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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01302 Doc No. C05517243 Date: 05/05/2014
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INFO USMISSIGN USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 04 KIGALI 03188
STATE FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PEACEKEEPING
YAOUNDE AND LILONGWE FOR DATT
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, AORC, MASS, UN, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: UM RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD DISCUSSES
THOUGHTS ON UN INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA
REFS: (A) KIGALI 3092, (B) STATE 250795,
(C) USUN 3985, (D) ADDIS ABABA 5645
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. UN RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD TOLD
REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Daris, Senior Reviewerl
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01302 Doc No. C05517243 Date: 05/05/2014
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01302 Doc No. C05517243 Date: 05/05/2014
CHARGE HIS TEAM'S FINDINGS POINT TOWARD À WHOLLY UN,
PHASED PEACEKEEPING OPERATION (PKO) WITH SEVERAL
COMPONENTS, PEAKING IN SIZE DURING THE FORCE
DISENGAGEMENT/DISARMAMENT/DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS,
THEN TAPERING OFF SIGNIFICANTEY. HE WORRIES THAT A
FORCE SMALLER THAN THE "MINIMUM VIABLE" OR DELAYED IN
ARRIVAL COULD JEOPARDIZE À POTENTIALLY SUCCESSFUL
PKO. WHAT FORCES CAN BE MOVED IN WHEN TO ASSURE THE
PROCESS STAYS ON TRACK IN THE "CRITICAL" WEEKS
IMMEDIATELY AHEAD SO À GOVERNMENT CAN BE PUT IN PLACE
IS À MAJOR PREOCCUPATION. HE ASKED THAT THE US.
URGE BOTH SIDES TO REMAIN PATIENT AMD CALM PENDING UN
START-UP. END SUMMARY.
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3. CHARGE MET 8/26 WITH BRIG. GEN. ROMERO DALLAIRE
TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON UM INVOLVEMENT IN À PEACEKEEPING
OPERATION IN RWANDA. CHARGE CONVEYED US, POSITION
ÀS OUTLINED REF B. THE GENERAL WAS RELUCTANT TO
DISCUSS SPECIFICS CF HIS TEAM'S FINDINGS IN ORDER NOT
TO PREEMPT HIS REPORT TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL OR
COMPROMISE THE UNSYG'S DECISION-MARING AUTHORITY.
NEVERTHELESS, HE DISCUSSED BROAD OUTLINES OF HIS
THINKING AT THIS STAGE AND EXPRESSED FEARS FOR THE
OPERATION'S SUCCESS SHOULD THE UN SKIMP ON
RESOURCES. ALSC PRESENT WERE ISEL RIVERO, UN
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, AND FLORENCE BARRILLON-POMES,
SPECIAL ASSISTANT.
4. PARAMETERS. THE GENERAL SAID HE WILL RECOMMEND
TO THE UNSYG A PKO FOR RWANDA THAT IS "REASONABLE BUT
RESPONSIBLE" GIVEN THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE NEEDS ON THE GROUND,
HE WILL PRESENT OPTIONS TO THE UN/SYG WITH À
CONVINCING ARGUMENT FOR WHAT HE DEEMS THE "MINIMUM
VIABLE" OPERATION. BELOW THAT, HE SAID, THE UN WILL
BE ONITS OMN.
5. À WMINNER. GEN. DALLAIRE SAID THE RWANDAN PKO
COULD BE A WINNER [IF IT IS APPROACHED PROPERLY AND AT
À PACE THAT KEEPS THE RISK FACTOR LOW. IF FORCE
ARRIVAL IS DELAYED, HE SAID, CR IF THE OPERATION IS
SHORT-CHANGED ON RESOURCES, FAILURE COULD BE A REAL
POSSIBIEITY. HE SAID HE FOUND GOOD WILL ON BOTH
SIDES TO MAKE THE PEACE PROCESS WORK. THAT THE
CEASEFIRE WORKS WITH ONLY 50 NMOG OBSERVERS IS
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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01302 Doc No. C05517243 Date: 05/05/2014
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EVIDENCE OF THIS GOOD WILE.
