Citation
CONFIDENTIAL 7
15 [25/97
Your file: Our file: 161/1/1
12:29 (47854) 700/WSH/00000/00000 $492.41
FROM: WASHINGTON C03039/WSH 21-Jun-1994
TO: WELLINGTON NEW YORE Immediate
WGTN UNSC Immediate
cc: PARIS LONDON Priority
CANBERRA OTTAWA Priority
ROME MADRID Priority
MOSCOW GENEVA Priority
BEIJING SANTIAGO Priority
HARARE BONN Priority
To: Defence Immediate
MFAT (UNC,MEA, AMER, ISAC,HRU,EUR,DSP1,LGL)
(EAB)
P/S MFA
DEFENCE HONZDF (DSTA,OPS,DDI)
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES )
Subject
U04454; SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA
Your €C42779. Our fax of 20 June (Wotn and NY only).
Summary
US support for the French initiative is more nuanced than
their public statement or French reports suggest. While the
US finds it impossible to oppose the French offer to bring an
end to the killing in Rwanda, it has expressed concerns that
the operation be multilateral, under a UN umbrella, for a
defined time period, and that France make “every effort to
convince the RPF of its good intent". However the US shares
French view that there is no way to get UNAMIR in place
quickly enough to stop the killings, nor does it support a Ch
RMeworr:.
~
eat
VII mandate for UNAMIR. Calton
atson
Action
2 For information.
Report
3 We met early today with State's Rwanda desk officer
(Aiston, Office of Central African Affairs). We set out some
of New Zealand's concerns. We stressed that deployment of a
national force with robust rules of engagement could (a la
Somalia) cause difficulties for the UN force which must take
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over ‘trom it, and noted recent reports of targeting of
Francophone UNAMIR personnel. Aiston took careful note of
these points and undertook to pass them on.
4 In setting out US views, Aiston noted that the US found
it politically impossible not to support a credible initiative
to bring an immediate end to the killings in Rwanda. It would
be "a mistake for the international community to forgo this
offer to save lives". Secretary Christopher had thus
indicated to FM Juppe that the US would support the French
proposal.
5 In conveying its support, the US had also expressed
privately to France a range of concerns about their proposal,
which Aiston remarked were similar to New Zealand's:
(a) The French initiative should be under a "UN umbrella"
(i.e. a Chapter VII UNSC mandate);
(b) Participation in the intervention should be "as broad
as possible";
(c) France should make "every effort" to persuade the RPF
of its good intent, i.e. that the French role would be
limited to the protection of civilians (largely Tutsi);
(a) There should be close cooperation between the
French-led coalition and the UN. While the US sees
some advantages in a national~-led command structure, it
Wanted appropriate links and reporting to the UN
Secretariat and UNSC. The US wants the DR strengthened
on this point (and could be receptive to a specific
proposal on reporting requirements).
6 Aiston commented that the US had also discussed with
France the importance of strict neutrality of the French
forces in the discharge of their mandate. Implicit in the US
understanding of the French proposal was that it would "not
necessarily" be a barrier to RPF forces and would not seek to
be a buffer or interposition force. (Comment: there may also
be room within US instructions to see a strengthening of the
DR on this point).
7 We asked about the US understanding of the RPF reaction
to the French proposal. Aiston conceded that it had been
negative. The problem is that the RPF does not believe French
declarations of good intent. However the RPF's US
representatives had hinted that if the operation was
UN-sponsored and truly multilateral they may reconsider their
position. (State did not necessarily interpret these
statements to have the backing of the RPF leadership in
Rwanda). Continuing RPF opposition does not affect US support
for the French plan - the US was well aware that they were
likely to have problems with it. The US view is that French
action is driven by domestic human rights outrage. Although
"political" in that sense, it was "clear" that France was not
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motiv ‘ed by other military or strategic objectives.
8 State's information on most recent international
reaction added little to your own. State's information on EU
views tallied with yours - the British are "lukewarm", Belgium
was supportive in principle but not in materiel, Germany had
some reservations but would not oppose; Italy would lend
active support "if others did". The US had no information on
the Danish or Dutch positions but was due to receive embassy
representatives later today. Among the Africans, only the
Senegalese had offered active support. (Aiston noted the
apparent anomaly that this could be made available immediately
to France but would take some weeks to deploy with UNAMIR).
Ghana had not yet, according to US information, confirmed its
support for the French initiative.
9 On the military situation, State confirmed reports that
the RPF was beginning to be stretched thin. However RPF was
continuing to drive towards any areas where there were
remaining Tutsi populations, especially Butari. State noted
that there were few Tutsi (left) in the North West, which was
a Hutu stronghold, and the US assessed the RPF would not
attack in this region where it would face heavy resistance.
10 In response to probing on how the French announcement
had impacted on the situation, State noted that the RPF had
stepped up the level of fighting in an apparent attempt to
make maximum territorial gains before the French arrived.
Commenting on implications for the ceasefire talks, Aiston
sald that State's first priority is to see the killing
stopped, but it also believed that the French action could,
with appropriate international assistance, be "leveraged" into
forcing a ceasefire agreement. The reverse did not hold: by
waiting for a ceasefire agreement, we would not see an early
end to the killings.
11 Aiston did not feel that there has been any "evolution"
in US policy between its early opposition to an expanded
UNAMIR and its current support for the French proposal.
Rather the US had a "bad PR problem". It was and is "working
feverishly" to get UNAMIR deployed. Even when the US had
raised questions in New York about the end point and plan of
operations for the expanded UNAMIR, Aiston argued that this
"did not slow the deployment down", as the search for troop
contributions continued in parallel with the US/UN
discussions. State has been "pushing the bureaucracy" both in
Washington (i.e. DOD) and in New York (i.e. the UN).
12 The US does not share our view on the need for UNAMIR
to have no less robust a mandate than any French~led force.
France does not want a repeat of what happened to the Belgians
~ dit will not go in “with its hands tied". Chapter VII
mandate for France was appropriate as it was a different
mission from that assigned to UNAMIR, for which the proposed H
VI authority would be sufficient. There were advantages in
keeping the two operations distinct. (Aiston noted that
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UNAL R One did not even have a mandate to protect
civilians).
13 Aiston went on to say that US assessed that if France
“was there for two months and had fought its way in, they are
likely to have done all the hard work" before UNAMIR-2 was
deployed. We disputed this: 1-2,000 French troops would
hardly subdue 20,000 RPF and some 40,000 (ragged) RGF forces.
Aiston said that US reporting indicated RGF forces were now
down to 20,000 due to desertions, and the French, with the
advantages of being "Western, well trained and equipped and
nationally commanded", would be able to achieve their
objectives. (Comment: Aiston's reply did not address the
implications for UNAMIR of any such French action).
14 On the question of a US contribution, Aiston noted that
the 50 US APCs had been ready for delivery to Entebbe last
weekend, but that the UN had requested a delay while it moved
10 APCs from Somalia to Rwanda. Rather than store the APCs in
theatre, the US had held off shipment until this week. The
first shipment could go as early as 22 June. Main deployment
would begin on Friday 24 June an@ it would take until 29 June
to get all 50 APCs to Entebbe. Aiston made no mention of any
additional US assistance to the French operation. We will
check further.
End Message
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