Citation
THE FRIENDS OF EVIL: When NGOs support genocidaires
Posted: August 29, 2013 in Book
Tags: FDLR, genocide, Genocide Denial, Rwanda
THE FRIENDS OF EVIL: When NGOs support genocidaires
By Tom Ndahiro—–Copyright © Tom Ndahiro 2013
Table of contents
Foreword
Introduction: When genocidaires come together
Chapter I: Refugees’ Camps under the Military
Chapter II: The FAR’s Vision for the Future
Chapter III: Refugees in captivity
Chapter IV: The RDR or disguised genocidaires
Chapter V: How to wage continued genocide and terrorism
Chapter VI: When racial hatred is fashionable
Chapter VII: Complicity between the NGOs and the genocidaires
Chapter VIII: Rwandan civil society in exile–villains posturing
as victims
Chapter IX: Other initiatives of Rwandans living in Exile
Chapter X: Fast moves from European NGOs to rehabilitate felons
Chapter XI: A Club of Lovers of Hatred
Chapter XII: Carrero, a Mockery to the Nobel Peace Prize
Chapter XIII: Indifference to the demons of race
Chapter XIV: A Final Appeal and Conclusion
Foreword
“Friends of Evil” will be a troubling surprise for anyone who believes
— as most probably do in North America and Europe -– that the 1994
Rwanda genocide is a thing of the past and a lesson learned for the
international community.
The book is based on extensive new research and documentation which
will be a revelation even to Rwanda experts. The first part shows how
in 1994-95 the “Hutu Power” perpetrators of the genocide, allowed by
the international community to regroup in eastern Congo, reorganized
themselves behind a new organization called the RDR, and developed
their military and political strategy to return to power in Rwanda.
Genocide denial was a central element of that strategy, as was the goal
of gaining reentry into Rwandan political life. The second part shows
the extraordinary degree to which Western “civil society,” and
particularly several NGOs in Europe, have been complicit in this
genocidal strategy.
But perhaps all this should not be a surprise at all. The attitude of
Europe and North America toward Rwanda during the preparation and
implementation of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis ranged from the
active complicity of French authorities and media to the passivity and
feckless “humanitarianism” elsewhere. This attitude stemmed from
indifference, ignorance and no doubt an element of racist arrogance.
These are deep-rooted and stubborn habits, easy to revert to once
Western establishments processed the shock of 1994 through
hand-wringing regret and partial admissions of guilt.
It is hard for genocide perpetrators to face up to their crimes. It is
also hard for their abettors and the bystanders to move beyond whatever
arguments or narratives serve to lessen their responsibility.
This helps explain the tolerance and the space given to exponents of
Hutu Power ideology and genocide denial in Europe and North America
since 1994, by governments, media, human rights organizations and
NGOs. But is does not make it acceptable.
This book is both an education and an appeal for Europe and North
America to do better: to put an end to impunity, and to confront the
racist ideology that still threatens to sabotage the emergence of a new
and peaceful Rwanda. The scores of known Rwandan perpetrators in
Europe (especially France) and North America need to be tried or
extradited to Rwanda. Their armed forces in eastern Congo need to be
definitively defeated. Their ideological sympathizers and supporters
need to be silenced.
Holocaust denial is not tolerated in Europe and North America, but
denial of the genocide of the Tutsis is. This is morally wrong. It is
also strategically wrong. The future of Germany is assured. The
future of Rwanda is still at stake.
Richard Johnson
Introduction: When genocidaires come together
It is hard to imagine that those who planned the 1994 genocide against
the Tutsi in Rwanda and their accomplices could still be meeting; in
the very city that shelters the most powerful international
tribunals. But—they are. One such meeting took place on April 26, 2008,
at The Hague in Holland. The meeting was organized by Rwandese
associations, Duurzaam voor Afrika (DVA) and Dusabane. It was funded by
an influential Dutch NGO, Oxfam-Novib. Participants were claiming to
promote peace in the Great Lakes region but the final communiqué of the
meeting was vague as to its objectives recommendations.
The organizers of the meeting placed guards at the hall’s entrance, to
stop anyone suspected of being a Tutsi. An observer, whom I spoke with,
compared this action to the roadblocks which were erected during the
genocide of 1994; where those who had the right to life could pass but
those who were condemned to death could not. One of the participants
told me they had accepted the participation of a single Tutsi, on
condition that he does not take any photographs. The same conditions
had been imposed at another meeting held earlier in Brussels in
February 2007.
While justifying their action, the DVA and Dusabane denied the meeting
had gathered negationists and committed genocide perpetrators.[1] The
authors of their press release stated they would pay no attention to
allegations about “genocide deniers” and “organizations known to be
apologists of the Tutsi Genocide and close allies to Genocidal forces”,
because they react to demonstrated “facts and not to allegations.” They
also said “Inside Rwanda, the term “genocidal ideologies” was untimely,
used to falsely accuse individuals and/or organisations that the
Government wants to threaten or jail.”
Paul Rusesabagina, who gained fame because of the film “Hotel Rwanda,”
was the guest of honour and key speaker [2] at this meeting of April
2008, as well the one that preceded it held in Brussels in February
2007. Rusesabagina was accompanied by other bigots such as the
Frenchman Pierre Péan, known for his anti-Tutsi hatred and racism.
Rusesabagina, according to his promoters and himself, is said to have
shown a lot of courage during the genocide against the Tutsi in 1994,
and specifically, to have saved the lives of more than 1000 people.
Thanks to the film, Rusesabagina has become so famous that he is now
the beacon of all the organizations which preach the rationale and
inevitability of the genocide of Tutsi. He has for some time been
travelling all over the world, giving conferences and raising funds
from benefactors, pretending the money will be used as aid to genocide
survivors.
Another speaker at the April 2008 meeting was Robert Krueger, former
American ambassador to Burundi from 1994-1996, which made him a
“specialist of the Great Lakes region’s issues”[3]. In his speech,
Krueger told the participants that nobody should be prosecuted for the
crime of genocide. At another meeting held in Chicago, on 19^th May
2008, he had said the same thing. He declared that the courts should
not prosecute those accused of genocide due to their large number. He
proposed that in order to achieve truth and reconciliation, the
genocidaires should confess and be acquitted.
An end must be put to the support given to the criminals
Those who prepared this meeting of April 26, 2008 knew full well that
they were bringing together people who were in some way involved with
the genocide. If they did not see any problem in supporting a meeting
in which a high official of the ultra-extremist Hutu group Coalition
for the Defence of the Republic (CDR), Jean Baptiste Mugimba took an
active part, it follows that the peace they claimed as their goal is a
peace founded on the culture of impunity and promotion of genocidaires.
To host a meeting involving hardliner members of CDR can only be
interpreted as support for the acts and ideas of the Hutu power militia
(Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi) as a whole, and specifically for well
known genocide planners such as Ndereyehe and Mugimba.
Let us be clear. That, some Rwandans meet to discuss their problems is
not in itself, a problem. It is a problem when those people are
advocates of a genocidal ideology, and have the support of European
NGOs funded by their governments or by international bodies such as the
European Union. Some of these organisations are from Holland—the same
country which hosts a significant number of international
courts/tribunals!
During my last visit to Holland to investigate this meeting, I wanted
to know to what extent the members of the Dutch government and NGO’s
were informed about the nature of the group of criminals who had
initiated this meeting. I met with officials in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Mr W. Wooter Plomp and Mrs Marjolein Jongman, head of the
Central and Southern African Desk and Department of Sub-Saharan Africa
and Chargée d’affaires in the Sub-saharan Africa Department and Central
Africa Division respectively.
Among the heads of NGOs of that country, I met with Rolf Van De Maas,
Central Africa Programme Officer in Oxfam-Novib and Kees Van Den Broek,
Programme Officer in CORDAID. I spoke on telephone with Carl Jansen of
ICCO-Kerkinaktie. I had one question for these five persons: whether
they knew RDR and its political line. They all answered in the negative
and they did not even know that RDR had its head office in The Hague!
Those in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked me what RDR stood for
and who its members were.
I briefly explained to them that it was a group of persons who had
played a great role in the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda or who
supported the genocide ideology. They asked me whether the RDR was the
same as the FDLR. I answered that RDR gave birth to FDLR and that they
are still together in what is called FDU-Inkingi. I could not believe
that they knew nothing about the RDR. Firstly, the RDR has its head
office in The Hague and carries out its activities there. Secondly, a
number of their own NGOs have sometimes been the spokespersons of the
RDR, while the Dutch Government has helped greatly these NGOs. It was
with this Dutch government money that Dutch NGOs financed the meetings
of these criminals.
In any case, I believe the NGOs I spoke to, knew RDR better than did
the Dutch government officials because of the long history that linked
them. The NGO representatives I spoke to knew to what degree the Dutch
NGOs are linked to Rwandan civil society and to what extent they
support local organisations in Rwanda. Dutch NGOs have forged
friendship relations with several Rwandan individuals working in some
registered NGOs in Holland, some of whom took active part in the
genocide against the Tutsi. But this does not prevent these European
NGOs and their leaders from continuing to support their Hutu protégés,
despite the crimes they committed against the Tutsi in 1994.
In addition to the issue of the RDR, I asked the three Dutch NGOs about
a report which they published in 2003 in which they acted as
spokespersons for the genocide perpetrators. One of the employees of
OXFAM-NOVIB answered that he wasn’t there at that time. When I asked
about the collaboration they had with some Belgian NGOs such as
VRADESEILANDEN, he answered that he did not even know of it. The
answers I got from these NGOs made me conclude that in those
organisations, there were probably people who have been collaborating
either clandestinely or unknowingly with genocide perpetrators for some
years. It is a story which resembles that of 1994 or even prior to
1994.
The senior officials of CORDAID and OXFAM-NOVIB with whom I met, asked
me to give them some information on the RDR. Were they of good faith? I
doubt it because I can’t imagine that an NGO can support a “political
party” in exile without knowing its exact nature and the justification
of its existence. Whatever the case, I would hope that, this book will
help their understanding of the RDR. At least, those who will continue
supporting RDR will know that they are supporting an organisation
whose raison d’être is genocide and its denial, because its membership
and leadership comprises people who were deeply involved in that crime.
The choice is theirs.
On December 9, 2008, I wrote an open letter to Mr Tim Cooke, who used
to head the Africa Service of the BBC. It was a reply to an open letter
of his, which I timed to coincide with the 60^th anniversary of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. I
concluded my letter with questions which he has not answered to date:
- Should an individual or an association which denies that there
was the genocide of the Tutsis have the right to speak on the airwaves
of the BBC-Gahuzamiryango, of which he is the head?
- Should a person or an association which states publicly that
the authors of the genocide should not be publicly brought to justice
be given a forum for discussion on the radio, for example the one he
works for?
- Does Cooke believe that an individual or an association that
argues that the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda was a necessary
political undertaking is defending ideas which are politically
acceptable?
- Tell me honestly, what kind of support is given them when they
are provided with airtime, as BBC does so often on its radio?
- Does Cooke believe that ideas which are intended to divide
people, which are racist and genocide denialsdeserve to be aired
publicly and to be given free air-time on any radio, and especially the
BBC, which is listened to by so many people? When BBC gives them a
platform, doesn’t the think that such an act could have harmful
consequences on a national scale in a country like Rwanda?
- When the BBC invites people or associations who dare to argue
that the genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda had neither perpetrators nor
victims, and that no one put a stop to it, what does BBC think is going
to learn from them?
- Is the BBC aware of the fact that the perpetrators of the
genocide in Rwanda are always looking for ways of using the press,
especially international radios, to propagate the genocide? Does the
BBC know that it is among those radio stations the genocidaires
identified to manipulate for this purpose?
- Does Cooke not think that the denial of genocide constitutes a
reprehensible criminal act, and liable to be condemned by anyone of
decency?
- Is Cooke knowledgeable about the different strategies
(especially when it comes to language) used by those who spread the
ideology of genocide and by those who deny the genocide?
- Does Cooke not believe that certain kind of information,
either written or broadcast, can put the security of a person, or a
group of people at risk, and even endanger their lives?
- In its history, did the BBC radio dare to give as much room
for expression to known Nazis and to those who deny the Shoah? If not,
then, why should Cooke and the BBC think that the denial of the
genocide of the Tutsis should be freely granted so much space on BBC
airwaves? Is there, in Cooke’s eyes, a genocide whose denial can be
professed so publicly without a reaction?
I believe that upon reading this book the BBC, and those who read the
letter, will understand why the questions were asked and what it means
to be a friend of evil.[4]
Notes
_______________________
[1] Press release titled: “Hague Conference: facts speak for
themselves, let nobody manipulate them”. It was signed by Cyriaque
Mbonankira, (Chairman Duurzaam voor Afrika) and Ignace Rukeribuga,
(Chairman Dusabane) See:http://www.duurzaamvoorafrika.org/docs/Press_Re
lease_30.04.08_ok.pdf
[2] The press release is silent on this but the meeting’s program which
I received later shows his role. It is also stated
on http://www.olny.nl/RWANDA/Videos/Hague_Peace_Conference_26_April_20
08.html#rusesabagina
[3] See: http://www.duurzaamvoorafrika.org/docs/Press_Release_30.04.08_
ok.pdf
[4] This is because part of the answer, was published in a book “After
genocide”.
Chapter I: Refugees’ Camps under the Military
The pre-genocide government army (FAR) were very instrumental in the
planning and execution of the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda. Apart
from preparing the killing machinery before the death of president
Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, it was the army which instated the
“interim government” that would supervise the genocide. Judging from
the range of testimonies by the survivors, witnesses and perpetrators
of this odious crime, every major massacre of Tutsis was committed with
the involvement of the military, since they were the ones to provide
arms and supervise their use. After the defeat of their government, as
will be shown in this chapter, the military remained in charge of the
political landscape across the borders in Zaire.
On September 29, 1994, Major-General Augustin Bizimungu sent to Bukavu
a “Highly Confidential” meeting report to “His Excellency the President
of the Republic of Rwanda (Theodore Sindikubwabo) and “The Honourable
Prime Minister” (Jean Kambanda). The report was about a seven day
meeting of senior officers in the Rwandan Armed Forces High Command,
held in Goma from on September 2-8, 1994.[1]
The content of this report, demonstrates clearly that the origin and
the actual foundation of the now quite wide-spread Rwandan genocide
ideology, genocide denial, and double genocide theories is to be found
within the circles of the army High Command. What was planned, before
April 1994 and in September 1994, is very apparent today.
In this retreat, with a view to achieving return to Rwanda, the RAF
“delved into the analysis of the reasons for their defeat so as to
propose strategies for a political or military solution to the Rwandan
problem”[2]. The first reason given was a “lack of a common political
and military perspective in operational plans.” They said the conduct
of operations was often influenced by politicians, rather than the
army. That was the reason why they were determined not to make the same
mistakes again. The RAF decided they would firmly control the
political- military organization that would become the RDR.
The high command decried “naive faith in the Arusha Peace Accords,”
which they said were a creation of “RPF henchmen, and half-heartedness
in the implementation of the said Accords which led to the acceptance
of the RPF in Kigali without control.”[3]
In the document the FAR blamed almost everybody, starting with what
they termed as ‘UNAMIR’s complicity with RPF’, the ‘involvement of
foreign countries in the conflict: Uganda, Belgium, USA, Burundi and
Tanzania’, ‘the sudden change of mind on the part of France, which was
their main and only sure military partner’ and ‘UN’s military and
diplomatic embargo against Rwanda followed by a misdirection of
unofficial supply channels to avoid the embargo.’
They admitted having internal problems including poor organization, a
lack of personnel and lack of leadership. “Lack of a national defence
policy and lack of structures that are suited to all the echelons of
command led to inefficiency in the conduct of the operations.” (…) “The
ideological training of our men was not guaranteed despite internal
political contradictions.” There were logistical problems including “a
glaring shortage of senior staff at all levels…it was NOT possible to
have soldiers with adequate qualifications for the posts of command and
execution” and a “lack of reserves linked to the planning of
recruitment…it was not possible to move from the temporary defensive
state to offensive operations.” Another thing was “Weakness of some
senior officers and loss of the Rwandan Armed Forces leaders on 6 April
1994, which caused some hesitation in decision-making and a succession
struggle, while RPF continued to benefit from the initiative.” And,
“Erosion of discipline at all levels without a corresponding system of
sanctions.”
Finally, the RAF again blamed their internal division on an external
force, claiming there was a “presence of RPF allies within the
Government and the Rwandan Armed Forces.”[4]
Road map
Opening the meeting, the chairman, Gen. Bizimungu, said the army had
entered Zairian territory with all the country’s institutions. He said
the purpose of their meeting was “to assess the political and military
situation in order to reflect on how to identify and explain the root
causes of our present situation and to devise a common strategy on how
to resolve the problems facing our soldiers in particular and the
people of Rwanda in general.” Indeed this meeting was to change the
course of events.
Bizimungu said it was a “must” to do some “serious self-evaluation and
a thorough analysis of the situation as a whole so as to use the
lessons learned in future undertakings.” One thing he felt was obvious
was that “the people and the Army felt “humiliated” by the situation
and were “flagrant in the eyes of the foreigners”. The army, he said,
faced several difficulties: the lack of housing, food, and medicine
well as dispersal of military rank and file and decision-makers. The
RAF’s Chief said the Armed Forces were “no longer functioning.”
Explaining this, he said the officers and other officials in the
administration acted more as individuals and not collectively.
Among other things, he said, there was a problem of “the embargo
imposed on our country; domestic politics and regionalism; the RPF army
made up of Ugandan Army elements with the support of its sponsors; the
international community’s poor understanding of the Rwandan problem;
the complicity of UNAMIR and that of other powers, etc…”
There was a need to have “operatives in Rwanda” and to provide the
military personnel in refugee camps with training and ideology.
Priority was to be given to maintaining the forces which would be
brought together before the implementation of the entire plan. He said
it was “a must to put in place a political-military organization on
three fronts: the political front, the military front, and the economic
and financial front.
Taking the lead
The military brass was in total agreement that the current Government
in exile was a ‘government in name only… NO LONGER operational and is
now totally ignored by the international community.’ They claimed the
only thing the brass had left, was “the confidence the refugee
population has in it”.
Without mincing words, Bizimungu said in his opening speech that: “some
think that the current government is no longer up to the task and that
it must be replaced by a political-military committee capable of
voicing the concerns of the Rwandan refugees to the international
community.”
Meanwhile, he emphasized, “the entire population had built its hopes”
on the Rwandan Armed Forces; and therefore it must be united and
organized. He underscored that the army needed to be “reorganized
swiftly to enable it to participate in guiding the population and gain
the confidence of the Rwandan civilians who took refuge in Zaire and
elsewhere recently.”
In the opinion of the FAR, their existing government suffered from two
major handicaps: being discredited on the world stage, and being
contested by the RPF. It also had difficulty in choosing its members,
possibly due to strife between parties. The military proposed a
reshuffle in the government, with fewer ministers, and more flexibility
in reflecting on and addressing the problems facing the refugees and
setting short-term objectives for the ultimate purpose of returning to
Rwanda.
This new government, they suggested, would serve as a deterrent
vis-à-vis the RPF, which was considered an adversary to be reckoned
with. A new government within the spirit of the ARUSHA ACCORDS would
also address the question of “NEGOTATIONS WITH THE RPF” and devise
other ways to return to Rwanda, should the negotiations with the RPF
not take place or end in failure. The FAR even proposed the ministries
to be established and the way they could be shared: Foreign affairs and
cooperation (MDR); Social affairs (MRND); Information and propaganda
(MDR); Defence and Security (FAR); Economy and finance (PSD) Judicial
affairs (PL) Road works and national assets (PL); and Mobilization and
Youth (MRND).
In line with the decisions of the army, a new “government” was
announced on October 30, 1994, composed of the following members:
President: Dr. Théodore SINDIKUBWABO
Prime Minister: Jean KAMBANDA
Ministers were:
- Justice- Stanislas MBONAMPEKA (PL, Hutu, Ruhengeri);
- Mobilization and Youth Affairs- Frédéric KAYOGORA (MRND,
Hutu, Gisenyi);
- Social and refugee affairs-Callixte KALIMANZIRA (MRND, Hutu,
Butare);
- Information-Joseph KARINGANIRE (MDR, Hutu, Kibungo);
- Foreign Affairs and Cooperation- Jérôme BICAMUMPAKA (MDR,
Hutu, Ruhengeri);
- Defence Colonel (retired)- Athanase GASAKE (Hutu, Ruhengeri);
and
- Patrimony and Logistics- Innocent HABAMENSHI (MDR, Hutu,
Ruhengeri).
This new government was tasked by the military to follow closely the
RPF’s policies in Rwanda as well as the political situation in Zaire
and elsewhere in the world, and to make contacts with persons capable
of influencing international opinion in their favour. The “government”
was required to embark on a tangible and vigorous action “to raise
people’s awareness and urge them to stick together and support one
another should a negotiated solution fail, and ensure …unconditional
and reckless return.”[5]
If this new government were NOT up to the expectations of the
population and Armed Forces, a new political-military organization
would be put in place, and its structure would be prepared and proposed
by the FAR. This organization would be headed by a committee comprising
of seven members: three soldiers and four civilians.[6]
The FAR high command believed that such an organisation would have the
possibility of being recognized by the international community; would
be more efficient as it would be composed of committed volunteers; and
that the RPF would certainly accept it for negotiations. The envisaged
disadvantages of this politico-military organisation were the time it
would take to make itself recognized by both the population and the
external world, lack of basic means to be operational and vulnerability
due to internal conflicts especially within the political parties.[7]
Strategic decisions
The genocide which had been committed by the government they had
created and by the army which the led, determined the military
leadership’s plans in exile. The war which the FAR High Command was set
to continue waging, against the RPF was not only a war on the
battlefield, but also one of international acceptance. This meant
winning the favour of NGO’s, the media and other figures who would who
had influential audience. The FAR High Command felt cornered by a dirty
past which was not easy to leave behind. But, they had plenty of ideas
on how this might be achieved. And they proceeded to plan and implement
them.
1. Accusing the RPF
The FAR High Command’s preferred method to cleanse their bloody hands
and minds was to heap blame on their sworn enemy, the RPF, and to
assume the role of being victims of an international conspiracy.
This conclusion reached, it was deemed “necessary to inform the
international community about the acts of violence committed by the RPF
against the Rwandan people throughout the current war.”[8] Therefore,
they argued that, “since its attack on October 1, 1990, (the)
RPF exasperated the Rwandan people with its atrocious acts of violence,
the April 6, 1994 attack (against Habyarimana’s plane) being only the
straw that broke the camel’s back.”
Their approach was based on the claimed premise that the media and
virtually the entire international community was “behaving as if the
Rwandan tragedy started after 6 April 1994.” From their standpoint,
the world had “fallen into the trap set up by RPF” which made the
innocent RTLM and Interahamwe into scapegoats.[9] The FAR therefore
prepared its own dossier to combat recognition of the Rwandan Genocide,
based on their distorted presentation of history.
The FAR accused the RPF of attacks against civilian targets, attacking
public places, places of worship, and displaced persons camps,
massacring civilians by gathering a number of people together in houses
and then burning them by throwing grenades; all kinds of tortures and
mutilations; murder of administrative, political and religious
authorities; destruction of public infrastructures; and terrorism[10].
A decision was made to have a compendium compiled from SITREPS
(situation reports) of the FAR between 1990 and 1994, contacts with the
refugees, newspapers; documents from NGOs, religious denominations and
other organizations and associations, and many other sources.[11]
2. Military reorganization and the Interahamwe factor
The FAR’s strategic objectives in the fall of 1994 required
reorganization. They admitted a disorderly situation, decrying “acts of
lawlessness and barbarity against the Zairian people.” The FAR were
also accused of engaging in acts of murder, but approached this not in
terms of crimes to be punished, but in terms of bad publicity for their
cause.
The FAR had to recruit and train new soldiers. The Interahamwe was the
obvious pool for recruits. The FAR leadership were in agreement that
they encountered many problems in the supervision of the Interahamwe
and all civil defence recruits, with serious incidents reported every
day. The main reason, the report said, was inadequate training for the
militia, and the lack of a code of ethics for the military. Two
solutions were proposed: Maintain the Interahamwe, and provide them
with sound basic training on army life according to the Rules of
discipline, or direct them to civilian sites.
The FAR’s leadership recognised, however, that “simply directing the
recruits and Interahamwe to civilian camps might create a climate of
serious insecurity in the refugee camps,” and that “the enemy” would
take advantage of this to “spoil the reputation of the Rwandan Armed
Forces.” Knowing the Interahamwes’ contribution during the genocide,
they agreed that they “must keep and take care of them as recruits
because they did their best to help the Rwandan Armed Forces.” It was
also thought it to be an appropriate solution considering the high
number of Interahamwe.[12]
The FAR aimed to train their troops and equip them with “infiltration
and destruction” techniques. One of the RAFs priorities was the
creation of pockets of resistance within Rwanda, and if possible in all
the countries of the world where Rwandans may be living, as well as the
identification and disruption of pro-RPF services and activities.[13]
3. The Ideology and Army
As noted above, the FAR asserted that their main strength at that time
was the “solidarity between the Army, the population and the Rwandan
civil society.” They also believed that “a part of the Kivu population
supports the Hutu cause” and that, “the situation developing in Burundi
could be favourable” to them. Another positive feature, for the “army
and the population,” was the possession of “basic technical tools to
fight,” with an added advantage of “camping near the border even if
such proximity exposes the population and FAR to possible raids by the
Inkotanyi.”[14]
The refugee camp leaders were required by the FAR to improve
“ideological training of refugees” and psychological preparation of the
refugees, by informing them about the stages they must go through
before they can return to Rwanda in maximum security. Another strategy
was to ‘raise public awareness among the refugees about the “insecurity
in Rwanda and the RPF’s ploys” and to request the refugees “NOT TO take
the risk of returning to Rwanda WITHOUT being guaranteed security.”
Training and operations were to involve refugees in Tanzania “for
actions in the eastern part of the country.”[15]
The ‘problem of regionalism’ had been listed as one of reasons for the
FAR’s defeat in Rwanda—a problem which existed under the regimes of
both Kayibanda and Habyarimana. With the resumption of the war in April
1994, the report alleges, the “Rwandan people” realized the need to
unite in dealing with a “common enemy”, i.e. the Tutsi. This is how
regionalism could be checked in favour of “national unity”.
Unfortunately, they said, such awareness came too late and did not
prevent “the tragedy” which culminated in the exile of the “Rwandan
people”[16].
The agreed strategy was to create this solidarity by any means
necessary. “We must infiltrate people into the various organizations to
make them support our cause, although we must first have an ideology to
be defended and disseminated”[17].
The FAR High Command specified that the ideology to be inculcated in
the population would be prepared by the Mobilization ministry, based on
existing documents, including the one already prepared by the Ministry
of Defence with key ideological elements for the soldiers and the
Rwandan population. The FAR also took up the duty to “multiply
document(s) and organize seminars for officers and non-commissioned
officers who will communicate the message to other soldiers.” With
regard to education on what they christened “patriotism and
nationalism”, they said they “must identify able and experienced
experts” to carry out this duty. Indeed, the FAR leadership and the
intellectuals in their service, started the project of rewriting
Rwanda’s history.
4. Diplomatic relations
The FAR leadership were aware that the government in exile had not yet
received from the Zairian authorities the political asylum it had
requested. Nevertheless, they believed this problem could not prevent
them from ‘reorganizing’ themselves so as to make their voices heard by
the international community “without waiting for Zaire to react, as
they have their own set of problems.”[18]
A committee to prepare a dossier for possible negotiations with the RPF
was set up. The initial debate was whether the negotiations were to be
held “with the RPF or with the Kigali government”. They deemed it
‘appropriate to talk of negotiations with the RPF, which is in power in
Kigali, as only a handful of countries has recognized the Kigali
Government.’ With resolve they concluded that “the principle of
negotiations DOES NOT rule out military actions, aimed at either
forcing the negotiations or having more clout during the negotiations.”
The FAR leadership, after their military failures, felt completely
dependent on outside support. Their most important lines of attack were
therefore to conduct a media and diplomatic campaign to raise the
awareness of the international community regarding acts of violence
allegedly committed by the RPF, currently or in the past; raise funds;
make contacts in political circles in France, Belgium and Zaire to make
them aware of their cause; and to convince international public opinion
that the implementation of the Arusha accords was necessary for power
sharing and creation of a “real national army.”[19]
Relations with Zaire also had to be cultivated, since without Zaire’s
tolerance of the FAR to stay in their territory to train and organize
themselves, there was no chance of their survival. Burundi, seething
with ethnic tension, also was a potential source of support for the
FAR. Documents exist which show the FAR was in contact with PALIPEHUTU
and FRODEBU to determine if there was a way for them to cooperate and
undertake joint actions.[20]
English-speaking East Africa was not ignored. Opponents of Yoweri
Museveni of Uganda were to be contacted, and the Rwandan refugee
population within Tanzania was tasked to “infiltrate the political and
administrative apparatus”.[21]
5. Tactical deployments: Intellectuals, the clergy and journalists
The principle aim was to “destabilize the RPF in order to pressure them
into accepting negotiations.” In order to facilitate the success of the
anticipated organization, the FAR decided that it “must infiltrate
people into the various organizations” to make them support their
cause. although they “must first have an ideology to be defended and
disseminated.”[22] The most dependable in this respect appeared to be
intellectuals, the clergy and journalists.
a) Intellectuals
The FAR leadership ordered military officials to appeal to Rwandan
intellectuals “to help the political and administrative officials in
raising the refugees’ awareness and guiding them; to take initiatives
aimed at creating focus groups on patriotism and return to our country;
to approach foreign organizations, inform them about our cause, and
request them to provide assistance to the population; to tell the truth
about the Rwandan problem.” The FAR decided that “Rwandan
intellectuals must apply for employment at the international level and
interface with foreigners.”[23]
They also saw a need to “try to penetrate western political circles,
especially in traditionally friendly countries (Belgium, France, and
Germany) in order to interest them further in their cause.” To this
end, the Government was tasked to intensify diplomatic activity
especially during the period of “electoral campaigns in some European
countries.” This was done through newly appointed intellectual figures
and interlocutors, as will be discussed elsewhere in this book.
b) The clergy
The FAR leadership sought not only to renew ties with political figures
abroad, but religious ones as well. They believed that clergymen
considered theirs, would be credible for the cause. They were not only
men of the cloth, but they were also seen as above politics, and were
‘in the field’ and thus could testify effectively on behalf of the
previous regime and its followers.
Special attention was paid to Catholic chaplains who were “to prepare a
memorandum on how the Catholic Church evolved in Rwanda,” highlighting
its political influence. This was seen of such importance that ‘the
Ministry of External Relations and Cooperation should facilitate travel
for (our) clergy abroad so as to enable them to promote (our) cause.’
The role of the clergy in FAR politics will be discussed further in the
section focussed on churches.
The FAR leadership emphasised that “military chaplains and commanders
must work with members of the clergy who are mindful of (our) cause…and
urge them to seek the assistance of the religious community to the
Rwandan refugees… (they) must be urged to visit churches all over the
world to seek the assistance of Christian refugees.”[24] As for the
clergy engaged with the Rwandans in Zaire and in other places, the
“members of religious orders must get involved in teaching moral
standards to members of the public and soldiers.”
Finally, echoing the claim of ‘double genocide’, the FAR wrote that
“RPF does not enjoy the trust of the people because it took power by
force after massacring Hutu populations and leaving the Catholic Church
without leaders.”[25]
c) Journalists
In concluding their strategy document, the FAR leadership writes that
they should: “Encourage by all means the placing of our journalists in
media houses, who would be useful to us and establish links of
correspondence with them.”[26]
During their discussions the FAR leadership had specified that Rwandans
were to be sent to media houses “establishing correspondence links with
foreign radios’ and to ‘contact our journalists to write articles to be
proposed to newspapers and magazines which can promote our cause.” They
sought to “boost the initiative to optimize the personal relations
forged by our journalists with foreign newspapers in order to interest
them in our cause’ and by ‘posting our journalists to favourable media
houses, either by ourselves or through intermediaries, and
correspondences with foreign radios.”[27]
The FAR leadership complained that the de facto media embargo imposed
on them by the international community benefited the RPF. Aware of the
power of the media, Gen. Bizimungu said it was a weapon which should be
handled cautiously and with clear-sightedness. He described it as a
“double-edged sword” which could help them to transmit their message
“in order to influence public opinion” in their favour, but which could
also disclose secrets, distort the message, and spoil their reputation.
The ultimate goal of their overall message was to “pressure the RPF
into accepting to negotiate”. It is for this reason that it was
emphatically stated that ‘ONLY the high command can designate an
organization or person to deal with the press on behalf of the FAR.[28]
These would necessarily be “new people, who were not involved in
earlier dossiers, people who are NOT compromised in the eyes of the
international community, and who are mature enough to adopt good, wise
positions in such a delicate situation.” The “dossiers” referred to
here had to do with the genocide, as will be seen later in discussing
the choice of leaders of the politico-military organization.
The media was also relevant to the lives of Rwandans in Zaire, and the
FAR leadership planned to produce and control the media, just as the
army and government had done in the early nineties. One of the first
steps on the ground was to fund a FAR printing house, an operation that
the Committee viewed as a priority.[29] Its raison d’etrewas to
facilitate the creation, within the region, of newspapers that support
“our cause,” particularly by giving them printing facilities free of
charge.
The radio was also viewed as an asset to unify military units between
Bukavu and Goma and with the public at large. The FAR wished to make
use of materials from former Radio Rwanda and RTLM, and were to make
“contacts…with Zairean personalities”, who are willing to use such
material on private radio stations to further their cause. The
possibility of starting a regional radio for North Kivu was also to be
explored. It was decided to “resume contacts with media houses” with
which they had signed contracts “in order to make our cause known to
the outside world.”[30]
The FAR leadership noted that it had already established ties with
foreign press, radio and television, particularly in Francophone Africa
including Zairian newspapers, Afrique No.1 of Gabon, Canal
Afrique[31] in South Africa, Jeune Afrique[32] and several media in
Kenya.
Notes
_______________________
[1] Prosecution Exhibit N^o P457B tendered in court on12 December 2006,
in case N^o ICTR-98-41-T.The original text which is in French was a 49
page document (plus source). I used the English text, as a translated
version by the ICTR. With court references WS06-339 (E)
KO04-1476-K004-152
[2] K0370577
[3] K0370600
[4] K0370600
[5] K0370578
[6] K0370578
[7] K0370579
[8] K0370594
[9] K0370594
[10] K0370595
[11] K0370594
[12] K0370590
[13] K0370595-6
[14] K0370601
[15] K0370601
[16] K0370581
[17] K0370598
[18] K0370582
[19] K0370601
[20]K0370580
[21] K0370580
[22] K0370597
[23] K0370579
[24] K0370579
[25] K0370595
[26] K0370613
[27]K0370593
[28] K0370593
[29] K0370593
[30] K0370593
[31] This Radio recruited former Radio Rwanda broadcaster Abdallah
Nzabonimpa who was known for his anti-Tutsi extremism. He has never
returned to Rwanda since 1994.
