Citation
DECEMBER 2007
A WELCOME EXPRESSION OF INTENT
THE NAIROBI COMMUNIQUE
AND THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE
PO Box 3836, Kigali, Rwanda
Tel: 00 250 50 36 79
Email: rights@rwanda1.com
Web: www.africanrights.org
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY
4
INTRODUCTION
5
A LONG CHAIN
The Origins and Evolution of the Political/Military Organizations of
the Ex-FAR and Interahamwe
9
Same People, Different Organizations
1995: The Creation of the RDR
1996: The Founding of PALIR
1997-1998: The Insurgency in the Northwest of Rwanda
and the Birth of ALIR
1997: The Departure of Renzaho and Ntiwiragabo for
Sudan
1998: A new Chance for ALIR as Rwanda Launches War
in the DRC
1998: The Founding of CCR
1999: The Emergence of the FDLR
2000: Ignace Murwanashyaka Assumes the Presidency
2002-2003: Regrouping in the East
2004: RUD-URUNANA Comes Into Its Own
2005: The Announcement of CMC-FOCA, FDLR-CMC
2005-2006: Rasta Comes to Light
2006: A Revolt in FOCA Leads to AN-Imboneza
2.
THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRUCTURE OF THE
FDLR/RUD TODAY
The Political Leadership of the FDLR
FOCA: The Military Wing of the FDLR
The Political Leadership of RUD/URUNANA
The Military Leadership of RUD/URUNANA
3.
REPRESENTATIVES AND LOBBYISTS IN AFRICA, EUROPE
AND NORTH AMERICA
Africa
Europe and North America
11
12
13
14
16
16
19
19
21
22
22
23
23
24
25
25
27
30
31
32
34
37
2
4.
THE TARGETS OF THE AGREEMENT & THE GENOCIDE
Preliminary Details on Some Individuals
FDLR Military Commanders in North Kivu
FDLR Civilian Advisors in the Kivus
Congo-Brazzaville
Zambia
Malawi
France
Belgium
41
42
50
54
57
61
61
66
5.
OTHER GENOCIDE SUSPECTS IN THE DRC
68
6.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
78
7.
THE NAIROBI COMMUNIQUE AS AN ANNEX
84
3
ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY
ADFL
ALIR
CCR
CDR
CNDP
DRC
ESO
FAC
FAR
FARDC
FDLR-FOCA
ICTR
MDR
MONUC
MRND
PALIR
PARECO
PL
PSD
RCD
RDR
RPA
RPF
RTLM
RUD/URUNANA
UNAMIR
Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
Liberation Army of Rwanda
Committee of Co-ordination for the Resistance
Committee for the Defence of the Republic
National Congress for the Defence of the People
Democratic Republic of Congo
Academy for Non-Commissioned Officers
Congolese Armed Forces
Rwandese Armed Forces
Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (After 2003)
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda-Fighting Forces
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Democratic Republican Movement
United Nations Organization Mission
in the Democratic Republic of Congo
National Republican Movement for Development (1975-1991) and
National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development
(1991-1994)
Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda
Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Fighters
Liberal Party
Social Democratic Party
Congolese Rally for Democracy
Republican Rally for Democracy in Rwanda
Rwandese Patriotic Army
Rwandese Patriotic Front
Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
Rally for Unity and Democracy
United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda
Terms for Administrative Units and Their Corresponding Administrators
Rwanda’s local administrative structure was changed between 2001-2006. However, in this
report, we have used the geographical locations, the names of administrative units and their
corresponding administrators as they existed in 1994.
4
INTRODUCTION
On 9 November 2007, representatives of the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) and Rwanda met in Nairobi, Kenya, and signed a communique pledging “a
common approach to address the threat posed to our common security and stability by the exFAR/Interahamwe.”1 The agreement was facilitated by the United Nations and witnessed by
the United States and the European Union. This new accord represents a comprehensive and
construc tive point of departure that could pave the way for an end to the armed presence of
the ex-FAR and interahamwe in eastern DRC, and to the needless suffering of those living in
North and South Kivu provinces, who have been the most directly and seriously damaged by
the recent violence in the region. A Welcome Expression of Intent reveals details of the
organization and functioning of the ex-FAR and interahamwe both within eastern DRC and
internationally. In publishing this report, African Rights hopes to support and encourage the
crucial process of dismantling these forces.
The protracted lack of co-operation in finding lasting solutions to long-standing problems in
eastern DRC, in which the two governments and the peoples of both countries have an
enormous stake, has profoundly hurt the entire Great Lakes region in terms of human security,
political stability and economic development. The neighbouring states of Burundi and Uganda
have also been affected by the troubles in this shared border region. Yet, as the signatories
themselves point out, there has been no shortage of agreements—bilateral, sub-regional and
regional—to promote co-operation between the DRC and Rwanda. 2 It is therefore easy, and
tempting, to write off this latest initiative as just another document. Indeed, it may turn out to
have little real impact, or far less than the civilians whose lives have been devastated need and
deserve. It is for their collective benefit that every effort must be made to translate the
promise of Nairobi into reality.
Behind the negotiations are the bloody rebellions and counter-rebellions in eastern DRC,
which have left hundreds dead, displaced thousands internally or to neighbouring countries,
and which are sowing the seeds for intractable future conflicts. The clashes have been
particularly intense in North Kivu. Here, soldiers loyal to the National Congress for the
Defence of the People (CNDP), set up by a Tutsi general, Laurent Nkunda, are at war with the
armed forces of the DRC. The communique draws special attention to the need to reign in
Nkunda’s CNDP, whose military campaigns have been a major contributing factor in the
humanitarian disaster. Also ranged against the CNDP are the Mayi Mayi militia, and the
Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Fighters, (PARECO), a militia force essentially made up of
Congolese Hutus, both working in close collaboration with the Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a Rwandese militia directed by former officers deeply
implicated in the 1994 genocide, and which counts many genocide suspects among its
1
The text of the communique is attached to this report as an annex.
Previous agreements include the Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement of 1999; the July 2002 bilateral agreement
between the DRC and Rwanda; the Principles on Good Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation between the
DRC, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda of 25 September 2003; the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in
the Great Lakes Region of 15 December 2006; and the many written engagements within the context of the
Tripartite Plus Commission which brings together the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.
2
5
combatants and civilian cadres. PARECO is in fact a creation of the FDLR. In South Kivu,
two units composed of Congolese Banyamulenge soldiers are in rebellion against the regular
army. Also operating in South Kivu is Rasta, a small militia made up of former Mayi Mayi
who have merged with elements from the FDLR. These multiple conflicts reinforce each
other, providing new opportunities and justifications for the endless cycle of conflict.
Whatever the political, ethnic and social tensions that characterize the history of eastern
Congo, there is little doubt that the seemingly permanent crisis in the Kivus dates from the
arrival of more than two million Rwandese refugees in July 1994, including soldiers of the
Rwandese Armed Forces, known as the ex-FAR, and their allies, the interahamwe militia.
Their activities, and those of the groups which express their political interests and aspirations,
and which fight on their behalf, for example the Republican Rally for Democracy (RDR), the
FDLR and the Rally for Unity and Democracy (RUD/URUNANA), are at the source of the
violence, mistrust and sense of hopelessness which feed on each other in the Kivus. In
particular, the y have hardened and widened the gulf that already existed between Congolese
of Rwandese origin —both Hutus and Tutsis—and the other ethnic groups, and these fault
lines are now part of the complex political landscape. In South Kivu, the presence of a large
number of Burundian refugees who crossed the border after the murder of President Melchior
Ndadaye in October 1993, was an additional complicating factor.
Although the most recent fighting and atrocities in the Kivus were sparked by the rebellion of
Laurent Nkunda, there is little prospect of stemming the violence, of restraining the armed
groups or of facilitating the voluntary return of Rwandese refugees without first neutralizing
the ex-FAR and interahamwe. They are the key to a realistic and successful strategy to bring
human security to the Kivus, to defuse political and ethnic tensions, to promote dialogue and
to lay the groundwork for effective and lasting regional solutions to the challenges spelt out in
Nairobi. Even if Nkunda is brought under control, so long as the ex-FAR and interahamwe
hold sway, as they do, in large parts of the Kivus, there will be neither peace nor security for
the Congolese people or Rwandese refugees, and the Great Lakes region will continue to be
unstable and fraught with tension.
In addressing the complex configurations of warfare, the Nairobi communique rightly
acknowledges that all foreign as well as national armed groups in the Kivus are part of the
problem and must be tackled in a serious, urgent, concerted and collaborative manner, and
places particular emphasis on the hazards inflicted by the ex-FAR and interahamwe. It calls
for military action to dismantle illegal armed groups, as well as political programmes to
enable fighters to lay down their arms, move away from the border areas and, for the
Rwandese, to exercise the right to choose between voluntary repatriation to Rwanda or
peaceful integration in the DRC. Rwanda and the DRC have committed themselves to impose
strict controls to prevent cross-border movements of fighters, weapons and the provision of
food and medical supplies to all groups; to refrain from giving human, material or political
support, directly or indirectly to the armed groups; to desist from engaging in destructive
propaganda against each other, to encourage and enable refugees to return home; to share
information and to use existing mechanisms to deal with issues of common concern. It urges
the DRC to “arrest and hand over to the ICTR [International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda]
and Rwanda those indicted for crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.”
6
Calling the ex-FAR/interahamwe a “genocidal military organization”, the communique also
calls on the Security Council to impose sanctions against them, and appeals to all member
states of the UN to “prevent all fund-raising, mobilization or propaganda activities of the exFAR and interahamwe.”
International concern about the serious crimes the ex-FAR and the interahamwe combatants
have inflicted on communities in eastern DRC is crucial to achieving progress in the region,
but African Rights believes that attention must simultaneously be focused on the activities and
presence of their members abroad. Little consideration, if any, has been given to their
representatives and spokespeople in Africa, Europe and North America, who raise funds;
lobby governments, Churches and NGOs for political and other support; recruit within the
large Rwandese diaspora communities; facilitate travel and travel documents for their leaders
and their families; act as conduits through which relatives send money to the fighters; win
over public opinion, especially through contacts with the media, and spread the propaganda of
their groups to mislead the world. They also travel to the DRC itself to help settle internal
disputes to maintain the cohesion and effectiveness of the ir armed forces.
The presidents of the FDLR and RUD, Ignace Murwanashyaka and Jean Marie-Vianney
Higiro, are based in Germany and the US respectively, along with other senior officials, an
advantage that gives their organizations considerable exposure and opportunities
internationally. FDLR cells or satellites exist in Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville, Tanzania,
Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, and also in
Norway, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Canada, Be lgium, France and the US. A
Welcome Expression of Intent provides extensive information about the identities and
backgrounds of the men and women who act and speak in the name of the ex-FAR and
interahamwe in the DRC and on the world stage. Many of their names are on the wanted lists
of Interpol, the US Rewards for Justice Programme and the ICTR.
Drawing on years of extensive research on issues relevant to peace and security in eastern
DRC 3 , its substantial body of work on genocide justice in Rwanda, and using new research
that consists of detailed interviews with former combatants, African Rights is publishing this
report as a contribution to the debate on some of the central questions at the heart of the
Nairobi agreement, on which so much else in the Kivus depends.
A Welcome Expression of Intent provides answers to some of the following questions:
§
§
§
§
Who are the ex-FAR and interahamwe in eastern DRC?
What is the structure of the political and military organizations to which they belong,
and how did these evolve?
What is the background of their political and military leadership?
What is the evidence that some of these military commanders and senior politicians
participated in the 1994 genocide?
3
See “The Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Cycle of Conflict, Which Way Out in the Kivus?”, December
2000, 340 pages; “Rwanda: The Insurgency in the Northwest” September 1998, 412 pages and the October 2005
Letter to the President of the Security Council.
7
§
§
§
§
§
Where are their representatives and supporters based around the world?
What is the evidence that some of them took part in the genocide?
What is the nature of the support they receive from the committees and communities
they rely on outside the DRC?
What sanctions, which the signatories urge the Security Council to impose, are
warranted and feasible?
What can, and should be done by Rwanda, the DRC, neighbouring countries, the UN,
the US, the EU and other concerned institutions and countries to help implement the
letter and spirit of the communique?
The current impasse comes at a time when the DRC is emerging from the first national
elections which observers qualified as free and fair, and in which the international community
invested considerable resources and hope. It was thought that the elections, which grew out of
long and tense negotiations would bring an end to the armed conflicts that have ravaged the
DRC for the past decade. The efforts at the local, national, regional and international levels
helped to address some of the existing crises in the DRC. But as the situation now unfolding
there shows, the Kivus require a different approach. Here, a complex, bitter and long history
has left a complicated legacy and a people who are angry and divided. Congolese of
Rwandese origin argue that they are still not accepted as full citizens, despite the elections and
regardless of a new constitution that grants them Congolese citizenship. In the long-term, the
DRC will need to reflect on the appropriate policies and measures to promote peaceful coexistence. This will not be possible as long as the Kivu region is hostage to the politics and
interests of the ex-FAR and interahamwe. Implementing the Nairobi communique is a first
step in the right direction.
8
1
A LONG CHAIN
The Origins and Evolution of the Political/Military
Organizations of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe
Between April- July 1994, Rwanda experienced a genocide, directed at the Tutsi minority, and
a war between the FAR and the rebel group, the Rwandese Patriotic Front. 4 Facing the
prospect of military defeat in early July 1994, the FAR, which had played a pivotal role in
organizing, inciting and implementing the genocide, together with politicians, civil servants,
the interahamwe militia, journalists, doctors, university lecturers, teachers and clergymen,
urged the Hutu population of Rwanda to abandon the country en masse. While some chose
Burundi or Tanzania, the overwhelming majority, estimated at two million, settled just across
the border, in North and South Kivu. The ex-FAR, as they came to be known, quickly reorganized themselves as a fighting force with the goal of recapturing power in Rwanda. They
used the camp set up for the refugees in Mugunga in North Kivu as their military
headquarters, with Major-General Augustin Bizimungu, the Chief of Staff of FAR, 5 at the
helm. The national gendarmerie was integrated into this force. Other camps which housed
substantial numbers of former soldiers and gendarmes, in addition to civilians, included
Katale, Kahindo and Kibumba in the north, and Kashusha and Panzi in the south. In addition
to the headquarters, the new military structure consisted of two divisions, each with four
brigades, with the First Division set up in Bukavu, in South Kivu, and the Second Division in
North Kivu. The fight that began then—to retur n to power in Rwanda using eastern DRC as a
military and political base—continues today.
Asked who is preventing and discouraging the return of fighters and refugees to Rwanda from
the DRC, Major-General Paul Rwakarabije divided the opponents of peaceful repatriation into
three principal categories.
Firstly, there are the extremists who are known for their participation in the genocide,
especially those who are wanted by the ICTR, men like Ildephonse Nizeyimana who is
working in Masisi in the office of the second vice-president of the FDLR, Gaston
Iyamuremye. He knows very well that he is much sought after by the institutions of justice for
his role during the genocide. Callixte Nzabonimana is also well aware that justice bodies have
their eyes on him. Here, I can also name [Faustin] Sebuhura, a captain who was the deputy
commander of the gendarmerie in Gikongoro, the deputy to Mpatswenumugabo. He is in
Masisi.
4
The war started in October 1990, when the RPA attacked from Uganda. A long process of negotiations
culminated in the Arusha Accords, signed in August 1993, which brought the war to an end, and introduced a
system of power sharing between the government, the RPF and opposition political parties. The war reignited on
the first day of the genocide, 7 April 1994.
5
Augustin Bizimungu was arrested in Angola on 2 August 2002 on an ICTR arrest warrant, and transferred to
Arusha on 14 August 2002. His case is part of the on-going joint military trial which groups together a number
of officers.
9
The second category he labelled as “hardliners.”
These individuals are not necessarily génocidaires, but their convictions make it difficult for
them to lay down their arms. Take, for example, Sylvestre Mudacumura who never tires of
saying that he worked for the regime of Habyarimana, that he is loyal to him and to no one
else.
It is also the position of Gaston Iyamuremye who, pointing to his advanced age, tries to
dissuade men younger than him, including myself, saying: “You are still young, you don’t
know the inyenzi. Me, I studied with them, I knew them in 1959/60 and I know they are bad
and can never like a Hutu. Nubaha 6 , who died recently in Belgium, used to make similar
comments.
Finally, he said, there are the “ideologues of the FDLR.”
The ideology taught by the soldiers and the civilian refugees have one centre of gravity,
namely “the wickedness of the Tutsi.” It is very close to the views expressed by the CDR
[Committee for the Defence of the Republic] before and during the genocide. The courses in
ideology are essentially based on a book entitled “Ten Years After Independence”, a book of
the Parmehutu party, and certain passages of the songs of the choir Abanyuramatwi such as
“Turatsinzegaye.”7 It’s not easy for them to think of coming back to live with the Tutsis who
they have made out to be so evil. However, I believe they can be made to see reason, slow ly
and with time. One of their teachers returned just last week, a captain.
Rwakarabije knows the military and political terrain in the DRC only too well. The head of
training, recruitment and operations at the headquarters of the national gendarmerie in
Rwanda, he arrived in Goma on 17 July 1994. He settled his family in camp Katale, and took
over as the head of the 4th brigade of the Second Division. After the closure of the camps, he
went on to become one of the top commanders during the insurgency in the northwest in
1997, and mid-1998 took charge of the insurrection after the death of his superiors. He later
became the 2nd vice president of the FDLR. He returned to Rwanda on 14 November 2003, at
the head of 113 members of his battalion, including 11 officers.
Rwakarabije’s views were echoed by Col. Evariste Murenzi, who has a similar history, first as
a fighter in the camps, then in the insurgency, when he was known as Mwalimu, and later in
the FDLR. He mentioned two senior officers in the FDLR who boast openly about their
contribution to the genocide.
Gakwerere, who was at ESO in Butare, brags about the fact that he directed the soldiers who
attacked the family of the préfet of Butare during the genocide, Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana.
Ildephonse Nizeyimana, also from ESO, is accustomed to saying, when he speaks about Tutsis
in Butare: “We really killed them.” When we were in the refugee camp at Kashusha, he got a
6
Col. Laurent Nubaha died in Belgium when he went to testify for the defence in the recent trial of Major
Bernard Ntuyahaga accused, among other charges, of involvement in the murder of 10 Belgian soldiers in Kigali
on 7 April 1994.
7
This refers to a well-known song about the victory of MDR-Parmehutu during the referendum of 21 September
1961.
10
message from the wife of Vincent Ntezimana [an academic from Butare who was prosecuted
and convicted in Belgium] asking him to testify for the defence. He spoke to me about this one
day, saying: “He can look after himself. I told him many times to mind his own business and
to leave the genocide to the soldiers. But he didn’t want to listen to me.”
The political convictions of the men who occupy senior military and political positions must
also be taken into account in order to understand the FDLR, he added.
There are others who, although perhaps not genocide suspects, have clear anti-Tutsi views, for
example Gaston Iyamuremye. He says openly that he will not return to a country run by
Tutsis. Mudacumura does not only hold extremist views; he publishes them. When we were in
Kamina, he was writing a book in Kinyarwanda, but I don’t remember the title. I read it, and it
is extremist, in the true sense of the word.
Men like Callixte Nzabonimana, Mudacumura, Ildephonse Nizeyimana and others who are
wanted for genocide, will never drop their weapons and return through voluntary repatriation.
You would have to be really naïve to believe this.
However, Murenzi underlined the urgency of dismantling the FDLR.
It is not only a menace for Congo and Rwanda, but also for other countries in the region.
When there are infiltrations into Cyangugu, the fighters often pass through Burundi. There are
also those who slip into northern Rwanda via Gisoro in Uganda.
Today, it is Rwakarabije’s job, as a member of the Commission for Demobilization and
Reintegration, to design policies which will convince his former colleagues and the men he
had commanded, and recruited, to lay down their arms, opt for voluntary repatriation and
return to their families and communities.
Rwakarabije and other former FDLR members estimate the number of fighters at 6000-7000,
and put the number of civilians in the Kivus at double that number.
Same People, Different Associations
Behind the bewildering array of acronyms, the reality is simple: the names change, but the
people remain the same. From the first association to the most recent, the core political and
military objective remains the same, namely to deny the genocide, to provide a sanctuary to
genocide suspects, to change the government in Rwanda, or at the very least to force it into
political negotiations. The emphasis and the tactics have differed at times, but over the past 13
years, there has not been a profound shift in the goals. What has changed, is the people in
leadership positions, sometimes because of personality clashes, competition for power and
influence, or because of differences over the use of funds or management style.
Much of this report focuses on the FDLR-FOCA which is, today, by far the most important of
the organizations which speak and act on behalf of the ex-FAR/interahamwe, in terms of the
territory it controls or where it has influence, and in terms of its manpower. The others are
essentially small splinter groups.
11
1995: The Creation of the RDR
The organizations which today represent the military and political interests of the ex-FAR and
interahamwe, and of the forces of genocide broadly speaking, have their origins in the
establishment, on 3 April 1995, in Mugunga camp, of the Rassemblement pour le Rétour des
réfugiés et la Démocratie au Rwanda, or Rally for the Return of Refugees and Democracy in
Rwanda.” 8 The very next day, the ex-FAR issued a statement in which they expressed their
full backing. The high command of the ex- FAR met in Bukavu on 28-29 April 1995, and
went as far as publicly asking the “go vernment in exile”, which it had put in place, to resign
in favour of the RDR.
After examining the goal and the objectives of RDR, the Rwandan Armed Forces welcomed
this positive initiative to set up an organization which can exert efficient supervision over the
population in exile, guarantee maximum cohesion and bring about influence through the
media and through diplomatic channels, which are the preliminary conditions for the return of
the refugees to their country. This is the reason why the Rwandan Armed Forces signed a
declaration of support for the RDR on April 4, 1995. The FAR believes that the Government
must be aware of its responsibilities before history, the Rwandan people in general and the
refugees in particular, [and to show this] by … resigning to let the RDR represent and defend
their interests. Therefore, the Government must hand in all the documents it has kept on behalf
of the people in exile. The relations between the FAR and the Government are being cut off as
of April 29, 1995.
The list of signatories reads like a who is who among the leaders of the genocide and of the
camps in the Kivus, of ALIR and now of the FDLR: Major-General Augustin Bizimungu;
Brigadier-General Gratien Kabiligi 9 ; Col. Murasampongo; Col. Aloys Ntiwiragabo (see
below); Col. Vénant Musonera (see below); Lt.Col. Juvénal Bahufite; Lt. Col. Antoine
Sebahire; Lt. Col. Augustin Rwamanywa 10 ; Lt. Col. Paul Rwarakabije; Lt. Col. Edouard
Gasarabwe; Lt. Col. Dr. Baransalitse; Major Aloys Ntabakuze 11 ; Major Théophile Gakara (see
below) and Major François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye. 12
The first president, Francois Nzabahimana, had been Minister of Commerce between 19911992. Its members, particularly at the senior level, included genocide suspects and genocide
ideologues, ministers, diplomats, and senior civil servants. One of the founders, and the
commissioner for political affairs, Charles Ndereyehe Ntahontuye, had been the head of an
extremist think-tank called Cercle des Républicains Progressistes (CRP). The CRP was
8
It changed its name in 2003 to Rassemblement Républicain pour la Démocratie au Rwanda (RDR), or the
Republican Rally for Democracy in Rwanda.
