Citation
Broadcasting
Genocide:
Censorship, propaganda
& state-sponsored
violence in Rwanda 19901994
1
Contents
Chapter 1
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Chapter 2
FROM EXTERNAL AGGRESSION TO THE
ENEMY WITHIN; Incitement and StateSponsored Violence (1990-1993)
Chapter 3
SUPPRESSION OF INFORMATION
Chapter 4
THE RISE OF “HATE MEDIA” AND ITS
GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP
Chapter 5
RTLM BEFORE THE GENOCIDE
(8 July 1993 – April 1994)
Chapter 6
RTLM AND THE GENOCIDE
Chapter 7
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE MEDIA AND
GENOCIDE
Chapter 8
CONCLUSION
Summary of conclusions and recommendations
2
Chapter 1
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
1 History and Social Structure
Rwanda and Burundi have a similar history and social structure. In both countries
the Hutu make up a substantial majority of the population – about 85 per cent –
with the Tutsi comprising 14 per cent. The Twa constitute the remaining 1 per
cent.
Conventional colonial historiography described the Hutu and Tutsi as different
races, claiming that the Tutsi were a Nilo-Hamitic people, from the area now
known as the Horn of Africa, and therefore were somehow more closely related to
Europeans than other Africans. German, and later Belgian, officials maintained
that the Tutsi were superior to the Hutu and, therefore, naturally better suited to
serve as leaders.
Although these colonial theories have been disproved, there is still surprisingly
little agreement about the origins and character of the different ethnic groups¹. It is
commonly accepted that the Twa of “pygmies” were the original inhabitants of the
area, arriving between 2000 BC and 1000 AD, with a hunter-gatherer economy.
Between the fourth and seventh centuries AD, another group of clans settled in
Rwanda and began farming the land. The nature of this second group remains the
subject of ongoing debate by historians. One school of thought maintains that
these settlers were baHutu (Hutu) and argues that the baTutsi (Tutsi) migrated to
Rwanda much later, between the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Another group of
historians refutes the notion that the Hutu and Tutsi ever had different geographical
origins. 2 Instead, the latter school asserts that the second wave of settlers was
banyaRwanda and that the distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi emerged from
within the same society. It is believed that these categories may have been based
on occupational differences, with the Hutu cultivating large areas of land and the
Tutsi breeding livestock.
Regardless of the historical or geographic origins of the two groups, the categories
of Hutu and Tutsi were already evident in Rwandan society by the early eighteenth
century, when the territory known today as Rwanda comprised several small
independent states.
According to Catherine Newbury, these distinctions evolved with the emergence of
a more centralised pre-colonial state in the mid-to-late nineteenth century. She
argues:
… with the arrival of central authorities … the categories of Hutu and Tutsi
assumed new hierarchical overtones … Later, when the political arena widened
and the intensity of political activity increased, these classifications became
increasingly stratified and rigidified. More than simply conveying the connotation
of cultural difference from Tutsi, Hutu identity came to be associated with and
eventually defined by inferior status. 3
3
These small states, which had existed since the fifteenth century, were united by
the Mwami (traditional chief or king), Kigeri Rwabugiri, who ruled from 18601895. During this period, the mwami, as head of this highly centralised state, also
became the symbol of political authority. As such he owned all the land and cattle
and also acted as the supreme arbiter of justice in Rwanda. By the end of his rule,
the Rwandan kingdom had become tightly organised into a series of the
administrative divisions which were mainly headed by Tutsi. 4 This unusually high
level of administrative organisation is still reflected in Rwanda today. 5
The German colonisation of the kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi, which began in
1899, accentuated the divisions between Hutu and Tutsi. Although Rwanda and
Burundi had formed separate pre-colonial states, Germany united them as one
colony, Ruanda-Urundi. Unlike most areas in Africa then, the boundaries imposed
by the colonial authorities largely corresponded to distinct pre-colonial political
entities. Ruanda-Urundi was administered by only a small number of colonial
authorities and they relied on the Tutsi traditional leaders already in place to
enforce their rule. However, the colonial authorities formalised the previously
fluid social distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi by introducing identity cards
which classified the holder by ethnic origin. Each individual was assigned to the
ethnicity of his or her father. 6
As the colonial authorities sought to consolidate their power, they exacerbated
tensions between Hutu and Tutsi by interfering with their traditional leadership
structures. The German colonial authorities used the Tutsi mwami and other
traditional Tutsi leaders to subject the entire territory to colonial rule. In northern
Rwanda, where Hutu leaders had remained independent of the Tutsi-dominated
pre-colonial state of Mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri, this policy caused wide-spread
social strife, including a short-lived popular uprising in 1911, near Ruhengeri,
which was suppressed by the German military.
When Belgium took over the colony of Ruanda-Urundi from Germany at the end
of World War I, it continued to depend on Tutsi leaders to enforce its rule. In the
late 1920s, the Belgian colonial authorities reorganised the system of traditional
leaders and instituted a formal policy of replacing Hutu chiefs with Tutsi leaders
throughout the country. By the 1930s, Tutsi leaders enjoyed a complete and
unprecedented monopoly of “traditional” leadership positions in Rwanda. 7
2. Revolution, Separation and Independence
Towards the mid-1950s, the policy of promoting Tutsi over Hutu as traditional
leaders was challenged, as internal and external pressure mounted for the
authorities to allow Hutu to participate in government. In 1945, Ruanda-Urundi
had become a UN Trust Territory, with the effect that the UN required Belgium to
steer the colony towards independence. In 1957 the UN sent a mission to Rwanda
to evaluate the steps taken by the colonial authorities to promote democracy.
Increasing national pressure to move towards more equal political representation
before independence was articulated that same year in The Manifesto of the
Bahutu, written by religious teacher and future President, Grégoire Kayibanda.
The social Revolution of 1959-1961 was supported by both the colonial authorities
and the Catholic missionaries, who were very influential in Rwandan society.
4
Although its causes were more complex, the Revolution itself was sparked in
November 1959 by an assault on a party official belonging to the Mouvement
démocratique républicain-Parti du muovement de l’émancipation des Hutu
(Republican Democratic Movement-Party of the Movement for the Emancipation
of Hutu –MDR-Parmehutu) by a Tutsi. This incident led to an uprising in which
the majority of the Tutsi chiefs (21 out of 43 chiefs and 314 out of 549 sub-chiefs)
were killed or forced into exile. Hundreds of other Tutsi were massacred. 8 The
colonial authorities replaced these leaders with Hutu chiefs, thereby abolishing the
Tutsi monarchy.
During this period, several political parties emerged which were grouped along
ethnic lines. The Union nationale rwandaise (National Rwandan Union – UNAR)
and the Rassemblement démocratique rwandais (Rwandan Democratic Assembly –
RADER) mainly enjoyed support from Tutsi communities, whereas the
Association pour la promotion sociale des masses (Association for the Social
Promotion of the Masses – APROSOMA) and the MDR-Parmehutu represented
mostly Hutu constituents. This ethnic polarisation of Rwandan politics became
even more apparent with the legislative elections of September 1961, which were
marred by widespread elections of September 1961, which were marred by
widespread violence against Tutsi. Hutu-dominated parties won 83 per cent of the
votes nationwide, a figure which corresponded to the percentage of Hutu in the
general population. 9 Rwanda and Burundi gained formal independence as separate
states on 1 July 1962.
Under the First Republic of President Grégoire Kayibanda, which came to power
in Rwanda after independence, the political system was monopolised by his Hutubased MDR-Parmehutu, the only party to field candidates during the next
legislative election in 1965. Meanwhile, President Kayibanda’s government
targeted both political opponents and Tutsi for intimidation and state-sponsored
violence. This violence became more widespread when groups of Tutsi exiles
based in Burundi and Uganda, who had fled the country during the Social
Revolution, launched a series of attacks on Rwanda during the early 1960s. In
Rwanda, the rebels were commonly referred to as “Inyenzi”, or “cockroaches” and
the authorities responded to the attacks by retaliating against Tutsi living within the
country. For example, in late 1963, following a major attack on the Bugesera
region, government authorities organised massacres of Tutsi in many parts of the
country. In the préfecture (province) of Gikongoro, some 5,000 to 8,000 Tutsi
were killed – 10-20 per cent of the Tutsi population. 10
3
From the First to the Second Republic
By the early 1970s, the Tutsi were so effectively excluded from political influence
that politics began to divide along regional instead of ethnic lines. Hutu from
northern Rwanda, particularly Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, began to resent the power and
economic advantages enjoyed by the central region of Gitarama, President
Kayibanda’s home region.
In 1973, the authorities harassed and expelled Tutsi from schools, the civil service and
private businesses. It is believed that these events were, in part, sparked off by the
genocidal killings of Hutu in Burundi which had occurred in 1972. Hundreds were
killed and this led to another major exodus of Tutsi from the country. Moreover, the
5
persecution of Tutsi instigated more widespread violence in the country, fuelled by
economic and regional resentments. 11
In the midst of this social strife, the army, whose senior officers were mainly from the
north, overthrew the Kayibanda government and General Juvénal Habyarimana, then
Minister of Defence, became President. 12 General Habyarimana consolidated his
authoritarian rule by proscribing the former ruling party and dissolving parliament. In
1974, a court martial sentenced President Kayibanda and seven other government
members to death. 13 The next year President Habyarimana announced the creation of
a new political party, the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement
(National Revolutionary Movement for Development – MRND).
In 1978, President Habyarimana made the transition to civilian rule but retained the
one-party system. In 1981 he reintroduced parliament, which was renamed the
Conseil national de développement (National Council for Development – CND). 14
Moves towards economic nationalism were reversed, a more centralised system of
administration was introduced, and government-sponsored political violence against
Tutsi largely abated in the absence of border incursions. Despite this, widespread
discrimination against the minority continued.
4
The Early 1990s:
Transition to Democracy and War with the RPF
On 1 October 1990, the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA), the armed wing of the
Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), a group of mainly Tutsi exiles based in Uganda,
invaded Rwanda. The RPA initially numbered approximately 2,500, many of whom
had previously fought in Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) which
overthrew Uganda’s President Obote in January 1986. The RPA increased its strength
to approximately 7,000 at the height of the war. 15
The RPF leaders described their invasion as an attempt to secure the right of return for
Rwandan exiles who had been forced to flee the country since the Social Revolution.
Although, theoretically, the exiles had been allowed to return under Grégoire
Kayibanda’s government, during the Second Republic the government maintained
that the country was too overpopulated to accommodate them. 16 At the time of the
invasion, Rwandan Tutsi exiles were estimated at 600,000, nearly 9 per cent of the
population within the country. 17
The RPF leaders described claimed that the attack was the sole means of pressuring
President Habyarimana’s government. However, one week earlier, the Rwandan
government, under internal and foreign pressure since the late 1980s to address the
question of a democratic transition, had begun to take steps in this direction. On 24
September 1990, a commission nationale de synthése (National Commission of
Synthesis) was created to draft a charte politique nationale (National Political
Charter) which would establish regulations governing the formation of other political
groupings. 18 Although the Commission suspended its work for one month following
the RPF invasion, by the end of the year it had published its findings, a draft charte
politique nationale as well as “a draft constitution and bill on the [formation of]
political parties”. 19
6
By early 1991, the government was under great pressure to allow multi-party politics.
In March, political groupings which had previously operated clandestinely began to
publicly demand formal recognition and to be allowed to participate in government.
The newspaper Le Démocrate published a letter signed by 237 persons, many of
whom were from Gitarama préfecture, who declared their intention to organise a
political party called the Mouvement démocratique républicain (Republican
Democratic Movement – MDR), named after Grégoire Kayibanda’s MDRParmehutu. Other political interest groups, the Parti social démocrate (Social
Democratic Party – PSD), Parti libéral (Liberal Party – PL) and the Parti démocrate
chrétien (Christian Democratic Party – PDC) also became active. 20 The following
month the ruling party changed its name from the Mouvement révolutionnaire
national du développement (National Revolutionary Movement for Development MRND) to the Mouvement revolutionnaire national du développement et de la
démocratie (National Revolutionary Movement for Development and Democracy –
MRND), ostensibly to demonstrate its support for the process of political reform. In
June, the 1978 Constitution was amended to abolish the one-party form of
government. This was followed by the enactment of the Political Parties Law, which
legalised opposition parties, five of which were officially registered the following
month.
In late 1991, the government engaged in negotiations with leaders of several
opposition parties on the possibility of adopting a transitional coalition government in
which the major opposition groups would be represented. Initial discussions failed to
produce an agreement by the end of the year and, on 30 December 1991, the Prime
Minister designate formed a new government with only one minister from an
opposition party, the PDC.
A transitional coalition government which represented several major opposition
parties was finally established in April 1992. President Habyarimana appointed as
Prime Minister MDR representative Dismas Nsengiyaremye, who formed a
government with three other opposition parties, the PSD, the PL and PDC. The
MRND retained half of the cabinet posts whilst the remainder were divided amongst
the four opposition parties. Executive power was shared between the President and
the Prime Minister. It was this government that initiated negotiations with the RPF
which ultimately led to a cease-fire and peace accord.
On 24 May 1992, Foreign Minister Boniface Ngulinzira met with RPF ViceChairman Patrick Mazimpaka. A delegation from the MDR, PSD and PL then
organised meetings with RPF leaders in Brussels (Belgium) on 6 June. The following
day the RPF declared that it would cease hostilities and undertook to use only political
means to pursue its agenda with the Rwandan government. On 12 July, the RPF and
the Rwandan government signed a cease-fire and began negotiations over a peace
agreement. 21
Although the RPF broke the ceasefire on 8 February 1993, leading to a massive
increase in the number of internally displaced people, from 300,000 (1990-1992) to
860,000 by early March, a cease-fire was enacted the following month and
negotiations aimed at a peace agreement continued. 22 The Arusha Accords, which
defined the terms of the peace agreement with the RPF, were signed in August 1993,
and were originally scheduled to be implemented by late 1993. However, the
implementation of the Accords was repeatedly obstructed by President Habyarimana
7
and other MRND politicians, and still had not been effected when Juvénal
Habiyarimana’s plane was shot down on 6 April 1994.
The Arusha records were designed to change the political system from a presidential
to a parliamentary one, with most of the President’s responsibilities assumed by a
Council of Ministers. In the interim period, cabinet positions in the Council of
Ministers of a Broad-based Transitional Government (BBTG) would be shared
between the MRND, internal opposition parties and the RPF. The MRND would
retain only 5 out of 19 positions. In addition, a transitional National Assembly would
be established with representatives from these parties. Furthermore, the Accords
called for the integration of the RPA into the Forces Armées Rwandaises (Rwandan
Armed Forces - FAR) on a 40-60 per cent basis, which necessitated a significant
demobilisation of government troops. During the transitional period, it was agreed
that the RPF would maintain a battalion of 600 troops in Kigali, stationed in the
parliament building, the CND, to provide further security for RPF leaders. Another
RPF battalion remained stationed in northern Rwanda. In October 1993, the UN
Security Council passed Resolution 872 which approved an international force of
2,500 troops, UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda), to assist in the
implementation of the Accords and the integration of the two armies. The first of
these troops were stationed in Rwanda by late October. 23
5
Orchestrating Violence: The growth of MRND and
CDR Militias
The process of democratisation and the Arusha Accords represented a major threat to
members of the ruling elite. In particular, the reforms in the military and government
dealt a blow to hardline sections of the FAR and the MRND. President Habyarimana
had publicly expressed his ambiguous attitude towards the Arusha negotiations as
early as 15 November 1992 in a speech where he described the Accords as “scraps of
paper”, suggesting they could be disregarded. 24
In 1992, just as the multi-party transitional coalition government began to institute a
series of reforms, the ruling party founded militia, the interahamwe, meaning, “Those
who work together”. Simultaneously, another extremist political party emerged, the
Coalition pour la défense de la république (Coalition for the Defence of the Republic
– CDR) which also organised a militia called the Impuzamugambi or “Those with a
single pupose”.25 Although sometimes described as random groups of young thugs,
the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi were centrally organised, with a national
president, vice-president and leaders down to the neighbourhood level. Party leaders
recruited militia members from the party youth organisations, paid them and provided
them with military training, weapons and sometimes uniforms. These groups began
to gradually expand throughout the country during 1992, setting up roadblocks in
various areas, to stop and harass individuals. They were first reported to have played
a role in the government-sponsored violence during the Bugesera massacre in March
1992.
The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
Bacre Waly Ndiaye, reported that in April 1993 both militias were “guilty of
incitement to ethnic violence against the Tutsi, massacres of the civilian populations
and political assassinations”. 26 He also noted that the militias were widely believed to
8
represent attempts by “certain authorities to ‘privatise’ violence by channelling it
through such groups, so as to avoid being held responsible for the massacres”.27
Although opposition members of the coalition transitional government publicly
condemned the militia violence, both groups are reported to have received strong
backing from MRND officials and members of the security forces. Human Rights
Watch reported that in late 1993 and early 1994, militia members were given rigorous
military training in a military camp in the north-eastern region of Mutara. 28
In addition to the militias, another clandestine organisation with the official backing
emerged in 1992. A death squad, “Network Zero”, is reported to have targeted
political opponents for assassination, “thus discrediting democratic reforms, the multiparty system and the peace process initiated at Arusha”. 29 The leading members of
“Network Zero” were prominent figures in the presidential entourage, known as
Akazu (”the little house”), including President Habyarimana’s three brothers-in-law,
Colonel Elie Sagatwa, the President’s personal secretary, Séraphin Rwabukumba, and
Protais Zigiranyirazo; Alphonse Ntirivamunda, Director-General in the Ministry of
Public Works and son-in-law of President Habyarimana, Captain Pascal
Simbikangwa, Côme Bizimungu and Charles Nzabagerageza, former préfets of
Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. 30
Clearly, in 1992, there were already signs that the clandestine organizations were
centrally organised and highly structured. Human Rights Watch reported, in February
1992, that “most leading activists [in Rwanda] believe that the government ahs
compiled lists of naming people to be assassinated when circumstances require.
People in smaller cities and towns, as well as leaders in the capital, assume that such
lists exist”. 31 Jean Birara, former governor of the Central Bank and relative of
General Déogratias Nsabimana 32, reported to the Belgian press that by April 1993,
these militias had prepared a list of 500 people targeted for killing. He claimed that
this list had grown to include 1,500 individuals in the Kigali area by February 1994.33
The existence of such lists became more evident in the months leading up to the
genocide. In January 1994, General Dallaire, head of the UNAMIR contingent in
Rwanda, reported to the UN Security Council that he had evidence that lists had been
drawn up of Tutsi to be exterminated. 34 Moreover, this period was marked by a
visible increase in the activities of the paramilitary groups. The US State Department
report for 1994 noted that in January and February 1994 “government militiamen
killed several dozen civilians, blocked streets, searched cars, beat perceived
opposition supporters and damaged property”. 35 The violence by MRND and CDR
militias during this period was also a major factor in stalling the implementation of
the Arusha Accords. In January and February, UNAMIR intervened to block the
importance of several unauthorised planeloads of arms at Kigali airport, destined for
the Rwandan armed forces. 36
6
The Genocide
On 6 April 1994, around 8.30pm, the plane carrying President Juvénal Habyarimana
and President of Burundi Cyprien Ntaryamira was targeted by a ground-to-air missile
and exploded just as it was nearing the airport in Kigali. All on board were instantly
killed. The two Presidents had been returning from a meeting of regional heads of
state in Dar-es-Salaam in which Juvénal Habyarimana had finally agreed to
9
implement the Arusha Accords of August 1993. Within half an hour of the crash and
before any public announcement was made, government security forces and militias
threw up roadblocks in Kigali and began selective killing. 37 It has not been possible
to establish who was responsible for downing the plane. However, many observers
believe that the speed with which the government and armed forces started the
bloodshed would suggest that both the crash and the violence which followed were
part of a highly organised plan. What happened over the next 24 hours has been
described as “the almost simultaneous occurrence of a military coup, renewed civil
war, systematic political assassinations, and commencement of genocide”. 38
Within the first week, an estimated 20,000 people were killed in the Kigali area alone.
In less than three months, approximately 500,000 were slaughtered; two million
became refugees; and one million were internally displaced. 39 French historian
Gérard Prunier estimates that 80% of the victims were killed during the first six weeks
of the genocide, an extermination rate which would prove five times as fast as that of
the Nazi death camps. 40
The earliest victims were cabinet members and politicians from opposition parties as
well as leaders of civil society. Prime Minster Agathe Uwilingiyimana was killed
along with her husband by government forces early in the morning of 7 April. Ten
Belgian peacekeepers assigned to guard her were disarmed, taken to a military camp
and killed. Minister of Agriculture Frédéric Nzamurambaho, from the PSD, and
Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, Landoald Ndasingwa, PL leader and a Tutsi,
were both slaughtered on 7 April. President of the Supreme Court Joseph
Kavaruganda and Minister of Information Faustin Rucogoza, who had tried to
introduce reform at Radio Rwanda, were also among the first to be killed. Scores of
independent journalists and human rights activists were hunted down and killed
within the next number of days.
A self-proclaimed “interim government” was formed on 8 April, by which time all the
opposition cabinet members had been killed or forced into hiding. Théodore
Sindikubwabo, President of the CND, was sworn in as President, citing Article 42 of
the 1991 Constitution. This was inconsistent with the Arusha Accords, however
which required that if the President were deceased or became incapacitated, a new
head of state would be elected during a special joint session of a new head of state
would be elected during a special joint session of the BBTG and the transitional
National Assembly. 41 Although it claimed to follow the protocol of 7 April 1992,
which had established the first transitional government with opposition representation,
this self-proclaimed cabinet drew all its members from the MRND, the CDR and the
extremist “Hutu Power” factions of several opposition parties which had been close to
the MRND. 42
The RPF responded early in the morning of 7 April 1994 by launching a military
offensive from northern Rwanda, where most of it s troops had been stationed. Later
that day, RPF forces arrived in Kigali to reinforce the 600 RPA troops stationed in the
parliament building in accordance with the peace agreement. 43 On 12 April, as a
result of fighting between the RPA and the FAR in the capital, the interim
government moved from Kigali to Gitarama. By mid-June, the RPF advance had
forced the interim government to relocate to Gisenyi prefécture. Although the
genocide was clearly distinct from the combat, UN Officials, including UN Special
Representatives, Secretary-General Jacques Roger Booh-Booh and, later, Shaharyar
Khan, failed to recognise this and instead lobbied the RPF and the FAR for a cease-
10
fire. However, the RPF refused to consider a cease-fire while government forces
continued the massacres of civilians. 44
The international community failed to take any effective action to stop the widespread
killings during the genocide. The only foreign military intervention during this period
was Opération Turquoise, which the French military began on 23 June 1994.
Although primarily a humanitarian mission, Opération Turquoise established several
“safe havens” in south-west Rwanda which protected an estimated 12-15,000 Tutsi
from slaughter. Meanwhile, the UN not only failed to respond to the crisis; on 21
April the UN Security Council cut the size of the UNAMIR force from 2,500 to 270
troops. ON 8 June the Security Council passed another resolution authorising the use
of 5,000 UNAMIR troops with a stronger mandate. This step proved futile as the
necessary logistical support for this mission was not forthcoming from the United
States (US) until late July. By that point the genocide had already ended with the
RPF victory of 18 July. The next day, Pasteur Bizimungu became President and
Major General Paul Kagame was appointed Vice-President and Defence Minister. 45
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
The Hutu and Tutsi are considered to constitute distinct ethnic groups,
although they speak Kinyarwanda in Rwanda and Kirundi in Burundi and
share a common culture.
The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, Rwanda, Burundi:
Historical background, 1995-96 (London: EIU, 1995), 4.
C. Newbury, The cohesion of oppression. Clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda
1860-1960, in: Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The
International Response to Conflict and Genocide; Lessons from the Rwanda
Experience, (Study 1: Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors),
(Denmark: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency
Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996), 23.
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, note 3 above.
Rwanda is composed of 10 préfectures (provinces), each headed by a préfet
(prefect) who is appointed by the President of the Republic. Each préfecture
comprises 143 communes (municipalities), which are all led by a
bourgesmestre (mayor), who is also appointed by the President. (Ibid., at 15).
Each commune is organised into 7-10 secteurs (sectors) which are each
represented by an elected councillor. In turn, every sector is divided into
cellules (cells), which are headed by an elected committee of five people. The
committees choose a responsible de cellule (cell leader) to represent them.
Fédération internationale des droits de l’homme, Africa Watch, Union
interafricaine des droits l’homme, Africa Watch, Union interafricaine des
droits de l’homme et des peoples, Centre international des droits de la
personne et du développement démocratique, Report of Internationale
Commission of Investigation on Human Rights violations in Rwanda since
October 1, 1990 (January 7 -21, 1993 Final Report (New York: Human
Rights Watch/Africa, March 1993), 12.
Identity cards indicating ethnicity were retained by the First and Second
Republics in the post-independence period; however, they have since been
abolished by the Rwanda Patriotic Front, which took power on 19 July 1994.
11
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
F Reyntjens, L’Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise: Rwanda, Burundi: 19881994 (Paris: ditions Karthala, 1994), 20.
Ibid., at 27
Ibid
Ibid
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, note 3 above, at 32
Habyarimana retained both positions until the first transitional government of
Prime Minister Sylvestre Nsanzimana of Dec. 1991.
Some of the government members were granted clemency which reduced the
death sentences to prison terms. Grégoire Kayibanda was placed under house
arrest but died two years later after being refused access to medical care.
The Economist Intelligence Unit, note 2 above, at 6
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, note 4 above, at 35
Reyntjens, note 7 above, at 143.
Ibid., at 25.
Ibid., at 104
Ibid., at 105
Ibid., at 106
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International
response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience
(Study 2: Early Warning and Conflict Management) (Denmark: Steering
Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda,
March 1996), 24
G Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide (London and
New York: Hurst & Company and Columbia University Press, 1995), 174
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, note 3 above, at 46.
“Chiffons de papier”, in Reyntjens, note 7 above, at 205
Although originally an opposition party, in late 1993, the CDR formed an
alliance with extremists in the MRND.
UN Economic and Social Council, Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, Addendum – Report by Mr B W Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur, on
his mission to Rwanda from 8 to 17 April 1993, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1., dated 11 Aug. 1993, 12.
Ibid.
Human Rights Watch/Africa, Genocide in Rwanda: April-May 1994 (New
York: May 1994),2
UN Economic and Social Council, note 26 above, at 13
Prunier, note 22 above, at 168
Africa Watch, Rwanda: Talking Peace and Waging War; Human Rights Since
the October 1990 Invasion (New York: Africa Watch, 27 Feb 1992).
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces until killed in the plane crash with
President Habyarimana on 6 April 1994.
Prunier, note 22, above at 222.
This cable is reproduced in F Reyntjens, Rwanda: Trois jours qui ont fait
basculer l’histoire, Cahiers Africaine no. 16 (Institut-Africain-CEDAF and
l’Harmattan: Brussels and Paris, 1995). It cites a report from an informant that
the Interahamwe could kill up to 1,000 Tutsi in 20 minutes
US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
1994 (Washington: US Government Printing Office 1995, 200-208.
Human Rights Watch/Africa, note 28, above, at 2
12
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
US Department of State, note 35 above.
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. Note 21 above. For an
analysis of the plane crash and events during the first several days of the
genocide, see Reyntiens, note 34 above.
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, note 3 above, at 50.
Prunier, note 22 above, at 261. The exact death toll will probably never be
known. Most observers estimate the deaths by genocide at 500,000, however,
Prunier has put forward the higher figure of 800,000, which he bases on
demographic calculations. Professor Filip Reynjens has estimated that the
total number of deaths caused by the genocide, war and refugee crisis from
April to the end of September1994 was 1.3 million.
This provision of the Accords technically was effective from 4 Aug. 1993,
however, by April 1994 the transitional institutions it referred to still had not
been put into place. Reyntjens, note 7 above, at 297.
Reyntjens, note 34 above, at 90. These factions had caused splits within most
of the opposition parties by late 1993.
Ibid. It was widely reported in the international media that the RPF launch
began on 8 April 1994.
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, note 3 above, at 54.
The RPA also killed scores of civilians. Amnesty International has reported that
possibly thousands of unarmed civilians are believed to have been summarily
executed by the RPA from April-July 1994. However, more precise figures are
unavailable. See, Amnesty International, Rwanda: Reports of Killings and
Abductions by the Rwandese Patriotic Army, April-August 1944 (London:
Amnesty International, Oct. 1994).
45
Ibid., at 78-80
13
Chapter 2
FROM EXTERNAL AGGRESSION TO THE ENEMY WITHIN; Incitement
and State-Sponsored Violence (1990-1993)
Although President Habyarimana ordered citizens to assist in the battle against
“infiltrators”, he did not explicitly call for violence. However, in contrast to the
vague rhetoric of high-level government officials, local civil servants directly
instigated and organised several massacres of Tutsi civilians between 1990 and 1993.
1. Incitement to Violence by Administrative Officials
“Massacres Téléguidés”
While clearly distinct from the fighting at the battle-front, the state-sponsored
violence of 1990-1993 was incited and directed by Rwandan authorities who
repeatedly invoked the war as a pretext to attack civilians. The first two such
incidents occurred in north-west Rwanda, the general region affected by the war.
These were the massacre in Kibilira commune in October 1990, and the killings of the
Bagogwe² between January and February 1991.
Subsequent episodes, however occurred far from the combat zones, such as the
attacks in Murambi, Eastern Rwanda (7-8 November 1991) when dozens of Tutsi
were attacked and their homes pillaged; the killing of 85 Tutsi in Kibuye préfecture
(August 1992); and the Bugesera massacre (March 1992). At first the attacks targeted
only Tutsi civilians, however, by March 1992 they were also aimed at Hutu members
of opposition parties. These killings were clearly organised by local government
officials, specifically within their own administrative divisions, and generally did not
spread to other areas. 3 From 1992 onwards, the militias affiliated with the MRND and
the CDR, the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi, also played a role in executing
the violence.
UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Bacre
Waly Ndiaye, writes that the role of administrative authorities in the violence
“consists chiefly in encouraging, planning and directing the operation, and in some
cases actually participating in it”. 4 The authorities used false rumours and
misinformation to promote ethnic hatred and incite the local residents to take part in
the attacks on Tutsi civilians. Bacre Waly Ndiaye noted that a “study of the phases
preceding outbreaks of violence among the population shows that such outbreaks are
planned and prepared, with targets being identified in speeches by representatives of
the authorities, broadcasts on Rwandan radio and leaflets”. 5 Describing the methods
used by local officials to instigate violence, Gérard Prunier claims the massacres were
“preceded by political meetings during which a ‘sensibilisation’ process was carried
out … to put local peasants ‘in the mood’, to drum into them that the people they were
to kill are ibyitso (accomplices), actual or potential collaborators of the RPF archenemy”. 6
The first attacks in Kibilira commune, 7 which occurred between 11 and 13 October
1990, 10 days after the start of the RPF offensive, and claimed the lives of 348 Tutsi
civilians, illustrate this pattern of incitement and violence. According to testimony
gathered by the International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights
Violations in Rwanda since 1 October 1990, violence began in Kibilira following a
meeting of Communal Councillors in which the sous-préfet produced two dead bodies
and claimed that they were Hutu who had been murdered by Tutsi. 8 The sous-préfet
14
ordered the Councillors to “sensitise the population’ to the importance of security
measures” in their respective administrative divisions. 9 The same day, the
responsable de cellule for Makoma, Gatumba secteur, is reported to have ordered
people to set fire to the houses of Tutsi in that region, claiming that the Inyenzi
planned to exterminate all the Hutu. Other administrative authorities in Gatumba
sector instilled panic by spreading false rumours that a prominent regional authority.
Colonel Serubuga had been murdered. In the sectors of Kirengo, Ntobwe,
Ngurugunzu and Karehe, administrative authorities falsely alleged that another major
military figure, Colonel Uwihoreye, had been killed.
Although high-level government officials, including the then préfet of Gisenyi, Côme
Bizimungu, and the Director of ORINFOR, Christophe Mfizi, as well as foreign
diplomats, were aware of the violence, police failed to respond before 13 October.
Following the killings, authorities blamed the incidents on both the RPF and Tutsi
civilians. The Rwandan Embassy in Washington claimed on 11 October that RPF
rebels were responsible for the killings and had used peasants as a shield during an
attack. The next day, the Rwandan government alleged that the several hundred
people massacred were rebels, killed in combat. On 13 October the government
reported that the initial confusion arose because the rebels killed had all been
disguised as civilians. 10 A report from the Office of the Public Prosecutor in Gisenyi
later stated that the massacre had been incited by “Tutsi extremists”, who encouraged
the population to commit atrocities.
More state-sponsored violence occurred shortly after, probably in retaliation for the
RPF raid on Ruhengeri town in late January 1991 (see Chapter 1, Section 2). These
massacres, which were organised in several parts of the north-western préfectures of
Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, killed between 300 and 1,000 Bagogwe. 11 According to the
International Commission of Investigation the violence was systematically incited by
local administrators, sometimes in collaboration with high-level authorities. In the
communes of Gaseke and Giciye, the attacks began soon after the Minister of the
Interior, Jean-Marie Vianney Mugemana, and the préfet of Ruhengeri, Charles
Nzabagerageza, visited the region and issued a leaflet which stated: “Go do a special
‘umuganda’. Destroy all the bushes; and all the [RPF] Inkotanyi [indomitable
fighters] who are hiding there. And don’t forget that those who are destroying weeds
must also get rid of the roots”. 12 “Umuganda” is the term for communal labour,
usually agricultural or construction work, which was required of all Rwandans, over
the age of 18, one day a week, from the 1970s. 13 This metaphor of killing as work
had already been used in Mukingo commune on 12 October 1990, when the
bourgemestre, Juvénal Kajerijeri, required residents to participate in a communal
work project which involved the killing of two Bagogwe women. Communal labour
also served as the pretext for civil servants in Giciye commune to assemble a large
crowd on 2 February 1991 and order them to attack Bagogwe in that area.
In Mukingo and Kinigi communes, civil servants continued to direct violence against
members of the Bagogwe population from late January to early February 1991. In
Kinigi, between 30 and 60 Bagogwe were killed on 27 January after bourgemestre
Thadée Gasana order several communal councillors to round up and attack them with
machetes and sticks. 14 In the Mukingo commune, bourgemestre Kajerijeri ordered
local police to arrest the Bagogwe in the area, who were then killed by a group
comprising local administrators, several teachers, and other citizens, using stones,
spears and guns.
15
In other areas, the authorities invented reasons to justify their persecution of the
Bagogwe. In Mutura commune, the Rwandan military – repeating the charade of 4-5
October 1990 in Kigali – enacted a fake RPF attack on the military camp at Bagogwe.
The following day this attack was used as a pretext for soldiers and local
administrative authorities to comb the area for RPA forces or “accomplices” who
could have participated in the attack.15
The massacres of the Bagogwe occurred mostly in remote areas which were not easily
accessible from the rest of the country, and information did not emerge about the
bloodshed for several months. In August 1991, the RPF issued a communiqué calling
for an international investigation into the violence but, although the RPF report was
covered by both the national and international media, the Rwandan authorities denied
that any violence had taken place. Instead, the government again invoked the war to
explain away the disappearance of hundreds of Tutsi civilians, and maintained that
massive numbers of Bagogwe had suddenly left the country to join the RPF.