[32] This magazine had as a journalist Esperance Mutwe Karwera, who for
a long time represented it in West Africa, and was based in Dakar,
Senegal. She was the MRND’s director of Propaganda and the managing
editor of a hate paper called UMURWANASHYAKA which was a hub of
journalists who would later all join another paper called INTERAHAMWE
and Radio RTLM. Her husband Balthazar Mutwe is one of the founding
members of CDR. Karwera is a founding member and contributor to RTLM.
She has never been to Rwanda since 1994.
Chapter II: The FAR’s Vision for the Future
Soon after the September meeting of the FAR leadership, and the
Bizimungu report sent to Sindikubwabo and Kambanda, and as recommended
by the French and the IDC, the FAR began work on a post-mortem of its
defeat in Rwanda and a course of action for the future.
To this end, a special commission was formed under the chairmanship of
Lt. Col. Juvenal Bahufite. This commission comprised the following
members: Lt. Col. Eng. Jean Bosco Ruhorahoza, Maj. Emmanuel Neretse,
Maj. Dr. Desire Ruhigira, Maj. Eng. Faustin Ntilikina, Capt. Eng.
Vincent Nsengimana, and Capt. Hasengineza. Their assignment was “to
determine the causes of our (their) defeat after considering the
developments of the situation since the beginning of the war on 1
October 1990; then determine and analyze all possible scenarios with a
view to the return of all the refugees in their country in security and
dignity”.
The analysis of these scenarios led to proposed concrete actions to be
carried out in order to reach this objective. The findings of the
commission were put in a report which was submitted to the FAR High
Command on December 20, 1994.[1]
In its introduction, the report reviews the reasons of the defeat of
the FAR in Rwanda by the RPF. It says that the ordeal of the army
started on October 1, 1990 when “elements of the Ugandan regular army
attacked Rwanda in the north, on its borders with Uganda. The attackers
claimed to belong to “something called the Rwandan Patriotic Front”
which had among its objectives the return of TUTSI refugees who had
been forced into exile since 1959-1960 following the social revolution
which chased out of power the ruling TUTSI class”.
The commission explained that the FAR put up a strong defence against
the attack, and broke it on October 30, 1990. But the attackers
launched “a guerrilla strategy by spreading the war all along the
border of the two countries while intensifying military preparations,
and particularly the media campaign throughout the world.”
The report relates how their Government initiated negotiations and
cease-fire agreements that were never respected, so that the war
continued on the whole border with Uganda. Note should be taken here
that the report does not mention who was responsible for non-respect of
the signed agreements. There is ample documentation to prove that
Habyarimana’s government, and especially the military, did not want, at
all, the full implementations of the Arusha Peace Accords.
The commission said that the international community believed that
peace was going to come back to Rwanda after the peace agreements
signed on August 4, 1993. Yet, “This was without reckoning with the
resolve of RPF of attaining its objective at all cost of taking power
in Kigali by force”.
The FAR’s denial of genocide is wrapped in allegations of “constant
provocations by the RPF”—which ended up making these agreements
inefficient. They say the problem was caused by “assassinations of Hutu
political leaders, kidnappings and killings of Hutus, particularly
supporters of MRND and CDR, military recruitments inside the country
which increased between August 1993 and April 1994 with the complicity
of MINUAR under the commandment of the Canadian General Romeo Dallaire.
The assassination of the Head of State in the evening of 6 April 1994
crowned this series of provocations with impunity and resulted in the
eruption like a volcano of the wrath of the population which had been
suppressed for a long time and to atrocious interethnic massacres”[2].
Scenarios for the return of refugees
Three assumptions were identified and proposed by the FAR report. The
first was peaceful return through negotiations based on the Arusha
Accords or on new bases; the second was, return through violent means—
either “wage war until total victory” or, “aiming at limited
objectives” with a view to exerting sufficient pressure on the RPF
Government so that it accepts negotiations.
The third option was “More or less forced repatriation of the refugees
using a combination of FAR armed force with ploys of
“therapeutic-homeopathic” type and propaganda or use of these,
“subterfuges” only.
For each scenario, the Commission identified prerequisites for their
implementation, possible obstacles, measures to be taken, and
indication of the required resources. The advantages and disadvantages
of each assumption were also identified.
a) Peaceful return through negotiations
The hypothesis of a peaceful return through negotiations embraced three
types of action, each of which required appropriate human, financial
and material resources. These were set as: Outward oriented actions
(diplomatic, media, representations abroad, propaganda …); inward
oriented actions (organization, sensitization and information of the
population, propaganda …); and special actions (intelligence, sabotage,
disinformation…).
The FAR planners considered the advantages of peaceful return through
negotiations to be: the least onerous for them from the material and
personnel point of view; the least destructive for the entire Rwandan
population and the country; the quickest in that it does not require
much preparation; and would facilitate power sharing by consensus and
hence political opening and therefore rapid democratization.
The commission found, that, the major disadvantage of the peaceful
return of refugees to the country through negotiations was that the
success of this solution depended largely on external factors which
were beyond the control of the refugees—above all on the good will of
the RPF and on the help of the international community. The commission
thought they had ‘insufficient trump cards on the part of the refugees’
and above all, lack of sufficient military, diplomatic and media
pressure— leading to “a diktat in favour of RPF and its allies.”
Preconditions for a negotiated solution within the framework of the
Arusha Accords were: The parties (representatives of refugees and the
RPF) accept to go back to the Arusha Accords; the international
community to convince and push the two parties in that direction; and
as a must, that the RPF to first recognize explicitly the
Government-in-exile, given that the players provided for in the Accords
are the Government of Rwanda and RPF.
The FAR planners foresaw the following obstacles: the military victory
of RPF made the Arusha Accords null and void. Without addressing the
issue of genocide, the report indicated the RPF victory was “as a
result of different events that occurred” and had led to the creation
of the post of Vice- President, inclusion of soldiers in parliament,
the exclusion of the MRND, and a “schism” in stakeholders in the
government and political parties— part of these politicians remained
with RPF, and another had left with the refugees. Also, the Hutu
refugees in Zaire had not carried out enough diplomatic and media
activities to demonstrate to the RPF and the international community
that it represents a threat as long as it remains outside the country
and that its government is still the competent negotiator. Another
obstacle was the existence of “unconditional allies” of the RPF.
The commission also made a pertinent observation: “Some behaviour on
our side may make the international community reject us, e.g.,
unjustified uprisings in the camps, attacks on foreigners, banditry and
criminality in the camps, etc. Being accused as the perpetrators of the
genocide still weighs heavily on this government; and the return by
whatever means of the refugees in the country would deprive the
government in exile of its justification and, therefore, its meaning.”
As far as FAR diplomatic and media actions were concerned, they thought
they should be able to persuade international opinion that the military
victory of the RPF had not resolved the fundamental political problem,
that the RPF will not be able in the future to manage the country
alone, and that the war was not yet over, with all the resulting
consequences inside the country and at the regional and international
level.
Dealing with the problem of the “schism”, the FAR planners hoped to
convince the leaders of political parties of the need to find a
solution to internal disagreements through negotiations inside the
respective parties, to adapt them to the new realities. Another thing
was to get the international community interested in their cause and to
exert pressure on RPF and prevent it from consolidating its power, as
this may break its reluctance to negotiate; and prepare their own
defence and mitigate accusations against the FAR by accusing the RPF.
The other strategy was to provide ideological training to the refugee
population.
The commission observed that negotiations within the Arusha Agreement
had advantages: The agreement already existed as a working tool, it had
the backing of the international community accepted by the opposing
parties, and increased the credibility of “the people of Rwanda”. And,
it could be perhaps be used to induce the RPF to share power with
political parties like MDR, CDR and other extremist factions which had
been grouped in 1993 under the name of “Hutu-Power”.
Some of the identified disadvantages were: Increased credibility for
the RPF, which would present itself before the international community
as the only political force with a coherent structure and, therefore,
the only one capable of organizing and managing the country; the
refugees could get tired of the differences of opinion among their
leaders and could accept to return to the country under the conditions
laid down by the RPF; from the outset, the Arusha Accords placed the
“government” (Hutu) side in a weak position because it was composed of
several political parties with divergent views compared to the
monolithic RPF; and, “the Arusha Accords ignored the ethnic problem
(Hutu/Tutsi) and yet it is basic to the Rwandan problem in its
totality. Bringing forward this problem within the Arusha Accords would
meet the resistance of the RPF which has always liked to ignore it
under the pretext that the problem was rather ideological
(democratization). On the other hand, failure to raise it would bring
the population to maintain a certain mistrust of these Accords.”
For anticipated negotiations to be possible, the two parties were to be
composed of “representatives of refugees and of the RPF” whereby the
International Community would be obliged to see in the community of
refugees “a dissuasive entity”.
Under this scenario, the commission saw several prerequisites before
negotiating within the framework of the Arusha agreement could be
possible. One was that the international community had to put enough
pressure on the RPF to bring it to “open up to democracy.” The second
was to overcome the “problems of regionalism and partisanship” in the
refugee camps, to achieve what they termed “unity of opinion” and
“joint efforts”. The third was that, “Insecurity inside Rwanda must be
permanently maintained so as to make them feel the threat that we
represent and force RPF to accept negotiations.”
The FAR planners, however, foresaw several obstacles. International
opinion favoured the RPF “either knowingly (for various interests)” or
because it was “not well informed or is manipulated by pro-RPF media”;
“The RPF has allies who are unconditionally attached to it namely the
Ugandan government and the Burundi army, and other allies who were said
to be supporting RPF for various objectives (the USA, Belgium, and
England). RPF power was becoming increasingly credible before the
international community especially with its gradual control over the
population with the help of the United Nations (MINUAR); and the media
and diplomatic embargo against refugees did not allow them to be heard
and thus influence international opinion.
The military commission noted that their people were “inexperienced in
international politics, particularly in terms of knowledge of leading
ideas which guide the international politics of the moment as well as
decision making mechanisms in international circles.” They also
regretted that their, “whole population” had been made to feel guilty
by accusing them of being the perpetrators of the genocide, which they
considered to be the “will of the RPF to get rid of any political
opinion against it”, hence preventing their “cause from being heard.”
Apart from internal disagreements based “on partisan quarrels and
regionalism”, the FAR planners also mentioned “obstacles that hinder
actions of destabilizing the country: untrained staff in this type of
sabotage activities, lack of adequate equipment (remote-controlled
equipment, portable mines, explosives…), lack of complicity from host
countries, the draconian control of RPF inside the country and on its
borders, lack of a system of intelligence whereas this type of actions
requires the existence of consistent intelligence, and lack of
strategies on how to face foreseeable consequences, especially with
regard to the population inside the country and the international
community.
The Commission proposed more than a few actions to overcome these
obstacles. The first was the intensification of propaganda. To better
achieve their objectives, priority was to put in place representations
in “friendly countries” and avail them with resources to “carry out
propaganda in favour of our cause”. These representations, it was made
clear, would be composed of people living in those friendly countries,
students, and people sent to this effect. Target groups (important
persons, social groups, States, media, etc…) for whom messages would be
intended would be defined beforehand. Concerning the media—the planners
called on the FAR to develop guiding principles for diplomatic and
media actions for these representations to follow in their activities.
As far as propaganda was concerned, the FAR planners considered it most
important to approach carefully selected international media and
communication experts with adequate resources in order to bring them to
serve the cause; to continue showing the international community that
the war was not yet over, so that it would get more interested in the
Rwandan problem and force the RPF to accept a negotiated solution; to
convince the countries supporting the RPF of the bad consequences that
would result from continuing such support, i.e. the possibility of a
new war which would have repercussions on their countries; to denounce
the hidden objectives behind alliances with RPF; and to discourage
foreign investors and donors from investing or providing financial
resources to Rwanda.
Other propaganda strategies laid out by the FAR planners were to
disseminate information on what they called the “real genesis and
developments of the conflict”, as well as “other events that led to
the massacres”; to encourage and help their people to participate in
international conferences; to make judicious use of the existing
competences of some of their politicians or public servants (former
ministers, former ambassadors, former international civil
servants,…etc) and to forge alliances with opposition political forces
inside those countries so that they may defend their cause.
The FAR was also required to prepare for the defence of those who would
be tried by studying meticulously the development of the events and
explaining all the provocations of RPF that led to these tragic events;
make provisions for lawyers who will consider and analyze reports made
by UN experts so as to show their possible defects and propose
corrective solutions; and, prepare documents accusing RPF of all crimes
committed and other provocations and frustrations of the population
which resulted in the killings of civilians, raids on properties,
destruction of infrastructure and environment, assassinations of
politicians.
The commission also proposed a strategy of terrorism: to carry out
destabilization activities against the Kigali government, particularly
by preventing the refugees in Zaire from going back to Rwanda,
preventing those living in the camps inside Rwanda from going back to
their homes, and by encouraging those still inside to flee the country;
to promote insecurity inside the country through actions of sabotage;
to denounce the complicity of the United Nations (MINUAR) with the RPF;
to put the UN staff in a condition of insecurity so that they stop
“their complicity”.
Diplomatically, the FAR planners proposed a study of the political
situation of neighbouring countries, especially potential allies like
Kenya, Central African Republic and Gabon and in which the government
in exile might re-settle and be able to work in favourable conditions.
The plan was to approach the governments in those countries, the
opposition political parties and all other political, religious,
military and economic actors who may facilitate their mission.
Part of the FAR planner’s rehabilitation program was to develop a
common strategy and action programme and to disseminate it to whoever
it may concern especially to countries or institutions of interest
(Belgium, France, Vatican, foreign political parties…)
b) The return by force
The FAR planners listed the following prerequisites for this scenario:
Substantial international support; a community of refugees with an
assured rear base; sufficient logistic support; good technical, moral
and ideological preparation of the personnel; existence of an adequate
politico-military structure; existence of an efficient intelligence
system inside the country; good preparation of the population inside
the country and the refugees; and, an internal situation favourable to
the operations.
The following were identified as obstacles to this strategy: The
consolidation of RPF power in Kigali was likely to prevent the
international community from seeking alternative solutions to the
Rwandan problem. The international community would be reluctant to give
approval to their war, preferring peaceful solutions. The FAR plans for
“terrorism particularly against foreigners” could strengthen the
international opinion against the refugee community. A sectarian or
extremist ideology would not get the support of the international
community; Tanzania favours the government in Kigali within the
framework of the “English-speaking family”, and Uganda as an
unconditional ally of RPF is hostile to the refugee community. The FAR
lacks resources and has difficulty finding donors. They also noted
their uncertainty of recovering their properties held by the Government
of Zaire.
The FAR planners outlined actions to overcome these obstacles:
Well-thought- out destabilization activities (propaganda, terrorism…);
a diplomatic and media campaign abroad to expose the shortcomings of
the Kigali government with regard to human rights and democracy; quick
establishment of an international action program (with personnel,
guidelines…) to spread their ideology; sensitization of the major
Zairean politicians to the threat of having a regime dominated by the
RPF in Kigali, linking the security in Zaire and the internal
situation in Rwanda; strengthening diplomatic and military activities
of the opposition in Burundi to prepare in advance infiltration
operations of their troops and/or recruit locally to minimize the
effects of the obstacle of the Rusizi river; contacting opposition
circles in Tanzania to sensitize them to the fact that the economic
development of Western Tanzania depends on political stability in
Rwanda; contacting and sensitizing Ugandan opposition forces and
helping them if possible to change the government; mobilizing aid and
establish a system of contributions to a resistance fund; sensitizing
potential donors to the cause of the refugees; enlisting allies, both
private and public, by promising them benefits in the exploitation of
conquered territory; and, undertaking diplomatic and media actions to
sensitize the international opinion on the justification of their
cause.
The military commission also spelled out the advantages and
disadvantages of returning by force.
Advantages of the return by force were: It offered the best political,
social and psychological conditions to the refugees, since winning the
war would erase the defeat suffered earlier. To the refugees, the
resumption of the war would weaken the arrogance of the RPF which
pretends to have won the war but cannot manage the country alone. The
refugee community would escape the de facto media embargo to which it
had been subjected since April 1994. War against the RPF could lead to
spreading the war in the region, and this could perhaps encourage the
international community to look for more sustainable solutions to the
conflict.
The disadvantages of the return by force were as follows: It was costly
in terms of material and human resources. It would not easily get
international support. The timeframe was likely to be too long (need to
acquire equipment, convince the international opinion, prepare men,
etc.). And war worsens the destruction of the social fabric.
In the same hypothesis of using force to return to Rwanda, two
scenarios were thought to be possible: the first was the use of force
until final victory and the second was force with limited objectives.
Concerning the use of force until final victory, the FAR noted that the
conditions for final victory must exist from the political,
socio-economic, military and media-diplomatic point of view. This
scenario had the following advantages. To take power without having to
compromise with the RPF would guarantee “a definitive solution to the
Hutu/Tutsi antagonism” and therefore of real re-establishment of peace;
with the power in the hands of the majority, military victory would
erase the shame and frustration of the Hutu majority; it would also
restore the image of the FAR and the Hutu elite in general.
Its disadvantages were: The military solution by final victory shatters
all the chances of national reconciliation. The regionalization of the
conflict could lead to other challenges for foreign powers and the
outcome of the war may be uncertain for the refugees.
The scenario of the use of force with limited objectives accompanied
with negotiations had the following advantages: Chances of national
reconciliation; a relatively shorter period of preparation and
relatively limited resources; and avoiding the possible danger of
generalizing the conflict in the region.
According to the military commission, this scenario had also its
disadvantages: The RPF may refuse to negotiate. Power would all the
same be shared after negotiations. This scenario required greater
coordination of military and political actions which are still lacking
among the refugees; and also would require intense political,
diplomatic and media efforts.
Mechanisms for accomplishing this scenario were divided into 4 groups
of action: The first was diplomatic, media actions and propaganda; the
second was preparing men and military units entailing moral and
ideological training, as well as training in tactics and technique;
third, acquisition of the necessary equipment; and fourth, proper
planning.
c) Third hypothesis: More or less forced repatriation of the population
The military commission considered this as a possibility, if “the RPF
entrenches its power” with the support of the international community.
It was anticipated that the “FAR and former dignitaries” would then
find themselves separated from the refugees by use of different ploys,
for example a media campaign by the RPF and NGOs calling upon the
population to return, with attractive promises.
With NGOs no longer distributing enough food, the refugees could grow
tired and disappointed and in despair, they would be forced to return
to the country. This was thought to be the most unfavourable hypothesis
for the refugees because it means total failure with total
neutralization of the army.
The commission proposed certain actions under this hypothesis: A media
and diplomatic campaign to interest the international community and the
countries of the region in the cause of the refugees; show them the
dangers of a Diaspora which would inevitably lead to war in future ;
show them also that the consequences of such a war could be harmful to
them too; convince them that, if there are any culprits, they must be
tried quickly before the international tribunal so that the rest may be
free; prevent the RPF from establishing its power; improve discipline
among “the FAR and former dignitaries”; show the international
community that they represent no danger, especially to the rest of the
population; contact NGOs in order to bring them to have a better
understanding of the cause of the refugees, to defend them on the
international scene and continue distributing food and other aid; and
produce concrete results at the level of the media, diplomacy and
military.
According to the commission, the advantages of this scenario were that
the problem of the refugees would be quickly resolved since its
implementation of required very little preparation or negotiations.
Furthermore, there was the possibility of infiltrating all sorts of
agents who could act upon orders to support any future action.
Its disadvantages were many. The FAR planners wrote that the whole Hutu
population would feel frustrated by this catastrophic defeat of
returning unconditionally, and would lose confidence in its leaders and
its Army for failing to get them out of this situation with dignity.
The lack of pre-negotiated political conditions for the return of the
refugees would make their future uncertain in terms of security,
recovery of their properties and their rights.
They also predicted that this scenario would result the creation of an
intellectual Hutu Diaspora which would constitute an explosive
situation, which would inevitably lead to a war capable of
destabilizing the entire region. The unconditional return of all the
refugees would also contribute to the consolidation of RPF power, since
the RPF would rule the country alone without any threat from outside.
This would, they wrote, reduce the chances for a rapid democratic
opening, and likely lead to a de facto dictatorship of the Tutsi
minority.
The commission was of the view that within the FAR and the refugee
population, some were tired and desperate, and ready to return to
Rwanda willy-nilly. Actions to prevent this were envisaged. One was a
media and diplomatic campaign to bring the international community and
NGOs to serve the cause of the refugees; convince the refugees about
the risks they are likely to incur by returning to the country in this
manner; and sensitize the international community to these risks.
Notes
_______________________
[1] Rapport au Comd des FAR, Goma, le 20 décembre 1994. (Author’s
archives)
[2] Ibidem, p.8 The fact however, is that the extremist Hutu
politicians and the military who planned genocide, never accepted the
outcome of the Arusha Peace accord.
Chapter III: Refugees in captivity
In a December 1994 report, the French NGO called Doctors Without
Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières or MSF) reported about a meeting
between the Rwandan government in exile, the FAR, and the Interahamwe
which was held in Bukavu at the beginning of October 1994.[1] The
decision taken at the meeting was to seize power over the camps and
make the government in exile the sole representative of all refugees.
The MSF report shows how the refugees were regularly “subjected to
violence by members of the militia and sometimes get killed publicly
because of their wish to return to Rwanda.” According to this report,
the refugees wanting to return home were “considered collaborators with
the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF)”[2]
This NGO had reports of visits to the camps by the former Minister of
Defence,[3] the Chief of staff of the former Rwandese army,[4] and the
Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda who visited the Camps of Katale and
Kibumba. Kambanda, MSF reported, “was greeted with much enthusiasm in
Kibumba where he spoke to a crowd of several hundred people. His speech
inflamed the spirits of the listeners and when asking the crowd if they
wanted a peaceful or a violent return to Rwanda, he was greeted with an
overwhelming cry for war.”[5]
The situation in the camps was described as ‘unacceptably dangerous’ by
16 international NGOs, in their joint press release of 3 November 1994.
In another MSF report of July 1995, MSF says the refugees, had been
convinced by their leaders that it was too dangerous to go back to
Rwanda, a conviction that was reinforced by the anti-RPA propaganda and
hate campaign carried out by camp leaders.[6]
According to MSF, “refugees wishing to return home were virtually held
hostage by the camp leaders,” and “adequate protection for refugees
needed to be guaranteed in order for them to feel free to return home
or remain in the camp without fearing for their lives.” This situation
led to the withdrawal of several NGOs from the camps, both in Zaire and
Tanzania.
MSF-France, which was among those NGOs that decided to leave the camps,
came to the conclusion that their continued presence in those camps was
“contradictory with the principles of humanitarian assistance,” given
that there was a constant diversion of humanitarian aid by the same
leaders who had orchestrated the genocide, a lack of effective
international action regarding impunity, and a refugee population held
hostage. Another NGO, Care-Canada checked out of Katale camp following
death threats.[7]
MSF reporting shows that the genocidaires in the camps sought to mask
their control methods, by creating a new political organisation (the
RDR) and replacing overt military control of the camps with a “civil
society” control mechanism.[8]
Thus the “social commission” (Commission Sociale) which had been
created by the government in exile and the FAR, during the process of
restructuring the camps’ leadership, gave way to a broader Civil
Society organ called “Société Civile”, which was also given the mandate
“to act as the representative of the refugee population in any
negotiations for a political settlement with the government in
Kigali.”[9]
By mid- January 1995, the Société Civile had, according to MSF, “92
affiliated non-profit-making organizations such as: l’Association des
journalistes rwandais en exil, le Cercle des intellectuels,
l’Association pour la promotion féminine et la réhabilitation de la
famille rwandaise, and l’Association des juristes pour les droits de
l’homme….Most were founded by members of Rwanda’s well-educated elite,
the MRND, and of the extremist media that functioned in Rwanda before
the genocide. Some receive substantial funding from abroad.”[10]
The MSF assessment, which was perceptive, was that the Société Civile,
and the leadership of the RDR had the same ideological background as
the extremists; they justify the genocide and paint themselves as
victims. They circulate a list of all human rights abuses in Rwanda
since October 1990 when the RPF first invaded the country and claim to
give a “truthful accounting of the facts” surrounding the death of
President Habyarimana; followed by a long list of what they consider to
be prerequisites for peace. The RDR states that if they fail to attain
their political objectives, they will resort to “military action as a
final option”.[11]
MSF saw no reason to be optimistic about the new leadership in the
camps (the RDR and Société Civile), since they “emerged from the same
Hutu extremist ideological position.” MSF understood that the new
leadership structures served to further the monopoly of extremism, with
no room for moderate voices to be heard:
“The leaders’ control over information is, in large part, the key to
their control over the population. The former government authorities
incited a population to commit genocide through the use of extremist
propaganda. Due to continued impunity, these same officials continue to
manipulate the refugee population by controlling the flow of
information and political discourse in the camps. They talk tirelessly
about the victimization of the Hutu people. A number of extremist
publications devoted to fuelling ethnic hatred and silencing moderate
voices regularly circulate in the camps. They portray the Hutu people
as victims and attempt to re-write history. Revisionism and
victimization are central to the camp leader’s extremist
ideology.” [12]
One example of such revisionism provided by MSF, is a report that was
published by an NGO called The International Solidarity for The Rwandan
Refugees (SOLIDAIRE-ASBL) with the title “What Has Not Been Said About
the Massacres in Rwanda,” which referred to the Hutu population in
exile as “victims of a well-hatched plot, planned long before”, [who]
had “killed only because it was attacked.”
MSF sites another publication “L’Autre face du genocide”, published by
an NGO called Peace and Justice Association for Reconciliation in
Rwanda (Association Justice et Paix pour la Réconciliation au Rwanda)
in collaboration with the Société Civile, which contends that “no
evidence” incriminating the self-proclaimed government-in-exile had
come to light, and that it was the RPF who had committed a genocide of
the Hutu. This NGO claimed: “The elimination of the Hutu majority was
aimed at decimating the opposition and attaining the numerical balance
[they had] sought for so long.”
MSF noted that extremist publications like Amizero, and numerous
political tracts, blamed every assassination in Rwanda on Tutsi “and
repeat that to return to Rwanda is to go to your grave.” In another
tract, “L’Oeil des refugiés,” all Hutus are warned against going back
to Rwanda, referring to this as “suicide.” The songs schoolchildren
sometimes sing are, according to refugees, traditional hunting songs –
songs about hunting down Tutsi.[13] Some force was behind all this.
Friendly advice
On a closer look, the reorganisation and attempted rehabilitation of
genocidaires through the creation of a new politico-military
organisation called the RDR, was not an initiative of Rwandans alone.
The government of France and the IDC played a vital role in the
process.
After his visit to France, around September 1994, Jerôme Bicamumpaka,
then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation in the genocidal
“government,” gave very interesting information in this
regard.[14] Bicamumpaka says he was not received in Egypt, among the
countries he had earmarked to visit, but did have an “informal” meeting
with “a French official” in Paris. In his mission report, he reveals
the presence of “an important personality of the (CDI)…from Brussels”
who had come to have talks with him in Paris.
According to Bicamumpaka, the image of the interim government among the
French and the émigré Rwandans he had met “was so much tarnished that
few people would accept to receive any envoy of this
government.”[15] He notes that: “This image is tarnished mainly because
of the massacres that many put on the shoulders of the government”, and
because this government “does allegedly have nobody from the Tutsi
ethnic group” and because “our government did not fulfil its promise
that it would put a stop to the massacres by April.”[16]
Bicamumpaka was advised by his French interlocutors that “realpolitik
dictates” their government should “keep a low profile”. He was told
that the two factors compelled this attitude: First, certain
personalities “do not hesitate to assert that our government is
non-existent since the military victory of RPF”, and to ignore this
would amount to “lack of realpolitik”.
The second factor was the fact that the “government in exile” had
failed to get recognition by Zaire. Bicamumpaka wrote in his report:
“This government can claim to exist only if at least the Zairean
authorities had accepted to officially grant it asylum, and this asylum
was not even unofficially granted.”[17] As a result, he said, talking
of the “refugee Rwandan Government in Zaire” was likely to even anger
Zairean politicians.
Bicamumpaka reported that his French interlocutor recommended to their
genocidaire government, that information and evidence should be
collected from every commune and every prefecture to prove the
atrocities committed by RPF: “the genocide committed by RPF since
October 1990 and since April 6, 1994”, “the responsibility of the
Nigerian General, Mr Opaleye and GOMN/NMOG (Neutral Military Observer
Group) as well as General Dallaire and MINUAR in the genocide”, “the
names of RPF officers who commanded “death squads” and the areas where
these massacres were committed.”[18]
Bicamumpaka reported that this exercise of compiling the crimes
allegedly committed by the RPF should be completed by November 1994—
the date when the final report of the United Nations Commission would
be deposited, and should also be submitted by the “government in exile”
to an impartial international tribunal. (The ICTR was not yet in
place).
Bicamumpaka also reported that as far as the French were concerned, the
RPF-led Government was “illegal since it is a government that was put
in place by the Ugandan Army; the majority of whom do not speak
Kinyarwanda or French; a government which rules a country deserted by
the majority of its population; in short, a government by an occupation
army.”[19]
Bicamumpaka’s interlocutors suggested to him that the issue should be
submitted to the leaders of Francophone countries, who were scheduled
to meet November 7- 9, in Biarritz, so that they too would condemn the
government put in place by RPF. In short the plan was to mobilise the
“La Francophonie” to take a common stand against recognition of the
government in Kigali.
Another advice, given to Bicamumpaka by his French and IDC
interlocutors, was on the “type of organization that should be put in
place for the defence of the cause of the Rwandan people”. He reported
that it was necessary “to the extent possible, to be active on the
international scene through unprecedented media actions”: e.g. by
increasing “well thought out” statements which are part of a “coherent
and responsible strategy and not aggressive statements which would lead
to polemics”.[20]
The French added advice on the necessity of getting closer to the
population in the camps, and organizing them “so as to instil
discipline among the population as well as among the FAR…For them,
discipline is the basis of everything else… Without that, our
credibility would be lost forever.”[21]
The genocidaires were also counselled by Bicamumpaka’s French
interlocutor(s) to work for the unity among refugees and for “a
Collective self-evaluation during which errors would be identified
without complacency, for subsequent correction.”[22] On the diplomatic
front they told that “alliances must be forged with Presidents Mobutu,
Moi, with Sudanese authorities, President Mwinyi and with opponents of
President Museveni of Uganda.”[23]
Bicamumpaka reports that the idea of “the possibility of establishing a
new political structure which is more functional and operational” was
“greatly appreciated by [our] French partners”, who insisted on the
prompt implementation of this project.
These partners of genocidaires also gave advice on the personalities
who would lead this structure: “However, the personalities to be put at
the head of this new structure should be…persons with international
experience, particularly in the field of communication, with real
competence and should not be compromised in the massacres of the
civilian population (…) It is necessary to form a solid, well knit
team, possessing experience in international mechanisms.” [24]
The communication campaign was supposed to target Western countries and
selected African countries (like Zaire).[25]
The public support of France for the “cause of the refugees,”
Bicamumpaka reported, “was impossible” in the immediate future because
the world was “still under the shock of the massacres,” France was
“being accused by the international community of bearing some
responsibility in the Rwandan genocide,” and “the elections period in
France excludes any support”.
Bicamumpaka added that he was told that it would be impossible for
France to provide direct support unless the “government in exile” found
a “friendly” African country through which this support could be
channelled to them—“Hence the importance of President Mobutu in our
strategy”[26].
Regarding the “re-conquest of power through armed force”, Bicamumpaka
reported that the French advice was “to be very careful because in the
immediate we would have the whole world against us. This action would
therefore be doomed to failure”. In the French opinion, what was more
important for the government was “to be alive and be recognized by the
international community as being genuinely representative of the
Rwandan people.”[27]
The solution to the Rwandan conflict was to be found in the Arusha
Accords— which carried basic principles of power sharing. In
Bicamumpaka’s opinion, though, “the world knows that the RPF Government
is antidemocratic and that Anglo-Saxons are solidly settling in Rwanda,
France can do nothing more for us for the time being.”[28]
In his report, Bicamumpaka requested to meet as soon as possible with
the Government and FAR general staff, to discuss these problems and
develop appropriate strategies. “The objective of this would be to save
and serve the Rwandan people. Government’s priority must be to gain
back credibility through the demonstration of its sense of
responsibility, especially with regard to the Rwandan refugees.”[29]
It is fundamental, at this juncture, to remember what French Defence
Minister Francois Leotard said when he addressed the potential for
further military conflict in Rwanda, on Radio France Internationale, on
July 25, 1994. Here, Leotard said that if the government in Kigali
failed to show its impartiality and its will to solve Rwandan civilian
issues peacefully, the beginning of a fresh military confrontation was
imminent “because these forces, which represent – or feel that they
represent – an ethnic majority, that of the Hutus, 85 – 90 per cent of
the population, will unfortunately resume their military harassment
techniques against the new authorities, just like the RPF did from
Uganda in the past.”
Notes
_______________________
[1] Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) Breaking the Circle: Activities in
and Around Rwanda, December 1994
[2] MSF—BREAKING THE CIRCLE: p. 3
[3] This must be Jean Bizimana
[4] Major General Augustin Bizimungu
[5] Ibid, MSF—BREAKING THE CIRCLE p. 7
[6] MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERE (MSF) DEADLOCK IN THE RWANDAN REFUGEE
CRISIS :Virtual Standstill on Repatriation July 1995 (p. 7) fn 13,
quoting Reig Miller, ‘Rwandan Refugees’, Associated Press, 7 July 1995
[7] Ibid, p.8 MSF-Belgium and -Holland decided to continue working in
the camps while at the same time continuously and publicly advocating
for an end to impunity and improvements in the security situation for
the refugees
[8] Ibid, p.11
[9] Ibid, p.11
[10] Ibid, p.11
[11] Ibid, p.12 the report refers to Reuters story. Buchizya Mseteka,
‘Rwandan refugee party pushes for talks with Kigali’, Reuters, 19 April
1995 (fn 26)
[12] Ibid, p.18
[13] Ibid, p.18
[14] Rapport de Mission en France, Goma, 4 October 1994. (Author’s
archives) The whole of this Section is based on this report
[15] Ibidem, p.2.
[16] Ibidem, p.2.
[17] Ibidem, p.2.
[18] Ibidem, p.3.
[19] Ibidem, p.4.