9
Gratien Kabiligi was promoted from colonel to brigadier-general on 8 April 1994. Responsible for security in
Kigali, he is one of the officers who directed the genocide in Kigali. He then became the deputy commander with
responsibility for the 1st Division in Bukavu. He was one of several genocide suspects arrested in Nairobi on 18
July 1997 and transferred to Arusha.
10
Lt.Col. Augustin Rwamanywa, from Mudasomwa, Gikongoro, worked in logistics in the army. After working
with the High Command in exile, he joined the insurgents in the northwest.
11
Major Aloys Ntabakuze a battalion commander in FAR was, like Kabiligi, arrested in Nairobi on 18 July 1997.
12
Major Francois -Xavier Nzuwonemeye, deputy commander of the Reconnaissance battalion in Rwanda, was
arrested in France on 15 February 2000 and arrived in Arusha on 23 May 2000.
12
instrumental in launching the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR), whose
ideology underpinned the genocide, and whose leaders and militia, the impuzamugambi,
played a significant part in the massacres in 1994. Ndereyehe, who now lives in the
Netherlands, is on Interpol’s wanted list of November 2007. The RDR was very active in the
refugee camps. But with offices in France, and later also in Belgium, the Netherlands and
Canada, it was also effective internationally. Ignace Murwanashyaka, the current president of
the FDLR, became the representative of RDR in Germany.
The RDR was essentially formed as a mechanism to circumvent the embargo imposed on the
government in exile in Zaire, as the DRC was then known, by the international community.
The government in exile was handicapped by its association with the genocide and it was
therefore necessary to found a movement that could be an intermediary between the refugees
and the world. The executive secretariat was established in Nairobi, where the treasurer,
Dénis Ntirugirimbabazi, former governor of the Central Bank of Rwanda, lived. RDR
maintained close relations with the soldiers, until there were disagreements over money
between Nzabahimana and Major-General Bizimungu. Col. André Bizimana, who would later
become a key figure in the FDLR, talked about the nature of the rift.
Bizimungu had maintained a strong hold over RDR. At the beginning of 1996, infiltrations
into Rwanda, christened “operation insecticides”, had just begun and had to be financed. To
find the money, the soldiers sold the vehicles and other property they had seized from
Rwanda. Ntirugirimbabazi had sent a sum of money for this as well. When Nzabahimana
found out about it, he asked for a report about how the funds had been used. Bizimungu
refused, fearful that this would expose the secrets of the military. That’s how mistrust and
misunderstandings arose. The treasurer, Ntirugirimbabazi, preferred to deal directly with
Major-General Bizimungu, without having to check in with either the president or the
executive secretary. 13
1996: The Founding of PALIR
The disagreements over money, and the imperative of demarcating the line between the
military and civilians, led to a new round of discussions, and the birth of a new movement,
Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda, PALIR.
Bizimungu and the other leaders of the army decided that it was better to let RDR focus on the
needs of the refugees, without getting involved in military matters. So in 1996, the high
command despatched a delegation to Nairobi to talk to RDR about setting up a new body
which could combine the political and the military aspect. From Mugunga, Bizimungu sent
two envoys, namely Col. Juvénal Bahufite 14 who was in charge of intelligence (G2) in the new
army, and Major Ntabakuze, who had been head of the Paracommando battalion in Rwanda.
When they reached Nairobi, they were joined by Major Emmanuel Neretse, who now lives in
Belgium, and who was then in Nairobi as the liaison officer between RDR and the leaders of
the army.
13
14
Interviewed in Gisenyi, 29 November 2007.
Col. Juvénal Bahufite was killed in battle in Gbadolite, DRC, in 1997.
13
So its these three officers who founded PALIR, Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda,
after letting the leaders of RDR know that they will no longer have anything to do with the
military aspect of things, and that RDR must concentrate on fighting for the peaceful return of
the refugees.
As for the new movement, PALIR, it could undertake military action since it represented the
masses who, having no other choice, “had taken up arms to reclaim the right to go back to
their country.”
When the camps were disbanded, RDR and PALIR existed side by side, with the latter seen as
a military affair, and the first as an advocate for the return of the refugees. Nevertheless, the
army always needed RDR to mobilize the international community.
There was no talk at the time, Bizimana added, of ALIR, the armed wing that would stand for
the Liberation Army of Rwanda.
They did not speak of ALIR. That came later, during the insurgency in the northwest of
Rwanda.
1997-1998: The Insurgency in the Northwest of Rwanda and the Birth of ALIR
In September 1996, the Government of Rwanda, working closely with the Governments of
Uganda and Burundi, and the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of CongoZaire (ADFL), led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, launched a war against the DRC, with the
forcible closure of the camps as a specific aim. The majority of the refugees returned to
Rwanda. Augustin Bizimungu was evacuated in a helicopter by the Congolese army.
But most of the ex-FAR either continued into the interior of Congo to fight alongside the
forces of Mobutu,—including Renzaho and Ntiwiragabo who went to Kisangani—or they
decided to remain in North Kivu, as a base from which to re-group, re-organize and to take
the war into Rwanda itself. The main pull was the proximity to Rwanda, but there were other
advantages as well. It was inhabited by Congolese of Rwandese origin who spoke
Kinyarwanda, and there was an abundance of food.
The closure of the camps inevitably brought about political uncertainty, but it also brought
political tensions to the forefront. Innocent Butare, the executive secretary of RDR 15 , resigned.
Worried about the future, which was further complicated by the existence of PALIR, the other
commissioners travelled to Brussels where the president, Nzabahimana, was living.
Nzabahimana rejected their arguments for new elections. Some of the commissioners then
published a statement, saying that RDR had become a purely political body, and would not
engage in military matters. The army, which was fighting a war, was furious, as were some
members of RDR, including Murwanashyaka who spoke out against the new position. New
elections were held in January 1998, and Victoria Ingabire was elected as the new head of
RDR.
15
Innocent Butare used to be the director of the Iwacu vocational training centre in Kabusunzu, Kigali.
14
Even before the insurgency in the northwest began in earnest in May 1997 16 , there were of
course ex-FAR soldiers who had quietly slipped into Rwanda. Their mission was to gather
intelligence, gauge the potential for local support, sensitize the population, create a network of
informants and of people who would assist their fighters, and to find new recruits as
combatants. The early infiltrators included men who would later play a critical role in the
insurgency, for example Lt. Innocent Ndamyumugabe, alias Kazungu, and Sub-Lt. Musare,
now head of the military wing of RUD-URUNANA. Others, like Captain Alexandre
Shumbusho, alias Gashumba, had taken advantage of the massive return of the refugees to
sneak back into the country. They were joined by others in the early months of 1997 to begin
acts of sabotage, in order to test the capacity of the RPA to retaliate and forestall attacks, now
that it was also fighting a war in the Congo.
In May, the attacks in the préfectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri intensified and became more
open and daring, targeting schools, local government offices, buses etc… But it was not, for
the most part, until July that the senior commanders of the insurgency, men like Léonard
Nkundiye, Paul Rwarakabije and Gaston Iyamuremye (now the 2nd vice-president of the
FDLR), entered Rwanda. In October, Col. Flodouard Mugemanyi, arrived from South Kivu
and was appointed as the chief of staff of ALIR and the overall head of ALIR/PALIR.
Officers who now hold senior positions in FDLR/FOCA, or who did until they returned to
Rwanda, were among the top commanders of ALIR.
§
§
§
§
§
Paul Rwarakabije, head of military operations and subsequently 2nd vice-president in
the FDLR;
Major Laurent Rwagakinga, now with the FDLR in Zambia, in charge of personnel
and administration, GI;
Major Appolinaire Hakizimana, alias Poète, the current commissioner for defence and
security in the FDLR, responsible for intelligence, G2;
Major Gaston Iyamuremye, 2nd vice president of the FDLR, head of the political
department responsible for relations with civilians, G5;
Jérôme Ngendahimana was the deputy to Iyamuremye and at one time was the
commander of the division in South Kivu for the FDLR.
ALIR was set up by Nkundiye, Mugemanyi and Rwarakabije who had come to realize that
they needed two institutions: PALIR to mobilize the civilian population, and a military wing.
So confident was ALIR/PALIR in its hold over the northwest that a year later, by mid-July
1998, the leadership had set up a base and a training centre for non-commissioned officers in
cellule Cya nika, sector Cyanika in commune Nyamutera, Ruhengeri. They abandoned
Nyamutera after a siege by the RPA on 22 July which led to the death of Nkundiye. Encircled
a few days later, 2 August, in Gatonde, Ruhengeri, Mugemanyi died. The remaining officers
regrouped and remained in the northwest until 10 October when Rwarakabije ordered a
general retreat back to the DRC.
16
For a detailed discussion of all aspects of the insurgency, see Rwanda: The Insurgency in the Northwest,
September 1998, African Rights, 426.
15
1997: The Departure of Renzaho and Ntiwirigabo for Sudan
Col. André Bizimana settled in Nairobi from late 1996. Nairobi was home to a large number
of genocide suspects, especially the educated. But on 18 July 1887, a number of them were
detained on arrest warrants issued by the ICTR. Two of the men who eluded arrest are among
the founding members of the FDLR, Col. Tharcisse Renzaho 17 and Col. Aloys Ntiwirigabo.
They eventually moved to Sudan. Bizimana explained how the link with Sudan came about.
The idea of Sudan came from Hyacinthe Rafiki18 , former Minister of Public Works [in 1994].
He had contacts with Joseph Kony’s Ugandan rebels, the LRA [Lord’s Resistance Army],
based in south Sudan. Through this connection, Rafiki put Renzaho and Ntiwirigabo in touch
with the Sudanese embassy in Nairobi which provided them with travel documents and
everything they needed to go to Juba in South Sudan. They arrived there as refugees, and they
were given houses by the government.
There were two important factors in the choice of Sudan as a destination. Firstly, it was the
enemy of the United States, which was seen as the principal backer of Rwanda and Uganda.
Secondly, Sudan was already home to an anti-Museveni group, and there was a belief they
would be willing to help a movement based in the DRC.
Despite the distance from Rwanda, Bizimana said that Ntiwirigabo and Renzaho kept in close
touch with developments in the north of Rwanda where ALIR was waging a war.
They sent letters via the Embassy of Sudan in Nairobi which were collected by Rafiki and
given to Col. Jean-Bosco Ruhorahoza, who died later in Kinshasa, and myself. So Ruhorahoza
and I became the go-between between ALIR and Renzaho/Ntiwirigabo. Rafiki remained our
political contact.
One of the suggestions put forward by Renzaho and Ntiwiragabo was to jettison the name of
ALIR which had been placed on a US list of terrorist organizations after the murders of
western tourists in Bwindi Park in Uganda.
1998: A New Chance for ALIR as Rwanda Launches War in the DRC
The retreat to Congo coincided with the fighting that began on 2 August 1998 when Rwanda,
working with the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) declared war on Congo. The war
created a new and vital political opening for ALIR/PALIR. Within a few days, said Bizimana,
a diplomat at the Congolese embassy in Nairobi made contact with him and Ruhorahoza and
they met him at Ruhorahoza’s house.
He told us: “The personal envoy of President Kabila in Brussels would like to speak to your
chief of staff so we can work together.” We asked him to give us two days, during which we
contacted Major Emmanuel Neretse in Belgium to verify this request at the embassy of Congo
17
Col. Tharcisse Renzaho was the préfet of Kigali in 1994 and was the overall supervisor of the killings in the
city. See Col.Tharcisse Renzaho: A Soldier in the DRC? October 2001, African Rights, Charge Sheet No. 6, 23
pages. He was arrested in the DRC on 29 September 2002 and was taken into the custody of the ICTR in Arusha
on 30 September. His trial is in progress.
18
According to some of the people we spoke with, Hyacinthe Rafiki is living either in Kinshasa or in Cameroon.
16
in Belgium. He confirmed the request, so we told the diplomat in Nairobi that we were ready
to help Kabila, provided we got something in writing from Kabila himself.
On 10 August, Bizimana said he and Dr Casimir Bizimungu, the Minister of Health in 1994,
met in Nairobi with a minister in Kabila’s government, and one of his advisors.
We gave them the necessary assurances, pointing out that we were also in touch with our
officers in Brazzaville, those fighting in Rwanda as well as with Renzaho and Ntiwirigabo in
Sudan. Casimir Bizimungu became the political go-between with Congolese officials, and I
became the military go-between.
A few hours after this exchange, Bizimana left for Lubumbashi with the two advisors. The
next day, they reached Kinshasa where the discussions concentrated on Congo’s urgent need
for the ex-FAR soldiers living in the refugee camps in Congo-Brazzaville, “to come and
protect Kinshasa.” ALIR had other priorities, as Bizimana informed the Congolese.
We asked them to send military supplies to our soldiers in the east so we could begin largescale assaults in Rwanda, thereby forcing Rwanda to withdraw its troops from Congo. But
Kabila’s envoys insisted on the security of Kinshasa, saying everything else can be taken care
of later.
Bizimana was then told that President Dénis Sassou-Nguesso of Congo-Brazzaville had given
the green light for the ex-FAR in his country to cross the border into DRC, provided the move
was “invisible and no one knew about it.” Nguesso had his own reasons to be grateful to the
ex-FAR, for they were instrumental in helping him topple the government of Pascal Lisuba,
and in restoring him to power.
It was Bizimana who went to find and prepare the ex-FAR in the camps.
To find my way around, I first made contact with a man called Babona from Karago, Gisenyi,
married to a certain Séraphine who was head of the Rwandese community. She had been
installed in Brazzaville by Agathe Habyarimana. This Séraphine used to work for the RDR in
camp Kibumba, North Kivu. I also met with Sub-Lt. Gatambiye from Bushiru, Gisenyi. I
heard he had led a platoon of Rwandese which had enabled Sassou to take the airport of
Mayamaya in the north of Brazzaville.
He learned the identities of some of the ex-FAR officers in Brazzaville, who are now almost
all in the senior ranks of the FDLR.
§
§
§
§
§
Captain [François-Xavier] Birikunzira;
Major Mbarushimana 19 ;
Major Emmanuel Nyamuhimba, in camp Lukolela;
Major Léodomir Mugaragu, in camp Kinkele;
Captain [Anastase] Munyakayanza, in camp Lilanga.
He assembled some 800 ex-FAR, joined by about 1,400 young volunteers. The brigade was
led by Major Mugaragu and crossed the border into the DRC on 5 October 1998, preceded by
19
Major Mbarushimana had been a personal assistant to Augustin Bizimana in Rwanda.
17
Angolan and Zimbabwean soldiers. Bizimana returned to Congo-Brazzaville to recruit
additional soldiers.
We found 2200 men in camp Lukolela, under the leadership of Nyamuhimba. Two batallions
which he commanded were sent to Gbadolite.
More fighters came from the Central African Republic.
Evariste Nyampame came with 380 men. Mudacumura was also in the CAR, but he was under
arrest as the government there suspected him of involvement in a coup attempt.20 He came
later to the DRC, in March 1999.
The new arrivals were integrated into the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC). When referring to
them, fighters in the east describe those who fought in the west as “ALIR 2.”
Ntiwirigabo and Renzaho returned from Sudan after the troops from Congo-Brazzaville, led
by Mugaragu, had been sent to the front.
Renzaho and Ntiwiragabo took command of the troops out of the hands of Mugaragu which
created tension between them.
Ntiwirigabo remained in Kinshasa, but Renzaho settled in Lubumbashi.
Murenzi gave figures for the strength of ALIR 2 at the time.
The manpower of the ex-FAR in western DRC was roughly the same as those fighting in the
east, between 5000-6000. So in total, I would say there were about 11,000 ex-FAR soldiers in
the DRC.
Most of the ex-FAR fought in Pweto, but two battalions were also dispatched to the Equateur
region.
In the meantime, in the east, ALIR/PALIR, on 14 September, attacked Goma, the capital of
North Kivu and a town that was then in the hands of Rwanda and its allies, “to show the
government of Kinshasa that we were their natural allies”, as Rwakarabije, who ordered the
raid while he was himself still in Rwanda, put it. The strategy was successful, as the
discussion above shows. A certain Sebuyange, alias Nkota, was sent by Kabila to the east as a
liaison officer. Still, commented Rwakarabije, they waited in vain in the east for tangible
signs of the new friendship with Kabila’s government. What they wanted, above all else, were
weapons. They were promised help, but one condition.
They told us we could have the weapons provided we worked together with the Mayi Mayi
militia and the Congolese army. They wanted us to mix with the Congolese so the local
population would have confidence in us, and not see us simply as Rwandese who wanted to
return to their country.
20
According to Bizimana, Ntiwirigabo visited the Central African Republic to press for his release, but failed,
and that he was only released after the intervention of senior officials from the DRC.
18
1998: The Founding of the CCR
The military defeat of ALIR and its inclusion on the US list of terrorist organizations
weakened the hand of ALIR/PALIR in the negotiations with the DRC government. It became
necessary to start up a new organization which could speak on behalf of the ex-FAR, and
thereby strengthen their hand. Ruhorahoza, Dr Bizimungu and Bizimana came up with the
name of the Committee of Co-ordination for the Resistance (CCR) with Bizimungu as
president, Ruhorahoza as chief of operations and logistics and Bizimana in charge of
administration and intelligence. Augustin Ngirabatware 21 , the Minister of Planning in the
interim government, who lived in Libreville, Gabon, was given the portfolio for external
relations. The Intercontinental Hotel in Kinshasa served as their headquarters.
On 4 October 1998, Hyacinthe Rafiki and Renzaho arrived in Kinshasa, and the steering
committee of the CCR was broadened. Bizimungu remained president, but new appointments
were made.
§
§
§
§
§
§
Executive Secretary and Chief of the Armed Forces: Renzaho;
Service for documentation and security: Rafiki;
Overall military commander and head of logistics: Aloys Ntiwiragabo;
Administration and personnel (G1): A captain whose identity we have not been able to
establish;
Intelligence (G2): Bizimana
Training, recruitment and operations: (G3): Ruhorahoza
On 10 October, Rwakarabije ordered all ALIR fighters to leave Rwanda and to return to the
DRC. In December 1998, Major Protais Mpiranya, commander of the Presidential Guard
during the genocide, arrived in Kinshasa from Cameroon. He was named as the commanding
officer of a unit fighting in Mbujimayi. Dr. Bizimungu returned to Nairobi to evacuate his
family, but stayed longer than he planned and was arrested on 11 February 1999 on an arrest
warrant from the ICTR.
1999: The Emergence of the FDLR
The FDLR was born out of an internal struggle for power and influence between the leaders
of the CCR. Bizimana said that he first learned about the FDLR in a meeting that Renzaho
called on 14 February 1999.
He told us that he, Ntiwirigabo and Rafiki had set up a new group, the Democratic Forces for
the Liberation of Rwanda, FDLR. They had decided on this new initiative on the quiet,
without involving anyone else. Rafiki did not get along with Bizimungu.
21
Augustin Ngirabatware was arrested in Frankfurt, Germany, in September 2007. See the statement issued by
African Rights and Redress, “The First Arrest of a Rwandese Genocide Suspect in Germany: Augustin
Ngirabatware in Detention”, 20 September 2007.
19
When Bizimana and Ruhorahoza voiced their objections, he said they in turn were accused of
associating with the RDR which they said had turned its back on the army in the past.
They very quickly informed Kabila that the FDLR was the only legitimate link between the
ex-FAR and the DRC. The only outstanding question was what to call the military branch. As
they didn’t know what the ex-FAR in the east thought, they decided to wait.
Ntiwirigabo became president of the FDLR, and an angry Ngirabatware resigned from the
CCR and refused to become part of FDLR. Ignace Murwanashyaka replaced Ngirabatware as
the commissioner for external affairs, this time in the framework of the FDLR.
Murwanashyaka was, until then, known in ex-FAR circles as a representative of the RDR in
Germany, and for the fact that he had challenged his colleagues when they wanted to distance
themselves from the army. Célestin Harelimana, a protocol officer at the presidency during
Habyarimana’s time, who comes from Greater Kigali, became the commissioner for politics.
Murenzi gave details of the new FDLR-ALIR 2 structure:
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
President and commander of ALIR 2: Ntiwiragabo in Kinshasa;
Deputy Commander and in charge of operations; Renzaho in Lubumbashi;
Chief of Staff: Sylvestre Mudacumura in Pweto;
G1: Col. Bernard Uwizeyimana from Byumba;
G2: Col. André Bizimana ;
G3: No one was appointed to this position as Renzaho was in charge of operations;
G4: A lieutenant known as Saddam from Bugesera.
The negotiations to end the war in the DRC gained momentum with the signing of the Lusaka
Accords on 10 July 1999, which threatened the political ties of the ex-FAR with the DRC. To
bolster their position, Rwakarabije said they formalized their collaboration with the proKinshasa Mayi Mayi. The convention was signed by Rwakarabije for the ex-FAR, and on
behalf of the Mayi Mayi by their leader at the time, Kalendo Bulenda, alias Padiri22
The despatch of the arms to the ex-FAR was delayed, but the first plane carrying bullets and
communication equipment arrived in North Kivu in September 1999, and they continued; in
2001 deliveries were also made to South Kivu.
The fall of Pweto in July 2000 was the beginning of the end of what was known as ALIR2.
Mudacumura himself was evacuated to safety in Kabongo, and his troops fled to Kamina.
Mudacumura relocated to Kamina, and ALIR2 was restructured. Mudacumura became the
chief of staff, Major Sébastien Uwimbabazi, alias Nyembo 23 , who comes from Kibuye, took
over G2, Murenzi was appointed to G3 and Fred Irakiza, alias Nsanzubukire, who now works
with the FDLR in South Kivu, was given responsibility for G4.
Pweto was also a turning point in the relations between the ex-FAR and Kinshasa. Bizimana
spoke of the multiple challenges that Kinshasa faced.
22
23
Kalendo Bulenda, Padiri, is now a senior officer in the DRC.
Major Sébastien Uwimbabazi remains with the FDLR in Masisi.
20
After the unforgettable defeat at Pweto, the central government in Kinshasa realized that it
was impossible to achieve its military objectives in their entirety: to get the RPA out of Congo
first, then to help us take power back in Rwanda. In addition, they were under pressure from
the international community, they were involved in negotiations with other rebel groups and
the Zimbabweans were highly critical of the military performance of FAC soldiers at the front.
Kabila put an offer on the table that the ex-FAR did not like, but which they could not refuse.
He said he would continue to help us, but on the political level. He invited the SecretaryGeneral of the UN to visit Kinshasa to show him that the DRC was serious about disarming
the FDLR. He asked us to give him a brigade to be disarmed and confined, to show the world
that this was the only ex-FAR unit in the country. We had no choice and proposed the 1780
brigade led by Col. Ndagijimana, alias Ndanda Vincent, from Gikongoro. They were confined
in Kamina and some of their weapons were burnt in front of the cameras.
Kabila made another suggestion which would change the balance of power within the FDLR
itself.
During the preparations for this event, Kabila insisted that the FDLR choose, as their
spokesperson, someone who was not wanted for genocide. He felt he could not introduce the
president, Ntiwirigabo, to a visiting UN delegation.
