APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B
REPUBLICOF RWANDA
MIN:ISTRYOF JUSTICE
B.P. 160 KIGA LI
Honorabl,e Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
KIGALI
RE ; Transmiss ion of the letter requesting documen_ts to the Government of France
Hon. Minister;
I am pleased to forw :ard for your kind attention the attached letter .requesting the
Government of France the disclosure of documents -, for onward ttansmissio n to
the competent · au th ority in France ..
.Enclosed, please fin d attached the lists of d.ocuments. and communicatio ns that
the Governmen t of Rwanda would like the Government of France to declassify .
, ·, ,
1/
BUSINGYE Jolins"'o ·-~ _;
Minister ·of Justic e and Attorney General
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MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
B.P ..160 KIGALI
Honorable Minister of Justice
Republic of France
PARIS
Re : Request for Documents Related to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi
Hon. Minister,
By this letter1 the Government of Rwanda respectfully requ _ests th e French government
to declassify and pro duce docun;tents and other materials regard in g the 1994 Genocid~
against the Tutsi. Apr il 7th of this year marked the 25th year •since the Genocide began.
The history of the Genocide ag~t
the Tutsi is a matter of grave and profound
importance to the Government of Rwanda and its people , and we se~k France's
cooperation in making certain that the complete history is underst ood.
We respectfull y submit t;hat both governments and the people of both countries have a
deep interest in establishing the truth regarding the Genocide against the Tutsi For
Rwandans, it goes to one of the core events in our country's history. For the French
people , it provides an honest assessment of France's conduct in Rwanda .
Access to the Governm ent of France's documents is essential to establishing the full
history . So long as France does not declassify and produce its documents, the public will
continue to ha ve- questions about the precise role o1 French officials in the Genocide
against the Tut si.
As an initial matt er, we ask you to establish a process so that the full complement of
vant mater ials can be made available for producti:oo and transfer to Rwanda for
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review-:- To begin the uudert.aking, we attach a schedule setting forth the type of
documents we a.re seeking and suggestions for their producrti.on. As matters pro gress
and the inquiry contin ues, we cart identify additional documents and work closely with
the people task ed with gathering and producing the information . Matte.rs such as
declassification, confid entiality and other factors can be fully evaluated, with a
recognition of each country ' s legitimate interests.
Permit me to close on a personal note . Every person in Rwanda continues to be affected
by the Genocide against the Tutsi. As we began Kwibu.ka- our 100 days of remembrance
- in April, we ar e again reminded of thevitalneetl for a full and accurate history. Without
an honest study of history, we run the risk that such events will <)gain occur. We are
mindful ot and gui ded by, the truism that those who do not know history are condemned
to repeat it The memo ry of the deceased .and injured should be hon ored by having both
governments fully inv ested in this undertaking . We are aware that many people in
France are questioning events central to the Genocide. Let us wor k together so we can
find a way forw ard and have these events openl y and honestl y stu died.
Thank you
foryour thoughtful
B.USIN
Minister o us· ce an
.
.
~
.
·consideration of these matters .
General
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Honorable Mil).ister of Foreign Affairs and .International Cooperati on
KIGALI
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Schedule A
Definitions
The following terms · u_sed 'in the request5 below should .be understood
definitions provi ded
us ing tlie
here
1. DcYC'u
ments are all writings, incfo:ding but not litnifud to letters, emails,
memoran da, cables ,. notes, fiches prrrticu
lieres, reports , mililacy order s, press
releases, Irll,P, calendars , diades, datebooks, orgMizationa.I ·charts , audio or vid eo
recQrding s, and photugrapbs.
c;ati
ons are all writtings or recordmgs tt;msmi~d froII:t a sende _r to a
:2. Com!f1uni
r eceiver, including but not limited to l~tters, emails, memoranda, fidll!s
pnrJimlieres, cables , notes , reports, military. mders, and press releases.
3. FrenchOfficials are ,all civilians working for, or on be.halfof ,an y aomponent of the
Fi:enth governme nt (whether .elected , politically .appoin ted or hired into the civil
senrice) and all members of the Fr.ench_militacy or the French Foreign'Legion.
Requests
RequestNo. l ; Any -and all versions and drafts dfcommunicatio~
related to 'the Genooi d e agains .t the Tutsti.
and documents
Request No. 2: Any anpall IDaterials , including butno tlimi ted tocommimic;al;ions .
and doct.m_lei:ifs,
related to the 'Office Rwimd11is-ci'
InfomUJtiJJ11
("ORINFOR"), RadioRwamln
or Radio Teliuision Lib.redes MilTe Collirles("RTLM''), or any of the ir officers, directors ,
empJ.oyees,, ag ents, or.r epresentatives , iocludirtg l:n;1t Mt limited t o d ClCUilleElis
related to :
g but notliµu ted to
(a) Any aud all financial, technical or othei: assistanc~ , inclucl:in
tr.11-ining,p rovided by any entity or official of the French gov-er nm.e11t to
ORINFOR Ra.cfioRwanda ·or B.TLM;
(b) .My and all :recordings, copies , transcr ip ts or SUIIUl'laries of Radio l{wanda
broad cas ts ·r elated
1992;
tQ
massacres against Tutsi civilians in Buge_s.era, in; March
(c) Any a.nd all m eetings or other communications
OR!NfOR officials ;
between French offi.tj ats and
(d) Any and all recordings / copies , transcrip'ts or. summar ies ofR'.('LM broadc ast5.
-
(~J TheestablisJ:unent ·of RTLM;
(~ Any and all discus.sions, of terminating, j~g
◊r
interrupting R11M
br<.iadeasts through'.technologi~ or dip1onmticrneans;(g) ORINFOR (including, but not limited to Radio· _
R:w,and~
) officets~directprs,
employees; rep..resentativesor agents, including but notlin:iifetl to:'
i:.- Ferdinand Nahimana (Pi:rectm oiO.RINFOR r 1990-1992)
ii.- Jean-Baptiste Bamwanga (Radio Rwanda Editor in Chief, 1992)
·jjj . Paul Mbaraga ·(Director-of Radio Rwanda , 1976"1990)
iv, Froduald Ntawulikura (Head of Rural Communication Development
Departmenf at ORINFOR)
v, Joseph Serugendo (Chief of Maintenance for Radio Rwanda}
vi. Christophe Mfizi(Director of ORINFOR,1978-1990)
vii. Charles Nahayo ·(Director of the Rwan4a television Project, 1992.)
(h} Any documents ,regarding commmtications between F1:anc.e .o:r :P.
t~ch
companies~incl:U~g but not limited t'-0Telediffusion decFrance, and RTI._M or
Eclipse-:nwrui~te ,gardfug tlre cre:ationof a Rwandan teievlsion station.
(i~ Any ;_:tn~ all meetings or oth~ cqnum1rikati0ns betw een. aii,.y
Fren ch official
and an y .offic~, dire~for,. ~loyee
,.representative or a.gent of RTI.M;
(j) Any and.cU1 RTI..1VI
offkers ,- qh-ectp11
s, e~ployees, representatives or agents ,
iriclu.din g but not limited to:
t.
F.elicien I
Assembly q£Sha.r~ol~$; Pre_sident, InHiative Committee)
Ii. F.erdinand
Nalumana (E,diforial ]0"ard ; Presid.ent,- 'Iedinical and
Programs; Memberylnitiativ.e Co.lrtnljttee)
.i:ii.Jea:n.JBosco.·Barayagwiza (B'ditotialBo~4)
iv.. Joseph Serugendo. (Editorial Board)
v. Phocas H:ab)mana (Managing Dir.ectot)
vi,. Gaspar d· Gahlgi (Chief Editor)
vii. Philipp e Mloilizi(Chief 0£French Programs)
·v1iL Jean
Ntezi~
(Otlef'Techni d an)
ix.- Igna'.MeTemahapra (Secret.aryt Initiative Committee )
()<)Any and ctll inv~to rs in or ~h.areholders of R'I'.LM.,including l;>µtnorli.rnitedto :
i._
Jeanlfaptis~ Bamwanga
i).
~re Ilanzubaze
iii. Jerome ~icamumpaka
,v.·Simon Bil9:ndi.
v. Telesphore Bizimungu
vi. Ernest Buroko
vii. Geo r ges Gakeri
viii. Jean Habyarimana
ix. P. Celestin Haguma
x. Mujawayezu Marthe
xi. Math ieu Hakizayezu
xii.Victor Kalisa
xiii. Bernard Maniragaba
xiv~ Drocella M:ukambonera
xv.
Issac Mulihano
xvi. Pasteur Musabe
KviL Jean Mvulirwenande
xvHL Marie Vianney
xiJL Cyprien N dagijimana
xx. Jean Damascene Ndagijimana
xxi. Claude Ndamiye
xxiL Jean Baptiste Nemeyabahizi
xx.iii. Bibiane Negeg~yire
xxiv~ Emmmanuel Ngirwanabagabo
xxv.. Augustin Ngirabatware
xx '". Dieudonne Niyitegeka
xx i. Ephrem Nkezabera
xx ·u. Deogratias Nsabimana
xxix. Bema:rdin Nsengamungu
xxx. Andre Ntagerura
xx.xi. Daniel Ntawamenyumunsi
xxxii. Alp honse Nplivamunda
xx.xiii.Aar on Ntizihabose
xxxiv. Froduald Ntawulikura
xxxv. La urence Nyirabalinda
xxxv i. Beatrice Nyirabalinda
xx.xvii.Charles N zabagerageza
xxxv1u.
Joseph Nzirorera
xxxix. Boniface Rucagu
xl. Phenea s Rtthumuliza
xli. Georges Rutaganda
xi ii ~ Francois Serushyana
xl iii. Robert Simba
xii . Stanis las Simbizi
xiv. Marc Siniyobewe
xJvi. Igan ce T.emhagari
xlvii. Rose Usabuwera
....
Request No . 3: Any and all documents andcommuniaationsr .elated to tbe'rtrilifi~
.asthe mferahamweand the Tnipuzaniugam.bl
and to th1;1
.relati orufap
between French authodlies and the milHias,including, but not limifed to matters re.lated
ifl Rwanda, such
to:
(a) Any of the ft.en ch officialsstatio,ned , worl
Gabiro or Gako, between October 1, 1990 an(! )Uly 4, 1994.
(b} Any tra ining oi militias in Rwanda by French officiaJs.
(e)
Any French official's knowledge ofmiliti!l training in Rwanda.
(µ) Any coo1·dination,
p lanning , or communh ;afions ~ .tween the militias in
Rwanda and R1LM.
·(e) AI).y of the lmp11
zam11ga111bi
'.s leaders ) otficials, JI(embers, representatives oi
financial _s_upporters .
official, member, representative , aelviser to, investor
s.upp0r l'et of the !nleralu1:m1Qe
1 including, f:mtnoflintited tp;
(t) An_yleader ,
L
in, or
Toe Na ti0_nalConunittee
ti. Jerry Robert Kajuga (Ourinnan .)
b, Pheneas Rulun;nuli~ (Senior Vice-Chairman)
·c. GeorgesRutagauda (First Vice-Chairman
d. Eugene Mbarushimana (~etµy-Ceneral)
e. Dieudonne Niyitegeka (Treasurer Genefal)
ii
College of Advisers
a: Bernard Ma:niraga1:i@(Ch.airman , ~ommissi on on Social
Legal Matters)
b. Joseph Serugendo (Chairman, Research . and Development
Commission)
p. Jean Piei:re Sebartetsi (Oiairman, .commjssion
on Political
Mil.he
rs and Propaganda)
d. Ephr~
Nkezabera (01airman, Etononuc and F.inandal
Commis!>ion)
"'· J.M.V. Mu_dahinyuka (Chairman, FoUowup and Ass~$Sment
Commission)
f. Alphonse Kanimba (Chairman,
Doctimentatiort _Commission
iii
Ex.ternal
Other Suppodei:s
a. Seraphin .Rwabukumba
-
Relations
an.d
b.
~d.
e.
Col Rlje Sagatwa
Col ·The'onest~ Bagosora
Lt, Bahufite Jµvenal
Seraphin Twahirwa
f. Gervais Nzabanterur
g. Rose Karushara
h. Charles Nyandwi
l Mathieu Nginm1patse
j . Pk. Profuis Zigiranyirazo
I. Serapbin Rwabukumba
m. Joseph Nzizorera
n. Charles Nyandwi
a. Pasteur Musabe
p. Charles ·Nzabagerageza
q. Callixte Nzabonimana
t.
Bonifaee Rucagu
s. Ll.eutenant..COlonel TharcisseRenzaho
t. Pierre Celestin Rwagafirita
u. ~~seal Simbikan:gwa
v. Leon.~ Mbonabaryi
w. Fidele Murigande
x. Annable Ngabitsi.n7..e
r- Jules Rugiria
z. •Richard Simba
aa .Pierre Kayondo
bb. Oaye.r Kama.ita
cc. Isaac Kamaii
dd. SunonBikindi
ee. Fidele_Rwambuka
Ef. Aloys Ng_ir~atware
RequestNo. 4: Any and all documents and communications related to Operation
TUJ'.quoise,includin g, but not limited to matters related to:
(a) France's decision to propose an intervention mission, its negotiations with
other Stares iI.1conneclioQ with the possible intervention , and th_ereafter its
request for auffto.rization by the United Nations Security Council for an
interventi on in Rwanda and all communications related to this request
(b) TI1econd uct of the Forces armees rwandaises ("FAR 11), 1 bet,,veen Apr.il.61 1994
and December 31, 1994, including but not limited t'O their role in the ~enocide
agains t the Tutsi; their role i:Qthe pre-Genocide massacres of "(utsf civilians;
their Illilitary engagement with the Rwandan Patriotic .Anny; th~ir in,reractiqn
1
PAR;shellJnclude'f r{ officials and. ex:-F.ARoffioiaJsthroughout thts do:cumentreqµesl.,whercver·n1eniwn·ed,
with or violence against Tutsi civilians; , their Teadiness ; any-'requests from t;he
LoterimRwandan GQvenm;i..ent·w the Government of Ftance 01 individuaj
French officials to assisf the FAR; and any, provision of ass:istanee by French
offurials"t0 the ,FAR;
(c) Any ·and all communications by French officials with officials from either the
Int¢m Rwandan Gov .emment or tne FARrbetween June 20, 1994 and Jmy 18i.
1994, indudin~ not limited to:
i. Theodore Sindikubwab~, President of the Republic
ii. Jean .Kambanda, Prime .tvlinister
iii. jfu:Ome
· Bfoamumpaka, Minister of Foreign Affairs an d Opoperation
i-v.Eliezet Niyitegeka,Minister of Information
v. Ao gustin Biz~a,
Minister ·of Defense
vi. Casimir Bizimu.ngu ,-Minister of Health
vii. Agnes Nta:mabyaliro, Mhµster ofJustice
Vlll .
Str aton Nsab-u.mukUI)Zi, Minister of Agriculture and Live.stock
ix. Daniel Mbangara , Minister of Higher Edu.cation, -Scilmtific Researchand
Culture
x. J ean de Dieu Kamuhanda , Minister of Higher Bduca tion, 'Research and
Cultur e
J'(alimanzir~ Minister of the · lntetior and Municipal
Dev elopment
;xii.Ed0'Uard Karemera , Minister 0f the Interior
xiii. Emmanuel Ndindabahizi ~ Minister of Finance .
xiv.
Prosper. Mugiraneza 7 Minister of Public Service
xv. .Ancir~ Ntagenn:~ , Ministe r of Transport and Communicati ons
xvL Paoline Nyiramasulruko, Minister of the Family and th.e Promotion ·
xi Callixte
of Wo men
xxii. Andre Rwamakuha, Minister of Primary and $econdaiy Edu ca tion
xvui. Augustin Ngirabatwar-e, Minister ·ofP~g
-:xix. Calli1.
Nzabonimana >Minister of Youth
xx.
Daniel Mbangura, Director of the Cabinet of .thePresidency
xxi. fus tin Mugenzi, lyti.nister of Commerce , Industry and Handicrafts
xxii. Ana.tole Nsengiyumfa, Commander of the Gis~yi S_ector
xx.JJ:1.Hyacinthe Nsertgiyunrva Rafiki, Minist& of Publi<;:Works and
Energy
oi Labor and Social Affairs
Gaspard Ruhum :uliza , Minister of Environment and T_0urism,PDC
xxvi. t
dre Singaye
xxvif. Col. ·Theaneste Bag_osora
xxiv. Jean de Dieu; Habineza, Mims~
n-v .
xxvi ii. Gratien Kabiligi, Head of th e Military Operations Bureau (G-3)
xxix. A.ruitole. Nsengiyumva1 Com.n-w.1J.d~
of the Gisenyi Sector -
x.xx. Aloys Ntabakuze, Commander of t;h.e'f>aracommando Batallion
xxxi. Au_gµsfinBizimungu, Commander of Operations · for Ruhengeri
5ecteur and Chi~.fiofStaff 0f the Rwa,nd 'an Armyafter 19 April 1.994
lllr.ll
xxxii. Augustin NcUncUliyimana,Chief of Staff'of the Gendanneri~
nati.onale
xxxiiL Eran~oi~Xavier Nzuwom~meye, Commander of the
Reconnaissance (RECCE)Battalion
nxi v. Innocent Sagahutti, Commcmder of Squadron A 0f the RECCE
"Battalion
xxxv IldeJ>honse Hategekin1ana, Commander of fhe Ngoma Military
Camp
xxxv'i. Protais Mpiranya,, Commander of the Presidential Guard Battalion
XXXVli.
Tharciss~·Muvunyi , Commander of Ecole{de$]sous-officier
s (FSO)
xxx, •ili.
Ild~phQns.e- :N°izeyimana,officer at Ecole [de~) sous..Q/ficier6
(FSO)
xxx~ Samuel Imanishimwe , Commander of the CYangugu Military Camp
icl. Cql. Tharcisse Renzaho
xl.i. Col Leonidas Rusatira
xiii. l t. Cot. Ephrem S.etako1 head of the division of legal affairs in the
Ministry of Defense
xlui. Lt. Col. Afoys Simba
(d) Any and all c0Illlil1mkations with any ex-'FA'RofficiaI,·~y m~mbel'oi the
.former Interim Rwandan Goverrunent, or any member of the so-called
"Rwand an Governni~ntin I!xile," between July19, 1994 and P.ecember ·31,
1996, i:ncludi.n,gnot limited to:
i. 111eodore Sindiku~wabo
ii. Jean Katnbanda
iii. Callixte Kalimanzira
j_v• •Joseph Karingan.i:re
v. Jerome BicamumJia.ka
"'.L Athanase Gasake
vii. lnnocertt Habamenshi
vrn. Stani.~as Mbona:m.peka
ix. Frederic Kayogora
x. Anat-oleNsengiyumva
xi. A ugus.tin "B~
xii.Andre Bizimana
xiii. Seb~tian Ntahobar.i.
xiv . Cyptien Kayumba
xv. Cyprien Tereraho
(e) ;.ny and· all eommunications or me_e_tings between. French. officials, ·and
, between ].IDle 20, 1994 and Deeember 311
UNAMTRand/ or UNREO officialEj
1994, including but not limited to i
i:, Herny Anyidoho, deputy
Ghanaian troops (Ghana)
commander-in-chief , commander
of
ii. Colonel Walter Balis (Belgium), , ,Deputy Chief of Operations of
UNAMIR
iii. Br ent Beardsley (Canada), Gen. DaJlaire~s assistant
iv. Jacqu~s-Roger Booh-Booh, Special Representative ,of the UN Secretary
General in Rwanda
v. Romeo Dallaire, ·General; Commander of UNAMIR (Canada)
vL Amadpu Deme, captain, intelligence officer (Senegal)
vii. Joseph Dewez, colonel, commanding the Belgian battalion , Kibat
(Belgium)
VIIL
Mbaye Diagne, .captain, military observer (Senegal )
ix. Babacar (or Bubacar) Faye, captain (Senegal)
x. Moctar Gueye~ deputy spokesperson for UNAMIR
xi. Somalia Iliya, Lieutenant-Colonel, military observer in the RPF secto r
in northern Rwanda (Nigeria)
xii. Abdul Kabia (Sierra Leone), Acting Executive Director of UNAMIR
xiii. Nlamadou Kane, Booh-Booh Policy Advisor
xiv, Don MacNeil., Major, member of the HumJutltarian Assistance Cell
(Canada)
xv. Luc Marchal, colon~l, commander of the Kigali sector of UNAMIR
(Belgium)
Cheri£ El Oualide Mbodj, captain (Senegal)
xvi.
xvii Pierr e Mehu, spokesperson for UNAMIR
xviii. Colo nel Moen (Pakistan), head of UN AMIR operations
xix.
Colonel Nazrul, commander 0£the Bangladeshi battalion
xx. Gilbert Ngijol, assistant to the Booh-Booh Special Repres.entative
KKi. Maree .Pajik, Major (Poland)
xxfi. Jean~Guy Plante " Major, Media Officer (Canada)
xxiiL- Luc Racine, Military Observer (Canada)
xxiv . Mamadou Sarr, Colonel (Senegal)
xxv. Joe Sills, spokesman for UNAMIR
xxvi. Stefan Stec, ~jor (Poland)
xx.vii. Samba Tall; capt_ain, military observer (Senegal)
xxviii. Isoa Tikoka, Colonel, Chief of the UNAMIR !1ilitary Observer
Group (Fiji)
xxix. Robert VanPutten , captain, aide-de-camp of Dallaire (Nether lands)
xxx. But-ch Waldrum .,Logistics Advisor
xxxi. Clay ton Yaache (Ghana)
(f) Any and all confrontations of French soldiers with RPF in Rwanda, between
June 20, 1994 and Au .gust 31, 1994;
(g) Any and all known instances of threats to the lives of Tutsi civilians in Rwanda ,
any and all respons~s to those threats by French officials or- others, or the absen ce of response to those thteats, from June 20, 1994 to December 31, 1994;
(I})
/Dy and all organizational chart8 and ~ of Frenc;h milimry off:id~ of all
ranks deployed in Rwanda . as part of Operation TW'quoise;
(i) Any and _al] complaints about the conduct of any French militl!.rf o_fficialor
officials in Rwanda , l?etween June-20, 1.994and December 31. 1994;
G) Any an d all 'disciplinary or other actions taken against any French officiid for
hi:salle_ged cond net in Rwanda ,,between June 20, 1994 and ·oa.'€1llber 31, 1994;
(k) Any ;md all km;iwn roadblocks, any and all respons.es to those roadb locks by
French official$.or others , or the absence of r-esponse to those threats, . from Jun e
20, 1994 to A.u~t31 , 1994; and
(l)
Any and all communications regiJ.tdin·g RTLM broadcasts, including but not
limited t'o th·e broadca'SJli themselves, any and all discussion of terminating
RTLM broadcasts, and any an:d all communications wjth RTLM officials ,
officers , directors oremployees,
(m)
Ally and all documeuts , concerning Gen:eral L'e Page, head of Special
Oper .atwn i, Command (COS), in .cortnection wi_th Oper _ation twguoise
betw-een June 15, 1994 and December 31, 1994.
(n) ·An_yai:id
andocuments
c0ncernlng Colonel Lebel, :Oeputy to the Chie f of the
Inrellig.enceOnit, in connection with Operation Tw:quoise between June 15,
1994i!nd December 31, 1994;
(o) Atty and .all communi cations regarding whether Frimce would contiru.te to
recognize the Interim Rwandan Goverrui1ent as the fegi~te
Rw.anda
between 1D1e20, 1994 and Decembe r 31, 1994;
gove rnment
rif
(p),Any and all mili~
plans for French soldiers or other -military ass .ets to deploy
to Klgali Jeadin_g-qpto or-during Operation Turqu·olse;
(q) Any and all clo<:uments pertaining to the poss1ble par tition of Rwanda ,
including bu t rto.t limited t_o the _formation of a ''.Hutuland " or foanao:on of
"Tutsiland " in Rwanda;
(1:)Any and all dOCUJnents responsive to the document requests issued by
Monsieur da ude Ch:oquet lfild n0t provi ded to ilie Tribunal de Grande
Instance de Paris.
(s) Any .and all do .cumen~ related to theJ=e
and wamirigs about tl'i"em.
199.4massacre of'T1.1tsiaf Bisesero .
