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116213
MDHIAN 9706
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TELNO 1285
OF 092132Z APRIL 94
INFO DESKBY 1009007 PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALA
INFO DESKBY 101500Z WASHINGTON |
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INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS, ACTOR
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SUMMARY ——
1. SECRETARIAT BRIEF COUNCIL MEMBERS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN RWANDA.
LATE ON 8 APRIL AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN AGREED AND A
PROVISIONAL CEASE-FIRE WAS HOLDING. BUT THE SITUATION IN KIGALI
HAD DETERIORATED RAPIDLY THEREAFTER. THE RPF WERE FIGHTING THE
PRESIDENTIAL GUARD AND RPF FORCES HAD BEGUN TO MOVE ACROSS THE DMZ
TOWARDS KIGALI. PROVOCATIVE STATEMENTS AGAINST FOREIGNERS WERE
BEING BROADCAST. A NUMBER OF CONVOYS OF FOREIGN NATIONALS HAD LEFT
KIGALI BY ROAD. ONE ORGANISED BY UNDP SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN ATTACKED
ALTHOUGH NOT SERIOUSLY. THE AIRPORT WAS CONTROLLED BY FRENCH:
TROOPS.
2. FRENCH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE BRIEFS ON FRENCH ACTIONS. SOLE
AIM OF DEPLOYMENT OF FRENCH TROOPS IS TO EVACUATE FRENCH CITIZENS
AND OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS. THE OPERATION WHICH IS BEING CARRIED
OUT JOINTLY. WITH BELGIUM IS ENTIRELY HUMANITARIAN AND TIME LIMITED.
THE NATIONAL DECISION TO EVACUATE IN NO WAY IMPLIED THAT UNAMIR
SHOULD LEAVE. ALL COUNCIL MEMBERS WHO SPEAK SAY THEY UNDERSTAND
FRENCH AND BELGIAN ACTIONS. BUT ALL EXPRESS CONCERN AT THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SITUATION FOR UNAMIR. AGREEMENT THAT COUNCIL
PRESIDENT SHOULD SPEAK TO THE PRESS AND THAT INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS
SHOULD BE HELD AGAIN ON 11 APRIL TO CONSIDER THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR.
DETAIL
3. THE FRENCH AND RWANDAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES CALLED FOR
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MDHIAN Pape. .
INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 9 APRIL, P5
AMBASSADORS MET BEFORE THE CONSULTATIONS, BUT THE GROUND COVERED
WAS VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL TO THAT COVERED IN THE CONSULTATIONS.
&. THE CONSULTATIONS BEGAN WITH A BRIEFING FROM RIZA (ASSISTANT
SECRETARY-GENERAL, DPKO) ON THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS, ON 8 APRIL
AFTER THE PREVIOUS COUNCIL BRIEFING CTUR REFERS) THE SECRETARIAT
HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN AGREED AND A
PROVISIONAL CEASE-FIRE HAD ALSO BEEN AGREED, WHICH SEEMED TO BE
HOLDING. BUT NOT LONG THEREAFTER THE SITUATION HAD COMPLETELY
CHANGED, THERE WAS AGAIN A RAPID DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN
THE STREETS. THERE WERE LARGE NUMBERS OF DISPLACED PERSONS SEEKING
REFUGE INCLUDING IN THE STADIUM WHERE PART OF THE BANGLADESHI
BATTALION WAS STATIONED. THE RPF WERE NOW ALL OUT OF THEIR
BARRACKS AND WERE FIGHTING IN THE STREET WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL
GUARD, RPF TROOPS HAD ALSO BEGUN TO MOVE ACROSS THE DMZ TOWAROS
KIGALI. ALTHOUGH THERE HAD NOT YET BEEN ANY CLASHES WITH RWANDESE
GOVERNMENT FORCES, IF THE RPF CONTINUED TO MOVE THESE WERE
INEVITABLE. THE FORCE COMMANDER WAS STILL TRYING TO WORK WITH THE
CRISIS COMMITTEE TO RESTORE SOME KIND OF ORDER BUT THE SITUATION
LOOKED BLEAK. ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, THE RPF NOW SAID IT
DISAVOWED THE NEW INTERIM GOVERNMENT. THE SGSR WAS CONTINUING TO
TRY AND KEEP IN CONTACT WITH THIS INTERIM GOVERNMENT BUT THE
SITUATION WAS VERY UNCLEAR. ONE OF THE LOCAL RADIO STATIONS WAS
BROADCASTING PROVOCATIVE STATEMENTS AGAINST FOREIGNERS. THESE HAD
INTENSIFIED AFTER THE FRENCH HAD LANDED AT THE AIRPORT.