[20] Ibid. p. 4
[21] Ibid. p. 4
[22] Ibid. p. 4
[23] Ibid. p. 4
[24] Idem
[25] Idem
[26] Ibid. p.6
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid. p.7
[29] Ibid, p.9
Chapter IV: The RDR or disguised genocidaires
On March 30, 2009, the BBC-radio (Kinyarwanda service) aired an
interview of Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza, an extremist Hutu who is
president of the RDR and also president of another umbrella
organisation called FDU-Inkingi. At the time of this interview she was
based in The Hague, Holland. She told her Rwandan listeners that if the
government in Kigali does not change their ways, there will be another
1994.
This threat was uttered close to the 15^th commemoration of the
genocide of Tutsis. It was horrifying and revealing—both of the BBC’s
bizarre willingness to serve as a conduit for hate-speech to Rwanda,
and the tenor of RDR discourse.
Such discourse, the history of RDR and that of its leaders, together
with documentary evidence available, indicate that there is no other
way to qualify the RDR, than as a genocidal rather than a political
organisation. That it can operate on the international level, is a
stark reminder of the dangers of international indifference to the
dangers of racism and resultant ideologies.
Towards the end of year 1996, when regional countries— especially
Tanzania—were cracking down on the RDR operatives who were known as
‘intimidators’, this organisation declared it was non-political and
therefore did not see why their members were being persecuted.[1]
These ‘intimidators’ were influential men and women in the camps in
Tanzania and Zaire, who had the duty and powers to discourage, threaten
or even kill refugees who wished or tried to return to Rwanda.
Political or not, what is this organisation which has its base in The
Hague, Holland, where Dutch officials profess ignorance as to its
nature and aims?
There is a newspaper, Intego, which used to be published in Kigali two
years after the genocide in 1994. This paper’s journalists were
privileged and able to visit refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania,
because they had close relatives there.
In their first issue, Intego described the RDR as an organisation
“dominated by genocide perpetrators” and reported how it had filed a
case with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda against some
officials in Kigali, because RDR also claims that the authorities in
Kigali took part in the genocide and must be tried for it.[2]
In their next issue, Intego spoke to an unnamed Rwandan refugee in
America who gave them his analysis about the return of refugees. He
told the paper, that the RDR had no chance of success because it is
supported by those refugees in Goma and Bukavu who were involved in the
genocide, and is equally supported by civilians and the military who
led the people of Rwanda into committing genocide, adding, that those
people will continue sabotaging Rwanda through small-scale attacks.[3]
This assessment associating RDR with genocide was also expressed by the
former Prime Minister of the Government of genocidaires, Jean Kambanda,
in his testimony to the ICTR investigators, saying that the RDR was a
creation of the military and members of the MRND and CDR.[4]
It was after many months of deliberations and planning by the FAR that
finally, on April 3, 1995, the political-military organization, the
RDR, was born. Indeed, the initial and crucial decision to create this
criminal organization, to replace the so called ‘government in exile’
had been taken by the FAR Command on September 2-8, 1994, when they met
in Goma.
A second six day meeting of eleven men to formalize the creation of the
political-military organisation they named the RDR, was held in Goma on
March 29- April 3, 1995.[5] Its composition included Major-General
Augustin BIZIMUNGU (Chairman), Brigadier-General Gratien KABILIGI,
Claver KANYARUSHOKI, François NZABAHIMANA, Charles NDEREYEHE, Aloys
NGENDAHIMANA, Aloys RUKEBESHA, Colonel Joseph MURASAMONGO, Jean
Marie Vianney BAGEZAHO, Lieutenant Colonel BEM Juvénal BAHUFITE,
and Major CGSC Aloys NTABAKUZE who was their rapporteur.[6]
The chairman told the ten other participants in the meeting that the
FAR “was prepared to face the RPF, but it was necessary to create a
political organization capable of mobilizing the means and ensuring
unity among the population for concerted action.” Furthermore, their
“interlocutors in Europe” had proposed a “credible political
organization to represent the refugees.”
It is very clear from the onset that the military was to remain in
charge. The first leadership of RDR, which was made public in 1995,
was its executive committee of extremist civilians. But the real power
lay in the Umbrella committee, as the “decision-making
politico-military organ”.[7] But they decided it should “not be
official for strategic reasons”. Its members, 6 from the executive
committee and 4 members of the FAR command council, i.e. the
FAR Commander and Deputy Commander, and 2 Division Commander
were: François NZABAHIMANA (Chairman) and Major-General Augustin
BIZIMUNGU as Vice/Chairman. Other members included Claver
KANYARUSHOKI, Froduald GASAMUNYIGA, Aloys NGENDAHIMANA, Innocent
BUTARE, Denys NTIRUGILIMBABAZI, Brigadier-General Gratien KABILIGI,
Colonel Tharcisse RENZAHO and Colonel Aloys NTIWlRAGABO.
It was also decided to integrate the Interahamwe in the new army which
would become the “RDR’s military wing”.[8] The FAR high command
reiterated that it “still consider themselves as the ‘People’s army’
and confirmed their strong willingness to work directly with and for
the people.”[9]
As announced in the declaration of the creation of the RDR, in Mugunga
camp on April 3, 1995, appointed members of the Executive committee
were: François Nzabahimana (Chairman); Pierre Claver Kanyarushoki
(V/Chairman in charge of external relations); Aloys Ngendahimana (V/
Chairman in charge of social affairs); François Gasamunyiga, V/
Chairman in charge of economic affairs and planning; Dr. Innocent
Butare (Executive Secretary); Denis Ntirugirimbabazi (Treasurer); Oscar
Murayi (Advisor and chairman of the legal commission). Others with the
position of advisors were Joseph Bukeye,[10] Jean Marie Vianney
Ndagijimana[11], Eugenie Nyiramajoro; Donatila Nzabonimpa; Donat
Hakizimana, Jean Marie Vianney Bagezaho; Sebahakwa, Augustin Banyaga
and Cyprien Habimana.
The four key ‘goals’ of this organisation, from its establishment were
allegedly:
- To do everything possible, for the quick return of refugees,
in a peaceful and honourable manner;
- To strive for dialogue, peace and national reconciliation;
- To represent and defend the interest of Rwandese refugees as
well as all Rwandese excluded from the governance of the country; and
- To contribute in throwing light on the tragedy of the Rwandese
people in view of achieving a fair justice inside Rwanda and the
impartiality of the International Tribunal on Rwanda.[12]
The president and chief ideologue of the RDR admitted in 1998 this
organisation was established to bypass or circumvent the de facto
embargo imposed on the “government in exile” in Zaire, and of course on
other fugitives who were in positions of power during the genocide.
An RDR document published on 17 November 1998 and signed by Charles
Ndereyehe revealed that it took the “refugees two months of serious
thinking about setting up an organisation, which would be capable of
breaking the media and diplomatic embargo affecting them.”
The document reads:
“The idea of a large organisation was born during the meeting held in
Bukavu in October 1994. To circumvent the embargo which had struck the
government in exile during the 2-3 months while the refugees lived
in exile, several series of refugee initiatives were launched in
different places, particularly in the former Zaire and Tanzania, where
more than 2 million Rwandans who fled en masse in July and August 1994
were living. But these initiatives lacked coordination. Mr. François
Nzabahimana was among the organisers of this meeting, at which the
refugees from Europe and the Americas were unfortunately
under-represented. After two days of debates, the refugees were given 2
months for reflection before establishing an organisation which was
able to break the media and diplomatic embargo under which the refugees
were struggling. At the end of the first gathering of the organisation,
the refugees published a charter for the rapid and peaceful return of
refugees who fulfilled its requirements.”[13]
The FAR leadership which “actively participated in the creation
of the RDR” but for “strategic reasons” did not sign the
declaration on its establishment,[14] issued a statement of
support for the RDR the very next day.
On April 4, 1995, in Bukavu-Zaire, this declaration was issued by the
FAR high command:
“We, members of the Rwandan Armed Forces in exile, heard about the
creation of the “RDR” and express our satisfaction to know that the
“RDR” is an organization of refugees whose main objective is to
mobilize all socio-political forces, for a quick repatriation, justice
for all, the instauration of legitimate and representative
institutions, the creation of a real national army, peace, and national
reconciliation. Therefore we subscribe completely to the noble
objectives of the RDR.”[15]
The signatories were Major-General Augustin Bizimungu,
Brigadier-General Gratien Kabiligi, Colonel Murasampongo, Colonel Aloys
Ntiwiragabo, Colonel Venant Musonera, Lieutenant-Colonel Juvénal
Bahufite, Lieutenant-Colonel Antoine Sebahire, Lieutenant-Colonel
Augustin Rwamanywa, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Rwarakabije, and
Lieutenant–Colonel Edouard Gasarabwe Lieutenant- Colonel Baransalitse,
Major Aloys Ntabakuze, Major Théophile Gakara, and, Major
François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye.
As one can see, among the signatories of this declaration of support,
were people who attended the March 29-April 3, 1995 meeting which
created the RDR, and were in its leadership. The remaining signatories
had participated in the meeting of September 2-8, 1994 which had
initially proposed the creation of such a politico-military
organisation.
Whether to make it crystal clear to all members of the previous
“government in exile” that their job titles were defunct, or to enforce
the desired illusion that the RDR was a break with the past, the FAR
High Command issued a further declaration April 29, 1995.
“Since its creation on April 9, 1994, with the assistance of the
Rwandan Armed Forces, the Government has been subjected to media and
diplomatic embargo, and the Government reshuffle of November 1994 did
not improve the situation. The absence of Government action for the
refugees in the camps due to lack of adequate and efficient structures
is remarkable.…In the search of intermediate solutions to get out of
the impasse, with the refugees’ initiative, the “RDR” was recently
created to address the concerns of the refugees and of the oppressed
Rwandans inside the country. After examining the goal and the
objectives of “RDR,” the Rwandan Armed Forces saluted this good
initiative setting up an organisation that can ensure efficient
supervision of the population in exile, guarantee maximum cohesion and
having a media and diplomatic influence, which are preliminary
conditions to the refugees’ return to their country. This is the reason
why the Rwandan Armed Forces signed a declaration of support to the
“RDR” on April 4, 1995….Conscious of their responsibilities and …their
strong willingness to work directly with and for the people… [t]he FAR
believe that the Government must be aware of its responsibilities
before history, the Rwandan people in general and the refugees in
particular, by supporting the refugees’ good initiative, and by
resigning to let the “RDR” represent and defend their interests.
Therefore, the Government must hand in all documents it has been
keeping on behalf of the people in exile. The relations between the FAR
and the Government are stopped as of April 29, 1995.”[16]
The FAR’s statement, signed in Bukavu by the same group which made the
first declaration in support of the RDR, tells the sincere objectives
behind the creation of RDR. The real power behind the newly created
organisation believed that the “government exile” had become
ineffective in serving the interests of refugees in Zaire and of
Hutu everywhere, and instead declared its unswerving support for the
RDR.
The birth of RDR and its objectives were expressed in an ideological
discourse which poured out hatred against the Tutsi and denial of the
genocide. One of these was in the editorial of the April 1995 issue of
Kangura, where Hassan Ngeze, the publisher and editor, suggests Tutsi
are ridiculous, that they made the world believe that the Hutu
exterminated the Tutsi race. Ngeze celebrates the crime of which he is
among the perpetrators: “When they call us criminals, do they believe
that we have forgotten that they exterminated the Hutus in the
prefectures of Byumba, Ruhengeri and Kibungo? If we exterminated
them—who is occupying the country and our houses? Why don’t they show
Hutu dead bodies? All dead bodies look alike. Must we return to the
country through negotiations or through war? The community must be
sensitized on the merits of a political dialogue that must be
privileged instead of war.”[17]
For those who knew Ngeze, it is not surprising that he started using
the language of the RDR the same month this organisation was created.
With a combination of menace and optimism, Ngeze asserts that the RPF
knows well that “some day we will go back to our country,” and that
there were only two alternatives: “starting political negotiations or
go to war.” As he rightly added, everyone knows they left Rwanda with
their army, and supplies in armaments were easy to obtain.[18]
Ngeze began his enthusiastic cheerleading for the RDR by showering
praises on the RDR leadership, for having the special Hutu qualities
key to ensuring the return of the refugees. As he put it in an article
whose title can be translated as “Here are the Hutu who will ensure our
return to Rwanda”, these were: the ability to infiltrate, communicate
and lobby in order to convince the international community about the
importance of the refugee problem; the ability to enter into dialogue
and to consult with those concerned; the capacity to combine ideas and
acts; the ability to use deceit and cunningness like the Tutsi; and a
commitment to kill in self-defence only, and to promote fraternity
among all the brothers of the same ethnic group. This, Ngeze said, was
what they call the Hutu code of ethics.[19]
In the following issue of Kangura, another voice of support for the RDR
was Dr. Joseph Mugenzi, a refugee in Nairobi, who had previously been
in charge of the Umuravumba Pharmacy in Kigali. His interview in
Kangura covered two pages. He said the RDR is an association he
supports without a second thought. Mugenzi emphasised about the need to
combine efforts for a dignified, secure and quick return of Rwandan
refugees back to their homeland.[20]
In another Kangura interview, RDR Vice-president Aloys Ngendahimana
puts it in plain words that his movement was the only one capable of
representing, defending and uniting all Rwandan refugees. It was a
matter of promoting the unity of Rwandans in exile. The RDR is
presented as the right party to enter into negotiations with the
RPF.[21]
The Genocidaires as the “Hutu”, “the people,” and “victims”
The leaders and key people in the interim government and its armed
forces who perpetrated the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi were, from
top to bottom, remorseless—and determined to pose as victims. In the
previous chapter we saw the FAR planning for its public relations work.
This scheme was again emphasized in the meeting, to formally establish
RDR, when General Bizimungu spoke about his army’s readiness.
The military option had been decided and operations were on-going.
After all, they were convinced it was a matter of time. As noted above,
Mbonampeka had estimated the government which ousted the genocidaires
would not last beyond April 1995.
From Kinshasa, Jerome Bicamumpaka, on behalf of what was dubbed as the
‘legitimate government of the Republic of Rwanda’ had issued on the
July 27, 1994, a threatening and racist statement saying:
“In the absence of a determined action based on the force of law to
which the RPF and its accomplices remain allergic, the Rwandan people,
thus compelled and forced, will have no other choice but to resort to
armed struggle to restore their inalienable rights. The legitimate
government of the Republic of Rwanda, which has always sought a
negotiated political settlement of the conflict and tragedy that has
afflicted the Rwandan people, recommends the implementation of the
following proposals and measures to definitely end the conflict and
tragedy.”[22]
As if by coincidence, General Augustin Bizimungu spoke to the press in
the town of Goma the very same day. He criticized the international
community which, he said after “supporting the RPF”, is asking refugees
to return to their country, and he felt this was “the most ignoble of
complicities”.
Menacingly, he affirmed they were “capable of organizing” themselves to
“resume war” inside Rwanda where they still had soldiers.
Gen. Bizimungu told reporters that he could not counsel Rwandan
refugees in Zaire to return to their country unless a political
solution was found to the crisis.
For him, refugees like him had run away from danger—“the minority Tutsi
RPF who want to exterminate the majority Hutus,” especially its
intellectuals.
True to his racist ideology, the defeated general said the new Rwandan
head of state, Pasteur Bizimungu, was “a renegade who wants to satisfy
his stomach” who allied himself to the RPF “because he is married to a
Tutsi.”
For this general, president Bizimungu was therefore a “traitor used as
a front by the RPF to deceive international opinion.”[23]
As French journalist Laurence Simon reported at the time, there were
“desperadoes” amongst the FAR who feared punishment for “the massacres
they committed against the Tutsis.” They wanted to go through to the
bitter end, and “arm themselves in order to harass the RPF” and start a
resistance movement, using Zairean soil as a rear base.[24]
The language used by the leaders of the “government in exile”, the FAR,
and the RDR in 1994-95, the “honourable manner of return,” the
‘legitimate representative’ and ‘real national army’ or ‘people’s
army’, all meant the same thing: the genocidaires meant to return to
power.
That is also what they meant when they spoke about “contributing
towards a search for a durable peace, by addressing once for all, the
root causes of the Calvary of the Rwandese people.”[25] It also held
the same meaning as the ‘Rwandese people’ have no trust in RPF
government[26] or, are ‘victims of the brutal force unleashed on it by
the Kigali regime.’[27]
Charles Ndereyehe, at the time the second president of the RDR after
the departure of Francois Nzabahimana, repeated the same discourse in
his article Solidarité entre les réfugiés, published in October 1998:
that the people of Rwanda had never known a regime as cruel as the
RPF.[28]
As can be read from various statements before and later in this book,
“the people” and “Rwandans” to the genocidaires and their friends means
the Hutu.
In its press release to celebrate Rwanda’s Independence Day on July 1,
1995, the RDR said: “it will be a year since the RPF conquered the
Rwandan territory but it still faces an uphill task to win the hearts
of the Rwandan people.”[29]
The RDR’s dogma was that “the Rwandan people” have never considered the
RPF as its liberator, because the people who had run away from its
advance in the summer of 1994 were “a glaring example of the opposition
of the majority of the Rwandan people to the Kigali regime.”[30]
They are categorical, that “the true people of Rwanda will never back
the RPF”, and that “no amount of intimidation or military support will
deter Rwandese refugees and other victims of RPF repressive policy,
from claiming their inalienable rights to a homeland and a rule of
law.”[31]
The RDR insisted that the refugees would not return without their army,
because: “They refuse to succumb to blackmailing whose aim is to bring
them into surrendering to RPF and meeting the worst humiliation in its
hands.”[32]Voluntary returns in response to UNHCR appeals were
considered as “surrendering” to the RPF government and facing its
wrath, or lending “legitimacy to RPF dictatorship.”[33] The RDR
regarded the regime set up by RPF in Kigali as “not viable.”[34]
In the same frame of mind, on August 28, 1995, the RDR blamed the UN
Security Council for making peace with “the bloodthirsty regime of the
RPF”, at the expense of the “Rwandan people hurt by more than 5 years
of a war imposed by the RPF.” It hoped that peace-loving countries
would maintain the arms embargo as a sign of “solidarity with the
Rwandan people”[35]
Five years later, in August 2000, some of the resolutions at the RDR’s
third Congress were to “allow the people to regain her sovereignty” and
renewed commitment to co-operate with the other democratic forces
struggling for the liberation of the “Rwandan people from the RPF
bloodthirsty and bellicose dictatorship.”[36]
It is standard in the discourse of extremist Hutus and their friends’
to gloss over the genocide against the Tutsi, attribute to the RPF the
kind of behaviour typical Hutu extremism, and to assert as a statement
of faith that the “Rwandan people” can only be loyal to Hutu extremism.
Thus, a 1995 RDR statement claims that “Since the 1^st October 1990,
date when the RPF rebels invaded Rwanda, the people of Rwanda are going
through the most tragic period of their recent history. Massacres,
fear, grief, injustice, violence, repression and falsehood are part of
the daily problems that the Rwandan people have to face. The RPF has
won a military victory, God knows at what human sacrifice, but fifteen
months later it has not yet won the trust of the Rwandan people.”[37]
The RDR blames the international community for consolidating or
imposing a “Stalinist RPF regime on a people that hate it”. The RDR
particularly faults the international community for denying it
rearmament, and therefore asks on behalf of the ‘Rwandan people’: “who
armed the RPF and financed its war and in whose interest?”[38]
In one of their press releases in 2002, the RDR talks about the loathed
“illegitimate government, dictatorial and controlled by warmongers of
the RPF”[39] a government which had been described before, as a
“permanent danger for peace in the African Great Lakes region”.[40]
On August 27, 1998, in an open letter addressed to US President
Clinton, the RDR says that: “The oppressed people of Rwanda”
represented by the RDR, appeals to the American people to stop spilling
blood and fuelling chaos in the African Great Lakes region.[41] Only
the RDR, they claim can produce a national consensus, since on one side
there is the “RPF military regime in Kigali,” and on the other the RDR
as “representatives of refugees and Rwandese people.”[42]
In early 1996, the current government of Rwanda embarked on a program
of issuing new identity cards which did not have a mention of one’s
ethnic group. The RDR, with their racist ideology of looking at Tutsi
as foreigners, described this as an RPF ploy to import from abroad more
than half a million people, rewarding “aliens for their contribution
towards RPF war.”[43]
The RDR consistently portrays the RPF and, by extension, all Tutsi as
outsiders and usurpers. Such distortion and reversal of historical
reality, which belittles the significance of the genocide, is
common throughout the RDR’s documents. The RDR refers regularly to
Hutu refugees as “Rwandan and Burundian”[44] refugees, while Tutsi
refugees are referred to simply as Tutsi.
The implication here is that Tutsi belong to their ethnic group, rather
than to their nation, and that Hutu are the rightful heirs to power in
Rwanda and Burundi. The governments in Rwanda and Burundi are described
as “Tutsi-led”[45] or “minority”[46]regimes, implying a lack of popular
credibility or an inherent injustice in anything but ethnic
majority—that is, Hutu—rule.
Maintaining the argument that the RPF and all Tutsi are outsiders,
Press Release No. 11 of 1 July 1995 states that the RPF’s high command
“is exclusively made up of former members of a foreign army” and refers
to “the so-called national assembly,”[47] while another statement
refers to “the so–called national parliament”[48] in Rwanda,
reinforcing the notion of the illegitimacy of RPF rule in Rwanda.
Generally speaking, in the RDR’s press releases, the terms “RPF” and
“Tutsi” are used interchangeably and contrasted with descriptions of
Hutu as “true Rwandans,” “the Rwandan people” and “the population.”[49]
The RDR continually attempts to distance the RPF from the “Rwandan
people,” implying that the RPF is not truly Rwandan and instead a
self-imposed and discredited government; “a clique of individuals, who
are desperately trying to cling to power against the verdict of the
people.”[50]
Such statements echo the claim in the RDR’s Political Platform that the
RPF government “has no political or social base; it is not
representative of the population. It is a government that took power
through military force by an ethnocentric oligarchy, which so far has
not been able to win the hearts of the people over which it rules.”[51]
The RPF is portrayed as an occupying force; an administration of
non-Rwandans subjecting true Rwandans—Hutu—to repressive, minority
rule.
The myth of Tutsi being “foreigners” or “outsiders” is not new in
Rwanda. After 1959, successive governments maintained that the Tutsi
were foreigners who needed to be eradicated. Killing Tutsi by throwing
them in the Nyabarongo River was considered part of sending them back
to their purported origin—Ethiopia, via the River Nile.
In a more recent version of this argument, the RDR’s Press Release No.
67 of 17 April 1996 describes economic migrants and foreigners who have
been given legal rights to property in which they had been “squatting”
since the genocide, allegedly as part of an attempt by the RPF to
“enhance its political constituency.”[52]
This implies that the RPF is not a party for Rwandans; that to maintain
power it must buy support from outside of the country and can only
govern with the help of foreigners. An RDR statement on 4 June 1996
accuses the RPF of needing to “pay a moral debt to Tutsi in Zaire who
financed the RPF war,” alleging that the RPF relies on foreigners,
especially members of the Tutsi Diaspora, to stay in power.[53]
During the whole period of 1996, RDR-led forces in eastern Zaire, were
preparing to escalate armed incursions into Rwanda, and the tone of the
RDR’s press releases reflected this. In one of them, on April 17, 1996,
the UN Security Council was blamed for consolidating “a mono-ethnic
army that cannot inspire confidence to all citizens of the country”.
The RDR further described the RPF government as an “intrinsically
unviable political system.” Without denying that the FAR and
Interahamwe were rearming, the RDR claimed the issue was that “any
human being will always find a way of resisting and getting rid of
injustice meted out on him from any quarter however apparently
powerful.”[54]
This was repeated in another press release of September 29, 1996, where
the RDR sought to give their hideous plans the legitimacy of South
African struggle against apartheid.
The communiqué states: “No amount of weaponry will deter thousands and
thousands of Rwandese victims of RPF repression from claiming their
inalienable rights to democratic governance. (…) After two years in
power, RPF has proved that it carries within itself seeds of
self-destruction; the same way the military mighty of the apartheid
regime did not prevent it from collapsing. Like in South Africa, Rwanda
needs a democratically elected government and a truly national
army.’[55]
The RDR accused the USAID of funding an RPF school of military science
and political education, reminiscent of the communist era, at GISHARI
in what used to be MUHAZI commune. Yet such a school has never existed.
USAID was requested to fund more pro-people projects, instead of RPF
‘instruments of coercion and political indoctrination.’[56]
To justify and confirm its readiness to use violence to recapture
power, the RDR evoked genocide or a “deliberate attempt by the RPF to
wipe out part or the whole population of Hutu refugees in Eastern
Zaïre” something that would “ultimately compel the victims to resort to
the use of all available means to resist the RPF regime as a way of
reclaiming their dignity and other legitimate aspirations of any free
human being.”[57]
Towards the end of the year 1996, the successful repatriation of
Rwandese refugees from Tanzania was seen by the RDR as part of a “wide
conspiracy against Hutu refugees”. They renewed their threats saying
this was not the beginning of the end of the crisis, but ‘the beginning
of a new cycle of instability, and eventually a return to square
one.’[58]
Denial and hate
Genocide denial and genocide ideology is the founding doctrine of the
RDR. In the minutes of the meeting which decided to form the RDR, there
was a resolution on what they called the “genocide issue”.
Unambiguously, the founders of the RDR said that “there is no evidence
of the preparation of the genocide on the part of the Rwandan people
and their leaders.” Rather, they emphasize—“it is true that massacres
occurred and that the RPF must mainly be held responsible for the
tragedy that befell Rwanda.”[59]
The RDR denies there are any fugitives from justice among the refugees,
and says that claim to the contrary are “false and dangerous:” the
refugees are simply people who ran away from a country “ruled by the
machine gun and the jail keys.” They are “political opponents” who need
a political dialogue, and hence who “cannot return to their homeland
while the evil political system, which forced them to exile, is still
in place.”[60]
In the Kangura issue N^o 69, of May 1995 Ngeze derisively declared that
it was the RPF which was responsible for genocide. In the typical
manner of genocidaires to blame others for the crime for which they
themselves are responsible, he said it was RPF propaganda which
provoked massacres of the Tutsi.
Ngeze predicted that this RPF propaganda would endure for only two more
years. And then, he asks: “What will the Tutsi do when that time comes
and they realize that the 1994 genocide was prepared by the RPF?” He
even claimed that some Tutsi were already aware of the emptiness of
such a pyrrhic victory.[61]
In this very issue of Kangura, there was also a mention of a document
which was published by the NGO Solidairé-Rwanda in October 1994, giving
a list of alleged sites of RPF massacres and the number of victims, an
RDR appeal to the international community to stop the RPF abuses, and a
warning to the media against being manipulated. It was made public on
April 27, 1995 at Mugunga by Dr. Innocent Butare, the RDR’s Executive
Secretary.[62]
These spirals into the depths of denial are found not only throughout
the RDR’s writings, but also in the writings of their European friends.
The racist description of Tutsis as liars is found in the early RDR
Press releases.
In one such press release are presented accusations such as: “The RPF
has so much benefited from its policy of lying that it has
institutionalised it.” (…) “The RPF has developed in a refined manner
the art of lying.”[63] Thus, the release states: “The international
community has come to consider the aggressed as aggressor and the
aggressor as the aggressed; the main killers who in fact launched the
war in October 1990 are today considered as victims of genocide”.[64]
The same arguments appear, for example, in the writings of the
notorious French genocide denier Pierre Péan and the Spanish
hate-monger Juan Carrero.
It is my firm conviction that genocide scholars analysing the discourse
of the genocidaires and their friends will certainly agree with Alex
Alvarez, who fittingly says: “Invariably, genocide receives much of its
perceived legitimacy from professionals who provide the ideological,
intellectual, scientific, and legal underpinnings for the destruction
of a specific group. Because of their status and visibility certain
professions are very important in legitimating the destructive actions
of their states. Lawyers, doctors, and scientists often justify
genocide by providing “vocabularies of motive” that frame the genocidal
actions in such a way as to make it acceptable and palatable for the
mass of a society.”[65] Alvarez borrowed the term “vocabularies of
motive”, from C. Wright Mills, “Situated Actions and Vocabularies of
Motive,” American Sociological Review 5 (1940)
The genocidaires, and especially the intellectuals who led them, never
admit committing that crime. They know very well that what they do is a
crime punishable by law. That is why they deny it and attribute it to
others.
In June 1996, members of the RDR’s Cameroon branch released a typical
genocide denial statement to validate genocide. The original text,
which was in French, has the title: “Le conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU
Induit en erreur sur Pretendu ‘Genocide Tutsi’ au Rwanda”. The text
used in this book is the English translation by the ICTR, (United
Nations Security Council Misled About the Presumed ‘Tutsi genocide’
Rwanda) as a Prosecution Exhibit tendered in court on October 11, 2006
as Exhibit No P419B in Case No ICTR-98-41-T and also as Exhibit No P161
(E) on 20 February 2007 in Case No ICTR-99-50-T RDR Cameroon Wing.
The signatories of this document were: Col. Theoneste BAGOSORA,[66] Dr.
Ferdinand NAHIMANA, Jean Bosco RARAYAGWIZA, AnatoIe NSENGIYUMVA,
Laurent SEMANZA, Telesphore BIZIMUNGU, Andre NTAGERURA,
Jean-Baptiste BUTERA, Augustin RUZINDANA, Col. Felicien MUBERUKA,
Michel BAKUZAKUNDI[67] and Pasteur MUSABE (+).[68]
This group of thinkers for the RDR is very categorical in denying the
established facts of history. They said “there was neither “Tutsi
genocide” nor any “genocide” at all in Rwanda.”[69]
Thus the use of the word “genocide”, according to these genocidaires,
was born of a campaign “expertly orchestrated by the RPF and its
allies to gain all the sympathy of the international
community in a war they resumed and which they saw as a final
solution.”[70]
Knowing the seriousness of their crime, this RDR group says: “The word
“genocide” gives one the shivers; it immediately arouses widespread
disapproval, and an overwhelming urge for repression. The word
“genocide” warrants prompt, concrete measures that are supposed to
yield visible results against the perpetrators of that “genocide”.[71]
The RDR brings into play the argument of self-defence throughout their
writings. The RDR Cameroun branch made up of ideologues and planners of
genocide, thus accuses the UN Special Rapporteur of not being
conversant with the social, political and historic realities of Rwanda,
and of compiling his report on the basis of information furnished by
persons who were implicated in the conflict. Otherwise, so they say,
“he would have noted that those massacres had always stemmed from
extremism, arrogance and murderous provocation by certain members of
the Tutsi population (…)”.[72]
The RDR Cameroon branch talks about a “wave of inter-ethnic insecurity”
which occurred after an alleged “large scale drafting of Tutsi youth
into the RPF and the attendant systematic insubordination against
established authority”.[73]
They see no falsehood at all, in portraying Tutsi as “bloodthirsty,
power-hungry” and “determined to impose their rule on the people of
Rwanda by means of the gun…” [74]
Therefore, they argue that: “…denouncing the danger constituted by the
Tutsis regaining power by arms should not be tantamount to incitement
to ethnic hatred and violence”.[75] Thus they defend the incendiary
RTLM radio, of which all the authors of the document were shareholders
urging that the RTLM was merely “Denouncing the enemy’s manoeuvres,
boosting the morale of the resistance fighters, and denouncing the
crimes already committed by the RPF.”[76]
The RDR Cameroon branch’s genocide denial is quite similar to that of
their genocidal interim government during the genocide itself. By April
8, 1994, genocide was already underway in many parts of
Rwanda—especially Kigali and many parts in the east.
Many people including anti-genocide members of the previous government
and the president of the Constitutional Court had been killed, and the
systematic slaughter of Tutsis was gathering steam. Genocidal killings
were fully taking place. Yet in a special announcement from the
Ministry of Defence, there was no mention of that situation. It simply
spoke about security being merely “disrupted”, due to “some soldiers
who, because they were angry, escaped from their barracks and attacked
and harmed the population.”[77]
The Ministry did not admit there were massacres. Rather in a veiled
discourse, it announced: “The armed forces once again urge the people
to be vigilant and help them stop the wrongdoers.”[78] In practice,
“stop the wrong doers” meant “kill the Tutsis and those who do not want
to kill the Tutsis”. The Ministry claimed the armed forces were doing
everything possible to protect “those in trouble”, and asked “the
people” to assist the armed forces so that they can “continue to
maintain security.” The announcement concludes with a slogan of the
ultra-extremist Hutu-Power party, the CDR: “Stay alert.”
Similarly, the new “interim government’s” Prime Minister Jean Kambanda
announced in an April 9, 1994 speech that the commitment of his
government was to provide “security for people and property, and
restoring understanding among the people and, “restoring peace and
pacifying Rwandans” over coming weeks. All this would be done “with
only the welfare of the people at heart and not personal or group
interests.”
Rwandans and the friends of Rwanda were reminded by the Prime Minister
of the country’s critical situation, whereby the “contribution of
everyone is necessary so that we can solve the difficult problems.”[79]
Kambanda announced that a top priority of his government was the
“effective management of state affairs, notably by restoring order and
the security of people and property”. Once again, “Rwandans, friends
of Rwanda” were requested to “double their vigilance.”
In practice, alertness and maintenance of vigilance were meant to
convey the message of tracking down the “defined enemy,” i.e. the
Tutsi. Ensuring effective security of the people was a metaphor or
codeword for the extermination of the Tutsi.
The language of denial is part of the process of extermination. In his
April 9, 1994, inaugural speech, interim President Sindikubwabo said
the country needed the “strength of its children.” He thanks and
expresses support to those who acted swiftly after the death of the
president and “did their utmost, as always, to preserve the peace of
Rwandans,” especially in the capital, Kigali.[80] As if the dead and
the dying were none of his business.
What Sindikubwabo said was later echoed by the RDR, in defence of the
Interahamwe: “The noun Interahamwe is used to signify men determined to
walk together, to accomplish good deeds for the benefit of the
country.”[81]The RDR adds that from April 6 to July 1994 the term
Interahamwe meant: “Rwandans opposed to the RPF taking power by
force”.[82]
In mid-May 1994, the President of the Interahamwe, Robert Kajuga, was
interviewed by a French reporter, Jean Helene. He told him that the
massacres of the Tutsi were the results of fate rather than of any
deliberate plan.
Asked if the militia were organised; his answer was: “They are not
organized – no way, no way, no way. You have to see the situation: the
President died, and after three hours, the population really did not
understand what was going on. They saw their neighbours next door who
had guns to kill everyone – well, they just defended themselves.”