6. RISKS EXIST. NEVERTHELESS, HE SAID, RISKS
EXIST. HE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR PREOCCUPATION WITH
RISKS IN THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE PROCESS WHICH HE
CONSIDERS "CRITICAL". WHAT WILL HAPPEN, HE ASKED,
WHEN THE UN FORCE FAILS TO ARRIVE BY SEPTEMBER 10,
THE LOCALLY AGREED MILESTONE FOR PUTTING THE
GOVERNMENT IN PLACE? HOW LONG WILL THE PATIENCE OF
THE TWO SIDES LAST BEFORE ONE OR THE OTHER BREAKS THE
PEACE? HE SAID HIS TEAM IS DOING A RISK ASSESSMENT
TO DETERMINE WHAT RESOURCES ARE NEEDED AND WHEN IN
ORDER TO ENSURE AGAINST COLLAPSE OF THE PROCESS
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INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIGRITY
AMEMBASSY ADDP
WMMBA PRIORITY 1366
AMEMEASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMEURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
UNCLASSIFIED U:S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01302 Doc No. C05517243 Date: 05/05/2014
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01302 Doc No. C05517243 Date: 05/05/2014
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 CF C4 KIGALI 03188
STATE FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PEACEKEEPING
YAOUNDE AND LILONGWE FOR DATT
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, AORC, MASS, UN, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: UM RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD DISCUSSES
BEFORE IT EVEN GETS STARTED. HE BELIEVES THAT
FINDING À WAY TO PÜT THE GOVERNMENT IN PLACE EARLY
WILE BE CRUCIAL.
7. PHASED OPERATION. THE GENERAL TALKED ABOUT À
THREE-PHASE OPERATION WITH THE NUMBER CF ASSETS
PEAKING DURING THE DISENGAGEMENT/DISARMAMENT PROCESS
OF PHASE Il. ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL WAS DELIBERATELY
VAGUE IN DESCRIBING HIS VISION, CHARGE UNDERSTOOD THE
FOLLOWING:
PHASE | WOULD BEGIN SEPTEMBER 10 AND EXTEND UNTIL
SUFFICIENT UN ASSETS WERE DEPLOYED TO RWANDA TO
PERMIT THE DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS TO BEGIN. ONCE A UN
RESOLUTION AND BUÜDGET WERE APPROVED, À COMMANDER
COULD BE NAMED AND BE IN COUNTRY WITH AM ADVANCE
PARTY POSSIBLY WITHIN ABOUT TWO WEEKS. FORCES MIGHT
BE ABLE TO BE BORROWED FROM ANOTHER UN OPERATION IN
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ORDER TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO BE
PUT IN PLACE. THIS, THE GENERAL BELIEVES IS THE
CRITICAL PHASE.
— PHASE || WOULD BEGIN WHEN À UN FORCE REASONABLE
ENOUGH TO BEGIN THE DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS ARRIVED IN
COUNTRY. HE SAID THREE MONTHS WOULD BE THE MINIMUM
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01302 Doc No. C05517243 Date: 05/05/2014
‘UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01302 Doc No. C05517243 Date: 05/05/2014
TIME NEEDED FOLLOWING PASSAGE OF À UN RESOLUTION FOR
THE MAIN BODY TF À UN FORCE TO BE DEPLOYED TO
RWANDA. THE NUMBER OF FORCES WOULD PEAK DURING THIS
PHASE WHICH WOULD LAST UNTIL THE FORCE INTEGRATION
WAS COMPÉETE, ABOUT NINE MONTHS OUT.
— PHASE II, BEGINNING ONCE FORCE INTEGRATION WAS
COMPLETED, WOULD SEE FORCES REDUCED, POSSIBLY LEAVING
ONEY AN OBSERVATION FORCE UNTIL THE END OF THE
22-MONTH TRANSITION PERIOC.