After discussions, Ignace Murwanashyaka’s name was put forward.
Although he was young and lacked experience, he didn’t have a history in Rwanda, and was
known for being an eloquent speaker, as well as having other advantages. He was appointed as
vice-president, but told to speak as if he was the president of the FDLR. However, it was made
clear to him that Ntiwirigabo remained the real, and only, president.
The Secretary-General of the UN at the time, Kofi Annan, did not meet with the FDLR
himself, but sent one of his senior officials.
2000: Ignace Murwanashyaka Assumes the Presidency
Murwanashyaka was confirmed as vice-president by the congress of October 2000. He came
out of Ntiwiragabo’s shadow in December 2001 when he became the official president, a
position he retains until today. Aged 44, Murwanashyaka comes from commune Mugusa in
Butare and graduated from the University of Bonn in 1998 with a PhD in economics.
The changeover was a difficult process, recalled Murenzi.
We asked Ntiwir igabo, in different meetings, to yield the presidency to somebody else for two
reasons. As head of ALIR2, he was seen as a terrorist. And he was sought after by the
Rwandese justice system for genocide. But he rejected the suggestion, and I remember that
Alexis Nshimiyimana had to come from Austria to ask him to step aside and allow the FDLR
to function. After putting up a lot of resistance, he finally gave in and Murwanashyaka took
his place
21
Other appointments were made at the same time.
§
§
§
1st vice-president : Jean Marie -Vianney Higiro;
2nd vice-president : Paul Rwarakabije ;
Executive secretary: Alexis Nshimiyimana.
On 16 January 2001, Kabila was murdered and was succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila, who
had been his chief of staff of the army. It was an uncertain time for the ex-FAR from Rwanda,
commented Rwarakabije, as they immediately perceived a change of tactics on the part of the
new Kabila.
Joseph Kabila struck us as someone who put more emphasis on political negotiations with his
opponents, and was less interested in a military approach. We began to think more about the
political aspect of our fight, without giving up on the armed struggle.
Murwanashyaka returned in 2001, this time to undergo military training. Murenzi was one of
officers who trained him.
He first came to Lubumbashi for an induction course intended for civil servants or future
political leaders. I remember well that I gave him a course entitled “an initiation to the life of
the military” which lasted less than a month and took place at the military camp at Kimbembe.
After that, he went back to Germany. The other participants in the course included Dr
Cyimana who lives in Zambia (see below).
2002-2003: Regrouping in the East
The period after Kabila’s death was, for ALIR2, a difficult time, especially coming so soon
after Pweto. There were other setbacks. In July 2002, the US State Department included
Rwanda on its Rewards for Justice Programme for the ICTR indictees still at large. Almost
immediately afterwards, on 2 August, Major-General Augustin Bizimungu was arrested in
Angola, and on 29 September Renzaho was picked up in the DRC.
In November, ALIR2, including Mudacumura, made preparations to go east. They arrived in
Kilembwe, South Kivu, on 15 February 2003 and were welcomed by Rwakarabije and his
officers.
2004: RUD-URUNANA Comes Into Its Own
On 12 September 2004, Jean Marie-Vianney Higiro, who lived in the US, left the FDLR.
Together with Félicien Kanyamibwa, also based in the US and who had been the treasurer of
the FDLR, he founded the Rally for Unity and Democracy. The word “Urunana”, means a
chain in Kinyarwanda. The rupture with Murwanashyaka seems to have occurred, at least in
part, over disagreements about money. AN-Imboneza, whose creation is discussed below,
subsequently became the armed wing of RUD/URUNANA.
22
2005: The Announcement of CMC-FOCA, FDLR-CMC
Most of the disagreements to date were between politicians, but in 2005 it was the armed
wing of the FDLR—FOCA—which was marred by dissent. In June 2005, Séraphin
Bizimungu, alias Amani Mahoro, challenged FOCA when he established a dissident wing, the
Military Command for Change. He gave his reasons for “taking his distance.”
I supported the Sant’Egidio accords signed in Italy on 31 March 2005. 24 But Mudacumura and
others around him had a different opinion, so I went my own way and put together what we
called CMC-FOCA
Col. Nsabimana, alias Rubasha, who comes from Giciye in Gisenyi, became Bizimungu’s
deputy, and an officer known by his nickname, Castro, but whose real name is Balthazar
Ntakamarishavu (or Ntakarimaze), from Byumba, became his chief of staff.
Bizimungu himself returned to Rwanda in December 2005, and the other two officers are now
in Zambia. But it was not the end of CMC, for FDLR-CMC, with Christophe Hakizabera as
leader, soon emerged. Hakizabera lives in Belgium.
I didn’t use the name FDLR-FOCA. It’s rather politicians who were against Murwanashyaka,
who decided to ally with this new military branch.
2005-2006: Rasta Comes to Light
Since 2005, a very small, but extremely brutal group calling itself Rasta, began to prey on
civilians in South Kivu. Though estimated at perhaps less than 100 men, who have no
identifiable political objective and who seem to operate essentially as bandits, they have made
their mark. In an interview in August 2007, General Sylvain Tshikwej, FARDC commander
of the 10th military region, told IRIN that Rasta includes deserters from the FDLR, adding:
“These elements use Congolese as guides during the raids.”
Rwakarabije has no doubts about Rasta’s connections to the FDLR.
Rasta is made up of the Mayi Mayi group which used to be called Mudundu 40, who have
merged with some FDLR elements.
Modibo Traore, head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA) in Bukavu, made similar observations.
I say Rasta is one with the FDLR because they operate untouched in areas that are controlled
by the FDLR. How they operate is this: because FDLR cannot raid the people in the areas they
control and are known to the people, they send a small group of their men to distant villages to
loot and rob; they distance themselves from such groups, saying they are the Rasta, yet in
24
On 31 March 2005, Ignace Murwanashyaka read a statement in which the FDLR undertook to end their war, to
disarm its fighters and to transform itself into a purely political organization. The negotiations were spearheaded
by a Roman Catholic lay community, Sant’Egidio, who have been involved in peace endeavours elsewhere in the
world.
23
reality they are the same. How come the loot the Rasta take often ends up in the hands of the
FDLR or being shared in areas that are controlled by the FDLR”?25
2006: A Revolt in FOCA Leads to AN-Imboneza
Another important development in 2005 was the decision by Col. Jean-Damascène Ndibabaje,
alias Musare, head of a brigade in Walikale, to form a splinter group. An argument between
Mudacumura and Musare appears to have been the spark. A corporal in one of Musare’s
companies shed light on the incident, and its consequences.
Even before Musare arrived back at base, we heard about the fight between him and
Mudacumura. We heard there was a discussion about money, and that Musare had suggested
giving each fighter more than Mudacumura had proposed. When he got back, he was asked
about it at a meeting. He avoided the question, no doubt because he didn’t want to tarnish the
image of FDLR-FOCA in the eyes of us, the simple soldiers. Musare is someone who believes
profoundly in the legitimacy of the war against the government in Rwanda. He has no quarrel
with what the FDLR stands for as such. He’s simply against what he sees as bad policies on
the part of certain leaders which might bring about the defeat of the FDLR.
Within a few days, Musare was demoted. From commander of a brigade, he was appointed as
a liaison officer with the local civilian population, a position normally given to someone much
more junior. This corporal said that the announcement was greeted with anger within the
brigade which, after a meeting, issued a statement.
There were three main aspects to our declaration:
§
§
§
We criticized and rejected the changes imposed on our brigade;
We denounced the dictatorship within the leadership of FOCA;
We spoke about the lack of consideration for ordinary soldiers.
There were various attempts at mediation by the senior echelon, including Emmanuel
Kanyandekwe26 , Léodomir Mugaragu and Gaston Iyamuremye, but Musare rejected their
overtures. Finally, Murwanashyaka himself came from Germany. But Musare would not
budge, and in June 2006 Mudacumura’s soldiers attacked Musare’s brigade on 5-6 occasions.
Musare then established AN-Imboneza and allied himself with RUD/URUNANA.
25
“Behind the violence in South Kivu”, IRIN, 3 August 2007.
Emmanuel Kanyandekwe, who became a brigadier-general in the FDLR and was the deputy commander of
FOCA, died at the end of 2006.
26
24
2
THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRUCTURE
OF THE FDLR/RUD TODAY
In analysing the top echelons of the FDLR/RUD, as well as the background of their
representatives and supporters, there are few surprises. For the most part, they come from the
préfectures in the north of the country, Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Byumba and Greater Kigali,
especially the communes of Rushashi and Tare in the north of Greater Kigali. During the time
of President Habyarimana, power, privilege and wealth were concentrated in the hands of
people from these préfectures, in particular Gisenyi, Habyarimana’s home region. The
politicians were almost all loyal and long-term members of the ruling party, the National
Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND), or they belo nged to the
hard- line faction of the Republican Democratic Movement, MDR-Power, or to the most
extreme of the political parties in existence, the Committee for the Defence of the Republic
(CDR). Many of them were also shareholders in the RTLM, which came to be known as radio
machete.
The Political Leadership of the FDLR
The political branch of the FDLR has its seat in localité Mbeshimbeshi, groupement
Ufamando 2, collectivité Katoyi in zone Masisi. But some of the men at the helm are based in
Europe. The men who make the political decisions are:
§
§
§
§
§
§
President: Ignace Murwanashyaka, Germany;
1st Vice-President: Straton Musoni:, Germany; 27
2nd Vice-President: Brigadier-General Gaston Iyamuremye, alias Rumuli Michel, in
Masisi;
Executive Secretary: Callixte Mbarushimana, France;
Deputy Executive Secretary: Col. Rumbago (a codename) from Gitarama; Masisi:
Principal private secretary and director of Murwanashyaka’s office in Masisi, Jean
Marie-Vianney Nyawenda 28 from Nyanza, Butare.
The Executive Secretary is responsible for the different commissions of the FDLR. The
commissioners who run them are based in the DRC.
§
Commissioner for Defence and Security, Brigadier-General Appolinaire Hakizimana,
alias Poète; Commissioner for Finance and Patrimony, Gilbert Rucira from Kibungo, a
graduate in economics who used to work at the National Bank of Rwanda;
27
There are reports that Straton Musoni may have moved to France.
Nyawenda’s older brother, Major Guerchome Ngayaberura, is with the FDLR in Zambia; see later discussion
on the strength of the FDLR in Zambia.
28
25
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Commissioner for Politics: A civil engineer from Kibuye who used to have a
construction company called SOCOFI;
Commissioner for Social Affairs and Education: Gabriel Kabanda, alias Mikekemo,
from Gatonde in Ruhengeri. A former monk, he was the prefect of studies in the
secondary section of APE Rugunga, a private school in Rugunga, Kigali;
Commission for Information: Ignace Nkaka, alias Laforge, 29 from Karago in Gisenyi.
He studied literature at the University of Nyakinama;
Commissioner for Mobilization and Propaganda, Enock Dusabe from Butaro in
Ruhengeri. He was a teacher at Group Scolaire in the town of Butare;
Commission for Gender: Eugénie Niyonizigiye from Byumba. In 1994 she was
studying in Russia and is said to have been in Rwanda for holidays when the genocide
began;
Commissioner for Documentation: A civilian with the nickname of Maboko from
Kibuye who used to be a lecturer at Nyakinama University;
Commissioner for External Relations: Juma Ngirinshuti;
Commissioner for Human Rights, Basabose Testament from Karago in Gisenyi. A
student in Rwanda in 1994, he subsequently studied law in the DRC;30
The FDLR has three regional committees to oversee it s activities in the Kivus. The mission of
the regional committees is to sensitize the Rwandese living in the DRC and to take a census as
to their numbers.
§
Regional Committee One runs Rutchuru, Rubero and a part of Walikale in North
Kivu, under the direction of someone with the nickname of Santa Maria Haridi, a
technician from Musasa or Shyorongi, Greater Kigali, who was working for the
government’s telecommunications company;
§
Regional Committee Two is responsible for Masisi, south Walikale and Kalehe. Its
director is a certain Baptiste from Cyangugu who was a student in his first year of
medicine at Butare University;
§
Regional Committee Three runs South Kivu. We were not able to find out who is in
charge of this committee.
Some of the Active Civilian Supporters
§
Callixte Nzabonimana, Minister of Youth in the interim government of 1994 has long
been an important advisor to the FDLR, though he appears to have been somewhat
sidelined of late. He apparently lives in Kibua, but spends much of his time in
Nyabyondo where he owns a carpentry centre. Nzabonimana comes from commune
Nyabikenke, Gitarama;
29
Ignace Nkaka is the younger brother of Lt.Col. Léonard Nkundiye, the deputy chief of staff of ALIR until his
death in July 1998.
30
His predecessor as the Commissioner for Human Rights is Charles Rwanga who has lived in Zambia for at
least three years and is now said to be a member of RUD. A lawyer from Butaro, Ruhengeri, Rwanga was
working for Electrogaz
26
§
§
§
Damien Biniga, a deputy préfet in Gikongoro in charge of the sous-préfecture of
Munini. He has been a member of the political commission;
Cyrille Nsanzimihigo, alias Bahati, bourgmestre of Satinsyi, Gisenyi. In 1994,
Nsanzimihigo instigated and co-ordinated the genocide in his commune;
Charles Modeste, a former judge from Kibuye, a member of the Judicial Commission.
FOCA: The Military Wing of the FDLR
Since most combatants, and many of the members, are known by a nickname, or by their nom
de guerre, it is not always easy to establish their full identity. Sometimes, the interviewee may
know only the first name, the place of origin or prior occupation in Rwanda. But by
interviewing a broad section of people, we have been able to put together a fairly
comprehensive picture of the structure of the FDLR and RUD which we present below.
In North Kivu, the headquarters of the FDLR-FOCA is in the localité of Kalonge, groupement
Ufamando 2, collectivité of Katoyi in the zone of Masisi.
General Sylvestre Mudacumura
§
§
§
§
§
Overall commander: General Sylvestre Mudacumura, alias Mupenzi Bernard, from
Kibilira, Gisenyi;
Deputy Commander: Stanislas Nzeyimana, alias Bigaruka or Izabayo Déo, from
Butare. During the PALIR/ALIR insurgency in the northwest, he was responsible for
the operational sector which covered the sous-préfecture of Ngororero and certain
communes of Kibuye and Gitarama ; 31
Chief of Staff: Brigadier-General Léodomir Mugaragu, alias Manzi Léon, from
Rushashi, Greater Kigali. Before leaving Rwanda, he was deployed at military
headquarters;
G1, administration and Personnel: Col. Donath Habimana from Byumba, who used to
be in charge of personnel in Umutara;
G2, military intelligence: Lt.Col. Bizumuremyi from Butare, a former sub- lieutenant;
31
One of the communes was Kivumu, Kibuye. On 18 March 1997, insurgents killed six students and a security
guard at a school in Nyange and injured 20 others. They sought to separate the children into Hutus and Tutsis, so
they could more easily target the Tutsi children. But the Hutu students refused, and the attack was indiscriminate.
27
§
§
§
G3, training, recruitment and operations: Col. Cyprien Uzabakiriho, alias Tedeum,
from Murambi in Byumba. He was a sub- lieutenant in Rwanda;
G4, logistics: Lt.Col. Samuel Rucogoza;
G5, political department responsible for relations with civilians, Lt.Col. Amri
Bizimana, alias Idrissa.
Col. Donath Habimana
There are two divisions in North and South Kivu.
The First Division, North Kivu
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
32
Commander: Col. Pacifique Ntawunguka, 43, alias Omega, from Gaseke in Gisenyi.
He was a lieutenant in charge of the 4th battalion in Rwanda. During the insurgency, he
was head of sector Kingogo which grouped together communes from Gisenyi and
Gitarama;
Deputy Commander: Lt.Col. Ezéchiel Gakwerere 32 , alias Mokoko/Sibo Stany, is from
Rukara, Kibungo, and was serving at the Academy for Non-Commissioned Officers;
Chief of Staff: This position has not been filled;
G1 : Lt.Col.Sébastien Uwimbabazi, alias Manzi Christian, from commune Mukingo,
Ruhengeri;
G2 : The position is occupied by a lieutenant colonel, but we were unable to find out
his name;
G3: Lt.Col. Marc Habimana, alias Ndinzimihigo from Nyamutera, Ruhengeri;
G4: Lt. Col. Ephrem Manirabaruta, alias Furaha Honoré;
G5: The officer in charge, Lt.Col. Appolinaire Kwitonda, alias Mandela, died recently;
Some commentators also refer to his first name as Jean-Baptiste.
28
The four battalions that make up the division are:
§
§
§
§
1st battalion: Lt.Col. Elie (a nickname), from Greater Kigali;
2nd battalion: Lt.Col. Jean Marie-Vianney Kanzeguhera, (the surname could also be
Bizumuremyi) alias Sadiki Citadin from Karago, Gisenyi;
3rd battalion: The previous commander, Ndinzimihigo, has been transferred to G3 and
he has yet to be replaced;
4th battalion: Lt.Col. Tharcisse Nditirende, alias Hussein or Walen, from Butare.
The Second Division, South Kivu
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Commander: Col. Léopold Mujyambere, 45, alias Musenyeri Achille from Tare,
Greater Kigali. He was the head of a company within the Presidential Guard and had
gone to Arusha as part of the advance security team on 6 April 1994. He was still in
Arusha when Habyarimana’s plane crashed;
Deputy commander: Col. Félicien Mureramanzi, alias Kanze Kabobo from Nkuli,
Ruhengeri;
Chief of Staff: The division does not have one;
G1: Lt.Col. Nkundabakura, alias Taylor. Since he is said to be mentally unstable, his
place has been taken by LT.Col. Esthère Mukakinanira, alias Aminata or Tiger, from
Kibuye;
G2: Lt.Col. Uwimana, alias Sharafu from Kayove, Gisenyi;
G3: Lt. Col. Josué Hagenimana, alias Boniface, from Nyamutera, Ruhengeri;
G4: Lt.Col. Ferdinand Nsengiyumva, alias Bemba Bahizi;
G5: Lt.Col. Jean Marie-Vianney Ntahomvukiye, alias Igiraneza or Mirano from
Kibuye.
The four battalions that make up the division are:
1st battalion which covers the zone of Uvira-Sange and its environs : Lt.Col. Félicien
Nsanzubukire, alias Fred Irakiza. He is from Kinyinya in Kigali city.
2nd battalion which is responsible for the zone of Walungu-Mpesi and the areas close to it:
Major Abraham Bisengimana, alias Mutima, from Kibuye.
3rd battalion, in charge of the zone of Kilembwe and the surrounding area: Major Magambo,
alias Rugina.
4th battalion, which stretches across the zone of Mwenga and the surrounding area: Lt.Col.
Anastase Munyaneza, alias Job Kulamba, from Gitarama.
The Reserve Brigade
The leaders of FOCA-FDLR have the right to use the reserve brigade, consisting of three
battalions, to intervene wherever they see fit.
§
Commander: Lt.Col. Félicien Nzabamwita, alias Kalume André from Byumba. He is
alleged to have taken part in the genocide in Kicukiro, Kigali;
29
§
§
§
§
Deputy Commander; Lt.Col. Anaclet Hitimana, alias Kabuyoya Gasarasi from
Cyangugu;
1st battalion: Lt. Col. Wellars Nsengiyumva, alias Cirus from Kanama, Gisenyi;
2nd battailon: Lt.Col. Augustin Nsengimana, alias Kadanse, from Cyangugu served in
the 71st battalion (Huye battalion) based on Mont Kigali during the genocide under
Major Faustin Ntirikina, now a brigadier-general in FDLR (see below). Kadanse has
been particularly implicated in the massacres at the Parish of Ste. Famille as discussed
later in this report;
3rd battalion: Lt.Col. Noël Habiyaremye (or the name might be Habiyambere) alias
Frank, from Musha, commune Gikomero, Greater Kigali. He left for Zambie at the
end of Septembre 2007.
Other key figures in the military structure include:
§
§
§
Col. Sylvestre Sebahinzi, alias Zinga Zinga/Double Z, from Karago, Gisenyi, is the
military prosecutor;
Col. Faustin Sebuhura, alias Minani Marius, is the overall co-ordinator of military
training, for both senior officers and non-commissioned officers;
Major Hamad Harelimana, alias Bora Aziz, works in Murwanashyaka’s office in
Masisi, together with Jean Marie-Vianney Nyawenda.
Other officers affiliated with the FDLR include;
§
§
§
§
Lt. Col. David Mberabahizi, alias Mbezi, who used to be a paracomando;
Major Jean de Dieu Nzabanita, alias Romel, from Gikongoro. He was studying at the
Ecole supérieure militaire (ESM) in 1994, North Kivu;
Major Rugina, South Kivu
Warrant Officer Sendegeya, alias Shamamba, a former member of the Presidential
Guard.
The Political Leadership of RUD/URUNANA
Being a newer organization, RUD/URUNANA has a much smaller structure. However, as is
apparent from this report, it is gradually gaining more members as political alliances shift, and
those who area dissatisfied with the FDLR, for whatever reason, find a political home in
RUD/URUNANA.
§
§
President: Jean Marie Vianney Higiro, 58, based in the US where he is a professor in
the Department of Communicatio ns in Western New England College in Springfield,
MA He left Rwanda shortly before the genocide and had been the head of Radio
Rwanda. He comes from Mukarange, Byumba.
Executive Secretary: Félicien Kanyamibwa, 46, works for the pharmaceut ical
company, Hoffman-La-Roche in Nutley, New Jersey. He comes from Nkuli,
Ruhengeri. He was previously treasurer of the FDLR.
30
The Military Leadership of RUD/URUNANA
RUD/URUNANA has a separate military organization known as AN-Imboneza, based in
North Kivu, in localité Mashuta, groupement Kalehe, collectivité Banyanga, in zone Walikale
(The AN stands for National Army). It encompasses the Roquette brigade, with about 300
fighters, and Inkeragutabara based in Uganda, which was established by former sold iers of the
RPA, which is also known as Ingabo z’Umwami, the Army of the King.
The structure of AN-Imboneza is as follows:
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Overall commander: Col. Jean-Damascène Ndibabaje, alias Musare, from Mutura in
Gisenyi. He was a sous- lieutenant in Rwanda, part of the 64th battalion, where he is
said to have been the head of a company. This battalion, based between the communes
of Mbogo and Mugambazi during the genocide where its members committed
numerous atrocities. Musare was part of the operational sector Nazareth during the
insurgency, working in Ruhengeri, western Byumba and Greater Kigali. By the time
the insurgents were ordered to retreat to the DRC, he had become head of training,
recruitment and operations for a battalion named 001. When he reached Congo, he
became deputy commander of the Thorax brigade. And in 2001, he became the head
of this brigade which had changed its name to Roquette;
Deputy commander: Lt.Col. Martin Nzitonda, alias Rizinjirabake Roshidi from
Gatovu, Nkuli in Ruhengeri. He was a sub-lieutenant in the 31 st battalion in
Mukarange/Bymba in Rwanda;
S1, administration and personnel: Lt. Colonel Bernard Hitimana, alias Africa Michel;
S2, military intelligence: Lt.Col. Nteziyaremye alias Makoto, from Kinigi in
Ruhengeri. He is said to have been in the Paracommando battalion in Rwanda;
S3, training, recruitment and operations: Lt.Col, Nzitonda, the deputy head, is also
responsible for S3;
S4, logistics: Sub-Lt. Samuel Bahembera, alias Fungaroho, from Kinigi who, before
going into exile, was a sergeant in the 64th battalion;
S5, political department responsible for relations with civilians: Major Victor
(codename) from Cyabingo, Ruhengeri, who became a teacher in Cyabingo after he
had been dismissed from military school (ESM).