[Q] Are you collaborating with the army in this form of civilian
defence?[83]
[A] Hmm. Well, we just exchange advice. Otherwise there are really no
regular contacts with the army. We are just doing our best not to
disturb the army. If the army asks us to leave a spot, we leave it, but
we help the army to defend the country.[84]
Jerome Bicamumpaka, on his May 1994 tour to meet friends of
genocidaires in Europe, told the German TV reporter Beate
Mueller-Blattau that the Rwandans, fleeing to Tanzania at the time,
were Hutu running away from the mostly Tutsis RPF rebels who are taking
revenge for the Hutu army’s massacres of the civilians.
Bicamumpaka spoke about RPF soldiers attacking Rwanda “from the
neighbouring country of Uganda.” During these attacks, he said, they
carried out massacres of the civilian population, because these people
had helped the army when the RPF opened fire.
Still, to avoid admitting genocide was the main preoccupation of his
government, so Bicamumpaka said: “… the rebels had infiltrated their
fighters into private houses, which belonged to people who are
accomplices of the RPF. The Rwandan army then did the following. They
attacked the houses of the RPF-sympathizers in order to get hold of the
rebels. Civilians were killed in the process. Incidentally, those who
were hiding RPF-rebels in Kigali were predominantly Tutsis.”[85]
In a remarkable instruction handbook prepared by the “Rwandan
Government in exile” for those of its members likely face trial for
genocide by the ICTR, the state that: “contrary to what the authorities
in Kigali claim, if there had been a genocide organized by the Hutu, no
Tutsi would have been spared. However, due to the continuous Hutu
extermination, the Tutsi organized a real genocide against the Tutsi
themselves.”[86] They then generalise that “every person who followed
the situation closely” easily realizes that imposing the crime of
genocide on the Hutu, was an RPF ploy to avoid any negotiations with
those they consider “genocidaires…”[87]
This “Rwandan Government in exile” had earlier written and published a
document which was meant for the UN Commission for Human Rights.
Using again a metaphorical language of hate and justification of the
genocide against the Tutsi, the authors urge that: “One should not
forget that the RPF was conceived and created just to kill, it has been
killing in the past, and to-day it continues to kill.”[88]
Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, a genocidaire convicted by the ICTR, and a
member of the RDR, also blames everything on the RPF: “The Planners and
conceivers of the massacres are the RPF and its allies. The executing
mercenaries are the RPF troops, and the foreign mercenaries are the
Ugandans, Tanzanians and Burundians.”[89]
Barayagwiza’s associate in the genocide enterprise and in the RDR, and
also convicted by the ICTR, Ferdinand Nahimana, in a book he published
the same month the RDR was officially born, also denies the genocide,
attributing it to the “war launched by the RPF which culminated in the
killings that followed the assassination of President Habyarimana and
the terrible hostilities which brought the RPF to power after sending
4,000,000 people into exile.”[90] He further says “the RPF itself is
the principal culprit who must not hide behind those it accuses.”[91]
In the same vein, the RDR in their Press Release of December 30, 1996
asked the ICTR to get more involved in the genocide trials then
underway in Rwanda, on the grounds that the RPF had been the “master
planner and architect of the so-called October War which had sowed the
seeds of the massacres”, (…) and because the RPF were a front for
Anglo-Saxons and were denying suspects basic rights of the defence like
the “right to plead in a language of their choice, just to accommodate
English-speaking prosecutors.”[92]
This statement by RDR to deny genocide by justifying it is not hit or
miss. It is a verbal skill found amongst genocidaires and their
friends. The government in exile’s instruction handbook for the accused
at the ICTR says, “It is obvious that the Hutu and Tutsi who were
killed during the violence started by the vile assassination of
president HABYARIMANA, were killed because they were part of the same
diabolical plan of exterminating the Hutu, modestly called “satellites”
of Habyarimana. From then, it is absurd to talk of a genocide committed
by the Hutu against the Tutsi. The Hutu did nothing more, during the
sad events triggered by the RPF, than exercise their right to
self-defence to escape extermination.”[93]
Barayagwiza repeats the same: “With the Tutsi on the other hand,
domination, murders and selective massacres of the Hutu forced the
latter to take measures of self-defense and into reprisals. The Hutus
never elaborated a doctrine aiming at exterminating the Tutsi like the
Nazi. The Hutu reaction stems from pure self-defense and in no
circumstance can it be qualified as an act of genocide.”[94]
Nahimana also justifies genocide when he says that since the death of
Habyarimana was “the main trigger” of what he calls the most “serious”
and most “catastrophic” time for the “Rwandan people”. He comes to a
conclusion that, “The perpetrators of this death are therefore the real
people responsible for the massacres that occurred in Rwanda.[95]
In April 1994, the Minister of Planning in the interim Kambanda
government, Augustin Ngirabatware, went to Gabon to meet President Omar
Bongo, of Gabon. He told a radio reporter, Eugene Lamberne, in
Libreville, that through the “RPF media campaign and that of its
acolytes – the world has received information solely from the RPF
which, we know, is often full of lies.”
He was then asked: “What is your government saying about the
massacres?” The answer was: “The RPF is directly and indirectly
responsible for these massacres. Undeniably, the RPF – probably with
external support – assassinated President Habyarimana. All the other
massacres that followed in Rwanda and the ethnic troubles originated
from the assassination of the president of the republic.”[96]
Just as the 1995 instruction handbook for genocidaires advised them to
deny everything and charge the RPF with the genocide, RDR discourse
commonly portrayed the Kigali government as a genocidal regime.
In 1997 for example, the RDR described the situation in Rwanda as
“increasingly unbearable” and what they asserted as the beginning of
the “long-dreamed RPF hard liners’ policy of ethnic and political
cleansing;” the Kigali government was “busy weeding out prisoners” who
had refused to succumb to its trap of forcing them to plead
guilty.”[97]
The RDR charged the RPF with “rampant genocide” against the Hutu
population,[98] a genocide which they said was “planned and executed”
and demonstrated the “true nature of this criminal regime” which has no
other project than “the extermination of one section of the Rwandan
population.”[99]
Genocide as beneficial
Genocide denial is intended to further deepen the injury to survivors,
to isolate them and to silence them as witnesses. The perpetrators of
the genocide against the Tutsis have thus sought to perpetuate and
reinforce the world’s indifference about their victims.
Accordingly, the above mentioned document prepared by the ideologues
and planners of the genocide who resurfaced as members of RDR Cameroun
branch, noted that genocide was something which “generates instinctive
coalition and sympathy for the victims.” What’s more, they said, in the
case of Rwanda, “the number of victims, and macabre pictures which were
projected on the television screens, and photographs published on cover
pages with captions indicating that the victims were Tutsis, … was
intended to forge a spirit of solidarity with the Tutsis throughout
the world, while whipping up a sentiment of reprobation towards
the Hutus.”[100]
Additionally they charge that the use of the term “genocide” to
designate what they insist on calling “interethnic massacres” was
adopted by the RPF to get sympathy and enlist the assistance of the
international community, and “was exploited to stop the Tutsi criminals
from being bothered by the ICTR”[101]
They regret that because of the use of the word genocide, erstwhile
allies of the interim government “refrained from supporting it” for
fear of being labelled allies of the “genocide perpetrators.”[102]
The RDR Cameroon branch called for the treatment and policy towards the
Hutu refugees in host countries to be reviewed, and demanded that the
expression “genocide of the Tutsi” which was “used as capital by the
RPF”, should be “reconsidered and cease being used to demonize an
entire people.”[103]
The RDR discourse of genocide denial has been assiduously echoed and
supported by their friends and sympathisers in the North. Filip
Reyntjens, a Belgian academic considered to be an expert on Central
Africa, is a Professor of African Law and Politics and Chair of the
Institute of Development Policy and Management, at the University of
Antwerp. Reyntjens is described by his colleague Professor René
Lemarchand as an eminent and reliable analyst of the Rwandan political
scene on the eve of the genocide, and as the most reliable source on
post-genocide developments in Rwanda.[104]
Reyntjens’ main concern since 1994 has been to blame the international
community for not punishing the RPF for human rights abuses, despite
“international condemnations”. His primary sources are himself and
other known friends of Hutu extremism like Serge Desouter, Nick Gordon,
and Stephen Smith.[105]
To support this school of thought against the RPF, Reyntjens invokes a
supposed “conspiracy of silence, induced in part by an international
feeling of guilt over the genocide and a comfortable ‘good guys-bad
guys’ dichotomy.”[106]
He also says that: “The refusal to see the RPF for what it really is, a
banal and tragically violent military dictatorship, is the product of a
severe form of “political correctness,” which the RPF fully exploits by
using the ‘genocide credit’ to hide its own past and current
crimes.”[107]
What Reyntjens expresses is very common among the friends of Hutu
extremism who wish to portray the genocide against the Tutsi as
“manipulation.” One of these friends, who will be discussed at length
later, is Juan Carrero, who says that, “The manipulation of the term
“genocide” by Kigali is simple enough: It is carried out in three
phases. First it has to do with imposing an easily understood way of
looking at things: good guys and bad guys, cowboys and Indians,
assassins and victims, Hutus and Tutsis. For this they have no
hesitation to use the media, exhibiting dead bodies, lies and
half-truths. They play insistently on the emotions of an ignorant
public and also on a good number of ignorant politicians. In the second
phase, the public opinion thus established is consecrated and repeated
until it turns into sacred and untouchable proof. It is convenient to
use big slogans made up of words intended to shock, such as genocide,
mock trials, death squads, revisionism, minimalism, planned
extermination… Anyone who would raise their voice is condemned
beforehand”.[108]
In December 1995, the FAR High Command wrote a 134 page document meant
for the ICTR, about “The war of October 1990 and the tragedy of April
1994. Its title is: “Contribution of FAR to the Search for Truth on the
Rwandan Tragedy.”
Carrero’s arguments mirror those of the FAR perfectly. The FAR writes
that “for the RPF, the ethnic massacres were deliberately termed the
genocide of the Tutsi at the hands of the Hutu in order to mislead
public opinion and cover up the Hutu genocide, which was carefully
prepared by RPF before and during the war and even currently, but about
which the international community remains silent”.[109] The FAR
continues to say the RPF was aware that the Tutsi minority ethnic group
would ultimately be the victims of the RPF war, and set the
international community against the Hutus to justify its attacks: “The
RPF used genocide as a trump card in order to win support from the
international community.”[110]
Carrero argues that the current government of Rwanda uses “genocide” as
an excuse to commit extensive crimes against the Hutu population.
Throughout his work, refers to the beginning of the conflict happening
when the RPF “invaded” Rwanda in 1990, and to the genocide of 1994 as
“events”. He argues that the RPF uses the term genocide as a
self-defence tactic. He even goes as far as to blame the RPF for the
genocide, saying that the RPF knew what would happen to the Tutsis in
Rwanda but saw this as acceptable collateral damage that would allow
the RPF to establish a dictatorship in Rwanda, gain power in the
region, and get better access to the mineral rich Congo (Zaire at the
time).[111]
Carrero often finds support in the writings of Christophe Hakizabera,
who wrongfully claims to be a former member of the RPF, but who fled
Rwanda to join fellow genocide deniers and ideologues in the FDLR.
Hakizabera is someone who urges that: “It is obvious that Kagame needed
a Tutsi bloodbath as a later justification for the planned
extermination of the Hutus and in order to broadcast far and wide the
genocide that has today become an inexhaustible blank cheque for the
legitimisation of his regime.”[112]
Nyarubuye is a well known site in the southeast Rwanda where thousands
of Tutsis were massacred in or around a parish church. As this occurred
was under the leadership of the FAR and the communal administration of
Sylvester Gacumbitsi, who was convicted by the ICTR for, among other
things, his participation in the massacre at that parish church.
Despite this unquestionable truth, for the RDR, “…Nyarubuye is a golden
opportunity to justify [the RPF’s] 4-year guerrilla war, and for the
national and international community to forgive and forget that it took
over power at the expense of more than 1 million citizens
massacred.”[113]
Another aspect of the genocide deniers and genocidaires’ tactic of
dismissing the genocide as a “manipulation” is to also dismiss the
Kigali government’s prosecution of the perpetrators as a political
manoeuvre.
Thus the RDR charges that: ‘it is common knowledge that the RPF
authoritarian regime exploits the 1994 genocide against Tutsis for
political ends.’ Lists of alleged genocide suspects are dismissed as a
political weapon for the current Rwandan government “to silence any
real, potential or imaginary political opponent from the Hutu
community.”[114]
The Union of Rwandese Democratic Forces (UFDR), in their Press Release
N^o January 23, 2000 with a title: “UFDR is convinced that any lasting
solution to the war in the DRC will never end without finding an
acceptable solution to the Rwandese crisis” had a similar message.
They maintained some UN Security Council members had succumbed to the
propaganda of the Kigali government and therefore associate all the
opponents of that regime with genocidaires, and agitate the scarecrow
of “Interahamwe” militiamen and a permanent danger of genocide against
the remaining Tutsis of Rwanda.
The UFDR, an umbrella organisation, whose most influential member was
the RDR, asserts this was a diversionary strategy developed by the
regime in Kigali in order to cover up its countless crimes including a
“rampant genocide against innocent civilian Hutu population, in a
diabolical scheme of achieving numerical parity between the two ethnic
groups.”[115] The press release was signed by Charles Ndereyehe.
In RDR’s Press Release NO. 8/2001 of May15, 2001 with a title: “RDR
CONDEMNS THE EXPLOITATION OF THE 1994 RWANDAN GENOCIDE FOR POLITICAL
ENDS” the RDR “denounces and condemns” what they term “the political
exploitation of the 1994 Rwandan genocide” by General Paul Kagame in
order “to suppress any political opposition to his tyrannical regime or
to justify crimes committed by his militia, the Rwandan Patriotic Army
(RPA), in Rwanda since October 1990 and in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) since August 1996. (…) The genocide of Tutsis is exploited
by the RPF as a political weapon to disqualify any person or political
party (allied or in opposition) contesting its political choices or
leadership.[116]
Notes
_______________________
[1] Calls to the International witch hunting of so called
“intimidators” in Eastern Zaire are misconceived. RDR PRESS RELEASE
Nº106 November 15, 1996
[2] News in Brief, Intego N° 0 (sic!), p. 17
[3] A story by Amiel Nkuriza, Intego n° 1, p. 9 to 11
[4] See: Tom Ndahiro in “After Genocide”
[5] Prosecution Exhibit N^o P191B Tendered on 25 October 2002 in Case
No ICTR-99-52-T. Minutes of MEETING OF 29 MARCH-3 APRIL 1995
[6] Ibid, p.1
[7] Ibid, p.4
[8] Ibid. ICTR Exhibit P191B p.8
[9]Declaration of the High Command of the Rwandan armed forces after
its meeting of 28 to 29 April 1995 in Bukavu (Author’s Archives)
[10] He is one of the people who penetrated or was deployed to work in
the ICTR as defence investigator, and he is one of the “Obnoxious
Petitioners”
[11] See the chapter which talks about Obnoxious Petitioners. He is the
Chairman of La Fédération Internationale des Associations
Rwandaises (The international federation of Rwandan associations).
[12] These objectives appeared in RDR’s PRESS RELEASE No 1.Nairobi,
20^th April 1995
onhttp://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/20_april_1995.html
[13] The document carries the title «SUR LES TRACES DU RASSEMBLEMENT
POUR LE RETOUR DES RÉFUGIÉS ET LA DÉMOCRATIE AU RWANDA»
on www.rdrwanda.org/english/historical_background/
[14] Ibid. ICTR Exhibit P191B p.7
[15] The document is in the author’s archives
[16] In a Declaration of the high Command of the Rwandan Armed Forces
after its meeting of 28 to 29 April 1995, Bukavu, document in author’s
archives.
[17] Editorial: If the Tutsi call us criminals, why are they inciting
us into going to war? By: Hassan Ngeze. Kangura n° 68, April 1995,
pages 1 and 2
[18] Kangura N° 68, April 1995, page 2
[19]Hassan Ngeze, Kangura n° 68, April 1995, pages 9 – 14
[20] Interview with Dr. Joseph Mugenzi: Kangura n° 69, May 1995, pages
9 and 10
[21] The communiqué about the creation of the RDR as well as that of
the FAR expressing their support to the RDR were published by Kangura
from page 13 to 15 as part of RDR’s campaign in Kangura n° 69, May
1995, pages 11 – 15
[22] Voix du Zaire, 27 July 94
[23]AFP news agency, 27 July 94
[24] France Inter Radio, 26 July 94
[25] Ibid.
[26] RDR PRESS RELEASE Nº5 May 10, 1995 Signed by Dr. Innocent BUTARE
Executive Secretary:
Seehttp://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/10_may_1995.html
[27] RDR PRESS RELEASE Nº 6 May 24, 1995.
Seehttp://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/24_may_1995.html
[28] In French Ndereyehe says: “…dans son histoire, le Rwanda n’a
jamais connu de régime dont la cruauté soit comparable à celui que fait
vivre le FPR au peuple rwandais depuis le 1er octobre 1990.” See:
(http://www.rdrwanda.org/francais/publications/forum/Forum_Rwandais_No0
.html)
[29] RDR PRESS RELEASE Nº11of July 1, See: 1995
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/01_July_1995.htm
l
[30] RDR PRESS RELEASE Nº 12 of 10^th July 1995
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/10_July_1995.htm
l
[31] RDR PRESS RELEASE Nº 16 of 19^th, August 1995
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/19_august_1995.h
tml
[32] RDR PRESS RELEASE Nº17 of 24^th August 1995 with a title: The
Rising Anguish of Rwandese Refugees
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/24_August_1995.h
tml
[33] RDR PRESS RELEASE Nº29 of 16^th October, 1995
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/16_OCTOBER_1995.
htm
[34] RDR PRESS RELEASE Nº19 of 28 August 1995
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/28_August_1995.h
tml
[35] RDR PRESS RELEASE Nº8 June 13, 1995
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/13_June_1995.htm
l
[36] Resolutions of the RDR 3^rd Ordinary Congress – Bonn, 17 – 19
August
2000http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/24August1998.htm
l
[37]RDR Memorandum to the Heads of State, heads of Delegations and
Mediators participating in a Regional Conference on the Great Lakes
Region November 21, 1995
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/documents/RDR/Document_21_November_
1995.htm
[38] Viewpoint of RDR on the Cairo Declaration of November 29, 1995-
published on December 31, 1995
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/documents/RDR/Document_31_December_
1995.htm
[39] The Illegitimate and bellicose Kigali government is the main
obstacle to durable peace in the African Great Lakes Region. Press
Release nº 4/2002
[40] The New Phase for General Kagame’s War of Conquest– Press
Release of August 6,
1998 See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/6august1998
.HTML
[41] The Clinton Administration should stop all military assistance to
Rwandan and Ugandan warmonger dictators. Press release signed in
Brussels, August 27, 1998
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/27August1998.htm
l also available onhttp://www.inshuti.org/rdr10.htm
[42] PRESS RELEASE Nº 58 March 19, 1996 THE TUNIS SUMMIT ON SECURITY IN
THE GREAT LAKES REGION MISSED THE POINT ONCE AGAIN.
See: http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/Press_release58
.html
[43] PRESS RELEASE Nº67 April 17,1996
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/Press_release67.
html
[44] RDR Press Release No.6 May 24, 1995
[45] Ibid,
[46] Ibid,
[47] RDR Press Release No. 11, 1 July 1995
[48] Ibid
[49] Ibid
[50] Ibid
[51] The document, simply titled “RDR Political Platform” published in
Paris, on August 23,
1998 is available
on http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/basic_principles/RDR_Political_Platf
orm.PDF
[52] RDR Press Release No. 67, April 17, 1996
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/Press_release67.
html
[53] Ibid.
[54] RDR PRESS RELEASE Nº71 April 26,1996
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/Press_release71.
html
[55] RDR PRESS RELEASE Nº92 September 29, 1996. The ANC Government
Decision to Sell Arms to the RPF Government amounts to add fuel to
fire.
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/Press_release92.
htm
[56] RDR PRESS RELEASE Nº86 September 5, 1996—USAID involvement in
funding an RPF school set up to dispense military science and political
education.
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/Press_release86.
html
[57] RDR PRESS RELEASE Nº108 November 27, 1996
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/Press_release108
.htm
[58] RDR PRESS RELEASE Nº110 December 9, 1996
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/Press_release110
.htm
[59] Ibid. ICTR Exhibit P191B p.8
[60] Press Release No.13/2001 Done in Montreal on 1^st August 2001—RDR
CONDEMNS THE ON-GOING CAMPAIGN AGAINST RWANDAN REFUGEES IN THE AFRICAN
GREAT LAKES REGION
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/RDR_PRESSRELEASE
01082001.htm
[61] Kangura n° 69, May 1995, pages 8 and 9
[62] Kangura N° 69, May 1995, pages 14 and 15
[63] RDR-PRESS RELEASE Nº 6 Mugunga, May 24, 1995
[64] Ibid, RDR-PRESS RELEASE Nº 6
[65]Alex Alvarez, Justifying Genocide: The Role of Professionals in
Legitimizing Mass Killing
first Published in IDEA-A journal of Social issues, December 20, 2001
— Vol.6, no.1 Also readhttp://www.ideajournal.com/articles.php?sup=10
[66] Bagosora, Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Nsengiyumva, and Semanza, have
all been convicted of genocide by the ICTR.
[67] Bakuzakundi Michel, like Nahimana,was a founder member of the CRP
[68] He died in Cameroun and was a young brother of Bagosora.
[69] Ibid, RDR Cameroun 1996 p.36
[70] Ibid, RDR Cameroon June 1996 p.4
[71] Ibid, RDR Cameroon June 1996 p.5
[72] Ibid, RDR Cameroon June 1996 p.7
[73] Ibid, RDR Cameroon 1996 p.8
[74] Ibid, RDR Cameroon 1996 p.11
[75] Ibid, RDR Cameroon 1996 p.11
[76] Ibid, RDR Cameroon 1996 p.29
[77] Radio Rwanda April 8, 1994
[78] Ibid, Radio Rwanda April 8,1994
[79] Radio Rwanda, 9 April 94
[80] Radio Rwanda, 9 April 94
[81] Ibid, RDR Cameroun, 1996 p.31
[82] Ibid, RDR Cameroun, 1996 p.33
[83] It is truly remarkable how easily this French journalist adopted
the “civil defence” codeword for extermination as if it was
conventional.
[84] RFI, May 15, 1994
[85] Ibid,
[86] VADE MECUM DES JUSTICIABLES DU TRIBUNAL INTERNATIONAL POUR LE
RWANDA. (T.I.R) Par le Gouvernement Rwandais en exil, Ministère de la
Justice, Bukavu, Novembre 1995/ Vade Mecum of those to be tried by the
international tribunal for rwanda (ICTR) By the Rwandan Government in
exile, Ministry of Justice, Bukavu, November 1995 (p. 6) [Author’s
archives]
[87] Ibid p. 6
[88]LE PEUPLE RWANDAIS ACCUSE, Bukavu, le 21 septembre 1994/THE RWANDAN
PEOPLE ACCUSES, A document prepared by the Government in exile. Bukavu,
21/09/1994 p.10 Was presented as Prosecution exhibit No P.129 in Case
No. ICTR-99-50-T on August 29, 2006. Also in the author’s archives.
[89]Jean Bosco BARAYAGWIZA, LE SANG HUTU EST-IL ROUGE? Yaounde,
1995. IS HUTU BLOOD RED? (BY Jean Bosco BARAYAGWIZA) (p. 140) Was
presented as defence exhibit in “the Media Trial” No. ICTR-99-52-T on
May 31, 2002 as DEF.EXH.2D35
[90] Ferdinand NAHIMANA, RWANDA. L’ELITE HUTU ACCUSEE/ THE HUTU ELITE
ACCUSED, April 1995. p. 17 was presented as Defence exhibit No ID 103
in Case No. ICTR-99-52-T on May 31, 2006.
[91] Ibid, THE HUTU ELITE ACCUSED… p. 18
[92] RDR-PRESS RELEASE Nº113 December 30,1996
[93] Vade mecum p. 13
[94] Barayagwiza p. 140
[95] Nahimana p.20 The author say: “Not finding those people and not
bringing them to justice would be the wrong step in the search for an
explanation for the events that took place in this country through
judgments delivered by the international tribunal; it would be
discrediting the international community in general and the United
Nations Organization in particular.”
[96] Africa No. 1 Radio, 27 April 94
[97] RDR-PRESS RELEASE Nº 115 January 20, 1997 –Flare-up of killings
and disappearances in Rwanda
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/Press_release115
.htm
[98] RDR-PRESS RELEASE Nr 117 April 24, 1997. RDR WELCOMES A UN
INVESTIGATION INTO THE MASSACRES OF REFUGEES IN ZAIREAN REBEL HELD
TERRITORY.
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/Press_release117
.htm
[99] RDR-PRESS RELEASE Brussels, August 6, 1998—THE NEW PHASE FOR
GENERAL KAGAME’S WAR OF CONQUEST
See: http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/6august1998.HTM
L
[100] Ibid, RDR Cameroun 1996 p. 5
[101] Ibid, RDR Cameroun 1996 p. 36
[102] Ibid,Cameroon Doc. 1996 p.5
[103] Ibid,Cameroon Doc p.37
[104] René Lemarchand, Rwanda: The State of Research (November 2007) in
Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence ISSN 1961-9898 – Edited by Jacques
Semelin Read on http://www.massviolence.org
[105] Filip Reyntjens, RWANDA, TEN YEARS ON: FROM GENOCIDE TO
DICTATORSHIP in Royal African society journal (2004) p.197-198. [S.
Desouter and F. Reyntjens, Rwanda: Les violations des droits de l’homme
par le FPR/APR. Plaidoyer pour une enquête approfondie (Centre for the
Study of the Great Lakes Region of Africa, Antwerp, June 1995); S.
Smith, ‘Rwanda: enquête sur la terreur tutsie’, Libération, 27 February
1996; N. Gordon, ‘Return to Hell’, Sunday Express, 21 April 1996.
(footnote 79)
[106] Ibid, p.198
[107] Reyntjens, Filip (1999) ‘Rwanda: The Conspiracy of
Silence’ www.dayton.edu/~rwanda/ar
[108] Saralegui, J. C. (2002). The Case of the Great Lakes Region.
Paths and Stumbling Blocks to Peace in Africa. Madrid: Conference on
Anthroplogy and Missionary Work., www.inshuti.org
[109] FAR (1995) “Contribution of FAR to the Search for Truth on the
Rwandan Tragedy.” (p.5)
[110]Ibid FAR (1995) (p.17-18)
[111] Saralegui, J. C. (2002). The Case of the Great Lakes Region.
Paths and Stumbling Blocks to Peace in Africa. Madrid: Conference on
Anthroplogy and Missionary Work., www.inshuti.org
[112] Inshuti. (1999, November 19). Letter of Support to the
candidature of Juan Carrero Saralegui for the Nobel Peace prize of the
year 2000. Manresa, Catalonia, Spain., www.inshuti.org
[113]RDR Document, Rwandese crisis: The other side of the story -July
1996
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/documents/RDR/RWACRISIS071996.html
[114] Press Release No.12/2001, Montreal on 23 July 2001—The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) must rise above the
politics
See:http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/RDR_PRESSRELEASE
23072001.htm
[115] UFDR Press Release nº18 Brussels, January 23, 2000
See :http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/URDF/23_january_200
0.htm
[116] See: http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/PRESS_REL
EASE_15052001.htm In the same vein the RDR claims the most of Rwandan
opponents in DRC are ‘survivors of numerous crimes against peace and
humanity, war crimes and genocide committed by the RPA in Rwanda since
October 1990 and in eastern DRC since August 1996. See: RDR-PRESS
RELEASE Nº 6/2002 Done at Montreal on 27 August 2002—DURABLE PEACE IN
CENTRAL AFRICA: STATEMENT ON THE PRETORIA ACCORD
Chapter V: How to wage continued genocide and terrorism
In the last months of 1994, as indicated in earlier chapters, the FAR
was busy planning the future political framework and strategy of the
defeated genocidal regime. Many things had been done as per plan.
Unleashing terror was also part of the strategy which they aimed to
organise and carry out.
On February 21, 1996 Major General Bizimungu, the FAR leader in Zaire,
sent an Information Bulletin (I.B) No. 003/96 of January 15, 1996 to
his two division commanders, Col. Renzaho (North Kivu) and Col.
Ntiwiragabo (South Kivu).[1]The memo accompanying the I.B was copied to
the heads of intelligence and operations.
Bizimungu directed the recipients’ ‘particular attention’ to the points
which concerned urgent terrorist operation inside Rwanda. The army
headquarters and military divisions were required to “quickly attain a
better degree of operation planning and coordination.”
Choice of objectives, he said, “must aim at having a psychological
impact causing panic, especially among the members of the RPF and
expatriates.” They were also required to look for ways and means to
increase the involvement of the civilian population inside Rwanda in
what he called “the struggle”, meaning “economic sabotage,
dissemination of tracts, sensitization, information…” These operations
were to complement other military operations inside Rwanda, which
included locating RPA deployments and encouraging “massive desertions
within the RPA”.
The information in the I.B was thorough to objective, strategies and
actions to be taken. The I.B spoke about increased insecurity in
Rwanda. Thus, terrorist acts armed robbery, petty crime and other
criminal acts.
The I.B reported massive desertions at all levels (civil and military),
laying emphasis on “Important Hutu personalities” who have fled “after
disagreements with some important officials of the Kigali regime” and
on “Tutsi businessmen afraid of another war, which would deprive them
of their business.”
The I.B spoke about “continued field operations” inside Rwanda. During
the last three months of 1995, the operations became “regular and
attained satisfactory results”. It wrote that it was clear that many
“RPA soldiers were not keen on another big war”.
To achieve better results, the I.B reported there was a need to
accelerate infiltrations into the country, to improve technical and
psychological training for the staff infiltrated forces, to plan
operations, to search for material, and to “put in place a permanent
commandment and liaison teams inside the country.”
The I.B featured reports that “some enemy activists have been
physically eliminated.” It also indicates that: “There were some
sabotage activities in some prefectures.” The I.B said that even though
the civilian population was favourable to the RDR cause, they fear the
RPF reprisals, which the I.B said were the reason why “many people flee
the country after sabotage activities.”
What it meant, in other words, is that the RDR and its forces, created
such a flight of people to further justify the claim that the RPF was
unpopular. Within the 1^st Division[2], at the level of operations, the
focus was on “attacking small positions inside the country, placing
mines, destruction of bridges and energy equipment.”
The I.B had reports of how the operations carried out inside Rwanda
“provoked a movement of panic among Kigali authorities and some
businessmen”. The I.B stressed the need to reinforce this movement with
more actions, in a “better planned and coordinated manner,” especially
in the north and south of Rwanda and at the same time, to maximise the
psychological impact.
The I.B called for encouragement to be given to the population in
Rwanda to give false information to the RPF. Another instruction was to
“take advantage” of what they called “the slackening of control”
observed in Mutara and other regions where “many Tutsi live, to cause
insecurity with sabotage actions which have a great psychological
impact in order to cause the population to doubt the RPF capacity to
defend them.”
As far as the use of media for their cause was concerned, the I.B said
that the FAR and the RDR (civilians), “must enhance the press and
propaganda campaign to increase discord within the RPA by pointing out
cases showing distrust toward Hutu soldiers, more particularly those
from the ex-FAR”. It was also pointed out that available information in
their publications such as the Lettre du RDR and INDAMUTSO must be
given to Battalion commanders.
Reflecting on what was happening inside Rwanda, the I.B expressed
concern that the Constitution has been “amended by the Parliament and
English was declared the third language after Kinyarwanda and French”
and “the notion of genocide introduced.”
On the plus side, the I.B reported that Rwanda’s relations with France
were increasingly deteriorating “due to discourteous comments towards
France and its leaders…accused of supporting the genocide.” Also:
“Kigali continues to get on the wrong side of France and made new
enemies in the international community by expelling NGOs (…)”
Politically
In Bizimungu’s I.B, the FAR laid out a political action program and the
division of labour. The RDR (civilians and the military) was instructed
to prevent the RPF from improving their mark in diplomacy and the
press, by multiplying interventions in diplomacy and the media “to
reveal the RPF’s hideous crimes”; to reach out non-aligned countries,
which were or are on the side of the USA; and to get in touch with
countries like France, Egypt as well as “our compatriots who have
access to the UN diplomatic milieu.”
The RDR was instructed to organize press conferences in countries like
France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, and Canada. For countries like the
USA, Italy, Spain, Portugal and England, RDR branches and their
affiliated associations were to be mobilized to be more active.
The RDR was also tasked to create in at least one European country and
Canada, associations for the defence of human rights in Rwanda, aiming
at denouncing “the hideous RPF crimes” and putting pressure on the UN,
the UNHCR, the European Union, the International Tribunal…”
These associations should be composed of both Rwandans and nationals.
Note: This is how organisations like CLIIR, OPJDR, SOS-Rwanda Burundi,
and many more today, came into existence.[3]
The RDR, furthermore, was obligated to identify “(Rwandan) government
personnel, beginning with politico-administrative, judiciary and
financial posts, in order to show the world the RPF’s ethnistic policy
and convince Rwanda donors that it undermines the quality of human
resources and national reconciliation; and to recruit quickly some
Tutsi among the genocide survivors or the returnees who are really
opposed to the RPF’s hegemony and who are ready to denounce it
publicly; and castigate the unconditional support from the UN and other
countries like the US and England to the Rwandan Government.” Note: RDR
Press Releases, since 1995, have followed this line. And Prof.
Reyntjens followed suit.
The military and political wings had to act together in some
assignments. One of those actions was to counteract possible attempts
of Rwanda’s former Prime Minister Twagiramungu and others, who they
thought would have an influence on the refugees.
For this, the RDR had to follow closely political and diplomatic agents
inside and outside Rwanda; and to create a common platform among key
political associations representing the refugees. Another close
collaboration required between the FAR and the RDR was to support and
accelerate the degradation of the situation inside Rwanda.
For this the RDR and the FAR were to “target in all their actions, the
person of Kagame and his politico-military staff, alert Hutu
personalities who are still in the country about the dangers of death
which threaten them and if necessary facilitate their flight;
convincing them that nothing else would prevent the government from
persecuting the Hutu except a military and political defeat; and create
an intelligence network in the country.”
The RDR, I would say, achieved some success, in this regard, especially
in the mission to convince “Hutu personalities” to abandon their posts
in the government and to choose to live in exile. There was such a wave
of departures, especially during the period between mid-1995 and late
1996.
On the side of FAR, their major duty was to “increase insecurity in
Rwanda to enhance the war in diplomacy and the press; targeting vital
points and pro-RPF foreign organizations and intensifying
destabilization acts which could easily be attributable to the RPA, to
break the RPA’s feeling of a definitive victory.”