Reqaest No. 5: Any and~ documents .and communications related to th~ Safe
Humanitarian Zon e estat>lisbed irt Rwanda , in July 1994, including but not llmi.ted to:
(a) Any and all conunwications . and draft memoranda
establishm ent of the Safe Humanitarian Zone;
r.e1ated to th~
(b) Provision of .safe passage thro ,ugh, or admis.sjon to, the Safe Humanitarian
Zone for any Interim Rwandan Government offidal;· any FAR official; any
member of a militia (sum as thefnterahamwe); any officer , dp-ed:or, or e01ployee
of RTLM; or apyone : ~wn
to hav.e harmed°' killed or threatened to ham, or
kill a civilian;
(c) Any an d all .contact wii:h any Interim Rwandan Governmentoftidal; any .FAR
official ; any member of a militia (such as the litterah.am1..t
1e);any officer, director ,
or emplo yee of RTLM; or anyone known kJ'have harmed , killed or threatened
to harm or kill:a civilian in Zaire, including .but not limited to Go.ma, Zaire and
·within. any refugee camp;
(d) Any and a1Jcommunications wJfhofficials of the United N ations ~ including
membe r States ., regar-dtng whether to arrest or detain any Interim Rwandan
Government official ; any FAR official; any member of a militia (such as the
Jntemlzannue); any offk:er; director , or employ~ of RTI.lvl; or anyone kn own to
have ham.ed, killed or tltreatened to harn.1 or kiU.a,ciyilian ;
(e) Any anclall ~ontac _t with Tutsi civilians in ..the Safe Humanitarian Zone ;
(f) Any and an co.mmunic_aiions related to FAR military .activjty wi thin the Safe
Humani tarian :Zone·o'll;tsideof the garriso n ;
(g) Any and ~ comnn mieations regarding plans
tot the confis eati on of w:eapon:s,
ammuniti on., m9 other military equipment from memb ers of the FAR .or
militia s, and for-the seo.1.ringof such confiscated items ;
(h) Any and all romrr nmica ti.ons con~e.rning any attempt fQ disarm the FAR or any
of its officials. and the militias (or any of its members) in the Humanitarian
Zone .
(i) Any and all oom.n'luru@fionsregarding possible ,seeps·oohe taken to prevent
the looting of Rwandan assets and their movement throu gh the Saie
Humani tarian Zone;
G) Any and all communications
with officials of 'the Inte rim Rwan_dan
Government , th e FAR, oi:-ex-FAR, from April 6, 1994 tbrough August 21, 1994.
RequesLNo~ 6~Any and all documents .and comman.ications . :related to Rwanda
.and P.a:uJ_
Barril, Bob Denard or any other French mercenary operating in or performin _g
tasks Telated to Rwanda, &:om January1, 1993 through D.eceml;rer31~1995.
Request No . 7~·Any and
~
documents and ·commurtications related to Operation
Noro'it
.Request No. 8: Any and andocuments and c.ommmtlc~tions ·related to Operation.
Amaryllis or actions of the French gove1nmen.tpersonnel in Rwanda between April 6,
1994.and April 18, -1994, including butnofJ.imiteQ. to :
(a) Any ; and all communications
Rwandan Governmen t;
related to the establishment
of the Interim
(b) Any and all communications related to Rwandans approved or disapprove
by ·Fre11chofficials to be provided .r.efuge at the French embassy in I
(c) Any and all com.municati.0nsrelated .t0.Rwandans approved and
disappr oved by _French officials to be evacuated dwing Op.eration Amaryllis,
With.-specWcrnfere nce to the natiqnalliy (including honorary Pr.e.nch
citizenship) ·conferred upon any of the Rwandans whose names were
conside red ;
(d) Any and all communication,s th~tsnppor t the .conclusion that of the 3.94
Rwan.dais ·evacu:ated during Operatfon Amaryllis they were "40% Tutsi'.60%
Hut:u (seepage 42 of the Enqu~te s~e la :t;rag~die rwandaise: (1990-1994J
Tome Il., Annexes in the "ChronologfoDe La Ctise Rwandaise (mise a jow- du
17 avril 1~8)'1);,
(e) Any and .all comnm.nications relating to t:he denial by the French goven1ment
of asylum rothe five children of the Rwandan Prim~ Minister Agathe
Uwill11
giyimana, who, along with her husband, wasassassinat~d by
Rwandan Government Forces on April 7, 1994.
f) Any and all comm..unications related to fhe dea_ths of Otief Warrant Officer
Alain Didot, hls ~e · Gilda Lana, and ChiefWcm"a.ntOfficer Rene Maier ,
Request No . 9~Anyand all docu,ments and·communications,.from Janu.ary 1~1991
tht,bug'h,Ju.Iy
·st ..J994, r~Iated tp·the a.sedf roa~blecks in Rw an da to fli.scriminate against ,
harass-or harm tutsi civilians.
Request No. 10: Any and all documents ; and QO,mmunitations rel~ted tg the
downing of the Falcon 50, on April .6( 1994.
Reque-srNo.11_: Any and all DGSE nn~es from JanUB.I)' 1:,, 1990 t0 December ·31>
1995, r_elated. t~ R'.W,8nda
.
Re ques t.No . 12: Any and ·all :ORMnotes from June 1.6;1992 to' De:i;emper31, 1995,
related b;, Rwanda
Request.No, 13: Anyand all cale~s
to Decemb~r 31,;1995, for~
~diarie&-or datebooks, frori1January t~199.0
(a) Cla u de Aroa iid
(b) Serge B.oudevaiK
(c) Ja~ues Bouzerand
(dJNathalie 'Brio.t
(e) :Cql. G:ilber~Canovas
(f) Jaf;ques ~out bin
(g) BernardC~ac
(h1Ptan~ois de.Gt~ssouvt"e
(i) Bruno D.ela
ye
G) Patti Otjmid
(k) B~rtrand Dufourcq
(l) Roland DUillas
(m) Miche le 'Fra.mion-Buguet
(rt) Francois Qaufhier(o) YanniakGerar d
'(p)Rm1mondG_ermanos
(q) Cpt. Ma:ttm Gillier
(r) Je~ )-iei;nti,cl.1
(s) Col )"acques Hpgard
(t) J~an-l1..~re littchon
·(u).Phillippe Jehanne
(v~Alafa Jqpp~
(w)Cot Bruno Le Flem
..
(x) Gen.-Jean Claude Lafourcade
(y) Adm. JacquesLanxade
(z) Col Ch ristian Lareau
(aa) Jean-Mich~ Marlaud
(bb) Geor ges Martres
(cc) Brig. Gen . Jean -JacquesM~urin
(dd ) Gen. Laur entMichaud
(ee) Fran f ois Mitterrand
(ff)Je.an~Christo phe Mitterrand
(gg) JeawJ~que s Mouline
(hh) Geor ges .Dupuis
(ii) Dominiqu_-e
Pin
(jj) Antoine Pouille ute·
.(kk) Chri5tian Q
esnot'
(11)Jacques R1~ u1t
(nun) Mich el Rob.ard~y
(nn) Col. Jacques Rosier
(oo') Michel Roussin
(pp) Jean -Marc.Simon
(qq) Col 0 [dfer Tauzin
(x:r)JeanVarret
(ss) Hu beit Vedrine·
(tt) Gilles Vidal
(uu)
(vv)
Jacqu es Warin
Ben1ard Zimmermann
Request No. 14:Any and all documems.and communica tions relat ed to any and
all com..m
:g.nications be,tween any ot the individl.lals listed m Requ est N'o. 13 with
Rwand~ officials , betcween October~ , 1990 anq Pecember 31, 1995.
Request No . 15! Any and all 'documents and .communi:cation s I ela,t:ed to an_y
communications (evg,, .nbtes, cables, memoranda)' related to Rwart.dar which .any of the
indNi.duals listed in Request No. 13 drafted ., sent, received or ·on which they were copied,
between October l, ·1990 and December 31, 1995.
Request No . 16. Any and all documents and commuruca,.tions relat ~d to the
purchas e, transf er dr shipment of any weaponry , ammunition or other ,mili tary
equipment into Rw and a or Zair e, from Jat1uary1, 1994,through D.ecei,nber 31, 1995 by:
i'.
Th e Frend governm ent~including military
or securi o/. servic.es;
ii
iii .
xv·,
FLrnded by the French gov.ernmentor French banks, including but not limited
to Banque Natfonale de Faris ;French com.panies, including but not limited to .Sofremas, DYL Invest ,
Luthaite , 0r Thomson Brandt Armements; and/ or
Mil-Tee.
Request No. ·17: Any and ill documents , and cotnn}unfoatio.Illi related to the
purchase, transfer or sbipment ·of any coilliJU.lnications equipment into Rwanda or Zaire,
from January 1, 1994 th!ough Decenlbe,r31, 1995.
Request No . 18: Any and all documentaliort rela.t.ed to diseussiqns at the United
Nations Seeurity Council ("tJNSC '') regar.cling:
(a) French assistance to the Juvenal Habyarirnaiia government in Rwanda, from
October 1~90· --April .1994;
(b) Positions taken by the French government or any French offici~J ~fore the
UNSC;
(c) TI1e development, n.egotiation, exeeution and implementation of the
Accords ;
(d).UN AMIR;
(e) The Gen ocide against the Tutsi ;
.Arusna
(£) UNAMIRTI,
(g) Francer s request for authorization for an i:rttetvention into Rw:andatin 1994j
(h) The ~e Humanit.a.rum Zone;
(l) ArresJs. or detentions of genocidaires
in Rwanda or other states;
(i) Exttadi .tion and pIOSecution of individuals
charged Witb tomn_utting
internati onal O'iines · (e.g.r genoci4e.1crimes against humanity) agains.t the Tum
civilian s, during the 1994 Genocide against the ·Tutst -in ,Rwanda.
Request No. 19~Any and all documents and cpmmunica~ons related to French
soldiers, DGSE, and/ ox any individual woriking at the behest of the · French government
in ;Rwanda-between April 15, 1994 'and
June20, 1994-.
Reguest No . 20: Any and all documents and communiQ ions related ·to the use of
ethnic ID cards in Rwand~, between October 1990 and July 1994.
Request N0. 21.; Any and all documents and c.ommnaications r~Wed to warnings ·
bout ethnic killings of Tutsi , state-spons0rship of tbem.,
massacres of Tutsi at Bugesera
in March 1992, ~ d any· other massacres of Tutsi in Rwanda and/or a· genocide from
October 1990
tO Jul ~,;i.994.
Request Nn. 22: Any and all :documents · regarding Rwanda dated between 1
October1990 and 6 April 1994 and drafte4 by .Nicolas Coniere, Alain SalvyJJean Louis
Nicolas; Philippe Molle, Joel Warembourg, Alain D~, ;Mich~l Robarday, or any other
French official wh a advised or assisted the Rwandan Gendarm~rie in that ti.m.$ame.
Request No .. 23: Any and all documents regarding : Rwanda dated bemreen 1
October 19901 and 6 Ap ril 1994, drafted by,sent to, or received by Gilles Chollet, Etienne
Joubert,.J~cquesRosier,.Jean.:LouisNabia:sfBernard Cussac., Didier Tauzin, or any other
French official who w~ a part of the Detache_ment d; Assistance Mllitaire (otherwise
kw own as "DAMI '"'}Panda, Mission d'"Assistance Militare (otherwise known as "MAM:")
or advised., assisted ,: OI provided instruction to any members of the FAR in that
REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
Kigali [stamp:] 27 MAY 2019
No. [handwritten:] 1248/082 UP/IJJCD
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
B.P. 160 KIGALI
Honorable Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
KIGALI
RE : Transmission of the letter requesting documents to the Government of France
Hon. Minister,
I am pleased to forward for your kind attention the attached letter requesting the Government of
France the disclosure of documents, for onward transmission to tire competent authority in France.
Enclosed, please find attached the lists of documents and communications that the Government of
Rwanda would like the Government of France to declassify.
Sincerely,
[signature]
[stamp:] MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
BUSINGYE Johnston
Minister of Justice and Attorney General
Sans frais : MTN : 3936/Airtel : 3736 Site Web : www.minijust.gov.rw E-mail : mjust@www.minijust.gov.rw
: @Rwanda_Justice
Minijust Rwanda
RÉPUBLIQUE DU RWANDA
Kigali [tampon :] 27 MAI 2019
Nº [manuscrit :] 1248/084 UP/IJJCD
MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE
B.P. 160 KIGALI
Monsieur le Ministre de la Justice
République française
PARIS
RE : Demande de documents relatifs au génocide de 1994 contre les Tutsis
Monsieur le Ministre,
Par cette lettre, le gouvernement du Rwanda demande respectueusement au gouvernement français
de déclassifier et de produire les documents et autres pièces concernant le génocide de 1994 contre
les Tutsis. Le 7 avril de cette année a marqué le 25e anniversaire du début du génocide. L’histoire
du génocide contre les Tutsis est d’une grave et profonde importance pour le Gouvernement et le
peuple rwandais, et nous demandons la coopération de la France pour faire en sorte que cette
histoire soit comprise dans son intégralité.
Nous estimons, avec tout notre respect, que les gouvernements et les peuples des deux pays ont un
profond intérêt à établir la vérité sur le génocide perpétré contre les Tutsis. Pour les Rwandais, il
s’agit d’un des événements majeurs de l’histoire de notre pays. Pour le peuple français, cela
apporterait une évaluation honnête de la conduite de la France au Rwanda.
L’accès aux documents du gouvernement français est essentiel pour établir l’intégralité de cette
histoire. Tant que la France ne déclassifiera pas et ne produira pas ses documents, le public
continuera à s’interroger sur le rôle précis des fonctionnaires français dans le génocide contre les
Tutsis.
Dans un premier temps, nous vous demandons d’établir un processus afin que l’ensemble des
documents pertinents puisse être produit et transféré au Rwanda pour y être examiné. Pour
commencer ce processus, nous joignons une annexe indiquant le type de documents que nous
recherchons et des suggestions concernant leur production. Au fur et à mesure que les choses
avancent et que l’enquête se poursuit, nous pouvons identifier d’autres documents et travailler en
Sans frais : MTN : 3936/Airtel : 3736 Site Web : www.minijust.gov.rw E-mail : mjust@www.minijust.gov.rw
: @Rwanda_Justice
Minijust Rwanda
étroite collaboration avec les personnes chargées de recueillir et de produire les informations. Des
questions telles que la déclassification, la confidentialité et d’autres facteurs peuvent être
pleinement évaluées, en tenant compte des intérêts légitimes de chaque pays.
Permettez-moi de conclure sur une note personnelle. Chaque personne au Rwanda demeure
affectée par le génocide contre les Tutsis. En avril, période où nous commençons Kwibuka, nos
100 jours de commémoration, nous nous remémorons une fois de plus la nécessité vitale d’une
histoire entière et précise. Sans une étude honnête de l’histoire, nous courons le risque que de tels
événements se reproduisent. Nous sommes conscients et guidés par le fait évident que ceux qui ne
connaissent pas l’histoire sont condamnés à la répéter. La mémoire des personnes décédées et
blessées devrait être honorée par un investissement complet des deux gouvernements dans cette
entreprise. Nous sommes conscients que de nombreuses personnes en France s’interrogent sur
certains événements qui ont joué un rôle central dans le génocide. Travaillons ensemble pour
trouver une façon d’aller de l’avant et pour que ces événements soient étudiés ouvertement et
honnêtement.
Je vous remercie de l’attention que vous portez à ces questions.
Cordialement,
[signature]
[tampon :] MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE
BUSINGYE Johnston
Ministre de la Justice et Procureur général
CC
Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires étrangères et de la Coopération internationale
KIGALI
Sans frais : MTN : 3936/Airtel : 3736 Site Web : www.minijust.gov.rw E-mail : mjust@www.minijust.gov.rw
: @Rwanda_Justice
Minijust Rwanda
Annexe A
Définitions
Les termes suivants utilisés dans les demandes ci-dessous doivent être compris en utilisant les
définitions fournies ici.
1. Les documents sont tous les écrits, y compris notamment les lettres, les e-mails, les
mémorandums, les télégrammes, les notes, les fiches particulières, les rapports, les ordres
militaires, les communiqués de presse, les cartes, les calendriers, les journaux, les agendas,
les organigrammes, les enregistrements audio ou vidéo et les photographies.
2. Les communications sont tous les écrits ou enregistrements transmis d’un expéditeur à un
destinataire, y compris notamment les lettres, les e-mails, les mémorandums, les fiches
particulières, les câbles, les notes, les rapports, les ordres militaires et les communiqués de
presse.
3. Les fonctionnaires français sont tous les civils travaillant pour ou au nom de toute
composante du gouvernement français (qu’ils soient élus, nommés politiquement ou
employés par la fonction publique) ainsi que tous les membres de l’armée française ou de
la Légion étrangère française.
Demandes
Demande nº 1 : Toutes les versions et toutes les ébauches de communications et de
documents relatives au génocide contre les Tutsis.
Demande nº 2 : Tous les éléments, y compris notamment les communications et
documents relatifs à l’Office rwandais d’Information (« ORINFOR »), à la Radio Rwanda ou à la
Radio Télévision libre des Mille Collines (« RTLM »), ou à l’un de leurs dirigeants, directeurs,
employés, agents ou représentants, y compris notamment les documents relatifs à :
(a) Toute assistance financière, technique ou autre, y compris notamment la formation,
fournie par une entité ou un fonctionnaire du gouvernement français à ORINFOR, à
Radio Rwanda ou à RTLM ;
(b) Tous les enregistrements, copies, transcriptions ou résumés des émissions de Radio
Rwanda relatives aux massacres de civils tutsis au Bugesera, en mars 1992 ;
(c) Toute réunion ou autre communication entre les fonctionnaires français et les
fonctionnaires d’ORINFOR ;
(d) Tous les enregistrements, copies, transcriptions ou résumés des émissions de RTLM.
[signature]
(e) La création de RTLM ;
(f) Toute discussion sur la cessation, le brouillage ou l’interruption des émissions de
RTLM par des moyens technologiques ou diplomatiques ;
(g) Les dirigeants, directeurs, employés, représentants ou agents d’ORINFOR (y compris
notamment de Radio Rwanda), y compris notamment :
i. Ferdinand Nahimana (Directeur d’ORINFOR, 1990-1992)
ii. Jean-Baptiste Bamwanga (Éditeur en chef de Radio Rwanda, 1992)
iii. Paul Mbaraga (Directeur de Radio Rwanda, 1976-1990)
iv. Froduald Ntawulikura (Chef du service Développement de la communication
rurale chez ORINFOR)
v. Joseph Serugendo (Chef de la maintenance de Radio Rwanda)
vi. Christophe Mfizi (Directeur d’ORINFOR, 1978-1990)
vii. Charles Nahayo (Directeur du Projet de télévision du Rwanda, 1992)
(h) Tout document concernant les communications entre la France ou des sociétés
françaises, y compris notamment Télédiffusion de France, et RTLM ou EclipseRwanda concernant la création d’une station de télévision rwandaise.
(i) Toute réunion ou autre communication entre tout fonctionnaire français et tout
dirigeant, directeur, employé, représentant ou agent de RTLM ;
(j) Tous les dirigeants, directeurs, employés, représentants ou agents de RTLM, y compris
notamment :
i. Felicien Kabuga (Président-directeur général ; Président de l’Assemblée
générale des actionnaires ; Président du Comité d’initiative)
ii. Ferdinand Nahimana (Comité de rédaction ; Président de la Commission de la
technique et des programmes ; Membre du Comité d’initiative)
iii. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza (Comité de rédaction)
iv. Joseph Serugendo (Comité de rédaction)
v. Phocas Habimana (Directeur général)
vi. Gaspard Gahigi (Rédacteur en chef)
vii. Philippe Mbilizi (Chef des programmes en français)
viii. Jean Ntezimana (Technicien en chef)
ix. Ignance Temahagira (Secrétaire du Comité d’initiative)
(k) Tout investisseur ou actionnaire de RTLM, y compris notamment :
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
[signature]
Jean Baptiste Bamwanga
Marie Banzubaze
Jérôme Bicamumpaka
Simon Bikindi
v. Telesphore Bizimungu
vi. Ernest Buroko
vii. Georges Gakeri
viii. Jean Habyarimana
ix. P. Celestin Haguma
x. Mujawayezu Marthe
xi. Mathieu Hakizayezu
xii. Victor Kalisa
xiii. Bernard Maniragaba
xiv. Drocella Mukambonera
xv.
Issac Mulihano
xvi. Pasteur Musabe
xvii. Jean Mvulirwenande
xviii. Marie Vianney
xix. Cyprien Ndagijimana
xx. Jean Damascene Ndagijimana
xxi. Claude Ndamiye
xxii. Jean Baptiste Nemeyabahizi
xxiii. Bibiane Negegayire
xxiv. Emmmanuel Ngirwanabagabo
xxv. Augustin Ngirabatware
xxvi. Dieudonne Niyitegeka
xxvii. Ephrem Nkezabera
xxvii. Deogratias Nsabimana
xxix. Bernardin Nsengamungu
xxx. Andre Ntagerura
xxxi. Daniel Ntawamenyumunsi
xxxii. Alphonse Ntilivamunda
xxxiii. Aaron Ntizihabose
xxxiv. Froduald Ntawulikura
xxxv. Laurence Nyirabalinda
xxxvi. Beatrice Nyirabalinda
xxxvii. Charles Nzabagerageza
xxxviii.
Joseph Nzirorera
xxxix. Boniface Rucagu
xi. Pheneas Ruhumuliza
xli. Georges Rutaganda
xlii. François Serushyana
xliii. Robert Simba
xliv. Stanislas Simbizi
xlv. Marc Siniyobewe
xlvi. Igance Temhagari
xlvii. Rose Usabuwera
[signature]
Demande nº 3 : Tous les documents et toutes les communications concernant les milices
au Rwanda, telles que les Interahamwe et les Impuzamugambi, et concernant les relations entre les
autorités françaises et les milices, y compris, mais non exclusivement, les questions relatives à :
(a) Tout fonctionnaire français en poste, travaillant ou s’instruisant à Mukamira, Gabiro
ou à Gako, entre le 1er octobre 1990 et le 4 juillet 1994.
(b) Toute formation des milices au Rwanda par des fonctionnaires français.
(c) La connaissance qu’a tout fonctionnaire français de la formation des milices au Rwanda.
(d) Toute coordination, planification ou communication entre les milices au Rwanda et
RTLM.
(e) Tout dirigeant, fonctionnaire, membre, représentant ou sympathisant financier des
Impuzamugambi.
(f) Tout dirigeant, officier, membre, représentant, conseiller, investisseur ou partisan des
Interahamwe, y compris notamment :
i. Le Comité national
a. Jerry Robert Kajuga (Président)
b. Phénéas Ruhumuliza (Senior vice-président)
c. Georges Rutaganda (Premier vice-président)
d. Eugene Mbarushimana (Secrétaire général)
e. Dieudonne Niyitegeka (Trésorier)
ii. Collège des conseillers
a. Bernard Maniragaba (Président de la Commission des questions sociales
et juridiques)
b. Joseph Serugendo (Président de la Commission de la recherche et du
développement)
c. Jean Pierre Sebanetsi (Président de la Commission des questions
politiques et de la propagande)
d. Ephrem Nkezabera (Président de la Commission économique et
financière)
e. J.M.V. Mudahinyuka (Président de la Commission de suivi et
d’évaluation)
f. Alphonse Kanimba (Président de la Commission des relations extérieures
et de la documentation)
iii Autres sympathisants
a. Séraphin Rwabukumba
b. Col. Elie Sagatwa
c. Col. Theoneste Bagosora
[signature]
d. Lt. Bahufite Juvenal
e. Séraphin Twahirwa
f. Gervais Nzabanterur
g. Rose Karushara
h. Charles Nyandwi
i. Mathieu Ngirumpatse
j. Desire Murenzi
k. Protais Zigiranyirazo
l. Séraphin Rwabukumba
m. Joseph Nzizorera
n. Charles Nyandwi
o. Pasteur Musabe
p. Charles Nzabagerageza
q. Callixte Nzabonimana
r. Boniface Rucagu
s. Lieutenant-Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho
t. Pierre Celestin Rwagafirita
u. Pascal Simbikangwa
v. Leone Mbonabaryi
w. Fidele Murigande
x. Aimable Ngabitsinze
y. Jules Rugina
z. Richard Simba
aa. Pierre Kayondo
bb. Claver Kamana
cc. Isaac Kamali
dd. Simon Bikindi
ee. Fidele Rwambuka
ff. Aloys Ngirabatware
Demande nº 4 : Tous les documents et toutes les communications liés à l’opération
Turquoise, y compris notamment les questions relatives à :
(a) La décision de la France de proposer une mission d’intervention, ses négociations avec
d’autres États dans le cadre de l’intervention éventuelle, et ultérieurement sa demande
d’autorisation au Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies d’une intervention au Rwanda
et toutes communications relatives à cette demande ;
(b) La conduite des Forces armées rwandaises (« FAR »), 1 entre le 6 avril 1994 et le
31 décembre 1994, y compris notamment leur rôle dans le génocide contre les Tutsis ;
leur rôle dans les massacres de civils tutsis avant le génocide ; leur engagement
militaire avec l’Armée patriotique rwandaise ; leur interaction avec les civils tutsis ou
toute violence perpétrée contre eux ; leur disponibilité ; toute demande du
1
Tout au long de cette demande de document, partout où cela est mentionné, les FAR incluent les officiers et anciens officiers
des FAR.
