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FM UKMIS NEW YORK Da À
TO DESKBY 150730Z FCO
TELNO 1364
OF 1505027 APRIL 94
INFO DESKBY 1507307 PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALAT Ts
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DAR ES SALAAM À: agp
INFO IMMEDIATE ADDIS ABABA, UKMIS GENEVA | A? 2.
INFO IMMEDIATE SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS, ACTOR Lune :
1 tre
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YOUR TELNO 548: RWANDA ue
SUMMARY PE NT NS
1. Secretariat present to Council members two options for
future of UNAMIR: to Leave force in place at current strength
minus Belgian contingent (the Secretary-General's preference);
or to withdraw buik of force Leaving behind Secretary-General's
Special Representative with staff and some 150 troops as
security. Both options predicated on the existence of a
cease-fire. No substantive discussion of options although some
concern that Secretariat have not spelt out clearly enough the
mandates relating to eîither option or taken into account the
fact there is not a cease-fire. Secretariat explain that Force
Commander wants to use threat of UNAMIR withdrawal to persuade
parties to agree a cease-fire. Likelihood that Council may
give the parties a five-day deadline to achieve a cease-fire,
after which substantive decisions will be taken.
2, Inconclusive working group discussions on the NAM draft
resolution. The key operative paragraphs remaîn in square
brackets. Instructions requested.
DETAIL
3, At the informal consultations of Security Council members
on 14 April, de Soto (Secretary General's Special Political
Adviser) said that the Secretary-General had been following
closely the events in Rwanda. He had been în direct contact
with the Force Commander and the Special Representative as well
as with Headquarters. De Soto wanted to make ciear that the
Secretary-General's Letter of 13 April hed been written
following his consultations with the Foreign Minister of
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Belgium. They had agreed that the Secretary-General would need
to alert Council members of the need for a replacement
battalion, or for reconsideration of the Belgian decision. It
was in this context that the Secretary-General had put forward
the suggestion of a possible withdrawal by UNAMIR. He had not
recommended that UNAMIR withdraw. |
4. Riza CASG DPKO) gave a brief update on the situation on the
ground. The fighting was at a Lower Level but stili continued.
A Line of control seemed to be emerging across the city. There
was fighting outside Kigali as well. An ICRC convoy had been
attacked and several wounded. There had also been an attack on
the airport Che subsequently indicated that the attack had been
from the RPF). The talks between the parties which had been
scheduled for 14 April had not happened SR
The Force
Commander was now trying to reschedule the meeting for 15
april.
5. As far as the options for UNAMIR were concerned, the
Secretary-General believed an abrupt withdrawal was neîther
fessible nor advisable. There had been a fundamental change in
the situation in Rwanda and it was therefore not possible for
UNAMIR to fulfil its original mandate. The Secretary-General
saw two broad options. Both were predicated on a cease-fire.
The first would be to keep UNAMIR in place at its current
strength minus the Betgian contingent. They would redeploy
into Kigali. The parties would be informed that they had three
weeks to get back to the Arusha Peace Agreement. Certain
conditions would have to be set. The parties would be
responsible for security in the zones they controlled. Freedom
of movement would have to be guaranteed for UNAMIR. The
airport would remain a neutral zone. The intention would be to
give parties the time to negotiate and to agree on a return to
the peace process. It might not be exactly the Arusha process
but the aim would be to achieve agreement on some kind of
political solution. Six days before the deadline, the parties
would be warned and the Force would prepare for a complete
withdrawal. (Comment: although Riza did not make this point
when Annan described this option to me in the margins of a P5
meeting on Bosnia, he said that the key purpose of this option
would be for UNAMIR to secure the airport.) The second option
was to reduce UNAMIR immediately to a minimal political
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presence: the SGSR, his support staff plus at Least 150 troops
as a security detail. Total numbers would not excesed 200.
This option assumed no immediate prospect of a settlement and
that maintaining UNAMIR at a greater strength was not an
option. If the Council were to decide to adopt the first
alternative, which was the Secretary-General's preference, and
if there was no progress by the deadline imposed by the
Council, then it would be possible to move to option 2 rather
than withdraw the force totally. F
6. Keating (NZ, Council President) said he had circulated a
Letter from the OAU Secretary-General enclosing a statement
from the OAU Conflict Resolution Mechanism on the situation in
Rwanda (Cfaxed to AD(E)). He also drew attention to the press
release by the ICRC. The representative of the ICRC had asked
him to bring to Council members attention the ICRC's concern at
the publicity which emanated from Kigali, which implied the
problems related to the RPF alone. This did not reflect
reality.
7. Kovanda (Czech Republic) asked what happened if there was
no cease-fire. Both options were predicated on à cease-fire.
