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TELNO 1538
OF 2905507 APRIL 94
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALA, ROME, DHAKA
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ADDIS ABABA, ACCRA, NAIROBI.
INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, UKMIS GENEVA
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INFO PRIORITY SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS, ACTOR EN "2.
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MY TELNO 1494: RWANDA M
SUMMARY RS
1. Secretariat brief on developments,. VUnilateral ceaséfires |
are not holding. Fighting continues. Further shelling of
‘airport. Interim Government delegation inform Special
Representative that they did not attend the Arusha meeting
because they had gone to Zaire instead at President Mobutu's
invitation. They agreed à separate ceasefire there. WFP
distributing food in south and north of country. Could do more
if parties would guarantee security.
4
2. Council members discuss possible next steps. “Nigerians
outline African group ideas for OAÙU involvement. Czechs
circulate emotional draft Presidential Statement condemning
slaughter of civilians and placing the blame squarely on
elements of the Rwandan Government forces. General support for
some kind of statement but differing views on its contents.
DETAIL ,
3. During informal consultations of the Security Council on 28
April Gharekhan (Secretary-General's special political adviser)
gave a briefing on the latest developments in Rwanda. The
unilateral ceasefires declared by both sides were not holding.
Fighting continued and there had been heavy exchanges of
artillery, mortar and small arms fire. The RGF positions
around the airport were under fire from the RPF while the RGF
had targeted the RPF in the CND complex in the centre of
Kigali. Mortars had hit the airport again. This hed not
caused significant damage but a UNAMIR resupply flight had not
been able to Land. There had also been prolonged shelling of
the area surrounding the Amahoru stadium and the UNAMIR |
headquarters. But again there had been no damage. Overall
PAGE 1
there head been no Significant change in the positions of the
retties. The RPF were still advancing to Kigali from the east
Lt Wwère meeting stiff. resistance from the RGF. The Force
Commander was in daily contact with both sides, The main focus
of his contacts was a ceasefire, the Security of the airport
and humanitarian issues. .He had asked both parties to withdraw
troops and heavy weapons from 8reas controlled by UNAMIR. The
UNAMIR force Level remained at 450, This included 72 UNMOSs,,
The troops were drawn from Ghana and Tunisia and the UNMOs from
eleven other countries. The troops which had bèen evacuated to
Nairobi had now been repatriated to their home countries,
except for 175 UNMOs who would stay in Nairobi for à few more
days.
4. Gharekhan also briefed on the activities of the
Secretary-General's representative (SRSG). He had been to
Arusha where à draft Ceasefire agreement had been presented to
the RFP. This had also been presented to the RGF in Kigali,
The SRSG had then travelled to Nairobi where, on 27 April, he
had met a delegation from the interim government Cthe Minsters
of. Justice, Commerce, Transport and Communications and the
former Chief of Staff of the Army). The delegation said they
regretted they had not been able to go to Arusha. They had
received…an invitation from President Mobütu to visit Gbadolite
instead. Mobutu had given them à draft Ceasefire agreement
which they had accepted. The interim Sovernment delegation had
Said there was also an RPF delegation in Gbadolite. They had
also accepted Mobutu's draft, The SRSG would be returning to
Kigali as soon as he could. It was his firm view that Lesders
of neîghbouring states could play an important role in adding
to the peace Process in Rwanda and would continue to seek their
assistance.
5. Gharekhan also gave a briefing on WFP activities in
response to the US request (para 4 of TUR). MFP had mobilised:
Over 58000 tonnes of food to meet the needs of refugees for two
months. There had been two deliveries Last week in southern
Rwanda în cooperation with the ICRC. 8 tonnes had bee
distributed in Gitarama and 24 tonnes in Butare. However the
Supply to Butare had had to be suspended because of the
deteriorating Security situation. The ICRC and MSF had both be
deployed from Butare to Burundi, There were drugs and food
available in Burundi and a relief Programme could begin as soon
as the security situation improved. WFP were carrying out
PAGE 2
17412"
MDHIAN 2092
similar work in Northern Rwanda.