2
The Bugesera Massacre and the Role of the Media
The Bugesera massacre of March 1992 was exacerbated by the print and
broadcast media, which were used by the authorities as additional means of
encouraging violence. The pogroms in this region were preceded by a series of
attacks against Tutsi residents by administrative officials. 16 In October 1991,
Fidéle Rwambuka, Bourgemestre of Kanzenze, ordered the arrest of several
young Tutsi residents and accused them of preparing to join the RPF; 28 were
briefly detained and eight disappeared. In mid-February 1992, five more
civilians were arrested in connection with mine explosions which had occurred
in the region, and were tortured. 17 In early March, a leaflet was distributed,
allegedly by the authorities, following a verbal confrontation between members
of the PL opposition and Bourgemestre Rwambuka. This accused PL
supporters of working for the rebels, and stated: “They must not escape”. 18
In late November 1991, Hassan Ngeze, editor of the newspaper Kangura
(notorious for its hate speech against Tutsi and its connections with government
officials – see Chapter 4) travelled to Bugesera and distributed anti-Tutsi
leaflets throughout the region. 19 In addition, Bugesera was the subject of
several false and inflammatory broadcasts by Radio Rwanda, including some
reports which claimed that many young people from Bugesera had left the
country to enlist in the RPF. Meanwhile, Jean-Baptiste Nubahumpatse, Radio
Rwanda journalist and stringer for the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation)
French for Africa Service, filed a series of reports on mine explosions in
Bugesera, falsely stating that a mine had been placed in front of the Kanzenze
bourgemestre’s house and making unsubstantiated allegations that the RPF was
responsible.20
On 3 March 1992, Radio Rwanda broadcast a communiqué from a fictitious
organization, the Commission inter-africaine de la non-violence, said to be
based in Nairobi. This communiqué, which was broadcast five times, warned
that the fighting would soon move from traditional and guerrilla warfare to a
“third phase” of the war which would consist of “assassinations” and
“destruction of property”. 21 According to the communiqué, this campaign of
terror was to be carried out by “foreign terrorists”, Africans and Arabs, who
would infiltrate Rwanda under various guises, possibly as businessmen or
16
tourists. Once in Rwanda, they would contact the alleged local head of the RPF,
PL leader Justin Mugenzi – who in fact had no connection with the RPF – and
initiate their plan to destroy Rwanda, starting with the assassination of 22 major
political figures and businessmen,. After the destruction had taken place, the
communiqué predicted, RPF media organs would blame the violence on a
political party dominated by Hutu.
This warning was followed the next day by an inflammatory communiqué from
ORINFOR Director, Ferdinand Nahimana, which urged listeners to beware of
the dangers at hand and to take preventative action. It urged listeners “to
annihilate these machiavellian plans of the enemy “Inyenzi-Inkotanyi”. 22
Nahimana also added to the list of horrors predicted by the imaginary group in
Nairobi: the “destabilisation” process would include a campaign to provoke
wide-spread civil disobedience and to demoralise the armed forces, driving
them to resign or “lose their heads”. He also claimed that the Nairobi group
encompassed an equally fictitious organisation based in Rwanda, the Comité des
sympathisants de non-violence au Rwanda, which had begun to take steps to
prevent the threatened violence.
In early March, members of the Interahamwe militia and the Presidential Guard,
in civilian dress, were brought to the Bugesera region. During the night of 4-5
March, following Nahimana’s broadcast, violence swept Kanzenze commune,
killing mostly Tutsi. Within five days, 195 Tutsi and opposition supporters
were massacred and subsequently the figure rose to 277, 23 with 15,000 persons
displaced by the attacks. On 9 March, the Minister of the Interior denied
international press reports that Tutsi were targeted in the massacres, and
maintained that only 35 people had been killed. The next day Radio Rwanda
reported that the cause of the violence was unclear but claimed: “some people
are pointing the finger at the PL meeting held in Kanzenze on 1 March, which
flogged (sic) local authorities and wounded the feelings of the population”. 24
Prime Minister Sylvestre Nsanzimana publicly criticised ORINFOR for the
incident, but no disciplinary action was taken against anyone involved. He
merely issued a general warning to journalists and political party activists not to
use inflammatory language.
The independent press in Rwanda and national human rights groups strongly
condemned the government-sponsored violence and the role of the national
radio in encouraging it. Five human rights associations issued a joint
communiqué on 10 March 1992 which stated that the massacre was “a logical
and direct response to the mysterious [Nahimana] communiqué which had been
broadcast several times. 25 Largely as a result of these protests, Ferdinand
Nahimana was dismissed from his position by the multi-party transitional
government a few weeks after it was formed in April 1992.
3 Defining the Enemy: The Military Responds
The communiqués of March 1992 were not the first attempt to scare Rwandans
with unlikely allegations about the dangers of enemies lurking amongst them.
In December 1991, Radio Rwanda broadcast a communiqué from the military
high command which accused the RPF of massively infiltrating different
segments of civil society, including the private press and political parties, with
the aim of sponsoring violence. 26
17
During this period, the military formed a Commission of ten officers, led by
Déogratias Nsabimana, to prepare a plan to conquer the enemy “on the
battlefield, in politics and in the media”. 27 On 21 September 1992, this group
released a widely disseminated report which defined the main enemy as “Tutsi
inside or outside the country, who are extremists and nostalgic for power, who
have never recognised … the realities of the Social Revolution of 1959, and
who want to take power in Rwanda by any means, including by force”. The
document claimed that the enemies of Rwanda engaged in combat, espionage,
and rumour-mongering, and even identified possible suspects, citing a list of
newspapers and cultural associations it alleged were of a dubious nature. The
report denounced “activists [who] … turn public attention from the ethnic
problem to the socio-economic divisions between rich and poor”. The
Commission listed people working in non-governmental organisations who,
supposedly, were using their positions as fronts for the RPF. The text
concluded that it was necessary for the public to be aware “to what extent the
political and administrative authorities have been devoured” by the enemy. 28
4 The Léon Mugesera Speech: Punishment for the Enemy
A speech given two months later by Léon Mugesera, Vice-President of the
MRND in Gisenyi préfecture, represented the most explicit call for violence
against Tutsi civilians and Hutu opposition supporters at that time. At an
MRND rally in the sous-préfecture of Kabaya on 22 November 1992, Mugesera
warned his audience to remain vigilant at all times. If provoked, they should
forget the biblical notion of turning the other cheek and instead should meet
violence with greater violence. Léon Mugesera claimed that the lessons of the
Bible had changed: “I tell you that the Gospel has already changed in our
movement. If someone gives you a slap, give them two in return, two fatal
ones”. 29
Earlier in his speech, Mugesera had attacked the opposition parties in the
transitional government of April 1992, led by Prime Minister Dismas
Nsengiyaremye, from the MDR. He stated that MDR members should not be
allowed to enter Gisenyi préfecture, and exclaimed: “No infiltration in our
stronghold: It is forbidden!” According to Mugesera, the Brussels meetings in
mid-1992, between several opposition party representatives and RPF leaders, to
initiate cease-fire negotiations, clearly showed that the opposition was working
for the RPF. He castigated Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye for
announcing that the government would consider plans to demobilize a number
of army troops in order to create an army with 40 per cent RPA troops.
Mugesera insisted that the Prime Minister, along with any other people who
interfered with the defence of the nation, needed to be punished with “nothing
less than death”.
His speech also targeted Tutsi, referring to them as Inyenzi, and claimed that
they had also threatened the security of the nation, not by representing the
political interests of the RPF but rather by directly joining its ranks. He alleged
that families throughout the southern préfectures of Gikongoro and Butare were
sending their children to join the RPF. Arguing that this was another crime,
punishable by death, Mugesera demanded: “Why don’t we arrest these people to
exterminate them? Why don’t we exterminate these people who send young
18
people to the front?” He taunted audiences: “Tell me, are you really just waiting
blissfully to be massacred?”
Should justice system fail to carry out the punishment, Mugesera explained,
people needed to take the law into their own hands as justice should be executed
“in the name of the people”. Invoking religious authority, Mugesera also
incited genocide against Tutsi: “we ourselves will take care of massacring these
gangs of thugs. You know, it says in the Gospel that the snake comes to bite
you and, if you let it stay, you are the one who will perish”. He concluded: “the
mistake we made in 1959 … is that we let you get out safe and sound … your
country is Ethiopia and, soon, we will send you to your home, via Nyabarongo
[river in Rwanda], on an express trip”. During the genocide of 1994,
Mugesera’s statements were frequently repeated by Radio-Télévision Libre des
Mille Collines (RTLM). 30
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
This expression is from Filip Reyntjens and means “massacres orchestrated
and controlled from above”.
The Bagogwe are a Tutsi sub-group, mainly herdsmen, who have lived
outside Tutsi traditional political structures since the seventeenth century.
Fédération des droits de l’homme, Africa Watch, Union interafricaine des
droits de l’homme et des peoples, Centre internationale des droits de la
personne et du développement démocratique, Report of the International
Commission on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda Since October 1, 1990
(New York: Human Rights Watch/Africa, March 1993), 17.
UN Economic and Social Council, Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, Addendum – Report by Mr B W Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur, on
his mission to Rwanda from 8 – 17 April, 1993, UN
Doc.E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1.,dated 11 Aug, 1993, 13. Later incidents in the
north-west include: the attacks against Tutsi civilians in Kibilra commune in
March 1992 and then again in Dec. 1992 – Jan 1993. On 26 Jan. 1993, just
after the departure of the International Commission of Investigation, militia
members, sometimes in junction with soldiers or local residents, killed 300
people in north-west Rwanda.
Ibid., at 12.
Ibid.
G Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of Genocide (London and
New York: Hurst & Company and Columbia University Press, 1995), 137138.
Kibilira commune is situated between Kigali and the capital of Gisenyi
préfecture.
8 The International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations
in Rwanda Since October 1, 1990 was comprised of representatives of four
international human rights groups who visited Rwanda in January 1993 to
investigate the state-sponsored violence and other human rights abuses which
had occurred since the beginning of the war with the RPF. They had been
invited by several Rwandan human rights groups.
19
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Fédération international des droits de l’homme, Africa Watch, Union
interafricaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, and the Centre
international des droits de la personne et du développement démocratique,
Report of the International Commission of Investigation on HumanRights
Violations in Rwanda since October 1, 1990 (January 7-21, 1993) Final
Report (New York: Human Rights Watch/Africa, March 1993), 12.
“Massacre Alleged”, Washington Post, 11 Oct. 1990: “Rwanda Says Its
Army Did Not Kill Civilians”, New York Times, 12 Oct, 1990; and “Civilian
Attack Denied”, Newsday, 13 Oct 1990.
The exact figure has never been established; the victims were buried in
unidentified graves. Prunier, note 6 above, at 137.
Ibid., at 21.
It was later abolished by the second transitional government appointed in
April 1992.
Report of the International Commission, note 9 above, at 19.
Ibid., at 22.
At that time, Bugesera comprised a large Tutsi population. It was relatively
under populated until the 1960s when large numbers of displaced Tutsi
moved there after being driven from other parts of the country during the
Social Revolution of 1959-1961. The region includes the three communes of
Kanzenze, Gashora and Ngenda. Report of the International Commission,
note 9 above, at 25.
Report of the International Commission, note 9 above, at 26.
“Il ne faut pas qu’ils nous échappent”. F. Feyntjens, “Akazu, ‘Escadrons de
la mort’ et autres ‘Réseau Zéro’: une historique des resistances au
changement politique depuis 1990”, in A Guichaoua (ed.), Les crises
politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994), Lille/Paris: Université des
Sciences et Technologies de Lille/ ditions, Karthala, 1995), 268.
Ibid., at 267. He cites a telegram from the Gako army camp addressed to the
Etat-Major, which states that Hassan Ngeze travelled to the region “pour
provoquer conflits interethniques”.
The reports claimed that a mine had been placed on the path leading the
house of the official when in fact it exploded 5km from there.
Guichaoua, note 18 above, at 611-615.
“De tels plans étant découverts, nous ne pouvons en tant que presse publique
demeurer dans l’inaction. … pour annihiler ces plans machiavliques de
l’ennemi Inyenzi-Inkotanyi”. (“Communiqué de Ferdinand Namhimana,
directeur de l’ORINFOR Office Rwandais d’Information”, Kigali-Rwanda, 4
March 1992), as quoted in ibid., at 611-615.
Report of the International Commission, note 9 above, at 27.
Radio Rwanda, “Rwanda Stated Siege declared in South after ethnic
clashes”, 10 March 1992 and “Rwandan Minister says situation
normalising”, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 March 1992.
“La réplique logique et consécutive au mystérieux communiqué radiodiffusé
à plusieurs reprises”. “Déclaration des associations de défense des droits de
l’homme sur les massacres de la population de la region Bugesera (Kigali, 10
March 1992),” Guichaoua, note 18 above, at 611-615.
Report of the International Commission note 9 above, at 34.
As quoted in ibid., at 35.
Ibid.
20
29
30
“Je vous dit que L’Évangile a déjà changé dans notre mouvement. Si on
vous donne une gifle, donnez-en deux en retour, deux mortelles”. “Discours
de Léon Mugesera du 22 novembre 1992”, in Guichaoua, note 18 above, at
620.
In 1992 and later, during the 1994 genocide, Tutsi were dumped in the
Nyabarongo River after being slaughtered.
On 12 July 1996, the Canadian government announced plans to expel Léon
Mugesera from Canada, where he had lived since mid-1993, because of the
evidence that he had incited crimes against humanity in this speech. He lost
the case brought against him in the Canadian court.
21
Chapter 3
SUPPRESSION OF INFORMATION
Incitement to violence, particularly by government officials, is all the more alarming
when free speech and the right to information are restricted. In the absence of a
divers and truly independent media, propaganda becomes increasingly powerful. In
Rwanda, a country which faced the fear and uncertainty of war, government officials
easily manipulated information about the RPF and security issues as a pretext to incite
violence against Tutsi civilians. Wartime measures, introduced to improve security,
further exacerbated the lack of accurate information about the conflict by severely
limiting the movement of people within the country.
In Rwanda, stringent limitations on the right to freedom of movement were
introduced under the State of Emergency declared in November 1990, and applied
retroactively to 1 October 1990, to prevent the RPA infiltrating the country. People
were required to obtain a travel document from the administrative authorities, valid
for only 30 days, just to leave their commune. Barriers, erected on major roads and at
the entrances to towns, enforced these regulations. A night-time curfew was
introduced throughout the country. 1 These measures were not evenly applied, as
members of the ruling party, the MRND, received permanent laissez-passers enabling
them to travel freely throughout the country, even at night. 2
Wartime restrictions were relaxed by the transitional coalition government of April
1992 after the cease-fire which became effective from June 1992, but were
reintroduced when the RPF resumed fighting in February 1993. They were relaxed
once more several months later, except in the former front-line region. Even after
these regulations were lifted, general residential requirements under Rwanda law
(1964 Loi postant résidence, recensement et cartes d’identité des Rwandais) enabled
the authorities to maintain close control over the population. This stipulated that all
Rwandans were legally required to hold residence permits, in addition to national
identity cards indicating their ethnicity. Landlords were responsible, under penalty of
fines and imprisonment, for ensuring that all tenants had their papers in order. Under
President Habyarimana’s government, police checks, particularly in cities, were often
used to ensure that all residents were properly registered. During the course of these
inspections, people without valid documentation were sometimes deported to their
areas of origin. 3
The tight controls on the right to freedom of movement made it easier, in many cases,
for authorities to cover up human rights abuse and to further promote their version of
events, both about the war and the state-sponsored violence. The latter was generally
described by officials as either a direct result or a by-product of the war, 4, if not
attributable to the RPF itself. In some cases, survivors of massacres were prevented
by the authorities from leaving their areas, for example, after the first Kibilira
massacre in October 1990 and after the killings of the Bagogwe between January and
February 1991. Restrictions on the movement of the Bagogwe appear to have been an
important factor in suppressing news of their massacre for six months. Human Rights
Watch reported that, in 1992, many people in Rwanda still did not believe that these
massacres had occurred.
In other cases, the authorities used more specific means to isolate areas where
atrocities were in process. Telephone lines were suddenly cut during the Bugesera
22
massacre of March 1992, and also in the préfectures of Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and
Kibuye during the killings of January 1993. An official inquiry into the January 1993
killings found that the communication system resumed service, without requiring
repairs, after the killing had finished. 5
In rural or remote areas, this absence of information about human rights violations as
they occur is clearly a factor which facilitates their being committed in the first place.
During his mission of April 1993, UN Special Rapporteur Bacre Waly Ndiaye noted
that episodes of state-sponsored violence in Rwanda often ceased only after the
killings were reported by journalists and human rights groups. To redress this
situation, he recommended that a system he introduced “for sending information
rapidly from the place where the violence is occurring directly to a security service
responsible for taking action, for example, via radio link”. 6
1 Ruling the Airwaves
With a high illiteracy rate and many people living in rural areas, where
movement is greatly restricted, tight government control of the airwaves
enabled the Rwandan authorities to suppress crucial information about the
war and the killings of Tutsi civilians. 7 Radio is the most important means
of mass communication throughout all of sub-Saharan Africa, and most
countries still do not have an independent broadcasting service or fair and
accountable licensing procedures for private radio stations.8 Rwanda has
been no exception. Although Article 16 of the Press Law (no.54/91) of 15
Nov. 1991 stipulates that “the freedom to establish and operate a radio or
television station is guaranteed to every person”, during the Second Republic
the licensing procedure was regulated by government bodies and this practice
has continued under the RPF. Applicants were required to submit their
proposals to the Ministry of Information. The applications were then passed
to a government commission for consideration and recommendation. This
commission was composed of one representative each from the Ministries of
Information, the Interior, Justice, Defence, and a representative from the
Prime Minister’s office. The final decision on the application was made by
the Cabinet.
In Rwanda, however, the manipulation of information by the government has
been facilitated by the fact that, whilst few Rwandans outside of major cities
speak French or English, the entire population speaks Kinyarwanda. Most
people are dependent on Radio Rwanda for news and general information,
particularly given that no foreign radio stations have broadcast in
Kinyawanda until very recently. 9 In April 1992, opposition representatives
in the newly-formed coalition government began a difficult struggle to
retrieve Radio Rwanda from the firm grip of the MRND.
By mid-1992, Rwandans in all but the south were able to tune into Radio
Muhabura, the RPF radio station, broadcasting from Uganda, and named
after a mountain in northern Rwanda, which means “leading the way”.
Although this station broke the government monopoly on broadcasting, it did
little to contribute to the free flow of information. Instead, as its name
suggests, Radio Muhabura continued the culture of propaganda and counterpropaganda, providing little concrete information about events and spending
23
a lot of air time presenting and promoting the RPF to the Rwandan
population.
ORINFOR: the struggle for reform
Shortly after taking power in the 1973 coup d’état, President Habyarimana abolished
the Ministry of Information and replaced it with the Rwandan Office of Information,
ORINFOR, which controlled all government media and was, until 1991, directly
responsible to the President’s office. 10 The 9 Octobre 1974 Décret-loi sur la creation
de l’Office Rwandais d’Information, established ORINFOR as a parastatal
organisation whose activities were overseen by a seven-member Board of Directors
which defined “the direction of the establishment’s activities in accordance with the
country’s political orientation (Article 4). 11 In addition, the Board of Directors was
responsible for all matters relating to ORINFOR’s budget. Under the 1974 law,
ORINIFOR’s Director and Board of Directors were appointed by the President
(Articles 4 and 19). The Director of ORINFOR, who also served as the official
spokesperson of the President’s office, was responsible for supervising the activities
of the department and its personnel, who were nominated by the Board of Directors
and appointed by Presidential Decree (Article 21).
The Ministry of Information was formally reintroduced in December 1991 with the
establishment of the transitional government led by Prime Minister Sylvestre
Nsanzimana. In response to growing concern at the lack of an independent public
broadcasting system the trusteeship of ORINFOR was removed from the President’s
office and assumed by the Ministry of Information. In practice, however, ORINFOR
has always remained close to the President’s office and operates independently of the
Ministry of Information. Even under the RPF, ORINFOR continues to exercise
almost complete control over the government media, from Radio Rwanda to other
national television and government newspapers.
On 22 December 1990, almost two months after the RPF invasion, Christophe Mfizi,
the Director of ORINFOR, who had held the position since 1974, was dismissed and
replaced by Ferdinand Nahimana. According to former colleagues, Christophe Mfizi
had tried to practise a policy of relative openness at ORINFOR, despite constant
pressure from the President’s office and other high-level officials. In contrast,
Nahimana was already notorious for his extreme political views and prejudice against
Tutsi, having participated along with the figures such as Léon Mugesera, in the 1973
Comité de Salut Public, the movement which tried to exclude Tutsi from the
universities. Nahimana had no journalistic experience, but had previously been
employed as a Professor of History at the Ruhengeri campus of the University of
Rwanda.
Although the appointment of Nahimana as ORINFOR’s Director reinforced the
domination the MRND on national radio, with the legalisation of opposition political
parties in mid-1991, this exclusion was soon challenged. Radio Rwanda came under
mounting pressure to serve as a forum in which opposition political parties could
present their views. On 17 November 1991, the MDR, PL, and PSD held a rally of
20,000 people in Kigali to press for equal access to Radio Rwanda, along with other
demands, such as an end to the harassment of opposition supporters. A few days later
Radio Rwanda announced that representatives of several political parties had met with
Nahimana and had succeeded in obtaining 15 minutes of airtime weekly for each
major opposition party. 12 This move proved limited in that it did not otherwise affect
24
the content of radio programmes. It did, however, allow the political parties some
access to a vital forum for communication, and seems to have been an important
factor facilitating the rise in support for opposition parties over the next several
months.
In April 1992, when the second transitional government came to power, opposition
party members in the cabinet successfully pressed for Nahimana’s dismissal.
Although, officially, he was removed for censoring the speeches of the incoming
Prime Minister and MDR member, Dismas Nsengiyaremye, it is widely
acknowledged that Nahimana was forced to leave the office because of the
inflammatory communiqués, which were broadcast prior to the Bugesera massacre.
He was then appointed as a diplomat and sent to Germany, but returned to his
teaching position when the German government refused him diplomatic recognition.
The position of ORINFOR’s Director was vacant for over a year as the President and
MRND cabinet members succeeded in blocking all candidates put forward by the
opposition. Following the appointment in April 1992 of PSD member Pascal
Ndengejeho as Minister of Information, opposition parties enjoyed slightly better
access to the national radio station which began to provide some coverage of their
activities. The impact of the Minister of Information was limited, however, as key
posts within ORINFOR continued to be occupied by hardline MRND members during
the 15-month interim period before a permanent Director was appointed. Efforts by
Pascal Ndengejeho to introduce structural reform within ORINFOR and the Ministry
of Information were thwarted by the government.
Overall, the reporting remained heavily biased in favour of the MRND as Prospère
Musemakweli, ORINFOR’s interim Director, allowed several journalists close to
President Habyarimana to maintain control of the most important news programmes
at Radio Rwanda. 13 Musemakweli, the former head of Administration and Finance,
was not a journalist and, as a result, reportedly gave the department heads complete
autonomy, making no effort to check their pro-MRND bias. Meanwhile, the president
of the Board of Directors, Spérancie Karwera Mutwe, was a staunch MRND supporter
and the Board itself was largely dominated by MRND members. With these internal
pressures, ORINFOR continued to broadcast blatantly false reports of alleged abuses
by the RPF. After the RPF resumed the war on 8 February 1993, Radio Rwanda
provided a grossly exaggerated report that the RPF had killed 500 persons at the
Rebero camp for the internally displaced. 14 On 20 February, the Minister of
Information wrote a letter to the Director of the radio station, asking him to account
for the erroneous report. 15
Meanwhile, information about human rights abuses in Rwanda was still often
suppressed by the national radio station. In 1992 and 1993, Rwandan human rights
groups reported that they were sometimes denied the opportunity to issue
communiqués on the radio. And, in April 1993, UN Special Rapporteur Bacre Waly
Ndiaye noted that Radio Rwanda’s “two different language versions of reports of the
press conference he had given in order to put an end to rumours concerning the
objectives of his mission contradicted each other”. 16
Following the July 1993 appointment of a third transitional government, led by Prime
Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, President Habyarimana and the MRND cabinet
member finally agreed to accept MDR member Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro as
Director of ORINFOR. A few months earlier he had won a national competition
which was held to resolve the political deadlock over the post. This concession was
25
part of an attempt by the President to build a closer alliance with the incoming Prime
Minister, whom he had strongly supported over other proposed MDR candidates,
Higiro took up the position on 8 August 1993, but was somewhat restricted in his
attempts to improve the independence of reporting at Radio Rwanda by virtue of the
fact that a large number of journalists at the station and ORINFOR board members
were pro-MRND.
Although many observers noted that the quality of Radio Rwanda broadcasts
generally improved, with less bias, under Higiro and the new Minister of Information,
Faustin Rucogoza, incidents of incorrect and inflammatory reporting occasionally still
occurred. One observer reported that, in December 1993, Radio Rwanda broadcast an
interview with a woman in Byumba préfecture who stated that the RPF had
massacred a group of people. She claimed to have been beaten with a hammer and
then tossed, along with all the corpses, into a mass grave, 20 metres deep. The
woman maintained that she had managed to climb from the pit, just in time to witness
several RPF soldiers remove a foetus from a pregnant woman, and then immediately
force her to prepare a meal for them. Although neither her ascent from neither the
deep grave, nor the cooking by the recently disembowelled woman were physically
probable, this fantastic tale was presented by Radio Rwanda as a serious report.
Radio Muhabura: “leading the way”
In mid-1991, the creation of Radio Muhabura was reported by Radio Rwanda, Reuters
and the Ugandan government daily newspaper, The New Vision. Radio Rwanda
immediately instructed listeners not to believe anything which they heard on the rebel
radio broadcasts and warned: “whenever you will hear anything from that radio
station, try to understand their aim which is … to divide our country and try to put
back our country in to the thirties”. 17
The broadcasts were not detected by the BBC Monitoring Service in Nairobi until a
year later, after which point they were received regularly. The BBC first monitored
Radio Muhabura for one hour in the early evening of 2 July 1992 on 6400 FM kHz,
when the radio began its broadcasts with the following announcement: “This is Radio
Muhabura. Radio Muhabura, the voice that repatriates the voice of the RPF
Inkotanyi. 18 The programme followed with classical music and a discussion on the
Rwandan Constitution. Radio Muhabura broadcast regularly from that time onwards,
often pirating BBC radio broadcasts, and continued throughout the entire genocide of
1994.
Clearly it would have been difficult for any RPF journalist to enter Rwandan territory
to conduct on-site investigations, and Radio Muhabura relied heavily on a series of
confidential contacts for information on developments in Rwanda. Perhaps for this
reason Radio Muhabura focused on the RPF rather than on events within Rwanda,
which it was claiming to “liberate”. Radio Muhabura broadcast official statements by
RPF leaders, and generally tried to encourage people to support the movement in its
battle against the Habyarimana government and the FAR. The station relayed the
official RPF explanation of its decision to attack Rwanda, claiming that “arms were
necessary” for Rwandans to “regain their rights”. Radio Muhabura made sweeping
allegations about the “extremist” Rwandan government, without reference to the
political changes brought about by the transitional coalition of April 1992. It accused
the government of systematically fomenting ethnic and regional divisions within the
country and practising arbitrary arrests and imprisonment. By mid-1992, however,
26
the coalition government had already achieved some progress in the legal protection
of human rights, and incidents of arbitrary arrests began to decrease.
Although it should not have been difficult for Radio Muhabura to discredit MRND
government officials, given the violence by the Interahamwe militia of the MRND, or
the activities of the “Network Zero” death squad (see Political Background chapter),
Radio Muhabura failed to do so convincingly because its reports were largely vague
and unsubstantiated. O the issue of state-sponsored violence, Radio Muhabura often
indicated that incidents had occurred but failed to provide much concrete evidence .
Following the massacres in north-western Rwanda in January 1993, Radio Muhabura
reported: “the Kigali regime has now embarked on genocide, destruction and looting
of people’s property. There is concrete evidence to [sic] this. Killings have
systematically been perpetrated in communes … The Rwandan army and other
security organs are merely looking on as these massacres are committed”. 19
Although the station alleged that genocide was taking place, it did not state anything
specific to support this claim and failed to explain that Tutsi were being
systematically targeted in the violence. 20 Another broadcast, on 25 October 1992,
made the ambiguous claim that the armed militia of the MRND had “devised traps
aimed at exterminating the youth”. In the latter case, it remained unclear precisely
what the radio was alleging.
Meanwhile, Radio Muhabura systematically denied all reports of abuses by RPA
troops, even when there was substantial evidence to the contrary. After the RPF
broke the cease-fire and invaded Rwanda on 8 February 1993, its soldiers summarily
executed eight administrative officials and several of their relatives in Ruhengeri
town. It was also reported that the RPF killed as many as 100 other civilians during
this incursion. 21 Three days later, Radio Muhabura claimed that any allegation of
killings by the RPF must necessarily be false, It stated: “To kill innocent citizens is a
shameful crime that the RPF could not dare commit. … Ever since taking up arms,
the RPF has wanted to protect citizens who were being killed by the MRND”. 22
2 Restrictions on the Independent Press and Human Rights Reporting
In Rwanda, an independent press has existed alongside the official media since before
Independence. Kinyamateka, a monthly newspaper in Kinyarwanda, affiliated with
the Roman Catholic Church, was created in 1933 and greatly expanded in 1955, with
circulation rising from 5,000 to 20,000, after Grégoire Kayibanda, future President of
Rwanda, became its editor. 23 The newspaper then served as a vehicle for the ideas
behind the Social Revolution, repeatedly arguing that the “Hutu majority” must have
political representation. It was joined in 1967 by the bi-monthly Dialogue, 24 another
independent Catholic publication. Both publications enjoyed protection from
government harassment by virtue of their association with the Catholic Church, which
was an extremely powerful institution from the colonial period onward. Nevertheless,
in the post-Independence period, both newspapers generally had to refrain from
directly criticising the government or its treatment of Tutsi, who were systematically
targeted for abuse and discrimination during both the First and Second Republics. 25
In 1988, a truly independent press began to emerge, starting with the establishment of
the Kinyarwandan publication Kanguka (Wake up), by Valens Kajeguhakwa, a Tutsi
27
businessman. It was followed, in early 1990, by several newspapers, mostly in
Kinyarwanda but with some articles in French. Umuranga, Ijambo, Isibo, Le
démocrate and Kangura. 26 The latter was essentially a government-backed parody of
Kanguka, founded by Hassan Ngeze, who used to work there (see Chapter 4).
Although the independent press had both pre-dated and advocated a transition to
democracy, it quickly expanded with the advent of multi-party politics. Within a few
months of the legalisation of opposition parties in June 1991, the number of
independent newspapers in Rwanda rose from about a dozen to 60, most of which
were either affiliated with or financed by various opposition parties or by the ruling
party, the MRND. Many of these newspapers had ceased publication after the first
year, however, and by 1992, there were only 30 newspapers still publishing. 27
The nascent press in Rwanda was confronted with many of the same pressures and
restrictions prevalent in other countries which have not yet made a full transition to
democracy. Journalists were subject to arbitrary arrest and detention; newspapers
were seized and confiscated by the authorities. The Press Law (no. 54/91) of 15
November 1991 requires newspapers to deposit copies of all issues to the
administrative and judicial authorities, and provides for severe penalties, including
prison terms, for offences such as defamation of the Head of State. 28 Article 166 of
the 1977 Penal Code introduced a vague definition of sedition which amounts to a
sweeping restriction of free speech. It declares that it is a crime, punishable by 2-10
years in prison and by a fine of Rwfr2,000 to Rwfr200,000 (US$12 and US$1,189
respectively – in 1993 168.2 Rwandan francs = US$1), to
Incite the population to revolt against the established authorities,
either to incite or attempt to incite conflict amongst the population
or to cause alarm and seek to bring turmoil to the territory of the Republic. 29
In addition to this general harassment, the war brought further restrictions. The
limitations on freedom of movement hampered independent journalists in their ability
to conduct on–site investigations away from their areas of residence, particularly in
the north, where it was dangerous to travel. Newspaper distribution was disrupted by
the tight control on movement in between administrative divisions.30 Moreover,
journalists who criticised the government, especially in relation to its handling of the
RPF invasion, risked denunciation by the authorities as “the enemy”, “RPF
supporters” or “accomplices”. They could also be targeted by Article 47 of the 1991
Press Law, which states that it is a crime, punishable by 2-10 years in prison and by a
fine of Rfwr50,000 to Rwfr500,000 (US$297 and US$2,973 respectively), to provoke
Rwandan soldiers “in order to divert them from their military duties or from their
obedience to their superiors”. 31
Between 1990 and mid-1992, there were 41 cases of journalists being harassed by the
authorities, arbitrarily detained, or arrested and brought to trial. Many of these
incidents involved journalist accused of working for the RPF. In July 1990 Kanguka
journalist, Vincent Rwabukwisi, was detained immediately after conducting an
interview in Nairobi with the former King of Rwanda, Kigeri Ndahindurwa (Kigeri
V). Several months later he was accused of participating in the RPF invasion and
finally charged with “threatening state security”. On 22 October he was sentenced to
15 years’ imprisonment, although he was later released in May 1991 (see Chapter 4).
In other cases, the interests of national security were used to suppress the reporting of
state-sponsored violence against civilians. Government officials issued several
warnings to independent journalists telling them not to step out of line and, in May
28
1991, the Council of Ministers announced that elements of the private press were
threatening national security. Radio Rwanda reported:
The government recalled that freedom of expression should be carried out within
the limits set by the laws and regulation in force in our country, the exercise of this
freedom should not be synonymous with disinformation, intoxification [sic] and,
more importantly, not be an attack on the morale of our armed forces. The national
press is therefore called upon to stop publishing subversive items which, by their
nature, weaken the national cohesion which is needed more today than ever before
in order to win the war. … 32
According to this report, any criticism of government policies would constitute
“disinformation”, and negative coverage of the Rwandan troops, including articles on
their losses to the RPF, would be classified as “an attack on the morale of our armed
forces”; nothing less than treason. Less than two weeks later, journalists FrançoisXavier Hagimana, of the weekly Ijambo, and Charles Karinganire, Adrien Rangira
and Vincent Rwabukwisi, of Kanguka, were arrested and charged under Articles 166
and 391 of the Penal Code. 33 Enoch Ruhigira, government spokesperson and
Ministre d’Etat (Adviser to the President) claimed the four were guilty of
“consciously or unconsciously playing the enemy’s game”. 34 They were detained for
several months and then released.
Similarly, the December 1991 communiqué by the FAR, broadcast on Radio Rwanda,
which claimed that sections of the independent media were working for the RPF, also
served to intimidate independent journalists (see Chapter 2, section 3). Immediately
after the broadcast, seven journalists went into hiding for several weeks. 35 Two of
these, Théotime Kamanayo and Godefroid Nshimiyimana, were arbitrarily detained
less than a week after the broadcast.
On 3 December, Boniface Ntawuyirushintege, Editor of Umurangi, was arrested at his
home and beaten by members of the Service central des renseignements (Central
Intelligence Service – SCR). On 10 December Kanguka journalists, Obed Bazimaziki
and Adrien Rangira were held at a national printing company, l’Imprimerie nationale,
by the SCR. Antoine Mbarushimana, Publication Director of Le Soleil, was
separately detained briefly at the same location. The reasons for these detentions
were unknown. 36
On 29 March 1992, human rights activist Fidèle Kanyabugoyi, a Bagogwe and also
representative of the organisation Kanyarwanda, was arrested. This group had just
published a letter protesting the killings of Tutsi in the Bugesera region and, at the
time of his arrest, Kanyabugoyi had been in the process of documenting the 1991
attacks on the Bagogwe. The authorities confiscated all his records on human rights
abuses and charged him with jeopardising the security of the State. In April, he
obtained provisional release but was not allowed to travel freely thereafter. 37 He was
later beaten to death by the Interahamwe on 12 April 1994.