The FAR was also tasked to continue with the “destruction of all
infrastructures to paralyse towns and centres where the population is
mainly Tutsi;” carry on destabilization in bigger cities like Kigali
and Butare; “identify the NGOs which are remaining in Rwanda and target
enemies among them;” and to target Tutsi senior magistrates to
counteract the control of the Tutsi on the judicial system and to
prevent its functioning as long as Hutu magistrates were marginalized.
On the economy
The FAR, assessed socio-economic situation in Rwanda, as critical,
taking into account the level of agricultural production, purchasing
power, corruption and misappropriation of funds, and the situation of
the “Banques Populaires” network. The adopted policy was to:
- Keep Rwanda in socio-economic crisis or even worsen it.
- Paralyze the economy by damaging electricity, water and
petrol stations;
- Study how to destabilize importations;
- Devise and apply strategies aiming at starving more places
where Tutsi populations are concentrated, mainly Kigali city and other
relevant urban centres.
- Take advantage of financial embezzlements to facilitate
destabilization actions and use corruption to obtain documents and
information; encourage the detainees’ parents and detainees themselves
to resort to corruption for the improvement of detention conditions and
for escape; and
- Encourage the few Hutu who might still have access to Treasury
coffers to practise embezzlement for the common cause; and to steal
money from the “Banques Populaires” where they were operational.
Diplomatically
The FAR affirmatively assessed that the Zairian authorities felt
embarrassed by international pressure to arrest the “intimidators” who
acted to prevent the voluntary return of refugees to Rwanda.
It was therefore recommended for the FAR and the RDR to get around
these challenges:
- Set a calendar for realistic actions to initiate repatriation
in security and dignity before the beginning of the electoral campaign;
- Double efforts to track down infiltrations of enemies in the
camps and the region. For that purpose, they must not only cooperate
with Zairean information services, but also recruit and train
Banyarwanda information services for the Hutu cause throughout the Kivu
region;
- Sensitise the local military authorities to organize patrols
in and around the National Park to control closely the activities of
Ngezayo Foundation;
- Counteract the expansion of Anglophone powers in the region,
by establishing military, political and economic alliances with the
leaders of Francophone countries including Zaire;
- Define and quickly carry out appropriate actions to get
“intimidators” released and to prevent other arrests by mobilizing the
refugees so that they can show solidarity with those who get arrested.
- Follow closely the evolution of the war in Burundi and discuss
and agree with the Burundi rebels under Leonard Nyangoma about mutual
support. The defeat of the Burundian army would be a great asset for
the liberation of Rwanda.
- Encourage the Hutu to be combative and united like the Tutsi
and to carry out sensitization activities.
President Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania was not appreciated by these
genocidaires, because of his re-launching of the East Africa economic
Community to which Rwanda and Burundi could eventually adhere.
The then Tanzanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jakaya Mrisho
Kikwete’s visit to the refugee camps was interpreted as showing the
intention of Tanzania to help the Government of Kigali to solve the
problem of refugees.
The RDR and FAR decided on the creation of networks for RDR
coordinators, providing political training to youth and sensitizing the
refugees about the behaviour to adopt if they return to Rwanda in an
unexpected way.
The FAR instructed the RDR to double efforts to approach the Ugandan
opposition to discuss modalities of collaboration with them. With
regard to Kenya, the FAR assessment was that President MOI was
preoccupied by the improvement of his external image, after tough
international criticism of his declaration castigating the I.C.T.R and
other criticism of his regime by Western human right associations. The
FAR urged that genocide suspects and their lawyers collaborate to
castigate the partiality of the ICTR.
Precise strategies of terror
On March 25, 1996, at Mugunga camp in Goma, the head of FAR Military
intelligence Lt. Col. Juvenal Bahufite sent a memo[4] to the FAR
commander, Major General Bizimungu. The well thought out memo focused
on what should be done to achieve a rapid return to Rwanda.
In his introduction Bahufite said that it was the October 1, 1990 war
against them “by the anti-democratic fascist RPF forces” which brought
about a massive exodus of Rwandans in July 1994. Thus, he said:
“members of a people that deserved much respect were reduced to the
genocide perpetrators of the century, and what used to be called Rwanda
Armed Forces, had been reduced to “F”, Forces. In his view, these were
to be replaced by another force because their government had lost
sovereignty.
To correct past mistakes, Bahufite proposed what he described as
“preliminary activities to the preparation of a rapid return,”
organised within a body called a “coordination cell”. This was to be a
strong cell, in charge of coordinating the activities of the refugees
towards their return and acting as the politico-ideological brain for
the planning and follow-up of those activities. To make it more
cohesive, the cell would be made up of people “objectively chosen” from
among the military and the civilian forces. Civilian members should be
trained to work well with the military, with the purpose of maintaining
discipline within both components.
The essential actions of the cell were to revolve around “insecurity in
Rwanda and the behaviour to be adopted by refugees.” The first
objective was to convince the international community that life in
Rwanda led by the RPF was excruciating.
Concrete actions to create insecurity were to be strengthened. Such
actions, he emphasised: “should target expatriates from countries that
are allies of the RPF such as the United States of America, Canada,
England and Holland—and would have the direct effect of limiting the
expatriate presence in Rwanda and therefore limit investments. Sabotage
actions shall also be intensified in a carefully chosen targeted region
so as to make it accessible to refugees once they are expelled from
host countries. In such a region, “all expatriates without exception
and all the Tutsi and Hutu accomplices of the RPF should feel
threatened to the point they will decide to leave it under the control
of the liberation forces.”
While calling for “reinforcing communication and contacts with the Hutu
inside the country”, Bahufite observed that the ‘Rwandans outside the
country’ were in a better position to lead a struggle against the RPF
than those living inside the country; “the latter are in a better
position to undermine and paralyse the RPF system. Thus, all available
information against the RPF must in one way or the other reach those
inside the country who have espoused the cause of refugees, especially
intellectuals.” This, as said, was to enable refugees to remain united
with their compatriots who have remained inside Rwanda. With the help
of those regular contacts they had, would enable “…to win over the Hutu
against the RPF and its Government.”
Refugees should have well informed representatives in all corners of
the world where there is a Rwandan Hutu. This would allow regular and
easy denunciation of what he called ‘the villainous acts’ of the RPF.
Bahufite predicted that “gradually, refugees will change the
international opinion about the RPF.” Their representatives, he
suggested, “should be aware of the weakness of refugees vis à vis big
countries that are allies of the RPF.”
Instead of confronting those countries, he said, they should multiply
contacts with their populations with a view of getting them to know the
reality about Rwanda. “Such reality should be conceived inside the
coordination cell (indoctrination ideology designed to tarnish the
image of the RPF). It should be noted that even individual contacts
should not be neglected. In that way all the blame shall be imputed to
the RPF and its government.”
The head of intelligence also emphasised that the RDR should find all
means to galvanise various associations that were springing up to
support the cause of the refugees, like (Rwanda Pour Tous, United
Democratic Parties…). Since such associations were looking for members,
he suggested it was necessary to infiltrate them in order to get their
support and be informed about their activities. This, he said, would
allow the RDR to “gain supremacy over all those groups that claim to
represent Rwandan refugees.”
In his view, it was also necessary to form “a working group in charge
of denouncing the bad political activities of some humanitarian NGOs
working in refugee camps and individuals who were determined to force
refugees to go back home.”
These agents, he said, should work in close collaboration with the
various refugee associations in different camps. Bahufite felt it would
be useful to identify ‘Tutsi refugees’ who really support the cause of
the Hutu refugees. “Such people can contribute by declaring that there
are no persons intimidating refugees in camps and that it is the RPF
that is at the origin of Rwanda’s misfortunes by its 1990 attack.”
Finally, he emphasised, it was vital “to collaborate with other Bantu
races of Africa that are threatened by Hamites. (…) the Hutu of Masisi,
the Bantu of Kenya, and Uganda etc.” As much as possible, he said, they
“should envisage uniting the forces and concentrating them in the
successive liberation of the Great Lakes countries under Hamite
domination.”
Evil minds
In the minutes of a military Operations meeting held in Bukavu-Zaire on
April 25, 1996 and chaired by Brigadier General Gratien Kabiligi, who
was the FAR’s second in command, their planned attack on Rwanda
included the “elimination” of genocide survivors. “The adopted
method is to cleanse the countryside to be able to live.
That consists of the physical elimination of any supporters of
the RPF cause (acolytes, sponsors, supporters…)—those who escape
will find refuge in urban centres or in parishes. Ops will lay
landmines and traps; destroy roads and public buildings. The war must
be mobile: attack in urban centres and hide in the countryside. The
principle of cleansing the countryside by eliminating RPF sympathizers
and especially the best-known survivors has been approved. That will
allow our men to settle easily into rural areas and to take action in
small urban centres and against other specific positions.”[5]
Other participants in this meeting were: Lt.Col J. Bosco Ruhorahoza
(Chief of Operations 1^st Division); Capt. J. C. Ntirugiribambe (chief
of Military Intelligence 1^st Division); Maj. Léopold Majyambere
(Officer in the department of Operations in the 1^st Division); Lt.
Juvénal Malizamunda (Off Operations 1^st Div & Secretary to the
meeting); Maj. Alexis Rwabukwisi (Commander of 13^th Brigade); Capt.
Elie Nsanzabera (Commander of 136^th Battalion); Lt. Frédéric
Baziruwiha (Commander of 134^th Battalion); Lt. Turatsinze Victor
(Commander of Kagoma Battalion); Lt. Damien Maniraguha (Commander of
Vautour Battalion); Capt. Gérase Harelimana (Commander of 132
Battalion); Lt. Joseph Habyarimana (Commander of 133^rd Battalion);
Lt. Ndangamira (Off 13^th Brigade).
On August 14, 1996, General Bizimungu issued a decree which was sent
to Célestin MONGA (The alias of Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho) and César
KAMATE (the alias of Col. Ntiwiragabo) and copied to John SIMBA (the
alias of Dr. Innocent Butare), the RDR’s Secretary General[6]
The decree says: “Long before Kigali feared a resumption of the war
even without any serious hints, the intensification of the activities
following the declarations of PALIR pushed the people in power to
deploy a large military-political anti-guerrilla campaign. The way the
campaign was led shows the enemy is haunted by war, and is determined
to reduce the resistance of the friendly population, … Therefore, we
face a dilemma of either continuing and intensifying our activities to
destroy the economic fabric and undermine the enemy’s morale, or
suspending them while awaiting the availability of means enabling us to
protect the population. The chosen option was to continue the
activities, while ameliorating the political education of the
population to convince them to accept the worst sacrifices.”
Bizimungu’s instructions in this decree are highly interesting: In
order to protect “the population and maintain their fighting spirit”,
he laid out the following objectives and activities for the pursuit of
their struggle:
- Suspend the operations in the regions actually targeted by
the enemy and move them to non-affected zones.
- Develop radio propaganda aimed at denouncing the activities
of the enemy against the population.
- Forge relationships with human rights organizations and
supply them regularly with detailed and precise reports.
- Increase the involvement of Officers and Non-Commissioned
Officers in field operations.
Bizimungu listed the following tasks to better destroy the morale of
the Kigali government and undermine Rwandan economy:
- Eliminate politicians (ministers, members of parliament…),
enemy high-ranking civil and military officers (officers, especially
higher ones, central administration, local administration and
parastatal administrators);
- Maintain a campaign of intimidation supported by terrorist
acts forcing the enemy population to leave rural areas for urban
centres or for the MUTARA area;
- Harass the enemy population in settlement sites;
- Maintain the fear of poisoning among the Tutsi;
- Recruit political leaders among the friendly population and
train them in the dissemination of war propaganda ;
- Eliminate any isolated military staff;
- Intensify the harassment of weakly defended positions;
- Recruit RPA Hutu soldiers and incite them to persuade their
fellow Hutus to disassociate themselves from the enemy, to carry out
activities that will be attributed to the RPA, to protect the friendly
population, and to provide operational information and supply them with
military equipment;
- Carry out hold-up operations in banks with the help of
friendly agents to ensure escape and concealment inside the country;
- Eliminate or extort enemy business people in important
trading centres;
- Train the friendly population in selling dear to the enemy
and refusing them agricultural manpower;
- Train the friendly population to not buy enemy products;
- Target persons occupying Hutu property illegally to
terrorise them and eventually eliminate them;
- Train the friendly population to destroy enemy goods and
property (houses, vehicles, crops, plantations, cattle…)
- Continue sabotaging electrical installations and if possible
attack transformers;
- Set stations, warehouses and factories on fire;
- Destroy communication lines, bridges and main roads,
telephone exchange centres, telecommunication relay antennas;
- Attack enemy[7] and especially State-owned large goods
transport vehicles;
In his conclusion Gen. Bizimungu said: “We must especially develop a
media and psychological campaign through the training and setting up of
a pool of propaganda experts inside the country and if possible with
the support of radio broadcasts. We must now start the training of the
first network of propaganda staff.”
Notes
_______________________
[1] This section is, largely based on this document, which is in the
Author’s Archives.
[2] The FAR in Zaire had two military divisions. One in North Kivu
under the command of Col. Tharcisse Renzaho, and another in the south
Kivu under the command of Col. Aloys Ntiwiragabo.
[3] For instance the appearance and intensification of CLIIR’s
propaganda date from May 1996.
[4] The content of this section is based on this hand written document
which is in the author’s archives
[5] The document is available in the Author’s Archive)
[6] ROR No. 001/96 Decree of July 31, 1996, Bulengo, 14th August, 1996.
Signed by Kamanda Yves an alias of name Gen. Augustin Bizimungu.
Document in author’s archives.
[7] Note: In the above text Enemy=Tutsi
Chapter VI: When racial hatred is fashionable
Social psychologist Gordon Allport, says: “Race is a fashionable focus
for the propaganda of alarmists and demagogues. It is the favourite
bogey used by those who have something to gain, or who themselves are
suffering from some nameless dread. Racists seem to be people who, out
of their own anxieties have manufactured the demon of race.”[1]
Allport said people like Adolf Hitler and other demagogues find racism
useful in distracting people from their own troubles and providing them
with an easy scapegoat. He says demagogues who wish to unite their
followers ordinarily conjure up some “common enemy” and an “enemy race”
being vague, becomes easily serviceable.[2]
This belief underlies a great deal of the incessant and brutal violence
that has gripped the Great Lakes Region of Africa for the last two
decades.
Many civil society groups and European donors have been at the
forefront of peace-building efforts. But even as they have urgently
sought to address various causes of strife such as poverty and the
dearth of democratic authority and the Rule of Law, they have retained
a curious blind-spot when it comes to honestly addressing the Africa’s
Great Lakes Region’s history of racialised political rivalry. Whether
the violence is termed as arising from ethnic or racial divides, its
common characteristic is the idea that the Tutsi are a people apart
whose very nature impels them to always look to resurrect the so-called
‘Hima-Tutsi Empire’.
The Tutsi are as “Bantu” as their fellow Hutu Rwandans. In their late
twentieth century form, the Tutsis and Hutu identities in Rwanda are
largely an invention of colonial misapprehensions and manipulations.
This is too often ignored. On one side of the mythically racist
ideological divide—stand the Tutsi with their unending dream of empire,
and on the other are the ‘indigenous Bantu’ who are called to resist
and guard their liberty.
This racist vision was the essential basis of the 1994 genocide. And,
it is a construction that leads to Mahmood Mamdani’s famous phrase
‘when victims become killers.’ And its latest manifestation is in
Marie Beatrice Umutesi’s ‘Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a
Rwandan Refugee in Zaire’.[3]
Umutesi’s book was first published in French—‘Fuir ou Mourir au Zaire’—
by L’Harmattan in the year 2000 and has since been published in six
languages. It comes recommended in an English and French foreword by
Catherine Newbury, a well regarded American historian of the Great
Lakes, who asks us to look to it as a reliable source of knowledge of
what happened in the violent conflicts in Rwanda and the former Zaire.
The author’s activism in civil society begins in Rwanda and continues
in Zaire where she lived, as a refugee, from July 1994 to early 1998.
In these camps were NGOs who assumed leadership of the gathered
thousands on the basis of their superior organisation and resources
(often sourced from Western donors).
Much has been written about the camps in Zaire and the morally fraught
issue of how many thousands of their inhabitants were not only killers
during the genocide but had been leading figures in its organisation.
Since the Interahamwe – as the killer militias were popularly dubbed –
in the camps were armed and were determined to continue their genocidal
campaign, the many humanitarian organisations present were forced to
work with them if they were going to succeed in delivering aid.
The Interahamwe and the ex-Rwandan military (the FAR) not only wielded
their machetes and guns to control the camps, but also came to dominate
a group of NGOs that associated under an umbrella known as the
Collective. Thus were humanitarianism and genocidaire ideology
co-joined in the camps of Eastern Zaire in 1994.
Umutesi takes a different view, arguing that the Rwandan NGOs took the
lead in the refugee camps because they had not taken part in the
genocide or in the massacres that followed during attacks into Rwanda.
They were therefore, according to her, “well placed to provide better
information than that disseminated either by the sources close to the
new government in Kigali or by those close to the old regime of Jean
Kambanda” (Umutesi p. 73).
They were for her, a neutral, even objective alternative to the new
government and the genocidaires. Yet she was present in the camps and
cannot possibly have missed the levels of control that the Interahamwe
and the FAR had over their running. Indeed a wide literature
demonstrating this exists today, as shall be presented in this book.
A leading aim of the perpetrators of the genocide, during and after
committing this crime, was to muddy the waters when it came to its
apprehension as a genocide by the international community.
In line with this, Umutesi describes the Collective with its ‘European
partners’ as early as August 1994 organising seminars whose aim was to
show that it was complicated to understand the genocide of Tutsi—which
was in fact still continuing, especially in areas under the French
Operation Turquoise. “There are not simply victims on one side (Tutsi)
and guilty (Hutu) on the other as well as we have been led to believe,”
she writes, thus opening the door to the genocide denial or the Double
Genocide thesis that was to follow (Umutesi p. 73).
These seminars could scarcely have taken place without access to
funding from Western agencies, which may not have been aware that in
providing funds they were becoming complicit in a genocidaire
campaign. Several times in the book, NGOs like Jesuit Refugee Service
(JRS), Caritas and Rapporteur Sans Frontiers (RSF) are mentioned as
good of partners of the Collective.
As the FAR and the Interahamwe militias were carrying out incursions
into Rwanda to continue the genocide and try to regain power, the
Collective was on a propaganda offensive: it “decided to review its
strategies and focus all its energies on return and to that end,
organised meetings in all the camps,… discussions about return … and
sensitizing the international opinion on the issue of return for the
refugees.” (Umutesi p. 94-95)
The aim of this education campaign however, extended beyond influencing
the views of the powerful members of the international community. It
was aimed at the hundreds of thousands of camp inhabitants as well. In
this way, it was an extension of the Hutu Power propaganda of Kangura
newspaper and RTLM radio that led up to the genocide. It resisted the
new Rwanda government’s appeal for the refugees to return to their
homes, arguing that the refugees should be allowed to ‘decide for
themselves on the most opportune time to go’, and telling the refugees
that it was ‘possible to fight effectively against dictatorial and
criminal powers [read the RPF], without resorting to the same weapons
they used.’ (Umutesi p.96)
The success of this campaign was dependent on its ability to gain
resources from European bodies and to recruit them to sway public
opinion and put pressure on Kigali (Umutesi p.97).
These activities, as has been mentioned, were meant to complement
Interahamwe military operations and were dubbed by their practitioners
as “active non-violence,” bastardising the freedom struggles of Gandhi
in India and Martin Luther King in the United States. This cynical
scheme led to the arrest of the head of the Collective, Cyprien
Ndagijimana, by the Zairean Security Services at Bukavu in February
1996.
According to Umutesi, arrested alongside Ndagijimana was ‘another
trainer who was a Belgian and who was working in the camps at Goma on a
project dedicated to peace and reconciliation’ (Ibid, p.99). From
various reliable sources, this Belgian (whose name the author
conceals), is Jean Pierre Godding.
The author, throughout her book, presents herself as an active and
important member of a “Collective” of civil society, and as a devout
Christian. To appeal to or manipulate Christians’ sentiments, Umutesi
poses as a deeply religious person. She claims to have survived a long
journey in the forests of Zaire, on the go far away from Rwanda,
because of her “unshakeable faith in God” (Umutesi p.203).
As if she was an arbiter of people’s faith, she writes that she was
pleased that her Zairean host named ‘Ya Pepe’— one she found at a place
called Batsina—was a good “Christian in the True sense of the word”
(Umutesi p. 205). Again as the good Christian she claims to be, she
recounts how she left Bukavu ‘with a Bible’, got a rosary somewhere in
Irangi, and consequently ‘read the Bible, or recited the rosary’ when
she felt ‘ready to crack’.
Umutesi maintains she was able to learn religious songs, and ‘felt
restored’ after praying. Due to her self-proclaimed piety, she says she
“was able to bear the daily humiliation, deprivation, sickness and
misery better.” (Umutesi p. 214)
Praising Bigotry
Catharine Newbury characterises Umutesi’s story as “simple honesty and
a non-manipulative presentation.” But this historian’s reasoning is
difficult to square with a book that seeks to justify genocide and give
credence to the ‘double genocide’ theory, which is quite simply an
obscene attempt to deny the actual genocide.
Umutesi is a purposeful believer in colonial era racialism which
differentiated the Tutsis as ones who are “tall, slender and have
refined features,” while the Hutu are “of medium build with Negroid
features.” (Umutesi p. 6)
From this quick historicising of Rwanda’s divide, Umutesi moves to the
roadblocks of 1994. Here, “Hutu with refined features were killed at
the roadblocks, whereas Tutsi with Hutu features remained safe.”
(Umutesi p.7) Her own mother, a Hutu, is one example she gives who had
“Tutsi features” and was threatened with death several times, “even
though her identity card was completely in order.”(Id.)
The argument of an identity card being in order or not is a discussion
killers had at roadblocks while their terrified prey awaited the
verdict whether they would be murdered or allowed to live. The issue
was whether the identity card said “Hutu” or “Tutsi”. This reflected
nothing as much as an idea of Hutu purity, racial purity in the best
early twentieth century spirit. The Tutsi had been defined as enemies,
by the army loved and trusted by Umutesi.
In a letter dated 21 September 1992, the Army Commander, Colonel
Deogratias Nsabimana, had circulated a document prepared and signed by
a committee of ten officers giving a “contemporary” definition of the
term enemy. According to this document that was intended for the widest
possible dissemination, the enemy fell into two categories, namely,
“the primary enemy” and the “enemy supporter.”
The primary enemy was defined as “the extremist Tutsi within the
country or abroad who are nostalgic for power and who have never
acknowledged and still do not acknowledge the realities of the Social
Revolution of 1959, and who wish to regain power in RWANDA by all
possible means, including the use of weapons.”
The document made it clear that the “primary enemy” supporter was
“anyone who lent support in whatever form to the primary enemy.” It
also stated that the primary enemy and their supporters came mostly
from social groups comprising, in particular, “Tutsi refugees”, “Tutsi
within the country”, “Hutus dissatisfied with the current regime”,
“Foreigners married to Tutsi women” and the “Nilotic-hamitic” tribes in
the region.”
This identification of “primary enemy” and “enemy supporter”, led to
yet another way of categorizing an individual as a Tutsi. This time the
Interahamwe militia were to decide. As Prof. William Schabas says
without a shadow of doubt, “In Rwanda, the Belgian colonizers had
defined ethnic Tutsis as those possessing a certain number of cattle.
The determinations were made (…), then inscribed on identity cards, and
passed from parents to children according to customary rules. In 1994,
individuals were Tutsis if the Interahamwe militia said they were.”[4]
Many ordinary persons, including Umutesi, accepted the army’s
definition of the enemy. A prosecution witness, who confessed his
participation in the genocide, told the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) that they killed Tutsis because it was ‘a period of
war’ and that they were fighting against the Tutsi who were their
‘enemies.’ “We were fighting the Tutsi and also their accomplices.
Civilians were the ones targeted but even Tutsi soldiers were killed,”
he said.[5]
Umutesi writes of her ‘true identity’ being questioned in Belgium
(Umutesi p. 15) and says “it often happened that I was taken for a
Tutsi’ (Ibid p. 19). She says, “I could not wear a chignon, which made
me look like a Tutsi.” She says that militia in Kibuye exclaimed when
they saw her: ‘Look, a Tutsi woman’ (Ibid p. 67)
In October 1990, when the government arrested thousands of Tutsis
wrongly accused of being accomplices of the enemy, Umutesi suspected
she risked also being apprehended if state spies found in her
possession a ‘compromising’ photo of former Burkina Faso president,
Thomas Sankara because ‘they said he resembled the head of the rebel
Tutsi, General Fred Rwigema.’ (Umutesi p. 21) Umutesi writes, about her
friend “who looked like a Tutsi” (Ibid p. 53).
She describes a friend’s son who was allegedly threatened with death
because killers ‘took him for a rebel’. She writes, ‘With his tall
stature, his refined features, and his dark skin, he had all the
characteristics of a Tutsi. He was saved by his sister, who looked
like a Hutu.’ (Ibid p.60)
Umutesi is steeped in this view of racial essentialism: the Tutsis look
a certain way and their political being is an extension of their
biological or genetic characteristics. Even the very Tutsi name is
enough to cloud her sky. She Claims to have had a sense of insecurity
in the camp of INERA where she stayed in Bukavu, because she “was
called Umutesi, a name normally associated with Tutsi” (Ibid p.75). Her
fear emanated from the fact that there was widespread lynching in the
camp, and it was enough for you to be killed if someone shouted at you
as ‘RPF’. (Ibid p. 80)
Personally, Umutesi says that she ‘was considered to be ‘pro-RPF’
because, among other things, she ‘looked like a Tutsi and had a Tutsi
name’ (Ibid p.81). Here it should be noted, ethnicity and political
organization are confounded as one and the same. It is not a new
phenomenon but a pattern that existed before and during the genocide
whereby hate propagandists used the words enemy, accomplice, the RPF,
Tutsi and cockroach interchangeably. Umutesi does not wonder why no one
took her for a European or American for having a compound name
Marie-Beatrice, which is certainly a non-African name!
Umutesi knew that being ‘pro-RPF’ meant having an ‘anti-genocide
tendency’, a concept that existed before the death of Habyarimana. In
Yaounde Cameroun, Colonel Théoneste BAGOSORA wrote a paper dated
October 30 1995, “L’assassinat du Président Habyarimana ou
l’ultime operation du Tutsi pour sa reconquête du pouvoir par
la force au Rwanda.” (President Habyarimana’s Assassination or The
Final Tutsi Operation to Regain Power in Rwanda Using
Force).[6]
He wrote the paper to provide what he believes was “information to
help Hutus reflect on and try to understand their past mistakes,
assess their potential strengths and together devise a strategy to
quickly help their people out of their current
devastation”[7] Explicitly, Bagosora says: The “Power” factions joined
the President’s side while the others joined the RPF side. The
polarisation he emphasised was thus manifest at all levels and in all
segments of society. In other words, he said, there was already an open
conflict between the Tutsis and their collaborators on one hand, and
the Hutus on the other— “the Tutsis’ aim being to regain absolute
power, while the Hutus wanted to share it democratically”.[8]
Here are the demarcating concepts which are emphasised by Bagosora. The
“President’s side”, as articulated in this paper, was the MRND and CDR
groups which planned and implemented the genocide. On the other side
were “Tutsi and their collaborators,” a side which Umutesi did not wish
to belong.
Examples, by name, of who belonged to either of the two opposing sides
are in a document “United Nations Security Council misled about the
‘presumed’ Rwanda genocide.”[9]
This document was prepared by the RDR-Cameroon Branch, including
Bagosora, and other genocidaires, the majority of whom have been
convicted by the ICTR. In this document, for instance, politicians who
were members of the Coalition Government which existed up to April 6,
1994,[10] but who were killed on the April 7, 1994 by the “president’s
side”, also called “anti-RPF”, are described as “pro-RPF.”
They include Prime Minister Agatha Uwilingiyimana, Ministers Frederic
Nzamurambaho, Ndasingwa Landouald, and Faustin Rucogoza. Umutesi, in
her book, brought to light another crucial element which explains why
the genocidaires wish to say there was double genocide. She wrote: “It
was enough for a neighbour or an enemy to insinuate that one harboured
Tutsi to have a whole brigade of militia on the doorstep. You were
never sure how the search would end up. Many were killed, not because
were sheltering Tutsi, but because they had valuable possession or
money that the militia wanted to take for themselves. In order not to
be apprehended after the return of law and order, they would kill the
entire household.” (Umutesi p.61)
This makes it sound like Umutesi admits that the double genocide thesis
is meant to cover up Hutu extremists crimes. What she meant, that is
very true, is that there are so many Hutu who were killed by the Hutu
militia, but someone else—the RPF for that matter had to carry the
blame.
Umutesi is extremely fixated with fallacious identities she firmly
believes in—as a Hutu. She does not explain in her book, why she felt
“astonished that a southern Tutsi had married a Northern Hutu.” (Ibid
p. 61) The Tutsi was a man who married a Hutu woman; their entire
family, as Umutesi writes, was killed.
The hate dogma spread by the post-independence Rwandan governments and
intellectuals—through the media, ‘definitions of the enemy’, and
inciting speeches—not only claimed more than a million human lives but
also changed the national identity. According to the London based
organization, African Rights, which has done tremendous work on Rwanda,
the aim of the Hutu extremists went beyond the physical extermination
of every Rwandan Tutsi. “The aim was to transform the collective
identity of the Hutu, by eradicating the moderate Hutu leaders, and all
Hutus who tried to protect their Tutsi friends, neighbours and family
members… more radical was the creation of a nation of people complicit
in the genocidal killing; they wanted everyone to be tainted with the
blood of those who died.”[11]
This was in accordance with The Tenth Hutu Commandment, as published in
Kangura: “The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961, and
the Hutu Ideology, must be taught to every Muhutu at every level.
Every Hutu must spread this ideology widely. Any Muhutu who persecutes
his brother Muhutu for having read, spread and taught this ideology is
a traitor.”[12] From what the author says, the tenth ‘Hutu commandment’
was very much observed.
Umutesi describes another character in her book, named Serge, who was
‘suspected of being Munyamulenge’ by the militias in the camps (whom
she christens ‘youth in charge of security’). She confirms these qualms
by saying: ‘It is true that Serge resembled a Tutsi’ (Ibid p. 110).
Again, there is a story about an armed thug who spared Umutesi’s life
after verifying she was Hutu (Ibid p. 135) and also about a girlfriend,
Assumpta who “looked like a Tutsi,” and “escaped death countless times”
(Ibid p. 140). The story of Assumpta is associated with people who
brought an old Tutsi woman and ordered Assumpta to kill with her own
hands “as proof of her truthfulness and ethnic identity.” Umutesi does
not say whether Assumpta obeyed or not.
Umutesi’s racial slants are evident in other ways as well. She writes
about the advent of multiparty politics in early 1990’s, acknowledging
that socially and economically the Hutu and Tutsi were not different
(Ibid p.36). Although she recognises that Tutsi were discriminated
against by laws and regulations, she does not see any need for a
change.
For instance, regarding education policies she thought the Liberal
Party’s (PL) approach was superficial: “They rightly questioned the
system of access to secondary and higher education, which was based on
ethnic quotas, but instead proposed a system based on test results. I
thought this reflected the idea of Tutsi intellectual superiority that
was still held by certain Tutsi extremists.” (Ibid p. 36)
In this presentation, ‘they’ was initially supposed to mean the PL, but
later metamorphoses to mean an inimical ethnic group. What is initially
rightful questioning suddenly becomes a negative idea, held and
advocated by bad elements Umutesi dubs “Tutsi extremists.”
From discussions in political rallies, which I personally followed on
Radio Rwanda in 1991-93, people were not happy with the quota system
because access to secondary school education was not based on merit and
promoted mediocrity. It was a system that was not unfavourable to the
Tutsis only, but since the idea of changing it was from a party which
was seen to be “concerned with the Tutsi”; (Ibid p. 37) her suspicion
remained.
She includes in her book horrendous stereotypes, for which she doesn’t
quote sources. She writes for example: “Virginie and her cousins could
not walk around openly, because the peasants in this part of the
country, which was far from the urban centres, were not used to seeing
young women in pants, shorts, miniskirts, or braided hair. For these
peasants, a young girl who dressed that way had to be Tutsi. According
to them, young Hutu girls, were well brought up (not) to dress like
whores.” (Ibid p. 141)
Umutesi’s historiography is typical of that spread by hate propaganda
before and during the genocide. She brings into play the language of
mass murder masquerading as the language of liberty and justice. The
Tutsis are portrayed as a people beholden to an ancient wickedness that
must ever be fought since they aim perpetually, in the absence of
resistance, to build their (racial) empire.
The 1959 Hutu Revolution, she argues, was to get rid of feudal Tutsi
power, based on ‘servitude, exclusion and contempt…’ Umutesi adds
force to this erroneous assertion as she goes on to paint a parody of
the ancient regime: “Every Hutu owed allegiance to a Tutsi and had to
perform duties that were rendered without payment. A Tutsi could even
throw a Hutu out of his own home and occupy it himself.”(Ibid p.7)
On the 22^nd November 1992, Dr. Leon Mugesera, made a speech in which
he was equally clear on the targeted group in the 1994 genocide. He
publicly urged the Hutu to destroy the Tutsi and return them to their
(mythical) ancestral home in Ethiopia “via the short cut of the
Nyabarongo River”, which feeds into the rivers of the Nile watershed.
Not only did he agree with the army headquarters’ definition of “the
enemies,” but also agreed with the colonial racial theory. Killing the
“people in question, and dumping the bodies in the river—were a usual
practice in past massacres of Tutsi.”[13]
In that speech, Mugesera, a PhD graduate from Canada, who worked with
the ruling party MRND and the Ministry for the Family and Promotion of
Women, mobilized the business community “to finance operations aiming
to eliminate the (Tutsi) people. And, he remarked, “…the fatal error of
1959…was in letting them get away.” He sounded like the Nazi Marshal
von Rundstedt who regretted that one of the “great mistakes of 1918,
was to spare the civil life of the enemy countries.” The aim of this
annihilator was “to always keep the number of Germans, at least double
the numbers of the peoples of the contiguous countries!”
The wickedness of the Tutsi in Umutesi’s book appears in multiple
forms. They are portrayed as so power hungry that the victims of
genocide are defined as “collateral damage” for a cold-blooded RPF.
This idea is very salient in the ideology of the genocidaires.
In many speeches and publications which were made or written by the
regime which planned the genocide against Tutsis, the issue of power
and empire building is emphasised. The genocidaires charge that the
real reason the RPF took up arms to fight the regime of President
Juvenal Habyarimana was to take back the power the majority had taken
from the Tutsi in 1959. The limits of this power are not the borders of
Rwanda, but an empire to cover several countries in the region.