5. À CONVOY ORGANISED BY UNDP WAS TAKING SOME UN CIVILIAN STAFF
AND DEPENDENTS OUT OF KIGALI TOWARDS BURUNDI. IT WAS NOW IN
GITARAMA WHERE IT WOULD SPEND THE NIGHT. THE CONVOY HAD APPARENTLY
BEEN ATTACKED ALTHOUGH THERE DID NOT SEEM TO BE ANYONE SERIOUSLY
HURT. SOME OTHER CONVOYS ORGANISED BY EMBASSIES HAD ALSO LEFT
KIGALI FOR BURUNDI. THERE WAS NO NEWS OF ATTACKS ON THESE CONVOYS.
THE AIRPORT WAS IN THE CONTROL OF FRENCH FORCES. THE FORCE
COMMANDER HAD GIVEN GUIDANCE THAT UNAMIR SHOULD COOPERATE WITH THE
FRENCH TROOPS AS FAR AS WAS POSSIBLE WITHIN THEIR MANDATE. THE
PICTURE AT THE AIRPORT WAS SLIGHTLY CONFUSED. THE RUNWAY HAD BEEN
BLOCKED AGAIN BY RWANDESE- CIVILIANS BUT IT SEEMED LIKELY THAT, IF
MORE AIRCRAFT NEEDED TO LAND, THE RUNWAY COULD BE CLEARED.
6. MERIMEE CFRANCE) THEN INFORMED COUNCIL MEMBERS OF HIS
GOVERNMENT’'S ACTIONS. IN THE COURSE OF THE NIGHT OF 8 APRIL 190
FRENCH TROOPS HAD ARRIVED IN KIGALI. MORE TROOPS WOULD ARRIVE
DURING 9 APRIL BRINGING THE TOTAL TO 400. THE OPERATION TOOK PLACE
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MDHIAN 9706
PEACEFULLY,. THE RWANDESE ARMY HAD CLEARED THE RUNWAYŸ AND MEMBERS
OF THE RWANDESE. GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THE ACTION. THE SOLE PURPOSE
OF THE INTERVENTION WAS TO EVACUATE FRENCH CIVILIANS AND OTHER
FOREIGN NATIONALS WHO WISHED TO LEAVE. THE OPERATION WAS PURELY
HUMANITARIAN AND FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME. IT HAD NOTHING TO
DO WITH THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN RWANDA. THE ACTUAL EVACUATION
WOULD BEGIN AS SOON AS ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE TO ESCORT
CIVILIANS FROM KIGALI TO THE AIRPORT. THE OPÉRATION HAD BEEN
DECIDED UPON BECAUSE THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THE FRENCH
COMMUNITY WAS IN SERIOUS DANGER. TWO FRENCH CIVILIANS HAD BEEN
KILLED AND OTHERS HAD BEEN THREATENED. THERE WERE REPORTS OF RPF
MOVEMENTS. THE RPF WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY REACH KIGALI AND EVEN
WORSE FIGHTING WAS VERY LIKELY TO BREAK OUT. UNAMIR COULD NOT HELP
SINCE ITS MANDATE DID NOT EXTEND TO PROTECTION OF FOREIGN
NATIONALS. IT WAS THE FIRST DUTY OF ANY GOVERNMENT TO PROTECT ITS
NATIONALS AND FRANCE HAD THEREFORE TAKEN ACTION. THIS WAS A PURELY
NATIONAL DECISION WHICH NEEDED NO SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORISATION.
THE FRENCH DECISION IN NO WAY APPLIED THAT UNAMIR MUST LEAVE. THAT
WAS A DECISION FOR THE UN. MERIMEE UNDERLINED THAT THERE WAS
COORDINATION BETWEEN THE FRENCH FORCES AND THE UN FORCE COMMANDER
ON THE GROUND. HE ADDED THAT THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN A
SIMILAR NATIONAL DECISION AND THE EVACUATION WOULD BE A JOINT
FRANCO-BELGIAN OPERATION. THEY DID NOT KNOW WHAT SPECIFIC
ARRANGEMENTS THE US HAD MADE BUT FRANCE AND BELGIUM WERE
COORDINATING CLOSELY WITH THEM. MERIMEE EMPHASISED THAT THE FRENCH
GOVERNMENT HAD NOT EMBARKED LIGHTLY ON THIS COURSE OF ACTION.
