africa, although officially being linked to French
companies (or were these perhaps also SA front companies?) as Essor Ingineering and E.A.
Export.
This fits in with the information that Rouget allegedly directed a group doing reconnaissance
missions on the ANC in Europe. [Non-Lieu:5]. The head of his group in Europe was Victor Paul
Tramond. [Non-Lieu:7]. The liaison agent would have been Antonia Lucienne Soton, once Rouget's
lover, and a former militant of the right wing movements "Ocident" and "Jeune Europe".
[Non-Lieu:6]. Paul Tramond (or "Victor") is an alias for Tran-Thuy Tuong born in Saigon (Vietnam)
and a former militant of GUD, where he met Rouget in 1976 at the faculty of Assas in Paris. During
the period 1985-87 he lived under the name Paul Tramond in Brussels, where he worked until
December as a receptionist in Hotel Sheraton. The 22/12/87 he established himself in France with
his girlfriend, a Belgian woman named Anne Lejeune who had found a job in France (address: 7
allée de Longchamp, Suresnes (92), tel. 40.99.05.98) [Non-Lieu:7]. According to information of the
Belgian authorities Rouget staid two times at Sheraton in Brussels: the night of 6-7/12/87 and of
15-16/2/88 . This first "fiche d'hôtel" had been signed by Tramond, the only proof that Rouget and
Tramond have met at least once [Non-Lieu:8].
At the time of the attempted attack on Motsepe (4/2/88) and the murder of DS (29/3/88), Rouget
declared to have staid in South Africa. This could never been verified. However, Mrs. Soton told
the police that she was with Rouget in the Comoros until the 29/2/88, the date of DS's murder...
*7. Other murders in the 80's who could have been linked with weapon deals were the one of the
Norwegian diplomat Ole Dørum (Geneva, September 1987) and the murders of Anton Lubowski
(Windhoek, September 1989) and David Webster (South Africa) [see EG].
*8. A good friend of Jean Yves Ollivier is another Frenchman Allain Guenon [EG; Smith]. He is a
businessman, a former lecturer in philosophy at the University Sorbonne (Paris), who lived since
1984 in South Africa where he established himself as a TV producer. He befriended the Namibian
lawyer Anton Lobowski and Winnie Mandela. Later, as a representative of several big French
companies in SA, as for example Sagem (specialized in military and professional electronics),
ELF-Aquitaine (petrol/chemistry) and Spie-Batignolle (linked to the construction of the infrastructure
of Koeberg) he got to know Tokyo Sexwale well and Sivule Xhayiya also, for whom he arranged a
visit to France (April 1991), paid by Sagem. More and more he became an important middleman
between certain French business circles (especially the weapon industry) and the South African
Government. Guenon became a good friend as well of the old regime (he knew Magnus Malan well)
as of the new one. Guenon seems to have had a good relationship with the Mitterrand-family.
Guenon is suspected to be a French spy and/or a spy for the apartheid-regime. The Weekly Mail
linked Guenon to the murder of Anton Lubowski.
*9. Solly Smith (real name Samuel Khunyeli), who succeeded D.S. was according to French
informants not very effective: often drunk and not dedicated at all. According to the French lawyer
who dealt with the DS case, Solly Smith was rather hampering the investigation than helping to
resolve the murder case [Int. Dreyfus]. Smith whose loyalities were questioned since 1988 and who
confessed in 1991 to spying for the SA security services [Stober] was perhaps not the best person
to stimulate further investigations in the DS case.
Amsterdam July 97
Sources:
Persons interviewed:
- PA Albertini (see above)
- A. Bouillon (AAM)
- M. Cukierman (AFASPA)
- JB Curiel (PS)
- M. Délaever (PCF)
- A. Glaser (ION)
- M. Omet (CGT)
- J. Tillerson (former secretary of DS)
- N. Dreyfus (lawyer)
Articles, letters and documents:
a) official documents:
- Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris - Cabinet de Mme Forkel (Juge d'Instruction): Ordonnance
de Non-Lieu; Réf. générale No. P 88 102 2006/3; Réf. du cabinet no. 629. Paris 17/7/1992. (
Official declaration concerning the murder of Dulcie September with a summary of the results of the
investigation, concluding that no sufficient evidence was found to take suspects into custody)
[Non-Lieu]
b) other documents
- AC 29-07-88 Pointers. Angola: UNITA in France.[AC]
- Boon, Rudi:'Ik kan best de volgende zijn. Frikties binnen het ANC, heet het dan', De Groene
Amsterdammer 13-04-1988 [Boon]
- Black, Ian: "Britain exposes South African spy chief. Kicked Out", Daily Express 16/12/82
(about J. Klue) [Black]
- Breytenbach, Breyten:'Hoekom Dulcie?' in: Die Suid-Afrikaan, aug.1988 p.49 [Breyten]
- Le Canard Enchaîné, 6/4/88 [CE]
- The Citizen: "Police killed ANC's Dulcie - Coetzee" 1/10/96:1-2 [Cit]
- Couret, Bernard: 'Les tueurs de Botha', Africa International no. 206 -juin 1988. pp.31-32 [Couret]
- Daniel, John: Notes on the CCB and Vlakplaas based on a Discussion with Stephen Ellis,
Amsterdam, June 13,1996 with corrections/additions from Stephen Ellis [Int.Ellis]
- Document 'Godfrey & Dulcie'[G&D-doc]
- EG (investigative journalist): confidential letter of 21/10/96 about the murders of Dulcie
September, Anton Lubowski and David Webster [EG]
- Le Figaro 30/3/88; 31/3/88; 5/4/88 [Fig]
- Gevisser, Mark & Brümmer, Stefaans: "Spying row at SABC", The Weekly Mail & Guardian,
20-26/1/95 (about Stoffberg) [Gevisser]
- L'Humanité 30/3/88; 9/4/88 [Huma]
- The Indian Ocean Newsletter, no. 193 August 3, 1985 [ION-193]
- The Indian Ocean Newsletter: "Spotlight, South Africa: Pretoria's handiwork", no. 326 April 2 1988
pp.1-2 [ION-326]
- Intel/PP: 88-05 (12-14); 88-07; 88-08 (104)[Intel].