DHA assessment team was currently in Rwanda. The initial
appeal had been for $16.5 million in emergency aid.
A
6. Gambari (Nigeria) said UNAMIR was still playing a very
important role under difficult and dangerous circumstances. He.
noted that there were two types of fighting going on in Rwanda.
The first was fighting between the forces of the RPF and the
RGF and the second was the fighting and Killing Occurring as a
result of the total breakdown of Law and order in the country.
The African group had met earlier on 28 April to discuss what
could be done. The first suggestion was to convene an.
emergency meeting of the OAU Conflict Prevention Mechanism at
Foreign Minister Level. The second was that the OAU Conflict
Prevention Mechanism should help regional countries to arrange
a cCeasefire in a coordinated manner. The OAU should also ask
some of îts members to consider deploying mixed battalions of
police and soldiers to Rwanda. However the OAU did not have
the resources to do this itself. The expanded ECOMOG in
Liberia might prove a model, finance via 4 UN trust fund. The
final suggestion was that s Contact Group on Rwanda be
established. The African Group had also discussed Burundi (see
my separate telegram).
7. Kovanda (Czech Republic) circulated a draft Presidential
Statement (text by fax to ADCED and UND), This expresses
Security Council horror at the slaughter of innocent civilians,
and notes references in the Secretary-General's latest report
that the current wave of killings were started by members of
the Presidential Guard joined by elements of the RGF. It
characterises. the killings in Rwanda as genocide and warns the
interim government that it bears responsibility for reining in
and disciplining all elements of the RGF. In cireulating the
draft Kovanda drew attention to reports he had been receiving
from Amnesty International, Medicines Sans Frontieres and Human
Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch had said the violence in
Rwanda was not random. It had pointed the finger at the
Presidential Guard and armed militias trained over the past few
years by members of the previous coalition government. The
violence had been designed by Hutu hard-liners close to the
Late President to derail the Arusha process, It could not be
characterised as purely ethnic since, immediately after the
desth of the President, Hutu opposition leaders had also been
PAGE 3
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HDHIAN 2092
Killed. The massacres were of civilians and were totally
“
* Jing carried out by more conventional means. Human Rights
Watch and the ICRC both believed that what was happening in
Rwanda wës genocide according to the Genocide Convention.
8- Albright (US) said there were a number of ideas circulating
as to Security Council actions. One might be the establishment
of an arms embargo. Although much of the killäng was being
carried out by machetes, there were arms involved and the US
had reliable evidence that the RGF were actively Looking for
arms. The Rwandan Government should also be called upon to
ensure Îts armies stopped Killing civilians.
members except the Rwandan Ambassador Spoke. Merimee (France)
was attracted by the approach put forward by Gambari. The UN
had taken a decision on the wWithdrawal of troops. A4
Presidential Statement which made no reference to any action to
be taken would be somewhat wezk. Vorontsov (Russian
Federation) said there Was a need for something to be done to
stop the killing. In other operations the Council authorised
air power. to stop bombardment of civilians. Why hadn't we
acted to stop Killing of civilians in Rwanda? As à first step
the OAU should be called upon to do all it COUlLd and might be
helped by the UN. Olhaye (Djibouti) was not convinced that the
sort of presidential Statement suggested by Kovanda would help
in this respect. Yanez (Spain) said the Czech statement would.
need to be redrafted, but violations of humanitarian Law could
not be brushed under the carpet. Marker (Pakistan) said that
we should react in some way to the continuing atrocities. AS
well as focussing on human rights issues this statement should
underline the need for à ceasefire and à return to the
political process. AÀ Statement should be adopted on 29 April.
10. I said you felt Strongly that the Security Council needed
the help and guidance of the African countries in its
consideration of Rwanda. They should take the Lead in this
issue and. had the right to Look for UN help and guidance. 1!