HOWEVER THE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO ENSURE
THE SAFETY OF FRENCH NATIONALS.
7. WALKER CUS) SAID THAT THE US GOVERNMENT FULLY SUPPORTED THE
NATIONAL DECISIONS OF THE FRENCH AND BELGIAN GOVERNMENTS. THE
US WAS MAINTAINING CLOSE COORDINATION WITH THEM. THIS NATIONAL
DECISION WAS QUITE APART FROM ANY DECISION ON PROSPECTS FOR
UNAMIR. THIS SHOULD BE TAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS AS
APPROPRIATE. WE WOULD NEED ADVICE FROM THE SECRETARIAT AND THE
FORCE COMMANDER OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS AS WELL AS
POSSIBLE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR.
8. CARDENAS CARGENTINA) SAID THAT THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS
ABROAD WAS PART OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COULD BE JUSTIFIED UNDER .
ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. THE TRADITIONAL REQUIREMENTS HAD BEEN
MET. THERE HAD BEEN THREATS AND ALSO ACTUAL HARM TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS, THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO PROTECT THEM.
THE SOLE PURPOSE OF THE OPERATION WAS TO PROTECT FOREIGN NATIONALS.
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ARGENTINA HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE BELGIANS WHO HAD ASSURED
THEM THAT OTHER CIVILIAN FOREIGNERS WHO WISHED TO- LEAVE WOULD BE
EVACUATED AS WELL. THIS EXCEPTIONAL EMERGENCY ACTION WAS IN THE
VIEW OF ARGENTINA JUSTIFIED GIVEN THE GRAVITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
9. GAMBARI CNIGERIA) SAID THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA WAS GRAVE
AND DETERIORATING. HE BELIEVED THE COUNCIL SHOULD SHOW
UNDERSTANDING FOR THE ACTIONS OF SOME GOVERNMENTS TO EVACUATE THEIR
CITIZENS. BUT THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT JUST BE CONCERNED WITH THE
EVACUATION OF FOREIGNERS. IT SHOULD TAKE A POSITION ON THE RISK TO
RWANDAN CITIZENS. THE COUNCIL SHOULD ADDRESS THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LETTER ON STRENGTHENING OF UNAMIR AND SHOULD
CONSIDER THE RELATIONS BETWEEN UNAMIR AND THE FRANCO-BELGIAN FORCE.
THE COUNCIL MUST ALSO ADDRESS THE LARGER POLITICAL ISSUES. HOW
COULD PEACE AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS BE RESTORED IN RWANDA? WHAT
SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF THE OAU?
10. I SAID THAT THE UK FULLY RESPECTED THE RIGHT OF THE
GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO TAKE THESE ACTIONS. I ALSO WELCOMED THEIR
WILLINGNESS TO HELP OTHER NATIONALS. WHILE I AGREED THAT THE
FRENCH NATIONAL DECISION TO EVACUATE ITS CITIZENS WAS ENTIRELY
SEPARATE FROM ANY DECISION ON THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR, IN PRACTICE THE
FIRST WAS LIKELY TO AFFECT THE SECOND. IN PARTICULAR CONSIDERATION
SHOULD BE GIVEN TO WHETHER, IF A DECISION WAS TAKEN TO EVACUATE
UNAMIR, THE FRENCH AND BELGIAN ASSETS NOW IN PLACE MIGHT BE USED TO
HELP CARRY OUT THAT EVACUATION. WE WOULD WELCOME AN ASSESSMENT
FROM DPKO AS TO WHETHER UNAMIR COULD FULFIL A USEFUL FUNCTION IN
CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN RWANDA.