So driven by a lust for empire was the RPF, Umutesi writes, that their
war against the Habyarimana regime was in effect a ‘cold blooded
decision to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of Tutsis living in
Rwanda.’ (Umutesi p. 47) Evidence of this is that ‘an attack by the
refugee Tutsi inexorably led to massacres of Tutsi in the interior’, so
that the attack by the RPF in October 1990 ‘risked the lives of
thousands of innocent civilians’ leading her to ascribe to the RPF the
view that ‘life isn’t worth much when power is at stake.’ (Ibid p.19)
The above idea is not new with the genocidaires of 1994 and beyond.
Colonel Bagosora upheld this justification of genocide earlier than
Umutesi when he said: “It should be noted that each time, the Tutsis
inside the country were the victims of reprisals on the part of the
Hutus; the RPF thus seriously jeopardised the security of their
brothers”. Bagosora also makes use of President Grégoire Kayibanda’s
apocalyptic message to the Rwandan emigrants or refugees abroad, March
11, 1964.
Indeed, in 1964, President Grégoire Kayibanda issued the
following warning to Tutsi: “Some of you (…) through terrorist
activities organized from outside the country (…) disturb your
brothers who are living in peace in our democratic country
of Rwanda. (…) Assuming you managed to blast your way into
Kigali, just imagine the chaos of which you would be the
first victims. (…) That would be the definitive, abrupt end of the
Tutsi race.”[14]
The assassination of Presidents Habyarimana of Rwanda and Ntaryamira of
Burundi, according to Bagosora, “must be viewed as the ultimate
provocation, which exposed all those …namely the Tutsis and the Hutu
RPF collaborators.”[15]
Bagosora at that point goes further to say: “Habyarimana’s
assassination was therefore to be the RPF’s ultimate operation
in its bid to return to power, but its strategists either
made the serious miscalculation as regards the consequences of
such a decision or must have disregarded the price thereof,
which was obviously too high in comparison with the expected
benefits. In the latter scenario, still driven by their pride and
immoderate thirst for power, the Tutsi extremists decided to
cold-bloodedly expose their brothers to reprisals, in order to
make good their plan and thus justify resumption of the war
and the ensuing massacre of the Hutus. Nevertheless, aware of the
potentially disastrous consequences of the President’s assassination
on their relations with the Hutu majority and even with
their brothers who were thus imperilled, the RPF strategists
had to resort to all possible means to minimise such
consequence.”[16] (Need to chip in Mutsinzi report and the role of
Bagosora in the assassination of Habyarimana)
With the head of state dead, Umutesi writes, “there was bound to be
war. The reprisals would be horrific. Ethnic disturbances which were
sure to follow would be the excuse for the RPF to resume
hostilities.”(Umutesi p. 45) When the genocide begins, it is for her a
mere “settling of accounts” (Ibid p.47).
Even the massacre of Tutsi at Gahanga parish, a Kigali suburb, which
she claims to have witnessed, is presented as a battle between Hutu
militia and “Tutsi combatants” where the latter “could not resist for
long.”(Ibid p. 51) This is war and not genocide, Umutesi is claiming; a
sadly common ploy by genocide deniers throughout history.
There are also telling silences in Umutesi’s book. Her long stay in
Kigali during the genocide is fuzzy, the descriptions of what she is
supposed to have observed first hand lack the breadth and vividness
that are the staple in other books by witnesses. She travels from
Kigali to Gitarama and there is nary a mention of the roadblocks and
the dead and dying who were littered along the way.
Reaching Gitarama, the temporary seat of the deposed government,
Umutesi writes as the head of a developmental NGO. All the better she
seems to wrap herself up in the robes of objectivity. She and her
companions are overcome by the extent of the tragedy: “in addition to
the Tutsi genocide which was happening before our eyes, the rebels
undertook widespread killings of the civilian Hutu population in the
zones they occupied.” They begin to “denounce the massacres of the Hutu
and Tutsi…” (Umutesi p. 62)
By these devices of commission and omission, Umutesi ascends – or shall
we say descends – into the ranks of the genocide’s intellectual
deniers. At Gitarama, she continues to link genocide and war. She
observes, ‘The will to totally exterminate the Tutsi grew with the
approach of the rebels. The Tutsi who had been spared in one
neighbourhood or another because their neighbours didn’t have anything
against them were killed when rebel shells began to fall. It is human
nature to see enemies everywhere and think that the only way to stay
alive is to kill them.’ (Umutesi p.64)
Referring to the mass flight to Zaire in early July 1994, she writes
about what was churned out of their rumour mills in the camps: “Rumours
ran rampant that the rebels were going to block all the accessible
borders and prevent the Hutu from escaping to Zaire.
We were reminded that at Byumba they were already telling people that
they would push all the Hutu into Lake Kivu.”(Umutesi p. 69) The alarm
that spread through the refugees was another side of the genocidal
coin. The malevolent, plotting Tutsi who were to be massacred would
now surely take their revenge, went the reasoning. She identifies
herself with the “we” versus the “they”.
When friends meet
Umutesi can pass on some plain falsehoods without second thought. Just
two examples: She writes that Gen. Fred Rwigema held the post of
‘Minister of the Interior in Museveni’s government’ and President Paul
Kagame was “responsible for the Ugandan army.” (Umutesi p. 17) She,
presumably, tells this lie, to reinforce the idea of how Rwandans may
have been well-off in exile. The second lie is where she lays emphasis
on the danger of being trapped by ‘rebels’ writing Goma was “only about
one hundred kilometres from Kisangani.” (Ibid p. 123)
Throughout her book, Umutesi has a strange approach to the naming of
people. There are very few with more than one name. In this category
there are people for whom she could not avoid telling their full names,
in her acknowledgements. She begins with one Hamuli Kabarhuza of the
DRC, and then moves straight to people who were behind the writing of
the book.
“When I arrived in Belgium in 1998, I was welcomed by Marie Goretti
Nyirarukundo and Ivan Godfroid of Vredeseilanden-Coopibo, a Belgian NGO
based in Leuven. Thanks to their help and encouragement, the idea of
writing a book began to take shape. The realization of this project was
made possible by Vredeseilanden-Coopibo, which put its resources at my
disposal. Their personnel unfailingly provided me with the necessary
help. …Later they put me in contact with the Fundacio S’Olivar in
Estellencs, Mallorca…Juan Carrero Saralegui, president of the Fundacio
S’Olivar and spokesperson for the Spanish Forum for Justice in Rwanda,
understood that it was important for me…that the book be published in
English.”(pg. xvii)
She expresses gratitude to the translator, but the English version does
not say much about Ivan Godfroid, who apart from the “great assistance”
he provided, wrote a postscript for the original French edition that
was published in year 2000.
Her English translator Julia Emerson also reveals her political
sympathies. She expressed “deep gratitude to Nobel Peace Prize nominee
Juan Carrero Saralegui and the Fundacio S’Olivar…for the grant that
allowed her begin the translation of the ‘very important book.”[17]
Emerson adds that, Juan Carrero and his organization “worked tirelessly
and selflessly” to ensure that all of those involved in massive human
rights violations, both during and after the horrific events that
followed the assassination of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana
will be brought to justice, thus “bringing a more complete and balanced
understanding of this tragedy to a reluctant community” (Umutesi p.
xvii)
Emma Bonino, one time European Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs,
is also presented with both her names, and is labelled by Umutesi as
‘mother of the refugees’. To stress how important Bonino was, when they
were on the run, they ‘did everything possible’ to welcome her as a
mother (Ibid p.154). The way she praises Bonino, is different from the
way she speaks about Sadako Ogata—who, at that time was the boss of
UNHCR. The refugee agency is very unpopular with Umutesi. She brands
the agency’s workers who encouraged the refugees to return home, as
‘bounty hunters’ (Ibid p.211).
Many are mentioned only by their first names. The majority of such are
close friends, relatives, acquaintances and colleagues of the author.
She deliberately avoids their surnames in the same way she avoids
acknowledging that the RDR which was in charge of refugee camp life.
Even her own camp leader, a Spanish Catholic priest, is simply named
‘Father Carlos’ omitting his surname Olivera.
There is one name ‘Frans’ whose surname Umutesi also holds back. They
met together at the height of the genocide, in May 1994, when Umutesi
was preparing emergency plans to be submitted to their (Umutesi and
others) ‘backers’ through ‘Frans, a representative from our donors’.
(Umutesi p.63)
The nationality of Frans is made known only when Umutesi expresses her
appreciation to ‘the Dutch friend who had been such a great help’.
(Ibid p.64)
As you read the book you realise how close Frans and Beatrice were, as
she writes: “When I was at the death’s door, the two people I thought
about were my mother and Frans, a Dutch friend. I took advantage of the
rare moments when I was conscious to tell Virginie, and Marcelline my
last wishes: once they were out of the forest they should rip up any
papers that could identify them as Rwandan and they should do
everything to get in contact with Frans, who could help them get out of
Zaire.” (Ibid p.200)
Again to show how close they were, when news came to Umutesi that there
was one Frans looking for her in the Zairean jungle, she says: “I only
knew one person with that name…my friend Frans”(Ibid p.235) She says
for once in her life, what happened to her surpassed her wildest
dreams.
Frans had been her friend beginning in Gitarama in 1988. Frans was able
to learn where to find his friend in the jungle of Zaire, when
Marcelline was repatriated to Rwanda by the UNHCR. Marcelline, who was
repatriated to her country against the wishes of Umutesi, told
Umutesi’s mother, who knew where to get Frans who at that time was on
mission in Rwanda. The ‘Dutch friend’, who was relieved to hear news of
her, later communicated the news to the ‘Belgian friends’ (Ibid p.239)
Up to this point, I was not sure who this Frans was, but
Umutesi—finally gives a hint. “Frans was not afraid to run risks, even
big ones, when his friends’ lives were in danger. In May 1994 he had
come to a Rwanda torn by war and genocide. It was a big risk to take,
because one died easily in those days.” (Id)
The friend of Umutesi, who visited his friends in territory under the
control of the genocidaires, was Frans van Hoof, whose connections and
activism will be explained below.
Umutesi’s book is a study in subtle dishonesty and to write about it
further, following her journey from Bukavu to Brussels through Congo
forest and Kinshasa, would require more space than is available here.
The book’s nature is either her wish or that of the people who assisted
her in writing it.
Umutesi’s connections help explain the content of the book, and why it
was reproduced in many languages. Furthermore, it is while looking at
this network of friends who protect genocidaires that I decided to call
my book “friends of evil”. I came to the conclusion that the discourse
in Umutesi’s book, her relationships and friendships, among sundry
actors in the writing of her book, show a highly visible
politico-ideological facade.
Notes
_______________________
[1] Goldon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (25^th Edition),
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company (1980) p. 110
[2] Ibid, p.110 Allport said Hitler created the Jewish menace “not so
much to demolish the Jews as to cement the nazi hold of Germany”p.41
[3] A book which was published by the University of Wisconsin Press,
2004
[4] W. Schabas, The Genocide Convention at Fifty (Special Lecture,
International Institute of Human Rights-Strasbourg, July 9, 1999)
[5] Jane Some, FORMER ‘INTERAHAMWE’ MILITIAMAN TESTIFIES IN CYANGUGU
TRIAL Internews, ARUSHA September 17, 2001
[6] Prosecution Exhibit No 31(b) case No ICTR-98-41-T which was
tendered on 17September 2002
[7] Ibid, Bagosora 1995… (p.9)
[8] Ibid. Bagosora 1995 (p.10)
[9] Prosecution Exhibit No P.161(E) case No ICTR-99-50-T which was
tendered on February 20, 2007
[10] Ibid, RDR-Cameroun 1996 Table N^o 1 on p.18
[11] African Rights, Death Despair and Defiance, August 1995, p. 993
[12] Kangura No 6.of December 1990 p.8
[13] Propaganda and Practice: Human Rights Watch Report-1999
[14] Ibid. Bagosora 1995 (p.21-22)
[15] Ibid. Bagosora 1995 (p.23)
[16] Ibid. Bagosora 1995 (p.26)
[17]In reality, Juan Carrero Saralegui was a nominee of Hutu
Extremists
Chapter VII: Complicity between the NGOs and the genocidaires
The complicity between the genocidaires and various Europeans, both
individuals and NGOs, whose interests are not very well known, has a
long history. But the history could be summed up in what happened at
The Hague, fourteen years after the genocide which the international
community did nothing to prevent or end.
Part of history presented in this chapter, and the one following, will
also establish the connections of two of Umutesi Beatrice’s friends.
There is Frans who traced her in the jungles of Zaire, and Ivan who
received her in Brussels, and helped her write her book.
On 16^th May 1994, Radio Rwanda journalist, Etienne Karekezi had an
interview with Francois Nzabahimana, who was in Belgium at the time. In
that interview, Nzabahimana said that there were people in Europe (who
had lived in Rwanda for a long time) as well as NGOs willing to come
and help Rwandans, but that they were worried about their own security.
Voicing his support to the murderous regime, Karekezi the journalist,
had no scruple in assuring his interviewee that the zone under the
genocidaire Government’s control was secure.
Etienne Karekezi is currently a journalist with the Voice of America.
He is known in Rwanda to have been in league with extremists’ media
operators, being in the first team of the MRND
mouthpiece-Umurwanashyaka—a paper which forecast the genocide as early
as 1991.
François Nzabahimana would later become the first Chairman of the RDR.
But in May 1994, he was still the Director of Rwanda Development Bank
(RDB), and was in Europe on a special mission.
Nzabahimana played a major role in the coordination of
politico-criminal activities with Belgian NGOs (their collaboration
existed when the ousted Government was still in office) to come to the
rescue of the genocidal government. Their objective was to restore the
credibility it had lost before the international community and humanity
in general.
When Nzabahimana was saying that there were people willing to come to
Rwanda, he seemed to be aware of the visit to Rwanda of two men. These
were Ivan Godfroid and Frans Van Hoof—Belgian and Dutch nationals
respectively. From 15^th May to 8^th June 1994 they were on a mission
to Rwanda.
In the mission report,[1] these determined men explained they had been
sent by EUROSTEP[2]. It would be interesting to know who exactly (what
individual) had sent them on such a mission or had convinced them to
visit a country in the throes of genocide at the time!
It is not clear exactly when the connivance started between Van Hoof,
Godfroid and such NGOs as OXFAM-NOVIB and ICCO, as well as between
these and hard-line genocide deniers. Was it that mission which marked
the foundation of the complicity between the RDR genocidaires and the
above NGOs?
One could even think that such complicity existed before that time,
since the NGOs did not move from the start of the genocide against the
Tutsi. Both men went on with their mission of helping and collaborating
with the propagators of genocide-related hatred.
When Van Hoof and Godfroid came to Rwanda, they had started a project
called TRAITS D’UNION RWANDA (TUR) with the objective of making it a
forum for regional dialogue. The project grouped together the Belgian
NGOs COOPIBO, Vredeseilanden and SOS-FAIM. TUR had the same address as
SOS-FAIM.[3]
A closer analysis of events shows that the essential role of their
mission was to spread propaganda on behalf of their friends, in a
journal of the same name as the project itself— TRAIT D’UNION RWANDA—of
which Van Hoof was an active member of the editorial board. The idea of
providing a forum to the genocidaires was put into action before the
end of 1994.
Those who supported them at the time were organisations in different
countries in Europe, particularly Dutch organizations— ICCO and NOVIB,
Belgian ones, namely Broederlijk and Talita Koum in Eastern Flanders;
Groupe de Développement and Frère des Hommes of Toulouse in France, as
well as OXFAM U.K. of Great Britain. They found a fine sounding name
for the forum: “Forum d’échange d’Africains pour la Reconstruction du
Rwanda. [4]“
The three Belgian NGOs dared cobble together a banalisation of the
genocide against the Tutsi, by dedicating a forum to criminals. The
journal had rubrics reserved for ‘dialogue’. The most important are
those concerning politicians and military people.
One could find ideas of people who stopped the genocide on adjacent
pages, with those of genocide survivors and next to those ideas of
people who had just committed genocide, those who had planned it and
those who had supported it.
Formal support to the genocidaires by the NGOs
Frans Van Hoof and Ivan Godfroid in the Great Lakes Region! And the two
men, at the centre of Marie Beatrice Umutesi’s book! What had they come
to do in Rwanda at the height of the genocide? And why did they wait
for so long before they finally decided to move after about two months
of genocide against the Tutsi?
Part of the answer can be found in the document titled “Note de
renseignement Kamanda Yves[5]“. This document by a certain Prosper
Twizeyimana was meant for the FAR Chief of Army Staff General
Bizimungu, who used the pseudonym “Kamanda Yves”.
Prosper Twizeyimana is a former student of the Catholic Major Seminary
of Nyakibanda. He is an electrician by training, who worked for OXFAM
before, during and after the genocide. Twizeyimana however, was also
recruited by the army where he worked as an analyst in the department
of military intelligence of the former Rwanda Armed Forces.
This intelligence note is, in actual fact, a summary of an interview
which Prosper Twizeyimana had with Frans Van Hoof whom he knew since
1985, “as pioneers of the services Centre to the Cooperatives of
Gitarama.[6]“
Twizeyimana introduced Frans Van Hoof to his boss as “a Dutchman,
married to a Hutu woman from Ruhengeri,” explaining further that some
of van Hoof’s in-laws were in Rwanda, while others were at the time in
the Kibumba and Mugunga refugee camps around the town of Goma—in North
Kivu.
Van Hoof, the note indicated, had worked in Rwanda for over 10 years as
a Volunteer of the COMPAGNONS BATISSEURS and later of COOPIBO (the same
organisation which only changed names), in Kigali, Ruhengeri and
Gitarama. He had left the country in 1988 but kept coming back as an
independent consultant, notably at the service of COOPIBO.
Twizeyimana, like Umutesi, praises Van Hoof to the skies, as one of the
rare Westerners who came to Rwanda between April and July 1994 (during
the genocide). And also, as someone who “knows Kinyarwanda very well” –
quite normal for someone who is married to a Rwandese woman – and “is
highly respected in Rwandese circles, NGOs and among peasant
associations.”
The meeting between Prosper Twizeyimana and Frans Van Hoof took place
on 26-27th August 1996 in Goma. Van Hoof told his friend that he was on
a two-week mission to Rwanda and Kivu from August 24 to September 8,
1996, and that he had come on that mission to try and resume COOPIBO’s
cooperation with Rwanda. In actual fact, he observed, COOPIBO had been
“expelled by the RPF Government for giving space in one issue of TRAIT
D’UNION to the Prime Minister of the Interim Government and to former
Rwanda Army military chiefs”.
In the meantime, he said, Kigali had rejected the attempt, forcing
COOPIBO instead to seek to maintain its presence in neighbouring
countries. It had been working in Western Tanzania for many years and
had been carrying out investigations towards establishing a
representation in Uganda.
The essential part of their interview focused on the conditions in
refugee camps. Van Hoof told Twizeyimana that the “Dutch Minister of
Cooperation had organized a meeting on the Rwanda problem and Frans Van
Hoof himself was present together with, among others, Mr. Jean-Pierre
Godding” (a Belgian, Volunteer of Caritas in Goma refugee camps).
Speaking about the conditions in the camps, Van Hoof reported what he
had discussed with Godding, who said that the political and
administrative structures of the former regime were practically no
longer existent in the camps, but that the spirit remained unchanged,
in the sense that the new structures want to control everything and do
not allow people to express themselves freely or take other
initiatives. “He however expressed some optimism that despite the
intimidation, there are people who have the courage to think
independently through associations. Their influence being still
marginal, he pleaded for their support so that their influence may
grow. He added that unfortunately people encouraging those new
initiatives are under threat” and that he himself was among them.
Concerning the opinion in Europe about the problem of Rwandese
refugees, Van Hoof expressed disappointment that “people are already
losing interest in the problem and that the attention is now focused on
Burundi”, the Rwandese problem being too complex and without an end in
sight.
To the idea that individuals or organizations having worked in Rwanda
for a long time should get in touch and organize a debate in Europe to
revive the refugee issue, Van Hoof replied that: “French NGOs are
already out of the circuit since France’s past in Rwanda is not
honourable; the Walloon NGOs are totally in the RPF camp because of its
previous campaign against the Habyarimana regime and which was
confirmed by the genocide and massacres; several Dutch men are married
to Tutsi women; Flemish NGOs still interested in Rwanda are not
accepted by the Kigali Government and therefore their position would be
ipso facto perceived as partisan”.
According to Frans Van Hoof, the only NGO capable of intervening in the
Rwandese problem was OXFAM because it worked in Rwanda and in refugee
camps, is strong in Europe, and has people in charge who are interested
and believe that the problem is political. He cited one of them as Mr.
Anaclet Odhiambo, acting head of OXFAM in Kigali.
Van Hoof told Twizeyimana that he did not hear the RDR being talked
about in European circles he moves in (i.e. NGO circles). Van Hoof said
that while he had collaborated with François Nzabahimana for a long
time, he had only met him once, and that on this occasion, Nzabahimana
had blamed him for re-launching the activities of the Centre for
Services to the Cooperatives of Gitarama without prior permission from
Nzabahimana himself as the President of the Board of Directors.
On the other hand, Van Hoof noted he had heard from the Belgian Prime
Minister, and relies on Mr. Seth Sendashonga of the FRD. Mr. Van Hoof
is satisfied that peasant federations operating inside Rwanda are doing
well despite the refusal of the authorities to give them a legal status
and the unfounded suspicion that they are involved in political
activities. However, they limit themselves to social and economic
domain and dare not go into issues related to politics such as the
return of refugees, justice and national reconciliation.
At the end of the “Note”, Twizeyimana adds a few comments. The first
one is about the important role J. Pierre GODDING could play as person
who had “delved into political lobbying on the issue of Rwandese
refugees”.
Twizeyimana describes Godding as someone with influence in Europe, and
who is said to have initiated the task of identifying people in refugee
camps who might have a dialogue with the RPF, an idea of which a good
number of FAR and RDR officials do not approve. That was the reason why
Van Hoof regrets that people in Europe, particularly in Germany, were
disappointed by the RPF but could not find a suitable leader to sponsor
within the RDR.
Twizeyimana also recommends to Gen. Bizimungu that given his
importance, Godding should return to the refugee camps. He expressed
his belief that the RDR needed to improve its leadership and to work
with associations and individuals inside and outside the camps; and
that François Nzabahimana should be the spokesperson of the RDR in
Europe in order to convince the people there to give it support.
Twizeyimana proposes himself as the person who can influence OXFAM (he
knows the NGO very well because he worked with it before the genocide)
on the issue of Rwandese refugees[7].
This was not the only note that Prosper Twizeyimana sent to the Chief
of Staff of the former Rwanda Armed Forces. He had sent him an earlier
note on July 4, 1996. The note was about “the Situation in the Great
Lakes Countries and the possible developments during the second
semester of 1996.”
On the issue of Rwandese refugees, Twizeyimana notes that despite the
efforts made to seek conditions for an “honourable return of refugees
to the country,” what was expected was a categorical refusal by the
authorities in Kigali; and that one was not to rely on the
international community: “already weary of caring for Rwandese
refugees, it will refuse to put pressure on Kigali”.
He says what would then be expected is an unconditional and gradual
return of the refugees or, in a worst case scenario, the dismantling of
camps close to the border, which could engender the repatriation of a
sizeable part of the refugees, and provisional settlement for those not
subjected to a forced repatriation.
According to certain sources, he observed, the UNHCR was in favour of a
temporary integration of refugees in Zaire, if the Zairean Government
would agree. On the Tanzanian side, he said, they would pose no problem
provided that the situation does not last for too long. However,
Twizeyimana believed that even if the refugee problem is solved in
Eastern Zaire, destabilization of Eastern Zaire in Kivu by its Eastern
neighbours would not stop and that ethnic conflict in North Kivu could
be revived. In the meantime, Twizeyimana identifies an interim
solution.
For its own stability, he said, Zaire had no choice. Its interests
converged with those of Rwandese refugees. In order to re-conquer
(Rwanda) and extend its influence in the East, both parties must find a
solution which is favourable to them.
He urged the RDR and the former FAR to approach the Zairean government,
so that they might plan together in a manner that would benefit both
parties in a sustainable way. He said it would be naïve to believe that
the international community is still envisaging negotiations.
Let us return to the August 1996 meeting between Twizeyimana and Van
Hoof. According to Twizeyimana himself, he had gone to meet Van Hoof
“in order to get some Western information and considerations on the
Rwandan problem”. Let us recall that we are already in August 1996.
It appears that Van Hoof was no ordinary person: He is a friend of the
extremist Hutus, who is proud of being one of theirs after getting
married to a Hutu woman, and proud of having come to Rwanda when nobody
else dared venture there. He is obviously an important partner of the
Rwanda Government in exile.
The August 1996 visit is not the first, since Van Hoof came before and
during the genocide, from May 15 to June 8, 1994, and there is every
reason to believe that Twizeyimana was aware of it.
Van Hoof had come with Ivan Godfroid, sent by NCOS (an umbrella for
Flemish NGOs with its head office at 11, Vlasfabriekstraat in
Brussels), and EUROSTEP which also has its head office at 115, rue
Stevin[8] in Brussels.
The two came on a mission recommended by EUROSTEP on 26^th April 1994
at a European meeting on Rwanda. In their report they say, “The
objectives of this mission which took place from the 15^th May to the
8^th of June 1994 were as follows: to find out the socio-political
situation on the ground; find out what the local NGOs are doing and in
which way European NGOs can support their activities; and finally, by a
presence on the ground show solidarity with Rwandese partners.” [9]
One wonders what encouraged the two emissaries to be present in Rwanda
at all cost, and show their solidarity where they were not able to
intervene when the genocide started. First –”the feeling of
powerlessness” and all of a sudden the exceptional courage of NCOS,
EUROSTEP, Van Hoof and Godfroid!
The courage, that drove Van Hoof, took him first to the zone that was
controlled by the government of the genocidaires in the prefectures of
Butare, Gitarama, Gikongoro, Cyangugu and Gisenyi, where he met with
Mr. Jean Kambanda, Prime Minister of the genocidaire Government. He
also met prefectural authorities, examined the situation of the NGOs in
those prefectures, met the people in charge of the NGOs, and finally
visited the camps of IDP.
In Kivu (Zaire), Van Hoof went to meet the people in charge of Zairean
and international NGOs, both in Bukavu and Goma. In Goma, he also
visited sites of Rwandan refugees. With Ivan Godfroid, he visited the
people in charge of international and Burundian NGOs. He even went to
meet officials of international and Ugandan NGOs in Kampala and in
Kabale. He visited RPF territory in northern Rwanda, and spoke to
Antoine Mugesera, the RPF’s Planning Commissioner at Mulindi, Byumba.
He ended up in Ngara in Tanzania where he met with international NGOs
that took care of Rwandan refugees, and took a few testimonies from
refugees.
What supposedly interested both Van Hoof and Godfroid, in May-June
1994, was the situation that prevailed in Rwanda, but especially what
they termed as the “anguish” of “the population” in the face of the
advancing RPF.
The two ventured to state that “away from the frontline, the situation
seems calm again: people are working in the fields, markets are held
normally, children are going to school” [10]. It is very clear they had
little concern or none at all about the Tutsis who were being or had
been exterminated, all over Rwanda, and certainly “away from the
frontline.”
One has to wonder if the situation they are talking about was that
prevailing in Rwanda during May-June 1994, at the height of the
genocide! This is reminiscent of the lies told on the RTLM radio
station which, in order to encourage the genocidaires not to surrender
before the advancing RPF, was giving false information about what was
happening on the ground, covering up the routing of the RAF.
The main aim of Van Hoof and Godfroid’s report appears to have been to
legitimize the genocidaire Government at any cost. Thus, they reported
that the people being killed were either “RPF infiltrators”, or “Tutsi
who are being eliminated for the simple reason that the RPF is
advancing and thus they constitute a danger to the militias.”[11]
These “rationales” for genocide are quite similar to those used by the
interim genocidal government.
In any case, they report what they heard (or wanted to hear) from the
genocidaire Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda, and from officials of NGOs
they met. In effect, what explanation could they have given on
returning from their mission, which could justify what the world
television networks were showing on their screens?
Inevitably, given their leanings and their sources, it was that the
reason for the extermination of the Tutsis was “the murder of President
Habyarimana and the infiltration of RPF combatants or its allies in all
the regions of the country. […] it was the RPF which had a whole plan
to eliminate Hutu officials; […] “the massacres were a spontaneous
reaction of the population.” Similarly, they could also explain the
reason behind the Government’s arming of the population: it was for
self-defence, against the RPF and its accomplices.
But what interests Van Hoof the most is rather the issue of internally
displaced persons, especially in the West of Rwanda where the number of
IDP is estimated at more than one million, and more particularly in the
prefectures of Gikongoro, Gitarama and Ruhengeri (i.e. the area still
controlled by the genocidal interim government).
According to Van Hoof, the cause of growing number of displaced persons
is due to the fact that every push by the RPF forces the population to
flee further and further West. A small minority of this “one million
IDP” is in what he calls “appropriate zones,” the rest lack everything:
no food, and no health care services as only the International Red
Cross, Caritas-Burundi, CRS and Terre des Hommes are desperately
attempting a few interventions in Western Rwanda.
Van Hoof’s report sends a pressing message to International
Organizations to “launch a big scale aid program for the prefectures
with the most displaced people, in food and health care”. It suggests
that “to achieve their aim of helping the displaced, the international
NGOs should help the Rwandan NGOs which have already started organizing
the camps.”
The report did not completely forget the situation prevailing in the
RPF-controlled zone; the displaced are estimated at about 300,000 (that
is only what he heard), and are “at the mercy of the RPF soldiers.”
Indeed, according to Van Hoof—mimicking the discourse of
genocidaires—the refugees kept flocking to the refugee camps
in neighbouring countries (mostly Tanzania) from the RPF zone, as a
result of the RPF exactions— killing the civil population. On the other
side of the frontline, he said, ‘many rumours about the RPF massacres
circulate.’
His sources he refers to as “important number of private
people”—supposedly confirmed to him that the RPF was causing a lot of
casualties, even among the civilians.
“[…]During a visit, in the refugee camps in the region of Ngara, in
Tanzania, it was observed that between 500 and 2,000 refugees arrive
daily. Many of them come from the border commune of Rusumo. Others are
arriving from as far as Byumba and have taken weeks to reach Tanzania.
But what pushed those who come from nearer places to flee, after the
arrival of the RPF who claim they are bringing peace? At the same time,
we can see more bodies floating in the border river of Akagera. The
skin coloration indicates that they were killed barely two days earlier
and that they therefore come from the zone controlled by the RPF”[12].
Van Hoof and Godfroid nonetheless hoped that “the pressure on the RPF
from the international community, particularly from Uganda would help
end the war and negotiations would start, and thereby avoid
destabilizing the entire sub-region”.
It appears that getting a cease-fire and negotiations, was the real
purpose of their mission to Rwanda at this critical moment for the
genocidal government, whose armed forces were losing ground day after
day.
In order to justify this hidden agenda, their report describes the
scenario to be expected, if a solution to stop the RPF’s advance was
not put forward by the international community. Burundi and Kivu region
are most concerned.
Consequently, the report makes reference to what had happened recently
in Burundi: “The coup d’état in October 1993, the death of President
Ndadaye and the ethnic massacres that followed had an immediate effect
on the situation in Rwanda. The Hutu extremists did not fail to shout
from rooftops that this is what was to be expected from a Tutsi army,
and that the RPF approach was not any different. It is clear that any
evolution in Rwanda will have an immediate effect on Burundi, which is
what makes it crucial to negotiate a new equilibrium in Rwanda as soon
as possible, before Burundi is in turn totally destabilized”[13].
Secondly, Van Hoof and Godfroid argue that: “The situation in Kivu
region (ZAIRE) has been made more complex by the massive arrival of
Rwandan refugees due to the advance of the RPF. Indeed […] if the RPF
continues to advance, the hundreds of thousands of refugees will be
left with no other choice than to seek refuge in Kivu, breaking up
today’s prevailing precarious equilibrium. It is predictable that the
arrival of a big number of refugees will inevitably lead to social
tension, which will increase the ethnic tensions that still exist in
the region. This is why it was important to stop the fighting in Rwanda
before a civil war breaks out in Kivu”[14].
As for Uganda, which the report does not hesitate to implicate directly
in the RPF “war against Rwanda” and to accuse of continuing to supply
the RPF with arms, Van hoof and Godfroid contend that: “Now that half
of Rwanda is in the hands of the RPF, Museveni is adopting a more
careful approach. Since it is urgent to stop the war in order to
prevent a regional implosion, it is in Museveni’s interest to put
pressure on the RPF to agree to a cease-fire and start the
negotiations. The international community also has to put pressure on
Uganda.”[15]
According to the Van Hoof/Godfroid report, Tanzania is the least
affected. However one question remains: “UNHCR expects 95% of the
people to return to Rwanda in the following months, one year at the
latest. However the refugees themselves are not very enthusiastic. A
lot will depend on the composition and approach of the new Government
in Rwanda. And it should not be forgotten that many among the refugees
participated in the genocide against the Tutsis, and fear prosecution
in case the rule of law is installed in Rwanda. Tanzania has not yet
expressed its willingness to allow the refugees to permanently reside
on its national territory. But such a decision should be expected to be
preceded by a hot political debate.”[16]
In its Press release on Rwanda on June 14^, 1994, the NCOS reminds us
that when they organized their mission to the Great lakes region,
this group of Flemish Non-Governmental Organizations wanted to know
what had been the fate of their partner organizations: Rwandan NGOs and
human rights associations.
Among the objectives of the mission, there was the will to “see with
the local NGOs what had already been done, and in which manner the
Northern NGOs could reinforce their actions”. They therefore first
visited them, in Rwanda (in the zone controlled by the genocidal
interim government), in Kivu, in Burundi, in Tanzania and in Uganda.
In Rwanda, most of the NGOs formerly based in Kigali had been unable to
reorganize themselves. The CFRC-IWACU had moved its office equipment to
Gitarama. In the rural areas, the magnitude of the massacres was such
that that NGOS were powerless faced with the situation. This was also
due to the fact that many leaders were personally wanted by the army
and the militia.
Gitarama served as meeting places for the few NGO agents who were able
to get back to the town. They had just defined the beginning of a more
important assistance program for the displaced people, when the RPF
launched its offensive on Gitarama.