Because of the limited number of combatants, the brigade has not been divided into
batallions, but rather into the following companies, each with about three platoons:
§
§
§
§
First Company, known as Prague: Captain Théophile Nsengiyumva, alias Kennedy,
from Kinigi. He was a civilian when he left Rwanda in 1994, and is thought to have
been a teacher at the Ecole des sciences of Musanze, Ruhengeri;
Second Company, Belgrade: Captain Thierry from Mutura, Gisenyi; he too was a
civilian when he fled;
Third Company, Manila: Captain Gaheza from Gisenyi, previously a civilian;
Fourth Company, which is based within the headquarters, Captain Ndimukaga.
31
3
REPRESENTATIVES AND LOBBYISTS
IN AFRICA, EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA
“If the international community is serious about destroying the FDLR, and ending the terrible
impact they have on the sub-region,” argued Major-General Paul Rwarakabije, then it should
first deal with its leaders who live free and tranquil lives in their countries, for example in
Europe, the US etc…” Speaking from his long experience in the bush as a commander of
ALIR and of FDLR, he pointed out how the link with the outside world sustains the FDLR,
and also distorts reality.
Do you have any idea about the value of programmes transmitted by radios like the BBCGahuzamiryango [the BBC Kinyarwanda/Kirundi service]? The day we heard the
spokesperson of the FDLR speaking on our behalf in Brussels, followed perhaps the next day
by someone else setting out our position from France, it really used to lift the soldiers’ morale .
And sometimes I would hear them say: “It’s great, we are represented everywhere in
Europe.!” A simple soldier, who is perhaps become sick and tired of that life, feels motivated
again because he thinks that he is about to achieve what he is fighting for. However, all these
people who are speaking from these foreign countries know that attaining the goal is far more
difficult than they dare admit to the international media. They are far away from the bullets
and the harsh life in the forests of Congo. And they are not the ones who are going to die, but
the ones who live under these tough conditions.
The FDLR is especially well represented in Africa and Europe. In Africa, apart from its
substantial presence in the DRC, it has cells in Zambia, Mozambique, Malawi, South Africa,
Congo-Brazzaville, Tanzania (in both Kigoma and Dar es Salaam), Zimbabwe, Uganda,
Sudan and Cameroon. Its president, 2nd vice-president and executive president all live in
Europe, and it has cells in Germany, Belgium, France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the
Netherlands and Austria.
RUD is doing well in the US, home to its president and executive secretary. The FDLR also
has representatives in Canada. The strong presence abroad has helped both groups nurture
contacts, to lobby governments, inter-governmental agencies, Churches, academic institutions
and NGOs, maintain diplomatic visibility, raise funds, recruit Rwandese and foreign
supporters, facilitate travel documents for their leaders, to win over public opinion, especially
through contacts with the media, to spread the propaganda of their groups and to mislead the
world. The access to the media in Europe has been a source of political oxygen for these
groups. They also travel to the DRC to help settle internal disputes to maintain the cohesion
and effectiveness of their armed forces. In 2006, Murwanashyaka visited the eastern region on
a mission to broker peace between Mudacumura and Col. Musare, detailed earlier, and Alexis
Nshimiyimana travelled from Austria to the western part of the country in 2001 to convince
Ntiwirigabo to cede the presidency to Murwanashyaka.
The money that arrived from abroad while he was in charge, said Rwakarabije, came
essentially from well-wishers in Europe.
32
Members of the FDLR, and their sympathisers sometimes collect funds on its behalf, primarily
in Europe. We were aware of several fund-raising events where the money that was raised did
not reach us. Off the top of my head, I remember we were once sent $5000 to invest in
exploiting minerals, but we thought it wiser to simply share the money out among the soldiers.
He also recalled a visit from Murwanashyaka during which he bought them bullets.
He passed through Uganda and came to see us. He brought money with him, but we didn’t
know exactly how much of it he had used to buy the bullets from the Congolese. He gave us
the bullets and a small amount of cash. I think this visit was one of the sources of conflict
between Murwanashyaka and Félicien Kanyamibwa who was the treasurer of the FDLR at the
time and who argued that we got less money than we should have.
There were other promises of money from representatives in Europe.
Alexis Nshimiyimana [in Austria] said he would send us $4000 which had been collected after
our successful attack on Uvira in South Kivu. But we didn’t get anything.
A sub- lieutenant who was repatriated by MONUC in September 2007 said FDLR
representatives abroad act as conduits through which relatives send money to the
commanders. The commanders use this money for private business deals.
To enable commanders to live well, the FDLR allows them to go into business. He has to find
the capital himself, but he’s free to ask some of his escorts to devote themselves to look after
his business. If a commander doesn’t have the money for this basic capital, he can borrow
from the central command of FOCA. But those who have wives and other close relatives or
friends who can send money from abroad find it much easier to accumulate the necessary
capital.
The way the money is transferred from the relatives in Europe to the FDLR go-between, and
from him or her to the commanders in eastern DRC, is similar to a Western Union transaction.
The relative or friend in Europe gets in touch with the local FDLR person, who telephones the
commander in Masisi and asks him to advance the money to the relevant person, minus. 10%
which is put in the kitty. The rest goes to the person it was intended for. The money is brought
to the DRC when Murwanashyaka or another delegate comes.
Even more important than money, at least for those who are successful, is that a wellconnected cadre can facilitate visa and travel arrangements for FDLR commanders and their
families. In 2003, Rwakarabije said that Mudacumura intervened with Murwanashyaka to
enable Mudacumura’s wife, who was then working for an NGO in Rwanda, to leave for
Europe and accompany Murwanashyaka’s mother who he had arranged to travel to Europe.
Another important lifeline for fighters in Masisi which Rwakarabije pointed out, and even for
those manning FDLR offices in other African countries, is their wives who live in Europe,
South Africa, Zambia etc…
33
The wives of FDLR fighters and leaders, and especially the wives of officers, make a
significant contribution. To give a few concrete examples, my former ADC, Isaac Mpozayo,
was able to reach South Africa thanks to the intervention of his wife. Col. Aloys Mubiligi left
the front and went to France because his family was already living there. The same goes for
Major Aimable Ndayambaje who went to Malawi.
Africa
Within Africa, and outside of the DRC, the FDLR is particularly strong in southern Africa,
with the largest concentration in Zambia, followed by Malawi, South Africa, Mozambique
and Zimbabwe. Many of them came there from the DRC. There are also strong ties between
the groups in southern Africa, and a number of the FDLR people listed below shuttle between
the different countries, especially between Zambia and Malawi.
Zambia
With more than 6,000 refugees, Zambia has the largest concentration of Rwandese in Africa
outside of the DRC, including hundreds of genocide suspects, as well as FDLR activists, both
military officers as well as civilians. It is, therefore, not surprising that it is where the FDLR is
particularly strong there. Zambia and Rwanda, working with the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), have sought to genuine refugees to return home. But
their efforts have not borne fruit because the FDLR, which is well- represented in Zambia, and
the fugitives at large there, regard the existence of a large refugee population as a shield.
Members of the FDLR in Zambia travel regularly between the DRC and Zambia, and also
move with ease to Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa. Zambia is also home to the wives
of many FDLR officers serving in the Kivus. The presence of so many Rwandese, many of
whom have done extremely in business and in the professions, has made Zambia extremely
important to the FDLR, politically and economically.
The chapter below, which looks more closely at the genocide, will also examine the
allegations against a number of FDLR officials and members in Zambia. But here we provide
the names of individuals who serve in the secretariat of the FDLR in Zambia, or have done so
in the recent past.
A number of the former FDLR fighters interviewed for this report spoke about a woman by
the name of Louise, who has been sent by the leadership in Masisi with the specific goal of
establishing closer ties between the FDLR in the DRC and the Rwandese community in
Zambia, and to raise funds for the war effort. She was a third year medical student at Butare
University in 1994 and comes from Kibungo.
The wives and partners of many FDLR-RUD soldiers live in the Zambia, including the wife
of the military prosecutor, Zinga Zinga. Sometimes, these women work for the FDLR in their
personal capacity, for example Marie-Claire Nyirakamanzi, married to Major Déo Niyitegeka,
a battallion commander in South Kivu. She had first gone to Congo Brazzaville before going
to the DRC.
34
Zambia is also a point of departure for genocide fugitives who wish to settle in Europe and the
US. This may help to explain the persistent allegations that some of the Rwandese refugees
are engaged in selling fraudulent passports and documents. Whatever the reasons, a
substantial number of those who have been arrested in western countries on genocide related
charges, or who are living there and have been accused in Rwanda, were living in Zambia
before they moved there. 33
Military Officials
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Col. Laurent Rwagakinga, alias Kabore, is from Rushashi, Greater Kigali. At the time
of the insurgency, he was head of the operational sector named Quebec, which had
earlier been known as sector Charlie. He was a commander in the 214th battalion.
Major Guerchome Ngayaberura from Nyanza, Butare. He is said to be in charge of
recruitment in Zambia;
Major Dushimimana;
Major Mukiga;
Major Murasandonyi;
Balthazar Ntakarimaze (the surname may also be Ntakamarishavu), known as Castro,
from Byumba;
Lt. Innocent Sekimonyo from Ndora, Butare;
Sgt. Janvier Twagirumukiza from Kayenzi, Gitarama.
Civilian Officials and Members
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Dr Augustin Cyimana from Ntongwe, Gitarama, a medical doctor who worked at
Kigali’s main public hospital, CHK, and now works at the University Teaching
Hospital in Lusaka. He was, and may still be, the chair of the FDLR in Zambia:
Chrisostom Budengeri, a medical assistant in Mugina, Gitarama, who has been a vice
chair;
Bantari Rypa, an agricultural officer in Cyangugu, who has also been a vice-chair;
Cyprien Ngirabatware, a businessman in Gitarama; he was the treasurer;
Aurelia Mukakayumba, a lawyer, works in the secretariat. She comes from Bugarama,
Cyangugu;
Marcel Munyabarenzi, an agr icultural officer in Gashora, Bugesera;
Jean Marie-Vianney Mulindahabi from Rusumo, Kibungo, is a veterinarian;
Congo-Brazzaville
After the camps in the DRC were forcibly dismantled in 1996, thousands made their way to
Congo Brazzaville, including large numbers of ex-FAR and interahamwe, and they were
settled in different camps, for example at Lukolela, Kinkele and Lilanga. The ex-FAR in
Congo Brazzaville included several of the men who are now on the FDLR committee there,
Birikunzira, Nyamuhimba and Munyakayanza (see below). The ex-FAR were instrumental in
33
These men include Jean Marie-Vianney Mudahinyuka, detained in the US; Emmanuel Nteziryayo, detained in
the UK and awaiting extradition hearings to Rwanda.
35
toppling the government of After President Pascal Lisuba threatened to send Rwandese
refugees back to Rwanda, the ex-FAR living in refugee camps helped his rival, the former
president, Dénis Sassou-Nguesso, return to power and consolidate their presence in the
country.
The FDLR cell in Congo-Brazzaville includes:
§
§
§
§
§
§
Col. Emmanuel Nyamuhimba, as head of the committee. He was chief of the police
force in Kigali. He comes from Byumba;
Col. François-Xavier Birikunzira from Gitarama, head of the gendarmerie in Nyanza,
Butare;
Col. Augustin Munyakayanza, a former gendarme from Gikongoro;
Col. Bernard Uwizeyimana from Byumba;
Major Gatambiye from Nyabihu, Gisenyi;
Major Makuza from Byumba.
Major-General Evariste Nyampame was the representative in Congo-Brazzaville, but he is
now living in Sweden. See below.
Malawi
Malawi has become home to an increasing number of major genocide suspects, enabling the
FDLR to flourish there, especially given the close ties between the Rwandese communities in
Malawi and Zambia. Indeed, the secretary general of the FDLR in Malawi, Frodouald
Ntawulikura, lived for a long time in Zambia. He was a journalist at Radio Rwanda
throughout the genocide, where he made incendiary speeches. He comes from Mudasomwa in
Gikongoro.
South Africa
Though he travels a great deal, Kambanda Vérité (which may or may not be his real name), is
the representative in South Africa.
36
Cameroon
In Cameroon, the FDLR committee has been entrusted to two ex-FAR soldiers. They are:
§
Col. Félicien Muberuka from Rushashi, Greater Kigali
§
Lt. Col. Anselme Nkuriyekubona from Tumba in Byumba who commanded the
operational sector of Kibungo.
Europe and North America
The regional committees of the FDLR are led by:
§
Europe as a whole: Dr. Déo Twagirayezu, based in The Netherlands. He comes from
Nyabihu, Gisenyi;
§
France: Callixte Mbarushimana, the Executive Secretary, a former employee of the
UNDP in Kigali from Ndusu, Ruhengeri. See below for details about his role in the
genocide.
37
§
Norway: François Burasa, a former military officer, was in charge of imports at a
government owned company, Rwandex, in 1994. He is on the November 2007
Interpol wanted list in connection with the genocide in Rwanda. He has been dogged
by allegations that he and his wife then, Marie-Goretti Burasa, who is also now living
in Norway, 34 were deeply involved in the killings in Kigali. A cousin of Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza, a leading figure in the CDR, Burasa also helped to establish the CDR. In
the years before the genocide, Burasa and his wife were closely associated with efforts
to support the interahamwe militia and the militia of the CDR, the impuzamugambi.
And both are charged with helping Barayagwiza to distribute weapons in Kigali
during the geno cide.
§
François Burasa in Norway
§
Belgium: Dominique Munyampeta from Musumba, commune Nkuli in Ruhengeri,
was an employee of the Rwandese Bank of Development;
§
Canada: Augustin Dukuze, from Birambo, Kibuye. He was a lawyer with Electrogaz.
Someone with the first name of Marie-Goretti, who used to be based in Brussels, has
apparently been seconded to Canada.
34
According to a Norwegian newspaper article of 21 March 2007, Marie-Goretti Burasa was No.5 on the party
list of the Red Election Alliance (RV) for local elections.
38
Other Key Figures in Europe
§
Anastase Munyandekwe, spokesperson of the FDLR, Belgium. An official in the
Ministry of Transport and Communications, Munyandekwe, 57, was one of the
founders of MDR-Power, and was the president of MDR-Power in Gikongoro. He
comes from Kinyamakara in Gikongoro. Munyandekwe, who was on a course in
Senegal in early April, insists that he never went back to Rwanda, but many people in
Rwanda argue that he returned during the genocide, but African Rights has not had
the opportunity to investigate these conflicting claims;
§
Balthazar Iyamuremye, an ex-FAR who was in the FDLR committee in CongoBrazzaville, where he covered legal issues, is now based in Belgium;
§
Alexis Nshimiyimana, Austria: Nshimiyimana was a journalist at the Rwanda Office
of Information (ORINFOR), and was the producer of a popular programme aimed at
the young, Ejo Nzamerante [What Will I Become Tomorrow?] He had left Rwanda
prior to the genocide.
§
Major-General Evariste Nyampame, Sweden: Nyampame was a liaison officer for the
FDLR in Congo-Brazzaville before joining his wife in Sweden. He comes from
Kibali, Byumba. After falling out with President Habyarimana, he was sidelined and
went to work with ORTPN, the government agency in charge of tourism and national
parks. However, as soon as the genocide began, he was quickly reintegrated back into
the army.
§
Major Emmanuel Munyaruguru, Norway. Munyaruguru was a member of the FDLR
in Norway, but as his brother, Félicien Kanya mibwa, is now the executive secretary of
RUD/URUNANA, it is most likely that Munyaruguru has also switched alliances. A
civil engineer, he studied at the Royal Military Academy in Belgium. In 1994 he was a
member of one of the battalions. He now works as an Executive officer of Tromso
Municipality in Norway and was No.35 on the Labour Party’s list for the 2007 local
elections in Tromso;
§
Jean-Pierre Kamanzi, Norway. Kamanzi used to be the representative of the FDLR for
Scandinavia, but is now the spokesperson for RUD in Norway.
39
§
Evariste Nshimiyimana, a member of FDLR in Norway. He lives in Tromso where he
is the editor in chief of InterInfo Tromso’s web page. InterInfo is owned and run by
Tromso city. It is an intercultural service and an information centre.
Evariste Nshimiyimana in Norway
40
4
THE TARGETS OF THE AGREEMENT & THE GENOCIDE
Preliminary Details on Some Individuals
One of the key aspects of the Nairobi agreement is the explicit reference to the “exFAR/interahamwe as a genocidal military organization operating in the territory of the DRC.”
Many of the recent reports on the troubles in the Kivus ha ve also emphasized the links with
the architects and foot soldiers of the 1994 genocide, especially with regard to the FDLR.
What is significant about the most recent agreement, however, is the recognition that all the
armed groups from Rwanda in the DRC share this same history rooted in the genocide. They
have come out of the same organizations which were founded in the camps immediately after
the genocide and essentially share a similar mindset and the same broad goals. It is also
important in that the DRC government has committed itself to this framework, so that it can
take action against individuals on the basis of evidence about their involvement in the
genocide.
Rwanda has publicly argued, in the past, that it will not engage in identifying individual
suspects because it regards the FDLR and its splinter groups as a genocidal project, and that
there is little difference, in terms of the destructive impact of their activities, whether or not
the men and women who are responsible for these deeds are also genocide suspects. At the
other extreme, some commentators have sought to minimize the connection by arguing that
only a handful are likely to have been involved, and that the majority of the combatants in the
DRC are too young to have a history in the genocide.
What all agree on, which provides a common platform for action, is that the military and
political leadership of the FDLR in the DRC is largely in the hands of former soldiers and
politicians who helped to design, incite and implement the 1994 genocide, and that these men
have a personal interest in discouraging the peaceful return of Rwandese, and in a stable
region where governments co-operate across borders. In order to devise realistic and effective
strategies that will distance the rank and file among the combatants, and the civilian
supporters, from the leaders, it is necessary, especially for the Government of the DRC, and
for international institutions and agencies, to know who these individuals are, and what their
history is. And the task is not as daunting as it may seem, provided the will is there, because
former combatants are a rich source of information.
In this short report, we have included some cases where we have reliable information about
the person’s whereabouts and their affiliation. The details below merely summarise our main
findings, and are not intended as a comprehensive account. Where appropriate, we have also
indicated where additional information maybe obtained.
41
FDLR MILITARY COMMANDERS IN NORTH AND SOUTH KIVU
§ Major-General Aloys Ntiwiragabo, alias Vita/Omaar/Agakatsi
Major-General Aloys Ntiwiragabo
Before he went into exile in July 1994, Major-General Aloys Ntiwiragabo was a colonel and
worked in military intelligence (G2) at military headquarters, after a long stint in the
gendarmerie as head of the groupement de Kigali, which later became the operational sector
of Kigali. One of the code names he uses, Agakatsi, was his nickname when he was in
Rwanda. He comes from Hindiro, commune Satinsyi in Gisenyi. He was based in Sudan for
sometime, but is now said to move between Congo-Brazzaville, Cameroon and France where
his wife lives.
Ntiwiragabo’s name comes up repeatedly in this report. Together with Brigadier-General
Gratien Kabiligi, who was responsible for security in Kigali, Ntiwiragabo was one of the key
officers who supervised the genocide in Kigali. Both men met regularly with the préfet, Col.
Tharcisse Renzaho, whose office was the nerve centre for the planning of the genocide in the
city. It was here that the broad outlines and the details of the policy of genocide were debated
and decided, priorities drawn up and instructions delivered to local government officials and
militia leaders. One of the officials who attended these meetings is Grégoire Nyirimanzi, the
councillor of sector Nyakabanda, who accepts that he himself made a substantial contribution
to the killings in Kigali.
Aloys Ntiwiragabo did a great deal to incite the genocide. He asked all the leaders of the
sectors in Kigali to tell Hutus that they must consider Tutsis as their common enemy.
Whenever I went to meetings at the office of the préfecture, he was always there and sat next
to Col. Renzaho.
42
Ntiwiragabo gave permission to the heads of the interahamwe to use the police station in
Nyamirambo for the execution of Tutsis. It was also used to torture the men that were brought
there and to violate women sexually. This centre was under the authority of Phéneas
[Ruhumuliza, a vice president of the interahamwe] and Mucacu [François Nambajimana, a
leading interahamwe].
One of the recurrent charges against Ntiwiragabo was his extreme concern about the
reliability of certain serving officers, and the extreme measures he insisted upon to ensure the
loyalty of Hutus to the government’s programme of genocide.
Ntiwiragabo did not try to hide his distaste for soldiers he described as accomplices of the
Tutsis. He used to spoke at length about Marcel Gatsinzi. 35 He ordered us to supervise the
soldiers in our districts, to make sure that they were not accomplices of the RPF. He also
ordered us to kill those who did not want to co-operate with the militia and those who
demonstrated a willingness to intervene in order to save Tutsis.36
Valérie Bemeriki was such an effective proponent of the genocide on RTLM radio that she was looked
upon by the country’s military and civilian leaders as an important asset. She spoke of her contacts
with Ntiwiragbo in 1994.
Ntiwiragabo and Kabiligi were considered to be at the head of all the operations which took
place in Kigali. He contacted me on several occasions to ask me to announce, on RTLM, that
some Rwandese soldiers were working with the inkotanyi [RPF]. His messages were for me to
tell the interahamwe to be on the lookout for soldiers who were not cooperating with the
others in slaughtering the Tutsis. He also wanted me to tell all the interahamwe to verify all
the identity cards of the military, in order to pick out the Tutsis and execute them on the spot.
This is how soldiers were captured and killed by the interahamwe across the whole country.
Ntiwiragabo was, in particular, concerned about Marcel Gatsinzi, whom he looked upon as a
senior officer in contact with the enemy.
There are reports, which need to be verified, Ntiwiragabo is no longer with the FDLR, but has
joined RUD/URUNANA.
§ Brigadier-General Appolinaire Hakizimana, alias Poète
Brig.General Appolinaire Hakizimana, known as Poète, is the FDLR’s Commissioner for
Defence, and was previously head of ALIR’s department of military intelligence (G2), and
prior to that, a commander in Goma. Before leaving Rwanda in July 1994, he worked in
intelligence in the Ministry of Defence in Kigali. He was also a shareholder in RTLM. While
in the camps, he was a commander in Goma. Aged 46, he comes from Mwiyanike sector in
Karago, Gisenyi, the son of Karimunda and Nyirampozembizi.
35
General Marcel Gatsinzi, Rwanda’s Minister of Defence, was briefly named chief of staff at the beginning of
the genocide.
36
Interviewed in Kigali, 12 November 2007.
43
In 1994, one of his roles was to ensure uniformity of purpose amongst the different militia in
Kigali. He did this by travelling to the different posts to motivate them and encourage them to
perform acts of genocide against the Tutsis. He became a highly visible figure in the capital,
as he travelled to the different roadblocks to hand out weapons, to maintain the militia’s
commitment to the killings and reward them for their loyalty. He was also a frequent visitor to
the offices of RTLM to encourage its journalists to support the government’s policy.