8. BEGINNING AND END. IN RESPONSE TO À QUERY, THE
GENERAL SAID THAT THE END OF THE OPERATION WAS
CLEAR: 22 MONTHS INTO THE PROCESS WHEN THE PEACE
ACCORD CALES FOR THE TRANSITION PERIOD TO END AND
NATIONAL ELECTIONS TO BE HELD. THE GENERAL NOTED
THÂT HAVING "REASONABLE" ASSETS IN PLACE AT EACH
POINT IN THE PROCESS WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE
UN-—AND DONORS--TO PUSH THE RWANDANS HARD TO STICK TO
THEIR PROPOSED TIMETABLE.
9. RELATION TO THE OAU/NMOG. ASKED WHAT THE ROLE OF
THE CAU/NMOG WOULD BE, THE GENERAL SAID IT WOULD HGLD
THE FORT UNTIE THE UN COULD COME IN. AFTER THE
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ARRIVAL OF THE UN, THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER OAU
COMMAND STRUCTURE. THE OAU TROOPS WOULD THEN BE
WITHDRAWN OR FOLDED INTO THE UN GPERATION., HE HINTED
AN ACCEPTAMCE OF THE LONG-STANDING OAU PROPOSAL,
FIRST SUGGESTED DURING THE ARUSHA TALKS, FOR OAU
PERSONNEL TO BE SECONDED TO KEY POSITIONS OF A UN-LED
PKO TO GAIN EXPERIENCE FOR FUTURE CAU PKOS. CHARGE
PROBED WHETHER AN NMOG BATTALION {THINKING OF THE
EGYPTIAN OFFER) MIGHT BE ABLE TO SERVE AS THE KIGALI
FORCE THAT COULD ENABLE THE GOVERNMENT TO BE
INSTALLED. HE SAID ANY SUCH FORCE WOULD HAVE TO BE
UN-LED.N
VA COMPONENTS CF THE OPERATION. CHARGE ASKED ABOUT
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECT OF A UN
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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01302 Doc No. C05517243 Date: 05/05/2014
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FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4552
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRICRITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF C4 KIGALI 03188
STATE FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PEACEKEEPING
YAOUNDE AND LILONGWE FOR DATT
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, AORC, MASS, UN, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: UM RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD DISCUSSES
OPERATION TO THE MILITARY ASPECT. THE GENERAL SAID
THAT HE WOULD NOT BE PROPOSING AN ALL-SOLDIER
EXERCISE, BUT ONE WITH SEVERAL COMPONENTS. ALTHOUGH
HE DID NOT WANT TO BE SPECIFIC, CHARGE DEDUCED HE
ENVISIONS AT LEAST FOUR COMPONENTS: A FORCE TO
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01302 Doc No. C05517243 Date: 05/05/2014
UNCLASSIFIED US. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01302 Doc No. C05517243 Date: 05/05/2014
MANAGE THE DISENGAGEMENT/DISARMAMENT ACTIVITIES,
MILITARY OBSERVERS FOR THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE TO BE
EBTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO ASSEMBLY ZONES, A
CIVIEIAM POLICE COMPONENT, AMD A
HSNAMITARIAMAXASSISTANT COMPOMES (REINSTALLATION OF
DISPLACED/DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS/RETURNING REFUGEES).
HE STRESSED THAT HIS RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD BE FOR
"RÉASONABLE AND RESPONSIBLE" LEVELS OF PHASED
INVOLVEMENT IN ALL COMPONENTS. HE SAID THE
HUMANITARIAN COMPONENT MIGHT CONSIST SOLELY OF A
COCRDINATOR AS THERE IS ALREADY À WELL-DEVELOPED
UN-NGO-IGO NETWORK FOR DELIVERING AID TO THE
DISPLACED. THE GENDARMERIE AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
ARE VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT, HE SAID, SO THERE WILL
HAVE TO BE SOME ASSISTANCE IN BUILDING THE SECURITY
CAPABIEITY OF THE NEW GENDARMERIE.
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11. IDENTIFICATION OF SITES. CHARGE ASKED IF HIS
TEAM HAD IDENTIFIED SITES FOR CANTONMENT OF WEAPONS
AND ASSEMBLY OF TROOPS. HE SAID THEY HAD BUT THEY
WOULD BE PRESENTED AS RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UN/SYG.