From formal to informal repression
Following the introduction of the multi-party transitional government in April 1992,
journalists and human rights activists enjoyed greater legal protection from the
authorities and there were far fewer cases of arbitrary arrest and detention. From
29
April 1992 until the end of 1993, there were only three reported cases of interference
with journalistic activities by government authorities. 38 The authorities also took
steps to improve the legal framework for the press. Minister of Information Faustin
Rucogoza initiated a draft law to abolish all import tax on paper and ink. 39 In
addition, in 1993 he was responsible for developing a revised draft Press Law in
consultation with legal experts, human rights activists and several journalists
associations. 40
Just as formal respect for freedom of expression was improving, government critics
were increasingly subject to informal repression with the emergence in 1992 of
militias affiliated to the MRND and the extremist CDR. In addition to orchestrating
state-sponsored violence, these militias played a major role from 1992 onwards in
attacking and intimidating government critics, particularly journalists and human
rights activists. Another clandestine organisation, “Network Zero”, similarly targeted
outspoken critics.
The existence of “Network Zero” was first disclosed by Christophe Mfizi, former
Director of ORINFOR, who coined the expression, and was then established more
definitively in October 1992 by Professor Filip Reyntjens. 41 UN Special Rapporteur
Bacre Wale Ndiaye, reporting on his April 1993 mission to Rwanda, said that
although he could not prove that the militias or the death squad had been behind
particular attacks on individuals, he had little doubt about the strength of these
clandestine organisations. He stated that there were “sufficient indications to enable
the Special Rapporteur to conclude that a second power exists alongside that of the
official authorities”. 42
This “second power” soon came to represent the biggest threat to independent
journalists and human rights activists in Rwanda. The death squad and militia groups
used death threats, physical attacks and political assassinations to terrorise and
intimidate government critics. In 1993, all cases of attacks on journalists in Rwanda
reported by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) involved physical assaults or
killings rather than arrests and imprisonment. For example, on 6 April 1993
television producer, Callixte Kalisa, was shot dead close to his home in Remera,
Kigali. He had found a grenade near the entrance to his home several days before. In
early May, Ignace Ruhatana, Editor of Kanyarwanda, published by the human rights
group of the same name, was attacked by a group of unidentified people who
attempted to steal his documents on human rights issues. Several months later, in
mid-November 1993, the prominent human rights activist and then Public Prosecutor
Alphonse-Marie Nkubito was the target of a grenade attack just outside his home.
Though seriously injured, he survived the attack.
Although it was not often possible to prove precisely who was responsible for a given
attack, in some instances militia leaders open admitted that they were planning to
harass or eliminate particular individuals. IN late 1993, Ali Yusuf Mugenzi, a
journalist at Radio Rwanda and BBC Swahili Service stringer, was targeted by the
Interahamwe on account of a report he had filed with the BBC concerning a violent
confrontation between MRND and MDR supporters in Kigali, which assessed the
Interahamwe’s intimidation of opposition members. The night of the planned attack,
Mugenzi was tipped off by two contacts within the MRND, who informed him that
his BBC report that day had upset party leaders. One of them, a colleague from Radio
Rwanda, took Mugenzi to meet Sued Ndayitabi, the Interahamwe leader responsible
for militia in Biryogo secteur, Kigali, in order to “apologise”. The militia leader is
30
reported to have admitted that earlier he had ordered several members to assault
Mugenzi that very evening, but was persuaded by the MRND member present to
cancel the plan.
Despite efforts by members of the transitional government and several Public
Prosecutors to halt militia activity, the situation seriously deteriorated. Distribution of
arms and ammunition to the militias had been reported as early as 1992 but
accelerated dramatically in 1993 and early 1994. Also in late 1993, military training
became more vigorous, as groups of approximately 300 militia members at a time
were brought to a military camp in the north-east region of Mutara. 43 In early 1994,
additional training of militias by the Presidential Guard was reported at the Kanombe
barracks in Kigali, as well as in military camps in Gabiro, north-east Kigali and
Bagogwe, Gisenyi préfecture. 44 The militias became visibly more powerful during
this period, to the extent that they threw up road blocks in many areas of the capital
and regularly harassed people trying to pass. After CDR leader Martin Bucyana was
lynched by a crowd in Butare préfecture on 23 February 1994, in response to the
assassination of PSD leader Félicien Gatabazi a few days previously, militias
retaliated by killing some 30 people in the neighbourhood of Gikondo, a CDR
stronghold in Kigali. Dozens of Tutsi families living there were forced to move to
other areas of the capital. In February 1994, Rwanda Rushya journalist Joseph
Mudatsikira described the situation:
Terror reigns in the city of Kigali and the surrounding area. People have been
killed, injured, and dispossessed of their goods; houses have been pillaged and
destroyed … The authors of these excesses are known: MRND and CDR militias,
supported by the Presidential Guard and the gendarmes. 45
The militias also became stronger outside the Kigali area. Human rights activist
Joseph Matata, Executive Secretary of the Association Rwandaise pour la Défense des
Droits de l’Homme (Rwandan human rights association – ARDHO), reported that in
December 1993 repeated threats by militia leaders in his home prefecture of Kibungo
compelled him to flee the area and live for several months at his office in downtown
Kigali.
Notes
1
2
3
See, US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1991 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1992),
302-311
F Reyntjens, “Akazu, ‘Escadrons de la mort’ et autres ‘Réseau Zéro: une
historique des resistances au changement politique depuis 1990” in A
Guichaoua (ed.), Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (19931994), Lille/Paris: Université des Sciences et Technologies de
Lille/Éditions Karthala, 1995), 266.
See US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 1993 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1994), 226-235.
The Special Rapporteur of Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, noted the “striking contrast between, on
the one hand, the close control exercised over the population and the
detailed partitioning of the territory … and, on the other, the absence of
31
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
any structure for the protection of vulnerable populations, more
particularly the Tutsi minority”. UN Economic and Social Council,
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Addendum – Report by
Mr B W Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur, on his mission to Rwanda from 8-17
April 1993, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1, dated 11 Aug. 1993, 14.
A Human Rights Watch report notes that in a speech on 25 Jan. 1993,
President Habyarimana claimed that the violence taking place in the northwest was “a popular reaction against the Arusha Accords and made no
effort to condemn it”. Later, in the correspondence to the Fédération
internationale des droits de l’homme, Habyarimana claimed that the RPF
invasion caused ethnic conflicts between the Hutu and Tutsi. Africa
Watch, Beyond the Rhetoric: Continuing Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda
(New York: Human Rights Watch, June 1993), 17.
UN Economic and Social Council, note 3 above, at 16.
Ibid., at 18
44 per cent of the population is illiterate. Joint evaluation of Emergency
Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and
Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience (Study 1: Historical
Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors), (Denmark: Steering Committee
of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996),
17.
On the issue of state control of broadcasting in sub-Saharan Africa, see:
ARTICLE 19 and Index on Censorship, Who rules the Airwaves?
Broadcasting in Africa (London: March 1995)
After the 1994 genocide for example, the BBC introduced a Kinyarwanda
programme to help reunite separated families, which includes a news
bulletin.
The internal structure of ORINFOR is defined by: 8 août 1978 – Arrété
Présidentiel N.273./01, Organisation et attribution des services de l’Office
Rwandais d’Information (J.O., 1978, 473).
“Les lignes générales de l’action de l’éstablissment en conformité avec
l’orientation politique générale du pays”. (J.O., 1974, 588).
Radio Rwanda (French), “Rwandan political parties to have regular airtime, “24 Nov. 1991, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts.
Three journalists who were later to become RTLM shareholders, all from
the north, held key positions: Jean-Baptiste Bamwanga worked as the
Editor-in-Chief of Radio News; Joseph Serugendo was retained as the
Head of Technical Services at ORINFOR; and Froduald Ntawulkura
served as Head of Radio Programmes, the department which produced
thematic programmes, for example, on women and children.
During this attack, the RPF executed eight civil servants and nine of their
relatives in Ruhengeri town. Elsewhere, up to 100 other civilians were
reported to have been killed. Africa Watch, Beyond the Rhetoric:
Continuing Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda, Vol. 5., No. 7 (New York:
Human Rights Watch, June 1993), 24-25.
Ibid., at 16
UN Economic and Social Council, note 3 above, at 17.
Radio Rwanda, Kigali (English), 1430 GMT, 13 June 1991, BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts.
32
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Rwandan rebel radio heard”, The
Monitoring Report, 7 July 1992.
Radio Muhabura (English), 0030 GMT, 30 Jan. 1993, “Kigali regime
continues with massacres”, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 Feb.
1993.
Radio Muhabura almost never mentioned the terms “Hutu” or “Tutsi”,
possibly because the RPF leadership tried not to call attention to the
Front’s own ethnic composition.
Africa Watch, note 14 above, at 24-25.
Radio Muhabura (Kinyarwanda), 1715 GMT, 11 Feb. 1993, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 Feb. 1993.
Kinyamateka enjoyed a widespread distribution service through the
Church, which was strongly established throughout the country.
Since 1991, Dialogue has been a monthly publication.
There were a few exceptions to this pattern. In 1968, Kinyamateka
journalist Félicien Semusambi accused the government of practising
corruption, nepotism and regional discrimination. He was imprisoned and
later fled the country, and Editor, Father Maida was expelled (Semusambi
was later killed during the genocide). Later, in 1986, Director, Sylvio
Sindambiwe tried to introduce more critical reporting but was soon subject
to threats and physical attacks. He died in a mysterious car accident three
years later. Kinyamateka became a truly independent newspaper under
Father André Sibomana, who became Director in 1988.
F Reyntjens, L’Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise: Rwanda, Burundi:
1988-1994 (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1994) 171
US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
1992 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 206-214.
Loi n.54/91 du 15 novembre 1991 sur la presse (J.O. N.23 du 1 er
décembre 1991), 1866-1878
“Exciter les populations contre les pouvoirs établis, soit soulevé ou tenter
de soulever les citoyens les uns contre les autres, soit alarmé les
populations et cherché ainsi à porter les troubles sur le territoire de la
République. “Code pénal Rwandais, Livre II, Décret-loi N. 21/77, 18
August 1977, (J.O., 1978, n. 1 Section II: Des atteintes à la sûreté de
l’Etat).
J-M Vianney Higiro, “Plaidoyer pour une politique nationale de
l’information,” Dialogue no. 147 (Kigali), juillet-août 1991, 108.
“Dans le but de les détourner de leurs devoirs militaries et de l’obéissance
qu’ils doivent à leurs chefs”.
Radio Rwanda (French). 1100 GMT, Kigali, 15 May 1991, “Rwandan
government tells press not to abuse freedom and undermine army morale”,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 May 1991.
Committee to Protect Journalists, Attacks on the Press 1991 (New York:
CPJ, 1991), 52-53. Charles Karinganire and Vincent Rwabukwisi were
later killed in the 1994 genocide.
As quoted in Reuters, “Rwanda detains journalists, delays legislation of
opposition parties, “4 June 1991.
They are André Kameya, Director of Rwanda Rushya: Jean-Pierre
Mugabe, Director of Le Tribune du Peuple; Théoneste Muberantwali. of
Nyabarongo; Edouard Mutsinzi. from, Le Messager; Théoneste
33
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Muberantwali, of Nyabarongo Edourd Mutsinzi, from Le Messager;
Théotime Kamanayo, Vincent Shabakaka and Godefroid Nshimiyimana,
of Kiberinka. André Kameya, Théotime Kamanayo and Vincent
Shabakaka were later killed in the genocide.
Committee to Protect Journalists, note 33 above, at 52.
Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1993 (London:
1993), 249
Committee to Protect Journalists, Attacks on the Press 1992 (New York:
CPJ, 1993), 78.
Faustin Rucogoza, “Allocution de Clôture, Dialogue, no. 175 (Brussels:
April-May 1994), 112.
Although never enacted, it proposed fines instead of prison sentences for a
number of offences and required the state to offer financial and logistical
support to the private press. (See Ministère de l’Information, Rapport du
seminaire de révision de la loi sur la press, 15-16 Dec. 1993)
G Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of Genocide (London
and New York: Hurst & Company and Columbia University Press 1995),
168
UN Economic and Social Council, note 3 above, at 13
Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Rwanda: April-May 1994, Vol. 6, No.
4 (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 1994), 2.
African Rights Watch, Death, Despair and Defiance, Revised Edition
(London: African Rights, 1995), 54
La terreur règne dans la ville de Kigali et dans ses environs. Des
personnes sont tuées, blesses et dépossédées; des maisons sont pillées et
détruites. … Les auteurs de ces exactions sont connus: les milices des
partis MRND et CDR, appuyées par les gardes présidentiels et les
gendarmes”. Joseph Mudatsikira, Rwanda Rushya, no. 54, Feb. 1994, 5-6
34
Chapter 4
THE RISE OF “HATE MEDIA” AND ITS GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP
1
Print Media: Kangura and Other Pro-MRND Newspapers
In addition to the independent press, which struggled to develop despite widespread
restrictions and took risks in reporting human rights abuses, another press soon
emerged which enjoyed official backing and appears to have served as a mouthpiece
for members of the Akazu. It was in these organs, rather than in the independent
press, that overt hate speech against Tutsi became so systematic as to seem the norm.
1 The first, and most notorious, was Kangura newspaper, noted for its systematic and
virulent abuse of Tutsi, as illustrated by its notorious “10 Hutu Commandments” (See
page 67). The newspaper appears to have been established by officials to counter the
influence of the popular Kanguka. Even in its choice of titles, the newspaper
presented itself as a self-conscious imitation of Kanguka; both titles mean “Wake up!”
in different Kinyarwanda, and sound similar, However, Kangura’s very different
orientation was clear from its slogan, “ijwi rigamije gukangura no kurengera rubanda
nyamwinshi”, which means, “the voice which seeks to awaken and defend the
“majority people”.
Kangura was first published in May 1990, the same month that Kanguka Director,
Valens Kajeguhakwa, was placed under house arrest. The first number of issues of
this newspaper contained vociferous attacks on him and on journalist Vincent
Rwabukwisi. The May issue claimed that Rwabukwisi, a Hutu, was a “Tutsi serving
the interests of his brothers who want to restore the monarchy”. Another article was
entitled “the double-dealing of Kajeguhakwa which backfired”. The June issue,
featured a second piece on Kajeguhakwa, claiming that he represented the Tutsi. It
alleged that they controlled 70 per cent of the country’s wealth but were ungrateful
about the assistance which it claimed the Rwandan government had provided them.
Instead, Kangura maintained, the Tutsi aimed to overthrow the Republic and
reintroduce a feudal monarchy, insinuating prior knowledge of the RPF invasion
which was to take place just one month later. 2 The following month Vincent
Rwabukwisi was detained (see Chapter 3, section 2, page 53).
Later in 1990, Hassan Ngeze, Editor-in-Chief of Kangura, was detained and charged
with subversion after the publication of his article claiming that the Tutsi enjoyed
disproportionate wealth in Rwanda. On 22 October, he was sentenced to a two-year
suspended sentence, whereas his colleague from Kanguka, Vincent Rwabukwisi, who
was also tried the same month, received 15 years. 3 It is widely believed that charges
were filed against Ngeze to make it appear that the authorities were not singling out
Kanguka, particularly given that Kangura had openly applauded the repressive
measures taken against Ngeze’s more liberal counterpart.
Only one other incident occurred in which Kangura staff were censured by the
authorities. On 4 August 1991, Hassan Ngeze was again briefly detained, following a
complaint by the Burundian authorities, who were angered by reports in Kangura
which claimed that the government of Burundi was providing military aid to the RPF.
President Habyarimana is reported to have ordered Ngeze’s immediate arrest as a
means of appeasing Burundian President, Pierre Buyoya 4.. Three days later, Radio
35
Rwanda reported on a meeting between Rwandan Foreign Minister Casimir
Bizimungu and his Burundian counterpart in which the Rwandan Foreign Minister
pointed to the recent arrest of Ngeze as proof that the Rwandan government was not
backing the newspaper. The national radio station explained: “Mr (Casimir)
Bizimungu insisted on clarifying an ambiguity […] the Kangura newspaper was
wrongly taken by some people as having governmental allegiance. The evidence is
that its editor-in-chief has been detained more than once. 5
In contrast to their colleagues within the independent press, journalists at Kangura
and other pro-MRND newspapers were rarely prosecuted, despite their constant
breaches of the law. François-Xavier Nsanzuwera, former Public Prosecutor for
Kigali, noted the level of impunity which Hassan Ngeze enjoyed by virtue of his
relationship with high-level authorities. In a letter of 6 August 1991, to Sylvestre
Nsansimana, then Minister of Justice, he explained that the Attorney-General had
issued a written directive instructing the security forces not to arrest Hassan Ngeze.
Meanwhile, Kangura staff were not subject to harassment by the MRND or CDR
militias, but, instead, were assisted by their party leaders. PON 28 September 1992,
for example, CDR leader Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza wrote to Amnesty International
asking the organisation to campaign on behalf of Hassan Ngeze, who had been
arrested the previous month. 6 Kangura even appeared to enjoy the support of
President Habyarimana who, when questioned in Paris on 24 April 1991 about the
newspaper’s excesses, argued that it was merely exercising the right to freedom of
expression. 7
Kangura is also reported to have enjoyed financial and logistical support from highlevel officials. According to Reporters sans frontiers (RSF), Kangura was principally
financed by Félicien Kabuga, financial advisor to President Habyarimana and future
President of the Board of Directors of RTLM. RSF also found that Joseph Nzirorera,
future RTLM shareholder, with links to “Network Zero”, as well as three members of
the Akazu, Charles Nzabagerageza, Jean-Baptiste Nyabusore, the nephew of Juvénal
Habyarimana, and Pierre Tegera, were behind Kangura.8 Elie Sagatwa, another
“Network Zero” leader, is also alleged to have supported the newspaper. 9 In addition,
African Rights reported that Agathe Habyarimana, the President’s wife, was also
involved in the publication.10
From April 1991 onwards, the newspaper, with a circulation of approximately 10,000,
was printed free of charge by a national printing company, the Imprimerie nationale.
Charles Uyisenga, manager at another state-owned printing house, Edition à la Régie
de l’Imprimerie scolaire, stated that only about 1,000 to 3,000 copies of the
newspaper were actually sold and that civil servants in Kigali and other major cities
distributed the rest, free of charge.11 François-Xavier Nsanzuwera reported to
ARTICLE 19 that FAR Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, then head of military
intelligence, personally assisted with the distribution of Kangura in the capital. 12
Perhaps the most compelling indication of Kangura’s official connections was the
content of the newspaper, which in many ways mirrored official rhetoric. The
newspaper accused opposition parties of being divisive and of encouraging RPF
attacks. Soon after the parties were formally registered in July 1991, a Kangura
editorial stated: “If the Hutu continue to bicker amongst themselves, in different
political parties, the Inkotanyi and their accomplices will exterminate us”. 13
Opposition leaders were systematically attacked and ridiculed in Kangura’s pages,
which regularly depicted figures such as Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and
36
Faustin Twagiramungu of the MDR as naked caricatures, in a series of vulgar
cartoons. 14
Kangura refused to support initiatives to promote freedom of the press. On 23 May
1991, when several other newspapers published an open letter to the President to
protest the repressive measures taken against the media, and even specifically
mentioned the case against Kangura, Hassan Ngeze chose not to sign the petition.
Instead, Kangura supported government officials in denying that human rights, abuses
were being committed in Rwanda. 15
In line with the authorities, Kangura identified and denounced people whom it
claimed were “enemies”, “accomplices”, and “traitors”, secretly working for the RPF
in Rwanda. In issue No. 7 of December 1990, Kangura published a list of 41
merchants in Kigali who were suspected of supporting the RPF, stating that it had
received this information directly from the authorities. 16 Just as high-level officials
accused the international media of conspiring with the RPF, so Kangura targeted
individual foreign correspondents, alleging they were RPF agents. In issue No. 8 of
January 1991, Kangura attacked Belgian journalist, Marie-France Cros, of La Libre
Belgique, in an article entitled., “Marie-France Cros’ artful lies and her complicity
with the Inkotanyi”, after she had criticised Kangura’s racist content in her articles
and broadcasts for Deutsche Welle. 17 The newspaper also repeated calls by the
authorities for people to be vigilant and to participate in repulsing the RPF attack. It
warned: “Let us learn about the Inkotanyi plans and then let us exterminate every last
one of them”. 18
Given the context of widespread arrests and state-sponsored violence against
civilians, under the pretext of security, it was clearly intimidating to be publicly
accused of supporting the rebels, Yet for people who were denounced by the
newspaper, the consequences often proved more tangible. Shortly after denunciation,
many of Kangura’s scapegoats were persecuted by governmental authorities. Even
government officials were not immune. In issue No. 7, Kangura declared that the
government was infiltrated by “accomplices of the enemy” and urged the President to
confront this problem. On its front cover, the newspaper published the names and
photographs of six high-level government officials who, it claimed, were working for
the RPF: François Habyakare, Ministre de la Fonction Publique (Civil Service
Minister); Théoneste Mujyanama, Ministre de la Justice (Minister of Justice); J M
Mugemana, Ministre de l’Intérieur (Minister of Interior); Antoine Ntashamaje
Ministre des Relations Institutionnelles; 19 Alphonse-Marie Nkubito, Procureur
Général prés de la Cour d’Appel de Kigali (Attorney-General for Kigali Appeals
Court), and Bonaventure Habimana, secrétaire général du MRND (MRND SecretaryGeneral ). In February 1991, all four ministers were dismissed during a cabinet
reshuffle. Alphonse-Marie Nkubito was punitively transferred from Kigali to a more
remote area and Bonaventure Habimana was sidelined from the party leadership. 20
In another case, Christophe Mfizi, Director of ORINFOR, was dismissed just a few
days after Kangura published a letter to the editor complaining about him, supposedly
from a reader in Gisenyi prefecture. After Ferdinand Nahimana was appointed to the
post, Kangura ran a piece praising this decision:
… a Kangura reader has complained of the inadequacy of the staff at Radio
Rwanda. He has been heard. A new boss has been appointed to head ORINFOR
and the first programmes are full of promise. This appointment was necessary to
awaken a people under attack who remain asleep. Bravo Radio Rwanda!! 21
37
This passage appears all the more dubious since it does not refer to any specific or
plausible complaint which might have been made about Mfizi. Instead, the
newspaper applauds Nahimana’s nomination, without reference to any changes he is
expected to make at ORINFOR.
Whatever Kangura called for usually occurred, when it related to specific individuals,
and this added to the fear which the newspaper inspired. This correlation between
what was published and what later followed, appears to have stemmed from the
newspaper’s relationship with Akazu members, rather than from any independent
influence which the newspaper actually enjoyed. François- Xavier Nsanzuwera told
ARTICLE 19 that he read Kangura and paid attention if the newspaper called for
something specific to happen or made a prediction. But, he explained there was
nothing magical about this: “I believed it [what was threatened or predicted by
Kangura], not because the [the people behind Kangura] were prophets, but because
they were the ones who carried it out [the threatened action]”.
These attacks on individuals did not technically constitute incitement, but were an
indication that certain people would soon be targeted by the authorities, almost a
preview of what the authorities were planning next. Beyond predicting and
applauding the government’s persecution of Tutsi and Hutu moderates, however,
Kangura urged its readers to discriminate against these groups. In this role, Kangura
engaged in incitement to hatred, presented at its crudest in the form of the “10 Hutu
Commandments”, which mimic the 10 Commandments of the Bible, well-known
throughout this predominantly Christian country. Published in December 1990, these
“Commandments” were instructions to mistreat and discriminate against Tutsi.
Kangura attempted to justify these measures by claiming that all Tutsi were
dangerous and aimed to exterminate Hutu, suggesting that they must be dealt with
before they could strike. The “10 Commandments” were presented as a response to
an earlier article published in Kangura, entitled the “Plan de colonisation Tutsi”
(“Tutsi colonisation plan”), a clearly fictitious account about how, supposedly, the
Tutsi were planning to colonise the entire region of Central Africa and enslave the
Hutu, Kangura’s message echoed official government propaganda about the RPF:
Since the Social Revolution of 1959, the Tutsi have never relinquished their plan to
take over the country, to exterminate the intellectuals and to dominate the Hutu
farmers. 22
This statement was an implicit reference to the RPF invasion, which was always
presented by the authorities as a plan by an ethnic minority to rule “the majority”.
While the Rwandan authorities exaggerated the size of the attack and the threat of the
RPF itself, Kangura tried to persuade its readers that the rebel invasion was only one
part of a larger plan by the Tutsi to “dominate” the Hutu.
The “Commandments” called upon Hutu not to trust any Tutsi, particularly women.
They stigmatised Hutu who failed to discriminate against Tutsi, declaring that any
Hutu who even conducts business with Tutsi is a “traitor”. The “commandments”
also supported the ethnic and regional quota system in schools, stating that the
education sector should be dominated primarily by Hutu. Finally, Kangura declared
that every Hutu must not only follow these commandments but also firmly believe in
them and faithfully spread the word, by proselytising. The “10 Hutu
Commandments” conclude: “Every Muhutu must widely disseminate this ideology.
Any Muhutu who persecutes his Muhutu brother for having read, spread and taught
this ideology, is a traitor”. 23
38
Although Kangura was the most well-known example of government-sponsored hate
propaganda, other “hate” newspapers demonstrated similar links with the presidency.
The other most striking example was the monthly magazine Umurava, founded in
May 1991, which appears to have been created and financed by several prominent
figures in the government and the military. According to its former Editor Janvier
Afrika, 24 the newspaper’s founders included President Habyarimana, Ferdinand
Nahimana, and leading “Network Zero” members Joseph Nzirorera, Charles
Nzabagerageza, Séraphin Rwabukumba and Capt. Pascal Simbikangwa. Tito Mongi,
who had been working at Radio Rwanda, is reported to have been the invited to join
the newspaper by Ferdinand Nahimana. 25 These figures are believed to have retained
editorial control over its content and to have used it to promote their ideas. The
March 1992 issue of Umurava (No. 8) featured an interview with Capt. Simbikangwa,
whose role in human rights abuses was well-known at the time. 26 Like Kangura,
Umurava frequently sang the praises of the President: “It is God who gave
Habyarimana the power to govern the country; He is the One who will show the
President the way”. 27
In August 1992, two separate editions of Umrava Issue No. 9 were published when
Editor Janvier Afrika attempted to introduce greater independence in the magazine.
His version criticised Capt. Simbikangwa and failed to follow the government line on
the President and the Akazu. Meanwhile, the government-backed Umurava continued
its pro-MRND editorial line much as before, declaring strong support for President
Habyarimana. Subsequently the government-sponsored Umurava was discontinued
for reasons unknown. 28
Some ten other newspapers emerged which also engaged in varying degrees of
incitement to ethnic hatred and which are alleged to have received support from the
Presidency. 29 Although less is know about their specific connections to officials,
some were formally affiliated with the MRND or CDR, and all of them consistently
promoted the ruling party in their articles. Interahamwe, an official MRND
publication, edited by the Interahamwe militia leader, Robert Kajuga, published
virulent attacks on opposition party leaders. 30 After representatives of several
opposition parties travelled to Brussels in mid-1992 to begin negotiations with the
RPF, Interahamwe claimed that these individuals had betrayed their country and
called upon its readers to apprehend them. It published an “Urgent Communiqué”
which stated,
The people are angry … The people want security personnel to remain vigilant …
The people promise a satisfactory reward to every person who arrests these traitors
and hands them over to the authorities. 31
This publication also announced schedules for forthcoming meetings organised by the
MRND party and its militia. As the Interahamwe became stronger, individuals who
risked attack often purchased the publication so they could be sure to leave the area in
advance of the meetings or rallies.
La Médaille Nyiramcibiri, an extremist newspaper named after Dian Fossey,
repeatedly incited ethnic hatred.32 In September 1991, one month after information
about the Bagogwe massacres had been made public, the newspaper denied that any
Tutsi had been killed but instead claimed that the Bagogwe were responsible for
widespread violence in north-west Rwanda:
39
They are the ones [the Tutsi] who have sparked the violence in the Mututa region
by provoking the population, beating and killing a soldier just as … the Inyenzi had
stepped up their attacks … the fury of the Bagogwe is stronger than that of lions.
… Why do certain Tutsi like blood? 33
This passage not only insinuated that all the Tutsi in Rwanda collaborated with the
RPF, committing violence within the country while the RPF intensified its attacks
from Uganda, but also alleged they were dangerous independently of their association
with the RPF and were inherently bloodthirsty. Reiterating the government’s
explanation of these massacres, the article claimed that the Bagogwe had disappeared
because they left to join the RPF.
Like Kangura, La Médaille Nyiramacibiri intimidated independent journalists who
reported on human rights abuses against Tutsi. In September 1991, Rwanda Rushya
journalist André Kameya received an anonymous death threat, written on the official
letterhead of the Ministry of Defence. 34 This above-mentioned article from La
Médaille Nyiramacibiri reiterated the warning to Kameya and was written as if
personally addressed to the journalist, referring to him throughout the article as “you”.
35
The newspaper attacked Kameya for his coverage of the Bagogwe massacres. It
accused him of “representing” the Tutsi and publishing misinformation to protect
them: “Kameya … these Tutsi … you willingly defend, they have appointed you [to
represent them] and trust you, but you share their stupidity”. 36 It claimed that his
reporting on the Bagogwe could plunge Rwanda into further violence. Referring to
figures which Kameya had published on the massacres, La Médaille Nyiramacibiri
stated: “this list, by its very nature, is likely to provoke conflict between Rwanda’s
people”. 37
2
The Foundation of Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines
Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (one thousand hills free radio – RTLM), a
nominally private radio station with informal connections to high-level government
officials and members of the Akazu, was added to the other government-sponsored
“hate” media in mid-1993. The idea of creating an independent radio station, devoted
entirely to the agenda of extremists within the MRND, appears to have arisen in
response to reforms at Radio Rwanda, which had been under pressure from opposition
parties to grant them access since late 1991.38 Plans to establish RTLM were
discussed tentatively in 1991 when, reportedly, preliminary meetings were arranged
by Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Stanislas Simbizi and Télesphore
Bizimungu, who were later to become founding shareholders.39 In May 1991, one
month before the legalisation of opposition parties, Kangura published a report which
claimed that a private radio station would begin broadcasting from Gisenyi prefecture,
using an FM frequency, on July 1 1991. 40
Moves to found RTLM were finally initiated after Ferdinand Nahimana was
dismissed from ORINFOR in April 1992, when the position of Minister of
Information was allocated to an opposition party in the transitional coalition
government (see Chapter 6, section 1). Attempted reforms by the new Minister of
Information, Pascal Ndengejeho, became a source of strife for CDR leaders, who
claimed that Radio Rwanda was unfairly dominated by left-wing opposition parties.
In a CDR rally on 18 October 1992, organised to protest against the transitional
40
coalition government and its peace negotiations with the RPF, militants shouted “Free
Radio Rwanda!” as one of their main demonstration slogans.41
Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, Société Anonyme (RTLM, SA) was
established as a jointly founded company with 50 original shareholders and was
officially registered on 8 April 1993. Although RTLM began to broadcast on 8 July
1993, the official contract between the government and the radio station was only
later signed on 30 September by Minister of Informatin, Faustin Rucogoza and
Felicien Kabuga, on behalf of RTLM. 42 Another procedural irregularity occurred in
the application of the terms of registration. Article 13 of the Statues specified that the
radio station was required to be managed by a Board of Directors, composed of
between five and nine members nominated by RTLM’s General Assembly, which
included all 50 of the original shareholders plus all other shareholders of the station.
The Board of Directors was responsible for electing the President and Vice-President
of the Board, who would be legally responsible for all matters relating to the station.
However, individuals involved with RTLM report that the Board of Directors was
never appointed, although Félicien Kabuga, financial adviser to President
Habyarimana, served from the beginning as President of the Board of Directors.
Instead of a Board which would be accountable to all donors and founding
shareholders, RTLM was run by an informal commission, composed of several
individuals, led by Ferdinand Nahimana who, by all accounts, was the driving force
behind the project.
Founders: links with the militias and interim government
The 50 original shareholders were, for the most part, extremely prominent figures,
ranging from bank managers and businessmen, to journalists in the official media,
army officers and government officials (See Appendix). Of the 50 individuals, 40
were from the north (17 from Ruhengeri prefecture, 16 from Gisenyi and seven from
Byumba). President Habyarimana’s region, whose elite dominated the inner circles of
power. Many had close personal ties with members of the Akazu or with the President
himself, often through business or marriage. Felicien Kabuga was an in-law to the
President; his daughter, Bernadette, was married to Jean-Pierre Habyarimana, the
President’s son. Ernest Buroko was the protégé of Protais Zigiranyirazo, brother of
Agathe Habyarimana. Alphonse Ntirivamunda is the son-in-law of the President. 43
Radio Rwanda journalist Robert Simba is the son of Aloys Simba, a retired colonel
who played an important role in the coup d’état which brought President
Habyarimana to power.
Most of the founders belonged to the MRND or CDR. Several served as
spokespersons or high-profile leaders for these parties, such as CDR leader JeanBosco Barayagwiza, member of the CDR Executive Central Committee Stanislas
Simbizi, and Ferdinand Nahimana, who reportedly led CDR rallies although,
officially, he was a member of the MRND. In 1996 the latter was indicted by the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and detained in Cameroon. As of 1
September 1996 he was still awaiting transfer to Arusha. Jean Habyarimana, a civil
engineer, was the President of the MRND for the city of Kigali. Joseph Nzirorera,
former Minister of Public Works and close contact of the President, was the
Secretary- General for the MRND. In addition, singer Simon Bikindi, whose antiTutsi song, “Je déteste ces Hutu” (“I hate these Hutu”), was repeatedly played at
41
CDR rallies and on RTLM but banned from Radio Rwanda, was also among the
original 50 shareholders.
Beyond their regional, political or ideological affiliations the founders are noticeable
for the key positions which many of them held in the government, both before April
1994 and throughout the genocide. In some cases, this meant that they were wellplaced to assist RTLM with practical issues. For example, Joseph Serugendo, who
had long worked as the Head of Technical Services at ORINFOR is alleged to have
provided free technical services to RTLM, which does not appear to have employed
its own technicians.44 André Ntagerura, member of the MRND central committee was
Minister of Transport and Communications before and during the genocide; this
Ministry is responsible for granting and allocating frequencies to radio stations.
Others held important posts, were generally influential, and could rely on a large
network of supporters. Télesphore Bizimungu was the Director-General of the
Ministry of Planning, which allocated not only project money from donors but also
scholarships and grants, which, in principle, were supposed to be handled by the
Ministry of Education.45 At the time of President Habyarimana’s death, CDR leader
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was the director of Political Affairs at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. He had earlier worked as the Directeur de Cabinet for a former
Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity. 46Charles Nzabagerageza,
another powerful individual, was alleged by the International Commission of
Investigation to have been involved in the massacre of the Bagogwe.47
In many instances, these figures appear to have formed part of the “second power”
which imposed itself through “Network Zero” and the militias; some reportedly
occupied positions of leadership in these paramilitary organisations. Déogratias
Nsabimana, Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces, who later died with President
Habyarimana in the plane crash of 6 April 1994, was alleged by his relative Jean
Birara, former governor of the Central Bank, to have possessed, in February 1994, a
list of 1,500 names of people in Kigali to be killed. 48 Georges Rutaganda, who served
as Second National Vice-President of the Interahamwe, was indicted in 1996 by the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 49 on eight charges, including distributing
weapons to militia members in Kigali immediately following the plane crash on 6
April. He was scheduled to face trial on 17 October 1996.50 African Rights reported
that Phéneas Ruhumuliza, a business man close to Georges Rutuganda, was First
National Vice-President of the Interahamwe.51 Alphonse Ntirivamunda, DirectorGeneral in the Ministry of Public Works before 6 April 1994 and son-in-law of
President Habyarimana, was identified by Professor Filip Reyntjens as one of the
principal leaders of “Network Zero”, in October 1992.52 Officials in his Ministry are
believed to have recruited Interahambwe members among the workers whom they
employed for short-term projects, such as road repairs and other manual work.