According to Valérie Bemeriki, who was one of the best known and most effective
broadcasters on RTLM, Hakizimana brought them “guns, rations and military uniforms”,
telling them that they should think of themselves as “soldiers attached to military
headquarters.”
He told us: “You deserve this honour because you are helping us destroy the enemy. Continue
to do what you’ve been doing.”
From 13 April onwards, I was well-regarded by Hakizimana because I was in a good position
to turn the Hutus against the Tutsis. Along with other genocide supporters, he passed
messages on to me intended for Hutus. He was especially keen for me to reassure the youth
that they had the backing in their mission to kill the Tutsis.
Bemeriki said she often accompanied Hakizimana on his rounds to places close to his office
and beyond.
We went to areas close to his office, and I watched the distribution of guns, grenades and
ammunition. He also liked to drop these off at Hotel Isimbi, which served as the headquarters
of the interahamwe. It was here that he met with the leaders of the interahamwe, men like
Robert Kajuga, Phenias, Mucacu and Georges Rutaganda.37
One evening in mid-April, Bemeriki said she and Hakizimana visited the home of Col.
Ephrem Setako 38 in Kiyovu, to confirm the details of a massacre which had just taken place
there, after which the three of them
We toured the roadblocks in Kiyovu to meet with the militia and to urge them to continue
being vigilant. We went to the checkpoint near the Mille Collines Hotel and also near the area
known as the Quai d’Orsay [downtown near the Belgian school] where we met Bonaventure
Habimana 39 and his son in military uniform. Mucacu and Phenias were also there, and they
made an appointment to meet the next day, with Habimana and his son, at the office of the
préfecture in Kigali, in order to evaluate the massacres. I left them close to the RTLM studio.
37
Robert Kajuga was the president of the interahamwe and died in Kinshasa shortly after the genocide. Phénias
Ruhumuliza was the first vice president of the interahamwe and is reported to have died in Nairobi. Mucacu,
François Nambajimana, was a close ally and is in exile. Georges Rutaganda, a businessman, was Kajuga’s
second vice president; he was extradited from Zambia to the custody of the ICTR in 1995 and on 6 December
1999 was sentenced to life imprisonment for genocide, crimes against humanity and extermination. They worked
together during the genocide and inspired terror among Tutsis in Kigali.
38
Col. Ephrem Setako was arrested in The Netherlands on 25 February 2004 at the request of the ICTR and is
awaiting trial in Arusha.
39
Bonaventure Habimana had been secretary-general of the MRND prior to 1994. He was one of the pillars of
the genocide in Shyorongi, Greater Kigali.
44
Col. Faustin Sebuhura, alias Minani Marius
Before the most reshuffle in June or July, Col. Faustin Sebuhura was head of the military
academy run by the FDLR in Kiluluma. He was promoted and is now the overall co-ordinator
of military training in Masisi, for both senior and non-commissioned officers, as well as a
programme that provides for continuous training.
Sebuhura was the deputy head of the gendarmerie for the préfecture of Gikongoro, and was
based in Gikongoro town, in the commune of Nyamagabe. Murambi, designated as a national
genocide memorial site, stands as a testament to the inhumanity and efficiency of Captain
Sebuhura. He worked closely with a number of men to plan and carry out the killings in
Murambi, and elsewhere. They include Col. Aloys Simba, retired from the army and currently
on trial at the ICTR in Arusha; Laurent Bucyibaruta, the préfet (governor) of Gikongoro, who
lives in France; Frodouald Havugimana, a deputy préfet who is in the DRC; and Félicien
Semakwavu, the bourgmestre of Nyamagabe, who is also in the DRC.
About 50,000 Tutsis are estimated to have died at a technical school under construction in
Murambi, in the early hours of 21 April. Many of them had first sought refuge at the Catholic
Parish of Gikongoro, but Sebuhura and his colleagues encouraged them, and other Tutsis, to
gather at the school. The refugees’ ability to fight back against the militia who had encircled
the school was undermined by lack of food and water, and by fear. In the meantime,
preparations for the massacre were intensified. At 3:00 a.m. heavily-armed soldiers and
gendarmes took up positions around Murambi, using their guns and grenades. The
interahamwe guarded the school to prevent any escape and to finish off the wounded.
Sebuhura, Bucyibaruta and Simba were among the officials who personally supervised the
killings. When the ammunition ran out at about 6:00 a.m., Sebuhura arranged for more
45
ammunition and weapons to be sent over from the gendarmerie camp. With the fresh
ammunition, the refugees were virtually annihilated.
Sebuhura and his companions asked the same militiamen to proceed immediately to the
nearby Parish of Cyanika in commune Karama and to wipe out the thousands of refugees
gathered there, which included a few survivors of Murambi. To make the evidence disappear,
bulldozers were used to remove the corpses at both Murambi and Cyanika and to dump them
in different mass graves;
At the end of April 1994, Captain Sebuhura also provided the weapons, ammunition and
gendarmes which killed thousands of Tutsi refugees from Gikongoro, Butare and Gitarama
who had taken shelter on hilltops in commune Ruhashya in Butare. Sebuhura’s ally in the
killings in Ruhashya was Charles Munyaneza, the bourgmestre of commune Kinyamakara in
Gikongoro.
§ Lt.Col. Ildephonse Nizeyimana, alias Sebisogo
Lt.Col. Ildephonse Nizeyimana works in the office of Brigadier-General Gaston Iyamuremye,
the 2nd vice-president of the FDLR, in charge of military intelligence and operations. He had
previously worked, as a trainer, in the training college for officers established by ALIR in
Gikoma, Masisi.
46
Nizeyimana is a native of cellule Kijote, sector Kora, commune Mutura in Gisenyi, the son of
Masiha and Madeleine. He was the deputy head of ESO in Butare, in charge of intelligence
and operations; he worked under Lt. Col. Tharcisse Muvunyi. Nizeyimana’s name is
synonymous with the genocide in the town of Butare and beyond. The ESO soldiers whose
names appear below took their orders and their assignments from him.
Nizeyimana formed special units of soldiers who carried out massacres throughout the
préfecture of Butare. One unit, known as the Military Police, targeted, in particular, Tutsi
soldiers, including those at ESO. He also brought new recruits into ESO who came to be
known as “new formula soldiers”, and who ravaged the town of Butare. Soldiers despatched
by Nizeyimana were responsible for massacres at the University, the University Hospital, the
Groupe Scolaire and the commercial centre.
The hospital is within a short walking distance of ESO and a contingent of soldiers was sent
from the army base to guard it. Tutsis initially thought that the proximity of ESO would be an
advantage, and flocked there as refugees. Instead, the soldiers killed the refugees, as well as
Tutsi patients and staff, and raped women. Afterwards, prisoners were brought in to dispose
of the bodies. Some refugees were taken to ESO or elsewhere and murdered. One of the
killing sites was located between ESO and the Electrogaz sub-station and was named
“Kinihira”, a reference to a place where Habyarimana and the RPF signed a peace treaty.
Nizeyimana and Sub- Lt. Pierre Bizimanaoversaw the killings and visited the hospital on a
regular basis.
Nizeyimana was responsible for the patrols which manned roadblocks at night, and was
identified as the most high-ranking soldier present at the night-time slaughter of Tut sis in
Buye where many university lecturers and doctors lived. He also helped to train civilians in
Mata, Gikongoro, to be sent to the battlefront and as a back up genocide force.
About 1,300 children and adults were sheltering at the Groupe Scolaire, a secondary school in
Ngoma. On 29 April, Nizeyimana and Lt. Ildephonse Hategekimana, the commander of Camp
Ngoma, authorized their soldiers to surround the school, enabling the interahamwe to kill the
refugees. The ESO teams sent by Nizeyimana were also involved in massacres in the business
district of Ngoma and in other communes in Butare, including Gishamvu, Huye, Nyakizu,
Runyinya, Muyaga, Ntyazo, Rusatira and Mugusa.
Two people were particularly sought after by Nizeyimana, namely the former queen and the
préfet of Butare. He entrusted the mission to Lt. Ezéchiel Gakwerere.
Nizeyimana is on the wanted list of the US Rewards for Justice Programme.
47
§ Lt. Col. Ezéchiel Gakwerere, alias Sibo Stany/Makolo
One of the men Nizeyimana most relied upon is Lt.Col. Ezéchiel Gakwerere, which is why he
sent him to kill Rosalie Gicanda, the queen of Rwanda until the abolition of the monarchy in
September 1961. She is believed to have been the first person killed in the town of Butare
once the genocide received official blessing.
Gakwerere is the deputy commander of the First Division (D1) of the FOCA.
For the first two weeks of the genocide, Butare was, for the most part, calm, due largely to the
efforts of the préfet, Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana, to preserve unity and security. On 19 April,
the president of the interim government, Dr Théodore Sindikubwabo, toured Butare to warn
residents about the dangers of acting as if they were not concerned. The killings began almost
immediately. And Habyarimana was arrested and taken to Gitarama, the seat of the interim
government. According to former colleagues, it was Gakwerere who arrested him and who
had a hand in his assassination.
On the afternoon of 17 May, about 15 soldiers, led by Lt. Gakwerere, descended on the
bursary of the Catholic Diocese of Butare. They then ran into the neighbouring convent of the
Petites Soeurs de Jésus. A young employee of the bursary, who had tried to escape by
jumping over the wall into the convent, was the first to die. The young man was captured and
he was killed by three soldiers, including Gakwerere. They killed six people that day,
including young girls who were stoned to death.
48
§ Lt. Paul Kanyeshyamba
Paul Kanyeshyamba, a lieutenant in FOCA in North Kivu, is said to be working in
intelligence. In 1994, he was a warrant officer at ESO. He is a Kinyarwanda-speaking
Congolese.
One of the first rural communes to experience the full impact of the genocide was Kigembe;
most of the Tutsis in this commune were murdered within hours of Sindikubwabo’s visit.
They, and refugees from Gikongoro and from commune Runyinya, Butare, died at the
commune office and at a nearby school known as CERAI in sector Nyaruteja, when soldiers
led by Warrant Officer Kanyeshyamba reinforced some of the mo st feared killers in the area,
including Burundian refugees from a local camp. During the four days that the massacre and
the search for survivors continued, from 19-22 April, Kanyeshyamba was physically present
and in charge. He himself lived in Kigembe, cellule Nyamihatsi, sector Nyanza.
Afterwards, the bodies were thrown into the Akanyaru river, in ditches and latrines.
Local officials throughout the préfecture of Butare appealed to ESO for assistance in
implementing the genocide, requesting help in the form of soldiers and weapons, including
Ladislas Ntaganzwa 40 , the bourgmestre of commune Nyakizu, on the border with Burundi. He
asked for reinforcements to deal with the large number of Tutsis at the Catholic Parish of
Cyahinda. Muvunyi and Nizeyimana sent a team led by Kanyeshyamba, whose guns and
grenades left most of the refugees dead. See below under Damien Biniga
To find out more about Nizeyimana, Gakwerere and Kanyeshyamba, see Lt.Col. Tharcisse
Muvunyi, A Rwandese Genocide Commander in Britain, Witness to Genocide Issue 12, April
2000, African Rights
§ Col. Anaclet Hitimana, alias Kabuyoya Gasarasi
The section below on Damien Biniga speaks about the build up to the devastating massacres
at the Parish of Kibeho, commune Mubuga, in the sous-préfecture of Munini, Gikongoro. Col.
Anaclet Hitimana, in the reserve brigade of FOCA, was then the sub- lieutenant in command
of the military units based in Munini, where Kibeho is located. He was Biniga’s military
counterpart.
Hitimana was instrumental, from the outset, in the plan to exterminate the Tutsis at Kibeho.
He selected a group of officials and private individuals to prepare the Hutu community. By 14
April everything was in place. Militiamen had come from all corners of Gikongoro, many of
them transported in vehicles provided by the directors of the tea factories in Kitabi—Dénys
Kamodoka—and in Mata, Juvénal Ndabarinze. With the arrival of four soldiers led by
Hitimana, who were all armed with guns and grenades, the killing was ready to begin, but not
40
Ladislas Ntaganzwa is still at large. His name appears on the November 2007 Interpol wanted list.
49
before Hitimana gave the signal. A policeman who admits that he shot into the refugees had
this to say
We began marching towards the church, under the instructions of Anaclet. The militia had
already surrounded the area around Kibeho parish. Anaclet and his group then gave us the
order to begin slaughtering them. We shot into the church. Some Tutsis came out to try and
defend themselves, but they fell into the hands of our militiamen. The massacre continued
until we had made holes in the walls of the church, which made it easier for us to burn the
remaining refugees huddled close to the altar of the church.
FDLR CIVILIAN ADVISORS IN THE KIVUS
§ Damien Biniga
Damien Biniga has been a member of the Political Commission of the FDLR. There are
reports that Murwanashyaka has asked him to leave the Commission, possibly because of
Biniga’s notoriety as a genocide suspect. He remains an active member of the organization,
however, and according to recent returnees, was sent on a political missio n to Mozambique in
July 2007.
Biniga was a member of parliament for Gikongoro, before he was appointed sous-préfet
(deputy governor) of its sub-region, Munini—which comprises the communes of Mubuga,
Rwamiko, Nshili and Kivu—in October 1990. He immediately devoted himself to the task of
building support for the ruling party, the MRND, and to forge alliances with local government
officials, employers, priests and other influential figures in Munini. He also recruited young
50
men to train as interahamwe, sending some of them to Kigali; on their return to Munini, they
passed on their new skills to others. Long before the death of Habyarimana, Biniga had
divided the Hutus and Tutsis of Munini, and created a loyal fighting force. When the time
came, the interaha mwe were well-prepared and proved themselves capable of the most
extreme brutality.
At 8:00 a.m. on 7 April, only two hours after the announcement of Habyarimana’s death,
Biniga arrived with his gendarmes at the Mata tea factory in Rwamiko commune, for a
meeting attended by many of the men who would prove loyal allies for the next three months.
The participants included the director of the tea factory at Rwamiko, Juvénal Ndabalinze, and
his counterpart at the tea factory in Kitabi, Dénys Kamodoka. The meeting finished at 10:00
a.m. and almost immediately the burning of Tutsis’ houses began. Several of the men in
Biniga’s meeting took part in the violence.
At 11:00 a.m., Biniga called a public meeting in Ruramba, Rwamiko where he asked the
Hutus: “What they were waiting for?” He chastised them, saying: “They have killed your
President and you are standing there with your arms folded! Start working. Burn the Tutsis’
houses and kill them.” The awareness campaigns which Biniga conducted in Munini were
critical to the speed and ferocity of the massacres which unfolded in the region.
As the tension and fear increased, so Tutsis from all over Munini left their homes to seek
sanctuary in churches and public buildings. Biniga used the resources, the vehicles and the
security forces of the sous-préfecture against the refugees. He used the authority of his
position to persuade the local people to take part in the killing.
Thousands headed towards the Parish of Kibeho in Mubuga, filling the church, the schools,
the houses the courtyards. They were welcomed and assisted by Fr. Pierre Ngoga 41 , who
refused to leave even though he was himself a Tutsi and much sought after as an educated
male.
There were an estimated 30,000 refugees at the parish by 11 April. Biniga first disarmed
them, and then, on 12 April, he gave a speech threatening them. He left six gendarmes behind,
whose main function was to prevent the refugees from escaping. Armed militiamen launched
an attack on the parish as soon as Biniga had gone. The refugees used sticks and stones to
fight off their assailants, but the next day they faced another assault. When Biniga came back
to Kibeho on 13 April, he brought more gendarmes and assured the refugees that they would
be secure. At dawn the following morning, 14 April, Biniga and his soldiers arrived with
thousands of interahamwe and surrounded Kibeho town. They were armed with guns,
grenades and traditional weapons. At around 11:00 a.m., the parish came under siege. Biniga,
the bourgmestre of commune Rwamiko, Silas Mugerangabo, soldiers, communal policemen
and militiamen who had guns and grenades shot and lobbed grenades, after which villagers
went inside with machetes, swords, axes and knives. The following day, at Biniga’s
insistence, the militia returned to Kibeho to set the church on fire, burning the survivors who
were still alive.
41
Fr. Pierre Ngoga was imprisoned and murdered in May 1994.
51
And even before he had finished with Kibeho, Biniga was preparing for another huge assault,
this time at the Parish of Muganza in commune Kivu, where there were around 11,000
refugees. On 15 April he led an attack which left most of them dead.
Many Tutsis were encouraged or forced to assemble in Mubuga at Biniga’s officeBiniga
transported some there himself, promising to protect them, while others were brought by the
militia. Once there, the refugees were prevented from leaving by gendarmes who patrolled the
office. On 16 April, gendarmes and the militia massacred the refugees at the office, with the
help of local residents. .
Biniga’s pursuit of Tutsis to kill took him across the border to the neighbouring préfecture of
Butare. On 15 April, he turned up at the Parish of Cyahinda in commune Nyakizu, with his
car full of gendarmes, and the shooting began. Defenceless men, women and children were
killed in their hundreds. But there were tens of thousands at the parish, and it took four days
of unimaginable brutality before Biniga, the gendarmes and militiamen were satisfied. The
worst violence at the parish took place on 18 April, and the killers included soldiers,
gendarmes, military reservists, interahamwe, Burundian refugees and villagers from the
surrounding areas and beyond.
Most of the refugees at the Parish of Karama had fled from massacres elsewhere in Butare
and Gikongoro and had barely been there a week when, on 21 April, Damien Biniga came in
pursuit of them. Once again regional borders were not a deterrent; Biniga joined forces with
the bourgmestre of Runyinya, Déo Hategekimana. Killers from the four communes of Munini
lent their support and expertise to the local assassins. The assault on the Parish of Karama was
one of the most devastating massacres which took place in Rwanda in 1994; 65,000 remains
were reburied in 1995.
On the way to Burundi, the survivors of the violence in Gikongoro and Butare were ambushed
by local militia, who killed many with their machetes. But some 4,000 did manage to reach
the border on 22 April. There they had their final encounter with Biniga. As they were
crossing into Burundi, he arrived and ordered the Burundian soldiers to send the refugees
back, arguing that they were “fleeing from famine” and that he now had food for them.
However, the soldiers had seen the consequences of the violence in Rwanda and refused to do
so.
See “Damien Biniga: A Genocide Without Borders: A Free Man in Brussels?” June 2006,
Witness to Genocide Issue 16, 41 pages, African Rights
52
§ Callixte Nzabonimana
Callixte Nzabonimana
Callixte Nzabonimana, the Minister of Yo uth in the interim government of 1994, is one of the
subjects of the US Rewards for Justice Programme. He is accused of inciting, organizing and
supervising the killings in his native commune of Nyabikenke in Gitarama, and in Kayenzi,
also in Gitarama. He had created, trained and armed a militia force in Nyabikenke long
before 1994. He arrived in Gitarama in mid-April and immediately called meetings, addressed
public gatherings and visited roadblocks to urge Hutus to begin killing Tutsis in Nyabikenke
and neighbouring areas. There is solid evidence that he distributed arms at massacres, at
roadblocks and at the commune office in Nyabikenke, and also provided the interahamwe
with food and beer to sustain their enthusiasm for killing.
Apprehensive about the security situation, many Tutsis headed for the commune office early
on, hoping for protection. But on the night of 14 April, militiamen, using Nzabonimana’s
vehicles, and those of his allies, launched their first attack on the commune office. On the
morning of 15 April, Nzabonimana returned to the commune office, along with the
interahamwe and the bourgmestre, Anatole Karuganga. Nzabonimana was the man at the
centre of the massacre which then unfolded, commanding the killers and providing the arms
which the militia used to wipe out the refugees.
Most of the survivors of Nyabikenke made their way to the Bishopric of Kabgayi, also in
Gitarama. But Nzabonimana came after them. As the refugees in Kabgayi had to write down
their names and their commune of origin, it was easy for Nzabonimana to identify the
survivors from Nyabikenke. He organized transport for about 100 men and boys who were
taken away and never seen again. The interim government fell before he had a chance to
abduct the women and girls.
See “Callixte Nzabonimana”, Charge Sheet No.1, March 1999, 6 pages, African Rights.
Nzabonimana is on the wanted list of the US Rewards for Justice Programme.
53
Congo-Brazzaville
§ Col. François-Xavier Birikunzira, alias Masumbuko
Captain François-Xavier Birikunzira was head of the gendarmerie for the sous-préfecture of
Nyabisindu in Butare in 1994. He was head of the gendarmerie post in Nyanza, commune
Nyabisindu. During the genocide, he was also given responsibility for policing certain areas in
the préfecture of Gitarama, namely the communes of Tambwe, Ntongwe, Kigoma and
Murama. Many large-scale massacres took place in all the areas under his supervision, and
with his direct complicity.
The bourgmestre of commune Nyabisindu, Jean Marie-Vianney Gisagara 42 , shared the resolve
of the préfet of Butare to keep the genocide out of Butare. But other powerful forces, led and
organized by Birikunzira, who were just as determined, did all they could to cripple his every
move. They also had more human and financial resources at their disposal. Birikunzira
worked closely with a number of men to undermine Gisagara’s campaign of peace, and to
turn Hutus against Tutsis. These men included Gaëtan Kayitana, a deputy-préfet; Fr.
Hormisdas Nsengimana, a Catholic priest and the headmaster of Christ Roi secondary school
in Nyanza, the main town in Nyabisindu; Dr. Callixte Mirasano, director of the governmentowned dairy in Nyabisindu; Dr. Célestin Higiro, director of Nyanza hospital and amongst
others, Vincent Nzigiyumfura, a businessman in Nyanza. They used their considerable
resources, authority and influence to establish a strong force that consisted of soldiers,
gendarmes, interahamwe, local government officials, professionals, businessmen, students
from Byumba displaced by the 1990 war and Burundian refugees, and incited hatred and fear
of Tutsis.
To unleash the genocide in Nyabisindu, their first priority was to get rid of Gisagara who was
forced to hide as the threats increased. Birikunzira discovered his hideout. On Thursday, 21
April, he drove in a car behind the van which dragged Gisagara’s body all around Nyanza,
both as punishment for his stand, and as a warning to Hutus who opposed the killing of Tutsis.
Eleven members of his family, including his parents, sib lings and wife, were also murdered.
The next day, Friday 22 April, roadblocks were set up everywhere and the massacres began
throughout Nyabisindu and, unopposed, claimed the lives of thousands of men, women and
children.
To facilitate the killings, Birikunzira personally visited the roadblocks to give encourage the
militia and to give them instructions to the militia, and also to receive reports about the
number of Tutsis who were executed at the checkpoints. He also gave the interahamwe
permission to seek guns, grenades and fuel from the gendarmerie camp in Nyanza.
42
For more details, see the chapter on Jean Marie-Vianney Gisagara in Tribute to Courage, December 2002,
African Rights, 299 pages.
54
Birikunzira also left his signature in Ntyazo, Butare where thousands of Tutsis from
Gikongoro, from the communes of Ntongwe, Tambwe and Kigoma in Gitarama and from
other communes in Butare—Muyira, Rusatira and Nyabisindu—had congregated in search of
safety. To ensure an early start to the massacres there, Birikunzira sent gendarmes from
Nyanza to arrest the Tutsi bourgmestre of Ntyazo, Narcisse Nyagasaza, who was then killed.