AN ADVANCE PARTY WOULD BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE
TWO SIDES ON THE PROPOSALS.
12. PHASE 1 CRITICAL. THE GENERAL REITERATED THAT,
IN HIS VIEW, À RWANDA PEACEKEEPING OPERATION HAD À
GOOD CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING. BUT IN ORDER FOR IT TO BE
SUCCESSFUE, HE SAID, SOME RESOURCES MUST BE
COMMITTED. HIS POLITICAL AIDE OBSERVED THAT THE
ANGOLAN OPERATION FAILED BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN
SHORT-CHANGED ON RESOURCES. THE GENERAL SAID PHASE I
WILL BE ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL. A "MINIMUM VIABLE
FORCE" WILL BE NEEDED DURING THIS PERIOD SO THAT THE
GOVERNMENT CAM TAKE OFFICE AND SO THAT THE TWO SIDES
CAN GET THROUGH THE PERIOD BEFORE A UN FORCE IS
PRESENT WITHOUT HAVING THE THE PROCESS "CRASH",
13. APPEAL FOR HELP. THE GENERAL APPEALED TO THE
U.S. TO HELP KEEP THE TWO SIDES PATIENT AND CALM AND
THE PROCESS ON TRACK PENDING THE ARRIVAL CF AN
INTERNATIONAL FORCE. HE SAID THE UN/SYG IS PULLING
OUT ALL THE STOPS TO MOVE QUICKLY ON THE RWANDAN
ISSUE. BUT, HE SAID, THE UN JUST CANNOT MEET THE
LOCALLY AGREED TIMETABLE. THE UN NEEDS HELP IN
CONVINCING THE TWO SIDES OF THE UN'S GOOP FAITH AND
IN KEEPING THINGS CALM IN THE INTERIM.
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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01302 Doc No. C05517243 Date: 05/05/2014
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14. COMMENT. IT IS CLEAR FROM WHAT THE GENERAL SAID
THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN HIS REPORT WILL INCEUDE
SPECIFIC NUMBERS ATTACHED TO SPECIFIC TIME FRAMES FOR
AN OPERATION THAT WILE HAVE A CLEAR BEGINNING AND A
CLEAR END. HIS WORRY IS LEGITIMATE: HOW LONG CAN
THB TWO RWANDAN FORCES REMAIN DEPLOYED IN BATTLE
POSITIONS ON OPPOSITE SIDES CF A NARROW DMZ WITHOUT
HAVING SOMETHING GO AW
XSHOW LONG CAM À GOHTRNMENT
GRIN POISED TO TAKE OFFICE BEFORE POLITICAL
MANIPULATION SETS IN TO DERAIL IT? EVEN THOUGH WE
ARE CONVINCED THAT RMWANDANS WANT THEIR PEACE PROCESS
TO WORK, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THEY CAN REMAIN
INDEFINITELY IN ANTICIPATORY LIMBO WITHOUT SOMETHING
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ACTION AF-01
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OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00
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FM AMEMEBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4553
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJÜUMBURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01302 Doc No. C05517243 Date: 05/05/2014
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01302 Doc No. C05517243 Date: 05/05/2014
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 04 KIGALI 03188
STATE FOR AF/, AF/RA, AND IO/PEACEKEEPING
YAOUNDE AND LILONGWE FOR DATT
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, AORC, MASS, UN, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: UM RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD DISCUSSES
HAPPENING THAT COULD SERIOUSLY TEST THEIR RESOLVE.
TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. THE GENERAL STRIKES US AS A
BRIGHT, NON-NONSENCE SORT OF GUY WHOSE
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HELPING RWANDA HELP ITSELF SHOULD
BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. HE STILL INTENDS TO
PRESENT HIS REPORT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOLLOWNG
THE LABOR DAY WEEKEND. END COMMENT.
LEADER
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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-01302 Doc No. C05517243 Date: 05/05/2014