Charles Nzabagerageza is also believed to have played an important role in “Network
Zero” and was a suspect in the assassination attempt on the former Rwandan
Ambassador to Rome in January 1994, who was the target of a grenade attack in
Kigali shortly after he resigned from the MRND party.53
A significant number of the original 50 RTLM shareholders held formal positions in,
or were active in publicly supporting, the self-proclaimed interim government which
took power on 8 April 1994. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza continued to act as Director of
Political Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and during the genocide played a
leading role in representing the government internationally. Along with Foreign
42
Minister Jérôme Bicamumpaka, Barayagwiza held meetings with President François
Mitterrand, Prime Minster Edouard Balladur and Foreign Minister Alain Juppé in
France and travelled to the UN Headquarters in New York. 54 After the genocide
began in April 1994, Félicien Kabuga created and headed a “Provisional Committee”
to mobilise people in support of the interim government. He also called upon
Rwandans to respect and value what he described as the “bravery and sacrifice” of the
armed forces, in “persecuting the enemy and his people”.55
Meanwhile, André Ngtagerura was retained as Minister of Transport and
Communications and is alleged by African Rights to have assisted in planning the
killings in Karengera commune during the genocide. 56 On 16 August 1996, he was
indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which requested that he
be sent to Arusha, Tanzania, from Cameroon, where he had been detained since
March. Augustin Ngirabatware, from the MDR “Hutu Power” movement, also
continued as Minister for Public Works. After 6 April, Alphonse Ntirivamunda
maintained his position of Director-General of roads and bridges in the Ministry of
Public Works. Journalist Froduald Ntawulikura also continued to work at Radio
Rwanda during this period and, according to Reporters sans frontières, is reported to
have incited genocide.57 Charles Nzabagerageza was employed as conseiller in the
Ministry of Transport and Communications. 58 Others changed positions or were
promoted during the genocide, In mid-June after the interim government had
relocated to Gisenyi from Gitarama, Joseph Nzirorera, Secretary-General of the
MRND and former Minster of Public Works, was nominated President of Parliament.
Radio Rwanda journalist Jean-Baptiste Bamwanga was appointed Director of
ORINFOR after Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro was forced to flee.
In addition, RTLM shareholder Pasteur Musabe, Director-General of the Banque
Continentale Africaine du Rwanda (BACAR), a prestigious private bank, was arrested
by the Cameroonian authorities in 1996 in connection with the 1994 genocide. He is
the younger brother of Colonel Théoneste Bagasora, who is reported to have played a
central role in arming the militias since 1991 and is believed to have been involved in
the orchestration of the genocide on a national level.59 In March 1996, Bagasora was
arrested in Cameroon on the basis of an international arrest warrant issued by
Belgium for the killings of the 10 Belgian UNAMIR troops on 7 April. On 16 August
1996, he was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. As of 1
September 1996 he had not yet been sent to Arusha.
Shareholders who financed RTLM
The founders of RTLM mounted a massive campaign to solicit funding for the radio
station, which required a minimum capital of Rwfr3 million (US$17,836) in order to
operate (Statutes, Article 36). 60
Although the radio station appears to have relied on large investments from a few key
individuals who supported the project from its inception, such as Félicien Kabuga and
Séraphin Rwabukumba, brother-in-law of the President, its founders aimed to solicit
smaller investments from a much wider section of people, through donations and
membership (Article 6), with a target figure of Rwfr100 million (US$594,530). A
minimum of Rwfr5,000 (US$30) was required in order to become a shareholder and
participate in the General Assemblies which were held periodically to review matters
relating to the radio station.
43
The fund-raising campaign appears to have begun only after April 1993, once the
station had been formally registered. Several observers reported that Radio Rwanda
broadcast a communiqué in July 1993 announcing the creation of RTLM and
appealing for people to invest in the project. RTLM supporters even lobbied
Rwandans living in Europe for investment. During the summer of 1993, Joseph
Désiré Ruhigira, a retired army officer living in France, along with Paulin Murayi,
MRND representative for Belgium, and Papias Ngaboyamahina, a student,
approached numerous Rwandans in Belgium for funding. 61 Ruhigira also circulated
an open letter which stated that RTLM aimed to counter the problem of lack of
information in Rwanda:
In has proven necessary and urgent to set up an organ which can not only present
opposing viewpoints … but also serve in the fight for democracy and the defence
of republicanism. 62
The letter also noted that RTLM accepted contributions from foreign nationals as well
as from Rwandans.
The total amount of funds raised by RTLM and the number of people who donated
money is unknown; it is believed that money was deposited into several bank
accounts in Europe and in Rwanda. ARTICLE 19 has obtained unconfirmed details
of an alleged account in the Banque Commerciale in Kigali where people deposited
money for RTLM. According to this information, 218 people deposited money into
the account between 29 April 1993 and February 1994. The deposits amounted to a
total of Rwfr1,958,400 (US$11,643). Although information was not available about
all of the investors, the list includes a number of well-known names. Three of the
largest investors listed are believed to have played significant roles in the genocide.
Augustin Bizimana, Minister of Defence during the interim government, invested
Rwfr100, 000 (US$595) on July 22 1993. Capt. Pascal Simbikangwa, a leading
member of “Network Zero”, also invested a total of Rwfr100,000 (US$595); he
deposited Rwfr70,000 (US$416) on 10 July 1993 and Rwfr30,000 (US$178) on 10
August 1993. Alphonse Higaniro, who invested Rwfr100,000 (US$595), was arrested
in Belgium on charges of genocide. Two others who also invested Rwfr100,000
(US$595), Jean Claude Ndamiye and André Muvunyi could not be traced by
ARTICLE 19. The vast majority of the donors to this account, 207 out of 218,
invested much smaller amounts, between Rwfr5,000 (US$30) and Rwfr20,000
(US$119).
The list also includes Major-General Augustin Bizimungu, Commander-in-Chief of
the FAR after 6 April 1994, who replaced Déogratias Nsabimana after he was killed
in the plane crash. André Rwamakuba, a member of the MDR “Hutu Power”
movement, who was appointed Minister of Primary Education in the interim
government of April 1994, invested Rwfr5,000 (US$30) in RTLM on 4 May 1993.
RTLM journalists
RTLM employed eight journalists, most of whom were highly experienced. All of
them had previously worked for the government media or with pro-MRND
newspapers and are believed to have been members of the MRND or CDR. Gaspard
Gahigi, Editor-in-Chief of RTLM, received his licence (Masters degree) at the Institut
des Sciences et Techniques de Communication. 63 Before working at RTLM, he served
in two high-level positions at ORINFOR, first as head of the Press Service and then as
head of the Radio Service between 1979-1985. During this period, he worked
44
simultaneously as an Agence France-Presse (AFP) correspondent.64 After moving to
Togo, he worked for a newspaper from 1987 to 1990, and then returned to Rwanda
and founded the MRND party newspaper, Umurwanashyaka.
Kantano Habimana, who is considered to have been one of the most popular
announcers at RTLM, also had considerable journalistic experience. He studied in St
Petersburg, where he obtained a Masters degree in Journalism, and later worked at the
government newspaper Imvaho and at Umurwanashyaka.65 Habimana also founded a
newspaper, Shishoza (“Be Discerning”), which produced only five issues. Earlier, he
had served as a local MRND leader in Butare, his region of origin.
Noël Hitimana, another well-known RTLM figure, brought with him a long
experience of radio broadcasting. He had worked at Radio Rwanda for several years
before being sacked, reportedly because of chronic alcoholism. At RTLM, he openly
joked about his heavy drinking, a particularly taboo subject in Rwanda, and often
went on the air obviously intoxicated, to the point where he sometimes had difficulty
speaking clearly.
Valérie Bemeriki was also a prominent personality at RTLM. Unlike many of her
contemporaries, she did not attend university but had previously worked on MRND
party papers, Umurwanashyaka and Interahamwe, before being recruited by RTLM.
Another notorious RTLM figure was Georges Ruggiu, a teacher and Belgian national
of Italian origin, who later evaded arrest in a refugee camp in Tanzania in mid-1995.
He apparently became involved with hardliners in the Rwanda community in Belgium
a few years before RTLM was created. He is believed to have been introduced to
RTLM’s founders by the then MRND representative for Belgium, Paulin Murayi.
Georges Ruggiu, along with the Zairean Philippe Mbirizi, about whom little is known,
conducted French-language broadcasts for the station. Georges Ruggiu is reported to
have led the anti-Belgian and anti-UNAMIR campaign on RTLM.
Journalist Ananie Nkurunziza had previously worked as editor-in-chief of the
newspaper Intera, which was founded in 1989 by leading “Network Zero” member
Séraphin Rwabukumba. In addition, he is reported to have formerly worked for the
Rwandan Intelligence Service, based in Uganda. 66 Emmanuel Rucogoza, a younger
and less well-known journalist, came to RTLM after a brief but unsuccessful stint at
Radio Rwanda.
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4
For an overview of the content of this “hate press”, see J-P Chrétien, Rwanda:
Les m dias du génocide (Paris: ditions, Karthala, 1995). This book presents
a volume of excerpts from Kangura and other newspapers, from 1990-1994,
translated from Kinyarwanda in to French.
Kangura, No. 3 (June 1990), as quoted in J-P Chrétien, “Presse Libre et
propaganda raciste au Rwanda: Kangura et “les 10 commandments du Hutu”,
in Politique Africaine, No. 42 (Paris: June 1991), 111.
Committee to Protect Journalists, Attacks on the Press 1990 (New York: CPJ,
1991) 100.
Pierre Buyoya served as President of Burundi from 1987-1993 and, on 25 July
1996, seized power in a coup d’état.
45
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
Radio Rwanda, Kigali (French), 04.30 GMT, 7 Aug, 1991, “Rwandan and
Burundian Foreign Ministers Discuss ‘Orchestrated’ Rwandan Media’, in BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 Aug. 1991
F Reyntjens, “Akazu, ‘Escadrons de la mort’ et autres ‘Réseau zéro’: un
historique des resistances
auchangement politique depuis 1990, in A Guichaoua (ed.), Les crises
politique au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-94) (Lille/Paris: Université des
Sciences et Technologies/ ditions Karthala, 1995.
J-P Chrétien, “Media and Propaganda in Preparation for and During the
Rwandan Genocide,” study submitted to UNESCO by Reporters sans
frontières and produced in collaboration with the Centre de Recherches
Africaines (Paris 1-CNRS) (Paris: UNESCO, 30 April 1995), 9.
Reporters sans frontières, Rwanda: Médias de la haine ou presse
démocratique? Rapport de mission 16-24 Sept. 1994 (Paris: RSF, 1994) 19.
F Misser, “Rwanda: M dias et g nocide”, Le Monde Diplomatique, Aug.
1994.
African Rights, Death, Despair and Defiance, Revised Edition (London:
African Rights, 1995), 101.
Chrétien, note 1 above, at 31.
In 1996 Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva was indicted by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on charges relating to the 1994 genocide, and
detained in Cameroon. As of 1 Sept. 1996 he was still awaiting transfer to
Arusha, Tanzania.
“Si les Hutu continuent à se chamailler dans différents parties politiques, les
Inkotanyi et leurs complices vont nous exterminer”. Kangura, No. 15 (Kigali:
July 1991).
Chrétien, note 1 above.
See, for example, “Aucun massacre de Bagogwe ni Kinigi, ni aillleurs dans le
nord du Rwanda”, Kangura, no. 24 (Kigali: Sept 1991) 19.
Chrétien, note 2 above, at 114.
“L’art de mentir de Marie-France Cros et sa complicité avec Inkotanyi”, ibid.,
at 112
“Apprenons à connaître les plans des Inkotanyi et prévoyons de les exterminer
jusqu’ au dernier”. Kangura, no. 9 (Kigali: Feb 1991), 10.
A new defunct ministry which reviewed draft laws proposed in parliament to
ensure they were in conformity with the Constitution
Chrétien, note 2 above, at 114.
“Un lecteur de Kangura s’était plaint de la carence du personnel de Radio
Rwanda. Il a été entendu. Un nouveau patron a été nommé à la tête de
l’ORINFOR et les premières émissions de Radio Rwanda sont riches de
promesses. C’est nécessaire pour réveiller un peuple agressé et qui dort.
Radio Rwanda Bravo!!”Chrétien, note 1 above, at 50.
“Depuis la révolution sociale de 1959, pas un seul jour les Tutsi n’ont lâché
l’idée de reconquérir le pouvoir et exterminer les intellectuels et dominer les
agriculteurs Hutu”. As cited in Chrétien, note 1 above, at 39.
“Tout Muhutu doit diffuser largement la présente idéologie”. Est traître tout
Muhutu qui persécutera son frère Muhutu pour avoir lu, diffuse et enseign
cette idéologié”. C. Braeckman, Rwanda: Histoire du genocide (Paris:
Editions Fayard, 1994), 140.
46
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
He worked as a government informant and then in the “Information and
Propaganda Service” in the Office of the Presidency before becoming a
dissident.
Chrétien, note 1 above, at 42-43.
F Reyntjens, L’Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise: Rwanda, Burundi: 19881994 (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1994) 172
“C’est Dieu qui a donné à Habyarimana le pouvoir de diriger le pays. c’est lui
qui indiquera la marche à suivre”. Chrétien, note 1 above, at 46.
Reyntjens, note 26 above, at 172.
According to Jean-Pierre Chrétien and Reporters sans frontières, the following
publications were created by members of the Akazu in 1991: Ijisho rya
rubanda, Umurwanashyaka, La Victoire-turatisinze, Dusanasane imitima
tudahushura l’Echo des milles collines, La Médaille Nyirmacibiri,
Kamarampaka, Jyambere, Kangura version internationale. In addition,
Ijambo, which began as an independent paper, later supported the “Hutu
Power” movement and is believed to have been backed by the Presidency.
Chrétien, note 1 above, at 45-47.
Ibid., at 52.
“Le peuple est en colère … Le peuple demande aux organes charges de la
securité de rester vigilants … Le peuple promet à toute personne qui arrêtera
et mettra entre les mains des autorités ces traîtres une recompense qui lui
donnera satisfaction”. Interahamwe, no. 6 (25 June 1992), 5. As quoted in
Chrétien, note 1 above, at 255.
Dian Fossey was an American anthropologist, who studied gorillas in northern
Rwanda. The slogan of the newspaper was a gorilla between two volcanoes.
“Ce sont eux [le Tutsi] qui ont déclenché la violence dans la region de Mutura
en provoquant la population, en frappant et en tuant un soldat à un moment où
… les Inyenzi avaient redouble d’ardeur dans leurs attaques … la fureur des
Bagogwe est plus forte que celle des lions … Pourquoi certains Tutsi aimentils le sang?” Georges Nkunzurwanda, “Kameya’s s’est fait le porte-parole des
Tutsi”, La Médaille Nyiramcibiri, no. 3 (Sept 1991), 14-15. As quoted in
Chrétien, note 1, above, at 176.
It stated: “For having provoked the Rwandan Armed Forces … To have taken
the tolerance of the Rwandan People for a weakness; … For being dangerous
to the Rwandan people; You are condemned to death. We are going to kill
you”. As quoted in Committee to Protect Journalists, Attacks on the Press in
1991 (New York: CPJ, 1992), 51.
André Kameya was later killed during the 1994 genocide
“Kameya … ces Tutsi dont tu te fais volontiers défenseur, ils t’ont délégué et
ils t’accordent leur confiance, mais tu partages leurs sottises”.
“Cette liste de Kameya est de nature à provoquer des troubles et des conflits
entre les enfants du Rwanda”.
Although several applications for private radio stations were made around the
same period, RTLM was the only station granted a licence.
According to journalist Sixbert Musangamfura, cited in Reporters sans
frontières, note 8 above.
Kangura, no. 16 Kigali: July 1991).
G Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide (London and
New York: Hurst & Company and Columbia University Press, 1995), 164.
47
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
Convention d’Etablissement et d’Exploitation de Radiodiffusion ou de
Télévision) Convention on the Establishment and the Operation of Radio and
Television).
Misser, note 9 above.
RTLM is also believed to have been provided with free electricity. Chrétien,
note 7 above, at 13.
In 1996, Télésphore Bizimungu was arrested in Cameroon but, as of 1
September 1996 had not been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda.
African Rights, note 10 above, at 108.
Fédération internationale des droits de l’homme, Africa Watch, Union
interafricaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, Centre international des
droits de la personne et du développement démocratique, Report of the
International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations in
Rwanda since October 1, 1990 (7-21 Jan. 1993) (New York: Human Rights
Watch/Africa, March 1993), 23.
Prunier, note 41 above, at 222
The International Criminal tribunal for Rwanda was created by the UN
Security Council (Resolution No. 955) on 8 Nov. 1994, and has its seat in
Arusha, Tanzania. Resolution 955 provides for prosecution of those
responsible for genocide, other violations of humanitarian law in Rwanda and
neighbouring states in 1994. It’s jurisdiction covers crimes occurring between
I Jane and 31 Dec. 1994.
Rwanda Genocide Trial Hears First 2 Suspects”, New York Times, 31 May
1996.
African Rights, note 10 above, at 163.
Prunier, note 41 above, at 168.
According to former Public Prosecutor François-Xavier Nsanzuwera, the case
was never resolved.
Prunier, note 41 above, at 277.
As quoted in African Rights, note 10 above, at 110.
Ibid., at 107.
Reporters sans frontières, Rwanda: l’impasse. La liberté de la presse après la
genocide, 4 juillet 1994-28 aôut 1995 (Paris: Reporters sans frontières, 199),
32-33.
Conseiller is the third most powerful position in this Ministry, after the
Ministre and Directeur-Général, respectively.
African Rights, note 10 above, at 112.
In 1993 168 Rwandan franc (Rwfr)=US$1. This exchange rate has been used
throughout.
Braeckman, note 23 above, at 163.
Ils s’avére donc nécessaire et urgent de mettre sur pied un organe qui puisse
non seulement donner une information contradictore … mais aussi servir de
combat pour la démocratie et la défense de l’institution républicaine”.
Braeckman, ibid.
Chrétien, note 1 above, at 71.
Reporters sans frontières, note 8 above.
Chrétien, note 1 above, at 71.
Ibid.
48
Chapter 5
RTLM BEFORE THE GENOCIDE
(8 July 1993 – April 1994)
1
Western-style Radio Talk Show
The question of Radio Mille Collines propaganda is a difficult one. There
were so many genuinely silly things being said on the station, so many
obvious lies, that it was hard to take seriously. It was like relying on the
National Enquirer [a US supermarket tabloid] to determine your policy in
outer space.
Lucie Edwards, Canadian Ambassador 1
RTLM broadcasts received little attention from the international community until the
genocide, when the station’s broadcasters were widely reported to have uttered
macabre calls to violence such as “the grave is only half full, who will help us to fill
it?”2 Allegations that RTLM constantly flaunted gory details of the killings during the
genocide have led some observers to conclude that the station was simply morbid, and
must have been so from its inception. This is an inaccurate and simplistic portrayal of
a radio station which was far more subtle, and less direct, than most observers have
acknowledged.
In its presentation and format, RTLM essentially resembled and probably modelled
itself after, Western-style radio talk shows, complete with audience participation,
offensive jokes and popular music. In a country where both the official media and the
rebel radio station were notoriously formal, the more entertaining RTLM faced no
serious competition. RTLM was frequently listened to by a wide section of Kigali’s
population, including by office workers during working hours. Outside Kigali and
other urban centres, the station is reported to have attracted people from urban
backgrounds, administrators and teachers, rather than peasants from rural areas.
Sources close to the RPF claim that RTLM was extremely popular with the rebel
soldiers, who clearly preferred it to Radio Muhabura, which constantly relayed RPF
propaganda and was rather amateurish. Even Alexis Kanyarengwe, RPF President, is
reported to have been an avid listener and, before the genocide, is said to have found
the station very amusing.
Although RTLM has been described by some sources as a “professional” radio
Station, 3 its broadcasters did not provide factual news reports or engage in standard
journalistic activities, such as reporting items of public interest, or conducting field
investigations. Instead, they presented informal and unstructured commentaries on
various subjects, usually in the form of dialogues and relied on lengthy interviews
with guests to fill airtime. They also introduced the modern concept of audience
participation, broadcasting RTLM’s studio phone number and frequently inviting
listeners to phone in with their comments. Broadcasters often relayed messages from
listeners or referred to conversations they had had with individuals who called the
station.
49
Given the level of RTLM broadcasters’ professional experience, their decision to
adopt Western style disc jockey personas appears to have been deliberate. In a
conference paper presented in March 1994, RTLM Editor-in-Chief Gaspard Gahigi
claimed that Radio Rwanda’s formal and outmoded language was a major reason for
its lack of impact on the Rwandan population. According to Gahigi, Rwandans were
“poorly informed” because the “official media has … retained its traditional
rhetoric”.4 In contrast, RTLM broadcasters spent airtime joking around, rather than
presenting serious programmes and, as a result, they quickly became familiar and
sometimes comic figures, household names to many of their listeners.
The heavy drinking for which Noël Hitimana apparently lost his position at Radio
Rwanda became an asset at RTLM, where he went on air directly after drinking
sprees. His alcoholism also provided material for jokes which were certain to shock
many listeners. On 3 April 1994, Hitimana, who used his diminutive nickname,
Noheli, comically recounted how he had made light of his drinking with a listener
who, supposedly, telephoned to ask why he was always in such a “good mood”.
Hitiman light-heartedly explained:
Someone just called me and asked, “Noheli, why are you always in such a
good mood, what happened? … I suspect that you have exorcized the evil
spirit’ my friend’, ha! … And I replied that it was just a matter of drinking tea,
child of my mother, except that sugar has become impossible to find.5
On any occasions, the banter in RTLM’s broadcasts was crude. Earlier in the same
broadcast, Hitimana, notorious for his vulgarity, had made a comment which drew an
analogy to the act of passing wind: “People say … if you’re going to fart … it should
stink’. The best thing to do is to produce a really foul smell”.6
This type of language, far from having universal appeal, clearly shocked and offended
many listeners, but served to attract a specific section of the population who were to
form its most avid fans: young people and delinquents. In an interview with
ARTICLE 19, French historian Gérard Prunier commented:
RTLM was geared to people on street corners – if it was beamed to peasants, it
was for the young ones. Their parents would have disapproved. It was for 20year-olds and under. … RTLM’s target was gangs, young thugs.
This was an important audience to reach as young, destitute people formed the vast
majority of militia members, with the exception of high-ranking leaders, who tended
to be older and part of the elite. This was a group which had not been greatly
impressed by the standard government propaganda about the RPF and Tutsi, which
was largely based on obscure references to the supposed evils of the Tutsi monarchy
which ruled before the 1959 Social Revolution. According to Prunier:
The older message was ‘we need to set things right after they went wrong
under the feudal monarchy’. The younger generation did not care about this.
It meant nothing to them. … you have to get the support of people not yet
born in the revolution of 1959 … The ideas [of ethnic hatred against Tutsi]
had been around for years. RTLM presented them in a form more palatable
for the younger generation. RTLM used street language.
50
2 The Assassination of Melchior Ndadaye
From July to October 1993, RTLM broadcasts were reported to have been fairly
innocuous, consisting mostly of popular music, with little news or commentary.
After the 21 October assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, the first democratically
elected, and first Hutu President of Burundi, RTLM programmes quickly became
inflammatory and began to incite ethnic hatred. Ndadaye and several members of
his government were killed by a group of high-ranking officers of the mainly Tutsi
Burundian Army who unsuccessfully attempted a coup d’état. Ndadaye’s murder
had a great impact on public opinion in Rwanda, where both the transition to
democracy and the prospects for implementation of the Arusha Accords seemed
increasingly fragile. RTLM used these events as a pretext to run ongoing
commentaries for several weeks on the supposed dangers of the RPF, the Arusha
Accords and the Tutsi generally.
RTLM broadcaster Kantano Habimana introduced one commentary on the events in
Burundi by repeating a proverb which he claimed had been used by the extremist
former Burundian Minister of the Interior in exile, Léonard Nyangoma
Even where the dog-eaters are few in number, they discredit the whole family.
That proverb was used by … Mr Nyangoma, meaning that those Burundian
Tutsi thugs have killed democracy by torturing to death the elected President
Ndadaye.7
This statement is clearly inflammatory, but Habimana presented it is an
authoritative statement by citing the Burundian official as his source.
The political assassination and coup attempt led to massive revenge killings of Tutsi
civilians throughout Burundi. Security forces, who were principally Tutsi in origin,
then conducted a brutal clamp-down and committed atrocities against the Hutu
population. In total, 50,000 deaths were reported, approximately 60 per cent Tutsi
and 40 per cent Hutu, and 150,000 people were displaced by the violence.8 Instead
of focusing on the Burundian Army’s role in the attempted coup and in the
repression which followed, RTLM blamed both the assassinations and the
massacres on the Tutsi generally. The station also failed to disclose the full extent
of the atrocities, omitting information on the widespread violence against Tutsi,
while exaggerating and distorting the abuses of Hutu. It also falsely alleged that the
Burundian Army was shelling Gitega, the town where Ndadaye came from, “in the
FRODEBU stronghold”, in order to seek revenge for the killings of Tutsi.9
Furthermore, the radio station distorted the circumstances surrounding the killing of
Ndadaye, who had been taken to a military camp and summarily executed alleging
that the coup plotters refused to turn over his remains. Habimana claimed:
We have learned that Ndadaye’s corpse was furtively buried, to hide the
mutilations that those beasts have wrought on his body. Anyway, they will be
accountable for this blood.10
According to one observer, FTLM even reported that this alleged refusal to hand over
Ndadaye’s corpse caused an international incident and that the government of
Tanzania threatened military intervention to recover his body.
51
Although short of accurate information, RTLM announcers did not hesitate to draw
sweeping conclusions in their commentaries on Burundi. The station tried to instil
panic and fear by presenting events in Burundi as a threat to internal security in
Rwanda, and called on listeners to intervene “on behalf” of the Hutu in Burundi,
claiming that the violence would soon spread to Rwanda. An RTLM broadcaster
quoted a headline from the newspaper Ijambo which criticised Hutu in Rwanda for
failing to respond to the crisis in Burundi. “Ndadaye dies, the Hutu of Rwanda
remain inactive”.11 He went on to read the article which supported military
intervention in Burundi:
The fact that the Rwandan army has not yet launched an attack on Burundi is a
sad thing. They should go and destroy the quarters of Inkotanyi in Burundi, if
they agree that the Hutu also have the right to live in Rwanda and Burundi. If
they do not do that, the attack that will come from Burundi will be strong, To
wait for the international community to go to the rescue of the Hutu in Burundi,
is to delay too much, and this will allow the Tutsi to regroup.12
The Ijambo article, quoted in detail by RTLM without further commentary, twisted
and purposely confounded developments in both countries. Instead of discussing the
discrimination against Hutu and the lack of reform in the Burundian armed forces,
RTLM presented the problems in Burundi as an extension of the Rwandan conflict
with the RPF. Although the Arusha Accords had been signed in August 1993, the
RPF was described as a continuing threat to regional security. RTLM claimed that
the RPF, not the Burundian military, was behind the slaughter in Burundi. According
to RTLM, the situation in Burundi required a military solution, outside intervention,
rather than pressure for institutional reform from within. The FAR had to “destroy
the quarters of Inkotanyi in Burundi, if they agree that the Hutu also have the right to
live in Rwanda and Burundi”.13
According to Ijambo and RTLM, the massacres of Hutu in Burundi were one
phase in a larger plot to eliminate this ethnic group from the entire region. If Rwanda
failed to take immediate action to ward off this looming threat, it would increase.
Ijambo, as cited by RTLM, stated that sweeping measures were needed in order for
the Hutu of Rwanda to succeed in defending themselves against this potential attack
by “Tutsi”: “All Rwandan Hutu are asked to contribute. Those who can use a gun, let
them cross the border, those who cannot, let them learn, those who cannot yet, let
them contribute money to buy guns and bullets”.14
Meanwhile, RTLM openly equated the RPF with the Tutsi generally, in both
Rwanda and Burundi, and claimed that failure to respond would “allow the Tutsi to
regroup” and dominate the whole region. After these ambiguous calls to arms, RTLM
proceeded to engage in clear attacks on Tutsi to regroup” and dominate the whole
region. After these ambiguous calls to arms, RTLM proceeded to engage unclear
attacks on Tutsi civilians in Rwanda and on RPF troops, claiming that all Hutu in
Rwanda were equally moved by the death of Burundi’s President and alleging that
Rwandan Tutsi supported his killing. RTLM asserted: “After the coup in Burundi, all
the Tutsi in Rwanda danced for joy, the Hutu of Rwanda were saddened”.15 In
another broadcast, Kantano Habimana recounted how, supposedly, he had a
conversation with a group of Tutsi Rwandans who declared themselves indifferent to
the bloodshed in Burundi: “They asked me why I talk about them, why I want them to
mourn for Burundi when they do not want to. I could not find anything to say”.16
52
Meanwhile, RTLM used the events in Burundi as an excuse to denounce the Arusha
Accords and to vilify the rebels. Although completely unconnected with the RPF,
RTLM maintained that the coup attempt in Burundi represented a breach of the
Rwanda peace agreement. Citing Ijambo, an RTLM broadcaster stated: “all
Rwandans must understand that the Arusha Peace Accords are void”. The
broadcaster concluded that any peace agreement with the RPF would be inherently
untenable because “[the decision] to give the Tutsi 40 per cent of the army was ended
by the plan to overthrow the Hutu rule”.17
This was critical allusion to the Arusha Accords which stipulated that the RPA would
integrate with the FAR with a 40-60 per cent ratio. Moreover, Habimana accused
UNAMIR, whose mandate was to oversee the implementation of the Accords, of
working for the RPF:
The RPF will ensure the security of its own leaders. Why cannot we take care
of our own security and that of our leaders, while UNAMIR would watch those
acting against the Peace Accord, instead of showing … that they support the
RPF … 18
RTLM also broadcast false reports about RPF leaders, designed to instil fear about
their presence in the country. Just after President Ndadaye’s assassination, the station
claimed that RPF President Alexis Kanyarengwe, a Hutu, had been killed by Tutsi
soldiers from the RPA. Habimana later reported that Kanyarengwe was still alive, but
had been “shot when the coup in Burundi was taking place”,19 suggesting that he and
the RPF had played a role in the putsch. The broadcaster falsely claimed that the RPF
leader was hospitalised in Tanzania and warned listeners not to pay attention to any
contradictory reports on Radio Muhabura, particularly interviews with Kanyarengwe,
because to “hear someone does not prevent him from being ill or wounded”.
2
Denouncing “Traitors”
Despite the fact that a cease-fire had been in effect since March 1993, one month
before RTLM was formally established, the station operated with the siege mentality
of the early 1990s. Like Kangura and the other pro-MRND newspapers, RTLM
frequently denounced the opposition figures and government critics as “enemies” or
“traitors”, accusing them of working for the RPF. Before the genocide, RTLM had
mostly targeted high-profile individuals, particularly opposition members of the
coalition transitional government, and leaders of civil society, who publicly supported
the Arusha Accords. Human rights activists and journalists who filed critical reports
of the MRND, the CDR or the “Hutu Power” movement, were also at risk (see
Political Background chapter, note 42). CDR or “Hutu Power” leaders, however,
were never attacked by RTLM and were frequently studio guests.
Given the strong militia presence and tension in Kigali, it was intimidating even for
government officials to be accused of working for the RPF: RTLM broadcasters
appear to have been well aware of this fact. In late October 1993, RTLM warned
listeners that it intended to continue singling out individuals on the air, regardless of
their reaction or protests. One announcer explained:
RTLM is a private radio! The reason why our radio surprises you is because
you were not used to this type of talk on Radio Rwanda,. We can understand ,
that is why you hear people complaining, “RTLM is talking about me!” It will
53
say even more. Now we are just making you familiar. We will keep on
increasing, increasing. 21
In many cases, the same individuals were regularly denounced by RTLM. Faustin
Twagiramungu of the MDR, who had been designated future Prime Minister under
the Arusha Accords, reported to ARTICLE 19 that the station repeatedly called him
an “assassin” and “traitor”, accusing him of having “sold the party to the RPF”.
Landoald Ndasingwa, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs in the transitional
government and leader of the PL’s moderate tendency, was also frequently attacked.
One of the few Tutsi to hold a cabinet position in the transitional government, he
challenged conventional attitudes towards ethnicity and was well-known for saying,
“I am Tutsi, my wife is a white Canadian, several members of my family are married
to Hutu, in fact were are tired of this ethnic business”.22 RTLM reportedly alleged he
was working for the RPF, repeatedly accusing him of “paving the way for his brothers
from Uganda” (a reference to the RPF). Ndasingwa, who walked with a limp, was
also mocked by the radio for his physical disability.
While government figures were constantly denigrated on RTLM, many had access to
guards and security services provided by the state. In contrast, journalists and leaders
of civil society were clearly more vulnerable. Nkiko Nsengimana, Co-ordinator of the
Centre Iwacu, a research centre which worked on rural development issues, was
targeted by RTLM after the Centre issued public statements in early 1994, calling for
the government to implement the Arusha Accords, which had been repeatedly
delayed. After this campaign, RTLM frequently reported that Centre Iwacu staff
were “working for the enemy”.
Independent and opposition newspapers were systematically attacked by RTLM and
labelled “newspapers of the enemy”. Gaspard Karemera, Editor of Imbaga, a
publication affiliated with the Centre Iwacu, reported that he was targeted by both
Kangura and RTLM after publishing an article in late February 1994 on the rise of the
“Hutu Power” movement within the MDR party. In March, Kangura published a
commentary on Karemera and accused his wife, employed by UN ICEF in Nairobi, of
serving the RPF. In late March, RTLM broadcast the Kangura article several times.
Other RTLM broadcasters went beyond denunciations and issued veiled threats,
flaunting their impunity. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, of the MDR, who served as Prime
Minister from July 1993 until she was killed on 7 April 1994, was threatened and
ridiculed. A broadcast on 3 December 1993 warned:
The Prime Minister has created a bad atmosphere because she co-operates
with the RPF. She should remember the scar she has was previously a
wound.23
This was a reference to an assault Agathe Uwilingiyimana suffered in 1992 when
intruders, allegedly from the MRND, broke into her home and beat her severely. She
is reported to have received further death threats, broadcast in February and March
1994, including one which warned that she was “not immortal”.
On 3 April 1994, Rwanda Rushya journalist Joseph Mudatsikira was threatened by
Noël Hitimana on RTLM. In the course of a commentary on an unrelated subject,
Hitimana suddenly shouted Mudatsikira’s name and continued:
Let me say Hello, child of my Mother, Let me salute you, as you are the same
as Noheli [a journalist]. … If you die just as everyone has been speaking
54
about you, it is not like dying like a sheep, without having been spoken of.
When we have spoken about you, you have been effectively spoken of.
In characteristic RTLM style, Hitimana threatened the journalist while pretending to
be on familiar terms with him. He then joked about the fact that he was singling out
the journalist, as if it were an honour to be mentioned on RTLM. According to
Hitimana, this meant that Mudatsikira would not die passively and anonymously,
“like a sheep”. Joseph Mudatsikira was killed in the genocide which began just a few
days later. The circumstances of his death are unknown.
4
Radio for the Militias
In Rwanda, the MRND and CDR party militias were already well-established and
active by the time RTLM was created. From its inception, RTLM demonstrated
several links to the militias and death squad. A significant number of high-level
militia members and “Network Zero” leaders were involved in creating and
financially supporting the radio station (See Chapter 4, Section 2). Moreover, a
number of individuals were targeted by RTLM because they had tried to criticise or
stop militia activities.
General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, the Head of the gendarmerie, reported that, in late
1993, a sergeant manning a roadblock in the town of Nyanza, Butare prefecture, was
denounced by RTLM. A few hours previously, he had tried to disarm a large group of
armed Interahamwe, travelling to an MRND meeting in Butare préfecture, an area
where the party had little support. The militia members resisted and the gendarme
failed to disarm the group. Later that day, RTL M announced that the sergeant was
“an enemy and RPF agent”.