He then turned his attention to the Tutsis who had settled on hilltops in Nyamure, Karama and
Rwezamenyo and who had organized themselves to fight their tormentors, using stones, bows
and arrows. The militiamen and civilians from Muyira and Bugesera, and the gendarmes in
the area who were guarding a nearby camp for Burundian refugees, were forced to withdraw.
Birikunzira sent reinforcements on two separate occasions, but they too failed to quell the
resistance.
Birikunzira then sought help from the soldiers at ESO. The commander of ESO, Muvunyi,
provided men as well as heavy weapons and ammunition, and Birikunzira sent an additional
15-20 gendarmes from Nyanza. With the help of Burundian refugees who had been trained by
the interahamwe militia, as well as the militiamen themselves, the killings went on for several
days, and by the end of April, had virtually wiped out all the Tutsis in Ntyazo.
To spark the genocide in commune Rusatira, Butare, Birikunzira’s gendarmes killed a number
of Tutsis on 22 April at the commercial centre of Gahana, known locally as the Arrêté, which
achieved its goal of turning Hutus against Tutsis. Most of the Tutsis living in Rusatira, along
with thousands from other communes and even préfectures, made their way to ISAR/Songa,
an agricultural research station in Rusatira. The attacks by the militia began on Monday, 25
April, but the refugees held their own, relying on their numbers as strength, and using
traditional weapons. But on Thursday the 28th , the refugees were encircled by gendarmes sent
from Nyanza by Birikunzira. The guns pounded the refugees who died en masse. The
survivors were killed in turn as they tried to make a getaway to Burundi. More than 5,000
died between 24-28 April.
The huge number of Tutsis who assembled on the hills in the neighbouring commune of
Ruhashya, Butare, also put up a spirited defence. As well as natives of Ruhashya, they
included a substantial number from the commune of Kinyamakara, Gikongoro, fleeing the
single- minded determination of their bourgmestre, Charles Munyaneza 43 , to eliminate the
Tutsis of his commune. Munyaneza, backed by a large crowd of interahamwe, had tried to
dislodge them, but in vain. But the women, children and men at the summit of the hills in
sectors Rwaniro and Gashoba “tumbled down like grasshoppers”, in the words of one
survivor, after Birikunzira intervened, sending gendarmes, weapons and ammunition.
In May, Birikunzira turned his attention to the préfecture of Gitarama. On 20 May, his
gendarmes helped the bourgmestre of Murama, Jean-Damascène Rutiganda (see below) and
his militia carry out three massacres in a single day. The first to die were several hundred
women and children in the commercial centre of Bweramana, known as the “Douane.” The
next victims were 50 Tutsis cut down near a market in Buhanda. The gendarmes and
Rutiganda then left Buhanda for the headquarters of the Adventist Church in Gitwe, to
43
Charles Munyaneza was arrested in the UK, where he had sought asylum, in December 2006; he and three
other Rwandese genocide suspects are the subject of on-going extradition hearings.
55
organize the slaughter of Adventist pastors and their families, numbering about 80 people.
They were transported to Gitovu where they perished.
A number of the massacres which Birikunzira orchestrated also implicate the bourgmestre of
Murama, Jean-Baptiste Rutiganda; see below.
§ Col. Emmanuel Nyamuhimba
Col. Emmanuel Nyamuhimba
Col. Emmanuel Nyamuhimba, an FDLR liaison officer in Brazzaville, was chief of the urban
police force in the city of Kigali before and during the genocide, when he was a major. In
1992-93, after the creation of the interahamwe militia force, he was active in the recruitment
of militiamen and their military training at Gabiro in Umutara.
In 1994, he served as the chief logistician for the interahamwe and soldiers who operated in
Kigali. He was a close ally of the préfet of Kigali, Lt.Col. Tharcisse Renzaho and, in the
words of a local government official who worked alongside them, “helped Renzaho put in
place the machinery of genocide in Kigali.”
Nyamuhimba regularly took part in the meetings to plan the genocide which took place at the
office of the préfecture. One of his first initiatives was to dismiss Tutsis from the police force;
most of them were subsequently killed.
Ensuring a steady flow of arms to militiamen and local officials was a critical element in the
success of the genocide. Some of the firearms used in Kigali were stockpiled in Renzaho’s
office, and it was Nyamuhimba who distributed them to the heads of the interahamwe, to
sector councillors and representatives of the MRND, MDR and CDR. They in turn put them
in the hands of those whose job was to guard roadblocks and to patrol the city in search of
56
Tutsis to kill. Amri Karekezi, one of the councillors who had … also remembered this about
Nyamuhimba.
He used to bring alcoholic drinks to the militia in order to make it easier for them to kill
Tutsis.
One of the best-known militiamen in Kigali acknowledges the crimes he has been charged
with, particularly with regard to the successive massacres at the Catholic Parish of Sainte
Famille in sector Rugenge, in the heart of Kigali in which Renzaho played a central role.
Nyamuhimba was one of the officers who worked closely with Renzaho. He always used to
come with the militia who abducted Tutsis from Sainte Famille. He used to come in a pick up
full of boxes of beer.
It was also part of Nyamuhimba’s responsibility to increase the number of militiamen familiar
with guns and grenades. He converted the premises of JOC, an organization of Young
Catholic Workers, near Sainte Famille, to a training ground, and appointed policemen under
his command as instructors. Some of them went on to become prominent killers in Kigali,
using weapons they received from Nyamuhimba.
Bemeriki recalled the imprint Nyamuhimba left behind in the commercial centre and in the
area downtown known as Matheus.
He had a group of soldiers working in tandem with the militia leaders to organize the
massacres in these areas, and to loot merchandise as well as vehicles. Some of these cars were
given to the interahamwe to hunt Tutsis.
Zambia
Zambia, as noted earlier, has the largest concentration of Rwandese in Africa outside of the
DRC, including hundreds of genocide suspects, as well as FDLR activists, both military
officers as well as civilians. Members of the FDLR in Zambia travel regularly between the
DRC and Zambia, and also move with ease to Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa.
Zambia is also home to the wives of many FDLR officers serving in the Kivus. The presence
of so many Rwandese, many of whom have done extremely in business and in the
professions, has made Zambia an extremely important source of political and financial
support.
The military officers who are part of the official structure of the FDLR in Zambia include Col.
Laurent Rwagakinga and Major Guerchome Ngayaberura, who is said to be in charge of
recruitment in Zambia. The civilians who are part of the same structure, or who are actively
engaged with the FDLR in Zambia, include many prominent génocidaires.
57
Dr. Augustin Cyimana, Charles Kagabo, François Twagiramungu and
Chrisostom Budengeri
Some of the men at the helm of the FDLR in Zambia helped to plan and carry out a highly
successful genocide in the commune of Mugina, in the préfecture of Gitarama. They were
themselves either from Mugina, or from the neighbouring commune of Ntongwe. They
include:
•
Dr. Augustin Cyimana, a doctor at Kigali’s main public hospital, the Centre
Hospitalier de Kigali (CHK), who comes from Ntongwe. He is now a doctor at the
University Teaching Hospital in Lusaka and was, and may still be, the chairman of
the FDLR in Zambia;
•
Chrisostom Budengeri, a medical assistant at Mugina health centre. He was
responsible for a program of vaccinations in both Mugina and Ntongwe and was
therefore also well-known in Ntongwe. He was, and may still be, the 1st vice
chairman of the FDLR in Zambia. He is said to own two shops in Zambia as well as a
minibus;
•
Charles Kagabo, the bourgmestre of Ntongwe, is said to shuttle between Zambia and
the DRC where he apparently operates a business to provide medical supplies to the
FDLR, travelling regularly to the zone of Busurunge in South Kivu;
•
François Twagiramungu, he had been bourgmestre of Mugina from 1986-90.
They, along with others, worked closely with Major Pierre-Claver Karangwa, a military
officer based in Kigali, 44 but who comes from Mugina. Together, these men incited and led the
genocide in Mugina by encouraging Hutus to turn against Tutsis, establishing the militia
which operated in the area, distributing guns, grenades and ammunition to them, organizing
and leading them during a series of massacres at the Parish of Mugina between 21-25 April
and in tracking down survivors until the very end.
Initially, their resolve to begin the killings in Mugina came up against a determined obstacle:
Callixte Ndagijimana, the bourgmestre of Mugina. Drawn by news that the bourgmestre of
Mugina was able to contain the genocide in his area, Tutsis poured into Mugina from Kigali
city, Bugesera, Musambira and Nyamabuye in Gitarama, and in particular from the two
neighbouring communes of Runda and Ntongwe. The fact that Ndagijimana welcomed Tutsis
and was attentive to their need for security, material assistance and moral encouragement only
increased the influx. Some stayed at the commune office, and others set up camp at the local
Catholic parish.
44
Major Pierre-Claver Karangwa was a liaison officer between the gendarmerie and the United Nations
Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) which had arrived in Rwanda in December 1993 to monitor the
Arusha Accords which were signed in August 1993 to end the war between the government and the RPF.
However, after the departure of most of the UNAMIR troops shortly after the genocide, Karangwa became an
officer who could be deployed anywhere by the head of the gendarmerie.
58
On 21 April, Ndagijimana was ambushed and murdered. From the testimonies of militiamen
who have confessed, he was killed with the complicity of Dr. Augustin Cyimana, Charles
Kagabo and Chrisostom Budengeri. Although he was caught near a camp for Burundian
refugees, he was murdered close to the residence of the parents of Dr. Cyimana. Even today,
the remains of the body of his car are still in the same spot, the cellule where Cyimana’s
parents had been living.
The death of Ndagijimana was a double blow for the refugees at the parish. It exposed them to
danger and redoubled the ferocity of the killers. Some of them escaped in time, right after
they learned of his death. But stunned and disoriented by the news, the overwhelming
majority remained put. With the whole area under siege, there were in any case few potential
avenues of escape. Some of those who tried to escape were intercepted and forced to return to
the parish, and others were killed as they tried to cross the border into Burundi.
With Ndagijimana out of the way, Kagabo, Cyimana, Twagiramungu, Budengeri, Karangwa
and their allies lost no time in mobilizing a sufficient force to overwhelm the refugees,
including Burundian refugees.
Most of the survivors of Mugina today consist of the few who got out just after Ndagijimana’s
murder and ran to the Bishopric of Kabgayi, some of the wounded who were evacuated there
by the Red Cross or those who held out in the forests and bushes until the very end.
In Ntongwe, the commune where Kagabo was the bourgmestre, the killings were swift,
comprehensive and merciless. The genocide in Ntongwe is also particularly notorious for
widespread rape and sexual violence. A large-scale massacre, led by Kagabo, took place on
20 April, just a day after a planning meeting at his home.
François Twagiramungu is on the Interpol Wanted List of November 2007.
§ Esdras Ruremesha
Men like Esdras Ruremesha form the backbone of the FDLR in Zambia, making financial
contributions and lending their political support. He was one of the 18 genocide suspects
detained by the Government of Zambia in 1995, 15 of whom were released after the ICTR,
which had only just become operational, decided to initially press charges against only three
of the 18.
Ruremesha worked as a topographical technician at the National Office for the Study of
Projects (BUNEP). He lived in Kigali, cellule Munanira, sector Nyakabanda in the commune
of Nyarugenge. He comes from Kibuye.
The residents of Nyakabanda remember Ruremesha as an active member of the interahamwe
created by the ruling party, the MRND. He quickly gained a reputation for fierce anti-Tutsi
sentiments when he joined the interahamwe militia in 1992 or 1993. In 1994, he was one of
the leaders of the genocide in Munanira cellule, and in much of sector Nyakabanda. There is
59
substantial evidence that he distributed arms to militiamen in his cellule and promoted the
massacre of Tutsis by encouraging the population to set up roadblocks to track them down.
He himself went to some roadblocks and led attacks against Tutsis.
Grégoire Nyirimanzi, the councillor of Nyakabanda, who admits that he himself was a leading
force in the massacres in Nyakabanda and beyond, said that he “collaborated with Esdras
Ruremesha, particularly in giving guns out throughout the sector.”
As Nyakabanda is a large sector, certain people were responsible in each zone for assuring the
implementation of the genocide. Ruremesha and someone called Gérant managed genocide
activities in Munanira cellule, including supervising the roadblocks there.
It was Ruremesha’s connections to Major Faustin Ntirikina (see below), he added, which
facilitated access to weapons.
Esdras fetched guns from Major [Faustin] Ntirinkina, commander of a battalion based on
Mount Kigali. During the first week, Ntirinkina accompanied Ruremesha to go and obtain the
arms. They went in Ruremesha’s Lada Niva vehicle.
§ Munyabarenzi Marcel
Marcel Munyabarenzi, an agricultural officer, was the head of the CDR in Bugesera, and was
one of the main figures behind the massacres of Tutsis in the Bugesera region in early 1992.
He worked with Célestin Nzabandora, a lawyer for the CDR, to defend the militiamen
imprisoned for these crimes and to get the m released. Nzabandora is on the November 2007
most wanted Interpol list.
§ Cyprien Ngirabatware
Cyprien Ngirabatware from Gikongoro was a trader in the town of Gitarama. He was a strong
backer of the CDR in Gitarama. His vehicles are said to have transported Tutsis hiding at the
Catholic Bishopric of Kabgayi in Gitarama, to be killed in Gisenyi. Ngirabatware, who lives
in Lusaka, owns transport trucks in Zambia and was, at one time, and may still be, the
treasurer of the FDLR in Zambia.
§ Bantari Rypa
Bantari Rypa was an agricultural office in Kamembe, Cyangugu, and was the chairman of the
CDR in Kamembe. He has shops in Zambia where he has registered as a Congolese from
Uvira. He was, and may still be, a vice-chairman of the FDLR;
60
§ Protais Samvura
Protais Samvura is from Nyamasheke in Cyangugu. He is said to be one of the planners and
perpetrators of most of the attacks which took the lives of Tutsis in Bugarama sector. He was
an ally of John Yusufu Munyakazi, the best-known génocidaire in the region, who is now in
the custody of the ICTR. For example, he and Yusufu are accused of distributing the guns
which were used to kill Tutsis at CIMERWA, the cement factory in Cyangugu. He lives in
Lusaka where he is said to have a wholesale shop and to own minibuses operating in the city.
§ Gaspard Twahirwa Mutabaruka
Gaspard Twahirwa Mutabaruka lived in Kicukiro, Kigali, but is from Kibilira, Gisenyi. Prior
to 1994, he was a businessman in Kigali. He has been implicated in the massacres in Gisenyi,
especially in inciting Hutus to turn against Tutsis, and in the distribution of guns and
grenades. He too lives in Lusaka, and owns a fleet of minibuses as well as a wholesale shop
Malawi
§ Frodouald Ntawulikura
Frodouald Ntawulikura, who had previously lived in Zambia, is now the secretary-general of
the FDLR in Malawi. He is from Mudasomwa in Gikongoro, was a journalist at Radio
Rwanda, had close ties with the MRND and was a shareholder in RTLM. He worked at Radio
Rwanda throughout the genocide and used the official radio of the government to call for
genocide. According to many of his former neighbours in Kimironko, Kigali, Ntawulikura
was responsible for setting up roadblocks in Kimironko both before and during the genocide.
France
§ Brigadier-General Faustin Ntirikina, alias Zigabe Pacifique
Faustin Ntirikina is an advisor to the FDLR, and is known to be particularly close to MajorGeneral Aloys Ntiwiragabo; both are natives of Hindiro, commune Satinsyi. He was a major
in 1994, an aide de camp to the Chief of Staff, Major-General Déogratias Nsabimana, who
died in the plane crash of 6 April along with Habyarimana. He was also a shareholder in
RTLM. He comes from in Gisenyi.
According to soldiers who worked with him, he was highly regarded as a fighter, and was sent
to Umutara for three years, almost the entire duration of the war with the RPF in the early
1990s. His battalion was brought back to Kigali towards the end of 1993, partly to give them a
rest and partly to reinforce the security of Kigali. It was initially based at Camp Kigali, then
moved, at the end of 1993, to one of the elevated hills overlooking Kigali, Mont Kigali. There
61
had not been a camp there previously. Mont Kigali, which lies above Nyamirambo to the west
of the city, was strategically located. It was a time of great political uncertainty, with
challenges from opposition political parties and civic organizations. The arrival of an RPF
battalion in Kigali in December 1993, as part of the August 1993 Arusha Accords, and of a
UN monitoring group to police the peace accords, heightened political tensions in the country
as a whole, but especially in Kigali.
Ntirikina, who had also been instrumental in the training of the interahamwe militia in Gabiro,
and in ensuring that they were well-armed, paid special attention to Hutus who were regarded
as accomplices of the RPF, and to Tutsis in general. A corporal in his battalion said there were
rumours that the Tutsis in commune Rutongo, on the outskirts of Kigali, were helping RPF
soldiers who wanted to infiltrate the city.
Ntirikina asked for permission to send two companies to Rutongo, and he was given the green
light. I was one of the soldiers who was sent there, under the command of Lt. Emmanuel
Ntivuguruzwa and Sub.Lt. Vénant Habiyambere. We erected roadblocks in several sectors of
the commune, and we sent reports to Ntirikina about the Tutsis who were captured at these
checkpoints. Ntirikina himself selected the individuals who should be imprisoned; the
majority never returned to Rutongo. They were executed secretly, after they had been tortured.
When the genocide started, the Huye battalion, the 71 st battalion, was led by Captain
Nyaminani, but he was quickly replaced by Ntirikina, and the battalion was given the mission
of supporting the interahamwe to eliminate the Tutsis living in the three sectors of
Nyamirambo, Nyakabanda and Kimisagara, which were part of the commune of Nyarugenge.
As soon as Ntirikina took charge, he met, in the tent on Mont Kigali which served as his
office, with the councillors in charge of the three sectors, namely Grégoire Nyirimanzi of
Nyakabanda, Rose Karushara of Kimisagara and the councillor of Nyamirambo. Nyirimanzi
gave this account of their early encounters with him.
We met Ntirikina on Mount Kigali in the tent that he was using as an office. He told us that he
wanted a large number of militia who were proficient with arms, as this was necessary in order
to hunt down the inyenzi. We agreed amongst ourselves that each leader was going to have to
mobilize 150 young men and teach them to use arms. Ntirikina requested that we brought
these men to him the following day at the regional stadium at Nyamirambo. As agreed, we
met there the next day. Ntirikina was there along with Major Bivamvagara, who was the head
of Civil Defence in Kigali, and the Commander Twagirayezu, who was a reservist. These last
two had come to help train the new recruits. The training lasted one day and took place at the
stadium. The militia didn’t take away any weapons however and the next day was set by
Ntirikina to distribute the arms.
The three leaders addressed the militia and informed them that they were to begin fighting the
enemy, starting with the Tutsis that they knew. After this order was made the weapons were
distributed from the vehicles that the three men had arrived in. Before the militia left Ntirikina
promised their support in all three districts and in particular at the roadblocks.
The authorities, and in particular Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho and Colonel Aloys Ntiwiragabo,
were aware that all this was taking place.
62
The corporal cited earlier, who worked under Ntirikina’s command, confirmed Nyirimanzi’s
account.
Ntirikina lost no time in contacting the officials responsible for the three sectors, asking them
to find him a large number of interahamwe who could be trained in the use of guns and
grenades. The militia were trained at the stadium in Nyamirambo, under the supervision of
Ntirikina, an officer called Twagirayezu and other officiers charged with civil defence. After
training, the interahamwe were sent out into the three sectors with their guns which were
brought for them by Ntirikina and Col. Tharcisse Renzaho.
But Ntirikina did not leave matters in the hands of civilian officials.
The day after his arrival, Ntirikina began recruiting additional militiamen to help the soldiers
in their pursuit of Tutsis in Kimisagara, Nyakabanda and Nyamirambo.
The distribution of weapons gave us the courage to continue hunting Tutsis because we felt
supported by the militia. Ntirikina didn’t remain on Mount Kigali. He supervised the three
sectors to make sure that the orders were being carried out. He was especially vigilant at the
roadblocks, where he received reports on the progress of the massacre. His car was always full
of weapons to hand out to the militia , for example in Nyakabanda those at the roadblock
below the Baobab Hotel and the checkpoint close to the residence of the employees of the
National Bank of Rwanda (BNR).
Although I have only spoken about the roadblocks set up in my sectors, Ntirikina also
supervised the massacres in Nyamirambo and Kimisagara.
The corporal highlighted Ntirikina’s commitment to the policy of genocide.
Ntirikina worked hard to encourage the interahamwe to kill the Tutsis, visiting all the
residential areas of these three sectors. He turned up at many of the roadblocks to give advice
to the militia. He himself had two roadblocks set up, one near the head office of the Xavérians,
opposite the stadium in Nyamirambo. He gave a lot of guns to the militia who he placed at this
roadblock, telling them to let the corpses of Tutsis rot there. He had another roadblock set up
in Biryogo, close to the mosque, where he liked to meet Stany Simbizi, who I heard was the
head of the CDR militia. 45
Like Apollinaire Hakizimana, now a brigadier-general with the FDLR and their commissioner
of defence (see above), Ntirikina stands accused of facilitating the massacres at the Parish of
Ste. Famille and at the nearby Saint Paul’s Centre. Hussein Longolongo, the militiaman who
spoke earlier about Hakizimana, had this to say about Ntirikina.
Once Tutsi refugees began to congregate at Ste. Paul’s and Ste. Famille, Major Faustin
Ntirikina was one of the officers who started bringing us guns to kill them. I mention him in
particular because he left us one of the soldiers in his battalion, Lt. Kadanse. Kadanse was a
key figure in picking out the Tutsis at Ste. Famille who were to be killed. And he did so under
the directive of Ntirikina who brought him guns and grenades to hand out to the interahamwe.
45
Interviewed in Kigali, 15 November 2007.
63
Ntirikina also used to visit a roadblock at a place known as “poids lourds.” He used to go there
with Lt. Kadanse. There too, their aim was to give weapons to the interahamwe at the
roadblock. A lot of Tutsis died there.
One of the people who collaborated with Ntirikina in furthering the genocide in Kigali is
Callixte Mbarushimana, also currently living in France.
§ Callixte Mbarushimana
Callixte Mbarushimana in Paris
The serious and consistent allegations against Callixte Mbarushimana, the executive secretary
of the FDLR, have been a source of considerable embarrassment for the UN for many years.
After the evacuation of foreign staff, the 44-year-old computer technician appointed himself
as Officer- in-Charge of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Rwanda,
from 10 April to 4 July 1994. He is accused by dozens of witnesses, including former
colleagues, militiamen and local administrators, of used his position, and the resources, of the
UNDP, to advance the policy of massacres, including the murder of Tutsis who worked for
the UNDP. Dressed in military fatigues, armed with a gun and carrying grenades in his belt,
witnesses say that he lent the vehicles and satellite telephones of the UNDP to military
officers, that he also used the UNDP vehicles to facilitate his own contribution to the killings.
He did not hide his collaboration with officers who were fully engaged in the genocide; they
visited him at work, he took part in meetings at the army staff quarters and he travelled to
Mont Kigali to hold discussions with Ntirikina. Mbarushimana, who comes from Ndusu in
Ruhengeri, started working at the UNDP in 1992.