Suggested that the Secretary-General consider what more could
be done to improve the Links between the SRSG, the force
Commander and the OAU and neighbouring Countries, It was
important for UN répresentatives, either from UNAMIR or from
PAGE 4
MDHIAN 208
headquarters, to participate in regional meetings. Experience
În-Bosnia had shown that a ceasefire negotiated away from the
f._Ad rarely stuck on the ground. .Local military leaders
needed to be part of the discussions. There should be no
disconnect between the efforts being made, for example, by
President Mwinyi towards a ceasefire and what was being
negotiated on the ground. As far as the statement was
concerned, I would seek instructions. But I woutd welcome
advice from the Secretariat as to whether the SRSG thought such
a Statement would help. If there was a statement, it should be
more than just condemnatory. It should talk about contacts
underway to bring about a cessefire and a return to the
political process. An expression of indignation was not
enough.
11. Chen (China) said it was difficult to see what effective
measures the Security Council could take. We should certainly
encourage the OAÙUfs activities... Better coordination was needed
‘between countries within the OAU, between the OAU and the SRSG
and the fFrce commander in New York and with the Security
Council. He saw problems with the draft Presidential Statement
circeulated. We should certaiïinly seek the advice of the SRSG as
to whether it would be useful. Any statement should address
both the massacres of civilians and the fighting between the
RPF and the RGF. Solutions to both these problems were related
and we should not addréss them in isolation.
12. Keating (New Zealand, Council President), said there was a
Lot îin Kovanda's draft which needed to be said but it would
read easier if it were more action-oriented. He also saw value
in Albright's suggestion that we consider an arms embargo.
13. There was, agreement that the New Zealanders would
cireulate additional elements for inclusion in a Presidentiel
Statement for consideration on 29 April (text by fax to UND
and AD(CE) when available). Gharekhan added that his one
appeal would be for any statement not to contain anything
which put the Lives of UNAMIR personnel in jeopardy. He also
made the point that the airport was crucial. It would be
useful if a statement could find some way to call on all the
parties to keep the airport open.
14. Possible Council action on Rwanda was also raised at the
weekly meeting of EU Ambassadors on 28 April. Yanez raised
PAGE 5
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MDHIAN 209:
n
As
HORS
in the question of a Commission of Inquiry (para. 10 of my
The Council had authorised such an inquiry
It could not be seen to discriminate
against African countries. He had some Support from Noterdaeme
(Belgium). I again expressed some Scepticism. The track
record of the UN on such inquiries was not encouraging. It
tended to be a short-term response whenthe Council was not
able to take military action. Discussion of the-terms of
reference for such an inquiry would ineveitably divert
attention from the most important task: éthieving a ceasefire.
I did not think we could rule out an eventual inquiry of some
Kind but it should be seen as one of the options before the
international community and not pursued în isolation. The only
Other specific suggestion was from Noterdaeme who argued, @
, that
additional UNAMIR troops should be deployed in small pockets
around the country protecting civilians, in particular those in
hospitals. I said this made Little sense. There was 2 danger
in placing penny packets of troops around the country in the
current security situation. À small group of soldiers Quarding
8 hospital was just as likely to be massacred as the patients
and doctors within it.
COMMENT
15. « Seen from
here, there would be value in retaining the reference to
genocide. However I do not think we should point the finger
Specifically at the RGF, despite the evidence cited in the
Secretary-General's report. Doing so might have serious
cONSequences for the safety of UNAMIR personnel on the ground.
One way round it would be to condemn the atrocities and make
clear that the two sides each bear responsibility for
violations of international humanitarijan Law in the areas under
their control. I am not much attracted by the ides of an arms
embargo: à possibility, if others want to pursue it, might be
to ask the Secretary-General in the statement to explore the
merit of the idea in his contacts With the OAU etc.
a
trno 1481 refers).
in the former Yugoslavia.
16. Grateful for instructions 2913007.
HANNAY
TETY
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