[signature]
gouvernement intérimaire rwandais au gouvernement français ou à des fonctionnaires
français individuels d’assistance aux FAR ; et toute assistance fournie par les
fonctionnaires français aux FAR ;
(c) Toute communication entre des fonctionnaires français et des fonctionnaires du
gouvernement intérimaire rwandais ou des FAR, entre le 20 juin 1994 et le
18 juillet 1994, y compris notamment :
i. Theodore Sindikubwabo, Président de la République
ii. Jean Kambanda, Premier ministre
iii. Jérôme Bicamumpaka, Ministre des Affaires étrangères et de la Coopération
iv. Eliezer Niyitegeka, Ministre de l’Information
v. Augustin Bizimana, Ministre de la Défense
vi. Casimir Bizimungu, Ministre de la Santé
vii. Agnes Ntamabyaliro, Ministre de la Justice
viii. Straton Nsabumukunzi, Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Élevage
ix. Daniel Mbangura, Ministre de l’Enseignement supérieur, de la Recherche
scientifique et de la Culture
x. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Ministre de l’Enseignement supérieur, de la
Recherche scientifique et de la Culture
xi. Callixte Kalimanzira, Ministre de l’Intérieur et du Développement municipal
xii. Edouard Karemera, Ministre de l’Intérieur
xiii. Emmanuel Ndindabahizi, Ministre des Finances
xiv. Prosper Mugiraneza, Ministre de la Fonction publique
xv. André Ntagerura, Ministre des Transports et des Communications
xvi. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Ministre de la Famille et de la Promotion de la
femme
xvii. André Rwamakuba, Ministre de l’Enseignement primaire et secondaire
xviii. Augustin Ngirabatware, Ministre de la Planification
xix. Callixte Nzabonimana, Ministre de la Jeunesse
xx.
Daniel Mbangura, Directeur du Cabinet de la Présidence
xxi. Justin Mugenzi, Ministre du Commerce, de l’Industrie et de l’Artisanat
xxii. Anatole Nsengiyumva, Commandant du secteur de Gisenyi
xxiii. Hyacinthe Nsengiyumva Rafiki, Ministre des Travaux publics et de
l’Énergie
xxiv. Jean de Dieu Habineza, Ministre du Travail et des Affaires sociales
xxv. Gaspard Ruhumuliza, Ministre de l’Environnement et du Tourisme, PDC
xxvi. Andre Singaye
xxvii. Col. Théoneste Bagosora
xxviii. Gratien Kabiligi, Chef du Bureau des opérations militaires (G-3)
xxix. Anatole Nsengiyumva, Commandant du secteur de Gisenyi
xxx. Aloys Ntabakuze, Commandant du bataillon para-commando
xxxi. Augustin Bizimungu, Commandant des opérations du secteur de
Ruhengeri et Chef d’état-major de l’armée rwandaise après le 19 avril 1994
xxxii. Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Chef d’état-major de la Gendarmerie nationale
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xxxiii. François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye, Commandant du bataillon de
reconnaissance (RECCE)
xxxiv. Innocent Sagahutu, Commandant de l’escadron A du bataillon RECCE
xxxv. Ildephonse Hategekimana, Commandant du camp militaire de Ngoma
xxxvi. Protais Mpiranya, Commandant du bataillon de la garde présidentielle
xxxvii. Tharcisse Muvunyi, Commandant de l’École des sous-officiers (ESO)
xxxviii. Ildephonse Nizeyimana, Officier à l’École des sous-officiers (ESO)
xxxix. Samuel Imanishimwe, Commandant du camp militaire de Cyangugu
xl. Col. Tharcisse Renzaho
xli. Col. Leonidas Rusatira
xlii. Lcl Ephrem Setako, Chef de la division des affaires juridiques du ministère
de la Défense.
xliii. Lcl Aloys Simba
(d) Toute communication avec tout ancien officier des FAR, tout membre de l’ancien
gouvernement intérimaire rwandais ou tout membre du prétendu « Gouvernement
rwandais en exil », entre le 19 juillet 1994 et le 31 décembre 1996, y compris
notamment :
i. Théodore Sindikubwabo
ii. Jean Kambanda
iii. Callixte Kalimanzira
iv. Joseph Karinganire
v. Jérôme Bicamumpaka
vi. Athanase Gasake
vii. Innocent Habamenshi
viii. Stanislas Mbonampeka
ix. Frederic Kayogora
x. Anatole Nsengiyumva
xi. Augustin Bizimana
xii. Andre Bizimana
xiii. Sebastian Ntahobari
xiv. Cyprien Kayumba
xv. Cyprien Tereraho
(e) Toute communication ou réunion entre des fonctionnaires français et des fonctionnaires
de la MINUAR et/ou du Bureau des Nations unies pour les secours d’urgence au
Rwanda (UNREO), entre le 20 juin 1994 et le 31 décembre 1994, y compris
notamment :
i. Henry Anyidohoho, Commandant en chef adjoint, Commandant des troupes
ghanéennes (Ghana)
[signature]
ii. Colonel Walter Balis (Belgique), Chef adjoint des opérations de la MINUAR
iii. Brent Beardsley (Canada), Adjoint du Général Dallaire
iv. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des
Nations unies au Rwanda
v. Romeo Dallaire, Général, Commandant de la MINUAR (Canada)
vi. Amadou Deme, Capitaine, Agent des services de renseignements (Sénégal)
vii. Joseph Dewez, Colonel, Commandant du bataillon belge, Kibat (Belgique)
viii. Mbaye Diagne, Capitaine, Observateur militaire (Sénégal)
ix. Babacar (ou Bubacar) Faye, Capitaine (Sénégal)
x. Moctar Gueye, Porte-parole adjoint de la MINUAR
xi. Somalia Iliya, Lieutenant-colonel, Observateur militaire dans le secteur du FPR
dans le nord du Rwanda (Nigeria)
xii. Abdul Kabia (Sierra Leone), Directeur exécutif par intérim de la MINUAR
xiii. Mamadou Kane, Conseiller politique de Booh-Booh
xiv. Don MacNeil, Major, Membre de la cellule d’aide humanitaire (Canada)
xv. Luc Marchal, Colonel, Commandant du secteur de Kigali de la MINUAR
(Belgique)
xvi. Cherif El Oualide Mbodj, Capitaine (Sénégal)
xvii. Pierre Méhu, Porte-parole de la MINUAR
xviii. Colonel Moen (Pakistan), Chef des opérations de la MINUAR
xix. Colonel Nazrul, Commandant du bataillon bangladais
xx. Gilbert Ngijol, Assistant du représentant spécial de Booh-Booh
xxi. Marec Pajik, Major (Pologne)
xxii. Jean-Guy Plante, Major, Attaché de presse (Canada) xxiii. Luc Racine,
Observateur militaire (Canada)
xxiv. Mamadou Sarr, Colonel (Sénégal)
xxv. Joe Sills, Porte-parole de la MINUAR
xxvi. Stefan Stec, Major (Pologne)
xxvii. Samba Tall, Capitaine, Observateur militaire (Sénégal)
xxviii. Isoa Tikoka, Colonel, Chef du groupe d’observateurs militaires de la
MINUAR (Fidji)
xxix. Robert Van Putten, Capitaine, Aide de camp de Dallaire (Pays-Bas)
xxx. Butch Waldrum, Conseiller en logistique
xxxi. Clayton Yaache (Ghana)
(f) Toute confrontation de soldats français avec le FPR au Rwanda, entre le 20 juin 1994
et le 31 août 1994 ;
(g) Tous les cas connus de menaces à la vie de civils tutsis au Rwanda, toutes les réponses
à ces menaces par des fonctionnaires français ou autres, ou l’absence de réponse à ces
menaces, du 20 juin 1994 au 31 décembre 1994 ;
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(h) Tous les organigrammes et toutes les listes des militaires français de tous grades
déployés au Rwanda dans le cadre de l’opération Turquoise ;
(i) Toute plainte concernant la conduite d’un ou de plusieurs officiers militaires français
au Rwanda, entre le 20 juin 1994 et le 31 décembre 1994 ;
(j) Toute mesure disciplinaire ou autre prise à l’encontre d’un fonctionnaire français pour
sa conduite présumée au Rwanda, entre le 20 juin 1994 et le 31 décembre 1994 ;
(k) Tous les barrages routiers connus, toutes les interventions des fonctionnaires français
ou d’autres face à ces barrages, ou l’absence d’intervention face à ces menaces, du
20 juin 1994 au 31 août 1994 ; et
(l) Toute communication concernant les émissions de RTLM, y compris notamment les
émissions elles-mêmes, toute discussion sur la cessation des émissions de RTLM, et
toute communication avec les représentants, les dirigeants, les directeurs ou les
employés de RTLM.
(m) Tous les documents concernant le Général Le Page, Chef du commandement des
opérations spéciales (COS), dans le cadre de l’opération Turquoise entre le
15 juin 1994 et le 31 décembre 1994.
(n) Tous les documents concernant le Colonel Lebel, Adjoint au chef de l’unité du
renseignement, dans le cadre de l’opération Turquoise entre le 15 juin 1994 et le
31 décembre 1994 ;
(o) Toute communication relative à la question de savoir si la France continuerait à
reconnaître le gouvernement intérimaire rwandais comme le gouvernement légitime du
Rwanda entre le 20 juin 1994 et le 31 décembre 1994 ;
(p) Tout plan militaire prévoyant le déploiement de soldats français ou d’autres moyens
militaires à Kigali avant ou pendant l’opération Turquoise ;
(q) Tous les documents relatifs à une éventuelle partition du Rwanda, y compris
notamment à la formation d’un « Hutuland » ou d’un « Tutsiland » au Rwanda ;
(r) Tous les documents répondant aux demandes de documents émanant de Monsieur
Claude Choquet et non transmis au Tribunal de grande instance de Paris.
(s) Tous les documents relatifs au massacre des Tutsis à Bisesero en juin 1994 et les
avertissements à leur sujet.
[signature]
Demande nº 5 : Tous les documents et toutes les communications relatifs à la Zone
humanitaire sûre établie au Rwanda, en juillet 1994, y compris notamment :
(a) Toutes les communications et toutes les ébauches de mémorandums relatives à la
création de la Zone humanitaire sûre ;
(b) Assurer la sécurité du passage ou de l’admission dans la Zone humanitaire sûre de tout
fonctionnaire du gouvernement intérimaire rwandais, de tout officier des FAR, de tout
membre d’une milice (comme les Interahamwe), de tout officier, directeur ou employé
de la RTLM ou de toute personne connue pour avoir blessé ou tué un civil, ou menacé
de le faire ;
(c) Tout contact avec tout fonctionnaire du gouvernement intérimaire rwandais, tout
officier des FAR, tout membre d’une milice (comme les Interahamwe), tout
représentant, directeur ou employé de RTLM, ou toute personne connue pour avoir
blessé, tué ou menacé de blesser ou tuer un civil au Zaïre, notamment à Goma et dans
tout camp de réfugiés ;
(d) Toute communication avec des fonctionnaires de l’Organisation des Nations unies, y
compris les États membres, concernant l’arrestation ou la détention d’un fonctionnaire
du gouvernement intérimaire rwandais, d’un officier des FAR, d’un membre d’une
milice (comme les Interahamwe), d’un dirigeant, directeur ou employé de la RTLM,
ou d’une personne ayant fait du mal, tué, menacé ou blessé un civil ;
(e) Tout contact avec les civils tutsis dans la Zone humanitaire sûre ;
(f) Toutes les communications relatives aux activités militaires des FAR dans la Zone
humanitaire sûre à l’extérieur de la garnison ;
(g) Toute communication concernant les plans de confiscation d’armes, de munitions et
d’autres équipements militaires à des membres des FAR ou des milices, et la
sécurisation de ces articles confisqués ;
(h) Toute communication concernant toute tentative de désarmer les FAR ou l’un de leurs
officiers et les milices (ou l’un de leurs membres) dans la Zone humanitaire.
(i) Toute communication concernant les mesures à prendre pour empêcher le pillage des
avoirs rwandais et leur circulation à travers la Zone humanitaire sûre ;
(j) Toute communication avec les fonctionnaires du gouvernement intérimaire rwandais,
les FAR ou les ex-FAR, du 6 avril 1994 au 21 août 1994.
[signature]
Demande nº 6 : Tous les documents et toutes les communications concernant le
Rwanda et Paul Barril, Bob Denard ou tout autre mercenaire français opérant au Rwanda ou
exécutant des tâches liées au Rwanda, du 1er janvier 1993 au 31 décembre 1995.
Demande nº 7 : Tous les documents et toutes les communications relatifs à l’opération
Noroît.
Demande nº 8 : Tous les documents et toutes les communications relatifs à l’opération
Amaryllis ou aux actions du personnel du gouvernement français au Rwanda entre le 6 avril 1994
et le 18 avril 1994, y compris notamment :
(a) Toute communication relative à la mise en place du gouvernement intérimaire
rwandais ;
(b) Toutes les communications relatives aux Rwandais dont les fonctionnaires français
ont approuvé ou désapprouvé l’hébergement à l’ambassade de France à Kigali ;
(c) Toutes les communications relatives aux Rwandais dont les fonctionnaires français
ont approuvé ou désapprouvé l’évacuation pendant l’opération Amaryllis, en faisant
spécifiquement référence à la nationalité (y compris à la citoyenneté française
d’honneur) conférée à tout Rwandais dont les noms ont été pris en compte ;
(d) Toute communication étayant la conclusion que sur les 394 Rwandais évacués lors de
l’opération Amaryllis, ils étaient « 40 % de Tutsis, 60 % de Hutus (voir page 42 de
l’Enquête sur la tragédie rwandaise (1990-1994), Tome II, Annexes dans la
« Chronologie de la crise rwandaise (mise à jour du 17 avril 1998) ») ;
(e) Toute communication relative au refus d’asile par le gouvernement français aux cinq
enfants de la Première ministre rwandaise Agathe Uwilingiyimana, qui, avec son
mari, a été assassinée par les forces gouvernementales rwandaises le 7 avril 1994.
(f) Toutes les communications relatives au décès de l’Adjudant-chef Alain Didot, de son
épouse Gilda Lana et de l’Adjudant-chef René Maier.
[signature]
Demande nº 9 : Tous les documents et toutes les communications, du 1er janvier 1991 au
31 juillet 1994, concernant l’utilisation des barrages routiers au Rwanda pour discriminer, harceler
ou blesser les civils tutsis.
Demande nº 10 : Tous les documents et toutes les communications relatifs au Falcon 50
abattu le 6 avril 1994.
Demande nº 11 : Toutes les notes de la DGSE du 1er janvier 1990 au 31 décembre 1995
concernant le Rwanda.
Demande nº 12 : Toutes les notes de la DRM du 16 juin 1992 au 31 décembre 1995
concernant le Rwanda.
Demande nº 13 : Tous les calendriers, journaux ou agendas, du 1er janvier 1990 au
31 décembre 1995, de :
(a) Claude Amaud
(b) Serge Boudevaix
(c) Jacques Bouzerand
(d) Nathalie Briot
(e) Col. Gilbert Canovas
(f) Jacques Courbin
(g) Bernard Cussac
(h) François de Grossouvre
(i) Bruno Delaye
(j) Paul Dijoud
(k) Bertrand Dufourcq
(l) Roland Dumas
(m)
Michele Fromion-Huguet
(n) François Gauthier
(o) Yannick Gerard
(p) Raymond Germanos
(q) Cne. Martin Gillier
(r) Jean Heinrich
(s) Col. Jacques Hogard
(t) Jean-Pierre Huchon
(u) Phillippe Jehanne
(v) Alain Juppe
(w) Col. Bruno Le Flem
[signature]
(x) Gén. Jean Claude Lafourcade
(y) Adm. Jacques Lanxade
(z) Col. Christian Lureau
(aa) Jean-Michel Marlaud
(bb) Georges Martres
(cc) Brig. Gén. Jean-Jacques Maurin
(dd) Gén. Laurent Michaud
(ee) François Mitterrand
(ff) Jean-Christophe Mitterrand
(gg) Jean-Jacques Mouline
(hh) Georges Dupuis
(ii) Dominique Pin
(jj) Antoine Pouilleute
(kk) Christian Quesnot
(ll) Jacques Rigault
(mm) Michel Robardey
(nn) Col. Jacques Rosier
(oo) Michel Roussin
(pp) Jean-Marc Simon
(qq) Col. Didier Tauzin
(rr) Jean Varret
(ss)
Hubert Védrine
(tt) Gilles Vidal
(uu) Jacques Warin
(vv) Bernard Zimmermann
Demande nº 14 : Tous les documents et toutes les communications ayant trait à toutes les
communications entre l’une ou l’autre des personnes énumérées dans la Demande n° 13 et des
fonctionnaires rwandais, entre le 1er octobre 1990 et le 31 décembre 1995.
Demande nº 15 : Tous les documents et toutes les communications se rapportant à toute
communication (p. ex. notes, câbles, mémorandums) concernant le Rwanda que l’une ou l’autre
des personnes énumérées dans la Demande nº 13 a rédigés, envoyés, reçus ou sur lesquels ils ont
mis en copie, entre le 1er octobre 1990 et le 31 décembre 1995.
Demande nº 16 : Tous les documents et toutes les communications relatifs à l’achat, au
transfert ou à l’envoi de toutes armes, munitions ou à tout autre équipement militaire au Rwanda
ou au Zaïre, du 1er janvier 1994 au 31 décembre 1995 venant de :
i. Le gouvernement français, y compris les services militaires ou de sécurité ;
[signature]
ii. Financé par l’État français ou par des banques françaises, y compris notamment par la
Banque Nationale de Paris ;
iii. Les sociétés françaises, notamment Sofremas, DYL Invest, Luchaire ou Thomson
Brandt Armements ; et/ou
iv. Mil-Tec.
Demande nº 17 : Tous les documents et toutes les communications relatifs à l’achat, au
transfert ou à l’expédition de tout équipement de communication au Rwanda ou au Zaïre, du
1er janvier 1994 au 31 décembre 1995.
Demande nº 18 : Toute documentation relative aux discussions au Conseil de sécurité des
Nations unies (« CSNU ») concernant :
(a) L’aide française au gouvernement de Juvenal Habyarimana au Rwanda,
d’octobre 1990 à avril 1994 ;
(b) Les positions prises par le gouvernement français ou par tout fonctionnaire français
devant le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies ;
(c) L’élaboration, la négociation, l’exécution et la mise en œuvre des Accords d’Arusha ;
(d) La MINUAR ;
(e) Le génocide contre les Tutsis ;
(f) La MINUAR II ;
(g) La demande d’autorisation de la France pour intervenir au Rwanda, en 1994 ;
(h) La Zone humanitaire sûre ;
(i) Les arrestations ou détentions de génocidaires au Rwanda ou dans d’autres États ;
(j) L’extradition et la poursuite des personnes accusées de crimes internationaux (p. ex.
génocide, crimes contre l’humanité) contre des civils tutsis, lors du génocide de 1994
contre les Tutsis, au Rwanda.
Demande nº 19 : Tous les documents et toutes les communications concernant les soldats
français, la DGSE, et/ou toute personne travaillant à la demande du gouvernement français au
Rwanda entre le 15 avril 1994 et le 20 juin 1994.
Demande nº 20 : Tous les documents et toutes les communications relatifs à l’utilisation
des cartes d’identité ethniques au Rwanda, entre octobre 1990 et juillet 1994.
Demande nº 21 : Tous les documents et toutes les communications relatifs aux mises en
garde concernant des tueries ethniques de Tutsis, leur parrainage par l’État, les massacres de Tutsis
à Bugesera en mars 1992, et tout autre massacre de Tutsis au Rwanda et/ou un génocide
d’octobre 1990 à juillet 1994.
[signature]
Demande nº 22 : Tous les documents concernant le Rwanda entre le 1er octobre 1990 et
le 6 avril 1994 et rédigés par Nicolas Corriere, Alain Salvy, Jean Louis Nicolas, Philippe Molle,
Joël Warembourg, Alain Damy, Michel Robarday, ou tout autre fonctionnaire français ayant
conseillé ou assisté la gendarmerie rwandaise durant cette période.
Demande nº 23 : Tous les documents concernant le Rwanda entre le 1er octobre 1990 et
le 6 avril 1994, rédigé, envoyé ou reçu par Gilles Chollet, Etienne Joubert, Jacques Rosier, JeanLouis Nabias, Bernard Cussac, Didier Tauzin, ou tout autre fonctionnaire français faisant partie du
Détachement d’assistance militaire et d’instruction (« DAMI ») Panda, de la Mission d’assistance
militaire (« MAM ») ou ayant conseillé, assisté ou donné des instructions à tout membre des FAR
durant cette période.
[signature]
0
(Convention de La Haye du 5 Octobre 1961)
1.
Countrv:
United States of America
This public document
2.
has been signed by Nancy T. Sunshine
3.
acting in the capacity of County Clerk
4.
bears the seal/stamp of the county of Kings
Certified
5.
at New York City, New York
7.
by Deputy Secretary of State for Business and Licensing Services, State of New York
8.
No. NYC-1261461
9.
Seal/Stamp
6. the 5th day of June 2019
10. Signature
Whitney A. Clark
Deputy Secretary of State for Business and Licensing Services
Apostille (REV : 09/25/ 12)
NEWYORK
OF KINGS
CLERK'S OFFICE
SS:
Nancy T. Sunshine, County Clerk of the County of Kings, State of Ne,w
rk and also Clerk of the Supreme Court in and for said County and State,
e same being a Court of Record and having a seal;
DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT GRIFFIN, MARGARET 01GR6352403
Term 12/27/2016 to 12/27/2020
Whose name is subscribed to the annexed affidavit, deposition, certificate
of acknowledgment or proof, was at the time of taking the same a NOTARY
PUBLIC in and for the State of New York, duly commissioned and sworn and
qualified to act as such throughout the State of New York; that pursuant to :
law a commission, or a certificate of their official character, and autograph
signature, have been filed in my office; that as such the Notary Public was
duly authorized by the laws of the State of New York to administer oaths and
affirmations, to receive and certify the acknowledgment or proof of deeds,
mortgages, powers of attorney and other written instruments for lands,
tenements and hereditaments to be read in evidence or recorded in this State,
to protest notes and to take and certify affidavits and depositions; and that I
am well acquainted with the handwriting of such Notary Public or have
compared the signature
the annexed instrument w~th1 their autograph
signature deposited in my office ~ r.
. ~
or-
IN WITNESS WHERE OF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
seal at Brooklyn, Kings County, New York on June 5, 2019 ,.._"
~~
0t-;;?
NANCY T. SUNSHINE
KINGS COUNTY CLERK
•
TRANSP ERFECT
City of New York, State of New York, County of New York
I, Wendy Poon, hereby affirm that the document entitled "letter from MINIJUST
to Minister of Justice of France" is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a true
and accurate translation from English into French.
VENUE: State of New York
County of New York
JURA T: Sworn (or Affirmed ) to before me this
~ day of Ofo20_19.
MARGARET GRIFFIN
NotaryPublic~ Stateof NewYork
No.01 GR6352403
Qualified
in KINGSCount;
omn,issionf !(plresDEC27, ,;.020
-·-----
Stamp, Notary Public
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APPENDIX C
1. Cables and Situation Reports from French Defense Attachés and Operational
Commanders in Rwanda
In the years leading up to the 1994 Genocide, defense attachés at the French Embassy in Kigali
(Colonel Rene Galinié from August 1988 – July 1991 and Colonel Bernard Cussac from July 1991
– April 1994) provided Paris with regular updates on the security environment in Rwanda through
both diplomatic and military channels. At various points, additional security reports were also
provided by operational commanders tasked with unified command of French military elements
in the country (Colonel Jean-Claude Thomann in mid-October 1990, Colonel Jacques Rosier from
June to November 1992, and General Dominique Delort in February-March 1993).
Evidence suggests that many such reports have never been publicly released. In his MIP testimony,
Colonel Galinié mentioned a defense attaché report in which he noted a serious risk of violent
massacres as early as January 1990. This report – along with dozens of additional cables, situation
reports, after-action reports, and analyses from Colonels Galinié, Cussac, Thomann, Rosier,
General Delort, and other officials – remain classified in French archives.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
All documents sent to or from the office of the defense attaché to the French Embassy
in Kigali through military or diplomatic channels from August 1988 to April 1994; and
All documents reflecting political or military matters in Rwanda to or from operational
commanders Colonel Jean-Claude Thomann, Colonel Jacques Rosier, General
Dominique Delort, and other officials.