Joseph Matata, the Executive Security of the Association Rwandaise pour la Défense
des Droits de l’Homme (Rwandan human rights organisation – ARDHO) reported to
ARTICLE 19 that he was subject to regular denunciations by RTLM after publishing
a series of reports on violence by militias. On 26 November 1993, he produced a
document on inter-ethnic massacres, which described violations by the Interahamwe,
in Mayange secteur, Kanzenze commune, in the Bugesera region. Later in the same
week, RTLM claimed that Matata was an RPF agent and, from late November
onwards, he was denounced approximately once a week by RTLM, which accused
him of hating the military and people from the North, where support for the MRND
was strongest. On 20 December, ARDHO published a report on an incident in Taba,
Gitarama préfecture, in which 17 schoolchildren were killed in a grenade attack.
According to Matata, Silas Kubwimana, a local businessman and alleged financial
supporter of the militias in that area, informed RTLM broadcasters of the report and
asked them to denounce the human rights activist.
After receiving threats from the militias and local civil servants, where he lived in
Gitega secteur Nyarugenge commune, in Kibungo préfecture, Joseph Matata fled to
Kigali, where he stayed for several months , continuing to campaign against militia
activity. On 12 February 1994, he delivered a letter addressed to the Head of the
Kibungo gendarmerie in Rwamagna, warning that there could be militia violence
following a scheduled MRND meeting in the town the next day. ARDHO called for
the gendarmes to intervene to protect the local communities from possible pillage.
According to Matata, the letter did not reach the Commandant but instead was
redirected to MRND leaders in the area, who read it aloud at a party meeting the
55
following morning. That afternoon, RTLM announcers broadcast excerpts of the
letter. They also denounced Matata as an “enemy of the MRND youth group” and
claimed that his reports on human rights abuses were “at the root of the turmoil in this
region”.
By virtue of RTLM’s de facto, relationship to the militias and death squads,
individuals who were denounced or even cited by its broadcasters risked attacks by
these clandestine organisations. Journalist Sixbert Musangamfura explained:
I listened to it [RTLM] constantly because every time RTLM alluded to
someone, you were sure to see the Interahamwe head out shortly afterwards.
Also, people who were prudent absolutely needed to listen to this station in
case they were mention. [If this happened], you knew you had to change your
address that day.24
Most of the Rwandan journalists and human rights activists interviewed by ARTICLE
19 indicated that they tried to take precautions for their personal security if they were
named by RTLM. In some cases, people tried to convince the station’s broadcasters
to change or correct what had been said about them. On 24 December 1993, BBC
Swahili Service stringer Ali Yusuf Mugenzi was accused by Kantano Habimana of
having of having reported for the BBC which noted that RTLM was principally
owned by CDR supporters. Habimana warned: “Tell him [Mugenzi] to come here.
This is not a CDR station”. According to Mugenzi, “Such a statement could be like a
death warrant in Rwanda”. He repeatedly telephoned the radio station that day and
pleaded with its broadcasters to change what they had said about him, explaining that
he feared he would be attacked as a result. Two days later RTLM finally retracted the
statement.
In addition to naming and threatening particular individuals, RTLM broadcast
warnings directly from the militia leaders themselves. On 3 April 1994, RTLM
relayed a message from the “Zulus”, a division of the Interahamwe:
The Zulus are issuing a warning to a group of people who live in the
Nyakabanda zone … of Remera in the SGP, who are walking around with the
Inkotanyi under the pretext that they are their relatives. 25
Noël Hitimana alleged that the previous night a group of “Inkotanyi” had attacked the
“Zulus” in the Kigali neighbourhood of Remera and had attempted to assassinate their
“President”, Aloys Ngirabatware, but were repelled by other members of the
Interahamwe. The “Zulus” had apparently asked RTLM to broadcast a warning to the
people in that neighbourhood.
The alleged attack on Ngirabatware was a pretext or token justification for this
warning. RTLM did not explicitly state what was threatened or the precise group of
people who were the intended recipients of this message. Although RTLM did not
directly accuse the RPA of involvement in the supposed attack, it insulated that the
alleged perpetrators were allies of the rebels.
Hitimana went on to identify another group targeted by the “Zulus”. In this second
case the threat of violence was explicit:
They [the “Zulus”] say ‘we are issuing a final warning. … to the drivers who
run the “taxi” service who have gone to pick up the Inkotanyi at the CND’.
They [the Zulus] say ‘we warn you, those who drive the taxis’….if they (the
Zulus) rip them [the drivers] into little pieces; they should not claim that they
56
had not been warned. Musabyimana Emile, then, do you hear all that?
Kiloso, do you hear that? Karisa, do you hear that? Kwetu, you hear
that? … They should not say that we haven’t warned them.
The pretext for targeting taxi drivers was the allegation that they accepted RPF
soldiers as customers. The CND was the parliament building where a battalion of 600
RPA soldiers was stationed. The reference to the violence which the militia
threatened was chillingly direct. At the end of the announcement, Hitimana
accredited the message to the “Head of the Disciplinary Section” of the “Zulus”, Paul
Zikanga.
There were instances when militia members responded to ambiguous calls for action
made by RTLM. Early in the morning of 24 or 25 February 1994, RTLM announced
that the RPF battalion stationed at the CND had begun an offensive and was
infiltrating the local population in Kigali. The station called on people to “search” for
RPA troops in their neighbourhoods, particularly in Kimisaga. Witnesses reported to
ARTICLE 19 that militias erected roadblocks in this neighbourhood almost
immediately after the broadcast and began harassing local people. Later that day,
militia members conducted raids in Kimisaga a, broke into several houses, and
threatened the Tutsi living there. Françoise Kagoyire, wife of Imbaga journalist
Gratien Karambizi,26 and dozens of other people, were forced to flee the area.
UNAMIR troops are reported to have intervened that evening to stop the violence and
the residents were able to return the following morning.
5 RTLM Broadcasts: A Breach of Law and Contract
In its broadcasts from October 1993 onwards, RTLM frequently violated both the
terms of its contract and the 1991 Press Law which includes several articles governing
broadcasting. According to the “Convention d’Etablissement et d’Exploitation de
Radiodiffusion ou de Télévision (“Convention on the Establishment and Operation of
the Radio and Television”) between the government and RTLM, signed by Minister
of Information, Fausin Rucogoza, and President of the RTLM Board of Directors,
Felicien Kabuga, RTLM specifically undertook to refrain from engaging in hate
speech or incitement to violence. Article 5 (2) states: “RTLM undertakes … not to
broadcast programmes likely to incite hatred, violence or any form of division”.27 in
addition Article 5 (1) maintains that RTLM must respect the right of reply and Article
5 (7) states that the station will adhere to basic principles of journalistic ethics.
RTLM also clearly violated the 1991 Law on several accounts, including Article
27, which guarantees the right of reply. Moreover, the hate speech and inflammatory
commentaries following the assassination of Burundian President Ndadaye were in
violation of Article 46 of the Press Law and Article 166 of the 1977 Penal Code. The
draconian Article 166 of the Penal Code states that it is a crime, punishable by 2-10
years in prison and fine of between Rwfr2,000 and Rwfr100,000 (between US$12 and
US$595) to “incite the population to revolt against the established authorities, either
to incite or attempt to incite conflict amongst the population or to cause alarm and
seek to bring turmoil to the territory of the Republic”.28
RTLM received several formal warnings from Minster of Information, Fausin
Rucogoza, and Director of ORINFOR, Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro, about these
57
breaches of law and contract, In a letter of 25 October 1993, addressed to RTLM’s
Directors, the Minister of Information noted:
[RTLM] used the putsch carried out by the Burundian army against the
democratically elected government as a pretext to broadcast communiqués and
programmes which can incite violence and undermine the path towards unity
and national reconciliation advocated by the Arusha Accords.29
On 26 November 1993, Minister Rucogoza summoned Félicien Kabuga to his
office and warned him again about the “divisive” broadcasts of RTLM.30 In a second
meeting with RTLM managers on 10 February 1994, Rucogoza stated that the station
was continuing to spread “rumours likely to provoke conflict within the country”. In
addition, he expressed concern about the anti-Tutsi propaganda on RTLM:
RTLM has a tendency to liken all the members of the RPF to the Tutsi; to
liken the domestic political opposition to the RPF; to reduce political problems
in Rwanda to ethnic hatred between Hutu and Tutsi; to liken the Tutsi from the
country to the Inkotanyi; and to make the population believe that all the
problems of the country emanate from the Tutsi.31
In March 1994, the Director of ORINFOR wrote a letter to the RTLM Directors in
which he underlined the concerns raised by the Minister of Information..
Although Minister Rucogozo does not appear to have taken any punitive measures
against RTLM, several members of the government initiated civil defamation cases
against individual broadcasters. These cases were blocked by the Tribunal de la
première instance (Tribunal of First Instance). Former Public Prosecutor AlphonseMarie Nkubito reported to ARTICLE 19 that he was discouraged by President
Habyarimana from taking any steps to prosecute RTLM journalists,
In addition to formal complaints by Rwandan officials, members of the international
diplomatic community informally expressed concern about RTLM in meetings with
President Habyarimana. They appear to have criticised the station for undermining
the Arusha Accords rather than for inciting ethnic hatred and violence, in violation of
Rwandan law. According to the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to
Rwanda:
Unable to agree among themselves on the significance of the radio [station]
and how to silence it the donors limited themselves to making yet another
representation to Habyarimana. The latter responded as usual by promising to
look into it, and there the matter rested.32
The possibility of jamming RTLM was apparently discussed that the US Department
of Defence at this stage (See Chapter 6, section 10), but not seriously considered .33
On 3 April 1994, the German Ambassador, speaking on behalf of the European Union
(EU), whose Presidency Germany then held, appears to have been referring to RTLM
when he stated that the EU “wishes to point out the unacceptable role of some media
which are blocking the indispensable climate of national reconciliation.
5
3 April 1994: Announcing the Apocalypse
In the months leading up to the genocide, several government-sponsored “hate” media
made various “predictions”, which suggested they were aware that widespread
58
massacres were being prepared. Extremist media warned that there would be a
bloodbath in Rwanda, while trying to conceal that the violence would be orchestrated
by their own camp, hardliners in the military and the MRND militia. Instead, RTLM
and Kangura claimed that the RPF was planning to launch an attack which would
trigger widespread violence throughout the country. Kangura published several
reports to this effect. One article, in January 1994 headlined “Who Will Survive the
War of March?”, claimed that the RPF had acquired reinforcements and that troops at
the CND already numbered 3,000, instead of the 600 agreed upon during the peace
negotiations.35 The article ominously concluded: “If the RPF have {sic} decided to
kill us … then let us kill each other. Let whatever is smouldering erupt”.36
In February, Kangura declared that the battle with the RPF would be massive. An
article headlined, “The Final Attack” warned, “We have indications that he RPF will
soon launch other attacks in Kigali from all sides”.37 Kangura then used the predicted
RPF hostilities as a pretext to threaten the rebels, referring to them abusively as
“Inyenzi”, a term understood to mean Tutsi generally. It continued: We know where
the cockroaches are. If they look for us, they had better watch out”.38 Another
government-sponsored “hate” newspaper, Le Médaille Nyiramacibiri, suggested that
Tutsi civilians could be eliminated in the course of this attack in February 1994, it
published an article headlined, “By the way, the Tutsi race could be extinguished”.39
Kangura also predicted that the President would be killed by the RPF within a few
weeks. Its Editor, Hassan Ngeze, wrote:
… Last month we saw undeniable signs showing how Habyarimana is going
to be killed … shot dead by a person taken from the Rwanda Armed Forces.
… That person will be a Hutu bought by Inyenzi.40
Although the press close to the CDR and the MRND made obscure allusions to the
violence which was to overtake the country, on 3 April 1994, three days before the
genocide, RTLM provided a more specific and graphic description of what was about
to happen. Like the previous warnings in the press, RTLM claimed that the RPF was
planning to violate the cease-fire and to overthrow the Rwandan government: “The
RPF rebels want to take power. Take it by the use of arms. They want to do “a little
something”. The RTLM broadcaster claimed that his informants inside the RPF had
confirmed that dates of the planned invasion:
They have dates, we know them … we have agents … who bring us the
information. They tell us this: on the 3rd, the 4th, and the 5th, there will be a
little something here in Kigali City. And also on the 7th and 8th … you will
hear the sound of bullets and grenades explode … But I hope that the
Rwandan armed forces are on the alert.41
Wednesday 6 April 1994, the date of the plane crash which killed President
Habyarimana and marked the beginning of the genocide, is conspicuously omitted
from this prediction of what was about to take place. The second time the
broadcaster mentioned the dates he noted that the RPF would “rest on the 6th”,
before resuming the following day. RTLM implied that its information was
something of an inside joke, and failed to state specifically what would occur; the
station repeatedly referred to the forthcoming unnamed event as a “little
something”. The only clue provided was that it would be mounted with “bullets
and grenades”.
59
According to RTLM, the “little something” was to be used as a mere distraction or
camouflage for something bigger which was to follow, the “Simusiga”42 or “final
attack”:
But in fact, they are planning the “Simusiga” … they say that when we have
finished this little something … disrupting the city, we will turn to the
“Simusiga” … but as to the date itself, my agent has not yet told me …43
Not an end in itself, the “little something” would serve as a decoy, to draw public
attention elsewhere. The larger attack would then follow and take the country by
surprise. The broadcaster declared himself unable or unwilling to provide any
information about the “Simusiga”, a soubriquet for the genocide, which was to
follow immediately. The “Simusiga” or “Final Battle” was how RTLM would
refer to the genocide as it occurred over the next three and a half months.
RTLM went on to claim that some Tutsi, “moderate Tutsi … who are humble”,
were against these alleged RPF plans to invade and tried to warn the rebels not to
go ahead with this move which would lead to widespread killings. The broadcaster
began to detail the bloodshed which was about to occur. According to RTLM,
“moderate Tutsi” had complained to the RPF about “these things … involving
disturbances, spilling yet more blood, whereas we are satiated”. The broadcaster
indicated that civilians were about to be killed and warned: “The RPF soldiers need
to understand … that they will not benefit from killing their Hutu relatives, killing
their Tutsi relatives”. After portraying FPR rebels as bloodthirsty and indifferent
to the deaths of their own “relatives”, he suddenly launched into a description of
the enormity of the bloodshed which was expected. Beginning solemnly in French
and then continuing in Kinyarwanda, RTLM’s broadcaster warned:
Let the RPF realise that it will answer to the People and to History for the
youth it has continued to decimate [said solemnly in French]. Let the RPF
listen up: in the face of world history, in history and to the People … One day
it … [the RPF] will have to explain to the People and to all of Humanity …
how these children of the country, these children of the country, they [the
RPF] hastened them to death … One day they [RPF] will explain.44
Still blaming the RPF for the genocide which would be orchestrated by the security
forces and militias, RTLM warned that the magnitude of the bloodshed would be
great.
After indicating the gravity of what was to happen, the broadcaster changed his
tone and joked about the bloodbath which he expected. Mocking RPF leader, Tito
Rutaremara and imitating his voice, he continued:
Ha! Rutaremara, if you are listening, you will tell… them [beginning soberly
and later changing tone] ‘Hey, yo yo yo so what? That’s how it is in times of
war’ … ha. Yeee!!!!! Yes, you will say it is like this: ‘It is like that in times
of war, shyeu. Yeee Ha Ha. You cannot pick up spilled blood.45 Blood can be
spilled by it cannot be picked up. Ha Heeee [said in a menacing tone]. … We
will have news about all that.46
He alleged that the rebel leader would revel in bloodshed and show no remorse,
gleefully alluding to the gory details of the coming genocide.
60
This broadcast ended with a specific warning to President Juvénal Habyarimana,
threatening that Rwandans would not tolerate a Head of State who no longer had
popular support. The announcer concluded:
But in fact … the people, they are the true shield. They are the real army,
which is strong … the armed forces fight but the people hold the rear, we are
the shield. The day when the people stand up and no longer want you and
when they hate you … from the bottom of their hearts, when you make them
nauseous … I wonder how you will escape? How can you get out? You
cannot govern someone who does not want you. That is impossible. And even
Habyarimana himself, if the citizens no longer wanted him, he would no
longer be able to enter his office. It is impossible.47
Maintaining that RTLM was the station of the “majority”, the broadcaster claimed
to know the wishes and beliefs of “the people” in Rwanda who, he suggested,
could be driven to use force to oust their opponents, comparing the population to
the FAR. RTLM claimed that anyone who upsets the masses should be prepared to
face death at their hands... The broadcaster ended by warning that there would be
no escape.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
As quoted in, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The
International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the
Rwanda Experience, (Study 2: Early Warning and Conflict Management),
(Denmark: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency
Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996), 86
Lindsey Hilsum, “The Radio Station Whose Call Sign is Mass Murder”,
The Observer, 15 May 1994
For example, Jean-Pierre Chrétien writes, “La puissante influence de
‘radio-la-haine’ ne peut pourtant s’expliquer sans faire référence à son
caractère professionnel”. (“The powerful influence of the ‘hate radio’
cannot be explained without reference to its professional quality”.) J-P
Chrétien, Rwanda. Les médias du génocide (Paris: Éditions Karthala,
1995), 71.
“Mal informés” because the “medias officiels ont … gardé leur ‘langue du
bois’ traditionnelle”. G Gahigi, “Impact des médias privés et opinion
publique rwandaise”, in Dialogue (April-May 1994), 15-19.
“Il y a quelqu’un qui vient de me téléphoner et il a dit: ‘Noheli comment
ce fait-il que tu es si euphorique, qu’est-ce qui s’est passé? hein? Je
soupçonne que tu es venu après avoir ‘exorcisé le mauvais sort’ mon
vieux?’ Ha! … Et moi je lui ai répondu qu’il s’agit seulement de boire du
thé, enfant de ma mere, sauf que le sucre est devenu introuvable” Hitimana
used a traditional expression to broach the taboo subject of alcoholism and
joke about the extent of his drinking. To ‘exorcise the evil spirit’ is an
expression referring to an old Rwandan belief that one is guaranteed good
luck for the day if one drinks or eats something just before leaving one’s
home in the morning. Hitimana admitted to drinking alcohol early in the
day but did so humorously, saying “It is just a matter of drinking tea”.
This is a well-known Rwandan joke referring to one who tries to hide the
fact that he is consuming alcohol by drinking it in a tea cup. The phrase,
“child of my mother” is an expression of great familiarity and affection.
61
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
(Unless otherwise indicated, RTLM transcripts were gathered and
translated from Kinyarwanda by ARTICLE 19.).
A slang expression implying that if one is going to do something
mischievous, one may as well go all the way. Its English equivalent would
be “One may as well be hanged for a sheep as a lamb”.
RTLM 17-31 Oct. 1993, translated from Kinyarwanda to English, Human
Rights Watch (unpublished Human Rights Watch transcript).
G Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide (London
and New York: Hurst & Company and Columbia University Press, 1995),
199.
RTLM, note 7 above]
Ibid.
Ijamba No.61 quoted by RTLM, note 7 above
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
RTLM, note 7 above
Ibid
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
As quoted in Prunier, note 8 above at 125.
As cited in C Mironko and S Cook, “Broadcasting racism, reaping
genocide: Radio Television Libres des Milles Collines (RTLM) and the
Rwandan genocide”, paper presented at the Annual Conference of the
American Anthropological Association, Washington, 16 Nov. 1995.
“Je l’écoutais à tout moment car chaque fois que la RTLM designait
quelqu’un, vous étiez sûr de voir débarquer peu après les Interahamwe.
Aussi, les gens prudents devaient absolument écouter cette radio au cas où
ils seraient cités. Vous saviez que vous devriez changer d’adresse le
meme jour”. Reporters sans frontières, Rwanda: medias de la haine ou
presse démocratique? Rapport de mission 16-24 Sept. 1994 (Paris: RSF,
1994).
Les Zulus mettent donc en garde un groupe de gens, qui vivent dans la
zone de Nyakabanda … de Remera au SGP, qui se baladent avec des
Inkotanyi sous prétexte qu’ils ont avec eux des liens de parenté”.
Gratien Karambizi was later killed during the genocide.
“La RTLM s’engage à … [n]e pas diffuser les emissions de nature à inciter
a la haine, a la violence et a toute forme de division”. Convention
d’Etablissment et d’Exploitation de Radiodiffusion ou de Télévision, in
Reporters sans frontières,.note 24 above
18 aôut 1977 – Décret-loi no. 21/77, Des infractions et de leur repression
en particulier, Section 11: Des atteintes à la sùreté de l’Etat (Code penal
Rwandais, Livre 11), J. O. 1978, n. l., 259.
“a pris prétexte du putsch perpétré par l’armée burundaise contre le
gouvernement démocratiquement élu … pour diffuser des communiqués et
[des] émissions qui peuvent inciter à la violence et saper la voie de l’unité
et de la réconciliation nationale prônée par les accords d’Arusha”.
62
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Reporters sans frontières, Rwanda: l’impasse. La liberté de la presse
après le genocide 4 juillet 1994-28 aôut 1995 (Paris: Sept. 1995), 32.
Ibid.
RTLM a tendance à assimiler tous les membres du FPR aux Tutsi, à
assimiler l’opposition politique de l’intérieur au FPR, à réduire les
problèmes politiques du Rwanda à la haine ethnique entre Hutu et Tutsi, á
assimiler les Tutsi de l’intérieur aux Inkotanyi et à faire comprende a la
population que (tous) les maux dont souffre le pays (viennent des) Tutsi”.
Ibid.
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International
Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda
Experience, (Study 2: Early Warning and Conflict Management),
(Denmark: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency
Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996), 86.
Ibid., at 87
Radio Rwanda, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 April 1994.
Kangura, no. 55, Jan. 1994
As cited in African Rights, Death, Despair and Defiance, Revised Edition
(London: African Rights, 1995) 73
Kangura no. 57, Feb. 1994, 4, as cited in Reporters sans frontières, note 24
above.
Là où sont maintenant les cafards, on le sait. S’ils nous cherchent, qu’ils
fassent attention”. Ibid.
Prunier, note 8 above, at 222.
As cited in African Rights, note 36 above, at 73.
‘Ils ont des dates, nous les connaissons. Nous commaissons ces dates
aussi. … nous avons des agents, yeah! Oh ho ho! Il y a là nos agents, il y a
des agents qui nous font parvenir les informations. Ils nous disent ainsi: à
la date du 3, du 4, du 5, hm, ils disent qu’il doit y avoir une petite chose,
ici à Kigali, Kigali-ville. Et meme a la date du 7 et du 8, hm. Et alors
vous entendrez le bruit des balles ou encore vous entendrez les grenades
tonner. …A la date du 3, du 4, et du 5, il est attendu qu’une petite chose va
survenir ici á Kigali, et même ils vont poursuivre et se reposer á la date du
6. et á la date du 7 et du 8, ils vont faire une petite chose, en utilisant ces
balles et grenades. Mais j’espère que les forces armies rwandaise sont en
éveil”.
Its literal meaning, “I will no longer spare him”, translates as “the final
attack”.
“Mais en réalité, il y a l’attaque Simusiga qu’ils prévoient, et ils disent
quand nous aurons fini cette petite chose de perturber la ville, nous allons
nous y metre avec l’attaque Simusiga après cela, mais quand à la date ellemême, mon agent [du FPR] ne me l’a pas encore dite, il ne me l’a pas
encore dite”.
“Que le FPR sache qu’il répondra devant le Peuple et l’Histoire, de cette
jeunesse qu’il ne cesse de faire décimer [dit en français et d’un très
solonnel]. Que le FPR entende bien: devant l’Histoire du monde, devant
l’Histoire et devant le Peuple … Un jour, il devra expliquer devant le
Peuple et l’Humanité entière … comment ces enfants du pays, ces enfants
du pays, ils les ont précipité dans la Mort … ils les ont précipite dans la
Mort … Un jour ils l’expliqueront … “
63
45
46
47
Rwandan proverb which means one should not die without reason.
Ha! Rutaremara [Tito Rutaremara, haut cadre et depute FPR] si tu
m’écoutes, tu leur di … tu leur diras [parodiant comiquement le rire et la
voix de Rutaremara]; “Heu, yo yo yo yo et alors? C’est ainsi en temps de
guerre” … Yeeee!!!! Oui, tu le diras comme ça: “C’est comme ça avec la
guerre, shyeu … Yeee Ha Ha. … le sang se verse mais ne se ramasse pas
[proverbe rwandais]. Le sang se verse il ne se ramasse pas, Ha heeeein
[exclamation insistante de menace d’advertissement] … On en aura des
nouvelles de tout ça…”.
“Mais en fait … le people, voilà le vrai bouclier, c’est la véritable armée
qui est forte … les forces armée case combattent mais le people lui il dit:
nous tenons vos arriéres, c’est nous le bouclier.. Le jour ou le people va se
lever et qu’il ne voudra plus de vous, qu’il vous haira … du fond de son
coeur, quand vous lui inspirez le nausée, je … je me demande par ou vous
échapperez. Par ou pouvez-vous passer? Tu ne peux gouverner celui qui
ne veut pas de toi. Cela est impossible. Et même Habyarimana lui-même,
si les citoyens n’en voulaient plus, il ne pourrait plus entrer dans son
bureau. C’est impossible”.
64
Chapter 6
RTLM AND THE GENOCIDE
RTLM appears to have reached its peak of activity during the genocide, reportedly
broadcasting 24 hours a day throughout the first several weeks of the genocide and
then daily with a more limited schedule for the rest of the three and a half month
period. RTLM welcomed the self-proclaimed interim government upon its formation
on 8 April 1994 and never acknowledged that it had effectively come to power
through a coup d’état. Nor did the radio station ever reveal the atrocities which the
interim government and its security forces were committing. Glossing over the fact
that most of the opposition cabinet members of the transitional coalition government
had been killed, or forced into hiding by the evening of 8 April, broadcasters Valérie
Bemeriki and Noël Hitimana reassured listeners of the new government’s legality.
Meanwhile, as independent journalists were hunted down and killed during the early
weeks of the genocide, RTLM journalists received special protection from the interim
authorities. Foreign correspondents covering the genocide reported that the authorities
prevented them from visiting RTLM’s premises. Unless authorised by the Minister of
Defence, they could neither meet nor interview RTLM broadcasters.1 Mark Doyle,
from the BBC, noted that the Belgian RTLM journalist, Georges Ruggiu, had free
access to the heavily guarded Hôtel des Dimplomates, which housed high-level
interim government officials, where access was strictly off-limits to anyone else.
1
The Plane Crash and the Proclamation of the New
Government
Having predicted, just a few days earlier, that a “little something” would soon happen,
RTLM was the first source to announce the plane crash which killed President
Juvénal Habyarimana around 8.30p.m. on the evening of 6 April 1994. The station
reportedly broadcast information about the downing of the plane by 9.00 p m., within
an hour of the crash, Radio Burundi, Radio France Internationale and other
international radio stations reported the news later that night. Neither Radio Rwanda
nor the armed forces made any statement about the President’s death until the
following day.2 President Habyarimana and the President of Burundi, Cyprien
Ntaryamira, had been returning from a meeting of regional Heads of State in
Tanzania, where President Habyarimana had been pressured to cease obstructing and
immediately implement the Arusha Accords. No investigation into the crash has been
conclusive, however, it is widely believed that the aircraft was shot down by
extremists who vehemently opposed and tried to block the implementation of the
Arusha Accords.3 The official explanation advanced by both the interim government
and RTLM over the following few days was that the plane had been shot down by the
RPF, assisted by the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR.
RTLM was also the first station to broadcast news of the inauguration of the selfproclaimed interim government on 8 April. Claiming to be a coalition
government, in fact, all “opposition” representatives were members of the
extremist “Hutu Power” factions of parties close to the MRND (see Political
65
Background, chapter, page 19). As Bemeriki and Hitimana announced the new
cabinet, they joked of how opposition representatives of the transitional
government, who had been assassinated or had gone into hiding, were being
replaced because they could no longer be found. Bemeriki began:
… Nzamurambaho [former Minister of Agriculture] … we don’t know what
has happened to him … the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education …
will be headed by Monsieur Rwamakuba André … I don’t know where JeanMarie Vianney [Mbonimpa] could be, him either … I really don’t know how
that happened … [Bemeriki tries to hold back from laughing and Hitimana
begins to giggle]. We don’t know much, but maybe … we will find out … but
now we don’t know. … Thus, we don’t know about Lando [Landoald
Ndasingwa], as for him … maybe “they” [the opposition members of the
Cabinet] have resigned … .4
By the time of the broadcast, Minister of Primary and Secondary Education, JeanMarie Vianney Mbonimpa, had fled. Frédéric Nzamurambaho, President of the
PSD and Minister of Agriculture and Livestock, was reportedly taken from his
home by Presidential Guards during the day of 7 April and executed. Landoald
Ndasingwa, PL leader, and Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, was also killed
the same day, along with his Canadian wife, their two children and his mother.
By mentioning people who had just been assassinated, the announcers suggested
that they had inside knowledge of the executions which were in process. Far from
denouncing the killings or expressing concern at the whereabouts of these figures,
Bemeriki professed ignorance about their cases. She insisted that their
disappearances were all random occurrences and claimed that the Ministers must
have simply wandered off. As her colleague, Hitimana, began to laugh, she
repeated “We don’t know much … We don’t know much”. Leaving listeners in
suspense as to the dreadful fate of their leaders, Bemeriki added that she expected
to soon find out what had happened to them: “but maybe … we will find out …
but now we don’t know”.
Further into the broadcast, Bemeriki and Hitimana began relaying some of the
morbid news. After criticising Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana at some
length, Hitimana suddenly interrupted Bemeriki, exclaiming with mock surprise:
“People have said that she has answered the call of God [that she is dead] … as for
myself, this is the first that I learn of it”. Agathe Uwilingiyimana had been killed
in the early morning of 7 April, after leaving her home, which was guarded by
several UNAMIR troops, to join her husband, hiding in the house of a Senegalese
neighbour. Her UNAMIR escort was ordered by its UN high Command not to
follow her and to withdraw protection. Rwandan security forces tracked down the
couple a few hours later and executed them on the spot. Ten Belgian UNAMIR
troops guarding Uwilingiyimana’s home were then disarmed by Rwandan security
forces, taken to a military camp, and executed.5
2 Genocide as “The Final Battle”
In a final war such as this, there can be no clemency for people who joke
around, be they members of the military or civilians … This war is really final
… We must wage a war without mercy.6
66
Despite allegations by the international media, RTLM does not appear to have
explicitly called for people to exterminate Tutsi civilians. The phrase, “the grave is
only half full, who will help us to fill it?” is frequently accredited to RTLM by the
international media, but ARTICLE 19 found no evidence in either transcripts or in
witness testimony to support its usage. However, RTLM indirectly and
systematically, advocated the killings of Tutsi by identifying them with the RPF,
who, it claimed, had just invaded Rwanda, assassinated the President, and would
exterminate all the Hutu if the supposed attack was not immediately repulsed.
RTLM described the genocide as a “final war” or “final battle”, claiming the only
way to stop the RPF was to exterminate all the rebels and their alleged
“accomplices”, implying all Tutsi civilians in Rwanda.
During the genocide RTLM to a large degree played on extant fears about the RPF,
which had been exacerbated by government propaganda throughout the years of
war from 1990 to 1993. RTLM echoed this earlier government misinformation
with its claims of systematic and unspeakable atrocities by the rebel group. The
images it portrayed were more graphic than those broadcast earlier by Radio
Rwanda. RTLM warned of “the Inyenzi’s thirst for blood”, and alleged:
… they [RPF troops] cruelly kill mankind … they kill by dissecting …by
extracting various organs from the body… for example, by taking the hear, the
liver, the stomach … the inyenzi-inkotanyi eat men.7
According to RTLM, this was not a war like any other but a final confrontation
with bloodthirsty monsters, who killed for the sake of killing. This assertion was
underlined by the allegation that rebels took pleasure in totally dismembering their
victims. Although in the early 1990s, Radio Rwanda had occasionally broadcast
reports claiming that the RPF had killed all the civilians in the areas it invaded, it
had never portrayed the rebels as likely to annihilate a large section of Rwanda’s
population. The rebel threat had been presented as ferocious, but limited in scope.
During the genocide, however, the RPF was described as evil incarnate, a direct
menace to the entire Rwandan population, and to all of humanity.
RTLM claimed that there was no point in negotiating with such a rebel force nor
even in fighting it through conventional warfare. According to the station, nothing
could rid the rebels of their impulse to kill, and nothing less than their elimination
could neutralise the threat they presented. On 3 June 1994, RTLM used this
reasoning to try to justify genocide” … understand that the cruelty of the Inyenzi is
incurable, the cruelty of the Inyenzi can only be cured by their total
extermination”.8
At other times, RTLM described the genocide as punishment which the RPF , and
thus the Tutsi, had brought upon themselves through the recent military offensive
of 7 April. This alleged attack on the “Hutu majority” by the “Tutsi minority”
amounted to “suicide” because the Tutsi had no chance of winning. Openly linking
the RPF to the Tutsi generally, Kantano Habimana speculated that the Tutsi were
in the process of forging their own destruction, referring to them as “the family
which is on its way to extinction in Rwanda”. 9 Claiming that the percentage of
Tutsi in the Rwandan population had already been reduced from 10 per cent to 8
per cent, he asked, “these people; are they going to continue to commit suicide …
67
to engage in a suicidal battle against a large group [implying the Hutu or the
‘majority’] … won’t they certainly be exterminated? 10 According to this
reasoning, the RPF and the Tutsi were not only responsible for the genocide they
could choose to halt it at any point.
RTLM also attempted to justify mass execution of “accomplices”, Tutsi who were
not members of the RPF, by claiming that this was exactly what the rebels had
planned for the Hutu. According to the station, the Hutu would surely have
perished had they not defended themselves by attacking first. On 23 May 1994,
Habimana claimed that the communal graves in which Tutsi were buried had, in
fact, been dug by RPA troops for their intended Hutu victims:
Kagame had not foreseen that the accomplices, men and women would
disappear as a result of the action of these citizens, in Kigali, that the graves
which had been dug for the Hutu were used for the accomplices.11
In other instances, RTLM described the killing of Tutsi civilians as an unfortunate
but inevitable by-product of the RPF offensive. On 12 June, Habimana accused
the RPF of direct responsibility for the killing of these innocent bystanders:
These Tutsi have caused the extermination of their fellows … their innocent
fellows … because of anger … following the attacks of the Inkotanyi, which
were unjustified.12
3
Incitement to Genocide
If you do not want to have Rwandans exterminated, stand up , take action … without
worrying about international opinion.13
Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, 15 April 1994
According to RTLM, the “final war” could not be won on the strength of the
Rwandan armed forces alone. It required the participation of the entire Rwandan
population, men and women alike. Along with the military and administrative
authorities, RTLM became an important vehicle for promoting this “duty “ of
genocide.
During the genocide, people throughout the country were compelled, under penalty of
death, to co-operate with the security forces. In many areas, all physically able
residents were expected to man the roadblocks, where individuals had to produce their
national identity cards in order to pass. Instructions were given that those identified
as “Tutsi”, and anyone unable to produce an identity card, were to be executed on the
spot. To be found “hiding” at home would raise suspicion and leave one vulnerable to
the roving militias and security forces conducting house-to-house raids in search of
the “enemy”.
In practice, the situation on the ground was far more complex and many people
resisted these instructions in whatever ways they could. ARTICLE 19 received
several accounts of how groups organised at the neighbourhood level to try to protect
Tutsi and opposition supporters in their areas. There are numerous reports of how
people manning road blocks quietly refused to carry out the orders to kill and instead
used their positions at the barriers to assist those trying to escape. Imbaga journalist
Jean-Baptiste Nkuriyingoma, who later briefly served as Minister of Information
68
under the RPF,14 was hidden for three months by a neighbour who was in charge of
what Nkuriyingoma described as a “good roadblock” in his neighbourhood of
Nyamirambo, Kigali. Nkuriyingoma explained: “During the genocide, there were
both good and bad roadblocks. The good roadblocks helped people to escape, warned
them about spots further up the road where militias were likely to attack”. In some
cases, people were advised that it would be safer to return to their home areas.