How Long would the Council be prepared to wait for one before
taking a decision? This concern was echoed by Sardenberg
(Brazil) and Gambari (Nigeria). The latter said that since
UNAMIR was even now engaged äîn helping to secure a cease-fire
it was illogical to suggest that for UNAMIR to remain there had
To be a cease-fire. FPedauye (Spain) said it was unclear from
the Secretariat's presentation what mandate UNAMIR would fulfil
under the two different options. Merimee (France) said he
preferred the first option. But it was clear that under this
option the security of the force would need to be assured. The
Council could say that in principle it favoured the first
option, but if within a specific time, say five days, a
cease-fire was not in place and respected, then we would choose
option two. The question of the cease-fire was essential. If
there was no cease-fire and the security situation deteriorated
still further then there wss a danger of more UNAMIR
casualties.
8. I agreed with Spain that the two options were more precise
on force Levels than on mandate. However the mandate must be
described în any resolution adopted by the Council. I
underlined that the Council should not seek to give either two
PAGE 3
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À
battalions or 200 men a mandate to protect Rwandan civilians.
it was heartbreaking to have to say so but this was simply not
achievable. I was as perplexed as others on the fact that
both options were predicated on & cease-fire. This condition
was very unlikely to be fulfilled given the fighting going on
on the ground. It would seem to be more sensible to have a
different articulation which would be to choose option two and
then move to option one when a cease-fire had been achieved.
Merimee's suggestion that the Council give a short deadline and
then make a decision to withdraw the bulk of the force if there
was no commitment to a cease-fire therefore had some merit. As
far as the draft resolution was concerned, I understood that
there was still disagreement on key paragraphs. I drew
attention to the OAU text which was a carefully balanced one.
Rather than the Council continuing to be held up on the
disputed text, we should use the OAU language.
9. Albright (US) expressed concern that both options depended
on à cease-fire. The truce was supposed to expire at noon on
15 April. The fighting would then continue. The airport was
insecure. Given this, we needed a resolution to authorïise an
orderly evacuation.
10. Riza intervened to say that when he had stated both
options were predicated on a cease-fire it had indeed begged
the question of how a cease-fire would be achieved. He had
hoped that by the time the options were presented to the
Council that further progress would have been made on the
ground towards this. The Force Commander had stressed that
both sides wanted UNAMIR to stay. His approach was to use this
as Leverage. A tight timetable should be drawn up for
achieving a cease-fire during which UNAMIR would strengthen its
presence at the airport and make preparations to withdraw.
Both the SRSG and the Force Commander wanted to use the threat
of UNAMIR's withdrawal to pressure the parties into a
cease-fire. He wanted to underline that it would be very
difficult Logistically and politically to withdraw then bring
the force back. This was why the Secretary-Genersal preferred
option one.
11. Keating saîd that if the Force Commander was essentially
asking for the Council's support to put pressure on the parties
by setting a very tight deadline for a cease-fire then the
resolution beïing drafted was perhaps not what was required. It
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might be better to aim for a short Council decision giving the
parties five days to agree a cease-fire and then taking a
decision on whether to maiïintaîn or significantly reduce UNAMIR
thereafter depending on the outcome. Since the NAM caucus had
insisted on being able to consult before making any substantive
comments on the options presented, it was agreed that Council
members would suspend their consideration of Rwanda until
151600Z with the aim of adopting a resolution Later that day.
The US have since told us that shortly after the informal
consultations the French, Nigerians and New Zealanders agreed
three additional paragraphs for the resolution. These are:
$) Demands that all parties agree on a cease-fîire throughout
Rwanda.
11) Decides that if within five days of the adoption of this
resolution there is an effective cease-fire in place, the
Security Council will review the mandate and composition of
UNAMIR with a view to assisting the parties in a resumption of
the peace process in Rwanda based on the basis of the Arusha
Peace Agreement.
111) Further decides that if within five days of the adoption
of this resolution there is no effective cease-fire in place,
the Council will reconsider the continued presence of UNAMIR in
Rwanda.
12. The working group discussions on the draft resolution
earlier in the day had proved inconclusive. There was
disagreement on references to the RPF and neighbouring
countries and the key operative paragraphs therefore remain in
square brackets pending consideration by Council members.
(Text by fax to ADCE).) It is Likely however that the working
group discussions will be overtaken by the apparent agreement
on the five-day language as above,
COMMENT
13. If the Nigeriens can persuade the rest of the NAM caucus,
it is Likely that a resolution will be adopted containing the
Language on the five day option. The Belgian assessment is
that a cease-fire within this period is extremely unlikely.
The Council is thus Likely to end up deciding on option 2 after
the five days have elapsed.
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14. Grateful for any comments you might have on the
Secretary-General's options and on the language in para 11
above deskby 1513007 please.
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