11. SIDOROV CRUSSIA) TOOK NOTE OF THE FACT THAT THE FRENCH
DECISION WAS CAUSED BY EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES. HE ALSO NOTED
THE STRICTLY HUMANITARIAN NATURE OF THE OPERATION AND THAT IT WOULD
BE LIMITED IN TIME. HE WAS WORRIED BY THE FATE OF OTHER NATIONALS,
IN PARTICULAR GIVEN REPORTS THAT THERE WERE NOW HOSTILE RADIO
BROADCASTS. REQUISITE MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN TO PROTECT
NATIONALS OF ALL COUNTRIES. RUSSIA HAD 15 MILITARY OBSERVERS WITH
UNAMIR BUT WAS CONVINCED THAT THE SECRETARIAT AND THE FORCE
COMMANDER WERE CAREFULLY MONITORING THE SITUATION AND WOULD TAKE
NECESSARY DECISIONS AS THE SITUATION EVOLVED.
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À
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO DESKBY 1009007 FCO
TELNO 1285
OF 0921327 APRIL 94
INFO DESKBY 1009007 PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALA
INFO DESKBY 1015007 WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, ADDIS ABABA
INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS, ACTOR
FINAL PART OF TWO
12. CHEN ÇCCHINA) SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ACTION TAKEN BY
FRANCE AND BELGIUM HAD BEEN TAKEN IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
IN RWANDA, WHERE THERE WAS NO GOVERNMENT AND CHAOS PREVAILED.
HE HAD ALSO NOTED THE STATEMENT THAT IT WAS A PURELY
HUMANITARIAN ACTION AND LIMITED IN TIME. IN THIS CONNECTION IT
WAS CHINA'S VIEW THAT GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL. LAW
SHOULD NOT BE COMPROMISED, IN PARTICULAR THE PRINCIPLE OF
RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY OF THE COUNTRY CONCERNED AND FOR ITS
DOMESTIC LAW. CHINA WOULD BE FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE POSSIBLE
IMPACT OF THE FRENCH AND BELGIUM ACTIONS ON UNAMIR. ALL
INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS SHOULD FACILITATE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
IN RWANDA.
13. PEDAUYE (SPAIN) SAID THERE WERE TWO MATTERS BEFORE THE COUNCIL
WHICH ALTHOUGH SEPARATE WERE INTERRELATED. THE FIRST WAS THE
FRANCO-BELGIAN OPERATION WITH THE LIMITED OBJECTIVE OF PROTECTING
AND WITHDRAWING FOREIGN NATIONALS IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES.
THE SECOND WAS THE PRESENCE IN RWANDA OF A UN FORCE AUTHORISED BY
THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IN THE LIGHT OF THE SERIOUS EVENTS IN RWANDA
THE COUNCIL NEEDED TO LOOK AT WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT UNAMIR.
SPAIN HAD NO DOUBTS ABOUT THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE FRANCO-BELGIAN
ACTION. THE ARGENTINIAN AMBASSADOR HAD SPELT OUT VERY CLEARLY THE
JUSTIFICATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. HE THANKED FRANCE FOR
WILLINGNESS TO EVACUATE OTHER NATIONALS WHO REQUESTED IT. HOWEVER,
AS THE NIGERIAN AMBASSADOR HAD POINTED OUT, IT WAS NOT JUST A
QUESTION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS. ANARCHY AND CHAOS REIGNED IN
RWANDA. THERE WAS A REAL PROSPECT OF RENEWED FIGHTING WITH THE RPF
WHICH WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE THE SITUATION. SPAIN WOULD
APPRÉCIATE THE SECRETARIAT'S VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR. BUT IN
THE MEANTIME IT WAS SPAIN'S VIEW THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS
ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL UN FORCES INCLUDING UNAMIR IN AN
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MDHIAN 9707
EMERGENCY SITUATION. IT WAS FOR HIM TO TAKE ANY MEASURES HE DEEMED
APPROPRIATE TO SECURE THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF UNAMIR.
14. SARDENBERG (BRAZIL) AGREED THAT ACTION TO EVACUATE FOREIGN
NATIONALS WAS JUSTIFIED PROVIDED IT WAS CLEARLY HUMANITARIAN AND
TIME LIMITED. THE COUNCIL NEEDED TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR
AS WELL AS THE SAFETY AND POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF UNAMIR AND. DTHER
UN PERSONNEL. HE HAD SYMPATHY WITH NIGERIAN COMMENTS ON THE WIDER
POLITICAL ISSUES AND ON THE NEED TO INVOLVE THE OAU. THE COUNCIE
SHOULD LOOK AS THIS ISSUE IN MORE DETAIL.