For RTLM, however, no such resistance could be tolerated. On 10 April, the station
ordered its listeners to participate in the manhunt:
Citizens are asked to remain vigilant, to stand up like real men, to defend
themselves. Roadblocks must be maintained. They really must be maintained
during the day so that they can halt these Inkotanyi. Because there are some
([Inkotanyi] coming … dressed as civilians and unarmed … apparently
seeking reinforcements. But citizens really need to stay at their roadblocks,
they really must defend themselves, they must remain invincible.15
This passage demonstrates the extent to which people were expected to take part in
the genocide. It also clearly shows how RTLM had overtly become an arm of
government policy. Stating that all the Tutsi targeted were RPF agents and denying
that it was demanding that people kill civilians, RTLM claimed that all the Tutsi
fleeing for their lives, without any visible signs of RPF involvement, “dressed as
civilians and unarmed”, were, somehow, travelling to procure military
reinforcements. According to RTLM, citizens who killed proved themselves to be
“real men”, and saved their country from total destruction.
Repeating what amounted to a clear call for violence, RTLM insisted that people at
the barriers must fight these RPF agents with all their might:
Let them [the citizens] stay and fight them [the RPF], and really demolish
them … you really need to stand firm, you must fight these enemies, really
ravage them, in short, defend yourselves.16
The language RTLM used to incite genocide indicated that the aim of this “battle”
was not simply to win the armed combat but rather to utterly destroy the opponent.
Occasionally the analogy of the battlefield was dropped in favour of something more
direct. On 13 April, Habimana told listeners: "continue to keep your eyes open,
remain vigilant … and give them the punishment they deserve”.
The station also issued more specific instructions as to what measures people manning
the roadblocks were expected to take. In May 1994 RTLM broadcast an order from a
member of the CDR militia, the Impuzamugambi, who warned:
Whoever does not have his identity card should be arrested and maybe lose his
head there … checking is necessary, one should have his identity card with
him, showing that he is Rwandan and that he is a son of [a]] cultivator 17, that
he is not an enemy or an accomplice, that he is not an Inkotanyi.18
RTLM did not merely issue stern instructions to kill, it acted as the drumbeat behind
the violence, goading and cheering the perpetrators of genocide. On 13 April, one
week after the genocide had begun, already claiming the lives of the major opposition
figures and approximately 20,000 others in Kigali, 19 RTLM congratulated its
listeners. It urged them to keep up their good efforts:
Everyone who is listening, continue your heroism, continue to be heroic, I
think that no one has decided to flee. … 20
69
In some cases, the station even suggested what types of weapons could be used. On
15 May, RTLM urged Rwandans to arm themselves with anything and everything
they could find.
Fight them with the weapons at your disposal; you have arrows, you have
spears. … Take up your traditional ‘tools’.21
RTLM’s broadcasters frequently expressed their support for people manning the
roadblocks. On 8 April, Valérie Bemeriki urged:
Let them [people at the roadblocks] be strong, RTLM radio is with them … it
follows them the whole time while … they are at their road-blocks, night and
day. … that is how RTLM radio is … it supports our own people.22
The armed forces and the militias responsible for hunting down Tutsi were a
particularly important target for RTLM, which often addressed messages to them. On
22 April, Philippe Mbirizi, a Zairean journalist working for RTLM, opened in French
with the following greeting: “ Hello my dear friends and listeners, hello FAR, hello
the whole Rwandan population, and a particular salute to those inhabitants of Kigali
and elsewhere, throughout the whole country, making the nightly rounds each day”.23
From the very beginning of the genocide, RTLM used its disc-jockey-style
presentation to promote the killings. It continued to invite listeners’ participation,
frequently featuring interviews with studio guests, including extremist politicians,
civil servants and members of the interim government, who encouraged listeners to
support the security forces and assist them in fighting the “war”. During May, RTLM
broadcaster Gaspard Gahigi interviewed interim government Minister for the Family
and Women’s Affairs, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, on the question of women’s
participation in the “war” effort. Nyiramasuhuko assured listeners that women in
Rwanda were making significant contributions: “The Rwandan lady, like any other
Rwandan, is on the front. She is fighting the RPF”24 When asked by Gahigi why
Rwandan women were not so visible in the ranks of the FAR, Nyiramasuhuko
described the specific role which she claimed women were playing:
They are not visible because there are not many of them in the Rwandan army.
… But you can see women in the civilian defence we have organised. I have
seen some learning methods of fighting the enemy along with their brothers.
… Besides, when their husbands and brothers go to the front, they prepare
food for them.25
There is little doubt that “learning methods of fighting the enemy” meant receiving
instructions on how to kill. Nyiramasuhuko ended her interview saying: “I would …
like to invite Rwandan women to work with the other Rwandans to fight the enemy”.
In addition, RTLM presented interviews with supposedly random individuals who
enthusiastically described their participation in the “battle” with the RPF. Gahigi
used an interview with a woman named Marie-Claire Kayirange, whom he claimed
was stationed at a roadblock in Muhima secteur, Nyarugenge commune, Kigali, to
further encourage women to partake in genocide. The woman recounted how she was
forced to flee her home and hide in a hole in the ground for three days, after her area
was bombed by the RPA. She claimed, that, as a result, she became determined to
help the Rwandan armed forces fight the “enemy”:
God willing I … managed to get out [of the hole] and left. But I told myself
that I would continue to fight … I was fighting without a gun, I did not even
70
know how to use it, I used traditional weapons. So you see, everybody is
fighting. Women … cannot rest.26
Although not explicitly stated, the word “fighting” implied “killing” in this context,
where genocide was continually described as war. This was reinforced by the
woman’s account of the means she used to counter the alleged RPF offensive. She
supposedly “fought” the heavy artillery attacks by the RPF with “traditional
weapons”, implying that her own target could not have been military.
After joining the “battle”, Kayirange claimed that she learned to fire a gun and found
this useful for manning the roadblock in Muhima. She assured listeners that she was
never sexually harassed by men while working at the barrier, and had only positive
things to say about her experience of “fighting” for her country. When prompted by
Gahigi, who asked her “what advice” she had for the “other girls”, she replied: “The
advice I would give the others is that they get military training and have the courage
to fight the enemy”. Gahigi then added, for good measure:
She is asking the other young ladies to have the same courage and avoid the
distractions of this world. ‘Let us fight’, she says, ‘and when the war ends,
those pleasures will have their time’.
The interview ended with Kayirange sending “greetings” to members of her family
(see below, section 6).
On other occasions, RTLM appeared to acknowledge that people might be hesitant
about killing, but insisted that “fighting” was the only option. Kantano Habimana
told his listeners they must not succumb to their fears but must be brave and engage in
combat. On 13 April, he was emphatic:
Man must to get up, adjust his pagne (loincloth – traditional dress0 and move
on. Because when the battle is there, it is there. It is no longer possible to do
otherwise.27
Habimana claimed that this was not a battle which one could run away from,
“fighting” was inevitable, there was no way around it. However, if any listeners were
thinking of avoiding the responsibilities of “war”, RTLM warned of the dire
consequences which they would face, reminding its audience:
You kill him. You burn him. That happened. To a soldier who had deserted
the front. If you, civilian, desert the barricade, what are they going to do if
they catch you? The civilian must understand that if a soldier catches him for
having deserted the barricade, he will take him to the … commune authorities,
to the secteur authorities.28
4
RTLM as an Instrument of Genocide:
Tracking Down Individuals Trying to Escape
Beyond generally inciting genocide against the Tutsi, RTLM played a more direct
role in assisting the killing. The station aided the militias and security forces in their
search to identify and locate individuals targeted for elimination. All the Rwandan
genocide survivors interviewed by ARTICLE 19 reported that RTLM broadcasters
frequently read out names of people whom they claimed were “RPA” soldiers or
“accomplices”, thus marking them for extermination. In many cases, RTLM
announced the precise whereabouts or even vehicle number-plates of individuals
71
trying to hide or flee. When this occurred, the people in question were usually killed
very soon thereafter, sometimes within hours of the broadcast.
Before the genocide, RTLM had mainly denounced public figures such as opposition
members of the coalition government, human rights activists and journalists. These
groups became the targets for assassination immediately after the genocide began, and
many were killed within the first few days. During the genocide, however, RTLM
shifted its focus from prominent personalities to a much wider section of Rwandans,
alerting militias and security forces to people who might otherwise have remained
inconspicuous, particularly in Kigali, where it was sometimes easier to hide. In
several instances, RTLM appears to have played a decisive role in enabling security
forces to track down and kill such individuals.
Those trying to escape constituted a major target for RTLM. The station repeatedly
urged listeners to look out for people attempting to flee instead of staying to “fight”
the enemy, as instructed by the authorities. According to RTLM, anyone attemp0ting
to leave an area was, consciously or unconsciously, assisting the RPA to infiltrate and
should be viewed with suspicion. On 13 April, Valérie Bemeriki stated:
You know that when they flee like that, in disarray, Ikotanyi find the
opportunity to mingle with them. This is what we call “infiltration” [said in
French], and when they arrive somewhere they begin to commit atrocities.
…29
It could be argued that this general warning constituted incitement to violence, in a
context where failure to support the armed forces in their “battle against the enemy”
was considered a crime punishable by death. According to RTLM, people fleeing
were sometimes unwitting accomplices. On many other occasions RTLM targeted
civilians more specifically, by claiming that they were RPA troops disguised as local
residents. During the genocide, this claim amounted to a licence to kill anyone trying
to escape. On 8 April, Bemeriki claimed: “We know that the Inkotanyi are now
dispersing, in fact, they are spreading out amongst the inhabitants”. Later in the
programme, the broadcasters were more explicit, claiming that individuals, clearly
fleeing for their lives, were in fact armed and dangerous. Noël Hitimana concluded:
"The Inkotanyi have spread out into the bush … and they are taking off for the hills …
They know how to hide and reappear!”
According to witness testimony gathered by ARTICLE 19, a number of individuals
travelling by car were identified and denounced by RTLM and intercepted shortly
afterwards, by militias manning the roadblocks. During the first week of the
genocide, RTLM described a red van which it claimed was “full of accomplices”, and
provided its vehicle number-plate. The passengers were family members of François
Ncunguyinka, a former préfet of Gisenyi, fleeing to Butare, where the genocide had
not yet begun. They were in Gitarama at the time of the announcement and are
believed to have been halted by a roadblock in that préfecture the same day, and
immediately executed.
Constantin Cyubaro, former Minister of Higher Education, was denounced by RTLM
in April or May (ARTICLE 19’s source could not provide the exact date) as he was
being evacuated from Nyamirambo, Kigali, in a Red Cross ambulance, after being
wounded during an incident at a roadblock in the neighbourhood. According to
information received by ARTICLE 19, RTLM broadcast his name and location, and
stated that he was travelling in Red Cross vehicle. Reportedly, the ambulance was
72
stopped en route to the centre of Kigali, near the outskirts of the city. Constantin
Cyubaro was taken from the vehicle and killed by the roadside.
In a separate incident, retired FAR officer Désiré Mudenge was denounced by RTLM
in April as he was trying to travel from Nyamirambo, in Kigali, to Gitarama
prefecture in a three-car convoy of people under his protection. These included
members of his family and several Tutsi. RTLM reportedly announced his name and
identified the vehicles, stating that Mudenge was “a traitor” and had “accomplices
with him”. The convoy is believed to have been stopped almost immediately
afterwards, at a roadblock near Gitega, not far from the Office National des
Transports (National Office of Public Transport) in Kigali. Désire Mudenge and all
other members of the convoy were killed on the spot.
On 3 May, RTLM appears to have contributed to blocking the evacuation of 62
people from the Hôtel des Mille Collines which had been authorised by the interim
government authorities. This five-star hotel, owned by the Belgian airline SABENA,
and guarded by about a dozen UNAMIR troops, had served as a sanctuary for many
Tutsi, Hutu government opponents, and foreigners, before the latter were evacuated in
mid-April. UNAMIR had secured permission for the evacuation and for a FAR escort
from Augustin Bizimungu, Commander-in-Chief of the army, who reportedly stated
that he could not guarantee the co-operation of the militias. The attempted evacuation
was highly publicised by the media, and a number of journalists were present and
tried to interview the evacuees as they boarded the convoy. According to witnesses,
RTLM journalist Ananie Nkurunziza also observed the evacuation, from outside the
Hotel. Immediately after the evacuees had entered the buses, RTLM reportedly
broadcast the full names of all 62 people and directed the militias to attack the
convoy. Two buses were stopped at separate roadblocks. Several people from the
first bus were ordered out of the vehicle and beaten. They were able to escape when a
skirmish broke out amongst the security forces manning the roadblock. The second
bus was permitted to return to the hotel after UNAMIR radioed for help and Colonel
Tharcisse Renzaho and Georges Rutaganda, Second Vice-President of the
Interahamwe, intervened.
In a separate incident in April or May 1994, François-Xavier Nsanzuwera reported to
ARTICLE 19 that he heard RTLM provide full details of a vehicle in Nyamirambo
which it claimed contained “Inyenzi”. The car belonged to Alain Mudenge, son of a
former Rwandan Ambassador to the UN. He and Désiré Nshunguyinka, whose father
had formerly served as a government minister, as a préfet, were travelling with
members of their respective families. They were apparently spotted in Nyamirambo
and immediately killed. Shortly afterwards, RTLM announced that their initial
broadcast about the car had in fact been a mistake.
In some instances, RTLM broadcasters issued “corrections” about individuals whom
they had denounced, in time to prevent them from facing certain death. During the
first three weeks of the genocide, a caller appears to have provided RTLM with the
vehicle number-plate of Emmanuel Nkunduwimye, brother-in-law of RPF supporter,
Silas Majyambere, which the radio then broadcast, claiming that he, too, supported
the RPF. RTLM broadcasters issued a correction and told listeners that this man was,
in fact, “one of their own”, Nkunduwimye was then permitted to travel freely, and
later accompanied a woman, very much at risk, to safety in Zaire. Half Tutsi, and the
wife of a well-known journalist, she had been targeted from the beginning of the
genocide.
73
The fact that RTLM issued “corrections” about specific individuals, having
denounced them earlier, underlines the importance of the station’s role in identifying
people for the security forces and militias. Moreover, its influence on the militias
during the genocide was emphasised by an unusual case in which RTLM appears to
have helped free a man who had been taken hostage by militia members. A 39-yearold car mechanic was abducted by militia members from Biryogo around 5.00 a.m. on
30 April. He was freed after people from his area pressured RTLM to broadcast an
announcement stating that he should be released.
RTLM’s close relationship to the militias during the genocide period is also
demonstrated by a case reported to ARTICLE 19 involving the head of the
gendarmerie, General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, who in mid-April, was accused by
RTLM of transporting RPA soldiers when, he claims, he was trying to evacuate
several Tutsi civilians. RTLM broadcast a description of his vehicle and its numberplate. The General reported that, despite his formal position, he felt threatened and
immediately changed cars on hearing the broadcast.
5
Directing Militias to Places of Hiding and Refuge
RTLM provided a significant amount of information as to the whereabouts of
specific individuals who were trying to hide from the militias and security forces and
encouraged listeners to phone in with any details they had about “RPA” soldiers and
their “accomplices”,. It also played an important role in directing militias to places of
refuge, where larger numbers of people were located.
On 10 April 1994, Valérie Bemeriki read out 13 names of people she claimed were
“RPF leaders” in various areas of Kigali. In addition, she provided their addresses,
jobs, nicknames and, in some cases, the places they were said to frequent. Bemeriki
alleged that these individuals were conspiring to assassinate political figures in
Rwanda, and stated that “security” could not be re-established until they were found.
She called upon her listeners to immediately locate them.
In most cases, however, RTLM did not provide such complete profiles of targeted
individuals, generally announcing the name or simply the neighbourhood of persons it
claimed were “Inyenzi”. Providing the location often proved sufficient to provoke an
attack by local militias within a few hours. As one survivor of the genocide
explained:
RTLM often stated: '
We have just learned that so-and-so has ammunition'
.
This was the way to point him out. The next day, the militia would be at his
house".31
According to journalist Sixbert Musangamfura, RTLM broadcasters criticised the
militias if they failed to carry out attacks on particular individuals. Musangamfura
explained that Kantano Habimana would announce:
1 have just learned that the people who went to his place did not find him.
Where could he be? Continue to search the area."32
When only a name was announced, it was usually insufficient information to
immediately pinpoint the victim. Nevertheless, it alerted people manning the
74
extensive roadblocks throughout the country, who were checking identity cards.
Thus, in a number of such cases, individuals who were denounced by RTLM were
eventually killed within several days of the broadcast.
One of the most prominent people targeted by the station in this way was the wealthy
businessman Antoine Sebera, a Tutsi. He was mentioned several times by RTLM in
early April and accused of hiding large quantities of firearms and RPA troops at his
estate in Gikondo, Kigali. Several witnesses interviewed by ARTICLE 19 reported
hearing RTLM call upon its listeners to attack his home. On 8 April 1994, Valérie
Bemeriki warned:
the little Inyenzi ... even if they were still hoping to be guests of Sebera and
find security in his cellar ... now they are being grilled right there ... now they
are burning. ... In fact, there was a fair number of '
little things'[RPA troops] ...
crowded in there [the cellar]."33
Antoine Sebera often hunted game, and possessed a number of firearms specifically
for this activity for which he, reportedly, had the necessary papers. He is not believed
to have been involved with the RPF, but he had been detained for one week during the
massive arrests of October 1990, before being released without charge. According to
RTLM, however, he was an RPF leader and his home or, more specifically, his cellar
(cave) was described as a major strategic point for the rebels. Although RTLM did
not give numbers, Bemeriki insinuated that an entire RPF battalion could be stationed
there; she claimed there were so many RPA troops in his house that "people would
think it an exaggeration" if she were to announce the actual figure.
Embellishing this presumably fictitious account of an RPF stronghold, Bemeriki
claimed that the Rwandan security forces already had the situation under control.
Antoine Sebera and his allies were, she claimed: "being grilled ... burnt". A few
minutes later, she again mentioned Sebera, this time in passing, and maintained that
the attack on his home was a fait accompli. Extolling the virtues of the FAR and their
victory over the evil enemy, she referred to "the little Inkotanyi . which we crushed at
Sebera'
s place".
According to André Sebera, Antoine Sebera'
s son, who spoke to his father on the
telephone from Brussels during the days before he was murdered, and who has since
investigated the circumstances of his father'
s death, the attack on the house did not
begin until the following morning. At around I1.00 a.m. on Saturday 9 April, security
forces began to throw grenades at the house and Antoine Sebera and his family
reportedly resisted, using the firearms kept for hunting. On Monday 11 April,
Antoine Sebera phoned RTLM and insisted that he was not harbouring any RPA
troops in his home. Apparently, he pleaded with RTLM broadcasters to correct what
they had said, and told them to come and see for themselves if in doubt. Later in the
day, RTLM broadcasters discussed, on air, the conversation they had with Antoine
Sebera, but still maintained he was hiding rebels. On Tuesday, the attacks on the
house intensified and Sebera and his family retreated to the cellar. During the night of
12-13 April, after militias shelled the house, which caught fire, Antoine Sebera, four
family members and four other people who had been hiding, fled the premises.
According to one witness, they managed to reach the front of the Canadian Embassy
but were refused entry. As Sebera and his family were reportedly still armed with
75
hunting guns, the militias and police protecting, the Embassy called for
reinforcements from the FAR, who arrived shortly afterwards, and shot him, his
family, and the other four people dead."34
RTLM also accused others of active involvement in arming and fighting alongside the
RPF. In the particularly wealthy area of Kivugiza, part of Nyamirambo, where many
Tutsi lived, a man named Joseph Kahabaye was reportedly singled out in this way by
Noël Hitimana, who also lived there. During the first few days of the genocide,
Hitimana did not criticize people in this area but, instead, reported that all was well
there, saying, "At Kivugiza, we stand together". Around 11 or 12 April, however,
Hitimana claimed that this entire area was a centre of RPF activity, alleged that
Joseph Kababaye was responsible, and reportedly said: "in our area, at Kivugiza, a lot
of arms have been distributed ... Kahabaye'
s house is a bastion of the RPF. ... People
from the RPF are hiding in the attics". The entire area was raided by militias within
hours of the broadcast and Joseph Kahabaye was killed. The militias continued to
attack Kivugiza for the next few days until all the Tutsi there were slaughtered.
In another case, on the morning of 16 April, PSD leader Dr Théoneste Gafaranga was
tracked down and killed just a few hours after RTLM repeatedly broadcast that there
was "a big Inyenzi" still left in the neighbourhood of Rugenge, Kigali. Dr Gafaranga
had been hiding in the area, not far from his home, since 7 April, and was the last
PSD leader left alive; the others had been assassinated in the first days of the
genocide. According to witnesses, RTLM addressed the militias specifically and
directed them to the area with the following message:
Urgent! urgent! calling the militia members of Muhima! Direct yourselves to
the Rugenge area ... we have been informed that the Inyenzi and their
accomplices have not yet returned to the CND.
The militias searched the neighbourhood until, at 11.30a.m., they found Dr
Gafaranga, a well-known personality. They arrested him and took him away
immediately. The RPF station, Radio Muhabura, announced news of his death just a
few hours later.
On 15 April, Charles Kalinijabo, a Tutsi, was denounced by RTLM which provided
both his name and location. According to witnesses RILM stated: "there are
accomplices who are walking around the barriers of Nyanilrambo, one of whom is
Charles Kalinijabo ..." Kalinijabo had been helping to man a roadblock in
Nyamirambo when the broadcast, apparently, prompted local militias to search him
out. He was immediately arrested, taken to his home and executed there.
Meanwhile, Journalist and priest André Sibomana, Editor of the independent Catholic
newspaper Kinyainateka, reported that RTLM broadcast information about him when
he was hiding in the Centre Saint Paul in Kigali. According to Father Sibomana, on
the morning of 12 April, the station broadcast that there was "a high-level
accomplice" hiding in the Centre but did not provide his name. After hearing this
announcement, he immediately fled the premises. At 2.00p.m., several militia
members arrived at the Centre looking for him.35
76
Civil servants who resisted instructions to order the massacres were also denounced
by RTLM. Justin Nyandwi, then bourgemestre of Musambira commune, reported that
on 10 April he, his driver and three local policemen, were threatened by Interahamwe,
led by Rose Karushara of Kimisagara, Kigali, after he had directed people in his area
to prevent the Interahamwe from entering the commune. They were saved when
Kigali City'
s Chief of Police, Major Nyamuhimba, intervened. According to
Nyandwi, on 14 April, RTLM announced that he should be eliminated because he
opposed the massacres. On 20 April, a large group of Interahamwe went to his house,
searching for him, but he and his family escaped. In a separate case, Callixte
Ndaijimana, bourgemestre of Mugina, was caught and executed on 20 April. He also
had been targeted by RTLM, a few days previously, for trying to protect people in his
administrative division.
By many accounts, the préfet of Butare, Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana, had been
instrumental in preventing killings in Butare, which was the last area in Rwanda to
experience the genocide. The only Tutsi préfet in Rwanda, Habyarimana also took
measures to protect the internally displaced from other préfectures who sought refuge
in Butare. On 13 April, when the Butare préfecture had still not experienced any
killings, Valérie Bemeriki accused Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana of working for the
RPF and warned listeners:
I have told you, persistently, the Inkotanyi claimed they would make a
breakthrough in Gitarama and in Butare ... especially in Butare ... where they
would find an opening. And we are aware of the fact that they have
accomplices everywhere - even the préfet of Butare - and I am not making this
up, he himself said that he is a member of the PL but that, when the RPF
comes, he will become a follower of the RPF. So, if he plans to become an
RPF supporter, that means that he is already working for the RPF .36
Bemeriki identified Butare and Gitarama préfectures as key points of strategic
importance for the RPF. She claimed to have received indications from the RPF that
it planned to attack from these préfectures. This was, obviously, entirely untrue since
the RPF led its offensive from the north, where most of its troops had been stationed
since before the genocide. Bemeriki warned her listeners to remain vigilant, insisting
that there were "accomplices everywhere". She implied that the préfet himself had
informed her that he was an RPF supporter.
On 18 April, five days after this broadcast, Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana was dismissed
by the interim government, which also purged other civil servants in Butare for
opposing the genocide. Habyarimana was last seen in Butare City the day he was
sacked; he is believed to have spent one week in hiding before being arrested, taken to
Gitarama, capital of the interim government, and summarily executed. Massacres
began in Butare préfecture on the day of his dismissal and included some of the worst
in the entire period of genocide.37
Another group targeted by RTLM was priests believed to be protecting or hiding
people in their churches or parishes. During the genocide, many church leaders
demonstrated a high level of complicity with the interim authorities. Priests who
resisted the massacres, therefore, took extraordinary risks. RTLM often accused such
priests of being RPA troops or of supporting the RPF offensive. On 20 May 1994,
77
Valérie Bemeriki accused Father Pierre Ngoga of slaughtering Hutu, describing a
presumably fictitious account of an attack in Kibeho, Gikongoro préfecture:
There were 88 Tutsi who were going to commit the irreparable. ... This
backfired when Father Ngoga took a rifle, positioned himself near the church
and began shooting at the Hutu ... while they were chasing these Tutsi who
came to attack them. People saw it. ... He took his car and fled. Even today,
he is still on the loose 38
According to many witnesses interviewed by African Rights, Father Pierre Ngoga had
tried to protect people in his parish from the security forces during April and May.
He was killed in Butare about ten days after this broadcast, on 31 May. The church in
Kibeho was burned down and the thousands of refugees within were massacred.
Bemeriki cited a number of other priests whom she accused of similar atrocities. She
continued: "Father Ngoga is not alone. How about Muvara? ... Can Father Ntagara
explain to Rwandans why the Eucharist has been replaced with ammunition?"39 Two
priests, named Augustin Ntagara and Fé1icien Muvural had already been killed on 7
and 29 April, respectively.
Beyond singling out specific priests and parishioners, RTLM also targeted churches
and other places where large numbers of displaced persons were hiding or hoping to
find refuge. At the beginning of the genocide, RTLM claimed that RPA troops were
using churches throughout the country as military bases, thereby encouraging attacks
on churches, where some of the largest massacres in Rwanda took place, often with
thousands killed at a time.40 Never before in Rwanda had churches been so
systematically violated. On 8 April, Noël Hitimana told listeners that "a Doctor" had
given him the following advice:
he said '
during these times in which we are living ... if you have to see people
seeking refuge in the parish churches ... and in other places ... this is not good
at all'... he said '
moreover you find that these people ... whom they [RPA
troops] have placed in the parish churches and elsewhere. [were] …
given them grenades and other arms ... all this is not good."41
Hitimana tried to make this outrageous claim appear authoritative by citing the
"Doctor" as his source, a man whom he described as "someone I really trust".42
On 7 April, the day after the Presidential plane had been shot down, an estimated 200300 people fled to the church at Nyamirambo, in Kigali. Later that day, a small
number of militia members tried forcibly to enter the church, but many of those
hiding formed a barricade and, using traditional weapons, resisted the incursion.
Witnesses reported to ARTICLE 19 that, throughout the night of 7-8 April, RTLM
repeatedly broadcast that the church was full of armed RPA troops and announced
that reinforcements were required. At 10.00 a.m. on 8 April, a truck full of security
forces arrived and stormed the church grounds, forced people out of the church and
shot dead about 60 persons. Many others fled.
1
78
A number of those who escaped the massacre in the Nyamirambo church hid in the
nearby Collége Saint André. There, a similar siege occurred following another
broadcast by RTLM. By 11 April, an estimated I00 people were hiding in the school.
According to witness testimony, RTLM targeted the school on 11 or 12 April,
claiming it was harbouring RPF accomplices. In apparent response to the RTLM
broadcast, on the evening of 13 April, the RPF rescued about 40 of the people hiding
there. On 14 or 15 April, militias stormed the premises and killed all those remaining.
A similar case occurred on 10 April, when RTLM directed militias to attack hundreds
of people who were sheltering in the Nyamirambo Mosque. According to lawyer
Frédéric Mutagwera, interviewed by African Rights:
RTLM complained that this Mosque, which it named, was full of refugees.
On Monday and Tuesday, soldiers and Interahamwe came to the Mosque,
shooting in all directions. RTLM, which passed on the message, is directly
responsible for inciting this particular massacre. 43
Approximately 300 people, mostly Tutsi, were killed
In mid-June, towards the end of the genocide, RTLM appears to
have played a role in ordering a raid on the Church of St Famille, in
sectors. Rugenge secteur, Nyarugenge commune, where large numbers of
people had sought refuge since April. It was located next to the Centre
St Paul, which also served as a sanctuary during the genocide. On 14
June, at least 42 men were specifically selected and taken from St
Paul'
s by Interahamwe, allegedly on the orders of a Rugenge councillor,
Odette Nyirabagenzi. During the night of 16 June, the RPF
organised a raid to evacuate those sheltering in St Paul'
s and St Famille'
s and
succeeded in rescuing 1,800 from St Paul'
s but failed to gain entry to St Famille."44
Witnesses reported to ARTICLE 19 that early the following morning, RTLM called
for an attack on St Famille, claiming that it was still harbouring "accomplices". Later
that day, militias stormed St Famille and executed approximately 100 men.
6
Military Radio
Beyond addressing the general public, RTLM appears to have largely focused on the
more specific audience of the security forces and militia. Despite its repeated orders
for all "citizens" to partake in the genocide, it was this latter group of military and
paramilitary organisations, rather than the population, which orchestrated and carried
out large-scale massacres throughout the country at a relentless pace. In addition to
targeting individuals and groups of people for the militias, RTLM appears to have
relayed inside information about military developments to militia members and FAR
troops, at least in Kigali.45 Many observes believe that the RTLM had a direct link or
radio connection to high ranking members of the security forces because it frequently
conveyed up to the minute information about the situation in combat zones.
79
On several occasions, RTLM broadcast requests from civil servants or militia leaders
for supplies of weapons and ammunition to be delivered to their areas. Gaspard
Gahigi interviewed a woman named Euphrasia Kamatamu, councillor for Muhima
secteur, Nyarugenge commune, Kigali, who stated:
"Concerning the weapons, because we are directly facing the enemy, we need
more than the other sectors. … the civilians … would like (more strength) by
getting more weapons, because nobody would be afraid if all had their
weapons".46
Kamatamu has been accused by African Rights of playing a role in organising the
killing by militias in her area.47 Another interviewee, Marie-Claire Kayirange, who
claimed to be manning a roadblock in this same area, also indicated that additional
weapons were needed. At the very end of her studio visit, Gahigi announced:
"Kayirange says there is a shortage of guns at the barricades. The councillor and the
others in charge will look into the problem".48
The use of the station to broadcast information specifically destined to the military
and militias is demonstrated by the interrogation of Janvier Salongo, a captured RPA
soldier, which RTLM broadcast live on 15 April 1994. This 20-year-old Rwandan
exile had lived in Zaire since childhood and had barely set foot in Rwanda before the
genocide. He was taken prisoner by the FAR after being left behind by members of an
RPA battalion in Kigali following a battle. Salongo was subjected to a lengthy
interrogation by four FAR officers who bombarded him with questions about the RPF
and its strategic plans for the war. Clearly disorientated, with his voice faltering at
many points during the cross-examination, the young soldier seemed for the most part
genuinely unable, although at times unwilling, to answer their insistent questions.
The interrogation continued:
FAR:…why did you choose Gikondo [neighborhood in Kigali - for the
attack]?
JS: Gikondo? Glkondo, I don'
t even know where it is….it was like I was taken
around without knowing where I was going.
FAR: In fact when you go on the hills [for an attack], you go in groups of what
size?
JS: On the hills? We went out on the hills in a platoon.
FAR: How many men are in a platoon?
JS: 30 ... but not all platoons are the same.
FAR: What distinguishes them?
JS: Some have a lot and others have few.
FAR: ... and afterwards ... when you [the RPF] leave here... what
are your plans
after that ... after Rebero [strategic point in South Kigali taken by
RPF troops]?
JS-. Our plans are to fight. Period!
FAR: To fight where?
80
Bringing the captured soldier to the RTLM studio and exposing him to listeners no
doubt served to bolster the interim government'
s claim that they were winning the war
against the rebels. It also publicly humiliated the RPF, given that his fellow platoon
members had left him behind enemy lines, but was more than just a public relations
exercise. Salongo'
s interrogators attempted to extract information which could assist
the FAR in repulsing the RPA offensive. The FAR officers continually pressured the
soldier to reveal details about the RPA which were so specific that they would have
been incomprehensible to anyone not directly engaged in combat.
The incessant questions continued relating to the targets the RPA were planning to
attack next, and how the rebels generally decided which areas to target. The FAR
officers asked where the men in Salongo'
s battalion had gone, and how many men
were in his unit. In addition, they tried to find out more general information,
including what the command structure was for the RPA'
s battle units, and how the
RPF acquired arms and ammunition. They also asked how many men the RPA had
lost in battles with the FAR since the start of the genocide. During their exchanges
with the soldier, the FAR officers made no wild accusations of fictitious rebel
atrocities, as RTLM broadcasters had consistently done. Perhaps they did not want to
give Salongo the opportunity to refute such allegations. They did, however, maintain
that the RPF had killed President Habyarimana and demanded that Salongo explain
why the RPF had done this. He responded by weakly stating that he knew nothing
about any RPF involvement in the crash.
In general, their manner was direct, their questions were factual, and they largely
refrained from taunting Salongo on air. On occasion, they indulged in making ironic
comments. After asking Salongo explains how he came to be captured, one officer
commented: "don'
t you see that they [RPA troops] have hurt you?". The soldier sadly
admitted his bewilderment at having been abandoned under these circumstances: "me
too, that is what ... I ... I thought about why they did this and I didn'
t understand it
myself'
. Janvier Salongo is presumed to have been killed by the Rwandan security
forces following the broadcast.
7
RTLM Versus Radio Rwanda
From the very beginning of the genocide, the RPF argued that RTLM was playing a
pernicious role in the massacres and repeatedly called for it to be shut down. On 16
April, the RPF demanded the immediate closure of the station as one of four
preconditions to any negotiations with the interim government authorities.49 This was
ignored and the RPA shelled the RTLM station around noon the following day.
RTLM was broadcasting live at the time of the attack and witnesses reported to
ARTICLE 19 that they listened to the shelling on the radio as well as the reactions of
the broadcasters as they realized what was happening. The broadcast continued for
about 30 minutes after the bombing, during which time listeners heard RTLM
journalists assessing the damage. According to Médecins sans frontières, Valérie
Bemeriki and Noël Hitimana suffered serious injuries and were evacuated to the
Centre Hospitalier de Kigali, run by the Red Cross. Bemeriki had to have a leg
amputated but is still alive.
81
After shutting down for about three hours, RTLM reportedly re-launched its
programmes later that day by triumphantly and defiantly announcing that nothing
could stop them because "you cannot extinguish the voice of the '
numerous'people
[meaning Hutu]". After this attack, RTLM is believed to have moved to a mobile
station. African Rights reported that the radio relocated to "an armored vehicle
supplied, manned and protected by Presidential Guards".50
RTLM continued to operate regularly but no longer broadcast for 24 hours a day and
the range of its broadcasts appears to have diminished. Later, on 4 July, after the RPF
took control of Kigali, the station went off the air and relocated to Gisenyi '
préfecture,
where the interim government moved on 12 July. RTLM is reported to have begun
broadcasting again on 10 July. It went off the air one week later.
The BBC Monitoring Service in Nairobi was able to pick up Radio Rwanda
broadcasts only during the first five days of the genocide. After 12 April, it appears to
have stopped broadcasting on its short wave frequency, apparently because the relay
station it shared with Deutsche Welle near Kigali was damaged when fighting
between the FAR and RPA reached the surrounding area. Radio Rwanda is believed
to have broadcast throughout the rest of the genocide on FM frequency, with a
reduced range.