2. Documents related to meetings between diplomatic representatives of the RPF and
France in October 1990
Evidence suggests that, in October 1990, French officials held informal meetings with
representatives of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Kampala. According to an account of one
such meeting, French officials in attendance dismissed RPF proposals for refugee resettlement and
power-sharing, responding instead with a blanket demand that the RPF unilaterally suspend
military activities and accept whatever terms President Habyarimana might be willing to offer.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
All documents concerning formal and informal meetings between French and RPF
officials between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1990, including a meeting attended
by French Ambassador Yannick Gerard in Kampala on 11 October 1990; and
All documents reflecting the views of French officials in October 1990 as to whether
the RPF should unilaterally suspend military activities and accept President
Habyarimana’s proposals.
1
3. Documents reflecting knowledge of massacres that occurred in Kibilira and elsewhere in
northern Rwanda in early October 1990
International media outlets and human rights organizations reported that, shortly after the RPF’s
offensive into Rwanda in October 1990, Rwandan government forces directed attacks against
civilians in several heavily Tutsi-populated areas in the northern provinces. Documents suggest
that on or around 10 October 1990, hundreds of Tutsi were massacred and over 500 homes –
overwhelmingly Tutsi – were burned down in the town of Kibilira. Reuters described soldiers
attacking civilians and burning homes while civilian Hutus attacked women and children with
machetes. The Rwandan government, in response to allegations that its national army (the FAR)
had massacred 1,000 in Mutara, claimed that they had merely killed between 300 and 500 RPF
rebels dressed in civilian clothes.
Belgian authorities responded by refusing to extend further military aid, and the Foreign Minister
declared the Habyarimana regime’s human rights violations intolerable. In contrast, Georges
Martres, French Ambassador to Rwanda from 1989 to 1993, did acknowledge the acts of violence
engulfing the country, but also publicly criticized Western media for being manipulated by Tutsi
members of the Rwandan diaspora.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents reflecting French officials’ information about and discussion of
massacres of Tutsi civilians between 1 October 1990 and 31 October 1990;
All documents reflecting French officials’ discussion of or deliberation over the
provision of military assistance to Rwanda between 1 October 1990 and 31 December
1990, including any applicable Rules of Engagement; and
All documents reflecting discussions among French officials about media coverage of
events in Rwanda between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1990.
4. Documents regarding the summary arrests of purported RPF collaborators following the
1 October 1990 RPF offensive
On 9 October 1990, Le Monde reported that the Rwandan government’s
hunt for arms and rebels in the popular Nyamirambo neighborhood is brutal. In the
nearby stadium, the army has collected a few hundred “suspects.” This rather vague
official term could designate other citizens than the invaders' supporters, of Tutsi
origin.
Other publications placed estimates of arrests as high as 3000.
International outcry against the human rights abuses came from the media and foreign
governments. On 8 October 1990, Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens spoke to Rwandan
Ambassador to Belgium Francois Ngarukiyintwali about the Rwandan government’s violation of
its citizens’ human rights – in particular, the summary arrests of purported RPF sympathizers. On
10 October, the Quai d'Orsay issued a statement, declaring that it hoped that any excess could be
2
avoided in the resolution of the crisis in Rwanda and called on local authorities to “engage in
dialogue.” Belgium's ambassador to Rwanda Johan Swinnen personally urged President Juvenal
Habyarimana “to respect the rights of people detained in an anti-rebel mopping up operation.”
When reporters were able to gain access to the Nyamirambo the stadium on 9 October, they “found
it empty . . . and the whereabouts of the detainees was not known.”
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents reflecting French officials’ reactions to allegations of human rights abuses
perpetrated by members of the Habyarimana government between 1 October 1990 and 1
November 1990;
All documents drafted by or sent to French officials regarding arrests of Rwandan civilians,
and justifications for those arrests, dated between 1 October 1990 and 1 November 1990;
and
All documents drafted by or sent to French officials regarding Nyamirambo between 1
October 1990 and 1 November 1990.
5. Documents regarding deliberations among French military officials for the withdrawal
of Noroît Troops
On 4 October 1990, a company of approximately 150 French soldiers arrived in Kigali, launching
Opération Noroît. Originally tasked with a short-term mission to evacuate French nationals, Noroît
combat forces ultimately remained in Rwanda for more than three years. Documents indicate that
multiple senior French officials expressed doubts about the need for and, over time, the advisability
of a sustained troop presence. Shortly after directing the initial Noroît deployment, Admiral
Jacques Lanxade, chief military adviser to French President François Mitterrand, proposed a
partial withdrawal. He explained that it would be better for French troops not to be implicated in
the serious human rights abuses that had been perpetrated against the Rwandan population.
According to records reviewed during this Investigation, Lanxade’s successor, General Christian
Quesnot, may have felt similarly, at one point suggesting that a permanent French military
presence may no longer be militarily justified. Evidence suggests that other advisers, including
head of the Military Assistance Mission to Rwanda Colonel René Galinié, Élysée official Gilles
Vidal, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense Pierre Joxe, Commander of Operation Noroît
Colonel Jean-Claude Thomann, and Élysée Africa adviser Dominique Pin also pointed out
potential negative consequences of the French troop presence.
Despite the concerns raised by Admiral Lanxade and others, documents suggest that President
Mitterrand personally delayed a French troop withdrawal in the face of officials’ concerns and
reportedly assured President Habyarimana that France will continue to provide military support
for his regime. The rationale for Mitterrand’s decision, as well as the Élysée’s response to senior
officials’ hesitations about continued a Noroît deployment, have not been fully explained in
documents that have been publicly released.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
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All documents providing justifications for the deployment of French soldiers during
Opération Noroît;
All documents providing justifications for continued French military presence in
Rwanda through the end of Opération Noroît;
All documents relating to concerns raised by French officials regarding the French
troop presence in Rwanda in connection with Opération Noroît;
All documents relating to any responses from senior French officials (e.g., President
Mitterrand, Ambassador Martres) to such concerns; and
All documents and correspondence between France and Rwanda discussing France’s
continued military presence in Rwanda.
6. Documents related to Jean-Christophe Mitterrand’s alleged relationship with JeanPierre Habyarimana in 1990-1991
Since the 1990s, allegations have persisted regarding personal and private business relationships
between Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, son of President Mitterrand, and Jean-Pierre Habyarimana,
son of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana. Although Jean-Christophe Mitterrand has
repeatedly denied meeting Jean-Pierre Habyarimana, multiple sources and at least one official
eyewitness have suggested that the two enjoyed a close personal friendship and private business
relationship. As head of the Élysée’s Africa cell from 1986-1992, Jean-Christophe allegedly
maintained this relationship during a time when he held a significant position of influence over
French Rwanda policy. Documents suggest that, one day after the conflict with the RPF began on
1 October 1990, President Habyarimana placed a call to Jean-Christophe to request military
support. According to evidence reviewed in the course of this Investigation, the young Mitterrand
immediately agreed to send military assistance.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
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•
All documents concerning or suggesting a personal or business relationship between
any members of the Mitterrand and Habyarimana families;
All documents concerning the relationship between Jean-Christophe Mitterrand and
Jean-Pierre Habyarimana, including documents describing and/or referencing their
mutual involvement in any business venture(s); and
All documents concerning a conversation between Jean-Christophe Mitterrand and
Juvenal Habyarimana on 2 October 1990 and Rwanda’s request for French assistance
in 1990.
7. Documents related to General Jean Varret’s warnings to French officials about the
Rwandan military’s genocidal rhetoric
Documents indicate that in December 1990 General Jean Varret, head of the French Military Cooperation
Mission in Rwanda, met with members of the Rwandan military staff in Kigali. According to evidence
reviewed during this Investigation, during the meeting, Colonel Pierre-Célestin Rwagafilita of the
Rwandan Gendarmerie, sought to enlist General Varret’s support for obtaining heavy weaponry for his
4
police force. Evidence suggests that Varret objected, stating that such firepower would be inappropriate
for a force dedicated simply to maintaining order. Col. Rwagafilita reportedly responded by asking to
speak in private and then confiding that the weapons would be necessary in order to “liquidate” the Tutsi
from Rwanda. Varret has stated publicly that he was horrified by Rwagafilita’s comments and demanded
the colonel’s resignation during a subsequent meeting with President Habyarimana in December 1990.
There is also evidence that General Varret made repeated attempts to warn superiors about the genocidal
sentiments within Habyarimana’s government in official telegrams and during “crisis meetings” on
French-Rwandan military cooperation. Evidence suggests that at least three of Varret’s telegrams to Paris
(on 14 December 1990, 17 December 1990, and 15 February 1993) have never been released.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
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•
•
•
All documents related to General Jean Varret’s concerns about French support for the
Rwandan Gendarmerie, anti-Tutsi sentiments held by Rwandan political and/or
military officials, and/or the possibility of ethnic violence;
All documents concerning a meeting(s) on or about 13 December 1990 attended by
General Jean Varret and Rwandan military officials;
All documents concerning a meeting(s) on or about 14 December 1990 attended by
General Jean Varret, Ambassador Martres, and President Habyarimana;
All documents concerning Rwandan Colonel Pierre-Célestin Rwagafilita, including
documents concerning allegedly anti-Tutsi sentiments he expressed or held, documents
concerning any French officials’ reservations about his leadership of the Rwandan
Gendarmerie, and documents concerning any actions taken to remove him from his
position or lobby for his removal;
All documents concerning telegrams, reports, or other written communications sent by
General Jean Varret to French officials from 1 October 1990 to 30 April 1993,
including telegrams sent on 14 December 1990, 17 December 1990, and 15 February
1993; and
All documents concerning meetings or discussions involving General Varret and
representatives from the French Armed Forces, Élysée, and/or Ministry of Foreign
Affairs during which French support for the Rwandan military and/or government was
discussed.
8. Documents concerning pressure allegedly placed upon General Varret by MIP President
Paul Quiles to temper his testimony before the committee in 1998
On 6 May 1998, General Varret testified before the French National Assembly’s Mission d’information
sur le Rwanda, a committee charged with investigating France’s role in Rwanda from 1990-1994 (the
MIP). Years later, he told a French journalist that he spoke to the committee twice but that only his second
deposition was reflected in public documents. According to General Varret, after his first interview,
Committee President Paul Quiles asked him to testify again and temper his statements. No record of any
additional MIP interview by General Varret has been publicly released.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
5
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All documents concerning all testimony provided to the MIP by General Varret;
All documents authored or edited by General Varret which relate to the content of his
MIP testimony, including all trip reports from his visits to Rwanda;
All documents reviewed by General Varret before testifying before the MIP, including
Ambassador Martres’ end-of-mission report;
All documents concerning instructions given to General Varret by MIP President Paul
Quiles or others which in any way relate to the content of General Varret’s testimony;
All documents concerning pressure placed on General Varret to alter his testimony
before the MIP; and
All documents concerning the accuracy or completeness of General Varret’s testimony
delivered to the MIP on 6 May 1998.
9. Documents regarding French knowledge of and actions subsequent to the Bagogwe
massacres from January - March 1991
In late January 1991, the RPF led an incursion into Ruhengeri, freeing a number of Rwandan
prisoners jailed at the Ruhengeri Prison in Mukingo. Documents indicate that, in retaliation for the
prison raid, FAR combatants and Hutu civilians massacred between 500 and 1000 people
belonging to the Bagogwe ethnic group in northwestern Rwanda. The killings began immediately
after the Ruhengeri attack and continued for at least three weeks.
Amnesty International reported that local Rwandan authorities encouraged the massacres and that
several soldiers killed unarmed Tutsi civilian prisoners who had been accused of aiding the RPF.
The Flemish paper that broke the news in Europe declared that the Bagogwe massacres “could
speak of a real genocide.”
Despite the alleged role of the Rwandan military in the Bagogwe killings in early 1991, France
reinforced its Military Assistance Mission on 21 March 1991 with additional soldiers from the
Panda DAMI. In Europe, the Bagogwe killings were not reported until June 1991, several months
after the massacres had taken place.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents related to France’s decision to reinforce its Military Assistance Mission
with the DAMI Panda;
All documents reflecting orders or directives given to DAMI regarding its mission
between 1 October 1990 and 31 August 1994; and
All documents referencing information about massacres or other international crimes
in Rwanda between 1 January 1991 and 1 June 1991, including those referencing the
Bagogwe massacres.
6
10. Documents regarding alleged French efforts to hold ceasefire negotiations in Paris in
1991
There is evidence that, following the N’Sele ceasefire negotiations in March 1991, France sought
to have future negotiations in Paris. But the RPF was reluctant to let the French preside over
these negotiations since France supported one party over the other. Ultimately, the negotiations
were moved to Arusha, Tanzania, and Tanzania presided over the negotiations.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
All documents reflecting any discussions or efforts by France to hold ceasefire
negotiations in Paris with France serving as chair.
11. Documents regarding Paul Dijoud’s conduct during diplomatic meetings with the RPF
from 1991 – 1992
Contemporaneous records reflect that, from August 1991 to January 1992, Paul Dijoud met with
RPF delegations in his capacity as the Director of African and Malagasy Affairs at the French
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Public documents reveal key differences between Dijoud’s and his
colleagues’ accounts of these meetings and the accounts of RPF representatives (and, in some
cases, attending Habyarimana government officials). While Dijoud stressed France’s neutrality as
a mediator, records of his contemporaneous statements regarding French military involvement, the
RPF’s alleged status as “foreign aggressors,” and the viability of RPF political influence in a
Rwandan democracy suggest otherwise. The disparity between French and Rwandan accounts of
Dijoud’s meetings appears particularly evident in relation to two meetings held in August and
September 1991.
On 14 August 1991, Minister Dijoud met with representatives from Uganda, the Habyarimana
government, and the RPF in Paris. Prior to the meeting, Dijoud reportedly reached out to RPF
officials to assure them that France would play a neutral role. During the meeting, however,
Rwandan Foreign Minister Casimir Bizimungu reported that Dijoud made France’s allegiance
clear, warning the RPF that French military support for Habyarimana precluded the possibility of
an RPF victory.
From 17 to 23 September 1991, another RPF delegation led by Major Paul Kagame met with
Dijoud and Jean-Christophe Mitterrand in Paris. After the visit, Dijoud reported to Ambassador
Martres that “the RPF, like the government of Rwanda, welcome[s] all our initiatives.” Major
Kagame had a very different recollection, claiming that Dijoud showed complete and explicit
support for the Habyarimana regime during the talks and issued a foreboding warning that the RPF
must stop fighting. Other members of the RPF delegation confirmed Kagame’s account. Indeed,
more than nine months later, a U.S. diplomatic cable documented that RPF negotiators at Dar es
Salaam remained troubled by Dijoud’s words.
7
The Government of Rwanda requests:
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All documents concerning or discussing diplomatic meetings attended by Paul Dijoud
and RPF representatives between 1 August 1991 and 31 January 1992 – including
meetings held on 14 August 1991, 17-23 September 1991, 23-25 October 1991, and
14-15 January 1992;
All documents concerning or discussing the view attributed to Dijoud during the
meetings that French military support for Habyarimana precluded any possibility of an
RPF victory;
All documents concerning or reflecting warnings Dijoud or other French officials
delivered to RPF representatives during meetings between August 1991 and January
1992;
All documents concerning or reflecting assurances made by Dijoud to Habyarimana
that the RPF could not win elections because of their ethnic minority status;
All documents related to any meeting(s) with Paul Kagame or any trips made by Paul
Kagame to France;
All documents related to the detaining and jailing of Paul Kagame and Emmanuel
Ndahiro in Paris in 1991;
All documents relating to efforts and actions by Paul Barril to conduct “parallel
diplomacy” in conjunction with efforts and actions of Paul Dijoud when RPF
representatives, including Major Kagame, visited Paris in September 1991;
All documents relating to events, actions, and correspondence involving Paul Barril
and Colonel Eli Sagawata in September and October 1991; and
All documents and correspondence between Paul Barril and Fabian Singaye in 19911992, including an August 23, 1991 letter from Singaye to Barril, stressing that their
relations should remain “strictly private and secret” and “confirming the collaboration
between our security services and yours”.
12. Documents regarding France’s knowledge and training of the Interahamwe and/or the
Impuzamugambi.
The Interahamwe operated in Rwanda as the militia arm of the National Republican Movement
for Democracy and Development (“MRND”) political party from 1991 through the end of the
Genocide against the Tutsi in 1994. The MRND was the sole political party until May 1991 when
a change in the Rwandan constitution facilitated the proliferation of other parties. In addition to
carrying out organized killings throughout the Genocide, the Interahamwe also participated in the
murders of MRND political enemies in the years leading up to the Genocide. Evidence reviewed
during this Investigation suggests that the Interahamwe “operated with almost total impunity” in
the years before the Genocide as a result of the support they received from the Habyarimana
regime.
In 1993, the new hardline, right-wing Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (“CDR”) created
a youth wing called the Impuzamugambi, which functioned as the political party’s militia. The
ICTR found that CDR co-founder Jean Bosco Barayagwiza directed the Impuzamugambi to carry
out massacres and other acts of violence on his orders. The Impuzamugambi stopped, harassed,
8
beat, and killed Tutsi at roadblocks around Rwanda before and during the Genocide. Together with
the Interahamwe, the militia group was responsible for the massacre of large numbers of Tutsi
civilians.
a. Documents relating to the French military presence at the FAR military camp at
Gabiro
Reports indicate that in March 1992 President Habyarimana and his supporters began increasing
the recruitment and training of the Interahamwe, which had proven their effectiveness at attacking
Tutsi and political opponents of the Habyarimana regime. Documents reviewed during this
Investigation indicate that the FAR began training troops at Gabiro and Mukamira, among other
locations. Some sources also claim to have witnessed the training of the Interahamwe at a military
camp in Gabiro.
Records of correspondence among French military personnel indicate that several DAMI trainers
were present at the FAR military camp at Gabiro between April 1992 and August 1993 – a period
during which the Interahamwe would have received training at the camp.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
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All documents concerning the knowledge or awareness of French soldiers or civilian
officials of the Rwandan government’s recruitment and training of Interahamwe,
Impuzamugambi, and/or other militia groups at Gabiro;
All Rules of Engagement applicable to DAMI forces and other French or Frenchaffiliated military officers assigned to or present at the FAR military camp at Gabiro;
All documents, including videos and photographs, regarding the involvement of French
officials in training and/or overseeing, coordinating, or facilitating the training of
Interahamwe, Impuzamugambi, or other militia groups;
All correspondence between French military or diplomatic personnel regarding Gabiro
between 1 October 1990 and 7 April 1994;
All photographs of military or diplomatic activities at Gabiro between 1 October 1990
and 7 April 1994; and
All video or audio materials related to military or diplomatic activities at Gabiro
between 1 October 1990 and 7 April 1994.
b. Documents relating to the French military presence at the FAR military camp at
Mukamira
Documents reviewed during this Investigation indicate that French troops trained some
Interahamwe militia troops at a FAR military camp in Mukamira, in the northwestern region of
Rwanda on the road between Ruhengeri and Gisenyi. According to human rights reports, FAR
forces stationed at the Mukamira camp were responsible for a number of human rights abuses,
including the provision of support for the January 1991 massacre of Bagogwe civilians and the
habitual beating and killing of Tutsi civilians and MRND political opponents interrogated at the
camp.
9
Documents obtained in the course of this Investigation suggest French military officials were
present at the FAR camp in Mukamira between November 1991 and October 1993.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
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•
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All documents concerning the knowledge or awareness of French soldiers or civilian
officials of the Rwandan government’s recruitment and training of Interahamwe,
Impuzamugambi, and/or other militia groups at Mukamira;
All Rules of Engagement applicable to DAMI and other French or French-affiliated
military officers assigned to or present at the FAR military camp at Mukamira;
All situation reports regarding DAMI and other French forces stationed at the
Mukamira military camp between September 1991 and April 1994;
All correspondence between French military or diplomatic personnel regarding
Mukamira between 1 October 1990 and 7 April 1994;
All photographs of any military or diplomatic activities at Mukamira between 1
October 1990 and 7 April 1994; and
All video or audio materials related to any military or diplomatic activities at Mukamira
between 1 October 1990 and 7 April 1994.
13. Documents regarding distribution of weapons to the Interahamwe and other militia
groups in the months leading up to the Bugesera massacres
Documents reviewed during this Investigation suggest that in January 1992 – weeks before the
Bugesera massacres – French officials drafted communications discussing hundreds of firearms
that had been distributed by Rwandan government agents to civilians for auto-defense against RPF
advances. In reviewing the decision of the Rwandan Minister of the Interior Faustin Munyaneza
to distribute the weapons, one French official expressed reservations about arming the civilians
because, among other things, the local leaders charged with distributing the weapons were
members of the MRND.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
All documents reflecting French officials’ knowledge of the distribution of weapons to
civilians, particularly militia groups such as the Interahamwe, by the Rwandan
government between 1 October 1990 and 7 April 1994; and
All documents sent between French officials and the Rwandan Minister of the Interior
between 1 October 1990 and 7 April 1994.
14. Documents related to Ambassador Georges Martres’ knowledge of atrocities committed
against Tutsi and the MRND’s political opponents and information-sharing activities
with other Western diplomats
Documents suggest that, during his tenure as ambassador, George Martres and his staff received
information about the persistent persecution of the Tutsi in Rwanda and transmitted that
10
information back to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In January 1993, Ambassador Martres
sent a cable to Bruno Delaye, head of the Africa Cell at Élysée, about the Ambassador’s meeting
with Jean Carbonare, a member of the Federation internationale des droits de l’homme (“FIDH”)
Commission conducting a fact-finding mission in Rwanda. Martres’ cable discussed (1) the
systematic massacre of ethnic Tutsi; (2) President Habyarimana’s responsibility for those
massacres; and (3) the perceived complicity of French troops who protected French nationals while
others perished. In a cable back to the Ministry of Justice, Martres predicted that the FIDH’s final
report would “only add horror to the horror we already know.…”
Documents suggest Ambassador Martres, among other French diplomatic officials, may have
received information about atrocities through other western diplomats. Following the Bugesera
massacres in March 1992, several documents reference a meeting between diplomats of several
Western donor countries to exchange information about Bugesera and discuss collective action.
Records show that Martres shared his fears about the Bugesera violence with his Parisian
colleagues. Shortly thereafter, the French embassy dispatched staff to investigate the killings at
Bugesera.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
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All documents reflecting France’s awareness of the massacres and atrocities against
Tutsi and the MRND’s political opponents, including correspondence between
Ambassador Martres and officials from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs between
1 January 1989, and 27 April 1993;
Internal embassy memoranda or reports regarding ethnic massacres in Rwanda between
1 January 1989, and 31 December 1993;
All documents relevant to the investigation into the Bugesera or other massacres
conducted by French officials including embassy staff between 1 October 1990 and 31
August 1994;
All documents regarding proposed or executed collective actions by Western diplomats
in response to the Bugesera massacres in March 1992;
All documents created between 1 March 1992 and 1 April 1992 reflecting or regarding
communications between French officials and Belgian Ambassador Swinnen or
between French officials and other foreign diplomats in Rwanda; and
All documents reflecting the proposed or executed changes in French military support
policy that occurred as a result of the March 1992 massacres.
15. Documents regarding the French government’s reaction to the March 1993 FIDH Report
After sending a fact-finding commission to Rwanda for two weeks in January 1993, the FIDH and
other human rights groups released their Report on human rights abuses in Rwanda on 8 March
1993. Shortly after their departure from Rwanda, violence against Tutsi appears to have
intensified.
Documents show that during the commission’s trip, Ambassador Martres had a meeting with Jean
Carbonare, a member of the fact-finding mission. Mr. Carbonare kept Ambassador Martres
11
informed on the mission’s findings as they developed. Shortly after Mr. Carbonare returned to
France, he gave an interview with France 2 during which he compared the massacre of Tutsi in
Rwanda to the ethnic cleansing taking place at the time in the Balkans.
Documents suggest that during a March 1993 ministerial meeting, French Minister of Cooperation
Marcel DeBarge told attendees that the FIDH Report was damning with respect to Rwandan
government troops and noted that Belgium was planning to recall its ambassador to Kigali for
consultations. President Mitterrand requested that the Rwandan ambassador to France be
summoned to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide explanations. France’s ambassador
remained in Rwanda.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
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All documents reflecting discussions or deliberations among French officials regarding
the January 1993 FIDH Commission visit to Rwanda;
All documents reflecting discussions or deliberations among French officials reacting
to the release of the March 1993 FIDH Report;
All documents reflecting reactions of French officials to Africa Watch’s 27 January
1993 press release condemning the ethnic violence “threatened by local government
officials” in Rwanda;
All documents reflecting reactions of French officials to the violence in late January
1993 “following the departure . . . of the [FIDH] Commission . . . with the majority
Hutu resuming violent attacks on the Tutsi minority in the northwestern regions of
Gisenyi and Ruhengeri”;
All documents regarding restricted council meetings discussing the FIDH Report;
All documents reflecting reactions to – or knowledge of the French government’s
reaction to – Jean Carbonare’s 28 January 1993 France 2 interview, during which he
compared the massacre of Tutsi in Rwanda to the ethnic cleansing taking place in the
Balkans;
All documents regarding any meetings between Ambassador Martres and Jean
Carbonare between 1 October 1990 and 7 April 1994; and
All documents, including explanations, in connection with the Rwandan Ambassador
being summoned by President Mitterrand.