- Kent, Peter & Black, Ian: "Secret army of spy who lured British troops", Daily Express, 17/12/82
(about J. Klue) [Kent]
- Krop, Pascal: "Qui protège les tueurs < Z > ? L'Afrique du Sud bénéficie d'étranges complicités à
Paris. Jusqu'au cabinet de Charles Pasqua." L'Evenement du Jeudi, 7-13/4/88:56 [Krop]
- Libération: 30/3/88; 31/3/88; 1/4/88; 5/4/88; 6/4/88; 7/4/88; 8/4/88; 9-10/4/88; 11/4/88 [Lib]
- Le Monde: 30/3/88; 31/3/88; 1/4/88; 2/4/88; 3-4/4/88; 5/4/88; 6/4/88; 7/4/88; 8/4/88; 9/4/88;
10-11/4/88; 12/4/88; 13/4/88; 10/6/88; 20/7/88 [Monde] - Näslund, Lars: "Han förhördes två
gånger", Expressen (Extra), 29/9/96:12-13
(about H.Hüman) [Naslund]
- Resister 58: "SA-France: Intelligence chiefs meet", oct/nov 1988:10 [Res]
- Smith, Stephen & François, Didier: Guénon, un
Français chez les Mandela, in Paris,
Libération 4/7/91 pp.28-29 [Smith]
- South African Report: 'Italian link in September assassination probed',(SA), 22-04-1988 and
TB-letter 29-03-93 [TB-29/3/93]
- Southscan: 'Paris assassination. Doubts cast on Chirac government integrity', 13-04-1988 [SS]
- Sowetan: 30/9/96; 1/10/96 [Sow]
- Stober, Paul: "ANC inquiry into death of self-confessed spy", in Weekly Mail, 28/5/93:15 (about
Solly Smith) [Stober]
- S.Tribune: "New death squad allegations rock SAP, Hit squad dossier", 14/1/90
(about H Human) [ST]
- Thornycroft, Peta: "Security police asked Stoffberg to kill September", S.Tribune. 24/7/94 [Thorny]
- Vrije Weekblad: "Ek het Dulcie help vermoor sê Sweed", 12/1/90:5 (about H. Hüman) [VW]
- West Africa: 'South Africa. The long arm of terrorist apartheid', Dateline, 1/8/1988 [WA ]
- WoZ, die Wochenzeitung, Zürich 7 Jhg 1988, no. 13 & 15 [WoZ 15/4/88; 31/3/89 & 24/4/92]
Books:
- Bach, Daniel C. (ed): La France et l'Afrique du Sud. Histoire, mythes et enjeux contemporains;
Paris: Karthala, 1990. [Bach]
- Dossiers Noirs de la Politique Africaine de la France No.6: Jacques Chirac et la Françafrique.
Retour à la case Foccart?; Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995.[Dossiers]
- Gaillard, Philippe: Foccart Parle. Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard II; Paris: Fayard/Jeune Afrique,
1997
- Glaser, Antoine & Smith, Stephen: Ces Messieurs Afrique (1). Le Paris-Village du continent noir;
Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1992. [Glaser]
- Pauw, Jacques: In the heart of the whore. The story of apartheid's death squads, Halfway House:
Southern Book Publishers, 1991 pp. 207-208,281 [Pauw];
- Rigault J. & Sandor E.: Démantèlement de l'apartheid; Paris: l'Harmattan, 1992 [Rigault]
- Roth, Jürgen: Die Mitternachtsregierung. Reportage über die Macht der Geheimdienste; ?: Rasch
und Röhring Verlag, 1990:22-27 & 38-68 [Roth]
- Smith, Stephen & Glaser, Antoine: Ces Messieurs Afrique (2). Des réseaux aux lobbies; Paris:
Calmann-Lévy, 1997 [Smith]
- Soule, Allan; Dixon, Gary & Richards, René: The Wynand Du Toit Story; Johannesburg: Hans
Strydom Publishers, 1987.[Soule]
- Weinberg, Samantha: Last of the Pirates. The Search for Bob Denard; London: Jonathan Cape,
1994 [Weinberg]
The (secret) Truth Commission Files