15. MARKER (PAKISTAN) SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE FRENCH AND
BELGIAN ACTION. AS ARGENTINA AND SPAIN HAD POINTED OUT THIS-WAS
JUSTIFIED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. AS FAR AS PAKISTAN WAS
CONCÉRNED THE KEY PROBLEMS WERE THE CURRENT STATUS OF UNAMIR AND
WHAT ACTION THE COUNCIL NEEDED TO TAKE DN THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR BOTH
IN THE SHORT AND THE MEDIUM TERM. HOW THE EVACUATION WENT WOULD BE
RELEVANT TO THIS. IT WAS BOUND TO HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE SITUATION
ON THE GROUND. RPF INTENTIONS WERE ALSO RELEVANT. THE COUNCIÉE HAD
A MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNAMIR AND ITS PERSONNEL. THEY WERE IN
RWANDA AS À RESULT OF COUNCIL ACTION. THE FACT THAT OTHER
NATIONALS WERE BEING EVACUATED DID NOT REMOVE THE COUNCIL'S
RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNAMIR. WE SHOULD BE GUIDED TO A LARGE EXTENT
BY SECRETARIAT REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. A LONGER TERM ASPECT
WAS SECURITY COUNCIL RESPONSIBILITY FOR RWANDA ITSELF. THE
SITUATION THERE MIGHT WELL HAVE REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS. HE AGREED
WITH THE NIGERIAN SUGGESTION THAT THE COUNCIL MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH
THE OAU.
16. ANNAN CUNDER SECRETARY-GENERAL, DPKO) SAID THAT THE
POSSIBILITY OF A UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL COULD NOT BE RULED OUT. THE
SITUATION IN RWANDA WAS VERY GRAVE AS WAS DEMONSTRATED BY THE
UNUSUAL ACTION TAKEN BY SOME MEMBER STATES TO EVACUATE THEIR
NATIONALS. THE FINAL DECISION WOULD DEPEND ON THE CREDIBILITY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FORCE AND ITS ABILITY TO CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE
IF IT REMAINED, AS WELL AS THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND INCLUDING
THE EFFECTS OF THE FRANCO-BELGIAN ACTION. IT WAS CLEAR THAT IF
UNAMIR DID REMAIN THEN IT WAS LIKELY TO NEED A NEW MANDATE AND
POSSIBLY À NEW FORCE STRUCTURE. HE UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR CLOSE
COORDINATION BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND BELGIAN FORCES AND THE UN
FORCES. COUNCIL MEMBERS WÈRE WELL AWARE OF DIFFICULTIES WITH
COMMAND AND CONTROL EVEN WHEN THERE WAS ONLY ONE FORCE ON THE
GROUND. IF TWO FORCES WERE SHARING THE SAME SPACE WITH DIFFERENT
MANDATES SUCH PROBLEMS WERE EXACERBATED. HE THEREFORE WELCOMED
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MDHIAN 9707,
FRANCE'S STATED INTENTION TO COORDINATE WITH UNAMIR. IN RESPONSE
TO A QUESTION, ANNAN SAID THAT-THE-IDEA OF REINFORCING UNAMIR TO
CARRY OUT AN EVACUATION RAISED IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LETTER
THE PREVIOUS DAY WAS OVERTAKEN BY THE FRENCH AND BELGIAN
INTERVENTION.
17. THERE WAS THEN À BRIEF DISCUSSION AS TO WHAT ACTION, IF ANY,
THE COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE. GAMBARI PROPOSED THAT THE COUNCIL
PRÉSIDENT BRIEF THE MEDIA TO THE EFFECT THAT THE COUNCIL HAD TAKEN
NOTE OF THE ACTION OF SOME GOVERNMENTS TO EVACUATE NATIONALS,
EMPHASISING THAT THE RATIONALE BEHIND THIS ACTION WAS PURELY
HUMANITARIAN AND THAT IT WAS TIME-LIMITED. HE SHOULD ALSO STATE
THE COUNCIL'S ‘INTENTION TO AUTHORISE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO TAKE
THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL. A
FURTHER MEETING SHOULD BE SCHEDULED TO CONSIDER THE FUTURE OF
UNAMIR AND THE POSSIBLE NEED TO CHANGE ITS MANDATE, AS WELL AS THE
UN'S ROLE IN RE-ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY IN RWANDA AND REBUILDING ITS
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN COOPERATION WITH THE OAU.