In 1992, Mbarushimana settled in Nyakabanda, and formed close ties with a group of
extremists, all of who would distinguish themselves in the genocide in Kigali, men like
Stanislas Simbizi, the general secretary of the ultra extra extremist party, the Committee for
the Defence of the Republic (CDR); Robert Kajuga, the president of the interahamwe militia;
Georges Rutaganda, Kajuga’s second vice president; Phéneas Ruhumuliza, the first vice
president and other well-known interahamwe leaders like Jean Marie-Vianney Mudahinyuka,
alias Zuzu and François Nambajimana, alias Mucacu46 and Mugimba, president of the CDR in
46
Kajuga died in Kinshasa shortly after the genocide. Rutaganda was extradited from Zambia to the custody of
the ICTR in 1995 and on 6 December 1999 was sentenced to life imprisonment for genocide, crimes against
64
Nyakabanda. The fact that Zuzu, Mucacu and Mbarushimana all lived in Nyakabanda
reinforced their ties.
Long before the genocide, Mbarushimana was already encouraging young Hutu men to join
the interahamwe. His important network of contacts, and the fact that he was working for the
UNDP, gave him stand ing and influence among his neighbours, which in turn made it easier
for him to enlist militiamen. Augustin Habinshuti, the dedicated leader of the interahamwe in
Nyakabanda, was brought there by Mbarushimana.
As early as 8 April 1994, Major Ntirikina is said to have brought a jeep full of guns and
grenades to Mbarushimana’s home. Mbarushimana lost no time in giving them out to the
militia, for example those manning the checkpoint below the Hotel Baobab.
The guns were soon put to use, on 9 April, when more than 20 people were murdered at a
roadblock near a medical clinic close to Zuzu’s home. They had been rounded up from their
homes and assembled there. Zuzu, Mucacu and Mbarushimana arrived at about 10 a.m., all of
them armed with guns and grenades. The captives were ordered to lie on the ground, and
Zuzu then opened fire as a signal for the carnage to begin. A number of the women were
taken away to be raped, and some were subsequently murdered. Many of the corpses were
dumped in a mass grave below the stadium in Nyamirambo, in a place referred to as the “tapis
rouge” [the “red carpet”]. 47
Mbarushimana was also physically present at the massacre, on 7 June, at the monastery of the
Josephite Brothers in Nyamirambo. The operation was planned and supervised by Major
Pierre-Claver Karangwa 48 and Col. Edouard Hakizimana 49 , working closely with other soldiers,
one of the most notorious militiaman in Kigali, Habyarimana, better known as Kigingi;
Nyirimanzi; Habinshuti ; Félix Ntamfurayishyari50 and Callixte Mbarushimana who was
armed. Karangwa brought a group of gendarmes to back up the militia who numbered about
100. The killings began at around 5:00 p.m., leaving more than 80 victims.
In sector Biryogo, Mbarushimana acted as the right- hand man of Stany Simbizi, one of the
chief architects of the genocide in Biryogo. The two men converted a house into a training
ground for the pro-CDR militia known as impuzamugambi. Mbarushimana was a frequent
visitor while soldiers taught them, from 8 April to May, the manipulation of guns and
grenades. “They were plied with drink and then encouraged to form groups to kill Tutsis”, said
Karekezi.
humanity and extermination. Ruhumuliza is said to have died in Nairobi. Zuzu is currently detained in the US on
immigration fraud charges and for assaulting a federal officer.
47
It is common in Rwanda to have a small area behind large football stadiums which are known as “tapis rouge.”
The one in Nyamirambo is particularly well-known.
48
Major Karangwa’s contribution to the massacres in his own commune of Mugina, Gitarama, is discussed
earlier.
49
Col. Edouard Hakizimana, alias Ndabu, is living in Belgium.
50
Félix Ntamfurayishyari later became an interpreter at the ICTR in Arusha; African Rights is not aware if he is
still an employee of the ICTR.
65
During the genocide, Mbarushimana also maintained good relations with the préfet of Kigali,
Renzaho, and went regularly to the office of the préfecture to obtain petrol. His driver, who
was Mucacu’s brother- in- law was an important militiaman in his own right.
Mbarushimana continued to work for the UN after the genocide, in Angola and then in
Kosovo. He was eventually forced to stand down, after widespread publicity about his role
during the genocide. The UN carried out an investigation in 2001, based on 24 witness
statements. It concluded that he was suspected of directing and participating in the murder of
32 people, including Tutsis who had worked for the UNDP. Based on this investigation,
lawyers working for the ICTR concluded that he had a case to answer on charges of genocide
drew up the indictment, but the Prosecutor at the time decided not to proceed, arguing that he
was not “a big fish.” In 2005, the UNDP asked the French government to initiate proceedings.
Belgium
§
Lt.Col. Théophile Gakara
Lt.Col. Théophile Gakara was deployed in Kigali in early April 1994, in the personnel
department of the headquarters of the gendarmerie, but was quickly absorbed into the
reconnaissance battalion.
He worked in ALIR’s department of administration and personnel, then went to work for the
FDLR in Kinshasa. He then left the DRC because he apparently became worried when the
DRC government allowed some genocide suspects to be transferred to the detention facilities
of the ICTR. From Kinshasa, he went to Brazzaville and then to Belgium where he now lives,
and where he is active in the FDLR, in mobilizing funds etc. He comes from Byumba.
In the early 1990s, Gakara earned a reputation for the torture of Tutsis who were suspected of
being RPF accomplices. He and the gendarmes who worked with him, including a corporal
with the nickname of Kaveme, wore plain clothes as they combed Kigali to check out the
homes of Tutsis. Those who were later picked up were taken for interrogation and torture to
an office in the gendarmerie popularly known as “criminology.” The councillor of Biryogo at
the time, Karekezi, recalled his visits.
He played a great part in the arrest and torture of Tutsis. He used to come dressed in plain
clothes to many parts of Nyamirambo and Biryogo to check out the homes of Tutsis.
Karekezi met again during the genocide.
He came to many roadblocks in order to urge the interahamwe to kill the Tutsis. He came to
my sector, and told me that the time had come to erase the Tutsi race off the face of the earth.
He had such an aversion to Tutsis he told me that Hutu women married to Tutsis should have
an abortion. 51
51
Interviewed in Kigali, 14 November 2007.
66
§ Jean-Damascène Hategekimana, Belgium
Jean Damascène Hategekimana was the director of the Social Security Fund in Rwanda. He is
from Gatonde in Ruhengeri. He was with the FDLR until he left Masisi in 2004 for Belgium.
He was a much admired figure in the central committee of the MRND, where he was head of
the economic commission. He was also a member of the MRND committee in Ruhengeri. He
is accused of facilitating the purchase of weapons for the interahamwe militia, and of using
the resources of the Fund to finance the activities of the interahamwe in general.
Jean-Damascène Hategekimana is on the Interpol Wanted List of November 2007
67
5
OTHER GENOCIDE SUSPECTS IN THE DRC
In addition to the soldiers and civilians who are affiliated with the armed groups specifically
targeted in the Nairobi agreement (FDLR/FOCA, RUD-URUNANA, Rasta) there are
hundreds of well-known Rwandese genocide suspects currently living in the DRC. In this
chapter we provide background information, and a summary of some of the charges levelled
against a few individuals. Further details and new names will be discussed in future reports.
Some of the men and women mentioned below may, in fact, be members of the FDLR, RUD
etc… But even if they are not, it is in the interests of the government and people of the DRC,
and in the interests of security and stability in the Great Lakes, to establish their presence and
whereabouts, to investigate the serious allegations against them and to take the necessary and
appropriate measures to bring them to justice.
These men and women include:
§ Félicien Semakwavu, Flodouard Havugimana, alias Havuga, and David
Karangwa, alias Rufigi, at Murambi, Gikongoro
Félicien Semakwavu
Félicien Semakwavu was the bourgmestre of commune Nyamagabe where the town of
Gikongoro is located. Flodouard Havugimana was a deputy préfet in Gikongoro and David
Karangwa, alias Rufigi, was a clerk in the district court in Nyamagabe. Working in close
68
concert with the préfet, Laurent Bucyibaruta 52 , Captain Faustin Sebuhura, the deputy head of
the gendarmerie in Gikongoro (see above), and with Col. Aloys Simba, in charge of the civil
defence force, they managed to kill an estimated 50,000 Tutsis early on the morning of 21
April 1994. It was a technical school under construction on the crest of a hill in Murambi
cellule, sector Remera, just outside the town of Gikongoro.
A few days into the genocide, the Tutsis who had assembled at the Catholic Parish of
Gikongoro, and other public buildings in Gikongoro town, were directed towards Murambi by
Bucyibaruta, Simba, Havugimana, Sebuhura and Semakwavu amongst others. Tens of
thousands of people were taken there under official escort, but many others were murdered at
roadblocks before they even had a chance to reach Murambi. At the school, they waited in
vain for assistance and protection. Some died from untreated injuries, hunger and dehydration.
Havugimana and Karangwa helped to smash the water pipe and militiamen surrounded the
camp and cut short the lives of those who tried to break out or to go out in search of water and
food.
As conditions inside the camp deteriorated, outside its iron fence, military and civilian
officials prepared the Hutu population for what they described as a war of self-defence. The
days between 18-20 April were devoted to twin challenges: firstly, to generating fear and
distrust of the Tutsis in the camp among Hutus living in the vicinity, particularly males, in
order to convince them of the need for a showdown, and secondly, to drawing in forces from
further a field.
To spare the Hutu women and children living in the vicinity—whose husbands and fathers
had been enlisted as militiamen—Bucyibaruta, Semakwavu and Sebuhura relocated them
between the 18th and 20th to other premises in town. They also held meetings to make the
necessary preparations for a large-scale offensive against Murambi by intensifying
propaganda, recruiting militiamen and distributing guns and new machetes.
On the afternoon of 20 April, Bucyibaruta, Sebuhura and Semakwavu visited Murambi to
search for weapons. The gendarmes who accompanied them confiscated any item that could
be used for self-defence, including the sticks for herding cattle. But they went on assuring the
people there that their security would be guaranteed and all the while increased the campaign
to sign up large numbers of militiamen.
On the night of 20-21 April, thousands of interahamwe militiamen were brought to Murambi
from Nyamagabe and many other communes. The different teams were given instructions to
meet up at Kabeza, a collection of shops about one kilometre south of the school. Some were
transported in vehicles and others walked. They were advised not to make noise and not to
light cigarettes to avoid alerting their would-be-victims. The men were told to disguise their
faces with a variety of leaves, both as camouflage and as a means of distinguishing them from
the “enemy.” Gendarmes armed with guns and grenades joined them.
52
Laurent Bucyibaruta, who has lived in France for many years, was first arrested there on 20 July 2007, and
subsequently released and then re-arrested at the request of the ICTR which has asked France to prosecute him,
along with Fr. Wenceslas Munyeshyaka, a Roman Catholic priest who was at the Parish of Ste. Famille in Kigali
in 1994.
69
Shortly before 3:00 a.m., the men were met by Bucyibaruta, Semakwavu, Simba, Sebuhura
and his sub-ordina tes, as well as other leaders, including Havugimana and Karangwa. The
militia were ordered to encircle the camp.
Then at 3:00 a.m. the massacre began when the gendarmes opened fire. The refugees tried to
retaliate, but armed only with stones, they were quickly overwhelmed. The explosion of
bullets and grenades quieted in the morning, but the bloodshed continued as militiamen with
machetes, axes, spears and clubs finished off the wounded and trapped those who had found
hiding places. To prevent militiamen from abandoning their duties, Karangwa and
Havugimana placed a group of men at the Kabeza roadblock to turn back deserters. With the
school tightly surrounded, there was, in any case, little opportunity to elude the formidable
array of weapons.
At the end, Semakwavu, Sebuhura and Karangwa, amongst others, walked around to identify
wanted men among the corpses. They also offered congratulations and encouraged the militia
to feel pride in a mission accomplished, but indicated that the work was not over. The y asked
them to head towards the Parish of Cyanika in Karama commune to lend a hand to the
officials and interahamwe who had begun to massacre the 10,000 Tutsis there. Some of the
few survivors from Murambi ran to Cyanika. Many were murdered en route, and those who
reached the church were killed there within a few hours, along with all the others.
An attempt followed to conceal the killings so they did not come to the attention of visiting
journalists and the international community. Bulldozers were used to remove the corpses at
both Murambi and Cyanika and to dump them in mass graves. In Murambi, the work was
overseen by Semakwavu.
Semakwavu committed many other atrocities in Nyamagabe.
§ Déogratias Hategekimana
More people were killed at the Catholic Parish of Karama, situated in commune Runyinya,
Butare, and at the commune office of Runyinya, than in any other massacre which African
Rights has investigated in Rwanda since April 1994. The corpses of a reported 65,000 victims
of the massacre of 21 April 1994 were discovered and given a decent burial in 1995.
Déogratias Hategekimana, the bourgmestre of Runyinya, is the man who coordinated the
carnage of that day.
Tens of thousands of Tutsi refugees had converged on Runyinya from 7 April onwards,
mainly from Gikongoro, the neighbouring region where the genocide began immediately after
Habyarimana’s death. There were also Tutsis from Runyinya itself, as well as the communes
of Huye, Nyakizu and Maraba in Butare. There were so many refugees–more than 70,000,
together with their belongings and cattle–that they were spread across the expanse between
the parish, the office of the commune and the post-primary school of CERAI.
70
From 19 April, the refugees’ living conditions deteriorated sharply, as the bourgmestre cut off
their access to food and water. The gendarmes, who had come to protect the refugees, began
preventing them from leaving the parish or commune office, and started teaching local Hutus
how to use firearms.
On the morning of Thursday, 21 April, soldiers from Camp Ngoma 53 took up positions around
the parish, the commune office and CERAI. In the presence of the bourgmestre, they shot and
threw grenades non-stop from 10:00 a.m. until 3:30 p.m., the point at which the soldiers had
used up their ammunition. Survivors testify that Hategekimana participated in the massacre,
taking up a gun himself and shooting into the crowd.
When the soldiers returned to Butare to replenish their ammunition, the survivors who could
still walk left for Burundi or for the forest. But the killers continued to pursue them, using
dogs to track people hiding in the forest. Some of those heading for Burundi were killed or
injured at Gatobwe, about 9 kilometres from Runyinya, by gendarmes and interahamwe
despatched by the bourgmestre
See the chapter on the massacres in Runyinya in “Lt.Col. Tharcisse Muvunyi: A Rwandese
Genocide Commander Living in Britain”, Witness to Genocide Issue 12, April 2000, 109
pages, African Rights
§
Fidèle Nzamwita
The commune of Muyaga, in Butare, lies on the border with Burundi. And because the
genocide did not start there until 26 April, it appeared an oasis of peace and attracted
thousands of Tutsis from other communes in Butare, notably Rusatira, Kibayi, Mugusa,
Ntyazo and Nyaruhengeri, and even from Ntongwe in Gitarama. While some thought they
would be safe in Muyaga itself, others made their way there because of its proximity to
Burundi. And the bourgmestre, Fidèle Nzamwita, appeared welcoming. He even detained
troublemakers, giving the Tutsis in Muyaga, and the refugees, a false sense of security. This
turned out to be critical to the success of the genocide in Muyaga because it encouraged
Tutsis to believe that the bourgmestre would ensure their protection. Reassured by the
bourgmestre, they headed for his office, the headquarters of the commune. At the same time,
he quietly instructed the Hutu community to turn them back from the border.
The first assault came from civilians on Sunday the 24th ; they were swiftly repulsed by the
refugees. On the afternoon of Tuesday the 26th , the rumour spread that young Tutsi men who
had escaped to Burundi had crossed back into Muyaga and were terrorizing Hutus, with the
help of Burundian soldiers. It was not true, but it had the intended effect: to galvanize Hutus
and isolate the Tutsis. Soon afterwards, the gendarmes who guarded Burundian refugees in a
nearby camp opened fire on the commune office, assisted by the interahamwe and
Burundians. A lot of people lost their lives, but the gendarmes had exhausted their
ammunition between 4:00-5:00 p.m.
53
The commander of Camp Ngoma, Lt. Ildephonse Hategekimana, is awaiting trial at the ICTR.
71
Nzamwita then left to seek reinforcements from the military in Butare, and he returned to
Muyaga with three vehicles full of soldiers from ESO. They surrounded the commune office
at 6:00 a.m. on Wednesday the 27th , and used their firepower for several hours, allowing the
militia and Burundian refugees to use their machetes and axes against those who had survived
the bullets. The massacre would not have claimed so many live if it was not for the soldiers
Nzamwita had summoned from Butare.
Fidèle Nzamwita is on the Interpol Wanted List of November 2007
See the Witness to Genocide cited above for further information about the killings in Muyaga.
§ Tharcisse Kabasha, Amani Nyilingabo, Silas Kubwimana and Marcellin
Nsengiyumva in Bwakira, Kibuye
Four of the men responsible for the genocide in Kilinda, commune Bwakira in Kibuye, are
among the Rwandese living in the DRC. They are:
Ø Tharcisse Kabasha, the bourgmestre of Bwakira and president of the MRND in
Bwakira. Kabasha, 59, was born in cellule Nyabiranga, Bwakira;
Ø Amani Nyilingabo, a businessman in Bwakira;
Ø Silas Kubwimana, 47, a businessman who lived in Kigali, but was from Taba,
Gitarama, where he was the president of the MRND;
Ø Marcellin Nsengiyumva, the director of the School of Nursing in Kilinda (ESI).
They had a number of key allies, especially Michel Twagirayesu, president of the
Presbyterian Church in Rwanda (EPR); Dr Antoine Kamanzi, medical director of Kilinda
hospital who is now working as a doctor at the University Teaching Hospital in Lusaka;
Anaclet Rudakubana, a deputy préfet of the sous-préfecture of Birambo, and a group of
Presbyterian pastors.
Kilinda is the historical founding place of the Presbyterian Church and Twagirayesu’s region
of origin. Presbyterian pastors from all over the country were in Kilinda for a retreat on 7
April when the genocide was unleashed.
Kubwimana is widely regarded as the man whose arrival in Kilinda ignited the massacre of
Tutsis in the area. Married to Twagirayesu’s niece, he had been given building contracts in
Kilinda and was known there. Immediately he reached Bwakira, on 8 April, accompanied by
six armed militiamen in military uniform, and three vehicles, he demanded to know why local
residents had not turned on their Tutsi neighbours. He claimed that he had fled Gitarama
72
because Tutsis were massacring Hutus, and urged Hutus to strike first in Kilinda. The
message he brought, which his militia helped to spread, was welcomed by Twagirayesu,
Kabasha, Nyilingabo, Kamanzi, Nsengiyumva and the elite of Kilinda. Their frequent and
open meetings exacerbated the tension and fear.
The homes and property of Tutsis in Kilinda came under attack from 10 April onwards from
militiamen, including the men Kubwimana had brought. Many Tutsis sought shelter at the
hospital and the school, a move encouraged by Kabasha and other community leaders. A
meeting at about 5:00 p.m. on the 13th , attended by Kabasha and his allies, served as the
prelude to the massacres the following day.
The elimination of Tutsis of Kilinda began on the evening of 14 April with a massacre at the
hospital between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., followed by a massacre at ESI which began
between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. The bodies of the victims were then thrown into the Nyabarongo
River, along with some women who were still alive. The direct involvement of Kabasha,
Kubwimana, Nsengiyumva and Nyilingabo in both massacres is clear from the testimonies of
militiamen, survivors and witnesses. Nyilingabo and Kubwimana, armed with a gun and a
pistol respectively, were at the forefront of the men who descended on the hospital, and were
the ones giving the orders. Kubwimana’s son, Emmanuel, who carried a gun, and the six
interahamwe who had come with Kubwimana from Gitarama, were also in attendance. The
same men then proceeded to the School of Nursing, and committed the second massacre of
the evening.
Some of the Tutsis who got out, just in time, from ESI and the hospital succumbed to
machetes and spears along the way, trapped by the myriad roadblocks which Kabasha,
Amani, Nsengiyumva, Kubwimana and their allies had set up.
Additional Charges Against Tharcisse Kabasha
Tharcisse Kabasha is also accused of organizing a massacre that took place just a few hours
before the events at the hospital and ESI, on 14 April, in an adult literacy centre, IGA, at the
commune office. He also distributed weapons to the reserve soldiers and to the militia, and
called on all the officials who worked under him to ensure the success of the genocide. He
crossed the Nyabarongo river to help advance the killings in commune Masango, Gitarama,
where he joined forces with Esdras Mpamo 54 , the strongman of Masango.
Additional Charges Against Silas Kubwimana
In Taba, Gitarama, Silas Kubwimana was the right-hand man of the bourgmestre, Jean-Paul
Akayezu, the first person to be prosecuted by the ICTR. Akayezu bestowed the title of
“colonel” on him and put him in charge of a committee on “security.” With Akayezu’s
blessing, Kubwimana distributed weapons to the militia, co-ordinated the killings and led
many of the attacks himself. Together, the two men addressed meetings to justify the
massacres in order to enlist the participation of the population and visited roadblocks.
54
Esdras Mpamo is said to be living in Côte d’Ivoire.
73
For details, see “Jean-Paul Akayesu, First Prosecution by the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda”, September 1996, Witness to Genocide Issue 4, 55 pages, African Rights
§ Jean-Damascène Rutiganda
Jean-Damascene Rutiganda was the bourgmestre of the commune of Murama in Gitarama. He
displayed tenacious energy in hunting down Tutsis throughout his commune, at times
performing multiple massacres in a single day. His activities were comprehensive in terms of
geography, and demonstrated extraordinary cruelty towards anyone suspected of being Tutsi,
regardless of age, infirmity or position as a religious authority. He has been accused by
witnesses of the following:
Ø Creating a militia force known as Ibigashari, which carried out massacres and other
acts of genocide at his command and with his support;
Ø Inciting the local population to genocide, through encouragement, intimidation and
example, forcing residents to take part in the killings, and threatening those who
refused;
Ø Organizing and helping to implement massacres of Tutsi refugees at Murama
commune office on 25 April and, on 20 May, at Buhanda commercial centre, at a
place known as the “douane” and at Gitovu trading centre where Adventist pastors and
their families were killed;
74
Ø Raiding and ransacking houses in search of Tutsis, and ordering the killing of those
that he found, often performing the final coup de grace to finish off the victims;
Ø Personally taking part in the murder of dozens of people, including children, women,
the elderly and disabled people. He killed people by shooting them, crushing their
heads with stones, and bludgeoning them clubs. In two gruesome cases, he used a
knife to cut out the heart of the victim, and used a machete to decapitate a young
woman, parading her head through the streets as a strategy of intimidation;
Ø Forcing the local population to clean up after the massacres by digging mass graves to
dispose of the bodies;
Ø Encouraging militiamen to set fire to houses belonging to Tutsis;
Ø Ordering the looting of homes, stealing money, cows, and other household goods, and
distributing the plunder as a reward to those who participated in massacres.