During the first few days of the genocide, Minister of Information, Faustin Rucogoza,
was assassinated and Director of ORINFOR, Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro, fled the
country. Both were MDR party members who had tried to introduce reforms and
improve the independence of Radio Rwanda'
s reporting. Eliézer Niyitegeka, from the
extremist "Hutu Power" faction of the MDR, was appointed Minister of Information;
Jean-Baptiste Bamwanga, Radio Rwanda journalist and RTLM shareholder, became
Director of ORINFOR; Another RTLM founder, Froduald Ntawulikura, was retained
by Radio Rwanda which underwent a purge, as many of its moderate journalists were
killed, while several alleged extremists, such as Jean-Baptiste Nubahumpatse, a local
stringer for the BBC French for Africa Service, were promoted."51
After 7 April, Radio Rwanda served as a mouthpiece for interim government officials
including from the Ministry of Defence, who made a number of official
announcements, informing the public about curfews and travel restrictions. Gérard
Prunier writes that, in contrast to RTLM, the government station initially "remained
neutral and confined itself to information bulletins".52
Over the next number of weeks, Radio Rwanda reportedly became more vehement,
serving as a platform for extremist politicians and interim government authorities,
who frequently gave lengthy interviews or speeches in which they incited genocide.
Unlike their counterparts at RTLM, Radio Rwanda journalists do not appear to have
used these interviews as background to their own elaborate commentaries. Moreover,
Radio Rwanda does not appear to have played an active role in the killings. It neither
directed militias to specific locations nor assisted them in tracking down particular
individuals. The station did, however, incite genocide by calling upon people to
82
assist the security forces in "defending" the nation. It also generally requested people
to remain vigilant and help track down the "enemy". A broadcast in French on 12
April advised listeners:
The people should not panic, but tell the security forces where
the enemy is hiding. This happened in the Gikondo Sector yesterday
when the attention of a patrol of the national gendarmerie was drawn to the
presence of seven RPF combatants hiding in a house.53
8
Speeches and Announcements by the Interim
Authorities
The initial speeches by interim government President Théodore Sindikubwabo and
Prime Minister Jean Kambanda, during the very first days of the genocide, were
formal pronouncements on the composition and aims of the new government, which
were probably intended to make it appear legitimate. Although the self-proclaimed
government had effectively come to power through a coup d'
état, Théodore
Sindikubwabo insinuated that he and his cabinet of MRND, CDR and extremist "Hutu
Power" faction leaders, had assumed power legally. On 9 April, Sindikubwabo spoke
of "the death of the President of the Republic [which] was unfortunately followed by
other tragic events during which other people, such as Prime Minister Agathe
Uwilingiyimana, died". 54 He also expressed the "sincere condolences of the Rwandan
government and people to the bereaved families" of these figures.55
At a press conference the next day, Prime Minister Kambanda elaborated on what he
claimed were the reasons for the killings of former government members:
There have been confrontations among the population, especially in the city of
Kigali, and people have been killed, including the Prime Minister, Madame
Agathe Uwilingiyima, and some ministers as well as several citizens.56
He asserted that the population, overwhelmed with grief at the death of their
President, had suddenly become violent. The assassinations of Prime Minister Agathe
Uwilingiyimana and other ministers were supposedly the result of this surge in
random violence. He repeated several times, that this was the only possible
explanation for the killings which had swept Kigali, insisting:
It is largely this which has led to this turmoil;
our wish is that people try to understand this.
that people understand the reasons which have
provoked acts of violence of such a scale. 57
83
These two figures spoke in general terms about the measures they claimed were
needed to "restore security", but did not provide specific instructions as to how
citizens were expected to help. In his inaugural speech to parliament on 9 April,
President Sindikubwabo applauded the security forces, which by then had already
carried out widespread killings in the capital:
I would ... like to thank and give support to our country'
s forces who acted
swiftly after the death of the President and did their utmost, as always, to
preserve the peace of Rwandans, especially here in the capital.58
In addition, Sindikubwabo praised the army for its plans to establish a "crisis
committee" together with "civilian leaders", to deal with the situation at hand.
In his speech to parliament the same day, Prime Minister Kambanda also indicated
that the government and security forces would address the situation, but did not
explain how. He simply assured citizens that "the Ministers of Defence, of communal
Development, and of Justice, will do everything possible to restore peace as soon as
possible, let us say within two weeks".
In contrast to the general statements by Sindikubwabo and Kambanda, from the very
beginning of the genocide, civil servants issued specific orders which the civilian
population was expected to follow. On 8 April the sous-préfét of Kigali, François
Karera, made the following announcement on RTLM:
The préfet of Kigali asks all citizens to continue to be vigilant so that, together
with the army, they can defend the integrity of our country. Citizens, in
collaboration with their local authorities, the "ten-houses",59the heads of
cellules, communal councillors, bourgemestres, and even party leaders, must
mobilise to secure their cellules and secteurs so they unmask any person
hiding in their midst intending to support the enemy.60
This official statement made it clear to what extent citizens were required to
participate in efforts to "restore order". Their role was as important as that of the
armed forces; the civilians were expected to work "together with the army". This
announcement also indicates how the role of the civil servants, throughout the country
proved decisive during the genocide period. The entire administrative apparatus was
instructed to become involved in the genocide. The bourgemestres, political party
leaders follow. responsables de cellules, down to the leaders of the '
dix-maison'units,
required the local population to "mobilise" to assist in the killing. The sous-préfet
went on to explain precisely what this "mobilization" would entail:
For this reason they [citizens] need to keep a watch on all roads and,
moreover, wherever the enemy is suspected to be hiding - wherever
this is - flush him out without restraint. People are asked not to
abandon their homes, as this would give an opening to the enemy.
They are asked to patrol and to heed Radio Rwanda 61
84
The instructions were precise. People throughout Kigali préfecture were delegated
responsibility for hunting down "the enemy" in their particular neighbourhoods.
People were not told to look for an invading guerrilla army, nor even for individuals
who were armed or seemed dangerous. Instead, they were asked to target all
individuals found hiding. No evidence or sign of RPF involvement was necessary;
the Tutsi generally were tacitly associated with the RPF troops.
Several days later, both Sindikubwabo and Kambanda were more explicit in their
speeches, and openly called for the general population to participate in the genocide
or "final war". They travelled to Butare préfecture on 19 April, the day that Tutsi
préfet Jean-Baptiste Habyarimnana was dismissed along with other members of the
administration in that préfecture for opposing the genocide. There had been no
killings in Butare until then. On 21 April, Sindikubwabo and Kambanda gave
particularly vehement speeches in Butare in which they attacked both the
administrative authorities and the population in the area for having refused to carry
out the genocide. Jean Kambanda addressed a gathering in Butare:
.
… All of us, together, must wage this war ... It is a final war, it must be
finished. I address this message to certain bourgemestres who, it has been
reported to me, have gone to train with the Inkotanyi... they (the
bourgemestres) should make them [the RPF] understand that the government
is determined. The State, the military, the people have decided to
wage this war, and to win it.62
The Prime Minister employed the terminology of genocide as the "final war", which
had been used by RTLM consistently from 7 April onwards. He emphasised the need
for the entire population, including the administrative authorities in all the
préfectures, to contribute. By singling out the bourgemestres in Butare and accusing
them of working with the RPF, he immediately targeted them for killing.
Meanwhile, Sindikubwabo addressed his speech to the entire population of Butare.
Although he discussed the responsibility of civil servants in the genocide, he, too,
underlined the need for all civilians to give their full "participation":
During these difficult periods, our wish is that the [security] forces be assisted
by all able-bodied members of the population; all, all of us. Let no one say
'
this does not concern me'
. ... Security is not a matter for the gendarmes alone;
security is a matter which, above all, affects the population; the gendarmes
only intervene afterwards, when the population encounters insurmountable
difficulties."63
For Sindikubwabo, there could be no exceptions; the general security of the country
was a matter which concerned the population at large and, therefore, had to be dealt
with by everyone, not simply the security forces. People themselves needed to take
responsibility for "fighting" and should only look to the security forces in case of
85
"difficulties". He warned that any person who refused or failed to co-operate would
be severely punished. Any such individuals should be denounced and brought before
the authorities to "explain" why they did not feel an obligation to partake in the
genocide, why "they do not feel that this affects them".64
9
On RTLM: The Journalists and Interim Government
Officials Respond
During the genocide and after the fall of the interim government on 18 July, RTLM
journalists publicly denied that they played any role whatsoever in inciting violence.
The interim government officials, however, did not refute the charge that RTLM
incited violence but repeatedly stated that it was a private radio station over which
they had no control. Both groups have since argued that what occurred in Rwanda
from April to July 1994 was not genocide.
In early May 1994, the Belgian RTLM announcer Georges Ruggiu sent a fax to
Radio-Té1évision Belgique Francophone (RTBF) in which he refuted allegations that
he engaged in incitement to violence against either Belgian or Rwandan nationals
while working at RTLM Earlier, on 18 April, the Belgian Minister of Justice,
Melchior Wathelet, had requested an investigation to determine whether Georges
Ruggiu should be charged with incitement to commit crimes . Interviewed in Zaire in
August 1994, Ruggiu claimed that RTLM never violated the law. He stated:
We did not incite racial hatred. We did incite people to be critical about the
RPF and some interpreted that as a call to kill Tutsis [sic]. But we never
pronounced the word '
Tutsi'..It was a station where people dared to say what
they thought. But I defy anyone to find a tape of me saying: '
You must kill'
.
It'
s not true to say we told falsehoods or called on people to kill each other.
We simply said the RPF did not want peace.65
From the evidence of available recordings of RTLM broadcasts during the genocide,
it is quite possible that Georges Ruggiu never literally called on listeners to "kill
Tutsi", as he claimed. RTLM did imply that the "RPF" meant the Tutsi generally;
perhaps it is not surprising that Ruggiu pointed to this use of language to support his
claim. However, evidence that the station incited genocide is overwhelming,
regardless of the particular terms which RTLM employed.
RTLM journalists Emmanuel Rucogoza and Gaspard Gahigi also denied that the
station ever broadcast anything that was not totally accurate. According to Rucogoza,
RTLM was controversial precisely because "this radio tells the truth and the truth
hurts".66 In an with ARTICLE 19 in Goma, Zaire, Gahigi maintained that
there was longstanding tension between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and that RTLM
simply reported on this "problem" but did nothing to exacerbate it. He mocked the
notion that RTLM could have had any responsibility for what happened during the
genocide period:
86
Is a journalist who talks about a problem which really exists and
threatens society… guilty for having said it or, rather, would he be guilty for
not having said it?… Since all the media, worldwide, are now unanimous in
recognising that, in Rwanda, there is an ethnic problem which led to the
human catastrophe which we see today, if RTLM had not said it, would this
have prevented the problem from exisiting?"67
Gahigi insinuated that the allegations of incitement stemmed from that that station'
s
coverage of the supposed "ethnic problem" in Rwanda. He glossed over the question
of incitement, claiming that RTLM was being criticised because it dared to report on
this taboo issue. Ironically, he was able to bolster his claim by pointing to the fact
that the international media have frequently explained the Rwandan genocide as
a situation of ethnic conflict. He concluded by insisting. that RTLM had merely
become the victim of RPF propaganda:
... by telling the truth, by exposing the truth about the RPF. ... [the RPF]
began to wage anti-RTLM propaganda. This is why RTLM
itself, even before we left the country ... the pet hate of the RPF." 68
During the genocide, the interim government officials did not go to any lengths to
defend the content of RTLM broadcasts, instead they repeatedly claimed that the
station was exercising its legitimate right to freedom of expression. When asked
about RTLM by US Congressman Dan Burton, the Rwandan Ambassador to the US
replied , "It is a private radio station which the government does not control".69 On 16
April 1994, Rwandan government spokes persons also used this argument to respond
to criticisms of that station by the international media. When questioned by RTBF
about its anti -Belgium campaign, the Rwandan Foreign Minister responded:
The burgeoning of the democratic press in Rwanda was accompanied by the
birth of private media organisations, which by definition are beyond the
government'
s control. The reality is as much a fact in Rwanda as it is in
70
Belgium.
He argued that, if disturbed by RTLM'
s allegations, the Belgian government could
take steps such as "making use of its right of reply" or issuing public statements to
deny what the station had broadcast.71
The interim government Minister of Information, Eliézer Niyitegeka, also claimed
that RTLM respected the right of reply and that any listeners could have used it
during the genocide to correct what had been said about them He also argued that he
had no control over the station. In December 1994, he explained:
87
RTLM was an independent station. Anyway, nobody complained about
RTLM except the UN Commander, General Dallaire, who didn'
t like what was
said about him. I asked RTLM to offer him airtime for his views and they did.
If others had complained, they could have had time to put their view.72
10
The Reaction of the International Community:
The Decision Not to Jam RTLM
Despite the role of RTLM in inciting genocide and the lobbying efforts of international
human rights groups, Western governments appear to have failed to seriously consider the
possibility of jamming RTLM. From the very beginning of the genocide the US Committee
on Refugees consistently lobbied the US government to jam RTLM, marking the end .
but the United States initially refused, arguing that it would have been technologically
difficult and would have represented a violation of international law. Jeff Drumtra,
Africa Policy Analyst, for the US Committee on Refugees reported that, over a
month later, he was contacted by a representative of the US State Department who
told him that the US was considering jamming RTLM, but could not locate its
frequency. The US Committee on Refugees was able to find this
information within two hours and immediately relayed it to the US government
representative. The United States, however failed to take any steps to stop RTLM
broadcasting. George Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
reported on 4 May that the US had the capacity to jam RTLM, saying, "we probably
would have gone forward with [the jamming] but in the meantime we learned that the
RPF had successfully shelled RTLM". He claimed that the station was no longer
broadcasting.
Nor did the French government attempt to jam RTLM after its troops landed in
Rwanda for Opération Turquoise and established safe-haven zones in early July. The
mission had been authorized by the UN Security Council [Resolution 929 (1994)] as a
"strictly humanitarian" operation." By early July, French soldiers had gained control
of Gikongoro, Cyangugu and Kibuye in south-west Rwanda. According to François
Léotard, French Minister of Defence, the French government did not consider the
possibility of jamming RTLM because this was not part of its mandate as
agreed by the UN.74 On 2 July 1994, French Foreign Ministry spokesperson
Catherine Colonna reported that RTLM had ceased broadcasting, but did not specify
what exactly had happened. She provided assurances that the station would never
have been allowed to operate within the Opération Turquoise area:
We had specified ... that if these radio stations [Radio Rwanda and RTLM)
were in our zone, measure as would be taken to ensure that they stopped
broadcasting.75
The issue of RTLM was finally raised by the UN Security Council on 28 June 1994,
a few weeks before the RPF took over the country, marking the end of the genocide
A number of member state representatives criticised the station for its attacks against
both Tutsi civilians and UNAMIR troops, but no formal measures were taken to
88
ensure that it be closed down. The president of the UN Security Council Salim Bin
Mohammed Al-Khussaiby of Oman stated that "such comments against UNAMIR
will not be accepted",78 and requested that the Rwandan representatives present to
undertake the closure of the station The Rwandan interim government Ambassador
to the UN, Jean-Damascene Bizimana, insisted "it was an independent radio station",
but agreed to co-operate.77 The Nigerian Ambassador to the UN, Ibrahim Gambari,
noted:
The Security Council is extremely angry that these broadcasts by RTLM are
inciting ethnic hatred and hostilities and inciting people against UNAMIR
forces. ... If the interim government is indeed an interim government ... it
should put a stop to this within the next 24 hours.
When asked about the promise of the Rwandan Ambassador to the UN to close
RTLM, however, Ibrahhim Gambari admitted, "I don'
t think they were serious".78"
Notes
1 J-P Ceppi, Le Nouveau Quotidietin, 10 Aug. 1994, 4.
2 A Zaka, "Les Présidents du Rwanda et du Burundi ont trouvé la mort dans le crash
de leur avion", Agence France-Presse, 7 April 1994.
3 For a discussion of theories about the plane crash, see F Reyntjens, Rwanda:
Trois jours qui ont fait basculer I'
histoire (Caltiers Africains, N. 16),
(Brussels and Paris: Institut Africain-CEDAF and I'
Harmattan, 1995).
4 "Ainsi done Nzamurambaho nous ne savons pas ce '
il est de lui ... le
ministére de 1'
enseignement primaire et secondaire ... sera dirigé par
Monsieur Rwamakuba André. ... je tie sais pas oú Jean-Marie Vianney [Mbonimpa)
se serait lui aussi ... je n'
en sais rien comment cela s'
est passé. ... [Valérie Bemeriki
holds back from laughing and Noël Hitimana begins to giggle] Nous ne le savons pas
bien [Bemeriki laughs as she speaks]…. Nous ne le savons pas bien, mais peutê...
nous le saurons. ... mais maintenant nous ne le savons pas. ... Ainsi nous ne savons
pas Lando [Landoald Ndasingwa, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs] quand à lui
... peut-étre qu "ils" ont démissionné......"
5 Reyntjens, note 3 above, at 69-74. The five Ghanaian UNAMIR troops present
were also disarmed and taken to a camp but were later released.
6 RTI,M, 17 June 1994, as cited in J-P Chrétien, Rwanda: Les médias du genocide
(Paris: editions Karthala, 1995), 331.
7 ….Ils tuent cruellement I'
homme ... ils le tuent en le disséquant ... en extrayant de
son corps certains organes ... en lui prenant par exemple le coeur, le foie, 1'
estomac.
... les inyenzi-inkotatyi mangent les hommes". RTLM, 14 June 1994, as quoted in
ibid., at 162.
89
8 "Vous comprenez done que la cruauté des Inyenzi est irréversible, la cruauté des
Inyenzi ne petit étre guérie que par leur totale extermination" (italics added). As
quoted in ibid., at 204.
9 "'
La famille en voie d'
extinction au Rwanda". RTLM, 13 May 1994, as cited in
ibid., at 205.
10 "Mais done! ces gens vont-ils continuer à se suicider ... à engager une bataille
suicidaire contre un groupe nombreux ... ne vont-ils pas vraiment étre exterininés?"
Ibid.
11 "Kagame n'
avait pas prévu que ]es complices, hommes et femmes, allaient
disparaître sous la poussée des citoyens, à Kigali. ... les fosses qui avaient été creusées
pour les Hutu ont été utilisées pour ]es complices". As quoted in ibid., at 266.
12 "Ces Tutsi ont causé 1'
extermination de leurs congénéres... l'
extermination de tents
congénères innocents ... A cause de la colére. ... suite aux attaques non fondées des
Inkotayi)". As cited in ibid., at 197.
13 Jean Barahinyura, leading CDR founder, interviewed by Gaspard Gahigi. "Si
vous tie voulez pas faire exterminer les Rwandais, levez-vous, agissez ... sans vous
soucier de l'
opinion internationale......." Ibid., at 194.
14 He held this position from July 1994, when the RPF took power, until late August
1995, when he was dismissed in a cabinet reshuffle.
15
"Les citoyens sont done priés de rester les yeux ouverts, de tenir comme de
vrais hommes, pour se défendre vraiment. Les barriéres doivent étre maintenues.
Elles doivent étre maintenues vraiment pendant la journée, pour qu'
ils puissent arrêter
ces Inkotanyi. Parce qu'
il y en a qui sont en train de descendre, habillés en civil et
sans armes ... pour paraît chercher du renfort. Mais vraiment les citoyens, il faut
qu'
ils restent sur leurs barriéres, vraiment qu'
ils se défendent, qu'
ils restent
inébranables vraiment".
16
"Qu'
ils [les citoyens] restent et se battent contre eux et qu'
ils ]es terrassent
vraiment. ... il faut vraiment que vous vous accrochiez, que vous combattiez ces
ennemis, ravagez-les vraiment, bref défendez-vous".
17
The expression "son of cultivator" implies "Hutu", and was coined by the
singer and RTLM shareholder Simon Bikindi. His songs about "Hutu unity"
reportedly were played constantly by RTLM during the genocide, sometimes up to 15
times a day.
18
RTLM, Human Rights Watch, translated into English, 15-30 May 1994,
unpublished.
19
Human Rights Watch/Africa, Genocide in Rwanda.- April-Mail 1994 (New
York: May 1994) , 3.
90
20
"Tons ceux qui nous écoutez, continuez votre héroisme, continuez à étre
héroïques, je pense que personne n'
a décidé de fuir...."
21
Combattez-les avec les armes á votre disposition, vous avez des fléches, vous
avez des lances. ... Prenez vos '
outils'traditionnels". As cited in Chrétien, note 6
above, at 304.
22
"Qu'
ils soient forts, radio RTLM est avec eux ... elle les suit tout le temps
pendant qu'
eux-mêmes passent le temps sur ... leurs barriéres nuit et jour ... et radio
RTLM c'
est comme cela ... elle passe le temps à soutenir les gens qui sont les nôtres".
23
"Bonjour chers amis auditeurs, bonjour aux forces armées rwandaises, bonjour
á toute population rwandaise et une salutation particulière à ces habitants de Kigali et
d'
ailleurs de tout le pays qui font la ronde nocturne chaque jour". As cited in
Reporters sans frontiéres, Rwanda: médias de la haine ou presse démocratique?
Rapport de mission 16-24 Sept. 1994 (Paris: RSF, 1994).
24 RTLM, note 18 above.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 L'
homme doit se lever, ajuster son pagne et continuer. Parce que quand la bataille
est là, elle est là. Plus moyen de faire autrement".
28 RTLM, note 18 above.
29 "Vous savez que quand ils fuient comme ça en désordre, même des lnkotayi,
y trouvent l'
occasion de se mêler à eux. C'
est ce que nous appelons "infiltrations", et
quand ils arrivent quelque part, ils se mettent à commettre des horreurs.......
30 "Les Inkotayi) se sont répandus dans les broussailles ... ils sont en train de détaler
sur les collines. ... ils savent plonger et réapparaïtre!"
31 "On vient d'
apprendre que Untel a des munitions'
. C'
était pour le signaler.
Le lendemain, la milice était chez lui". C Lesnes, "Rwanda: 1'
engrenage du génocide
véçu par un jeune Tutsi", Le Monde, 5 Aug. 1994.
32 "Je viens d'
apprendre que ]es gens qui sont allés chez lui ne l'
ont pas trouvé. 0ù
est-ce qu'
il peut être? Continuez à fouiller le quartier". Reporters sans frontiéres,
note 23 above.
33 "Les petits Inyenzi ... même s'
ils espéraient encore ... [être] des invités en sécurité
dans la cave de ce Sebera ... je vous disais que c'
est là qu'
ils sont en train de griller
done ... maintenant ils sont en train de flamber. ... Au fait ... ii y en avait pas mal de
"petits trucs" [RPA troops] ... ils s'
étaient entassés là-dedans."
34 After the genocide the skulls and remains of eight unidentified people were found
in the house,
91
35 La Lettre de Reporters sans frontiéres, No. 62 (Paris: Oct. 1994).
36 "Je vous I'
ai dit avec insistence, surtout à Gitarama et à Butare, que les Inkotanyi,
surtout qu'
ils disaient que la Préfecture de Butare, que c'
est par là qu'
ils allaient faire
leur percée, et que c'
est là qu'
ils trouveraient la faille, et nous n'
ignorons pas qu'
ils y
ont des complices de tons ]es côtés, surtout que meme le préfet de Butare, et je ne
l'
invetite pas à sa place, lui-même a dit qu'
il est membre du PL [Parti Libéral) mais
que pour Iui quand le FPR vietidra, il deviendra un adepte du FPR. Alors s'
il
deviendra un adepte du FPR, c'
est qu'
il travaille déjá pour le FPR " (italics added).
37 "For example, Human Rights Watch reported that hundreds of staff and patients
were executed in a Butare hospital and that 21 Tutsi children were taken from an
orphanage and killed. Human Rights Watch/Africa, note 19 above, at 3.
38 "[Les Tutsi] qui allaient commettre l'
irréparable étaient au nombre de 88. ... Cela a
mal tourné lorsque le pére Ngoga en personne a pris le fusil et a pris position près de
1'
église, et qu'
il s'
est mis à tirer sur les Hutu. ... pendant qu'
ils pourchassaient ces Tutsi
qui venaient les assaillir. Les gens l'
ont vu. ... Il a pris sa voiture et a fui. ... Même
aujourd'
hui, il court encore". Chrétien, note 6 above, at 327-328.
39 "Le père Ngoga n'
est pas le seul. Et Muvara? ... Le père Ntagara peut-il
expliquer aux Rwandais la raison pour laquelle les eucharistes ont été remplacées par
les munitions?” Ibid., at 328.
40 For example, 6,000 Tutsi were massacred in a church at Cyahinda; 2,800 were
killed in a church in Kibungo; 4,000 were executed in Shangi Parish Church and
2,000 were massacred in Mibirizi Parish Church. (Human Rights Watch/Africa, note
19 above, at 3.)
41 "Il [le Docteur] a dit "en ces temps que nous vivons ... s'
i I faut voir des gens se
réfugier dans les paroisses ... et dans d'
autres lieux" ... il a dit "cc n'
est pas bien du
tout"... hm ... il a dit "en outre tu trouves que ces gens ... qu'
ils [RPF troops] ont placé
dans les paroisses et ailleurs. ... leur donnent des grenades et autres d'
armes encore ...
tout cela n'
est pas bien".
42 "Quelqu'
un en qui j'
ai confiance vraiment".
43 Quoted in African Rights, Death, Despair and Defiance, Revised Edition
(London: African Rights, 1995), 226.
44 Ibid., at 704-707.
45 After RTLM was shelled on 17 April, its broadcast range was limited.
46 Interviewed by Gaspard Gahigi, RTLM. Translated into English by Human
Rights Watch, see note 18 above.
47 African Rights, Rwanda: Not So Innocent - When Women Become Killers
(London: African Rights, 1995), 134-142.
92
48
Ibid., at 9.
49
Radio Muhabura (English), 1900 GMT, 16 April 1994, in BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts.
50
African Rights, note 43 above, at 80.
51 During the genocide, he was promoted to Editor-in-Chief of Radio Rwanda.
He continued to periodically file reports for the BBC until July 1994.
52
G Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide (London
and New York: Hurst & Company and Columbia University Press), 224.
53 Radio Rwanda, Kigali (French), 1000 GMT, 12 April 1994, in BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 14 April 1994.
54 Radio Rwanda, Kigali (French), 0407 GMT, 9 April 1994, "New president
addresses the nation, announces composition of new government", BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 1I April 1994.
55 Ibid.
56 I'
ll y a eu des affrontements au sein de la population, surtout dans la ville de
Kigali et les gens ont été tués, parmi lesquels le Premier Ministre, Madame
Uwilingiyimana Agathe, et quelques ministres, ainsi que plusieurs citoyens".
Chrétien, note 6 above, at 301.
57 "C'
est donc cela qui a entrainé en grande partie ces troubles, notre souhait étant
que les gens essaient de le comprendre. ... que les gens comprennent les raisons qui
ont provoqué des actes de violence d'
une telle ampleur". Ibid.
58 Radio Rwanda, Kigali (Kinyarwanda), 1140 GMT, 9 April 1994, "New president
addresses parliament, defends decision to assume power", in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 11 April 1994.
59 "Dix-maisons", administrative units comprising 10 houses. ARTICLE 19
believes that these were the smallest administrative divisions in Rwanda.
60 "Le préfet de la pr fecture de Kigali demande á tous les citoyens de continuer á
garder l'
oeil ouvert pour qu'
ensemble avec I'
armée du pays ils défendent l'
intégrité de
notre pays. Les citoyens se,sont donc unis aux gouvernants qui leur sont proches, ]es
'
dix-maisons'
, les responables de cellules, les conseillers communaux, les
bourgemestres et même les responsables des partis, ils doivent se mobiliser pour la
sécurité dans leurs cellules et secteurs pour qu'
ils démasquent celui qui se cacherait au
milieu d'
eux dans l'
intention de soutenir 1'
ennemi."
61 "Pour cette raison ils [les citoyens] doivent surveiller tous les chemins et en outre
Iá où ils soupçonnent que 1'
ennemi se cacherait, quel que soit 1'
endroit, qu'
ils le
débusquent sans modération. Les habitants sont priés de ne pas abandonner leurs
93
maisons car ce serait dormer une brêche à 1'
ennemi. II s sont priés de procéder á des
rondes ainsi que de suivre Radio Rwanda........
62 "... Nous tons ensemble, nous devons mener cette guerre ... c'
est une guerre finale,
ii fautjustement la finir. ... J'
adresse spécialement ce messace á certains bourgemestres
dont on m'
a rapporté qu'
ils sont allé s'
entraîner chez les inkotanyi ... qu'
ils [les
bourgemestres] leur [the RPA troops] fassent comprendre que le gouvernement est
détérminé. L'
Etat, les militaires, la population, nous nous sommes décidés à mener
cette guerre et à la gagner'. As cited in Chrétien, note 6 above, at 300.
63 "Pendant ces périodes difficiles, notre souhait c'
est que ces forces [de sécurité]
soient épaulées; par toutes les forces vives de la population; toutes, nous tons.
Que personne ne dise "moi, ça ne me regarde pas" ("je ne suis pas concerné"). ...
La sécurité n'
est pas une affaire de gendarmes uniquement; la sécurité est une
affaire qui concerne en premier lieu la population; les gendarmes n'
interviennent
qu'
après, quand la population rencontre des difficultés à surmonter". Translated
into French by Human Rights Watch (unpublished).
64 Ibid.
65 As quoted in M Wrong, "Exiled Rwanda Broadcaster has no regrets", Reuters, 24
Aug. 1994.
66 As cited by Agence France-Presse, "Hutu extremist radio reportedly broadcasts
from Gisenyi", 10July 1994.
67 "Est-ce que un journalists qui parle d'
un probléme existant réellement et qui
menace une société, est-ce que le journalists est coupable de I'
avoir dit on plutôt il
serait coupable de ne I'
avoir pas dit. ... Puisque tous les médias maintenant du monde
entier sont unanimes pour reconnaître qu'
au Rwanda, il y a un probléme ethnique qui
a débouché à la catastrophe humaine à laquelle nours assistons, aujourd'
hui.... Est-ce
que si la RTLM ne l'
avait pas dit, est-ce que ça aurait empêchié ce probléme
d'
exister?"
68 "En disant la vérité, en disant la vraie face du FPR. ... Il a commencé à faire
uiie propagande anti-RTLM. Et c'
est comme cela que la RTLM se retrouve
maintenant, ou même avant qu'
on ne quitte le pays, se retrouve la bête noire du FPR".
69 "C'
est une radio privée dont le gouvernement n'
a pas le contréle". J Garrus "Appui
américain", Agence France-Presse, 4 May 1994.
70 RTBF, 16 April 1994.
71 Ibid
72 As quoted in C McGreal, "Rwanda: Inside Story - Blood on their Hands,"
The Guardian, 3 Dec. 1994.
73 Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International
Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience
94
(Study 2:- Early Warning and Conflict Management), (Denmark: Steering
Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March
1995), 55
74
H Deguine, Le Monde Diplomatique, March 1995.
75
As quoted on Radio France Internationale, "French to prevent broadcasts from
safe zone calling on Rwandans to leave", 21 July 1994.
76 F Haq, "Rwanda: Close down Anti-Tutsi Radio, Says UN Security Council",
Inter-Press Service, 27 June 1994.
77
Ibid
78 Ibid
95
Chapter 7
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE MEDIA AND
GENOCIDE
There are a number of sources of international law relating to propaganda and
incitement to genocide and communal hatred. The Genocide Convention defines
several offences pertaining to the crime of genocide under which individuals may be
prosecuted. International human rights treaties impose various obligations on
governments to prevent and prohibit propaganda for war and incitement to
discrimination or hatred.
1
The Genocide Convention
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide obliges
states parties to enact laws to ensure the prosecution of and effective penalties for any
persons found guilty of genocide or any of the other related crimes that the
Convention declares shall be punished, including "direct and public incitement to
commit genocide"; "attempt to commit genocide"; and "complicity in genocide".1'
Genocide is defined as: "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing
members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part…".2 The Convention specifies that
any persons who commit genocide or a related crime "shall be punished" regardless of
"whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals". Furthermore, the Convention requires states parties either to ensure that
such persons are "tried by a competent tribunal" in the territory where the act was
committed or else "by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction".3
The most important case law in this regard derives from the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, which tried the perpetrators of the Nazi genocide of European
Jews. Among those prosecuted was Julius Streicher, the publisher of Der Stürmer, a
weekly anti-Semetic newspaper. He wrote and published articles that called
for the annihilation of the Jews. The Tribunal found that Streicher was not
sufficiently closely connected with Hitler'
s inner circle or the formulation of policies
that led to war to be found guilty of crimes against peace (the first count of the
Nuremberg indictment). However it did find him guility of count four, crimes against
humanity:
Streicher'
s incitement to murder and extermination at the time when Jews in
the East were being killed under the most horrible conditions clearly
constitutes persecution of political and racial grounds in connection with
96
War Crimes, as defined by the Charter (of the Tribunal), and constitutes a
Crime against Humanity
In contrast, Hans Fritsche, head of the Radio Division of the Reich Ministry of
Propaganda and Enlightenment was acquitted. The Tribunal found that he had used
the media "to arouse popular sentiment in support of Hitler and the German war
effort" rather than to incite the Germans to commit atrocities. It also '
concluded that
he was mainly a "conduit" who followed instructions that came from the Minister,
Josef Goebbels, and thus was not responsible even if the propaganda he relayed
resulted in atrocities. The second part of the holding has been considered
controversial and probably would be rejected by any international court today.
2 The State's Obligations to Stop Incitement
to violence
Two international human rights treaties in particular require governments to take
concrete measures against violence and incitement to violence based on ethnic hatred:
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).
Article 20(2) of the ICCPR imposed on states parties the obligations to "prohibit by
law……(a)ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement discrimination, hostility or violence."4 ICERD imposes a similar and
arguably even stronger obligation.5 These treaties clearly apply to hatred and violence
between Tutsi and Hutu: "racial discrimination" is defined to include any distinction
based on "race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or
effect of nullifying or impairing the… exercise on an equal footing, of human rights
and fundamental freedoms…"6 .. These treaties are to be interpreted and applied
"with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the rights expressly [enumerated]", including the right to freedom of
expression."7
These provisions impose three main obligations on governments.
First and foremost, governments must ensure that no public institutions or authorities
participate in any way in any of the enumerated crimes of incitement.8 Where the state
controls broadcasting it, has a direct legal responsibility to ensure that the state-run
media do not incite violence or hatred.9 Second, governments must adopt laws that
make incitement to violence a crime.10 Third, governments must investigate
97
complaints of violations and pursue prosecution and punishment where evidence of
these crimes is established.11
The obligation to investigate and prosecute is strongest where evidence suggests that
public institutions or authorities are either directly or indirectly involved in inciting
violence; in such cases where the evidence of a crime is sufficient, prosecution, or at
the very least, some effective corrective action is mandatory.12
A government'
s obligation to prosecute private media or individuals is less strong; the
obligation is discretionary, but it is likely that a government will be found to have
abused its discretion if it fails to take action to investigate and remedy (although not
necessarily prosecute) clear-cut violations, unless there is a very compelling
governmental interest counselling against investigation.13
The burden of imposing restrictions on freedom of expression always rests with the
party seeking to impose or justify the restrictions.14 The burden is all the greater
where the government seeks to impose a restriction that will substantially diminish the
free flow of information from a variety of sources.15
ARTICLE 19 is not unmindful of arguments that efforts to prosecute high ranking
government authorities or people with close ties to the government or military could
destabilize the government. This argument has been made with particular force
regarding nominally democratic governments that succeed criminally abusive
regimes, but it also applies to weak governments that are trying to stave off civil war.