16. Documents related to France’s familiarity and involvement with, and support for,
Rwandan media
Records show that, from the Bugesera massacres in the spring of 1992 to the onset of the Genocide
two years later, Rwandan media helped fuel ethnic violence and a nationwide hatred of the Tutsi.
Evidence suggests that, in spite of clear indications of the potential for Rwandan media to spark
genocidal violence, France continued to provide financial and technical support for Radio Rwanda
and the Rwandan Office of Information (“ORINFOR”) in the years leading up to the Genocide.
Evidence also suggests that, after the outbreak of the Genocide, France failed to make sufficient
12
efforts to shut down broadcasts from Radio Rwanda’s hate-media offshoot, Radio-Television Libre
des Mille Collines (“RTLM”).
a. Documents related to French awareness of the capacity of Rwandan media to
spark genocide
The massacres of Tutsi in Bugesera in March 1992 began after Radio Rwanda repeatedly broadcast
an unsubstantiated report of an alleged Tutsi plot to assassinate high-level Hutu officials. Evidence
ultimately revealed that the only evidence of the alleged plot (a note purportedly found on the floor
of Tutsi shopkeeper) had been fabricated. The Director of ORINFOR, Ferdinand Nahimana, later
admitted that he made no effort to establish the provenance of this letter when he cleared it for
broadcast. As a result, over the next week, Rwandan civilians murdered nearly 300 Tutsi civilians
in the Bugesera region.
Records reflect that, soon after the violent outbreak in Bugesera, senior French officials were aware
of Radio Rwanda’s instigating role. Soon after the massacres began, Ambassador Martres cabled
Paris to describe the attacks. In his cables, Martres criticized Radio Rwanda for sparking paranoia
through the unsubstantiated letter and characterized the broadcast as an act of misinformation by
official Rwandan media.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
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•
All documents concerning French officials’ awareness of the potential for Rwandan
media outlets to spark or fuel violence;
All cables sent by Ambassador Martres in March 1992;
All documents related to Ambassador Martres’s concern that Habyarimana officials
committed an act of misinformation that enabled the massacres in Bugesera in March
1992; and
All documents and/or communications reflecting or referencing discussions with
Rwandan government officials regarding the Radio Rwanda broadcasts on 3-4 March
1992.
b. Documents related to French financial and technical support for Radio Rwanda
Documents suggest that France provided financial, technical, and political support for ORINFOR
and Radio Rwanda in the years leading up to the 1994 Genocide. Evidence suggests that, in late
March 1992, the Director of ORINFOR Ferdinand Nahimana and his colleague Charles Nahayo
visited Paris to meet officials from the French Ministry of Cooperation. During the meeting,
Nahimana reported that the French ministers promised to deliver production equipment to support
Rwandan media and to help Radio Rwanda expand its reach to television. According to
correspondence between Nahimana and Habyarimana, French officials also promised that a
delegation from the Ministry of Cooperation’s Assistance Fund would visit Kigali shortly to assess
Rwanda’s need for further aid. According to the MIP Report, on 4 May 1992 France sent Rwanda
13
a large shipment of encryption equipment, accessories and maintenance tools, transceivers, and
high security digital telephone sets. Evidence suggests that later that month officials from the
Ministry of Cooperation and Military Cooperation Mission visited Kigali and promised additional
funds for Rwandan broadcasting. Documents reflect that, by the end of 1992, France had trained
approximately 70 Rwandan journalists and technicians, provided additional technical equipment
and promised another 1.2 million French Francs in aid for Rwandan media agencies.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
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•
All documents referencing or discussing Rwandan media and France’s assistance to
any Rwandan media groups or individuals;
All documents concerning French financial and technical support for Rwandan media;
All documents summarizing, commenting, or otherwise referencing any visits to Paris
by Ferdinand Nahimana in March 1992;
All documents related to French shipments of technical equipment to Rwanda from 1
October 1990 to 8 July 1994, including a shipment of encryption equipment and
telephone equipment on or about 4 May 1992;
All documents concerning trips by officials from the French Ministry of Cooperation
and Military Cooperation mission to Kigali in May 1992; and
All documents related to French officials’ promises of additional funds for Rwandan
broadcasting.
c. Documents related to France’s failure to intervene to end genocidal broadcasts
from RTLM
Records reflect that, as the Genocide began, RTLM continually broadcast hateful and violent
messages – conflating all Tutsi with the enemy, describing Tutsi as sub-human, and sharing the
names and addresses of Tutsi whom it wished exterminated. Evidence suggests that RTLM’s
broadcasts played an influential role in inciting massacres against Tutsis across the country, as
well as the murder of several moderate Rwandan political officials. General Roméo Dallaire has
written that he had long advocated to the U.N. for the shutdown of RTLM because it was being
used as a tool to promote genocide.
Contemporaneous records indicate that France may have held sufficient influence to impact the
content of Rwandan government-sponsored radio broadcasting. For example, documents suggest
that one month into the Genocide French officials may have successfully influenced RTLM
content by demanding that the FAR improve its image in the media. In June 1994, France
reportedly exercised its influence over Rwandan media again, successfully demanding that the
station end its calls for the death of Roméo Dallaire, commander of the United Nations Assistance
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). Yet, after RTLM’s violent messaging sparked massacres in April
1994, it appears that France did little to try to stop or temper the station’s broadcasts – even though
evidence suggests that French officials quickly recognized their genocidal nature.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
14
•
•
•
•
All documents concerning French attempts to influence the content of Radio Rwanda,
RTLM and other Rwandan media outlets, from 1 October 1990 – 18 July 1994,
including a meeting between General Jean Pierre Huchon and Lt. Col. Ephrem
Rwabalinda on 9 May 1994;
All documents concerning discussions between French and Rwandan officials
regarding the need to stop using media for hateful anti-Tutsi commentary;
All documents concerning discussions regarding the appropriateness of RTLM’s
messaging, the possibility of such messaging stroking violence, and the appropriateness
of French intervention; and
All documents concerning discussions about whether France possessed sufficient
influence to sway the content of any Rwandan media outlets.
17. Documents regarding increase of military assistance from France to Rwanda following
the Bugesera massacres in March 1992
Documents reviewed over the course of this Investigation indicate that shortly after the violence
in Bugesera took the lives of hundreds of Tutsi, Paul Dijoud urged French Minister of Foreign
Affairs Roland Dumas to increase assistance to the Government of Rwanda in the form of, among
other things, military combat equipment. Documents also reflect that, less than two months after
this request, French electronics and defense contractor Thomson-CSF delivered military combatfacilitation equipment to the Habyarimana regime.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents reflecting the Habyarimana regime’s requests for French military
equipment, lethal and non-lethal, between 1 January 1990 and 7 April 1994;
All documents reflecting French officials’ deliberations about the provision of weapons
to the FAR between 1 January 1990 and 7 April 1994; and
All requests from Paul Dijoud and others for weapons and other military equipment
transfers to the Habyarimana regime between 1 January 1990 and 7 April 1994.
18. Documents regarding French officials’ involvement with the FAR following the RPF
offensive in Byumba in June 1992
On 5 June 1992, the RPF launched an offensive in the Byumba province of northern Rwanda.
Evidence suggests that as RPF forces seized FAR positions in northern Byumba, President
Habyarimana asked France to send more troops. According to the MIP, France sent one new
company of Noroît troops arriving on 5 June 1992 and 30 new DAMI troops. On 12 June 1992,
Noroît and DAMI forces were integrated into a single unit and at the end of the month came under
the command of Colonel Jacques Rosier. Rosier would later command special forces during
Opération Turquoise in June 1994.
News reports from the time period suggest that during the fighting in Byumba, the RPF came under
the fire of 105mm artillery pieces. Documents further suggest that Col. Rosier personally
15
supervised and conducted operations led by a 105mm artillery battery that stopped the RPF
advance on Byumba, Ruhengeri, and Mutara. Witnesses have alleged that the French operated the
105mm artillery launchers.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
•
All documents regarding French participation on the battlefield in Byumba between 4
June 1992 and 31 July 1992;
All documents French training the FAR on the use of artillery between 1 October 1990
and 7 April 1994;
All documents reflecting communications between Defense Minister James Gasana
and Colonel Jacques Rosier between 1 April 1992 and 31 July 1993; and
All documents reflecting integration and subsequent engagement of Noroît forces and
DAMI between 4 June 1992 and 31 July 1992.
16
19. Documents regarding consideration of withdrawal of French military technical
assistance to Rwandan Presidential Guard beginning in October 1992
Ambassador Martres testified to the MIP that the rumors about the Presidential Guard’s actions
were so grave that an association of French officials with them would damage the reputation of
not only the French officer that had been charged with their technical training, but also France as
a whole. Such criticism of the Presidential Guard led Colonel Bernard Cussac to tell President
Habyarimana on 5 October 1992 that France would be withdrawing its technical support for the
unit.
Nevertheless, the MIP indicates that “[f]rom November 1991 to February 1993, the Rwandan
Presidential Guard indeed benefited from the presence of a Presidential Guard DAMI, consisting
of a team of two to three officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Denis Roux.” – well past the date of
Cussac’s missive. Moreover, documents suggest that other French military instructors provided
training to the Presidential Guard in October 1993.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
•
•
All documents to or from French officials regarding actions of the Rwandan
Presidential Guard sent between 1 March 1994 and 22 August 1994;
All documents regarding the possible withdrawal of French military technical
assistance to Rwandan Presidential Guard between 1 October 1992 and 7 April 1994;
All reports, letters, photos and other documents about DAMI and other French officer
training or providing technical assistance to the Rwandan Presidential Guard between
30 October 1991 and 7 April 1994;
All reports, letters, photos and other documents sent to or received by General Jean
Varret between 1 September 1992 and 30 April 1993 regarding the Rwandan
Presidential Guard; and
All reports letters, photos and other documents sent to or received by Colonel Bernard
Cussac between 5 October 1992 and 7 April 1994 regarding the Rwandan Presidential
Guard.
20. Documents regarding France’s engagement with the FAR following the RPF offensive on
Ruhengeri on 8 February 1993
In response to continued massacres of Tutsi by government forces, on 8 February 1993, the RPF
initiated an offensive into Ruhengeri. Documents suggest that after the RPF advanced on
Ruhengeri in the early morning of 8 February 1993, French forces immediately began relocating
soldiers to Ruhengeri and deploying additional forces in what would become known as Opération
Volcan. The operation was supposed to be a non-combat evacuation of French nationals to the
southern Ruhengeri, where the evacuees would meet a Noroît detachment that would take them to
Kigali. On the second day of Opération Volcan, France dispatched an additional company to Kigali
of 150 troops, vastly increasing the total number of French troops in the country.
17
Despite the very limited nature of this mission, Western media outlets began to report that French
troops had shelled the RPF at Ruhengeri. Then, on 16 February 1993, AFP and Reuters jointly
published an article highlighting the claim coming out of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), that a second source close the Rwandan government confirmed that “French troops
bombarded some of the rebel positions with sophisticated weaponry.” Witness statements also
support allegations that French forces participated in combat against the RPF alongside the FAR.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
•
All documents regarding French forces in or sent to Rwanda in February 1993;
All documents regarding French force involvement any combat activity in February
1993;
All documents regarding French military engagement with the FAR in Rwanda
between 1 January 1993 and 20 February 1993; and
All documents regarding communications between French diplomatic officials and the
OAU between 8 February 1993 and 20 February 1993.
21. Documents regarding French military cooperation with the FAR during Opération
Chimére and the reorganization of the FAR following the March 1993 Dar es Salaam
ceasefire agreement
Between 22 February 1993 and 28 March 1993, several months after French officials were made
aware of the FIDH Report, France deployed a detachment to Rwanda under Opération Chimére.
According to the MIP, “the [Chimére] detachment’s objective was to indirectly supervise an army
of about 20,000 men and to indirectly control it.”
Documents suggest that in the midst of Opération Chimére, a French military official in Kigali
proposed the continuation of the role of the DAMI after the Dar-Es-Salaam ceasefire. Proposals
included continued intelligence assistance to the FAR Etat-Major, strategizing and conduction
operations, personnel management, and logistical support. According to the MIP, the FAR EtatMajor accepted these and other reorganization proposals.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
•
All documents sent between French military or diplomatic officials and the Rwandan
Etat-Major between 8 February 1993 and thereafter;
All documents sent among French officials discussing operational orders between 8
February 1993 and 1 May 1993, including the Rules of Engagement;
All documents reflecting French involvement with the FAR’s reorganization between
8 February 1993 and 1 May 1993;
All proposals for the reorganization and administration of the FAR drafted by French
officials between 8 February 1993 and 1 May 1993;
18
22. Documents regarding French military cooperants remaining in Rwanda after the signing
of the Arusha Accords on 4 August 1993
Under the Arusha Accords, France was to withdraw its last two companies within 37 days of the
agreement going into effect. Despite this requirement, documents suggest that at least several
French “military cooperants” remained in Rwanda after the departure of the Noroît forces and the
arrival of UNAMIR. They remained on the ground until the end of Opération Amaryllis – the
French military operation initiated to evacuate French nationals at the start of the Genocide.
During his interview before the MIP, Michel Roussin, France’s Minister of Cooperation, explained
that these the military cooperants that had remained in Rwanda only conducted training operations,
mainly within the Rwandan Army’s general staff. But in a later publication, Admiral Jacques
Lanxade claimed that these military cooperants enabled French officials to continue intelligence
gathering in Rwanda, in the months leading up to the Genocide.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents relating to the continued presence of French troops in Rwanda after 4
August 1993;
All communications between Rwandan and French officials regarding French military
troops remaining in Rwanda more than 37 days after the Arusha Accords; and
All communications between French military officers and their superiors in France
between 4 August 1993 and 31 December 1994.
23. Documents related to whether the French troops in Rwanda were subject to the N’Selé
Agreement’s requirements that foreign troops depart
a. Documents relating to the applicability of the first N’Sele agreement, signed 29
March 1991
On 29 March 1991, the Rwandan government and the RPF formalized a ceasefire agreement at
N’Sele, Zaire. The agreement called for an end to hostilities, the deployment of a neutral OAUled military observer group along the Uganda-Rwanda border, and the withdrawal of all foreign
troops from Rwanda upon its arrival. The third provision was quickly challenged by the French.
Justifying the continued presence of French soldiers in Rwanda, Ambassador Martres claimed
N’Sele did not apply because France was not a signatory to the agreement. In June 1991,
Mitterrand ordered General Quesnot to keep troops in Rwanda, dismissing reservations expressed
by the general about a lack of military necessity. Ultimately, French combat forces in Kigali
through Opération Noroît and French DAMI advisers in Ruhengeri remained after the signing of
N’Sele – and the deployment of the OAU military observer group.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
All documents, including discussions between French officials, regarding the
applicability of the March 1991 N’Sele Ceasefire Agreement to French Noroît and
DAMI companies stationed in Rwanda.
19
b. Documents relating to the applicability of the second N’Sele agreement, as
amended at Gbadolite on 16 September 1991 and at Arusha on 12 July 1992
On 12 July 1992, delegations from the RPF and Kigali signed an updated version of their previous
N’Sele Agreement in Arusha, Tanzania. The amended N’Sele Accord provided for a renewed
ceasefire, along with provisions demanding the “suspension of supplies of ammunition and
weaponry to the field” and a withdrawal of all foreign troops following the deployment of a neutral
observer group at the end of July. The latter stipulation provided an exception for French forces
whose presence was permitted under bilateral military cooperation agreements.
The question of weapon deliveries posed a complication. Unsure of the permissibility of weapons
shipments under N’Sele, the French Defense Ministry sought clarification from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs on 6 August 1992. Francois Nicoullaud, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense,
requested advice on whether to proceed with a previously planned transfer of machine guns and
ammunition to the FAR. Nicoullaud also suggested that, in order to comply with N’Sele, France’s
DAMI forces would need to be re-classified as “cooperants” under the military assistance
agreement. On 12 August, the French Foreign Ministry responded to Nicoullaud by authorizing
the weapons shipments. While France has yet to release this letter, Nicoullaud relayed its
conclusions to Admiral Lanxade on 14 August, allowing the weapons shipment to go through
unencumbered.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
All documents, including those reflecting discussions between French officials,
regarding the applicability of the July 1992 N’Sele Ceasefire Agreement to French
Noroît and DAMI companies in Rwanda, as well as to French weapons shipments to
the Habyarimana regime; and
All documents, including the letter sent to Francois Nicoullaud from the French Foreign
Ministry on or about 12 August 1992, that relate to weapons shipments to the
Habyarimana regime.
c. Documents concerning the August 1992 MTAA amendment and the
reclassification as DAMI as cooperants
France signed a Military Technical Assistance Agreement (“MTAA”) in 1975 and amended it in
1983. On 26 August 1992, France and Rwanda adopted a second amendment to their MTAA,
abrogating the limitation on military assistance to the Rwandan Gendarmerie alone and extending
French military cooperation to all Rwandan armed forces. This amendment came only weeks after
the government of Rwanda and the RPF had signed the N’Sele ceasefire agreement (discussed
above), a condition of which was the removal of all foreign troops which were not in the country
pursuant to a bilateral cooperation. Before France and Rwanda signed the amendment, the only
French troops that would have been covered under exemption would have been officers training
20
the Gendarmerie. Documents suggest that all other troops, including French officers training FAR
and Noroît personnel, would have been among those whose departure was expected under the
ceasefire agreements.
While the N’Sele amendment did permit French officers in Rwanda pursuant to bilateral
agreements between the two countries to remain in Rwanda (like the DAMI) it did not permit the
presence of the Noroît troops that had remained in the country since October 1990.
Documents reviewed over the course of this Investigation indicate that some French officials were
aware of the tension between the presence of French troops and the then present state of the
MTAA.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
All communications and documents regarding the July 1992 ceasefire agreement
describing the presence and role of French troops following the agreement going into
effect; and
All documents describing the role of the DAMI and Noroît personnel in light of the
N’Sele Agreement.
24. Documents reflecting awareness of 11 Jan 1994 transmission from General Dallaire to
Kofi Annan claiming that the Government of Rwanda was planning for a Genocide.
Documents show that on 11 January 1994, General Dallaire sent a cable to General Maurice Baril,
at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (“UN DPKO”) in New York. The cable stated
that General Dallaire had been put in contact with a top-level informant well placed in the
Interahamwe militia of the MRND. The informant (who came to be known as “Jean Pierre”)
provided a considerable amount of information, much of which would prove prescient as the
Genocide approached. He stated, for example, that he had been told that a small number of Belgian
troops would be killed in order to force Belgium to withdraw its troops from Rwanda. He also
claimed that after the UNAMIR mandate had gone into effect, he had been told to register all Tutsi
in Kigali, and he suspected that the registration would be used to exterminate them. Finally, the
informant shared that he was prepared to share the location of a weapons cache with over 100
weapons. General Dallaire recommended protection for the informant and immediate action on the
weapons cache. He was rebuffed by DPKO and told to take no action.
21
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents created between 11 January 1994 and 7 April 1994 regarding General
Dallaire’s cable to the UN DPKO;
All documents created between 1 December 1993 and 7 April 1994 regarding weapons
caches in or around Kigali; and
All documents created between 1 August 1993 and 7 April 1994 regarding registration
of Tutsi in Kigali or anywhere else in Rwanda.
25. Documents reflecting discussions among French officials about French complicity in
Rwandan human rights violations in early 1994
On 25 January 1994, Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) published an open letter to President
Mitterrand, condemning his administration for providing military combat assistance to an army
that had committed widespread human rights abuses without applying sufficient pressure to stop
them. The letter alleged that France’s financial backing of Habyarimana – despite widespread
atrocities committed by his supporters – was virtually equivalent to an anti-RPF war effort. Other
reporting has suggested that French officials in the Ministry of Cooperation were preparing a
response to HRW’s allegations.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
•
All documents related to communications among French officials about the letter
released by HRW on 25 January 1994;
All documents reflecting the perspectives expressed in the letter that France was
complicit in Rwandan atrocities or that French support for the Habyarimana regime
was equivalent to engaging in its war effort;
All documents related to discussions between and among French officials about the
appropriateness of continued financial, technical, and/or military aid for the
Habyarimana regime from 25 January 1994 to 6 April 1994; and
All responses, including drafts, to the 25 January 1994 HRW letter prepared by the
French Ministry of Cooperation.
26. Documents regarding attempts to remove General Dallaire from his Command post at
UNAMIR in March 1994.
On 30 March 1994, a week before the Genocide against the Tutsi began, UNAMIR Commander,
General Roméo Dallaire, discovered that the French Government had tried to have him relieved
him from his command. According to General Dallaire, while on a trip to the UN in New York, he
learned that the French government had written to the Canadian government to request his removal
from the position of UNAMIR force commander. He suspected that this action was taken because
French officials had been upset by references General Dallaire had made to the presence of French
officers among the Presidential Guard, especially considering the Guard’s known proximity to the
22
Interahamwe. He believed his “bluntness had had rattled the French enough for them to take the
bold and extremely unusual step of asking for [his] dismissal.”
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents regarding communications between French and Canadian officials
between 19 August 1993 and 31 March 1994;
All documents regarding communications between French diplomatic officials and the
UN DPKO between 19 August 1993 and 31 March 1994; and
All documents regarding General Dallaire between August 1993 and August 1994.
27. Documents related to France’s reaction to the killing of Rwandan political leaders and
opposition party members in April 1994
Evidence suggests that, in the morning of 7 April 1994, members of the Rwandan military carried
out a string of targeted political assassinations of senior members of the Broad-Based Transitional
Government and MRND opposition parties. That morning, units from the Presidential Guard,
Reconnaissance Battalion, Huye Battalion, and École Supérieure Militaire (ESM) officer school
surrounded the Kigali residence of Agathe Uwilingiyimana, Rwandan Prime Minister and member
of the moderate wing of the MDR opposition party. After a prolonged standoff, the units
apprehended and murdered the prime minister, along with her small security detail of Belgian UN
peacekeepers. Simultaneously, members of the Presidential Guard and Para Commando battalion
tracked down and assassinated four key opposition leaders in the Kimihurura neighborhood of
Kigali: Joseph Kavaruganda (President of the Constitutional Court), Faustin Rucogoza (MDR
official and Minister of Information), Landoald Ndasingwa (vice-chairman of the PL and Minister
of Labor and Community Affairs), and Frédéric Nzamurambaho (Chairman of the PSD party and
Minister of Agriculture).
The killings effectively crippled the Broad-Based Transitional Government outlined by the Arusha
Accords, expanding a power vacuum caused by President Habyarimana’s death while creating an
opening for Col. Bagosora and his cabal of genocidaires to seize power. The result – the foundation
of the genocidal Interim Rwanda Government (IRG) – sent ripple effects throughout Rwanda and
the diplomatic community, prompting questions as to the legitimacy of the new government and
the possibility that a coup had occurred.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
All documents concerning France’s reaction to the killing of Rwandan politicians and
party leaders in Kigali by members of the Rwandan military or armed militia groups
from 6 April 1994 – 7 April 1994, including Joseph Kavaruganda, Faustin Rucogoza,
Landoald Ndasingwa, Frédéric Nzamurambaho, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, and
Uwilingiyimana’s U.N. peacekeeper security detail; and
23
•
All documents regarding the creation of the IRG in April 1994, the political
assassinations taking place in Rwanda, and the possibility that a coup had taken place.
28. Documents regarding French officials’ decision to evacuate certain figures in the
Rwandan Government during Opération Amaryllis.
On 8 April 1994, French officials initiated Opération Amaryllis, during which French officials
evacuated French citizens and 394 Rwandans from the country. The evacuated Rwandans
included President Habyarimana’s widow (Agathe Kanziga, a member of the extremist group, the
Akazu) and her family, RTLM co-founder Ferdinand Nahimana and his family, 40 MRND
members, and other extremists. French officials initiated and completed this operation, even as
they stated in the official order for Opération Amaryllis, issued on 8 April 1994, that the
Presidential Guard had begun to eliminate members of the opposition and the Tutsi.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents related to the evacuation of non-French nationals, including Agathe
Kazinga, Ferdinand Nahimana, and other Rwandan embassy staff, government
officials, party leaders, and their family members, in April 1994;
All documents reflecting communications between French government officials and
(1) Agathe Kazinga, (2) her staff, or (3) any other members of the MRND in April
1994; and
All documents, from the time of the Genocide to the present, showing support,
including financial and housing assistance and security, for Agathe Habyarimana, any
members of the Habyarimana family, or any persons alleged to have participated in the
1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi.
29. Documents regarding French officials providing refuge in the French Embassy to
selected Rwandans during the early days of the Genocide.