18. MERIMEE SAID HE WAS CONTENT WITH A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BUT
IT SHOULD BE SHORTER AND MORE GENERAL. SSSR
. MERIMEE
‘HAD TOLD THE COUNCIL CLEARLY THAT THE OPERATION HAD A HUMANITARIAN
OBJECTIVE. THIS SHOULD BE PUT ACROSS TO THE PRESS. MERIMEE
REPLIED THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT RESERVED THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE
TO PROTECT FRENCH NATIONALS. THERE COULD BE NO CONDITIONS OR
LIMITATIONS TO THIS RIGHT.
19. WE, THE US, PAKISTAN AND ARGENTINA SUPPORTED MERIMEE'S LINE.
NIGERIA, CHINA AND BRAZIL WERE IN FAVOUR OF À FULLER STATEMENT. IT
WAS EVENTUALLY AGREED THAT KEATING WOULD TELL THE PRESS THAT
COUNCIL MEMBERS HAD BEEN BRIEFED BY THE SECRETARIAT ON DEVELOPMENTS
ON THE GROUND AND BY THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON THE OPERATION HIS
GOVERNMENT WAS UNDERTAKING. HE WOULD ALSO SAY THAT COUNCIL MEMBERS
HAD DISCUSSED THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR AND BEGUN TO DISCUSS WHAT ROLE
THE UN MIGHT HAVE IN COOPERATION WITH THE OAU IN RE-ESTABLISHING A
POLITICAL PROCESS IN RWANDA.
20. KEATING CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT FURTHER INFORMAL
CONSULTATIONS ON RWANDA WERE SCHEDULED FOR 111500Z, AT WHICH THE
QUESTION OF UNAMIR'S FUTURE WOULD BE TAKEN UP, A MEETING WOULD
PAGE 3
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MDHIAN 9707
ONLY BE CALLED ON 10 APRIL IF ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.
CONTACTS WITH BELGIAN, US AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS
21. FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS WE HAD HEARD EARLIER IN THE DAY THAT THE
BELGIANS MIGHT BE THINKING OF BRINGING THEIR UNAMIR CONTINGENT OUT
OF RWANDA WITH THEIR NATIONALS, WE EXPRESSED PRIVATELY OUR CONCERN
TO THE BELGIAN MISSION THAT SUCH ACTION COULD LEAD TO SEVERE
CRITICISM OF THE EUROPEANS. BROUHNS (DPR) ASSURED US THAT HE HAD
MADE THE SAME POINT AND THAT BRUSSELS HAD CONFIRMED THAT THEIR
UNAMIR CONTINGENT WOULD REMAIN IN UNAMIR PENDING ANY DECISIONS ON
THÉ FUTURE OF THE FORCE AS A WHOLE. I ALSO SAID PRIVATELY TO THE
FRENCH AND US DELEGATIDNS THAT WHILE WE AGREED ON THE NECESSITY AND
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THEIR SPECIFIC HUMANITARIAN OPERATION,
POLITICALLY WE COULD NOT CONTEMPLATE AN EVACUATION WHICH CONCLUDED
WITH SIZEABLE NUMBERS OF UNAMIR OR OTHER UN/FOREIGN PERSONNEL LEFT
UNPROTECTED. THERE WOULD NEED TO BE VERY CLOSE DE FACTO
COOCRDINATION BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND THE SECRETARIAT
ON THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL AND UN OPERATIONS UPON EACH OTHER.
WALKER CUS) AGREED. WALKER ALSO REFERRED TO US - ORGANISED LAND
CONVOYS TO TAKE SOME FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM KIGALI TO BURUNDI, IN
WHICH THE US ENVISAGED UNAMIR ASSISTING (IN THE INFORMALS WALKER
PREVENTED KEATING SUMMING UP THAT UNAMIR WOULD HAVE NO ROLE IN THE
“EVACUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS NOW THAT THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS
HAD ARRIVED FOR THAT PURPOSE.)
22: THE FRENCH TOLD US LATER IN THE DAY THAT DELIBERATIONS ON THE
FUTURE OF UNAMIR MIGHT BE SOMEWHAT ACADEMIC. THE GHANAIAN
BATTALION CONE THIRD OF THE FORCE) WAS REPORTED TO HAVE ALREADY
FLED FROM THE DMZ WHERE THEY WERE STATIONED ACROSS THE BORDER INTO
UGANDA.
GOMERSALL
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