ARTICLE 19 notes that international law itself allows a measure of flexibility to
governments that face exceptional circumstances. The value of international legal
norms is that, forged as they are through the experience and practice of governments
including when faced with threats to their very existence, they provide some means by
which to limit the ability of governments to abuse their discretion with impunity. 16
3
The State's Obligation to Disseminate, and Promote the
Dissemination of, Accurate and Balanced Information
The rights to freedom of expression and information have been recognised as essential
pillars of democratic society by institutions and governments around the world. The
UN General Assembly, at its first session, declared: "Freedom of information is a
fundamental human right and ... the touchstone of all of the freedoms to which the
United Nations is consecrated".17 The European Court of Human Rights has
repeatedly affirmed that "Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential
foundations of such [democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress
and for the development of every man". The need to safeguard these rights is all the
more crucial where democracy is under threat or is struggling to claim a toe-hold.
98
In most circumstances, the communications media are the main vehicles for
promoting freedom of expression and information, and the government'
s role is to
refrain from interfering with the private media, to grant full editorial independence to
the public media, and to promote media pluralism, including by encouraging a
diversity of sources of information.
However, in a situation, such as Rwanda in the early 1990s and Burundi today, where
there are few media organs that are independent of the government or political parties,
the government is obliged to ensure that state-run media fulfil the principal function
of private media, namely to impart information and ideas of public interest.
Moreover, the government is obliged to impart information that is both accurate and
balanced, and to strive to promote tolerance and reduce violence. These obligations
derive directly from the fundamental rights of the public to access to information
necessary to protect their life and health, to non-discrimination, and to security and
physical integrity.
4
Circumstances in which the International Community
May Intervene to Suppress Incitement to Violence
A national government is entitled to close down or jam a radio station on the
grounds that it threatens public order and, indeed, the security of the government.18
However, the lawfulness of any assistance from the international community in
furtherance of this objective is shaky at best. A government is entitled to seek
support from other governments, and other governments are entitled to provide
support, to assist in quelling an armed uprising unless the uprising is consistent with
the UN Charter. Armed rebellions may be consistent with the Charter if, for
example, they are in pursuit of a legitimate claim of self-determination or they
represent a "recourse [of] last resort to rebellion against tyranny and oppression".19
If a rebellion reaches that stage, and attracts widespread popular support or attains
control over significant areas of the country, outside assistance to either side is
widely viewed by international experts as an intervention in violation of the UN
Charter in the internal affairs of a country.20
The international community may intervene to jam broadcasts where violence is
already under way and there is clear evidence that the broadcasts could incite
genocide, crimes against humanity or violence on such a scale as to threaten
international peace and security." International peace and security is understood to
be threatened by the creation of massive refugee flows across international borders,
especially in an area that is already unable to cope with the huge numbers of
displaced people.
99
Notes
The Conventions on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
approved and opened for signature by UN General Assembly resolution 260A (111)
on 9 Dec. 1948; entered into force on 12 Jan. 1951, Art. 111(c), (d) and (e).
1
2
Art. 11.
3
Art. IV.
4 The Human Rights Committee has interpreted Art. 20(2) to require states parties
to provide for an "appropriate sanction in case of violation". General Comment No.
I I (I9), 1983 Annual Report of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. A/38/40,
Annex VI (1983). This has been interpreted to mean that sanctions other than
criminal punishments are permissible for less serious infractions.
5 Art. 4(a) requires states parties to declare to be a crime "all dissemination of ideas
based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all
acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or persons of another
colour or ethnic origin…”
6 ICERD, Art. I (1). Even if a distinction between Tutsi and Hutu based on
ethnicity were to be disputed, there is no dispute that a distinction exists based on
descent.
7 For a fuller discussion of the requisite balancing, see K J Partsch, "Racial
Speech and Human Rights," in S Coliver (ed., for ARTICLE 19), Striking a
Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-discrimination
London: ARTICLE 19 and the University of Essex, 1993), 23-25.
8
CERD, Art. 2(1)a and b, and ICCPR, Art. 2(l).
9
F Hampson, "Incitement and the Media: Responsibility of and for the Media in
the Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia" Papers in the Theory, and Practice of Human
Rights, Number 3 (Colchester, UK: Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, 1993),
4
10
ICCPR, Art. 2(2) and CERD, Art. 2(1)c and d.
11 Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
Judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C no. 4, at paras. 166, 172; Artze fur das Leben v.
Austria, Judgment of 21 June 1988, Series A no. 139, at para. 34.
12
Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, note I above, at paras. 172-174.
13 E.g., L K v. the Netherlands, CERD, Communication No. 4/1991. In this case,
the Committee that monitors compliance with ICERD concluded that the municipal
government of Utrecht violated the treaty when it failed to take any action in response
100
to a complaint filed by a Moroccan citizen that he had been subjected to clear-cut
racist remarks.
14 ARTICLE 19, The ARTICLE 19 Freedom of Expression Handbook (London:
ARTICLE 19, 1993), 109-113, and authorities cited thereat.
15 See, e.g., European Court of Human Rights, Informationsverein Lentia and
Others v. Austria, Judgment of 24 Nov. 1993, Series A no. 276, para. 38 ("the State is
the ultimate guarantor" of the principle of media pluralism which is necessary if the
media are to accomplish their public tasks of informing the public and serving as a
watchdog of government).
16 See generally, D Orentlicher, "Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime," in I00 Yale L. Journal (I 993), 2540 et seq.
17
G.A. Resolution 59(l), 14 Dec. 1946.
18
Art. 19 of the ICCPR authorizes governments to impose restrictions on freedom
of expression so long as such restrictions are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect one of the enumerated interests, which include "the
protection of national security or ... public order".
19
UDHR, preamble, para. 3. As stated by the UN Human Rights Committee in its
General Comment on Art. 20 of the ICCPR, "The provisions of article 20 ... do
not prohibit advocacy of the sovereign right of self-defence or the right of
peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations". General Comment 11 on Art. 20 (1983), para. 2,
reprinted in "Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies", UN Doc. HRI/ GEN/l/Rev. 1, of 29
July 1994.
20
As stated by Oscar Schachter, a leading US authority on the subject:"Such
outside support would be contrary to the right of the people to decide the issue
by their own means. It would be immaterial whether the insurgency was
directed at overthrow of the government or at secession (or autonomy) of a
territorial unit". 0 Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force", in L
Henkin, R Pugh, 0 Schachter and H Smit, International Law: Cases and
materials (2nd edn )(Minnesota: West Publishing Co.1987), 758
21
Hampson, note 9 above, at 15
101
Chapter 8
CONCLUSION
In communal conflicts and humanitarian disasters the mass media have enormous
power for good or evil. The very language used can influence the perception of where
responsibility for conflict lies. For example, when the South African media reported
on "black on black" violence in the townships and squatter camps of KwaZulu-Natal
they fuelled the view that violence was somehow the natural condition of African
society and that blacks were unready for democratic power. In reality, of course, the
violence was largely provoked by state-sponsored hit squads and militias. Similarly,
in the Rift Valley of Kenya the use of the term "tribal clashes" has obscured the fact
that political violence has been organized by the government to drive opposition
supporters from the province.
Nevertheless, whether this power is as great as the media themselves would like to
believe is a moot point. To some extent, discussion of the role of RTLM in Rwanda'
s
genocide has been influenced by the international media'
s fascination with the
potential impact of their own technology.
The international media'
s continued emphasis on the role played by RTLM distracts
attention from its failure to report and analyze the causes of the genocide adequately
as it occurred. The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda concluded
that "Inadequate and inaccurate reporting by international media on the genocide itself
contributed to international indifference and inaction".1 For example
`
US television coverage and CNN erred on the side of vagueness, generally
referring to "unspeakable atrocities", and "ethnic violence", but picked up the
theme of tribal or mutual ethnic slaughter. It would not be until 7 May that
ABC correspondent Ron Allen suggested that the events were not a product of
spontaneous tribal violence, but were a premeditated political act intended as a
final solution.2
According to the Evaluation, the international media chose not to report on evidence
of plans for the genocide. However, the Evaluation also acknowledged that media
coverage during the genocide "influenced [humanitarian] agencies to act urgently
and responsibly, and raised awareness of politicians and the public at large”.3
However, the inaction of the international community in response to the threat of
genocide was a failure not of the media, but of international institutions, which did
not react to information which was readily available to them. The media have no
obligation, beyond their own professional standards, to report adequately on human
rights issues. The institutions of the UN and the Organization of African Unity, as
well as their member states, do have legal obligations under their founding charters
and a variety of treaties.
102
The failure of the international community to intervene in time to prevent the
Rwandan genocide is often described as a failure of early warning. This is
extremely misleading, since it carries the implication that if only the higher echelons
of the UN system and Western governments had known of the impending genocide,
then they would have taken action. Yet the Rwandan genocide was very clearly
signposted. The international community received three explicit warnings in
particular, two of them from within the UN system.
Firstly, in March 1993 an International Commission of Investigation composed of
representatives of four non-governmental human rights groups reported on political
violence and other human rights violations from October 1990. The report
documented the establishment of the death squads of "Network Zero" and the
Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militias, as well as their links to government. It
pointed out the role of Radio Rwanda in broadcasting propaganda for violence and
documented explicitly genocidal statements such as the November 1992 speech by
Léon Mugesera. The report concluded:
Testimony established that many Rwandans have been killed for the sole
reason that they were Tutsi. The question remains whether the designation of
some members of the Tutsi ethnic group as a target for destruction
demonstrates an intention, in the sense of the [Genocide] Convention, to
destroy this group or a part of it because of its members'ethnicity.4
Secondly, in his report of 11 August 1993, the UN Special Rapporteur on
Extradjudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, described
death threats and political assassinations against government opponents. He noted:
A study of the phases preceding outbreaks of violence among the population
shows that such outbreaks were planned and prepared, with targets being
identified in speeches by representatives of the authorities, broadcasts on
Rwandese radio and leaflets.5
Like the International Commission of Investigation, the Special Rapporteur raised the
prospect of genocide.
Thirdly, in January 1994, the commander of the UN peacekeeping mission in
Rwanda, General Romeo Dallaire, reported to the UN Secretariat in New York that
his intelligence network had gathered details of plans for genocide, including the
training of militias, caching of arms and lists of victims. The Secretariat questioned
the accuracy of the intelligence and made no contingency plans to deal with
genocide.6
To explain this failure is more difficult. Despite the general perception that the UN in
the post-Cold War era is better able to deal with humanitarian crises, the fact remains
that it is still dependent on the political will of its most powerful member states. The
United States had been badly burned by the failure of the UNOSOM operation in
Somalia, while all the major powers were deeply preoccupied with the crisis in former
103
Yugoslavia. The only major power with a strong interest in the region, France, was
an active supporter of the Habyarimana regime. Even those governments that evinced
a clear concern about the human rights situation in Rwanda, such as Belgium and
Canada, were reluctant to attach full human rights conditions to their aid because they
wanted to be seen to support democratization and the Arusha peace process.
The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda has fully documented these
failures. It poses the question of whether aid conditionality and an arms embargo
between 1990 and 1993 would have defused the conflict and prevented genocide.
Ultimately such speculations can never be conclusive. However the Joint Evaluation
report observes that "firmer conclusions can be drawn about what did happen":
By not standing firm on human rights conditionality, donors collectively sent
the message that their priorities lay elsewhere. By permitting arms to reach
the Rwandese protagonists, the possibilities for demilitarizing the conflict
were reduced. Arms supplies reinforced the determination of both parties to
seek a military and forceful solution to a political conflict.7
The broadcasts of Radio Rwanda were an extremely important source of early
warning - one which was utilized by both the International Commission of
Investigation and Special Rapporteur Bacre Waly Ndiaye. The latter stated in his
August 1993 report that incitement to racial hatred had been noted on several
occasions, for example through Radio Rwanda.8 The content of news programmes in
the Rwandan media differed substantially depending on whether the listener was
receiving the French version or the version in Kinyarwanda.9
In his recommendations the Special Rapporteur suggested that a radio link be set
up in order to inform the population about the violence which had taken place. The
aim of this would be to stop delays in information as well as failures and manipulation
of communication.10 He also suggested that a national reconciliation campaign should
be organised in order to stop the "incitement to hatred". The campaign should begin
with a public commitment to reconciliation on the part of the authorities, broadcast
in both French and Kinyarwanda and it should be followed by a series of public
education programmes about human rights.11
Finally, Mr Ndiaye suggested that media-related action should take place in order to
prevent future incitement to hatred by the media.
A reform of the role and structure of the media should be envisaged.
Journalists have already begun to study this question and have adopted a code
of ethics. They should be provided with training opportunities, in order to
enhance their professionalism and eliminate any lingering partisan tendencies.
The Minister for Information is attempting to effect reforms, but his powers
are limited and his action too often thwarted. 12
104
Subsequent commentary has drawn a much more radical conclusion: that "hate
media" should be banned. This lesson has been applied first in relation to Burundi.
This is always seen as Rwanda'
s "twin", since it shares an almost identical ethnic
make-up, although the political balance of forces is quite different. Some freedom of
expression activists, including the French organisation Reporters sans frontiéres, have
explicitly called for bans on extremist media. In March 1996, the Burundian
government responded by proscribing, seven newspapers. While it is clear that
international law would permit such bans and proscriptions in certain circumstances,
they should be treated with great caution, for two principal reasons.
Firstly, the authorities which implement bans are not themselves impartial. In part,
this is connected with the danger of applying the lessons of Rwanda mechanically to
its neighbour. Whereas in Rwanda the hate media were linked formally or informally
to the government, in Burundi they are attached to various political factions. There is
thus little chance that a ban will be enforced impartially.
Secondly, the emphasis on the media always tends to distract attention from the root
of the problem, which is the formal and informal structures, both political and
military, which plan and carry out human rights abuses, up to and including genocide.
Thus the UN Human Rights Commission, meeting in Geneva in April 1996, passed a
resolution condemning hate media in Burundi in preference to a stronger resolution
addressing the various political actors. Similarly, the previous month, the UN
Security Council requested "Member States and others to cooperate in the
identification and dismantling of radio stations which incite hatred and acts of
violence in Burundi". 13
The fundamental reality, which cannot be stated too often, is that genocide is not
caused by the mass media. At worst they may abet the process, but inflammatory
media coverage is essentially a symptom of a process resulting from other causes.
ARTICLE 19 endorses the approach taken by Bacre Waly Ndiaye, which was to use
the hate broadcasts of Radio Rwanda as an early warning of impending genocide and
to try to curb the impact of such broadcasts by extending media pluralism.
The alternative notion that the media caused the genocide in Rwanda - that it would
not have taken place without RTLM - rests upon a specific interpretation of the
genocide which was prevalent in international media at the time but which does not
stand up to serious scrutiny. This is the interpretation which sees the genocide as the
expression of primordial blood-lust between the Hutu and Tutsi communities which
only requires inflammatory propaganda to provoke outright violence. Yet all the
evidence points to the fact that the Rwandan genocide was a highly planned affair in
which the initial targets were moderate politicians from both communities. The
apparatus of militias, hit squads, arms caches and death lists was meticulously put in
place in the months before April 1994 - as documented by the UN military mission in
Rwanda and ignored by the UN Secretariat.
Much subsequent commentary on the role of RTLM has tended to conflate the
station'
s broadcasts before and during the genocide. For example, a study
105
commissioned by UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization) quotes only from broadcasts after 6 April 1994, although it purports to
describe the nature of RTLM'
s pre-genocide propaganda as well.14 Yet, as the present
report has demonstrated, RTLM'
s broadcasts before and after 6 April were
significantly different.
In ARTICLE 19'
s view the issue of RTLM'
s post-6 April broadcasts is a relatively
simple one which does not greatly bear upon conventional debates about "hate
speech" and freedom of expression. The term "incitement to genocide" is inadequate
to describe the role of RTLM once the killing was under way. The radio station did
not incite genocide so much as organise it, notably by identifying targets,
broadcasting vehicle number-plates, refuges where potential victims were hiding and
so on. ARTICLE 19 does not consider that there is a freedom of expression issue
involved here: giving orders to carry out human rights abuses is not protected whether
this is done in writing, orally, by two-way radio or by public broadcast. International
law clearly permitted external intervention to jam the broadcasts at this stage, which is
the course of action which should have been undertaken.
The question of what action should have been taken to counteract inflammatory
propaganda on RTLM and Radio Rwanda before the genocide is altogether more
complex. Radio Rwanda was formally a government radio station, while RTLM was
one in practice. This makes the issue rather different from the usual debate about
"hate speech" which tends to focus on private individuals. However, it also means
that there was a set of other standards which could have been invoked to require the
authorities to cease broadcasting ethnic propaganda. Thus the focus could have been
on promoting Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) - a positive obligation to promote freedom of expression and plurality rather than solely on Article 20 which restricts incitement to hatred.
ARTICLE 19'
s view is that it would not have been correct to call for a ban on hate
media such as RTLM in the months before the genocide, a lesson which applies in
contemporary Burundi. The emphasis should rather be on promoting pluralism in
privately-owned media and supporting attempted reform of the state broadcasting
system as a means of marginalizing extremist propaganda and developing the middle
ground. It might be objected that this would have been a hopelessly idealistic and
impractical position to take in the weeks immediately before April 1994. However,
the alternative position to call upon the Rwandan government or judiciary to close
down RTLM was also entirely unrealistic and any call for international action to jam
the broadcasts would not have been sanctioned by law. If useful lessons are to be
drawn from the Rwandan situation it is necessary to go back to the introduction of
multi-party politics and the failure to build adequate institutional support for
democracy.
In one sense the Rwandan experience is not atypical. In countries like Kenya and
Zambia, which also underwent rapid democratic transitions under pressure from
Western donor governments, there has also been a failure to transform or replace the
institutions of one-party rule in order to make them more accessible and accountable.
In particular the mass media have changed very little. Broadcasting remains a virtual
106
state monopoly, while the independent press exists in an almost permanent state of
siege. Even countries which democratized later and constructed better constitutional
safeguards - Malawi is a good example - nevertheless have failed to establish an
independent and accountable publicly-funded state broadcasting system.
In 1990 none of the external forces with influence over the Habyarimana government
attached much importance to the role of the mass media in democratization. In
reality, participation in multi-party politics means very little if the mass of the
population has no access to information and little opportunity to express its views. In
this respect Rwanda differed little from Kenya, Zambia, Malawi or any one of a
number of African transitional democracies. The implications were more explosive in
Rwanda because without open debate about policy issues, politics tended to revert to
expressions of the interests of Hutu or Tutsi. In fact, the countervailing tendencies
were quite strong in both Rwanda and Burundi. In Rwanda the moderate centre
ground was strong and popular. Although the inclusion of main opposition parties in
a succession of transitional governments was a major step forward in representing the
moderate centre, channels for popular debate within the mass media remained
dominated by the MRND.
Two important institutional changes were required in 1990. Firstly, the publicly
funded broadcaster, Radio Rwanda, should have been detached from the government,
with an independently-appointed board of management, financial autonomy and full
editorial independence. Secondly, an independent and accountable system should
have been established to oversee the licensing and regulation of independent
broadcasting. Licences should have been granted according to pre-established and
publicly available criteria, which would include consideration of the balance of
political and ethnic viewpoints across the broadcasting spectrum. Such a system,
properly enforced, would probably have precluded the licensing of a station such as
RTLM.
The best means of broadcasting regulation is to have a single independent licensing
authority responsible for both public and privately-funded broadcasting. This has the
effect of putting an extra buffer between government and the public broadcaster, as
well as ensuring that both broadcasting sectors are answerable to the same standards.
Such an independent authority would contain a mechanism for considering complaints
from the public about the broadcast media and imposing sanctions against
broadcasters who fail to honour the terms of their licences. Alone among newly
democratized African countries, South Africa has introduced such a system. This has
effectively guaranteed an independent and critical public broadcaster, the South
African Broadcasting Corporation, and a vibrant and pluralistic commercial and
community broadcasting sector.
It is important to understand that although the outcome of the Rwandan tragedy was
extreme and exceptional, its earlier course was not at all unusual. Rwanda'
s imperfect
democratization and failure to carry out institutional reform was, as we have argued,
typical of transitional democracies in the region. Similarly the broadcasts of Radio
Rwanda in 1990 and 1991 were typical of state-controlled media in a situation where
national security is perceived to be threatened. They were shrill, inaccurate and
ethnically biased, simultaneously exaggerating both the extent of the security threat
posed by the RPF and the military successes of the Rwandan armed forces. Anti-RPF
107
propaganda was consistently used to score political points against the non-violent
parties participating in the democratization process. However, if one considered, for
example, the broadcasts of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation at the height of
the Matabeleland crisis in the mid-1980s, one would find precisely the same mixture.
It is argued that the difference in Rwanda was that Radio Rwanda, and later RTLM,
played upon deep-rooted ethnic fears to create a situation in which radical measures genocide - were seen to be the only solution. This is undoubtedly true, yet what was
surely required was that such communal fears be confronted not suppressed. That is
why the main emphasis of freedom of expression advocates in such situations must be
on encouraging a plurality of viewpoints rather than suppressing the obnoxious ones.
Those who call for the banning of some radio broadcasts run the risk of playing into
the hands of governments which seek to restrict freedom of expression. A common
refrain among governments that have democratized reluctantly is to argue that ethnic
strife is caused by "too much" democracy - that single-party systems are better at
fostering national unity. In reality, ethnic conflict has often been caused by deliberate
manipulation on the part of the authorities, combined with an absence of any public
awareness of issues of policy.
An accountable system of broadcasting regulation should, in any event, have provided
the means for preventing the broadcasting of propaganda for genocide over the
airwaves. The debate about RTLM has largely been posed in terms of whether the
station should have been banned or its broadcasts jammed. In practice, there are a
series of other measures which could be taken either by a regulatory authority or
through the judicial system. These range from a formal warning, to criminal
prosecution for incitement to violence (if the evidence for such a charge exists), to
withdrawal of a broadcasting licence.
Of course, such discussion sounds like day-dreaming in the context of pre-genocide
Rwanda. RTLM was closely linked to MRND figures within the government and was
an integral part of the plans for genocide. There was no independent regulatory
authority for broadcasting - nor even an independent judiciary. The political
conditions for regulating hate broadcasting did not exist. However, the conclusion to
be drawn from this is precisely that the international community needed urgently to
address the rise in violence by the MRND and CDR militias and the plans for
genocide. This was not primarily a media issue. The genocide would have gone
ahead with or without RTLM.
However, if the Rwandan lesson is to be of relevance to those concerned with the
media and freedom of expression, it is essential to address these questions from an
earlier point - from the moment of democratic transition and the need for Institutionbuilding. Nowhere is likely to suffer a Rwanda-style genocide - not even Burundi.
However, many countries in the region are vulnerable to the instability caused by
state-sponsored ethnic propaganda and the organization of “privatized" or informal
repression by ethnic militias or private armies. The example of the state-sponsored
attacks by Kalenjin warriors in the Kenyan Rift Valley or Inkatha impis in South
Africa shows that this problem is not unique to Rwanda. Hence the urgency of
freeing broadcasting systems from government control so that their propaganda
cannot be used to reinforce ethnic division.
108
.
Summary of conclusions and recommendations
The owners and broadcasters of RTLM should be Indicted for
crimes of genocide before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
These charges should relate to the role played by RTLM in directing the
genocide from 6 April 1994 onwards. It is not recommended that charges be
brought in relation to the propaganda role of RTLM or Radio Rwanda before 6
April
Governments in the region, including those of Rwanda and Burundi, should
reform broadcasting to ensure that the publicly funded broadcaster is
institutionally, financially and editorially independent of government and that
there is an independent and transparent system for the fair allocation of
broadcasting licences. The licensing authority should have a complaints
procedure and the power to impose sanctions on broadcasters violating the terms
of their licence, up to and including withdrawal of the licence.
Governments in the region, with external assistance as necessary, should seek to
strengthen the judiciary to ensure that the necessary steps can be taken within the
domestic legal system to prevent the broadcasting of incitement to violence.
Governments should ratify the relevant' international treaties prohibiting
incitement to violence, discrimination and genocide, notably the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Genocide Convention.
They should take any necessary steps to incorporate these provisions into
national law.
The international community should monitor "hate radio." particularly when
linked to government authorities, and restrictions on freedom of expression as an
early warning of potential gross violations of human rights. This will require a
greater responsiveness on the part of the UN Secretariat to warnings generated
through other parts of the UN apparatus, notably the special mechanisms dealing
with human rights.
In situations of potential communal conflict, the international community should
encourage radio stations and other media which promotes tolerance and a variety
of viewpoints, whether these broadcast from within the country or from outside
in vernacular languages.
International bodies should strengthen their
programmes of professional training for journalists in countries affected or
endangered by communal conflict.
The main reforms needed to prevent genocide or other gross abuses of human
rights lie outside the sphere of the media. They include: reform of the security
forces to make them impartial and accountable; ending the culture of impunity
by holding perpetrators to account for human rights violations; establishing an
independent and impartial Judiciary; developing a culture and institutions of
popular democratic participation. The media can assist in this process by
exposing wrongdoing by state agents - in particular covert manipulation of
ethnic grievances by government agents.
109
Notes
I
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International
Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience,
(Synthesiss Report) (Denmark: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996), 66.
2
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International
Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, (Study 1
Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors) (Denmark: Steering Committee
of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996), 47.
3
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, note I above, at 66.
4
Fédération Internationale des droits de I'
homme, Africa Watch, Union interafricaine des droits de I'
homme et des peuples, Centre international des droits de la
personne et du développement democratique, Report of the International
Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda Since October
1, 1990 (January7-21, 1993) Final Report. (New York: Human Rights
Watch/Africa, March 1993), 29
5
UN Doc. E/CN.4//1994/7/Add.1, 11 Aug. 1993, para.42
6
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, note I above, at 19.
7
Ibid., at 18.
8
The visit on which the report was based took place before RTLM was
established.
9
UN Economic and Social Council, Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, Addendum - Report by Mr B W Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur on his
mission to Rwanda from 8 to 17 April 1993, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7/ Add. I., dated
11 Aug. 1993, para. 56-58.
10
Ibid., para. 65.
11 Ibid., para. 68.
12
Ibid., para. 69.
13
UN Security Council Resolution 1049 (1996), UN Doc. S/RES/1049 (1996),
5 Mar. 1996. para. 5, at 2.
14
J-P Chrétien, "Media and Propaganda in Preparation for and During the
Rwandan Genocide", study submitted to UNESCO by Reporters sans frontiéres and
produced in collaboration with the Centre de Recherches Africaines. (Paris I - CNRS)
(Paris: UNESCO, 30 April 1995).
110
111
AFTERWORD
Burundi
A confidential UN report, leaked to the press in mid-August 1996, has confirmed the
role of the Burundian authorities and military in the failed coup d'
état of 21 October
1993. It reports that "the assassination of President Ndadaye ... was planned in
advance, as part of a coup d'
état designed to overthrow him. The plan and execution
of the coup were carried out by very senior General Staff officers".1It notes that at the
time of Ndadaye'
s assassination, "no attempt was made to protect the President ...
nobody [guarding him] was killed and no vehicles were damaged".2 Moreover, the
report unequivocally rejects the idea that the violence following the putsch, which
claimed the lives of tens of thousands of Hutu and Tutsi, was the result of "supposed
ancestral hatred between the Hutu and the Tutsi" or the “spontaneous rage" of
peasants. Rather, it concludes that officials from the Front démocratiqe du Burundi
(the Burundi Democratic Front FRODEBU) were responsible for directing the
violence against Tutsi immediately following the coup and that gendarmes and the
mainly Tutsi army, which is close to the Union pour le progrés national (Union for
National Progress - UPRONA), conducted indiscriminate reprisal killings of Hutu.
The report found that " ordinary Hutu peasants took part in the massacres only in
response to the urging ... of their leaders who were present wherever the massacres
3
occurred" (italics added).'
From January 1994 Burundi was governed by a weak coalition government, in which
the two successive Presidents came from FRODEBU, President Ndadaye'
s party, and
Prime Ministers were appointed from UPRONA, the former ruling party. The
majority of government posts were allocated to FRODEBU members and the rest
were assigned to UPRONA and other opposition party representatives, a powersharing agreement which was reversed on 25 July 1996 in the coup d'
état led by
Pierre Buyoya, who had previously served as President from 1987 to 1993.
Despite the role of the Burundian authorities and army in the killings of October
1993, and in the subsequent massacres which claimed the lives of approximately
156,000 people, the media has been increasingly blamed as a factor in the bloodshed.
Burundian government officials, politicians and a local freedom of expression
organisation had mounted public pressure to ban extremist newspapers and jam
broadcasts of Radio Democracy, a pirate radio station based in Zaire and controlled
by Léonard Nyangoma'
s Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie (National
Council for the Defence of Democracy - CNDD). The Forces pour la défense de la
démocratie (Forces for the Defence of Democracy - FDD), the armed wing of the
CNDD, which was created in mid-1994, began to launch systematic guerrilla attacks
into Burundi from Zaire in early 1995, and is believed to be responsible for
widespread abuses of civilians.
The Burundian government has claimed that Radio Democracy, which began
broadcasting on 13 July 1995, is "another RTLM" and has called for its banning. As a
112
result of this campaign, and fearing “another Rwanda", international humanitarian and
human rights groups, as well as UNESCO and other UN bodies, have focused their
attention on the extremist media. In August 1995, the UN Sub-Commission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities called for Radio
Democracy to be dismantled.
On I November 1995 Burundi'
s National Communications Council declared Radio
Democracy illegal and appealed to the international community for assistance in
jamming the station. On 2 November 1995, Radio Burundi commented:
At a time when the Burundian government is organizing awareness and peace
campaigns all over the country to restore calm and security, this instrument of
hatred and division may disrupt the process of rehabilitating a social fabric
which is in tatters was the as case with the regrettably well-known MiIle
Collines radio station [RTLM]. It is therefore a matter of urgency that Radio
Democracy be dismantled so that peace is restored fully in Burundi aid in the
Great Lakes region….4
A few days later, UNESCO Director-General Federico Mayor sent an adviser to
Zaire and Burundi in order to investigate the radio station. It was reported that
UNESCO intended to "examine the possibilities of taking legal action to end the
broadcasts of [the] pirate radio station".5 In March 1996, the UN Security Council
adopted a resolution inviting member states to dismantle the station. This was
followed by a similar resolution by the UN Human Rights Commission in April.
Very little is known about the content of Radio Democracy broadcasts or the impact
of the station and the "hate press" in Burundi. Recordings of the station made by the
BBC Monitoring Service indicate a very different focus to that of RTLM, to which it
has been constantly likened. Although Radio Democracy called on people to
overthrow the former Burundian government, which is considered illegitmate, and to
fight the Burundian army, there seems to be no clear evidence that the station incited
violence against civilians. In fact, a Radio Democracy broadcast on 13 July 1995
warned:
Fight the enemies of Burundi, only attack military barracks and military
positions. The crime of killing citizens, old people, the sick and infants, should
be left to the criminal (Jean) Bikomagu (Chief of Staff of the Burundian
Armed Forces) and his army.é
Similarly, the move by the Burundian National Communication Council in March
1996 to ban, indefinitely, seven newspapers seems equally problematic. Although
this measure was supported by Reporters san frontiéres (RSF), UPRONA'
s hardline
newspaper L'
Indepéndent was not among those banned, while FRODEBU'
s
publication, L'
Aube de la Démocratie, not considered extremist, was proscribed.
Simon Kururu, Chairman of the National Communication Council explained the
reasons for the bannings:
113
Some newspapers were found to be causing disunity. Some were found to be
spreading lies, others brought about hatred amongst the people. Some had not
fulfilled all the requirements of the law.7
François Sendazirasa, President of the Burundian Association of Journalists (BAJ)
commented,” I believe that the measure has only political objectives. It aims at
protecting political officials who fear criticism, which cannot be supported by
BAJ".8
Journalists have continued to be harassed and arbitrarily detained in Burundi, yet
their plight has not drawn as much international protest as the rise of "hate media"
organs. Sendazirasa continued: "These people (journalists] are not dangerous, they
are not criminals. Criminals are walking about freely. Journalists should not be
handcuffed and imprisoned all the time".9
ARTICLE 19 hopes to publish a companion report on Violence and the Media in
Burundi, highlighting the context in which media control is exerted and its
consequences. Like Broadcasting Genocide, this second report will document
government propaganda on state radio, an institution which is in urgent need of
reform, and the systematic harassment of journalists by the authorities. Within this
context, ARTICLE 19 will present the rise of media organs which promote hate
speech and violence, their links to political groups and, in some cases, to militias
affiliated with political parties. Moreover, it will seek to gather first-hand
information on the content of Radio Democracy’s broadcasts and will examine the
question of whether the international community should intervene to jam the pirate
radio station. By separating the two reports we hope to emphasise that the tragedies
of Rwanda and Burundi have quite different origins
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
As cited in Le Soir, 14 Aug. 1996, in "Burundi: Belgian Newspaper
Publishes part of the UN report on October 1993 Events", BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 16 Aug. 1996.
Ibid
Ibid
Radio Burundi (French, 9430GMT, 2 Nov. 1995, "UNESCO Head Promised
to Help Burundi dismantle '
Radio Station Of Hatred'
", in BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts 4 Nov. 1995
Pan-African news agency (PANA) cited by the KNA news agency, Nairobi
(English) 1135 GMT 4 Nov. 1995 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 9
Aug 1995
Radio Democracy (Kirundi), 13 July 1995, "Burundian radio calls on
Burundians to fight Army, Support Hutu militias", BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 9 Aug. 1995
As cited in Radio Burundi (Kirundi), 1030 GMT, 19 March 1996, "Burundi:
114
8
9.
Publication of Seven Private Newspapers Halted", BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 21 March 1996
As cited in Radio Burundi (French), 1800 GMT, 19 March 1996, "Burundi:
Journalists'Union Criticizes Suspension of Newspapers", BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 21 March 1996.
Ibid
115
APPENDIX
RTLM Original Shareholders'
1. Isaac MULIHANO
2. Stanislas SIMBIZI
3. J Bosco BARAYAGWIZA
4. Félicien KABUGA
5. Charles NZABAGERAGEZA
6. Pasteur MUSABE
7. Ferdinand NAHIMANA
8. Rose USABUWERA
9. Marie BANZUBAZE
I0. Drocella MUKAMBONERA
11. Bibiane NTEGAYIRE
12. Claude NDAMIYE
13. Joseph NZIRORERA
14. Télesphore BIZIMUNGU
15. Ignace TEMAHAGARI
16. Mathieu HAKIZAYEZU
17. J Damascéne NDAGIJIMANA
18. Marc SINIYOBEWE
19. Ephrem NKEZABERA
20. Georges GAKERI
21. Joseph SERUGENDO
22. Françoise SERUSHYANA
23. P Cé1estin HAGUMA
24. Victor KALISA
25. Alphonse NTIRIVAMUNDA
26. Augustin NGIRABATWARE
27. André NTAGERURA
28. Mme Laurence NYIRABAGENZI
29. Ernest BUROKO
30. J Baptiste NEMEYABAHIZI
31. Robert SIMBA
32. Cyprien NDAGIJIMANA
33. Simon BIKINDI
34. Bernard MANIRAGABA
35.
37
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
Dieudonné NIYITEGEKA
.Phénéas RUHUMULIZA
Bernardin NSENGAMUNGU
Daniel NTAWUMENYUMUNSI
Aaron NTIZIHABOSE
Déogratias NSABIMANA
Béatrice NYIRABALITONDA
Boniface RUCAGU
116
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
Jean HABYARIMANA
M Marthe MUJAWAYEZU
Froduald NTAWULIKURA
J Baptiste BAMWANGA
J M Vianney MVULIRWENANDE
Amnanuel NGIRWANABAGABO
J Bosco BICAMUMPAKA
Notes
1. .Reporters sans frontiéres, Rwanda: médias de la haine ou presse démocratique,
Rapport de mission 16-24 Sept. 1994 (Paris: RSF, 1994).
117