In the immediate aftermath of President Habyarimana’s death on 6 April 1994, RTLM and other
extremist radio stations began to broadcast in French and Kinyarwanda, blaming the Tutsi for
causing the plane crash and calling for the Rwandan people to rise up and kill “the enemy” (i.e.,
the Tutsi) in retaliation. Documents indicate that, as the Genocide began, French officials allowed
various prominent Rwandan nationals, including Ferdinand Nahimana, co-founder of RTLM and
primary architect of its violent messaging, to seek refuge in the French Embassy in Kigali.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
All documents related to the decision to allow Ferdinand Nahimana and other
Rwandans to seek refuge in the French Embassy in Kigali in early April 1994;
All documents related to the decision to deny refuge to other Rwandan nationals,
including embassy staff and their family members;
24
•
•
All documents created at the French Embassy between 6 April and 13 April 1994; and
All inventories or lists of documents created or housed at the French Embassy between
6 April and 13 April 1994, including any documents which may have been lost or
destroyed.
30. Documents related to the alleged use of UNAMIR vehicles to transport and evacuate
Hutu extremists
General Roméo Dallaire, UNAMIR Commander from 1993-1994, has recounted that on or about
10 April 1994, RPF official Seth Sendashonga claimed that French officials used UNAMIR
vehicles to transport known Hutu extremists to the Kigali airport. Sendashonga also alleged that
the French had fired weapons from inside the UNAMIR vehicles on several occasions - prompting
Dallaire’s concern that France’s actions, if they had occurred, compromised the neutrality of
UNAMIR and the safety of UN forces. Dallaire told Sendashonga that Belgian Colonel Luc
Marchal was “arguing this point with the French commander.”
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
•
All documents concerning French officials’ knowledge of, direction of, or assistance
with the evacuation of persons alleged to be Hutu extremists;
All documents concerning the use of UNAMIR vehicles or other UNAMIR equipment
by French soldiers or officials;
A list of all persons evacuated at the request or with the assistance of French officials;
and
All documents reflecting conversations between French military personnel and Colonel
Luc Marchal, UNAMIR Sector Commander for Kigali.
31. Documents reflecting French government officials’ decision to recognize the Interim
Rwanda Government in the days following the plane crash of 6 April 1994.
Following the downing of President Habyarimana’s plane, French officials recognized the Interim
Rwanda Government (IRG) as the Rwandan government and received its officials in Paris. This
acknowledgement and acceptance of the IRG and its officials was particularly noteworthy because
at the time, only Egypt had agreed to do the same, while other states, such as Belgium and the
United States, had refused. According to the MIP, on 27 April 1994, on their way to New York
for a meeting at the UN, IRG interim foreign minister Jerome Bicamumpaka and CDR leader JeanBosco Barayagwiza met in Paris with a number of French officials including Bruno Delaye. When
asked on various occasions about the decision to receive Bicamumpaka and Barayagwiza, Delaye
offered several explanations. When questioned by Daniel Jacoby of the FIDH, Delaye responded
that it was better to talk to them than not. When challenged on the same point by journalist Patrick
Saint-Exupery, Delaye said “you cannot deal with Africa without getting your hands dirty.”
25
The ICTR subsequently found Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza guilty of direct and public incitement to
commit genocide and crimes against humanity (extermination and persecution).
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents regarding the April 1994 meetings between Bruno Delaye, Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza, and Jerome Bicamumpaka including any documents created in
preparation for or following the conclusion of the meeting;
All documents reflecting requests from Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza or Jerome
Bicamumpaka or any other members of the Interim Rwandan Government regarding
assistance from France between 7 April 1994 and 31 August 1994; and
All documents reflecting France’s effort to establish or assist the IRG.
32. Documents reflecting efforts by French officials to characterize 1994 Genocide Against
the Tutsi as a double Genocide in April 1994.
For the duration of the Genocide against the Tutsi, French officials persisted in representing the
government-sponsored massacres as a two-sided humanitarian crisis brought on by an armed
conflict. Not only did French officials promote this characterization within France, but also
persisted in its promotion internationally. For example, during the Genocide, while Rwanda held
one of ten rotating seats on the UN Security Council (“UNSC”), the Rwandan and French
representatives to the UNSC unsuccessfully sought to amend the opening paragraphs of a draft
UNSC statement by removing the assertion that Government forces were responsible for the
killings in Rwanda.
French officials characterized the situation as a civil war or a double-genocide, particularly in April
1994.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents created by members of the French government between 7 April 1994
and 22 August 1994 using the term “double genocide”;
All documents regarding requests to the UNSC to remove references to culpable
Rwandan government forces between 7 April 1994 and 22 August 1994; and
All documents sent between the French and Rwandan UN delegations between 7 April
1994 and 22 August 1994.
33. Documents reflecting attempts of French officials to legitimize IRG and FAR more than
a month into the Genocide against the Tutsi.
Evidence suggests that, even after the outbreak of the 1994 Genocide, French officials continued
to provide technical and political support for the IRG while seeking to improve perceptions of their
legitimacy abroad. In May 1994, Rwandan defense official Lt. Col. Ephrem Rwabalinda visited
26
Paris and met with General Jean Pierre Huchon, the military head of the French Ministry of
Cooperation. Evidence suggests that the participants discussed the FAR’s need for clothing,
ammunition, and transmission equipment. Documents suggest that General Huchon promised that
relief from the French would be carried out in favor of the FAR and stressed the importance of
bringing international opinion around in favor of the IRG.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
•
•
All documents related to Lt. Col. Ephrem Rwabalinda’s visit to Paris from 9-13 May
1994, including but not limited to his meeting with Jean Pierre Huchon of the Ministry
of Cooperation on 9 May;
All documents concerning French assistance planned for or provided to the
Habyarimana regime from 9 May 1994 to 18 July 1994;
All documents concerning shipments of encrypted (or any other) communications
equipment to the IRG;
All documents concerning French efforts to improve international opinion in favor of
the IRG; and
All documents concerning French officials’ belief in the legitimacy of the IRG as a
governing institution.
34. Documents reflecting decisions made by French officials during Opération Turquoise
a. Documents regarding the purpose of Opération Turquoise
Although the French government represented in 1994 that its purpose in conducting Opération
Turquoise was to save human lives and put an end to the massacres, documents reviewed over the
course of this investigation suggest that the French government may also have had other objectives
in mind. Guillaume Ancel, a French soldier in Rwanda during Opération Turquoise, has publicly
claimed that the mission’s purpose was to fight “the Tutsi soldiers” who endangered France’s ally.
Ancel has further commented that he was instructed to help prevent journalists from discovering
French attempts to rearm the FAR.
Consistent with Ancel’s account, journalist Catherine Bond reported on 28 June 1994 that France’s
Defense Minister, Francois Léotard, clarified French government strategy while on the ground in
Rwanda at the beginning of Opération Turquoise. “Mr. Leotard said that a Tutsi minority could
not rule Rwanda. France would ensure that the Hutu government would include it in a political
coalition.” In his 5 July 1994 New York Times article, journalist Raymod Bonner agreed, noting
that, “in protecting a region that contains Government forces but no rebel troops, France has
effectively come to the rescue of the beleaguered Hutu-dominated Government.”
Similarly skeptical, New Zealand’s Ambassador the UN Colin Keating expressed his doubts to his
Security Counsel counterparts, questioning why a French troops would be sent to do something
that the UN blue helmets should have been sent to do.
27
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
•
All documents identifying the purpose of Opération Turquoise, including its military
objectives;
All documents concerning French attempts to prevent journalists from discovering
and/or reporting on their activities in rearming génocidaires between 7 April 1994 and
31 August 1994;
All documents regarding orders given to Guillaume Ancel or his supervisors between
7 April 1994 and 31 August 1994; and
All documents reflecting reactions to reporting from Western journalists questioning
French government motivations in Opération Turquoise between 1 June 1994 and 31
August 1994.
b. Documents regarding alleged French orders to rearm FAR combatants and
génocidaires in 1994
French journalist Patrick de Saint-Exupéry reported that, in 2017, a senior French officer reviewed
French archives on Rwanda and confirmed the existence of several documents referencing an order
for French soldiers to rearm génocidaires in 1994. According to the officer, the documents he
reviewed indicated that many soldiers did not understand the order and hesitated to comply.
Addressing their concerns, Hubert Védrine, the secretary general of the Élysée, wrote a message
in the margin of one note, urging soldiers to “stick to the fixed directives,” which Saint-Exupéry
interpreted to mean rearming the Hutu. Guillaume Ancel has claimed that he personally carried
out orders to rearm génocidaires fleeing the RPF in the summer of 1994.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
All documents between 7 April 1994 and 31 December 1994 concerning orders for any
French military personnel to provide arms to members of the FAR, Hutu militias, or
other Rwandan combatants who participated or were alleged to have participated in the
1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi (“génocidaires”), including relevant after action
reports beyond this date range; and
All documents between 7 April 1994 and 31 August 1994 reflecting French weapons
caches intended for rearming génocidaires, including any weapons stored in sea
containers at the French base at Cyangugu Airport, including relevant after-action
reports beyond this date range.
c. Documents regarding French actions facilitating the passage of IRG members
through the Safe Humanitarian Zone from Cyangugu into Bukavu, Zaire
At his MIP hearing, Jean-Claude Lafourcade, Head of the Turquoise Commanding Force, testified
that in July 1994 members of the IRG crossed from Cyangugu (within the Safe Humanitarian Zone
which had been established by French forces the month prior) into Bukayu, Zaire. Lafourcade
28
claimed that while he knew about their presence in the SHZ, the French did not aid in their
movement into Zaire.
However, documents reviewed in the course of this investigation suggest that between 15 July
1994 and 16 July 1994 French officials including General Raymond Germanos arranged with the
Mayor of Bukavu for the passage of the fleeing IRG members from Cyangugu into Zaire.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
•
All documents reflecting French efforts to facilitate the passage of IRG members
through the safe humanitarian zone;
All documents sent from or received by General Raymond Germanos between 1 June
1994 and 31 August 1994 regarding the Operation Turquoise or the Safe Humanitarian
Zone;
All documents regarding communications between French officials and the Mayor of
Bukavu between 1 June 1994 and 31 August 1994; and
All documents regarding communications from, to, or though Jean-Claude Lafourcade
and General Raymond Germanos between 1 June 1994 and 31 August 1994.
35. Documents reflecting France’s continued willingness to harbor génocidaires within its
borders, its decision not to prosecute the offenders in its court system, and its resistance
to efforts to extradite them to the ICTR or Rwanda.
Since 1994, significant controversy has been generated by France’s protective approach towards
suspected génocidaires. Multiple international human rights bodies – including HRW, the
European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”), and the Paris-based NGO Collectif des Parties
Civiles pour le Rwanda (“CPCR”) – have criticized France for refusing to honor extradition
requests, delaying prosecutions and investigations, and failing to reach convictions of suspected
génocidaires within its jurisdiction. Between 1994 and 2017, the French Cour de cassation denied
over 33 extradition requests filed by CPCR and the Rwandan government. In the same time frame,
French courts issued only three convictions against suspected génocidaires, despite 25 civil
complaints for human rights violations filed by CPCR. In some cases, the complaints never
prompted investigations. When they did, French courts were often criticized for failing to bring
cases to a prompt resolution, as required by Article 5(3) of the ECHR. In January 2018, the 29th
session of the Universal Periodic Review Working Group, United Nations Human Rights Council,
placed France under review (for the third time) for undue delays in the investigation and
prosecution of suspected génocidaires within its borders. In January 2004, the ECHR unanimously
ruled that France had violated the rights of Yvonne Mutimura, a Rwandan genocide victim, by
allowing unreasonable delays in the investigation of her alleged perpetrator, Wenceslas
Munyeshyaka. Munyeshyaka remains at large, his case having been dismissed by a French judge
in October 2015.
To date, France continues to provide shelter for dozens of suspected génocidaires, including
Agathe Habyarimana (the former president’s wife and suspected architect of the genocide),
29
Callixte Mbarushimana (a former U.N. volunteer who allegedly killed 32 civilians while stationed
in Kigali), Eugéne Rwamucyo and Sosthéne Munyemana (violent members extremist Hutu-power
gangs), and Claude Muhayimana (accused of participating in the Genocide at Gatwaro stadium in
1994). According to some estimates, France harbors more génocidaires than any other country.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
All documents reflecting French government policies, practices, and decisions
regarding suspected génocidaires, including Agathe Habyarimana, Callixte
Mbarushimana, Eugéne Rwamucyo, Sosthéne Munyemana, and Claude Muhayimana
(i.e. denying extradition requests and providing funds and housing).
36. Documents issued by the DRM about Rwanda between 1992 and 1994
The Direction du renseignement militaire, Directorate of Military Intelligence (“DRM”) was
created in June 1992, at the urging of Minister of Defense Pierre Joxe. General Jean Heinrich led
the DRM from its inception until November 1995. According to the summary of General
Heinrich’s MIP testimony, the DRM sent the Minister of Defense a memo every morning
concerning the main crisis areas and, under this format, the Minister of Defense “would receive
daily or fifteen lines on the situation in Rwanda.” He also said that the DRM would also create
analytical reports to inform authorities when they found a situation to be important. Only a few of
these documents have been made available through the MIP and other forums.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
All daily memos about Rwanda drafted by any member of the DRM between 1 June
1992 and 31 August 1994 and all contributing documents; and
All analytical reports about Rwanda prepared by any member of the DRM between 1
June 1992 and 31 August 1994, and all contributing documents.
37. Documents created by the DGSE about Rwanda between 1990 and 1994
Between 1990 and 1994, the Direction Générale de la sécurité extérieure, (“DGSE”), France’s
foreign intelligence agency, relayed most of its intelligence on Rwanda back to Paris from its
established positions in Uganda. In his MIP testimony, Jacques Dewatre, DGSE director between
June 1993 and February 2000, stated that the DGSE issued 323 notes on Rwanda between 1990
and 1994: eight in 1990, 27 in 1991, six in 1992, 24 in 1993, and 258 in 1994. Only a few of these
notes have been made available to the public through the MIP and other forums.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
The full set of DGSE notes issued about Rwanda between 1990 and 1994;
All other documents prepared by or for the DGSE related to Rwanda between 1 January
1990 and 31 December 1994; and
30
•
All DGSE written recommendations regarding Rwanda drafted between 1 January
1992 and 31 December 1994.
38. Documents concerning the completeness of the 1998 MIP inquiry and the accuracy of its
conclusions
On 15 December 1998, the MIP concluded that “France [had] in no way incited, encouraged,
assisted, or supported those who orchestrated the genocide.” Controversial to many, this
conclusion even drew criticism from within its own body. The day after the MIP was released,
MIP committee member Jean-Claude Lefort, issued a press release claiming (1) that he had not
been consulted during the report’s final approval, (2) that he believed several major issues
remained unresolved, and (3) that he officially abstained from endorsing the final product. Lefort
explained in a 2008 interview that he believed the fact-finding mission failed in its mission to
highlight the truth.
Documents in the public record show that over the course of the parliamentary inquiry, Lefort
repeatedly emphasized to his colleagues on the committee that critical documents were missing
from their files. From 20 August to 20 October 1998, Lefort sent nineteen memos to other
committee members, highlighting unanswered questions, identifying gaps in the evidence, and
requesting additional documents. While it is unclear whether the committee members received any
of these documents, several the documents he identified as missing do not appear to be reflected
in the Annex of the final report. These documents include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
“CAP notes” held by the Quai d’Orsay;
Diplomatic cables and meeting summaries between French officials in Paris and
representatives of the Habyarimana regime during Opération Amaryllis (the MIP
Annex, Section 8 contains no such records);
Documents related to an equipment sale for Alouette II helicopters reported on 15 July
1994 (Lefort noted that File 11 in the MIP’s military cooperation folder contained a
record of the sale but not of the recipient);
Communications between the Mission d’assistance militaire and the assistants
militaires techniques (Lefort noted that an unofficial organizational chart from General
Mourgeon indicated that the units were “in connection” but the MIP had no records of
their communications);
Daily/weekly reports of the defense attaché for the following periods:
o February-April 1991
o March-May 1992
o September-December 1992
o November-December 1993
o Most of 1994 (the MIP Annex contains only one report from Col. Cussac in
1994);
Documents related to the activities of the DAMI bataillon-para and commando de
recherche et d’action en profondeur units; and
Documents related to a French fact-finding mission arriving in Kigali on 25 November
1991 (Lefort noted that two cables referred to the mission but that neither the telegrams
31
nor any other documents possessed by the MIP indicated the mission’s purpose or
conclusions).
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents identified as missing in the MIP archives by Jean-Claude Lefort,
including those outlined above;
All documents regarding concerns or questions related to the MIP inquiry expressed by
Jean-Claude Lefort and other parliamentarians during their time as members of the
committee; and
All documents gathered by the MIP during their inquiry, including all messages sent
from defense attaché Galinie on or about 27 January 1991.
39. All photographs and audiovisual recordings related to the Genocide
Evidence has indicated that, during Opérations Amaryllis and Turquoise, French soldiers, military
advisers, and officials took numerous photographs and audiovisual recordings. To the extent that
such media relate to events, victims, participants, and circumstances of the 1994 Genocide Against
the Tutsi, they constitute real and tangible evidence directly related to a critical chapter in Rwandan
history.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
All photographs, sketches, and audiovisual recordings in France’s possession related
to Rwanda taken or discovered between 6 April 1994 and 31 July 1994.
Conclusion
France has had a continuing and important role in events that impacted the course of the Genocide
against the Tutsi. The full measure of its role must be carefully and honestly assessed. And France
has a moral obligation to cooperate with this process.
In this letter, as in the one sent in December, we have delineated topical areas and offered some
commentary about their relevance. We underscore that no final judgments about these matters
have been reached. That will await the Investigation’s final report. But most certainly, the
Investigation will be enhanced and made more valuable with the cooperation of the French
government. The people of Rwanda, as well as the people of France, will benefit from France’s
transparency and cooperation with this process. [sign off]
32
APPENDIX D
1. Documents related to the Government of France’s monitoring of RPF activities
prior to the 1990 Attack
It is clear that President Habyarimana was monitoring the actions of the Rwandan Diaspora,
including Rwandans living in Uganda. He was also aware of the possibility of military action by
the RPA. The government of France’s long-time relationship with President Habyarimana’s
government suggests that it may have been involved in or, at the very least, aware of intelligence
gathering, which may have continued throughout the conflict between the RPF and the
Government of Rwanda. This relationship suggests that the government of France may have also
been otherwise assisting the Habyarimana government in its opposition to the actions of the
diaspora in Uganda.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
•
•
All documents related to the Government of France’s knowledge of, and actions taken
regarding, the Rwandan diaspora community;
All documents related to discussions or intelligence gathering by the French government
regarding the RPF before 19 July 1994;
All documents reflecting any discussions between the Governments of France and Rwanda
regarding a possible attack by the RPA;
All documents reflecting efforts to undermine the RPA as it prepared for the attack; and
All documents related to the Government of France’s efforts to engage the Rwandan
government on the issue of Rwandan refugees.
2. Documents related to the Government of France’s knowledge of human rights abuses
committed by Zairian troops in 1990
According to reporting from Reuters, in early October 1990, approximately 1,000 soldiers from
Zaire, including soldiers from President Mobutu’s Presidential Guard, were deployed to Rwanda
to fight alongside the FAR (Forces armées rwandaises) and Rwandan Gendarmerie units, with
French soldiers present, against the RPA. Shortly after their arrival, the Zairian troops developed
a reputation for brutality and widespread violations of human rights, according to an internal cable
from the US Secretary of State and a US Defense Intelligence Agency brief. In Kigali, Zairian
soldiers monitored city entry-points and carried out house searches, prompting reports of thievery,
intimidation, and sexual assault. Outside the capital, the Zairian forces lived off the land,
commonly seizing resources or property by force. Various countries in the region expressed
concern about the presence of the Zairian troops in Rwanda. US Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State Irvin Hicks has stated that the U.S. was taking a hard line against human rights abuses. On
11 October 1990, a Belgian official informed the US Ambassador to Belgium that the presence of
the Zairian forces in Rwanda was “unfortunate” and a reason for Belgium to withdraw from
1
Rwanda as soon as possible. Less than two weeks later, a US intelligence memo characterized the
Zairian troops as having “a penchant for human rights abuses and theft.” In a meeting with the
Rwandan ambassador to the U.S., Aloys Uwimana, on 16 October, Hicks also expressed
reservations about the military discipline of Zairian troops given reports of human rights abuses at
their hands. It is also unclear whether any French officials asked Rwandan military counterparts
to call for the discipline or withdrawal of the Zairian soldiers in light of human rights abuses.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
•
All documents relating to the presence and activity of Zairian armed forces in Rwanda in
October 1990, including any documents related to allegations of human rights abuses
involving the Zairean troops;
All documents relating to discussions held between French and Rwandan representatives
regarding the presence or actions of the Zairian troops;
All documents showing any coordinated activities between French and Zairian forces, in
opposition to the RPA; and
All documents showing that the Government of France, like the United States, Belgium
and other countries, condemned the human rights violations in Rwanda by Zairian troops.
3. Documents relating to the presence of French soldiers providing training for FAR
elite units while in battle with the RPA
In October 1990, there were already 17 French military cooperants on the ground in Rwanda,
including several who had been working to train key FAR units – the reconnaissance battalion, the
para-commando battalion, and the aviation squadron – that were among the first dispatched to
surveil and repel the RPA. General Jean Varret testified in 1998 that French instructor-pilots were
on board the Gazelle helicopters sent into combat alongside the Rwandans. The Government of
France has maintained, however, that the French instructors “were not at the controls of the
helicopter to fire” – they were onboard only “to provide flying and shooting instruction.”
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents reflecting French training of FAR troops, in the Fall of 1990;
All documents, including after-action reports, reflecting the role of the French military in
Rwanda, in the Fall of 1990; and
All documents referencing or suggesting how the Government of France was able to verify
that French pilots were not at the controls of the helicopters.
2
4. Documents related to a meeting among US Ambassador to Rwanda Robert Flaten,
US Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Carol Fuller, and President Juvenal
Habyarimana
There is evidence that in the summer of 1991, US Ambassador to Rwanda Robert Flaten and
Acting Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) at the US Embassy in Kigali Carol Fuller met with
President Habyarimana and another senior Rwandan official for a consultation visit. During the
meeting, Colonel Théoneste Bagosora walked into the room and placed a document on the table
in front of Habyarimana titled “la solution au problème Tutsi.” DCM Fuller took note of the title
of the document and expressed concern about it privately to Amb. Flaten after the meeting.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents referencing or suggesting the existence of a document titled “la solution au
problème Tutsi” written by or in the possession of members of the Habyarimana
government;
All documents relating to France’s awareness that members of the Habyarimana
government were discussing a “Tutsi problem” as early as 1991; and
All documents related to French officials’ concerns about ethnic prejudice against Tutsis
in the Habyarimana government.
5. Documents related to the arrest of Paul Kagame in Paris by the French Government
in September 1991
According to the French Parliamentary Report on its military operations in Rwanda between
1990 and 1994, in September, 1991, on a trip to Paris, Paul Kagame was arrested by the French
government. He had met with Paul Dijoud, Director of African and Malagasy Affairs in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the previous day. Kagame recalled in an interview that at his
meeting with Dijoud, Dijoud had told Kagame "If you do not stop the fight, if you take the
country, you will not find your brothers and your families, because all will have been
massacred!" Describing the arrest itself, Kagame recalled that at 4AM, “hotel security and the
police waltzed into our rooms with the master key, abruptly switching on the lights and waking
me up. They had guns pointed at me and were shouting ‘get up! get up!’” Then, Kagame and his
security team were driven to an unknown location for questioning.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
• All documents relating to the surveillance and later arrest of Paul Kagame and others in
his group;
• All documents regarding conversations between Paul Kagame and French officials,
including but not limited to Paul Dijoud;
• All documents of any interrogations by the French government of Paul Kagame and his
security team; and
3
•
All documents related to Dijoud’s statement that Kagame and the others there with him
would never see his family again.
6. Documents related to French officials’ perspective on and participation in the Arusha
negotiations
During the negotiations between the RPF and the Government of Rwanda (“GOR”) in Arusha,
Tanzania, France participated as an observer state, stressing its status as an independent and
impartial bystander. Evidence suggests, however, that French officials were strongly biased in
favor of, and advocated for concessions favorable to, the GOR while attributing sinister
motivations to RPF representatives. There is evidence suggesting, for example, that in July 1992,
General Christian Quesnot saw the RPF as using the Arusha process simply as a stall tactic to
strengthen its forces in preparation for another military campaign. On 4 September 1992, French
officials Jean-Marc de la Sablière, Catherine Boivineau, and Bruno Delaye met in Paris with an
RPF delegation led by Chairman Alex Kanyarengwe in advance of upcoming talks at Arusha.