It was previously thought that Rutiganda was living in Belgium, but recent information
indicates that he is living in the DRC. See “Jean-Damascène Rutiganda: A Free Man in
Brussels?” June 2006, Witness to Genocide Issue 16, 41 pages, African Rights
Jean-Damascène Rutiganda is on the Interpol Wanted List of November 2007
§ Théodore Gakuba
The man Rutiganda relied upon the most is Théodore Gakuba, a reservist in FAR and head of
MDR-Power in Murama. Gakuba, 53, comes from sector Nyabinyenga in Murama. Gakuba
was centrally involved with the killings in Buhanda and the murder of Adventist pastors and
their families in Gitovu on 20 May.
There is ext ensive information available on Gakuba in African Rights’ 2006 Witness to
Genocide on Rutiganda and also “Nkomero: A Collective Account” [of gacaca], April 2003,
50 pages.
§ Rose Karushara
Rose Karushara is one of the best-known female génocidaires. She was the councillor of
sector Kimisagara, commune Nyarugenge in Kigali. Now in her mid-sixties, she comes from
Bwakira, Kibuye. A tall and physically strong woman, and clad in military fatigues, she used
to beat up the refugees herself before handing them over to the interahamwe. She distributed
firearms to the militia and was seen frequently at the roadblocks in her sector, deciding on the
spot whether Tutsis who had been captured should be killed or not. She held meetings with
the militia at a place called Ntaraga in Kimisagara. The plans that led to various massacres
were drawn up at Ntaraga. The distribution of weapons to the interahamwe in Kimisagara was
75
carried out at her house. Many of the people massacred in her sector, both residents and
refugees, were thrown into the Nyabarongo river, or their bodies were dumped in a mass
grave situated around the hides and skins factory known as SODEPARAL. Others were killed
in front of her house while she watched.
Her son, Mutabaruka, then 24, was her driver during the genocide and carried a gun. The two
of them drove around the other sectors of the commune to follow the progress elsewhere.
Another son, Pascal, was also a militiaman who worked alongside his mother. It is a
testimony to the success of Rose Karushara as a genocide leader that a substantial number of
people were killed in her sector. After cleansing Kimisagara, she went to help the perpetrators
in the neighbouring sector of Cyahafi.
For additional details, see “Not So Innocent, When Women Become Killers”, August 1995,
African Rights
Rose Karushara is on the Interpol Wanted List of November 2007
§ Siméon Remera, alias CDR, and Gemma Nayigiziki
Siméon Remera, from Runyinya in Butare, worked as a medical assistant at Kabutare
psychiatric hospital in Butare. He was the president of the CDR party in Butare, and was
himself known as “CDR.” He and his wife, Gemma Nayigiziki, a nurse in a dispensary in
Rango, lived in the town of Butare, in sector Tumba, near the sector office. They are among
the princ ipal planners of the killings in Tumba.
Remera is accused, among other charges, of:
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Inciting Hutus to kill Tutsis;
Helping to organize and take part in the killings in Tumba;
Handing out guns, machetes and other weapons to the militia in Tumba;
Providing the petrol that was used to burn down the homes of Tutsis;
Making lists of Tutsis as targets, many of whom subsequently perished;
Facilitating the murder of children who were hiding in Kabutare;
Establishing a committee to monitor the progress of the killings in Tumba and nearby
Cyarwa.
His wife, Gemma Nayigiziki, was his main ally. She is said to have prepared lists of people to
be killed, and encouraging Tutsis to come to their home in search of safety, only to die shortly
afterwards. She also made lists of properties that belonged to Tutsis, which were to be shared
out by Hutus.
§ Marcel Murwanashyaka
76
Marcel Murwanashyaka, 37, is said to shuttle between Kinshasa and Congo-Brazzaville. He
was a teacher in Nyamasheke, commune Kagano, in Cyangugu. He was the president of CDR
in Kagano, and was among those who prepared and executed the genocide in Kagano.
More specifically, Murwanashyaka was a key figure in the massacres at the Catholic Parish of
Nyamasheke. He led the first attempt to storm the parish, on 13 April, which was neutralized
by the gendarmes guarding the thousands of refugees who had assembled there. In the
subsequent negotiations with local officials and clergy, he appointed himself as the
spokesperson for the militia. He instructed his men to cut off the water supply to the refugees,
and to stop vehicles in order to deprive them of food. And when the killings began at the
parish on the 14th , lasting several days, Murwanashyaka was at the centre of the carnage.
§
Gabriel Murara
Gabriel Murara was a medical assistant at Butare University Hospital. He was the president of
MDR-Power in commune Gishamvu, Butare, where he was also the head of the interahamwe
in April-July 1994. The charges which have been levelled against Murara inc lude:
•
•
•
•
•
Calling on Hutus in Gishamvu to take part in the genocide;
Setting up patrols to track Tutsis;
Giving the militia instructions to assassinate Tutsis, and to loot and destroy their homes
and properties;
Obtaining the guns that were used to murder Tutsis;
Taking an active role in the massacres that began on 25 April at the Parish of Nyumba and
at the Grand Seminary of Nyakibanda in Gishamvu where thousands died.
See African Rights’ report on gacaca in Gishamvu, “Gishamvu, A Collective Account ”,
January 2003, 26 pages.
§ Dominique Karani
Dominique Karani, 53, is from sector Birambo, commune Musambira in Gitarama. He was
the bourgmestre of Musambira for a number of years until 1993. And when the genocide
began, he joined forces with, amongst others, Abdelhamani Iyakaremye, president of the
MRND in Musambira and a member of the central committee of the MRND. The Tutsis of
Musambira went en masse to the Parish of Musambira, where most of them died at the hands
of Karani, Iyakaremye and their allies.
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6
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Implementation of the Nairobi communique depends, above all, on the political will of the
two main parties, the DRC and Rwanda. Neighbours like Burundi and Uganda, the African
Union, the UN, the US and the EU can exert political pressure to move the process forward,
and the UN, the EU and the US can assist by providing financial, logistical and practical
support. Other institutions and groups, including human rights organizations, can make a
contribution in suggesting further details, as we do below, and especially by monitoring the
quality and pace of implementation.
Dismantling the Ex-FAR/Interahamwe
The heart of the Nairobi communique is the determination to “launch military operations, as
a matter of urgency, to dismantle the ex -FAR/interahamwe as a genocidal military
organization in the DRC. Such operations should be simultaneously conducted with
operations to dismantle illegal armed groups in North and South Kivu.” A successful military
strategy depends, among other factors, on the element of surprise. In this context, the
announcement, on 5 December in Addis Ababa, that the operations will begin in March 2008,
is puzzling.
The ex-FDLR-FOCA officers and fighters who have deserted and returned to Rwanda ha ve
considerable experience between them, and are in a unique position to offer advice about how
to formulate a realistic and effective military and political strategy against their former
colleagues. They should be consulted at the earliest possible stage, and their input sought as
plans proceed.
Sanctions: Political Disarmament
The DRC, Rwanda, the EU, the UN and the US, as signatories, said they would “urge the
Security Council to pass a resolution establishing sanctions against the Ex-FAR/Interahamwe
and call upon all Member States to prevent all fund-raising, mobilization or propaganda
activities of the ex -FAR/Interahamwe…
If the purpose of the proposed military operations is to destroy the military machine the exFAR/interahamwe have implanted in the DRC, this must be matched by a similar
determination to disorganize them politically. As this report, citing those who had led and
fought alongside the FDLR has emphasized, the morale of the men who sustain this killing
machine, and their confidence that they are visible and vocal internationally, depends on the
ability of their representatives to lobby on their behalf. It is therefore essential to think long
and hard about ways in which this political machine can be turned off, so that no country can
be used as a source of financial, diplomatic or political support to carry out activities that
destabilize the DRC and its neighbours.
78
The Tripartite Plus Commission, in which the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi meet
regularly to discuss regional problems, had already, in 2005, elaborated a set of sanctions in
case the FDLR failed to disarm in accordance with the Sant’Egidio agreement of 31 March
2005. The ir suggestions were:
To ban the FDLR and its supporters from:
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Access to media;
Fundraising,
Political discussions ;
Travel;
Freezing assets;
Imposing visa restrictions ;
Cutting off all access to safe havens and arms flows to militias.
These ideas could be the basis for a discussion about the proposed Security Council
resolution. Whether a new resolution adopts any of these suggestions or not, it must have all
the elements that will make it impossible for the ex-FAR/interahamwe to rely on a strong,
well-connected, vocal and visible network of representatives, many of whom are now
nationa ls of the countries where they live.
Encouraging Repatriation
The FDLR fighters who are now living in Rwanda are the best vehicle for convincing those
who are still in the DRC to lay down their arms. It is clear that they themselves had been
influenced by the information they had obtained, regarding their families, the fate of ex
combatants in Rwanda and about conditions in the country, from those who had preceded
them.
To Rwanda
§
Increase transmission of the weekly radio programme, Isange Mu Banyu, which gives
voice to FDLR fighters who have come back voluntarily, to at least twice a week, and
for a longer duration. It is listened to attentively by those in the DRC;
§
Provide FDLR returnees with sufficient financial means to communicate with those at
the front. The only way to overcome the reluctance of those who remain sceptical
about the radio broadcasts is to enable their friends to speak directly to them.
79
To the UN and MONUC
§
The UN should improve the services provided by MONUC to welcome and assist
those who have opted for voluntary repatriation by increasing the number of reception
centres and, very importantly, by strengthening the security around the reception
centres. Ex combatants spoke about incidents in which they were nearly ambushed by
the FDLR near MONUC reception centres, and in some cases virtually snatched out of
the hands of MONUC soldiers;
§
Enable combatants to leave the reception centres as soon as they arrive. Some of them
have spent as long as two weeks, and given the inevitable anxiety they must feel,
compounded by fears about security, this will only discourage others.
§
Facilitate a confidential and independent study to examine why combatants who were
repatriated by MONUC are so critical of MONUC’s capacity to create an enabling
environment for would-be-deserters, and why so many question the commitment of
MONUC soldiers on the ground to repatriation.
Refugees and Family Reunion
A significant number of ex-FAR/interahamwe who are now living in Europe and North
America have benefited from the right of refugees to family reunion. They often settle their
families first in the west, both to guarantee them a better life, but also in order to join them
later through these programmes.
Rwanda should work much more closely with the EU and the US on this, providing them with
the relevant information on which officials can, where appropriate, begin the necessary
investigations.
Justice
Despite the long period that has passed since the end of the 1994 genocide, there is still
insufficient international interest in bringing the perpetrators of the genocide to justice. The
violence and insecurity which the ex-FAR and interahamwe perpetrate in eastern DRC, and
which their supporters seek to minimize and explain away, is inseparable from the issue of
genocide justice. Contrary to the arguments that there are only a small number of genocide
suspects among the FDLR in the Congo, there are hundreds. And there are dozens more
genocide suspects, living in comfort in Africa, Europe and North America, among their
representatives. They have not only escaped justice themselves. They are also undermining
the process of justice in Rwanda by intimidating and bribing those who have testified against
them in gacaca, or potential witnesses, and by setting up networks to help their close
relatives, accused of genocide, elude justice and find refuge abroad.
80
To Rwanda
§
Establish a central co-ordination body to bring together all the relevant information
concerning genocide justice available at the Prosecutor’s Office, the Military
Prosecutor’s Office, the gacaca jurisdictions and the national bureau of Interpol;
§
Submit lists of genocide suspects among the ex-FAR/interahamwe to be shared with
the government of the DRC and MONUC, as suggested by the communique. Rwanda
should consider this a priority, and provide not only names but solid and detailed
information on which action can be taken. Since the ex-FAR/interahamwe groups
connected to the FDLR/RUD etc… also live in Africa, Europe and elsewhere, similar
lists and detailed information should also be given to the relevant national
jurisdictions ;
§
Overcome the reluctance to make up such lists as a response to the suggestions, made
by some commentators, that everyone who is not on those lists can then automatically
be considered as having nothing to do with the genocide. This is unrealistic. Apart
from army officers who served in the same battalion, the combatants in the DRC were
not, for the most part, living and operating in the same areas during the genocide.
They cannot, therefore, be expected to know what crimes their colleagues or troops
might be accused of back in Rwanda. And the witnesses in Rwanda do not generally
know who, among the thousands of Rwandese refugees in the DRC, has joined the
FDLR, RUD or Rasta. Rwanda’s other argument, that the focus on individual
culpability for genocide crimes in 1994 ignores the genocidal nature of the
FDLR/RUD project, has now been addressed, in no uncertain terms, by the Nairobi
communique. It is, therefore, in the interests of all concerned for Rwanda to respond
positively to the suggestion that it provide lists and information about genocide
suspects to the government of the DRC and to MONUC.
To the DRC
§
Follow through on the commitment to make a military plan that includes the “arrest
and handing over to the ICTR and Rwanda of those indicted for crimes of genocide,
crimes against humanity or war crimes.”
To the African Union
§
Discourage African countries from harbouring fugitives from justice, targeting in
particular those who are, at the same time engaged in destabilizing activities on behalf
of the FDLR, RUD etc... There are significant concentrations of FDLR representatives
and lobbyists, many of them genocide suspects themselves, and who are directly
engaged in destabilizing the DRC and its neighbours. There is special cause for
concern with regard to Zambia which has become, by far, the most important centre,
outside of the DRC, for the FDLR and genocide suspects in general. Attention also
needs to be paid to Malawi, and increasingly Mozambique, as well as South Africa,
Tanzania, Congo-Brazzaville and Cameroon.
81
To the UN Security Council
§
Use every opportunity to remind all member states of the UN of their obligations to
bring perpetrators of the genocide, who are living in their countries, to justice;
§
Re-open the case against Callixte Mbarushimana, who was in charge of the UNDP
office in Rwanda during the genocide, and who is accused of complicity in the murder
of Tutsi employees of the UN, and of using the resources of the UN to advance the
cause of genocide. The UN must deal with the Mbarushimana case as a top priority,
given the gravity of the allegations against Mbarushimana. The UN cannot provide
moral leadership on genocide justice if it fails to treat this matter with the seriousness
it deserves. It cannot hope to convince member countries to act against the FDLR
when Mbarushimana, the executive secretary of the FDLR, and a virulent and tireless
advocate for the FDLR, is allowed to act as he does without fear of consequences.
To the United States Government
§
Expand the US Rewards for Justice Programme which has included Rwanda since
July 2002 with regard to fugitives from the ICTR. A significant number of “big fish”
were arrested in different African countries immediately it came into operation. The
fugitives who were on the list from the outset, and who are still large, include senior
officers with the FDLR who are profiled in this report. The programme should be
broadened to cover some of the other key figures whose names appear above, and
publicized as widely as possible;
To the European Union
§
Strengthen the relatively new European Network of Contact Points in Respect of
Persons Responsible for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, which
devoted its meeting in The Hague in May 2007 to Rwandese genocide suspects in
Europe. Bringing together prosecutors from across Europe, it is a useful mechanism
for addressing the large-scale presence of ex-FAR/interahamwe on European soil.
The Government of the DRC: Investing in Long-Term Durable Peace
Even if the current violence in the Kivus were to end shortly, the potential for future conflicts
will remain as long as the Government of the DRC fails to put in places polices to promote
long-term peaceful co-existence between the different ethnic groups in the Kivu region,
especially between the Congolese of Rwandese origin, and the other groups who describe
themselves as autochtones [natives of the region]. This is a comple x problem with a long,
bitter and deep-rooted history. It requires thoughtful initiatives not only at the level of the
central government, but particularly at the local level, and not only with the State, but with
civil society, NGOs and the Churches. Even with goodwill, initiatives by the government are
unlikely to bear fruit immediately. What is urgent now is for the government to show
evidence of its political will to move in the right direction, for example by setting up a multi-
82
ethnic commission with a wide-ranging mandate to study the problems of the Kivus in their
entirety, with the mission of elaborating concrete proposals for peaceful co-existence.
The Government of Rwanda: Contributing to Regional Stability
In asking Rwanda to desist from giving its backing “to any armed group or renegade militia
leaders” the Nairobi communique specifically singles out Laurent Nkunda’s group. In this
context, Rwanda should take measures to ensure that Nkunda cannot recruit fighters among
demobilized soldiers and among civilians living in camps in Byumba.
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7
THE NAIROBI COMMUNIQUE AS AN ANNEX
Joint Communique
of
the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo
and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda
on a common approach to end the threat posed to pe ace and stability in both countries
and the Great Lakes Region
We, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Government of the
Republic of Rwanda, having met in Nairobi on 9 November 2007, have agreed on a common
approach to address the threat posed to our common security and stability by the exFAR/Interahamwe 55 . The meeting was facilitated by the United Nations, in the presence of
United States and the European Union.
We, consistent with the commitments made in the Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement of 1999,
which set out modalities for the disarmament and repatriation of all foreign armed groups,
including the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, in the territory of the DRC; the bilateral agreement
signed in Pretoria on 30 July 2002 between the Governments of the DRC and Rwanda; the
Principles on Good Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation between the DRC and Burundi,
Rwanda and Uganda of 25 September 2003; the Pact on Security, Stability and Development
in the Great Lakes Region of 15 December 2006; and the various commitments made within
the framework of the Tripartite Plus Commission, including the commitments made by the
Tripartite-plus Members in Lubumbashi on 8 June 2007 and Kampala on 17 September 2007;
to eliminate the threat posed by illegal armed groups through peaceful and military means,
taking into account the action plan presented by the Government of the RDC to address the
problem of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe on 3 October 2007 and the response and counterproposal made on this plan by the Government of Rwanda:
Have reiterated the following:
1. Peace and Security in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region can only be achieved once
the threat posed by all foreign and national armed groups in the DRC and their
politico- military organizations is addressed;
2. The ex-FAR/Interahamwe constitutes a major threat to peace and security of Rwanda,
the DRC, and the countries in the Great Lakes Region in general, as well as to the
Congolese population;
55
The term ex-FAR/Interahamwe used in this text shall be understood as referring to all Rwandan armed groups
on Congolese soil, irrespective of their denomination (ex-FAR, Interahamwe, ALIR, FDLR, RUD-Unana, Rasta
etc.)
84
3. The presence of irregular Congolese armed groups in eastern DRC equally poses a
threat to peace and security in the DRC and the entire Great Lakes Region;
4. We both reaffirm our commitment to respect and uphold each other’s sovereignty, and
reiterate our commitment to fully cooperate and implement a common approach to
dismantle the ex-FAR/Interahamwe as a genocidal military organization operating in
the territory of the DRC;
5. We fully commit to prevent the direct or indirect support- political, material or human
- to any national and foreign armed group operating in the DRC;
6. We shall share information, and address issues of common concern through existing
mechanisms, in particular the Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM) and the Tripartite
Plus Commission;
7. We shall immediately assign the members to the JVT in Goma and Gisenyi as well as
in Bukavu and Cyangugu;
8. We commit to refrain from any negative propaganda against each other.
9. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo commits to:
(a) Prepare, by 1st December 2007, a detailed plan to disarm and address the threat
posed by the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. MONUC will be requested to provide support to
the planning and subsequent implementation consistent with its mandate and
capacities. The plan will be shared with the Rwandan Government by 1st December
2007;
(b) Launch military operations, as a matter of urgency, to dismantle the exFAR/Interahamwe as a genocidal military organization in the DRC. Such operations
should be simultaneously conducted with operations to dismantle illegal armed groups
in North and South Kivu;
(c) Identify and commit the necessary resources to implement the military components
of the plan;
(d) The plan shall include the following elements:
i) Reactivation and streamlining, in parallel with military pressure, existing
efforts to sensitize ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements to disarm and repatriate to
Rwanda;
ii) Temporary relocation of disarmed ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements to
reception centres/cantonment sites in the DRC; registration by MONUC under
the existing DDRRR procedures and repatriation of those who choose to return
to Rwanda;
iii) with the help of relevant international organizations, moving of the disarmed
ex-FAR/Interahamwe who do not wish to return to Rwanda and who are not
85
wanted for genocide by Rwandan justice or the International Criminal tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR), away from the border until their condition is normalized;
iv)Arrest and handing over to the ICTR and Rwanda of those indicted for crimes
of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.
(e) Refrain from statements in support of any armed group in the DRC;
(f) Publicize the contents of this joint communique.
10. The Government of the Republic of Rwanda commits to:
(a) Take all necessary measures to seal its border to prevent the entry into or exit from
its territory of members of any armed group, renegade militia leaders, Nkunda’s group
in particular, and prevent any form of support – military, material or human - being
provided to any armed group in the DRC;
(b) Share with the Government of the DRC and MONUC a list of wanted génocidaires
(all categories);
(c) Refrain from statements in support of any armed group in the DRC;
(d) Encourage, through appropriate programs, ex-FAR/Interahamwe members and
their dependents to return home and facilitate their effective socio-economic
reintegration;
(e) Publicize the contents of this joint communique.
11. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Government of
the Republic of Rwanda agree to:
(a) Establish strict border controls and prevent illicit cross-border movement of
combatants or recruits, arms, military material, food or medical support for any armed
groups;
(b) Refrain from aiding and abetting (arming, facilitating movement, allowing
recruitment, financing, providing sanctuary, etc) any armed group;
(c) Call upon all Congolese associated with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe to leave the
group immediately and definitely; disarmed combatants that are found to be
Congolese or are eligible to become Congolese in accordance with relevant national
legislation, shall not be subject to repatriation; these will be registered, and a list
identifying them will be shared with the Government of Rwanda;
(d) Cooperate in bringing to justice those accused of having committed war crimes,
crimes against humanity and genocide;
(e) Commit to take all necessary measures to encourage and enable refugees to return
home;
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(f) Commit to actively support and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance
to civilians in need, irrespective of political and ethnic affiliation;
(g) Undertake to minimize the negative impact of the agreed operations against the exFAR/Interahamwe on civilian populations and take measures to ensure the protection
of civilians, as well as compliance of their forces with international humanitarian and
human rights law;
(h) Commit to continuously share intelligence on the implementation of these actions
through the existing bilateral mechanism.
12. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Government of
the Republic of Rwanda call upon the International Partners witnessing this
Communique, and other partners the two signatories to this Communique may
agree on:
(a) To mobilize support to help implement the commitments expressed in this
Communique;
(b) To actively support the protection of civilians and the provision of humanitarian
assistance to IDPs, refugees and those in need.
13. MONUC will protect civilians, in accordance with its mandate, against the negative
impact of operations against the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and monitor compliance with
recognized standards of international humanitarian and human rights law.
14. The signatories of this Communique urge the Security Council to pass a resolution
establishing sanctions against the Ex-FAR/Interahamwe and call upon all Member
States to prevent all fund-raising, mobilization or propaganda activities of the exFAR/Interahamwe.
15. The United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, the United States, South
Africa and other partners the two signatories to this Communique may agree on,
together wit h Representatives of the two parties, shall be invited to facilitate and
monitor the implementation of this agreement.
Nairobi, 9 November 2007
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For the Government of
Democratic Republic of Congo
For the Government of the Republic of the
Rwanda
Antipas Mbusa Nyamwisi
State Minister of Foreign Affairs
Charles Murigande
Minister of Foreign Affairs
For the United Nations
Haile Menkerios
Assistant Secretary-General
for Political Affairs
For the European Union
For the United States of America
Roeland van de Geer
Special Representative
for the Great Lakes Region
Timothy Shortley
Senior Advisor to the Assistant
Secretary Jendayi Frazer for
Conflict Resolution
Department of State
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