A new regrouping was later put into place in Gisenyi, where they had
begun a similar program with limited funds provided by the Ministry of
Planning. They expressed satisfaction that a few local NGOS situated
far from the war zone (ADEHAMU, AJEMAC) seemed to have kept some
activities running. Despite the war, they had an intervention capacity
not to be underestimated in the interior of the Western part of Rwanda,
and they sent calls for help to their partners in Europe to assist them
in facing this challenge.[17]
Van Hoof/Godfroid report that: “…In Burundi, the Northern NGOS
generally have very little experience with the Burundian NGOs. This
resulted in a general lack of awareness.” [18]
They report that in Kivu, […] “a serious crisis seems to be affecting
all the NGOs, which then influenced the functioning of federations and
networks. Despite this, due to the Rwanda crisis, the CRONGDs from the
North and the South organized meetings in Goma, Bukavu and Uvira, to
assess the situation. They decided to organize help for the Congolese
repatriates left to their fate by the humanitarian organizations (food
distribution, transport to their region of origin).
The Van Hoof/Godfroid said that CRONGDs South Kivu had until then taken
care of the Rwandan NGO agents who had taken refuge in Bukavu. Access
to banks, the post office, telephone and fax on the Rwandan side of the
border has become impossible; as a consequence, the Kivu NGOs are
facing serious problems in their daily functioning and communication
with the outside world. Those in South Kivu are now going to Bukavu;
while those in North Kivu have no clear alternative.”[19]
The two messengers of the Northern NGOs reported that: due to the small
number of refugees on Ugandan soil and the big number of international
humanitarian organizations, which are not used to working through local
organizations, the Ugandan NGOs are not directly concerned. RRWF
(Rwandan Refugees Welfare Foundation) is the only one to have offered
its services, but until now, it has not found a financial partner. This
RRWF is blamed that “although they say they are non-partisan, their
discourse is very close to that of the RPF, but this should not be
surprising since the organization was founded by refugees.”[20]
As can be seen in the “NCOS General conclusions on their mission in the
Great Lakes Region” (also by Van Hoof and Godfroid), NCOS called on the
international community to urgently send food and medical help, but
also pressed another agenda. “The International Community has to
immediately organize massive food and medical assistance to avoid
further loss of human lives. This urgent help has to be done in close
collaboration with the local NGOs, not only to increase their
efficiency, but also to allow the Rwandan civil society to start
playing a constructive role” [21].
In the name of NCOS, Van Hoof and Godfroid requested that an
unconditional cease-fire be imposed, as well as an arms embargo on the
entire region. The NCOS claimed not to take sides with “any of the
parties in conflict but with the Rwandan people”, meaning the refugees
and the displaced persons. NCOS then makes itself the spokesperson for
the genocidal interim government which had delegated the “Rwandan NGOs”
to make appeals on its behalf, by calling on the European NGOs to go to
the field and visit the genocidal government instead of listening to
the propaganda machine of the RPF which is the cause of the
humanitarian disaster:
“As a Northern NGO, we have to search for creative ways to help the
leaders of the Rwandan NGOs who, from both sides of the frontline, are
ready to work to fulfil the real needs of the Rwandan people. An
operational support even for emergency activities can give the NGOs an
active role vis-à-vis the population. They have to become an
unavoidable actor as soon as possible, but will only have the right to
speak only if the people realize that despite the war they are present
and support the displaced persons. The ability to act independently
will also allow them to play the role of the critical eye vis-à-vis the
authorities” [22].
The NCOS pressed the Belgian government to grant visas to the members
of the NGOs (in zones controlled by genocidaires) who wanted to seek
refuge in Belgium, since they are the ones needed to rebuild Rwanda.
It is important to note that before the May-June mission of Van Hoof
and Godfroid, the NCOS had launched a real media offensive by
publishing a number of documents on the Rwandan conflict.
Already on the 19th of February in 1993, in its “press release and
letter to the Belgian Political leaders”, through its Secretary
General, Mr. Paul Van Steenvoort, the NCOS had put forward urgent
propositions for Rwanda with a view to finding a solution to the
Rwandan conflict. For these Flemish NGOs, the RPF is the real and only
problem. Indeed, in their urgent propositions, it is the RPF which is
mentioned and which must “stop its armed activities which violate human
rights”[23]
The NCOS appealed to the International community to “collaborate to
break the RPF supply in arms.”[24]
In addition, it requests Belgium and the international community, to
“intervene very rapidly to stop the escalation of the events. The
precarious economic and political circumstances could lead to a
catastrophic extension of the conflict. The ethnic problem was not the
main cause but the final point of the catastrophe and would lead to an
unimaginable degradation without any hope of ever returning to the
normal Rwandan way of life [...] Right now, the wave of destruction
could still be stopped and we can still avoid the country slipping into
a situation similar to that of Somalia.” [25]
Among other documents the NCOS published in the month of June 1994,
there is a “Revue de Presse Rwanda N°5” where Van Hoof gives
information on Rwanda. In his article “The drifting of Central Africa”;
the author denounces the silence of the big powers and the failure of
the UN and its Secretary General in Rwanda and elsewhere.
Then there is the “NCOS position in relation to the last events in
Rwanda”, dated May 27, 1994 but published on June 14, 1994.
The NCOS position is that it condemns indiscriminately both the RPF and
the genocidaires, as if it was ignorant of what was happening on the
ground. Since the 6^th April, part of the Rwandan population, the
Tutsis, was being exterminated following a diabolical plan carefully
conceived by a genocidal government.
Instead of recognising the genocide, the NCOS only condemns the
massacres perpetrated by the government and the murders and the bloody
retaliations carried out by certain members of the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF).
This confusion in the formulation appears intended to obfuscate the
existence for months, of trained and equipped groups of criminals—the
Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi—who were only waiting for the signal to
start their “work”.
The NCOS nevertheless did not forget to cite “the war by which, since
1990, the RPF has been trying to impose political reforms”, condemning
the RPF with all its energy before calling the two parties (the RPF and
the genocidal interim government) to stop “their nefarious
activities.”[26] To achieve this, the first condition was an effective
cease-fire to be sponsored by the international community and the
Belgian Government.
In the document “The General Conclusions of the NCOS mission in the
Great Lakes region,” apart from an appeal to the international
community to send urgent help “to millions of helpless displaced
persons inside Rwanda”, the NCOS insists that this help come through
“tight collaboration with the heads of local organizations, not only to
increase their efficiency, but also to allow the Rwandan civil society
to play a constructive role”.
As if the role Rwandan civil society failed to play three months
earlier, at the beginning of the genocide, by condemning the
extermination of the Tutsi, can now be played in the refugee camps, “to
avoid further human losses”.
Then the NCOS see as a lasting solution, negotiations leading to power
sharing. “To achieve this, the international community has to assume
its responsibilities […] by exerting strong pressure on both parties
(both guilty of unacceptable atrocities) and by imposing an arms
embargo on the entire region.”
Frans Van Hoof authored a further report dated June 3, 1994 entitled
“Rwanda: Three million displaced under threat”—ostensibly a plea in
favour of the “Rwandan population”. But Van Hoof is more preoccupied by
the people fleeing than by those being killed. In addition, Van Hoof
puts all the blame on the RPF and even goes as far as asking for help
for the authorities who prepared the genocide and are now on the run.
This is what he says in this report: “The Western media is very
interested by the refugee situation in Tanzania and the military
fighting and massacres inside the country. On the other hand, little
attention is paid to the huge problem of displaced people inside
Rwanda. Is the international community indifferent? These people are
fleeing in haste before the RPF’s mortar fire. With mattresses, sheep,
handfuls of beans, a photo album, they have left everything, and taken
only what they could carry. They are in a hurry but nonetheless seem
resigned to their fate. For some, it is already the third or fourth
exodus towards a safer haven. Once more, they are tracked like game by
the RPF [….] the Rwandan population doesn’t understand anything, they
feel attacked by the RPF and they are fleeing from the murderous
violence of the rebels, and despite this, they have the feeling that
the West is on the RPF’s side. The ordinary people, the authorities,
everyone insists on the responsibility of the international community,
and begs us to react, not to abandon them, to do everything to silence
the arms and help the survivors”[27].
Clearly, the NCOS, was very active in the Rwandan conflict. But the
question remains: if the genocide (for them it was the ‘escalation of
violence’) was so predictable, why did they not do anything when it
started?
And with regard to their return to Rwanda in May 1994, it is not
explained anywhere why they did not condemn the genocide and those who
perpetrated this heinous crime. Instead, NCOS is far more interested in
the testimonies of the refugees concerning the activities of the RPF.
What right does the NCOS, have to speak in the name of the Rwandan
population? And why is the word genocide not part of their vocabulary?
Indeed, not once does the term genocide appear in their report. Not a
word on the hundreds of thousands of Tutsis who had been killed, even
in a report issued in June 1994! Although Van Hoof and Godfroid were
shocked by “the corpses washing up on the shores of Lake Victoria and
which made the price of fish drop (Nile perch)”!
The answer to these questions is clear: the NCOS’ mission had only two
real objectives: coming to the rescue of the genocidal government which
was out of steam, and to the “Rwandan population” (meaning, for NCOS,
the Hutus) which was in need in the camps inside and outside the
country. They did not come to Rwanda because of compassion for the
Tutsis being exterminated. Instead, it was a mission to deny the
genocide and meet the genocidaires, give them moral support, mitigate
their shame and cover up their crime.
The diary of Jean Kambanda, ex-Prime Minister of the genocidal interim
government,[28] shows that he met Franz Van Hoof on 20^th May 1994 in
the company of Nkiko Nsengimana, ex-director of the Center Iwacu
Kabusunzu and president of the group of Rwandan NGOs under the umbrella
known as CCOAIB. Nkiko now lives in Switzerland. He is among those who
distinguished themselves because of their revisionist ideas, like Dr.
James Gasana, ex-Minister of Defence.
Nkiko Nsengimana is also the vice president of the FDU- Inkingi which
is an Umbrella organisation of genocide ideologues as shall be
explained further in this book.
Notes
_______________________
[1] Ivan Godfroid and Frans van Hoof, “ La Crise Rwandaise et ses
Implications Régionales: la Parole aux ONG-Rapport d’une mission dans
la Région des Grands Lacs du 15 mai au 9 juin 1994 (22 juin1994) ”.
(Author’s archives) also available
on www.grandslacs.net/html/tm/ongfmz.htm
[2] EUROSTEP is a network of European non-governmental development
organisations working to influence Europe’s role in the world,
particularly in pursuing the eradication of injustice and poverty. It’s
not very clear as to why this organisation kept on financing activities
and projects which seemed clearly against their mission to “promote an
international world order where the peaceful coexistence of all peoples
can flourish”. See more on:
http://www.eurostep.org/wcm/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&
sectionid=9&id=41&Itemid=48
[3] Their address was (or still is) 4, Rue aux Laines, 1000 Brussels,
Belgium.
[4] Traits d’Union N^o 5-Special Issue, African Points of View on the
reconstruction of Rwanda of 1 November 1994.
[5] Mr. Prosper TWIZEYIMANA’s letter, Bulengo, September 3, 1996.
(Author’s archives)
[6] Intelligence note to Yves Kamanda, p.1.
[7] Cfr. “Intelligence note to Yves Kamanda”, p.2-3.
[8] See the mission’s report titled “Rwanda’s crisis and its regional
implications: NGOs forum. Report of a mission in the Great Lakes region
from 15^th May to 9^th June 1994” and whose details are available at
NCOS – Brussels as well as in the brochure “Traits-d’Union: Rwanda”
published by COOPIBO and VREDESEILANDEN.
[9] The Rwanda crisis and its regional implications, NGO Forum, p. 2.
[10] The Rwanda crisis and its regional implications, NGO Forum, p. 2.
[11] The Rwandan crisis and its regional implications, p. 3.
[12] The Rwandan crisis and its regional implications, (p. 8)
[13] Ibidem, p. 10
[14] Ibidem, p. 11.
[15] The Rwandan crisis and its regional implications, p. 12.
[16] Ibidem, p. 13.
[17] Ibidem, 13-14.
[18] The Rwandan crisis…, p.14.
[19] Ibid. 17.
[20] Ibid., p.17.
[21] See” General conclusions on the NCOS mission in the Great Lakes
Region”, 10th June 1994.
[22] The Rwandan crisis…, p.19.
[23] Press release and Letter to Belgium’s Political authorities, 1993,
(19^th February).
[24]Ibid., p. 1.
[25] Ibid., p. 2.
[26] See: “NCOS’s position on recent events in Rwanda”, dated
27/05/1994 but published on 14/6/1994.
[27] See Frans Van Hoof’s report, “Rwanda: Three Million displaced
people threatened”. 3/6/1994.
[28] Kambanda, of course, confessed to and was convicted by the ICTR of
genocide in 1998
Chapter VIII: Rwandan civil society in exile–villains posturing
as victims
After the departure of Frans Van Hoof and Ivan Godfroid, the Rwandan
NGOs in areas controlled by the genocidal interim government
effectively went to work. And already, on June 21, 1994, the newly
created Collective for Emergency Aid and the Bureau for Coordination of
Humanitarian Interventions of the NGOS in Rwanda sent an open letter to
the Northern NGOs, their partners.[1]
The letter was not meant to denounce all the NGOs which had left Rwanda
the day after the start of the “war by the RPF”, but only some of them.
The letter noticeably, not only condemns the abandonment, the lack of
solidarity shown by the Northern NGOs; but it particularly denounces
the attitude of some Northern NGOs who, far from attempting to collect
truthful information, and coming to the help of the victims of the war
in the whole country, instead, actively took part in the conflicts by,
among other things, giving direct or indirect help to those who started
this bloody war (the RPF); it condemns those who imposed the
humanitarian embargo against the victims of this bloody war, as well as
those who only intervene in areas occupied by the RPF.
The Collective hopes for a quick return of those who stayed neutral,
asks them to come and see ‘up close the distress of this population’,
and to “ ‘support or complete the self-help initiatives taken locally
in the different refugee sites of this population condemned to wander
like people without any rights. The Collective invites its Northern
partner NGOs to mobilize resources to help their brothers, sisters,
parents and friends, without food, shelter, clothing, and future.”[2]
As we can see, most of the open letter to the Northern NGOs focuses on
the misfortune of the Hutu people, and the blame is entirely attributed
to the RPF war. There is total silence over the Tutsi genocide. The
letter attacks the NGOs which “betrayed” the genocidaires and
collaborated with “the RPF government”.
It is once more a barely veiled way of denying the genocide against the
Tutsi by distracting people’s attention (the NGO world, the Churches)
from the real problem (the genocide) and orienting them towards lesser
problems to which they are more sensitive such as hunger, epidemics,
etc.
Two days later, on June 23, 1994, the RWANDAN NGOs and CIVIL SOCIETY
made their declaration concerning the French intervention (Operation
Turquoise). While criticizing the international community and claiming
to be victims of misinformation calculated to tarnish Rwanda’s image,
they express gratitude to France for understanding the situation her
friends were caught in, and wanting to help them get out of it.
They naturally condemn those who are against the French intervention,
i.e. “those who led the country into the disaster everyone knows it is
in, who are happy to see millions of human beings kill each other for
their selfish interests.” [3]
Here, one can clearly recognize the accusations of the same Collective
of Rwandan NGOs against the RPF, whom they accuse of being responsible
for the genocide, stubbornly refusing to recognize the interim
government, refusing any compromise and resuming the war.
This firm position taken by the Collective of Rwandan NGOs will remain
a paradigm in different interventions of the Collective. Their constant
slogan is: if there is genocide, the RPF is fully responsible, and
therefore all others are innocent.
On July 26, 1994, the same Collective of Rwandan NGOs published its
report on “the question on interethnic relations.” [4] This report aims
to categorically deny the genocide; it talks instead of “the drama that
befell Rwanda and the ethnic group massacres which started on April 6,
1994 and led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people in a very
short period of time.”
The Collective of Rwandan NGOs asserted that it “had to take a stand
relating to the recent evolution of the Rwandan problem and trace
future prospects in the search for harmony for the society and lasting
peace for Rwanda”[5].
In this context, the Collective blames the RPF for every factor which
contributed to the deterioration of relations between Hutu and Tutsi:
“the continuous attacks of the Inyenzi (name the rebels who attacked
Rwanda from neighbouring countries since 1960 gave themselves), the
October 1990 war (attributed to the ethnic question for two reasons :
the name ‘’Inkotanyi’’ adopted by the armed group made reference to the
King’s close guards during the feudal-monarchist period, then the high
ranking officials of the RPF army were almost exclusively sons of old
dignitaries who reminded everyone of the time of the Inyenzi. There is
also the non-application of the Arusha Agreements, the death of the
Head of State and the institutional vacuum which followed the
resumption of the war by the RPF.”
The Collective even dares affirm that “the interim government had
organized a pacification campaign by government officials and other
leaders in the country. Slogans were continuously played on the
national radio to call the population to remain calm, but the
effectiveness of these actions was limited due to the psychosis the
population had suffered for four years of war, the stubbornness of the
RPF not to recognize the government and agree to negotiations, and most
especially due to the advance of the RPF on all fronts.”[6]
In reality of course, the slogans aired over the National Radio and
RTLM radio throughout the country were those inciting the population to
“work”—a term understood by the Hutu population to mean killing Tutsis,
destroying and burning their houses.
The Collective insists on denying any direct responsibility of the
interim Government, as well as any individual or Collective
responsibility apart from that of the RPF during the genocide. The
Collective justifies itself by saying that NGOs and human rights
associations failed because the RPF stubbornly refused to recognize the
Government in place, thereby refusing any compromise and starting the
war again.
The Collective also tries to define RTLM radio—notorious for inciting
the Hutu population to pursue and exterminate the Tutsis—as a defensive
operation. It says that the RTLM “was practically born to counter radio
Muhabura”[7] (the RPF radio station) which, according to the
Collective, also incited to hatred.
The Collective thus argues that the RPF was therefore indirectly
responsible for the massacre of the Tutsis by inciting the population
to kill the Tutsis, and concludes that the RPF voluntarily used the
massacre of the Tutsis to seize power: “The RPF should have realized
that its behaviour could incite the population to massacre the Tutsis,
unless they wanted to use this element as a pretext to seize power”[8].
The Collective accuses the international community of having imposed an
arms embargo against the Rwandan government, therefore facilitating the
rapid advance of the RPF on all fronts.
Concerning the massacres, the stand of the Collective in its July 1994
declaration is the same as the one later expressed by Rwandan émigré
advocates of “Hutu power” in Europe. It denies the genocide and seeks
to exonerate the genocidaires, while heaping all the blame on the RPF.
The Collective uses a number of arguments which, according to them,
show that “the RPF is directly involved in the massacres of Tutsis and
bears responsibility for what happened”[9]. It claims that the RPF went
on with the recruitment of soldiers although the country had just
signed the Arusha Agreements. “Their fund-raising campaigns also went
on, the behaviour of the RPF as soon as it entered Kigali forced the
MRND, the former unique party in power, to enter into confrontation
mood and prepare for war, the resumption of the war by the RPF after
the assassination of the Head of State and their stubborn refusal to
recognize the interim government.”[10]
As an obvious solution to relieve the ordeal the refugees had been
going through for four years, and to achieve national reconciliation,
the NGOs propose, as they did at Froidmont[11], the dissolution of the
government which was set up after the defeat of genocidaires. They wish
for a compromise in the Arusha Agreements, that the responsibilities of
each party be established, that the voice of the people be listened to,
that power be equally shared and that the population be represented in
the political and administrative structures. They also propose
reintegration of the refugees (old and new) into their property, this
with the help of the international community.
On July 29, 1994, the exiled NGOs also members of the Collective, in
Bukavu sent their “analysis of the socio-political situation in Rwanda”
to the Belgian NGOs COOPIBO, Vredeseilanden and SOS FAIM[12].
The self-proclaimed objective of this meeting of Rwandan NGOs in Bukavu
was to think about the Rwandan “drama” (the term genocide seems taboo
to them), its causes, and possible solutions. In addition, they
intended to study conditions for the return of the refugees, without
forgetting the role to be played by the NGOs in all this. They report
that millions of Hutus and Tutsis are dead. Of what? They avoid saying
there was a genocide in Rwanda, or advance their thesis of a double
genocide. They report that: “Rwanda seems totally empty of its
population who live in exile,”[13] and deplore the plight of “millions
of refugees in exile.” They gloss over the identity of these refugees,
who, of course, are definitely not Tutsi, since the Tutsi were largely
exterminated.
Additionally, the NGOs still count on the genocidal Government, but
deplore the breakup of the Hutu cohesion into two antagonistic
communities. They cite a myriad of other causes of the “Rwandan drama”,
including the struggle for power, the reference to ethnicity, economic
problems, misunderstanding and mismanagement of the multiparty system
since 1959, the absence of civil society opposition as a third force,
the complicity of the international community and the mass media, the
bias of UNAMIR in the Rwandan conflict in favour of the RPF, the
periodic attacks of the Inyenzi and finally Uganda which shelters the
RPF.
They cite another factor, with deep roots in extremist Hutu ideology:
that Hutus have a bad memory of the feudal-monarchic regime. They do
not, of course, cite the planning of genocide against the Tutsis.
As a way out of this crisis, the Rwandan NGOs advocate for five
strategies, and it is not by chance that their strategies correspond to
those proposed earlier by Froidmont, Nzabahimana and NCOS: give the
right of expression to the population (democracy), promote political
pluralism, reinforce civil society, ensure transparent elections, and
install political mechanisms which protect the parties which are not in
power. What they mean here is, the political parties which were behind
the genocide.
The Rwandan NGOs also tackle the issue of the return of refugees and
national reconciliation. Conditions which, it will be recalled, had
already been proposed by Nzabahimana. The Rwandan NGOs think that for
the return[14] of the refugees, a government of national unity which
doesn’t exclude anyone should be put in place, the refugees should be
repatriated in an organized manner, the deaths of presidents
Habyarimana and Ntaryamira should be investigated and a neutral and
competent tribunal should be established to identify, judge and condemn
the culprits of both the RPF and the interim government. They recall
the extent of the massacres perpetrated since October 1990 (since the
war started), and finally, call for free and democratic elections to be
organized under the aegis of the International Community.
Participants [15], as indicated in the footnote, included people like
Innocent Butare who would later become the Executive Secretary of the
RDR, and Marie Beatrice Umutesi.
Two months later, in October 13-29, 1994, another mission is jointly
organized by three Belgian NGOs, namely COOPIBO, VREDESILANDEN and
SOS-FAIM, to evaluate the work done by the Rwandan NGOs. Participating
in this mission was Marie Goretti Nyirarukundo and once again Ivan
Godfroid, respectively coordinator of the COOPIBO program in Rwanda and
Kivu and in charge of programs in Africa within COOPIBO.
The ostensible objective of the mission was to ensure the follow-up of
the programs of the Rwandan NGOs in Goma and Bukavu, collecting as much
recent information as possible, to fuel the work of the Rwandan cell of
the Belgian consortium (composed of COOPIBO VREDESILANDEN and SOS-FAIM)
informing all the partners of the Collective, and contacting all the
partners of COOPIBO in Kivu for a minimal follow-up of activities.
They would also visit Rwanda to identify new ways of collaboration with
the Rwandan NGOs inside the country, to stimulate the exchange between
the NGOs inside and outside the country. They would also seek a quick
reinforcement of the consortium’s permanent delegation in Kigali, as a
way of reinstalling a full-time representative, and identify ways to
distribute the magazine “Traits d’Union-Rwanda” inside as well as
outside the country.
It is worth noting that this mission, called “THE RWANDAN NGOS AND
REHABILITATION… ” was the fourth organized by COOPIBO and its partners
since the beginning of the genocide. The first was in May 1994 to do
some preliminary scouting and establish contacts—primarily with
perpetrators of genocide and their future public relations
organisations in the guise of NGOs.
The second was organized at the beginning of July 1994 after the great
flight of Rwandan refugees towards Cyangugu and Gisenyi.
In the meantime COOPIBO had been joined by Vredeseilanden and SOS-FAIM,
and the mission was dispatched to Goma to participate in the creation
of the Collective of the Rwandan NGOs and the fine tuning of a
six-month emergency programme.
After the final victory of the RPF, two French NGOs, Groupe
Développement and Frères des Hommes-Toulouse joined the Belgian
consortium to make a request for funds from the European Union. In the
available reports, it is not clear how and why they linked up.
In late August to early September 1994, a third mission of the
Consortium COOPIBO-VREDESEILANDEN-SOS-FAIM gave fresh impetus to the
reorientation of their programme, to adjust to the new situation, with
at least 1.5 million refugees in Kivu. The main focus was life in the
refugee camps in Zaïre.
The Collective of Rwandan NGOs (Goma zone) finds occupations for the
refugees. Curiously, they contend that the ex-FAR and Interahamwe do
not stop anyone from returning home. The professed objective of the
NGOs is the organization of the refugees in structures that are
reliable and representative for the refugees and credible for the
outside world.
This objective corresponds to one expressed earlier by Jean Kambanda,
but the NGOs fear “all identification of this popular organization
with the government in exile which risks endangering its credibility
from the start, in the eyes of the government of Kigali and of the
international community.”[16]
For the mission, however, Jean Kambanda remains a valuable person for
future negotiations with the government of Kigali. The mission reports
the “Kambanda’s will to be tried by an international tribunal is
understandable, since an acquittal would make him a key figure in
future negotiations. At the same time it is an impressive proof that he
doesn’t consider himself guilty of genocide. If only he could
contribute to the condemnation of the real culprits.”[17]
The four missions of COOPIBO and/or of Vredeseilanden, SOS-FAIM, Groupe
Développement and Frères des Hommes-Toulouse from May to October 1994,
and those of Fans Van Hoof and Maria Goretti Nyirarukundo, appear to
have had the underlying objective of denying the Tutsi genocide,
re-establishing contacts with the Hutu genocidaires, rehabilitating and
reintegrating them vis-a-vis the international community, as suggested
by the name of the fourth mission.
Until the month of October 1994, these NGOs persevered still in
justifying Kambanda’s role in the genocide, and considering him as a
key person in the negotiations into which the NGOs were hoping to force
the Government of Kigali.
Here one cannot avoid questioning the NGOs’ reasoning: If Kambanda is
innocent—then there was no genocide in Rwanda either. In this case,
where will he find “the real culprits” that these NGOs wish to be
condemned? And what crime will they be accused of, since there was no
genocide?
The Collective of Rwandan NGOs Bukavu zone then held another meeting of
its General Assembly on July 31, 1995. The objective of the Collective
was to pronounce itself on “the initiative for the Development of the
Synergies “IDS-TWUBAKE”.
According to its report of August 1, 1995, the meeting wanted to recall
that the Collective of Rwandan NGOs is an association of persons from
Rwandan NGOs (as contained in the charter). They expressed frustration
that since the genocide, the NGOS were experiencing difficulties in
contacting their partners (European). Meanwhile, the Rwandan refugees
needed urgent help.
To achieve this, the members and agents of the NGOs, with support from
certain European partners, created the Collective of Rwandan NGOs on
July 4, 1994.
Concerning its charter and its rules and regulations, the Collective
never claimed to support the transfer to Zaïre of Rwandan NGOs which
were operating in Rwanda under the same names. On the contrary, one of
its objectives was to encourage the Rwandan NGO team outside the
country to contact those remaining inside, to see how to elaborate a
single, common support programme to the Rwandan population wherever
they are. This principle was reaffirmed during the meeting held in
Nairobi on November 16-18, 1994, bringing together the NGO teams from
inside the country and those in exile in the presence of Zaïrean and
European partner NGOs.
The members of the Collective considered that the platform IDS-TWUBAKE
could not legally be an association of Rwandan NGOs, for the same
reasons as those evoked during the creation of the Collective and
considering the actual dynamics of the NGO movement in Rwanda. Since
its creation, the Collective always maintained that it was a structure
representative of the Rwandan NGOs.
This is because they could not carry out their activities on Zaïrean
territory since they were legally Rwandan organizations. The Collective
continued to work under the cover of Zaïrean NGOs, notably the CRONGD
South Kivu, the CRONGD North Kivu and the CRONGD.
In conclusion, the General Assembly decided not to recognize the
platform IDS-TWUBAKE under its actual form, “[...] the Collective will
not be able to support the platform if it presents itself as an
association of natural persons and not of Rwandan NGOs in exile.” In
addition, they excluded from the Collective: JMV Musabimana, Jean
Evariste Nayigizente, Télesphore Munyandamutsa, Thérèse Nyiranzabandora
and Marie Uzanyinka for misconduct. The Chairperson of the meeting was
Spéciose Kamanzi and the secretary of the meeting was Barutwanayo
Augustin.[18]
In November 1995, a women’s NGO called the DUTERIMBERE, in its report
titled “The contribution of the NGO teams to the UNHCR on voluntary
repatriation of Rwandan Refugees”, denounced any attempt at forced
repatriation of the refugees similar to the one in August 19-24, 1995,
which allegedly cost the lives of 15,000 refugees and dispersed more
than 150,000 others into the forests.
The DUTERIMBERE denounced the international community for not taking
care of the refugees and removing the embargo on arms for Rwanda. It
especially denounces the government of Kigali for threatening and
attacking them. DUTERIMBERE categorically denied any intimidation of
refugees by the Interahamwe militia, and advanced other reasons for the
refugees’ refusal to return.
The DUTERIMBERE report reasserts the central responsibility of the RPF
in the refugee problem. It describes the RPF as the cause of the exile
of more than three million Rwandans to Tanzania, Zaïre and Burundi, who
are permanently traumatized, and do not know when they will be able to
go home.
The report says that if they do not want to go home it is due to
insecurity (arrests, arbitrary detentions, disappearances,
deportations, cruel and inhuman treatment, massacres and
assassinations, summary executions of those who go back home,
injustice, illegal occupation of refugee property, etc.)
The report insists that Rwandan NGOs must collaborate with the UNHCR
and with international decision-makers to make them accept that these
are the real reasons that prevent the refugees from returning home.
For DUTERIMBERE, the RPF is responsible for the misfortune of the
refugees and this since the war of October 1990. This NGO accuses the
RPF of being responsible for the war, for non-compliance with the
Arusha Agreements, and for the death of Habyarimana and the massacres
that followed. (DUTERIMBERE, also, does not use the word genocide here)
In addition, according to DUTERIMBERE, the RPF does not tell the truth;
it does not wish for the repatriation of the refugees since it
deliberately chose dictatorial practices and manifested the will to
eliminate the Hutu ethnic group. Furthermore, the DUTERIMBERE report
accuses the RPF of using an alleged genocide for political ends to
receive help, and to exclude Hutu from the management of the country.
However, the NGO asserts, the refugees cannot live forever in exile;
they want to come home in peace and rebuild their country.
DUTERIMBERE contests the idea that the refugees must be sorted out in
terms of innocent peasants and killers, and regrets that the
international community seems to share this idea. DUTERIMBERE proposes
instead that as long as everyone’s responsibility has not been
established, both parties should sit at the same table to think about
how to rebuild their country. The report then asks for negotiations
with Kigali in order to implement the Arusha Agreements; it calls on
the UNHCR and the International Community to consider the problem of
insecurity which prevails in Rwanda before forcing the refugees to go
home to be killed; it calls on the UN, the Big Powers and also Uganda
to reconsider their behaviour and do what they did not do in the past
to rebuild Rwanda.
As condition for the return of the refugees, DUTERIMBERE demands that
the International Community impose an arms embargo against Kigali, and
order Kigali to release all prisoners. It calls on the authorities in
Kigali to cease talking about an alleged genocide, and asks other
countries to keep helping refugees.
In addition, DUTERIMBERE asks the NGOs which constitute the Rwandan
intelligentsia not to encourage the refugees to return home as long as
their security is not guaranteed. It asks the RDR to sensitize the
international community to the problems of Rwandan refugees.
DUTERIMBERE denies the genocide of the Tutsi and does not even want the
authorities in Kigali to mention it. DUTERIMBERE holds that the RPF
assassinated President Habyarimana, and is therefore responsible for
any killings that ensued.
From 16th to 18th November 1994 a seminar was held in Nairobi,
organized by NCOS in collaboration with EUROSTEP (earlier dealt with at
length) and the members of Rwandan NGOs, with the technical
collaboration from the Africa Conference of Churches. The theme of the
conference was “THE FUTURE AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NGO WORLD IN
RWANDA.”[19] The meeting brought together 12 participants from inside
Rwanda, 11 from Bukavu and Goma and about 30 from regional and Northern
partner NGOs.
Three themes were addressed at the seminar: the NGO world in Rwanda at
that time; the reconstruction of the NGO world and tasks of the Rwandan
civil society for the future; and the cooperation between Rwandan and
European NGOs.
As explained by Mr. Leo Goovaerts, responsible for the NCOS projects in
central Africa, the purpose of the seminar was to organize a meeting
between the Rwandan NGOs inside and outside Rwanda so as to facilitate
a dialogue and the reconstruction of the Rwandan NGO world; and to
organize a meeting between the Rwandan NGOs and the Northern NGOs so as
to redefine and promote their collaboration and determine an action
plan for the future and reconstruction.
At the end of the discussions, the seminar created a follow-up
committee with a six month term. The committee was to work towards the
return of the refugees, the reconstruction of the NGOs, communication
and information inside the country as well as outside, and lobbying.
This committee included four members of the Rwandan NGOs (two inside
and two outside), a representative of the regional NGOs, in this case
the PREFED, and a representative of the Northern NGOS. From inside
Rwanda, those chosen were Josue Kayijaho, Charles Karemano, Landrada
Mukayiranga, and Euphrem Mbugulize. For PREFED, Kabirigi Lindiro was
chosen while for the Northern NGOS, the NCOS was free to take care of
finding someone.
The participants committed themselves to working towards the return of
the refugees through psychological preparation of minds inside and
outside the country, putting in place reception structures, the fight
against impunity and violation of human rights.
The participants also asked the Rwandan government to facilitate the
work of NGOs in relation to the return of the refugees. They asked the
humanitarian organizations to make an effort to understand the
situation of the refugees. From February 27 to March 4, 1996, the
Collective of Rwandan NGOs in exile was visited by HILDE de MOOR and
IVAN GODFROID and had a meeting.
From the report of this meeting it is clear that the Collective had an
important extension to the South. Considering the activities in the
South as well as elsewhere, the Collective gained consistency and
remained highly significant in the refugee camps.
The Collective seemed well known by the Zairean authorities and the
refugees. The latter allegedly prefer the work of the Collective to the
work of foreign NGOs, because the Collective consists of fellow
Rwandans, and through the Collective there is already solidarity with
Europe.
The report describes a difference in approach between the North Kivu
Zone and the South Kivu Zone. In North Kivu the focus is on concrete
activities, given the large number of refugees, while in the South the
focus is on reflective activities. The report stresses that the camps
of Katale and Kahindo, in north Kivu are little or not at all open
because the people there are extremists.
The report says that the desire to return home is strong and the
refugees are ready to go home and face justice. It claims that the much
reported intimidation of refugees who want to go home is not explicit
but rather implicit (fear of denouncing someone, or of being pursued).