According to a report on the meeting, de la Sablière opened the discussion by demanding
concessions and angrily insisting that the French government would never allow the RPA to take
Kigali by force. When RPF-GOR discussions at Arusha resumed on 7 September, the French
delegation included Colonel Dominique Delort, a French officer who had previously helped
Colonel Jacques Rosier provide artillery equipment and training to the FAR, prompting concerns
about the partiality of the French. According to one report, a senior French military official
remarked after the conclusion of the negotiations that “Arusha, it’s Munich” – referencing the
appeasement of the Nazis before World War II.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents related to French officials’ engagement in the Arusha negotiations between
the GOR and RPF from 1992-1993;
All documents related to the decision to send Col. Delort as a member of the French
delegation to Arusha in September 1992; and
All documents related to a statement made by a French official that “Arusha, it’s Munich”
– or any similar statements by French officials suggesting similar sentiments.
7. Documents related to French presence at checkpoints manned by the FAR and
Rwandan gendarmerie
According to the French Parlimentary Report, In February 1993, Col. Delort, recently
appointed the commander of French military operations in Kigali, tasked French soldiers to
man checkpoints in Kigali alongside the Rwandan Gendarmerie. At the time, senior French
officials were well-aware of the frequent human rights abuses at Gendarmerie-controlled
4
checkpoints across Rwanda. Nonetheless, French Noroît soldiers were directed to provide
“limited action in support” of the Gendarmerie, which appears to have included delivering
“suspects” seeking passage through checkpoints to the Gendarmerie to be processed.
Testimony from multiple sources has indicated that French soldiers manning checkpoints in
Rwanda turned a blind eye towards human rights abuses committed by FAR, gendarmerie, and
other militarized groups at the checkpoints. Testimony has also suggested that French forces
contributed to the abuses by regularly checking ethnic identity cards at checkpoints and
detaining or denying passage to suspected Tutsi. Reports of French soldiers checking I.D. cards
for ethnicity, denying passage to Tutsi, and overlooking human rights abuses in plain sight are
widespread and span many geographic areas. Reports concern French soldiers at checkpoints
in or near Gatsibo in Byumba, the Kabuye Sugar Factory, Shyorongi, Ku Kirenge, Gisenyi,
Nyabarongo, and several locations in Kigali – among others.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents related to French military personnel manning, assisting in the manning
of, or otherwise present at checkpoints in Rwanda, including documents related to the
behavior of the soldiers or any disciplinary processes taken against them;
All documents related to allegations or evidence of human rights abuses occurring at
or in the vicinity of checkpoints where French personnel were present; and
All photographs and videos showing French military presence at checkpoints in
Rwanda.
8. Documents related to Colonel Henri Poncet’s claims about Opération Amaryllis
According to his book, Shake Hands with the Devil, On 9 April 1994, UNAMIR force commander
General Roméo Dallaire had a brief conversation at the Kigali airport with Col. Poncet,
commander of the Opération Amaryllis force. Dallaire recalls that Col. Poncet showed no interest
in cooperating with UNAMIR during the interaction and emphasized that his mission was only to
rapidly evacuate French and European nationals. In contradiction to reports already circulating
that French paratroopers had evacuated several Rwandans and 12 members of the presidential
family, Poncet told Dallaire that he was only there to evacuate French expatriates and “white
people.”
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
All documents related to the mission of Opération Amaryllis, targets of evacuation, and
orders concerning evacuations;
All documents related to interactions Col. Poncet had with Gen. Dallaire, including their
conversation at the Kigali airport on 9 April 1994; and
5
•
All documents supporting or undercutting Col. Poncet’s purported assertion on 9 April
1994 that the Amaryllis force was only in Rwanda to evacuate French expatriates and
“white people.”
9. Documents summarizing the contents of materials that were destroyed or burned at
the French embassy
Immediately after the beginning of the Genocide, evidence suggests France grew concerned that
documents in its embassy would expose France to criticism for its continued role with the
Habyarimana government and the coming of the Genocide. To protect France, the ambassador in
Kigali set in motion a process to destroy documents so they would not be seized.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
• All documents that were taken by the embassy staff following the plane crash and sent to
France;
• All documents reflecting the decision to destroy documents and materials at the French
embassy; and
• All documents regarding discussions between embassy staff and officials in Paris about
how to make sure information was not left behind that would incriminate France’s role.
10. Documents related to French military personnel and equipment remaining in
Rwanda after Opération Amaryllis
The French Parliamentary Commission’s Report on Military Operations Conducted by France and
Other Countries and the United Nations in Rwanda notes that Opération Amaryllis, as originally
conceived, “could have developed into something more than a simple humanitarian operation,”
but concluded that “this was not the case.” The report also indicates that, rather than simply
departing when it had concluded its evacuation efforts, the Amaryllis force, which brought with it
multiple Milan anti-tank missiles, left behind 35 military personnel under the command of Lt. Col.
Jean-Jacques Maurin to gather information, propose appropriate action, and guide air support. At
least one of these personnel was an intelligence agent.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents related to the conception of Opération Amaryllis’ operational design –
including its mandate, command structure, personnel, rules of engagement, and equipment;
All documents related to the decision to leave French military personnel behind in Rwanda
under the command of Lt. Col. Maurin after the conclusion of Opération Amaryllis’
evacuation mission;
All documents related to the behavior, objective, and reporting of French military
personnel after the conclusion of the Opération Amaryllis evacuations;
6
•
•
All documents related to the French objective to provide air support for the Rwandan
military in the spring and summer of 1994; and
All documents reflecting the basis on which the Parlimentary Commission concluded that
Opération Amaryllis could have evolved differently, as well as the evidence based on
which it concluded the operation did not develop into more than a humanitarian mission.
11. Documents related to UN opposition to Opération Turquoise
The Government of France’s proposal to intervene in Rwanda through Opération Turquoise was
met with much skepticism and doubt at the UNSC, ranging from ambivalence to open criticism.
Shortly after the operation was proposed to the UNSC, some of the UN Security Council’s five
permanent members expressed doubts about the advisability of the French mission. The United
Kingdom’s UN representative, Sir David Hannay, told the New Zealand delegation privately that
the French proposal was “crazy.” US delegation representatives revealed that the US State
Department’s Africa Bureau judged Turquoise to be “a disastrous policy.” Canada’s UN
delegation informed France that their government was “absolutely opposed” to the intervention.
UNSC member states opposed Turquoise for a variety of reasons. Some, including the US
delegation, expressed concerns that Turquoise would slow momentum for country contributions
to UNAMIR, as countries would want to wait to see the outcome of the French plan before making
additional commitments. Others, including the Nigeria delegation to the UN, feared that the
Government of France would not be an impartial actor in Rwanda, given their links to and
historical support for the Habyarimana regime. Such concerns centered around the Government of
France’s motives for intervention, with many fearing Paris was driven more by a desire to rescue
and re-instate their allies in the Rwandan military than provide humanitarian aid.
Regardless of the motives behind Turquoise, it was not lost on UNSC member states that a likely
outcome of the intervention would be to slow RPA advances to the benefit of the Rwandan
Government Forces (“RGF”). Even French UN Ambassador Jean-Bernard Mérimée
acknowledged privately on 17 June 1994 that the inevitable outcome of Turquoise would be to
help the RGF. In a 5 July 1994 State Department memorandum, USUN staffers noted that “Paris’
decision to establish a secure humanitarian zone in the contested area of southwestern Rwanda
creates a de-facto interpositionary force” that would block the RPA advance through Rwanda.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
All documents related to concerns or opposition expressed by UNSC member states
regarding France’s proposal to intervene militarily and/or establish a Safe Humanitarian
Zone in Rwanda;
7
•
•
•
•
All documents related to concerns or opposition expressed by UNSC member states
regarding the conduct of French military personnel or decisions of French policymakers
during Opération Turquoise;
All documents related to concerns or opposition expressed by French officials regarding
France’s proposal to intervene militarily, and/or establish a Safe Humanitarian Zone in
Rwanda;
All documents related to concerns or opposition expressed by French officials regarding
the conduct of French military personnel or decisions of French policymakers during
Opération Turquoise; and
All documents related to the sentiment expressed by Amb. Mérimée that the inevitable
outcome of Opération Turquoise would be to help the RGF.
12. Documents related to General Dallaire’s concern about Opération Turquoise, as
expressed in his meeting with Bernard Kouchner
In his book, General Dallaire described his meeting with Dr. Bernard Kouchner, a co-founder of
Médecins Sans Frontières, on 17 June 1994. Accompanied by a representative of President
Mitterrand’s crisis committee on Rwanda and acting as interlocutor for the Government of France,
Dr. Kouchner stated that the Government of France had decided it was prepared to lead a coalition
into Rwanda to stop the Genocide and deliver humanitarian aid. This coalition would come in
under a Chapter VII mandate and set up in the western part of Rwanda. General Dallaire
immediately said no in light of France’s history in Rwanda and the Government of France’s longstanding ties to the architects of the Genocide. As far as General Dallaire was concerned, the
French were “using a humanitarian cloak to intervene in Rwanda, thus enabling the RGF to hold
on to a sliver of the country and retain a slice of legitimacy in the face of certain defeat.” He went
on to say that “if France and its allies had actually wanted to stop the genocide, prevent my
UNMOs from being killed and support the aims of the UN mission—something France had voted
in favour of twice at the Security Council—they could have reinforced UNAMIR instead.” General
Dallaire concluded that Dr. Kouchner and the other French representative “had come to see if I
would voluntarily agree to subordinate UNAMIR to the French force,” something Dallaire did not
do.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
•
All documents identifying Dr. Kouchner’s role and any instructions given to him in
anticipation of his conversation with General Dallaire;
All documents concerning the planning behind this proposed Chapter VII intervention;
All documents regarding Dr. Kouchner’s report of his meeting with General Dallaire;
All documents relating to concerns expressed by Gen. Dallaire regarding French
intervention in Rwanda in June 1994;
8
•
•
All documents relating to the concern that a French intervention in Rwanda in June 1994
would directly or indirectly compromise the safety or effectiveness of UNAMIR; and
All documents relating to the concern that a French intervention in Rwanda in June 1994
would galvanize RGF and RGF-aligned groups to commit further acts of violence.
13. Documents related to Opération Turquoise's impact on the effectiveness and safety
of UNAMIR forces
As Opération Turquoise was being debated in the Security Counsel, General Dallaire feared for
its impact on the effectiveness and safety of his UNAMIR force. General Dallaire expressed
concern that the mere prospect of a French intervention would galvanize militarized genocidal
elements across the country and revitalize RGF forces which were perpetuating the genocide. Gen.
Dallaire also feared that a UN-authorized French intervention would spark retaliation against
UNAMIR by RPF forces because France’s pro-RGF bias would compromise the perceived
neutrality of UNAMIR. In addition, he noted, the promise of an imminent French intervention
inspired genocidal elements and gave hope to the retreating RGF to continue fighting.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
•
All documents relating to concerns expressed by Gen. Dallaire regarding French
intervention in Rwanda in June 1994;
All documents relating to the concern that French intervention in Rwanda in June 1994
would directly or indirectly compromise the safety or effectiveness of UNAMIR;
All documents relating to the concern that French intervention in Rwanda in June 1994
would galvanize RGF and RGF-aligned groups to commit further acts of violence; and
All documents relating to France’s awareness of anti-UNAMIR hostility and harassment
immediately prompted by the announcement of French intervention in Rwanda in June
1994.
14. Documents related to meetings or communications between UN Secretary General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali and French Officials about Opération Turquoise
According to the report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, during the lead-up to Opération Turquoise, Secretary General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a personal friend of French President Mitterrand and responsible for
facilitating his home country of Egypt’s entry into the Francophonie, weakened the mandate of the
UNAMIR peacekeeping force. Efforts to reduce the strength of the UNAMIR force ran directly
counter to the recommendations of the UN commander on the ground, General Dallaire, as he
desperately requested a strengthened force and mandate to keep the peace and stop the Genocide
in a series of cables to the UN in New York. In his book on the Rwandan Genocide, General
Dallaire describes how in December of 1993,
9
I’d sent directly to the DPKO very detailed sitreps, special incident reports and
periodic political and military assessments. I’d done media interviews. I had
produced several comprehensive military and political analyses of the situation,
with options and recommendations, which I had provided to the SRSG for his
action. Rarely did I get any response. Who actually read this material in New York
and what did they do with it? Was the SRSG actually passing on everything I was
producing? ... How much of it was getting through to the Security Council, where
our mission mandate was being reviewed?
The Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in
Rwanda also found that Boutros-Ghali “could have done more to argue the case for reinforcement
in the Council.” In his book, Eyewitness to a Genocide, Professor of International Affairs and
Political Science at George Washington University Michael Barnett puts it more strongly:
my cautious conclusion is that Boutros-Ghali and his staff knew what they were
doing. Regardless of the reasons for their silence, the effect was to discredit the
cause of intervention and to reinforce those in favor of withdrawal. Passionate
pleas from Boutros-Ghali would have been necessary if nonpermanent members
in the council who advocated intervention were to overcome the objections of the
powerful. No such words were ever delivered.
Later in his book, Professor Barnett rightfully expressed his concern about Boutros-Ghali’s
failure to pass on information that would have allowed for the UN Security Council to have a
greater understanding of the problems in Rwanda. No doubt that information would have
allowed the Security Council to understand the scope of the problem in Rwanda. Professor
Barnett noted:
Boutros-Ghali possessed information that illuminated the nature of the crimes. He
had an obligation to transmit that information to the Security Council but failed to
do so. Had he presented that information in a compelling way, he might have
convinced the council to authorize an intervention. Had an intervention occurred,
it is possible that the genocidaires would have called off their master plan.
General Dallaire details in his book that “despite our verbal and written reports of the worsening
scenario…reinforcement wasn’t being discussed in New York. Maurice [Baril] had made it clear
to me on several occasions that no one was interested in Rwanda…We had sent a deluge of paper
and received nothing in return; no supplies, no reinforcements, no decisions.” As the Genocide
began and intensified in April, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali was out of the country for three
weeks in Europe, thereby posing a problem for the timely flow of information as the Secretary
General had decided that no one was to brief members of the UN Security Council without his
approval. In contrast with his efforts to limit UNAMIR’s initial size and later lackluster
performance in seeing it strengthened, Boutros-Ghali fully supported France and “personally
10
intervened in support of an authorization of Opération Turquoise,” according to the UN’s
independent inquiry into the UN’s actions during the Genocide.
Professor Barnett speaks of Boutros-Ghali’s close ties with France and that “there is some evidence
that France coached Boutros-Ghali’s presentations to the council in order to elicit a verdict against
intervention.” Notably, after Boutros-Ghali failed to be reinstated as Secretary General in 1997,
“the French handed him a golden parachute as secretary-general of the Francophone, which only
increased the suspicion that he had forged an unholy alliance with the French during the month of
April [1994].”
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents showing France had repeated back-channel dealings with Secretary General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali seeking to undermine the RPF, to keep the Security Council from
being fully informed, and to thereby provide assistance to the then Rwandan Government;
All documents related to meetings, discussions, and communication between Secretary
General Boutros-Ghali and French officials with regard to the authorization and start of
Opération Turquoise, as well as decisions to withdraw UNAMIR troops; and
All documents related to decisions to appoint Secretary General Boutros-Ghali as head of
the Francophonie after his time as Secretary General.
15. Documents related to Opération Turquoise’s contributing partners
When Opération Turquoise was first proposed to the UN on 17 June 1994, French officials
emphasized that the intervention would not only include French troops but also troops from other
contributing nations, including at least one European power. In fact, a diplomatic cable shows that
in a meeting of the Permanent Five representatives of the UN Security Council on 17 June, French
Ambassador to the UN Jean-Bernard Mérimée insisted that finding a European partner to
contribute troops to the Turquoise mission was a necessary pre-condition for the operation to
proceed. As international concerns about Turquoise mounted, and potential contributing nations
began to walk back initial pledges of support, France appears to have shifted its tone. By 22 June
1994, the Government of France decided to proceed with Turquoise despite the lack of a single
European partner. In fact, French forces were already landing in Goma on 22 June before the
UNSC had authorized the intervention.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
All documents related to discussions within the French government about soliciting troop
contributions from other countries for Opération Turquoise;
11
•
•
•
All documents supporting or undercutting Amb. Mérimée’s assertion on 17 June 1994 that
France would only intervene in Rwanda if it found a European partner to contribute troops
to the mission;
All documents related to the decision to deploy French forces to Goma prior to the UNSC
authorization for Opération Turquoise; and
All documents related to any offer or provision of assistance by the Government of France
conditional upon another country’s decision to participate in Opération Turquoise.
16. Documents concerning the military equipment and units to be used in Opération
Turquoise
Military experts, including UNAMIR officers, question why the Government of France mobilized
over 100 armored vehicles, 120mm artillery, anti-tank rocket launchers, Super Puma helicopters,
Jaguar fighter-bombers, and more for a supposedly humanitarian mission. Given that the majority
of killings had been accomplished with machetes, it seems unlikely that anti-tank munitions or
other advanced military equipment would have been necessary except to engage with hostile
military forces. When French soldiers arrived, they were greeted by IRG supporters with cries of
“Long live France, death to the RPF!”—a sentiment that could have hardly been surprising after
years of military cooperation between the French and Rwandan government. The most likely force
Opération Turquoise troops could have been so extensively equipped to fight was the RPA, raising
questions of the true motive of the operation.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
• All documents concerning the military equipment to be used in Opération Turquoise and
the reasoning behind the provision of that equipment; and
• All documents discussing possible armed engagement with the RPA, as part of Opération
Turquoise.
17. Documents related to discussions between representatives from the US government
and the RPF about the avoidance of an RPA confrontation with French soldiers
There is evidence that, during Opération Turquoise, US diplomatic officials expressed concerns
about a potential shootout between RPA and French forces. At one point, a US State Department
official instructed Paul Kagame that the RPF should avoid any confrontation with the French,
stating: “do not shoot the white men” – meaning the French.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
All documents reflecting discussions with the US government or any other government or
international body about a confrontation between RPA and Turquoise forces;
12
•
•
All documents related to conversations between the French and US governments about
how to avoid a confrontation with the RPF; and
All documents related to US State Department officials’ insistence to Paul Kagame that
the RPA not “shoot the white men” in Opération Turquoise.
18. Documents related to US military personnel embedded with the French military in
Opération Turquoise
In July 1994, three US Defense Attachés arrived at the Zaire-Rwanda border to gather intelligence
and assess the regional security environment in advance of a humanitarian operation. One attaché,
Lt. Col. James Babbitt, spent time embedded with Opération Turquoise forces in Goma, Bukavu,
and later Cyangugu – where he observed and reported on French operations. Evidence suggests
that, during his stay at the French operation camp in Cyangugu, Lt. Col. Babbitt saw indications
that French forces were rearming Rwandan gendarmes and other vanquished RGF elements.
Evidence also indicates that Lt. Col. Babbitt reported his observations to his counterpart, Lt. Col.
Jean-Luc Nash, in Goma using a French satellite phone. There is evidence that the French military
was monitoring this and other activities and communications by the defense attachés. Soon
afterwards, a senior French official at the Cyangugu base presented Lt. Col. Babbitt with a
“persona non grata” (PNG) notice, demanding his immediate departure from the Opération
Turquoise Zone. Afterwards, the US Defense Attaché leading the initiative, Lt. Col. Thomas
Odom, elected not to fill Lt. Col. Babbitt’s posting, reasoning that the French would be unlikely
to allow another American in the Opération Turquoise Zone.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
•
All documents relating to Lt. Col. James Babbitt, Lt. Colonel Thomas Odom, and/or Lt.
Col. Jean-Luc Nash, including the PNG order for Lt. Col. Babbitt and any associated
documents;
All documents relating to the presence of defense attachés or other foreign agents in the
Opération Turquoise Zone, including documents relating to discussions over whether to
permit and/or how to interact with such agents;
All documents reflecting any monitoring of the communications or activities of the defense
attachés; and
All documents relating to the confiscation, disposal, and/or redistribution of weapons in
the Opération Turquoise Zone, including documents related to efforts to rearm Rwandans
in the zone.
19. Documents related to efforts to disarm génocidaires within the Safe Humanitarian
Zone
13
There is evidence that while some génocidaires had their weapons confiscated, many ex-FAR and
Interahamwe militia members, suspected génocidaires themselves, were permitted to, and did,
retain their arms within the Safe Humanitarian Zone established by the Opération Turquoise
forces.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
• All documents concerning the policies or rules governing whether or how Turquoise troops
disarmed FAR soldiers, militia members, or any other génocidaires entering or found
within the Safe Humanitarian Zone;
• All documents indicating the methods by which arms were removed from those entering
or found within the Safe Humanitarian Zone;
• All documents concerning the safekeeping, disposal, or distribution of weapons
confiscated from individuals within the Safe Humanitarian Zone; and
• All documents relating to ex-FAR and Interahamwe militia members rearming themselves
within the Safe Humanitarian Zone.
20. Documents related to FAR or IRG requests for ammunition or weapons from the
Government of France
There is evidence that, in the spring and summer of 1994, the IRG and its agents met with French
officials seeking weapons and ammunition. For example, on 24 June, Colonel Jacques Rosier met
at a “discreet” location with Rwandan Defense Minister Augustin Bizimana, who requested
105mm artillery, and later that month General Jean-Claude Lafourcade met with General Augustin
Bizimungu, the chief of staff of the Rwandan army during the Genocide, who also asserted that
“without ammunition, defeat was unavoidable.” Given the apparently dire nature of their situation,
it is likely that the Interim Rwandan Government (“IRG”) and FAR personnel continued to make
similar requests in the weeks that followed. New allegations of the role of French officials in
arming the IRG and the FAR during and after the Genocide continue to this day.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
• All documents from 6 April 1994 to 21 August 1994 concerning the provision of arms or
ammunition to the RGF, or any requests for the Government of France to provide such
arms or ammunition; and
• All documents reflecting efforts by the IRG and the FAR to purchase weapons following
the commencement of the Genocide.
• All documents reflecting any investigation into allegations that the French government,
directly or through interlocutors, armed the IRG/FAR, including accusation made by
former French officer, Guillaume Ancel, in his book Rwanda, la fin du silence Témoignage d’un officier français, and Walfroy Dauchy, French Red Cross worker, whose
14
allegation were published in a 2019 interview by Benoît Collombat - Investigation Cell of
Radio France.
21. Documents related to Colonel Didier Tauzin returning to France during Opération
Turquoise
There is evidence that Colonel Tauzin, head of 1st Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment, was sent
home to France on 5 July 1994, in the middle of Opération Turquoise, because of concerns that he
was becoming overly aggressive towards the RPA. Sources also suggest that this hostility towards
the RPA may not have been unusual in the officers sent as part of Opération Turquoise, given that
many had strong ties with members of the FAR after training them during previous military
engagements in Rwanda. Colonel Tauzin himself had previously worked with the Rwandan
government during Opération Chimère, France’s secret effort to help the FAR drive back the RPA
following the breakdown of the July 1992 ceasefire. According to the French Parliamentary
Commission’s report, during Opération Chimère, Colonel Tauzin was the de facto commander of
Rwanda’s armed forces.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
•
All documents concerning discussions and decisions to withdraw Colonel Tauzin from
Opération Turquoise;
All documents concerning any disciplining of Colonel Tauzin by the French military;
All documents concerning discussions and decisions to staff Opération Turquoise with
officers or soldiers with previous experience in Rwanda and potential bias in favor of the
RGF; and
All documents reflecting concerns that other military personnel, like Col. Tauzin, were
becoming overly aggressive towards the RPA.
22. Documents related to mission reports and assessments from Opération Turquoise
Describing the effects of Opération Turquoise, General Dallaire asserts that for every life saved,
the operation may have cost another because of the resurgence of the Genocide as the génocidaires,
emboldened by what they thought was French support against the RPA, redoubled their efforts. In
contrast, the Government of France promoted only that Opération Turquoise had saved thousands
of Rwandan lives, without acknowledging its problematic impact.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
• All documents identifying the outcomes of Opération Turquoise in terms of lives saved or
aid rendered; and
• All documents discussing any risk of negative outcomes of Opération Turquoise; and
15
•
All documents related to any investigation by French authorities to understand what
occured between the discovery of the Tutsi taking refuge in Bisesero by French troops,
their subsequent abandonment, and the decision to rescue the few surviving Tutsi at
Bisesero in late June 1994.
23. Documents related to the impact of Opération Turquoise on regional stability
Records from the French intelligence agency Direction du Renseignement Militaire (DRM)
reveal that many French cabinet officials believed that génocidaires would be the “direct
beneficiaries of the French Safe Humanitarian Zone,” were it created. Indeed,
commentators have noted that, by providing a clear pathway to Zaire for Interahamwe and
other extremist militias, Opération Turquoise contributed to instability in the Great Lakes
region and helped create the conditions for years of continued conflict between the ex-FAR
and the newly installed Rwandan government. For example, Ambassador Stephen Lewis,
co-author of the 2000 OAU report Rwanda: A Preventable Genocide, spoke of the
foreseeable nature of the consequences of Opération Turquoise:
The consequences of French policy can hardly be overestimated. The escape of
génocidaire leaders into Zaire led, almost inevitably, to a new, more complex stage
in the Rwandan tragedy, expanding it into a conflict that soon engulfed all of central
Africa. That the entire Great Lakes Region would suffer destabilization was both
tragic and, to a significant extent, foreseeable.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents relating to French officials’ awareness prior to or during Opération
Turquoise of the possibility that French Safe Zones would provide retreating militia groups
an opportunity for safe and armed retreat;
All documents concerning the possibility that Opération Turquoise would contribute – or,
indeed, did contribute – to destabilization in the Great Lakes region by providing a pathway
for militarized groups to retreat to Zaire or in any other ways escape to fight another day;
and
All documents relating to French officials’ attempts to minimize the degree to which
Turquoise Safe Zones provided cover for retreating militias, including by disarming
combatants.
24. Documents related to reports of French soldiers raping Rwandan women and girls
Some Rwandan women have alleged in interviews that French soldiers with Opération Turquoise
had raped or sexually assaulted them. Similar allegations were also present in testimony given by
Rwandan women to the commission established by the Rwandan government to examine French
16
conduct in the Genocide. Several interviewees also alleged that French soldiers would offer food
to Rwandan women and girls in exchange for sex.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
• All documents related to allegations of potentially criminal behavior of French troops in
Rwanda before and during Opération Turquoise; and
• All documents reporting French soldiers involved in rape or prostitution or allegations of
such conduct.
25. Documents related to Agathe Habyarimana’s travel to China and elsewhere to seek
arms and the money for arms to be used against
After her arrival in France, Madame Habyarimana continued to be actively involved in trying to
undermine the new GOR. In particular she was trying to locate funds for arms as well as the arms
themselves. According to one report, she travelled to China in October, 1994, along with President
Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to secure weapons to be used in the
fight against the RPA. Afterwards, she visited Gabon, Zaire, and Kenya and continued to seek
weapons to use against the new Rwandan government. France was aware of her travel and her
goals and knew that her purpose was to undermine the new government in Kigali. Nonetheless,
France continued to provide her shelter and protection, which continues to the present.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
•
•
All documents concerning knowledge of Agathe Habyarimana’s travel to China and other
countries for the purpose of securing arms to be used against the new Rwandan
government;
All documents reflecting knowledge of Madame Habyarimana’s continued efforts to be in
contact with members of the ex-FAR in order to undermine GOR;
All documents regarding efforts to determine whether Madame Habyarimana or members
of her family should be arrested for their roles in the Genocide against the Tutsi;
All documents related to evidence that Madame Habyarimana and members of her family
committed genocide and crimes against humanity; and
All documents reflecting any bank accounts or other sources of funds held directly or on
behalf of Madame Habyarimana or other members of the Habyarimana family.
26. Documents related to Félicien Kabuga’s residence in France and attempts to
prosecute
Félicien Kabuga is alleged to be the “financier of the Tutsi Genocide.” He had many close ties to
the Habyarimana regime, with several of his relatives being married to key figures, including
17
President Habyarimana’s son. Kabuga allegedly played large roles in radicalizing the Rwandan
regime and embezzling public funds in preparation for the Genocide, including arrangements for
the importation of machetes through Kenya. Kabuga created the National Defense Fund, which,
along with other state accounts, would help fund the Genocide. He also helped found and manage
the Radio-télévision libre des Mille Collines (“RTLM”), a state-sponsored hate radio station that
helped precipitate the Genocide by spreading anti-Tutsi propaganda. He allegedly continued to
pursue the genocidal ambitions of the former regime into the 2000’s, organizing logistics for
génocidaires to further their aims. Until his arrest in France on 16 May 2020, Kabuga had remained
at large after the evacuation of 12 of his family members from Kigali by the French embassy.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
•
•
•
All documents concerning Kabuga’s travel to France, including the decision of the French
Embassy in Kigali to evacuate members of Kabuga’s family from the city in April 1994;
All documents pertaining to French government officials’ knowledge of allegations or
evidence that Kabuga had committed crimes against humanity in Rwanda before his arrival
in France;
All documents related to efforts to investigate, search for, apprehend, or otherwise assist
in the prosecution of Kabuga, including documents pertaining to French official’s
knowledge of Kabuga’s presence in France;
All documents concerning meetings between Kabuga (or individuals acting on his behalf)
and French officials; and
All documents identifying the circumstances around Fabien Singaye, a noted member of
the pre-Genocide Rwandan Government’s intelligence services and Kabuga’s son-in-law,
being hired by Judge Bruguière as an interpreter and investigator; and
All documents reflecting any bank accounts or other sources of funds held directly or on
behalf of Kabuga or other members of the Kabuga family.
27. Documents related to Aloys Ntiwiragabo’s residence in France and attempts to
prosecute
As the head of military intelligence Aloys Ntiwiragabo was among those responsible for laying
out a plan with the intention of exterminating the Tutsi, eliminating members of the political
opposition, and maintaining power for the then regime from 1990 to 1994. During the Genocide
itself, Mr. Ntiwiragabo was responsible for updating the lists of people identified as enemies of
the regime, the Tutsi, and other people who would aid Tutsi. Because of reporting by the French
journal Mediapart, he was recently discovered living in France.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
18
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
All documents concerning Ntiwirabago’s travel to France, including any documents related
to his visa application or immigration status;
All documents pertaining to French government officials’ knowledge of allegations or
evidence that Ntiwirabago had committed crimes against humanity in Rwanda before his
arrival in France;
All documents related to French government officials’ knowledge of Ntiwiragabo’s
presence in France;
All documents related to Ntiwiragabo’s subsequent role in founding and maintaining the
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda;
All documents related to the French Government’s efforts to investigate, search for,
apprehend, or otherwise cooperate with the prosecution of Ntiwiragabo after indictments
were filed against him by the ICTR in 1998;
All documents related to Ntiwiragabo’s role in leading a terrorist group based in Rouen;
and
All documents related to the activities of Jean-de-Dieu Ngabonziza, Aloys Ntiwiragabo's
brother-in-law, with respect to the same group in Rouen; and
All documents reflecting any bank accounts or other sources of funds held directly or on
behalf of Ntwiragabo or other members of the Ntiwiragabo family.
28. Documents reflecting intelligence or investigation regarding extremists who have
been seeking to undermine the incumbent government
There is evidence that Félicien Kabuga and other members of the former genocidal regime have
participated or are continuing to participate actively in attempts to undermine the current Rwandan
government, using resources and shelter provided by host third countries as a shield for recruitment
and subversion operations. Kabuga and others have had a regular and continuing presence in
France during this time, and some of their activities have been known to French officials.
The Government of Rwanda requests:
•
•
•
All documents related to France’s intelligence regarding activity or proposed activity
against the government of Rwanda by former Habyarimana and/or IRG regime elements
in France or other host countries;
All documents related to French attempts to investigate, uncover, or prevent such actions
undertaken against the government of Rwanda; and
All documents reflecting meetings, conversations, or intelligence gathering about Madame
Habyarimana and her family, Félicien Kabuga and his family, or other former Rwandan
Government officials living in France.
19
APPENDIX E
Yael Danieli, Ph.D.
Clinical Psychologist, Traumatologist and Victimologist
Director, Group Project for Holocaust Survivors and their Children
345 East 80th Street (31-J)
New York, N.Y. 10075 U.S.A.
Tel. +1(212)737-8524 Cell +1(917)880-7444 Email: yaeld@aol.com
Introduction:
Having cofounded the first program to help Nazi Holocaust survivors and their children, and
participated in creating the body of knowledge about the long-term and multigenerational
legacies of the Holocaust and its aftermath upon them and others, I have often been invited by
other populations that have suffered atrocity crimes to help their victim/survivors emerge from
their own genocidal catastrophes, Rwanda being one. Ibuka, the umbrella organization of
survivors of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi there, specifically asked me to help bring
Holocaust and other genocides’ survivors to Kigali, to help them learn “how to live after death.”
That meeting was held in Rwanda in November of 2001. I did attend prior and subsequent
expert meetings in Rwanda and kept abreast as best I could of the wellbeing of the
victim/survivors of the genocide and that of their children. I have maintained ongoing
relationships with some of these persons.
To prepare my present opinion, I have also reviewed recent statements of three victims of
Murambi; eight victims, one rescuer and one genocidaire who served his 20-year sentence, from
Kabuye Hill; and one of Hassan Ngeze’s victims. All statements were translated from
Kinyarwanda into English and provided to me by representatives of the Government of Rwanda.
To augment my impressions from these, I was in contact with additional seven survivors residing
in the United States, Canada and Belgium -- all having lost the bulk of or all members of their
immediate families and countless members of their extended families and communities.
On May 27, 2018, I also conducted a Google Scholar literature search, using “Rwanda genocide
survivors, health” as key words. The search yielded “about 19,600” articles. The two articles
below are sound representatives of the ubiquitous findings in the field of trauma about the effects
and/or legacies of the genocide on its victim/survivors. They concur with findings about the
1
effects or legacies of massive psychic trauma on populations who have underdone other atrocity
crimes. Naasson Munyandamutsa, Paul Mahoro Nkubamugisha, Marianne Gex-Fabry &
Ariel Eytan (2012) conclude their article [on the mental and physical health in Rwanda 14 years
after the genocide,] reporting that “PTSD1 remains a significant public health problem in
Rwanda 14 years after the genocide” and urge that “Facilitating access to appropriate care for
all those who need it should be a national priority.” Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric
Epidemiology, November 2012, Volume 47, Issue 11, pp 1753–1761.
In their article, “Rwanda - lasting imprints of a genocide: trauma, mental health and
psychosocial conditions in survivors, former prisoners and their children,” Heide Rieder and
Thomas Elbert (2013) “demonstrated particular long-term consequences of the genocide on
mental health and psychosocial conditions.” Also, “[d]ifferences between families of survivors
and families of former prisoners accused for participation in the Rwandan genocide are reflected
in the mental health of the next generation.” Conflict and Health, 7:6
https://doi.org/10.1186/1752-1505-7-6
Indeed, to this day, many victim/survivors are (still) reeling from the multidimensional effects of
their victimization traumata, their immeasurable losses, their sense of living shattered lives -including their own and their children’s sense of identity and continuity. Many continue to
suffer from and to seek treatment for the injuries and persistent physical problems they sustained
and their impact on their functioning (“machete,” broken back, severe unhealable head injuries,
‘permanent’ headache and eye problem, severed chest and psychosomatic pains (headaches and
muscular pains, high blood pressure)). Additionally, they suffer trouble sleeping, nightmares,
waking up awash with fear, feeling wounded, “getting scared over nothing, [unable to] explain
the cause,” inability to concentrate and maintain social attention, among other psychosocial
sequelae – with their detrimental effects on their schooling, work, economic status and social
relationships. Economically, losing “everything, houses, livestock…,” Some, albeit feeling
desperate, nonetheless, having to “start from scratch and survive,” did. “Some children had to
stop school due to financial problems; others dropped out…due to lack of parental guidance,”
1
While a singular diagnostic category, PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) has often been used to connote other,
comorbid psychiatric and psychological conditions resulting from genocide and other atrocity crimes, including
Depression, Generalized and other Anxiety Disorder(s) and related psychosomatic conditions.
2
further hindering their long-term development and prospects for healing.
One survivor describes his trauma after the Genocide thus:
“I…became like a madman. Every day I would wake up and go hide myself from people
in the bushes, and whenever I would hear the sound of the birds I would run because it
sounded like screams. I always felt scared, thinking that I could be killed any time. There
is no place that my elder brother did not take me to look for treatment, but it all failed.”
Many find it too difficult to speak of their experiences and ponder their unimaginable, immense
losses. Their minds recoil against accepting their losses. “Whole families were wiped
out…There is no one left on our hill, all were killed…” Incomplete mourning, and resulting
depression, prevail. This exacerbates the sense of guilt and lack of finality for those who could
not find their relatives’ corpses and therefore could not give them proper burials with dignity.
Some keep hoping against hope that their family members will somehow return and,
remembering their loved ones’ dreams, plans (for example, become a doctor) and hopes (“s/he
loved to learn…”). They “always think about what would have become of them now had them
not been killed.”
“Whenever I meet the young people who survived and are now grown, I think of my
children and how they would be today. It is very hard to deal with.”
“One day I was seated in church and saw a child who looks like my first born son who
was killed...Since then, I never returned to… Church. I no longer go to pray.”
Some keep “wondering [especially at arduous times] how it would be if [their] family
members,…family elders…were still alive” to advise, protect and help them:
“I lost so many people in my family, siblings and friends who would be helping me now
if they had not been killed.”
“My children would be grown up and I would still be a mother and I would be a
grandmother. I would be very happy. I remain alone today. I am suffering. If I am in pain
or get sick, I have no one to care for me.”
Overcome by this “heavy burden” of sadness, grief and sorrow, sometimes [they] even “wonder
if the lucky ones are the ones who survived or the ones who died.” Feeling incapable of coping
with their loss, some are even unable to gather with others at commemoration events.
Crucially, feeling that they have “lost [their] identity as a result of losing those who [they] came
from,’ their ‘roots,’ also results in losing their “confidence” and “the desire to develop.”
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The above effects affect their parenting as well.
“My son is so much like my younger brother…But even that hurts – as I have to relive
my young brother’s death every time I see my own son.”
“How we are going to explain to our children what happened” when they ask questions?
A poignant example of the resulting broken generational linkages2 is the child who “had a hard
time learning the family links at school because he did not have living examples.” Broken
generational linkages was found to dependently predict Holocaust-related pathology in
Holocaust survivor’s offspring.
The effects of Holocaust, Genocide, and other atrocity crimes can thus be long-term. And,
unless addressed reparatively and preventively, they are likely to be lifelong and their legacies
more likely to linger into succeeding generations.
Justice after Genocide:3
Despite their omnipresent agony, survivors believe that “When there is justice and the world
acknowledges what happened to us, it helps us. But when people who committed those crimes
are being released without even finishing their sentence, it brings back our pain.” Allowing them
to be released early is devaluing the lives of our loved ones murdered in the genocide.
“An authority like Aloys SIMBA was supposed to advise the population and prevent
them from killing but instead he had been the one who desensitized them to kill. He
should be punished severely.”
Danieli, Y., Norris, F. & Engdahl, B. (2016). Multigenerational legacies of trauma: data-based
integrative modeling of the what and how of transmission. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry,
86(6), 639-651.
2
Danieli, Y. (2007). Essential elements in healing from massive trauma: Some theory, victims’
voices, and international developments. In J. Miller & R. Kumar (Eds.), Reparations:
Interdisciplinary Inquiries. (pp. 307-322). Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
See also Danieli, Y. (2014). Healing aspects of reparations and reparative justice for victims of
crimes against humanity. In Jo-Anne M.Wemmers (Ed.) Reparation for Victims of Crimes Against
Humanity (pp. 7-21). New York: Routledge.
3
4
The survivors’ reactions are exacerbated by fact that neither Aloys SIMBA nor Dominique
NTAWUKULILYAYO have accepted the responsibility for their crimes.
“They did not even ask for forgiveness. Releasing them before they complete their full
sentences “would be like putting a knife in the wounds of the survivors.”
The sub-prefect Dominique NTAWUKULILYAYO, an educated, trusted leader, blatantly lied to
and betrayed the trust of the Tutsi victims, luring them away from possible safety in Burundi or
in Gisagara Market to Kabuye Hill, where he facilitated their murder. He even facilitated his
own godson’s murder. Survivors used words like “killer” “Lucifer,” “an evil Satan” and
“monster” to describe him.
“If you have been to Kabuye Hill, you will know that releasing NTAWUKULILYAYO
would not be justice.”
I think is that the International Tribunal takes problems lightly because the people that
work for the court were not in Rwanda during the Genocide. If they had witnessed it, they
would be making serious judgements and condemn someone like NTAWUKULILYAYO
to life imprisonment.
“I believe the survivors don’t only consider it unfair but, myself included, would be
traumatized if that were to happen. Releasing him can hurt us very much.
It is so painful. There is nothing good that can come out of releasing him early.
A survivor who believed testifying in ARUSHA would help heal the aching wound in her
heart, and who was severely tortured and whose house was destroyed when she returned,
states, “I don’t understand how it is possible that NTAWUKULILYAYO could be
released from prison… We trusted that the court would bring justice, and if he is released
early, the court would have failed to bring justice.
I cannot even think about the possibility that Dominique NTAWUKULILYAYO could
ever be released from prison, let alone be released early. He is responsible for 100
members of my family being massacred on KABUYE Hill.”
A Hutu rescuer, against NTAWUKULILYAYO’s early release,” believes that “he would bring
back the bad ideology that he had and would take us back into the darkness that we went through
in 1994.”
A convicted genocidaire who served his 20 years sentence, states that
“NTAWUKULILYAYO was a very powerful authority. He was an evil man because he
incited people to commit genocide. Instead of protecting them, he sent soldiers and
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interahamwe to kill them. … I was personally impacted because had
NTAWUKULILYAYO not told us to go to the roadblocks, I would have not committed
the crimes that I committed. It was mandatory to go to roadblocks, those who refused
were treated as RPF accomplices and were killed. All the consequences of being
imprisoned for 20 years and living with the shame of having committed such atrocities
would have not happened to me.
I am against NTAWUKULILYAYO early release because I think even the sentence he
was given is very little compared to the small citizens who obeyed his orders, many of
them were sentenced to life imprisonment and others to 30 years of imprisonment and
they are still serving their sentence. For my own case, I was sentenced to 20 years of
imprisonment and that is because I pleaded guilty, and I served all my sentence, so for
NTAWUKULILYAYO to be early released when he did not plead guilty and when those
who he incited to commit genocide are still in prison would be extremely unfair.--including to the perpetrators he incited as well who have pleaded guilty and are serving
their full sentences.”
As noted previously, I was also in contact with Rwandan diaspora survivors. The following
statements are taken from their responses.
From a young woman:
I lost my entire immediate family (parents and all six siblings) and most of my extended
family to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Hearing that masterminds of
the genocide like Hassan Ngeze, whose newspaper Kangura was responsible for the
Anti-Tutsi propaganda and the dehumanization campaign which enabled the genocide to
take place, may be granted an early release is beyond words.
The crime of genocide is one of the most heinous crimes. It is thus astounding and
shocking that mass murderers can even be considered for an early release.
What does granting early release to masterminds like Hassan Ngeze, Col. Aloys Simba
and Dominique Ntawukuriryayo accomplish except to inflict more pain on us as
survivors, to minimize our loss and suffering and to minimize the gravity of the crimes
committed against our loved ones during the Genocide?
Granting early release to masterminds serves the perpetrators alone, not the victims or
survivors, which leaves us hopeless and without faith in international criminal tribunals.”
There is absolutely no good behavior that should ever justify an early release for
masterminds of genocide. Granting these early releases simply encourages the would-be
perpetrators because it lets them know that you can plan and carry out a genocide and
only end up in jail for a limited time, while survivors’ pain and loss is for a lifetime.
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Twenty-four years after the genocide, while many of us are only starting to come to terms
with what happened to us, early release of to the people most responsible for the murder
of our loved ones only adds insult to our injury and makes us feel as if the world does not
understand or simply does not care about what we suffered and lost during the genocide
or the pain that we experience when we see these masterminds of genocide being
released.
I and many others believe that ensuring Justice in the aftermath of genocide is key to
preventing future genocides. Granting early release to masterminds of this genocide is
contrary to the justice that victims and survivors expect and deserve.
This is not only for the sake of the victims and the survivors but to deter others who in
the future may consider orchestrating and executing a genocide against any group of
people.
From a young woman:
Granting early release to masterminds of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi such as
Hassan Ngeze, Col. Aloys Simba and Dominique Ntawukuriryayo is like killing us and
continuing the original plan to completely wipe us out. It takes away any hope that
survivors have for justice.
From a young man:
If ordinary criminals who are not genocidaires can get life without parole, how can a
genocidaire, someone who was an integral part in the murder of more than a million
people be eligible for early release? These laws and rules not only rob victims and
survivors of justice, but they undermine the spirit of international law.
From a young woman:
I was two years old during the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. The genocide took
away my father and a large number of my family members. I grew up facing its
consequences in every aspect of my life.
When the genocide happened my family were living in Gisenyi. After the genocide I was
living with my mother and aunties who survived. They couldn't spend a day without
talking about their journey during the genocide. Hassan Ngeze, one of the masterminds,
was in almost all their conversations. I grew up knowing that Ngeze is one of the people
who tortured my family and encouraged Hutus to kill Tutsis.
I remember when Ngeze was in the news when he first went to the court and one of my
aunties couldn't even stand listening or reading that name because it was a reminder of
the horrors she experienced during the genocide.
Hassan Ngeze deprived so many people including my own father of their right to live
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and constantly incited Hutus in my neighborhood and the whole country to kill Tutsis.
From a young man:
Granting early release to masterminds of the genocide is simply genocide denial. As a
survivor, I feel like this is a second genocide and the promotion of genocide ideology,
and I am afraid that this may lead to more genocides.
From a young woman:
As a genocide survivor, I feel angry and heartbroken to hear that someone who was a
mastermind of the genocide which took so much from me may be released early. These
are the people who orchestrated and planned the genocide against the Tutsi. They
committed heinous crimes and they should face justice to its full extent.
Conclusions:
Despite their attempts at healing and (re)building life anew, victim/survivors experience even the
mere consideration of early release of three of the masterminds of the 1994 Genocide against the
Tutsi as ominous, wounding and (re)traumatizing, and their barely mended scars at risk of being
re-ruptured. As well, it threatens to resurrect their victim identity at the expense of their hardwon, yet fragile, identity as survivors. They are bewildered. Bereft and confused, their reactions
range from disbelief to profound sadness, disillusionment and outrage to devastation and fears of
the return of powerlessness and hopelessness. Victims commented on what they believed to be
the absurdity of extending a humanitarian gesture to “rehabilitated” masterminds of Genocide
without regard to the “rehabilitation” of their victims. They also consider the possibility of early
release as a second Genocide and as permitting encouragement for future genocidaires.
Having found some measure of comfort in the international community’s attempt at justice by
holding fair trials according to international standards, thus being (re)included in this community
after the Genocide, and despite the ICTR’s historically fraught relationship with them,
victim/survivors feel betrayed and abandoned yet again by the same international community
that had abandoned them during the Genocide. They are as if attacked by memories, and feel
victimized anew, now by the international criminal justice system of a world that abandoned
them then and, again, now. They are betrayed anew and their “old” mistrust is exacerbated. And
what is the message to the future of Rwandan society? The possible impact on succeeding
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generations?
Their reactions are consistent with those of numerous victim/survivors of atrocity crimes other
experts and I have observed, known, and studied before and throughout my nearly five decades
of experience around the world. Psychologically, the possibility of early release of those
unarguably responsible for their agonizing losses at best undermines, and at worst undoes, the
reparative sense of vindication purported to be rendered by justice to the victims. , It also
virtually ensures reawakening of their own questionably dormant suffering, a new sense of
betrayal and sorrow, and the transmission of genocide’s multidimensional legacies to their
offspring.
Victim/survivors of Aloys SIMBA, Dominique NTAWUKULILYAYO, and Hassan NGEZE
uniformly attest that releasing these genocidaires will be a new wound to them. By diminishing
their losses and pain, thus undermining their sense of justice, this second wound is worse than
the first.4 It might also be regarded as a wholesale application of a foreign-based
criminologically oriented humanitarian gesture in response to crimes against humanity that were
the antithesis of humanitarian behavior, that will (re)traumatize victims and thereby inflict anew
a victimological humanitarian disaster.
For all the above reasons, I strenuously urge the United Nations International Residual
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (MICT) to heed the voices of the victims and also the voices
of a rescuer and a (‘foot soldier’) genocidaire who did admit his guilt and served his sentence in
full. I urge the MICT to fully consider the contextual meanings of the traumatological,
victimological, social, and psycho-historical elements in contemplating the early release of
masterminds of the destruction of their families, communities and society, and I caution against
the decision to release them early.
4
Danieli, Y. (Ed.) (1998). International handbook of multigenerational legacies of trauma. New
York: Kluwer
Academic/ Plenum Publishing Corporation; Now Springer Publishing Company. Available also as an ebook at:
http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-1-4757-5567-1/page/1; also
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=thoNwuDmHEQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=yael+danieli&ots=Lz5w
k8a4tj&sig=r5eLmv3JrgVAq6-PCbVQNJ3zMPo#v=onepage&q=yael%20danieli&f=false.
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DATE:
May 30, 2018
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