The report finds the UNHCR more intimidating since it urges refugees to
go home while keeping others at bay, considering them responsible of
intimidation.
The report finds that the real reason for not returning is fear of the
RPF and RPA, who kill Hutu men according to the information which comes
everyday to the camps. “We prefer dying in the camps than in the
killing fields in Rwanda”, they said. The refugees, were not reassured
by what they heard on the radio, nor by what is said by certain
authorities in the country, for instance the Minister of Foreign
Affairs who said openly they would use force to repatriate the
refugees.
The report accuses the government of Rwanda of not taking any
initiative to encourage the refugees to come home. The report also
regrets that the UNHCR pointed an accusing finger at the Collective as
being intimidators of refugees and therefore responsible for the
refugees not returning to their country Rwanda.
The report defends the Collective and charges the real intimidators are
Zaïrean soldiers who encircle the camps from 7:00 am to 5:00 pm. The
report does not say exactly when the Zairean soldiers conducted such an
operation. Those who have the intention of never returning, so they
say, are the ones with the means and motives for remaining. The report
tends to justify the violence meted out by the Hutu extremists against
the Rwandophone Tutsi population of Masisi, explaining that it is due
to the lack of a clear perspective for the refugees.
The Collective gives strong support to the creation of a Rwandan Civil
Society in Exile in South Kivu after the forced repatriation of August
1995. The Collective however does not appreciate the UNHCR’s position
against holding meetings in the camps. This, the report says, goes
against the rights of refugees and against the very programme of the
Collective.
The report acknowledges largely negative effects of the presence of the
refugees on the native population. In this regard, a new NGO, the EUB
(Emergency Biodiversity Group) was created with the intention of
enhancing collaboration between refugees and the local population with
leaders from Zaire, Kenya, and Rwanda.
The report claims that the UNHCR understood the Collective’s importance
and invited the northern NGOs which had suspended their activities to
come back. These include the Doctors without Borders from Belgium
working in Kahindo, and the Doctors without Borders from the
Netherlands operating in Katale. Both camps were in Kivu province of
the then Zaire. The authorities from Kigali are also said to have asked
the EUB to come and work inside the country.
In an annex to this meeting’s report, are comments on “THE RWANDAN
CIVIL SOCIETY IN EXILE”. This group is described as one that aspires to
be a platform of associations, to which the Collective of Rwandan NGOs
would belong with the goal of educating the refugees about democratic
and human values, building caucuses in the camps for the defence of
refugees’ rights, producing and sending documents and letters, and
organising sessions. Strange as it may sound, Jean Pierre Godding who
is said to represent “Justice and Peace in Goma” is said to be part of
these activities whose sole purpose was to spread hate ideology and
prepare for war against Rwanda!
Towards the end of 1996, on 02/12/1996, the European Movement for
International solidarity (Frères des hommes) also made its position
clear on the crisis in the Great Lakes region. It states that it is
happy about the return of the refugees, but that the challenges have
just begun. In addition, it is only one part of the refugees who went
home, the others (Rwandans and Zaïreans) about half a million are
scattered in South Kivu. The Movement believes more human rights
observers should be deployed in Rwanda, to monitor the government’s
side, to reassure the returnees on justice, the recovery of their
property and arbitrary arrests. The Movement takes up again the causes
of refugees not returning home spontaneously; causes raised by the
Collective of Rwandan NGOs in Exile and DUTERIMBERE.
From the analyses above the perpetrators of genocide had got a good
camouflage whereby the “Civil Society” and its activities provided them
legitimacy of being seen as refugees. Furthermore, this status allowed
many of them to speak as victims, rather than as the villains they
were.
Notes
_______________________
[1] “OPEN LETTER TO THE NORTHERN NGOS, PARTNERS OF RWANDA, Gisenyi,
21/6/1994
[2] “OPEN LETTER TO THE NORTHERN NGOs…” p. 3
[3]“DECLARATION OF THE NGO COMMUNITY AND THE CIVIL SOCIETY IN RELATION
TO THE FRENCH INTERVENTION FOR A HUMANITARIAN ACTION”.
[4]“ ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SOLUTION OF RWANDA : THE QUESTION
OF INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS”
[5] Collective of Rwanda NGOS Zone of Goma (Zaïre), Goma, 26 July 1994,
p. 1.
[6] Ibid, p. 5
[7] Ibid, p. 6
[8] Collective of Rwandan NGOs, zone of Goma (Zaïre), Goma, July 26,
1994, p. 5.
[9] Ibid, p.5
[10] Ibid, p.5
[11] Ibid. “RWANDA: FROIDMONT MEETING May 20-21, 1994, Provisional
report “. See more on Froidmont
[12] “ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION IN RWANDA BY THE
RWANDAN NGOS IN BUKAVU”, Goma, July 29, 1994.
[13] Ibidem, p. 2.
[14] “ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION IN RWANDA BY THE
RWANDAN NGOs IN EXILE IN BUKAVU, Goma, p.4.
[15] Participants in this Bukavu meeting include: 1. JMV Musabimana
(IWACU Center), 2. Telesphore Munyandamutsa (IWACU Centre), 3. Gabriel
Nkuliyimana (ADENYA), 4. Thérèse Nyiranzabondora (ADENYA), 5. J. d’Arc
Ntakibaruta (ARTC Filles), 6. Damien Hakizimana (ARTC Hommes), 7. J.
Evariste Nayigizente (CCOAIB), 8. Isabelle Nibakure (CCOIB), 9. J.
Bosco Gahongayire (ADENYA), 10. Aloys Nyarwaya (INADES), 11 Révocata
Uwamutara (Women Network), 12. Josepha Nyirankundabera (), 13.
Epiphanie Kampundu (Women Network), 14. Marie Unzaniyinka (ASR), 15.
Spéciose Kamanzi (Women Network), 16. Marie Béatrice Umutesi
(Programmme of Women of Byumba), 17. Innocent Butare
(ARAMET), OBSERVERS LIST: 1. Arsène Kirhero (IRED), 2. Uzziel
Twagilimana (IWACU Center), 3. J.D. Nyamwasa (IWACU Center), 4. Ephrem
Mbugulize (Consultant ONGD), 5. Gilbert Kashemwa (C.DE.KA), 6. Thaddée
Hyawe-Hinyi (SIKASH), 7. Alphonse-Marie Baddy (UWAKI), 8. Albert
Hategekimana (ADENYA) 9. Régine Van Der Syp (Consultant NOVIB/DRA).
[16] “RWANDAN NGOS AND REHABILITATION” p. 23
[17] “RWANDAN NGOS AND REHABILITATION” p.23
[18] LIST OF PARTICIPANTS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COLLECTIVE
31/07/1995
[Names, NGO of origin, Past and present positions ].
1. NDAGIJIMANA Cyprien, ENERWA Legal Representative
2. KAMANZI Spéciose, C.S.C GITARAMA-DUTERIMBERE, Coordinator, and
founding member respectively
3. MUKANYEMAZI Frieda, DUHAMIC/ADRI-DUTERIMBERE, respectively Executive
Secretary, Founding Member
4. UMUTESI M. Béatrice, Programme of support to the Socio-Economic
Promotion of Women/ BYUMBA, Coordinator
5. BUCUMI Balthazar, P.A.M.U, Coordinator
6. NKULIYIMANA Gabriel, ADENYA-IMBAGA-CCOAIB, respectively Coordinator,
Founding Member.
7. MUTABAZI Edouard, SNV-PADEC/GITARAMA, AJED (Youth Animation
Association for development), respectively a.g Coordinator, Legal
Representative
8. NSABIMANA Athanase, .ADENYA a.s.b.l., Member of Administration
Council and advisor.
9. HATEGEKIMANA Albert, ADENYA a.s.b.1., Chief of Secretariat
10. HAKIZIMANA Damien, A.R.T.C/H a.s.b.1., Group leader and Committee
member
11. SIBORUREMA Athanase, ARDI-KIGALI, Assistant in project service
12. GAHONGAYIRE J.Bosco, ADENYA, in charge of Health and Population
13. NYIRAHABIMANA Marguerite, ARBEF, Secretary.
14. NTAKIBARUTA Jeanne, ARTCF, Leader.
15. MUKAGELIMANA Faina, ARDI et ARTCF, Training officer ARTCF, Member
of ARDI.
16. NYIRAKOBWA Pauline, Women Network working for developpement,
SNV-RWANDA, Leader.
17. UWAMAHORO Séraphine, SNV-RWANDA, Women Network, Animator, PADEC
18. MUJAWIMANA M.Goretti, ARTC/F, Training officer
19. UZALIBARA Félicien, ADEHAMU, In-charge of Agriculture Service
20. MUKANDEBE Bernadette, Women Network working for development,
Handicapped center, DUTERIMBERE, respectively founding member,
reintegration service, Founding member.
21. NYARWAYA Aloys, INADES-training.
22. AVEMARIYA Védaste, C.S.C GITARAMA, Finance Officer
23. BARUTWANAYO Augustin, C.S.C GITARAMA, Research trainer
24. TWAGILIMANA Uzziel, IWACU/ CFRC, In charge of the Unit, Training
member of management
Committee.
25. MUSHIMIYIMANA Clotilde, CCOAIB, Secretary
[19] Due to the importance of the Seminar, White Father, Guy Theunis
announced it in Dialogue N°179, of November 1994, p.128. The journal,
Dialogue where G.Theunis is an acting editor in charge is sold at the
headquarters of NCOS which is organized the meeting. Names of
participants and in brackets NGOs they represent :
RWANDAN NGOS : Charles KAREMANO (ARDI), Canisius MUNGWAKUZWE
(ARBEF/COSYLI), Judith KANAKUZE (DUTERIMBERE), Jean-Paul
BIRAMVU (CLADHO), Jean-Baptiste MBERABAHIZI (KANYARWANDA), Oreste
MUPANDA (ARDI), Floride MUKARUGAMBWA (Women’s Network), Odette KAKUZE
(ARTFC), Eugène NKUBITO (IWACU), Josué KAYIJAHO (AVP), Stanislas
KANYANZIRA (CCOAIB), Barnabé TWAGIRAMUNGU, (ADEHAMU), Etienne
NSENGIMANA (ASR), René SIBOMANA (AJE), Prosper TWIZEYIMANA C/o Oxfam
Goma (COLLECTIF DES ONG), JMV MUSABIMANA c/o CRONGD North Kivu-Zaïre
(IWACU), Béatrice UMUTESI c/o CRONGD North Kivu Zaïre (Women’s
Programme BYUMBA), Speciosa KAMANZI c/o CRONG South Kivu
(CSC/GITARAMA), Marie UNZANIYINKA c/o CRONGD South Kivu Bukavu (ASR),
Thérèse NYIRANZABANDORA C/o CRONG South Kivu (DUTERIMBERE), Landrada
MUKAYIRANGA c/o CRONG North Kivu (CCOAIB), Ephrem MBUGULIZE
(NGOsCOLLECTIVE).
Northern NGOs : Leo GOOVAERTS, (NCOS), Luk BOUTERS, (NCOS/WITHUIS),
Michèle LEFEVRE, (CNCD),Mutombo MULAWI (AACC), Michiel VANDEKERCKHOVE,
(VREDESEILANDEN-SOS-FAIM COOPIBO), Luc BONTE, (KBA-FONCABA), Peter
OOSTERVEER, (NOVIB), Caroline OWEGI see above (AACC), Josepha
KANZAYIRE, (BROEDERLIJK DELEN), An MAES (UMUBANO), Esther MUJAWAYO,
(OXFAM-UK), Elske VAN GORKUM, (CCO), Nelson BINDARIYE,
(CIDSE), SCHLANG, c/o CRS Kigali (CIDSE), R. SALA (INTERMON),
R. EHRLER, (GERMAN AGRO ACTION), A. BIZIMANA, (MISEREOR/APTE), Andreas
SCHILD (INTERCOOPERATION), André BARTHELEMY (AGIR ENSEMBLE), Marie
Goretti NYIRARUKUNDO (COOPIBO-VREDESEILANDEN SOS-FAIM),Makoto KATSUMATA
(RWANDA RECONCILIATION SUPPORT COMMITTEE), ANACLETI Odhiambo
(OXFAM-UK), Anne Pieter VAN DIJK (NOVIB). ONG-REGIONALES : Cécile
MUKARUBUGA (ACORD), Celsius BARAHINDUKA (ITEKA), Mathe MUSUMBA
(CRONGD), Rose OTHIENO (IFOR), Père MINANI Bihuzo Bin Kakuru (GROUPE
JEREMIE),KABIRIGI Lindiro (PREFED), Léopold GARAMAWI (INADES-
FORMATION).
Others: Martin SISOKA MBANDA (PNUD/RESEAU AFRIQUE 2000), Sakura HIROSHI
(AMDA).
Chapter IX: Other initiatives of Rwandans living in Exile
Now that we have taken a first look at the complicity of Northern NGOs
in the efforts of Rwandan NGOs to deny the Tutsi genocide, let us
examine the various initiatives of the group RWANDAN CIVIL SOCIETY IN
EXILE (SCRE) towards the same end. Here again, logic impels us to begin
with what was happening in Europe. We will then go on to what was done
in Zaïre and elsewhere in Africa.
Prior to this however, an important question must be clarified. How
does the Rwandan civil society group “SCRE” introduce itself?
The SCRE signed its charter on January 14, 1995 and elected the members
of its general coordination office on January 28, 1995 in Mugunga camp
in Goma in North Kivu, Republic of Zaïre. The members of the
bureau were: Monsignor Simon HABYARIMANA (President)[1], Immaculée
NYIRABIZEYIMANA (Vice-President)[2], Anastase RWARAHOZE
(Vice-President), Isaac KILIMWABO (Vice-President), Jean Baptiste
HATEGEKIMANA[3] (Secretary), and Afzal Khan MOHAMED (Treasurer).
The SCRE announced its objectives as follows: to defend the interests
of Rwandan refugees by making their cause heard, promoting and
maintaining solidarity between Rwandan refugees, promoting the
conditions of security and well-being of the refugees, acting as the
link between the Rwandan refugee community and those living inside
Rwanda on the one hand, and the international community on the other,
examining with all concerned all the obstacles in the problem of the
return of refugees to Rwanda and the building of lasting peace.
The SCRE was composed of eight subdivisions, with one coordination
bureau each. Six sections were in Zaire: Mugunga, Kibumba, Katale,
Kahindo, Lac-vert and Bukavu. A Kenyan section was represented by an
Anglican Bishop, Augustin NSHAMIHIGO who lived in Nairobi, and
Tanzanian section was represented by another Anglican Bishop Augustin
MVUNABANDI, and who was in the refugee camp in Ngara, Tanzania.
While NCOS and EUROSTEP were organising their aforesaid May-June 1994
mission in the Great Lakes region, with Van Hoof and Godfroid as
envoys, another meeting of Rwandan civilians was being held at
Froidmont (Belgium) on May 20-21, 1994.[4] This meeting was not the
first of its kind; it was a follow up of another one held on May 12,
1994 in Brussels, which had called for further meetings to be held
often, to “carry out objective analyses of the problems and the
“illness” of the country”.[5]
This May 21 meeting in Froidmont brought together Rwandan civilians
from various political leanings and non-Rwandans working with European
NGOs who had lived in Rwanda, including prominent ones like Mayer Graaf
of Switzerland, Dominique Lessaffre, Bernard Taillefer of France and
Hugues Dupriez of Belgium. The majority of participants, however, were
from “Hutu power circles.” The purpose of this meeting was, “to
identify areas of agreement capable of helping to find a solution to
the tragedy the country was currently going through, point out areas of
disagreement which could be discussed at a later date, strengthen ideas
or positions of the Rwandan civil society, give room for voices other
than those of guns in the settlement of the conflict and the search of
lasting peace in Rwanda”.
Having identified the various problems of the Rwandan society which had
plunged the country into the genocide and massacres, the participants
aired their views and ideas about the most important points which had
always characterized the history of Rwanda: ethnicity and regionalism;
the regional and international geopolitical context; socio-economic
problems; extreme poverty and population density; the State,
dictatorship and fear; political parties, responsibilities in the
genocide and the massacres, and civil society.
The participants in this meeting expressed themselves on these points,
each one according to his political leanings, and their views agreed on
a number of points, particularly on ethnicity and regionalism. On this
point, the participants proposed “putting in place transparent rules of
the game governing the access to and change of power and the mechanisms
of power control, promoting the democratic culture by educating the
Rwandan people who are currently under the grip of intoxication
regarding the problem of ethnicity and regionalism”[6]
With regard to democracy, the meeting unanimously deplored that
democracy had never been able to flourish in Rwanda and that fear
stemming from dictatorship had instead been established. The
participants felt that “the State has always been a dictatorship which
has not worked for the public good. The International Community has
never discouraged this state of affairs. Dictatorial regimes generate
mechanisms which cause fear. The people of Rwanda fear that one
dictatorship is replaced by another. As for a true and free civil
society, it simply does not exist. The Froidmont meeting wants to
revive a genuine civil society, and this revival should be translated
in the establishment of a national commission of inquiry which is
independent from the current political powers”[7]
Views also differed, especially with regard to the problem of genocide
and massacres. Concerning responsibilities in the genocide and
massacres, the Froidmont meeting “condemned the political massacres and
the genocides committed in Rwanda since the beginning of the war (…),
demanded the setting up of an international commission to bring to the
surface all the responsibilities of the massacres and (…) that the
actors of these deeds should be tried and punished.”
It is important to note that at this meeting, the minutes of the
meeting condemn not the genocide, but the GENOCIDES (in plural). This
was done deliberately: the meeting linked these so-called genocides to
the beginning of the October 1990 war and called for the establishment
of an international commission to try the actors of the conflicting
parties, since the RPF, according to them, had also committed genocide
and massacres. The participants of the Froidmont meeting felt that
little or nothing at all was being said about the genocide and
massacres allegedly committed by the RPF.
It is not surprising that the Froidmont meeting had some similarities
with the NCOS mission in the Great Lakes region mentioned earlier. In
fact, their aims overlapped: both appealed to the international
community to intervene and put sufficient pressure to stop the war and
the massacres, and to bring the parties to resume dialogue and
negotiations for the formation of a transitional government which
should give a say back to the ‘Rwandan people’. These were the
cherished ideas of François Nzabahimana, who knew about the NCOS
mission, but who also attended the Froidmont meeting and whose role in
revisionism is very significant.
Nzabahimana developed these theses and disseminated them through a
group called Comité Rwandais d’Action pour la Démocratie (CRAD) or
Rwanda Action Committee for Democracy. In a document entitled
“Propositions sur la situation au Rwanda” dated June 17, 1994,
Nzabahimana analysed the Rwandan crisis in his own way and came up with
his own solutions. He writes about the causes of the crisis, the
behaviour of Belgium and other powers such as the United States, Great
Britain and France. His thesis on the causes of the crisis is well
known. It is the RPF attack of October 1, 1990: “the situation of
poverty, anxiety, abandonment which the population has been
experiencing since October 1, 1990, when the RPF first attacked the
country, sending a million people into internal displacement, the fear
of the Hutu seeing Tutsis (the RPF) take power.” These are allegedly
the indirect cause of the genocide; thereafter, “the death of
Habyarimana, the vacuum left by this death and the lack of a clear
position and rapid response of the International Community”[8] are the
immediate causes which led to the genocide, which Nzabahimana does not
admit it happened.
Nzabahimana tried to justify the anti-Belgium campaign before and
during the genocide, though in the past, Belgium had been “Rwanda’s
first and most important partner in the economic, social and political
aspects”.
According to Nzabahimana, it was from the date RPF attacked on October
1, 1990, that Belgium began misbehaving, by refusing to arm the
Habyarimana Government. This refusal was seen by Nzabahimana and by the
‘Rwanda people’ as Belgium being sympathetic to the RPF.
This, also, justified the animosity of the genocide perpetrators
towards Belgians, hence the killing of the Belgian peacekeepers.
Nzabahimana also accused countries such as Great Britain and the United
States for having done little to find a solution to the problem of
Rwanda.
His views about the solution of the problem of Rwanda revolve around
points to which he always makes reference in his documents, and which
we have found both in the Froidmont meeting and in the general
conclusions of Van Hoof and Godfroid NCOS mission. These are: the
people of Rwanda were abandoned in the hands of the RPF by the
international community; the perpetrators must be identified, tried and
punished; there is need for a rapid, resolute and strong intervention
(pressure) of the international community to bring the war to an end;
and a new Constitution should be drafted, supported by a process of
normalisation leading to elections.
An important document in which Nzabahimana officially addresses “the
conditions for the return of the refugees” bears the title “Quelques
préalables au retour des déplacés de guerre”. This is in fact a report
of a meeting held in Namur (Belgium) on July 30, 1994. This meeting was
attended by Rwandans living in France, Belgium and Germany and was
organised by CRAD with Nzabahimana as its chairman. The theme of the
meeting was “Refusal of the military solution imposed on the people of
Rwanda.”[9]
In this declaration, Nzabahimana’s cherished topics emerge: the RPF
took power by arms and the war it prosecuted against the people of
Rwanda over the last four years was the cause of the people’s flight;
the RPF is responsible for the massacres before and after April 6, 1994
and for the exodus of Hutus who were afraid of its cruel methods; the
thesis of double genocide is reiterated. The declaration maintains, in
fact, that “everybody killed both FAR and RPF; Hutus and Tutsis are
equally bad,” and “rejects the assertion that all the Hutus are
killers.”[10]
According to Emmanuel Havugimana, the author of the article “the
moderate has little chance to succeed”, a Hutu CDR or a Tutsi CDR are
all the same. In addition “all MNRD members are not killers”. See also
Dialogue N°187, December 1995, (p.73). In the same issue, a Belgian
Catholic priest and White Father, Guy Theunis advertises “Radio
Agatashya”, (p.172). Again, it was in this same issue that Dialogue
announced the publication of its three issues of “Revue de
presse rwandaise”.
It is remarkable and shocking, to see that Dialogue continues to
advertise Kangura (Revue de Presse Rwandaise n° 20), closing its eyes
to the role of this newspaper in the genocide of the Tutsi. It is in
this issue that we find the extract of the homily of Pope Jean Paul II
delivered in Nairobi on 19 September 1995. His message to the people
of Rwanda (and Burundi) called for reconciliation and forgiveness,
urged particularly the refugees of these two countries to persevere,
and pledged his help in order to lighten their cross. The Pope did not
utter a word on the genocide, be it on the survivors of this cataclysm
or on those who planned and committed it. (p.126)
The Namur document, started by identifying the reasons which made the
refugees flee from their country—the fear of RPF and the war it
launched. It emphasises that ‘the people’ ran away from the RPF because
they knew its atrocities and did not want to relive the experiences of
October 1990, February 1993 and of course, April 1994. The document
claims that, barbaric actions, by the RPF, against the civilian
population and the massive displacement of the people, were part of its
strategy. The International Community, it says, was made hostage by
RPF propaganda and did not listen to some Rwandans because they were
against RPF and were considered as extremists; it should accept the
restoration of the truth. (p. 1)
The document accuses the Government of Kigali, described as “the RPF
government”, of not complying with the Arusha Agreements and of using
then instead as “a stepping stone and a smokescreen for international
opinion”.(p. 3) It accuses the RPF of modifying these Agreements to its
whims and of holding several offices concurrently. It urges the
international community to not recognize the “RPF Government”, and
claims that “the people” do not identify themselves with this new
government. (Ibid p. 4)
The July 30, 1994 Namur document sets out the following conditions for
the return of refugees. The RPF must stop making lists of genocide
perpetrators. It must release the illegally occupied properties of the
refugees. It must reassure the population by appointing Hutus in the
Ministry of Rehabilitation. It must remove “foreign mercenaries” from
the army before forming a truly national unity army. The RPF must stop
acting as a judge, because it is also a defendant; the right of trying
the perpetrators of the massacres should be left to the international
community. Those responsible for the attack against the plane of
President Habyarimana (read, RPF members) should be identified, for
they are the real cause of the massacres. In short, “there is need for
political action leading to the establishment of a government of
genuine National Unity which must be negotiated and be representative
of the population.”(p. 5) Note that at no single time does Nzabahimana
speak of “the genocide against the Tutsi.” He prefers to refer to “the
massacres of Tutsis and Hutus.”
DIALOGUE and International pressure
One cannot speak of the actions of the Rwandan Civil Society in Europe
without mentioning the role of the non-profit making association
DIALOGUE [11], and the journal bearing the same name. The themes of
genocide denial by Nzabahimana and his colleagues are echoed by the
journal, DIALOGUE. For a long time, Nzabahimana was a member of its
editorial committee. During the genocide, he was made the chairman of
the Executive Committee of ASBL DIALOGUE.
DIALOGUE journal began publishing in Belgium after July 1994. The
issues of this journal were on sale at the head office of NCOS. Since
then, DIALOGUE published in Belgium has become a systematic critic of
the RPF and the Kigali government, as well as the mouthpiece of the
genocide perpetrators and revisionists, initially NZABAHIMANA being
their team leader.
Nzabahimana devoted all his energies to the defence of the rights of
the of the genocide perpetrators who lived in refugee camps in Zaire.
Determined to deny the genocide against the Tutsi, Nzabahimana ignores
what happened in Rwanda from April 6, 1994 which was rightly qualified
by the United Nations as “Genocide”, and prefers to systematically
remain evasive, and talk instead of “the events which shook the
country.”
There are other people who have coined inappropriate terms and
expressions to refer to the Rwandan genocide. For instance, Robert
Kajuga, the President of Interahamwe, says in, speaking to Le Monde
newspaper: “Everything was spontaneous. The population defended itself
when the rebels from the Rwandese Patriotic Front attacked. It was not
savagery, it was war”[12]
For the Editors of DIALOGUE No. 175, there is no question of genocide
but rather of “the greatest massacres in the history of Rwanda”. This
issue was due to come out in April 1994, but came out only in November
1994 “for well known reasons”, as the editor puts it. Why not simply
say, “because of the genocide against the Tutsi which started on 6
April 1994?” But we know the answer: the journal could not address this
issue honestly, even though it liked to call for “objectivity and
honesty in political information.” Quite strange!
In the DIALOGUE N^o 177, in an editorial by Nzabahimana focused on
humanitarian aid and the return of the refugees, the genocide is
systematically elided, with references to “the massacres of April” or
“tragedy” or “war”, and “collective hatred”.[13] And there is total
confusion when he even adds cholera!! (DIALOGUE No. 179
November-December, Editorial).
DIALOGUE No. 179 devoted to “Issues of concern in Rwanda,”[14] was full
of confusion deliberately sowed by the editorial staff, of which
Nzabahimana was well aware since he was a member of the editorial
committee. The editorial knowingly avoided talking of “Tutsis” killed
in the genocide and used the terms just mentioned above. Very subtly,
the word “survivors” was applied not to the very few Tutsis who
survived the genocide, but to “those who today are victims of
unspeakable vengeance and reprisals”!! Given the context of the defeat
of the genocidaires, and his own sympathies, Nzabahimana was clearly
reserving the term “survivors” for—Hutus.
The editorial of DIALOGUE issue No. 179 set out to prove that there had
been two genocides in Rwanda, and that the real culprit in these two
genocides was the RPF. In this connection, it stated on [...] “One
cannot understand the present without knowing the past, without
recognizing that the genocide has a history behind it and that RPF is
part of this history.” (p. 2)
The editorial’s author (i.e. the Editorial Committee) strove to argue
that it was wrong “to classify all the Hutus as the killers and the
Tutsi as the victims of the genocide; the former government as
embodying the genocide and dictatorship and RPF as the saviour of the
country and democracy”. In the opinion of DIALOGUE[15], both are
killers and both are victims.
The other cherished theme of the Editorial of DIALOGUE was “dialogue”,
a precondition for avoiding a new war. This dialogue was to be between
the RPF and “the representatives of the majority of the population”. In
his article “Sujets d’inquiétude au Rwanda” of October 1994, a Belgian
Filip REYNTJENS also raised the issue of dialogue. He expressed his
pessimism with regard to the stability of the country in which “can be
seen as the outlines of some worrying and potentially destabilising
trends”.
Reyntjens mentioned the insecurity created mainly by the RPA,
injustice, the return of old refugees and the unlawful occupation of
the properties of the new refugees, disappearances, massacres and
assassinations by the RPA, detentions which he compared to those meted
out to Ibyitso (accomplices of RPF) in 1990.
According to REYNTJENS, the current government, identified as “the RPF”
should hold a dialogue with the moderates among the politicians in
exile; otherwise there was the danger that Rwanda would be involved in
another war. This prediction of a new war was put forward as a way of
putting pressure on the Kigali Government of National Unity, so that it
would negotiate with those who planned and executed the genocide in
Rwanda and then fled to Zaire and to other countries supporting them.
In the same issue of DIALOGUE, a man called Charles BAKUNDAKWITA
reiterates the responsibility of RPF in the genocide against the Tutsi.
He writes on page 16: “When it started the war, RPF knew quite well
that it was making the Tutsi living inside the country hostages who,
wrongly or rightly, were considered as its accomplices”.
Bakundakwita continues by accusing RPF of having knowingly “infiltrated
Interahamwe militia in order to incite them to commit much more
atrocities and make particularly their hideous crimes more visible”.
With regard to international pressure, Jean Pierre Godding, a Caritas
(Goma) volunteer, also wrote an article in Issue N^o 179 of DIALOGUE in
the same vein. This Belgian had only one concern: the insecurity
prevailing in the refugee camps in Goma. But quite astonishingly, he
did not want to recognize the cause of this insecurity, namely the will
of the militia and the soldiers to hold the population hostage. Godding
instead blamed UNHCR for having failed to organise the camps and the
NGOs for having failed to do their work, resulting in the refugees
dying of hunger and scorning the refugee agency. In his report, Godding
proposed voluntary return of the refugees, and for this to happen, he
called for NGOs to put pressure on both parties “so that meetings are
made possible, negotiations are launched and a way to return is finally
found.” (p. 24)
The same concerns are found in another document by the same Godding,
dated January 14, 1995, but with only one new element: the possibility
of a new war if there were no dialogue. “[...] if both parties continue
to refuse to meet, if the refugees continue to feel abandoned, if the
new authorities talk of “winners” and “losers”, there is the risk of
new militias being formed, hatred and vengeance will prevail in a group
which will feel desperate and war will resume.”[16]
In the Editorial of DIALOGUE Issue N^o183 of May-June 1995, François
Nzabahimana finally gets around to recalling the memory of certain
members of DIALOGUE and of the Editorial Committee of DIALOGUE who were
no longer alive: François Funga, Director of the Journal, Emmanual
Bahigiki, Treasurer of the Executive Committee, Jean-Baptiste
Ngirabacu, member of the Editorial Committee, André Kameya and others.
However, Nzabahimana does not say how they died, but simply that they
were killed during the “events which happened in Rwanda”. Shouldn’t the
readers of DIALOGUE be told, straightforwardly, that these were killed
during the 1994 genocide? One would think that they died of a natural
catastrophe like earthquake, floods, etc!
In addition to glossing over the genocide, DIALOGUE tries to find a way
of establishing a moral and strategic equivalence between the
perpetrators and those who combated and ended the genocide. For
example, former Prime Minister Dr. Dismas Nsengiyaremye, in an article
entitled “What is to be done to get Rwanda out of impasse” does not see
any difference between the actions of the MRND-CDR and those of the
RPF. Both were killers and both trampled human rights in the same way:
“the MRND-CDR duo is not the only one to trample on human rights. The
other political military bloc, the RPF, is striving to equal it in
massacres and other crimes”. [...][17]
Quoting “Le Nouveau Quotidien” of Lausane-Switzerland, in its issue of
July 25, 1994, he writes: “while the refugees are dying in Goma, RPF is
clearing the capital Kigali. Disappearances, summary executions, night
infiltrations in hospitals (…) contrary to what it pledges, RPF is
carrying out acts of vengeance with the greatest discretion and sorts
out systematically suspects.”
He concludes: “RPF’s behaviour is curiously reminiscent of that of MRND
in the past: both of them act under the logic of absolute and sole
power which is acquired and kept by force and terror even if it means
driving the whole population out of the country as a result of
continuous killings and forced exile.”
Laurien Ntezimana from “Service d’Animation Théologique de Butare”
shared the same view in the same issue of DIALOGUE. He calls this
“falling from Scylla into Charybdis”, i.e. “avoiding one danger and
falling in a similar one” (p. 61) He found similarities between the
systems of the Interahamwe and the Inkotanyi. According to him, they
resemble each other and apply “the same forces of depravity of
humankind of fear, greed and conceit” (p.62). Neither of the two can
bring any positive change to Rwanda and to Rwandans. It is replacing
one dictator by another dictator.
As far as Ntezimana is concerned, the Interahamwe killed the Tutsi (he
does not mention the word genocide) and looted the country, and the
RPF-Inkotanyi did the same, if not worse. In fact, he wrote: “massacres
mainly during the lightning advance, serial killings after the victory,
“mysterious” disappearances today, this is what made the majority of
the population tremble. Without mentioning that all soldiers from both
sides and both periods are alike—behind these crimes, there is a whole
climate of terror which continues.”
In Ntezimana’s view, “Those who were not supposed to die” (Hutu) are in
fact at the mercy of “those who were supposed to die” (Tutsi) and who
escaped miraculously. It is enough that “somebody who was supposed to
die ” points a finger (gutunga agatoki) at “somebody who was not
supposed to die alleging that he has participated in the massacres or
looting for the latter to be automatically arrested and killed
(formerly) or imprisoned (currently) without any trial. One wonders how
those who fled will come back if anyone who shows up is punished before
he is tried” (Ibid p.63). There is not only a double genocide but also
a double looting of the country. Interahamwe and Inkotanyi “are all the
same.”
Ntezimana even calls the latter “vultures”, who not only loot but also
kill to take the properties of the Hutu: “Add to these those who
disappear because of claiming back their properties –some are killed or
ordered to be killed in order to take their vehicles or their houses
for good – if then these are added to those, without forgetting the
numerous scores being settled for other reasons (old quarrels, old
hatreds which finally find an appropriate context to vent out or get
satisfied) then one gets more or less a correct idea of the climate of
fear which prevails currently in the country of a thousand horrors and
a thousand mercies.” (Ibid p. 63)
DIALOGUE also featured preaching on the theme of double genocide on the
part of the church leaders, including Father Michel Donnet, a “Fidei
Donum” priest of the Diocese of Tournoi.[18] The main concern for him
is not the genocide against the Tutsi, but rather the “demonization” of
the Hutu as genocide perpetrators and the silence about the massacres
organised by the RPF, which too often are presented as “blunders” or
“loss of control.”
The Rwandan priest Venuste Linguyeneza who lives in Belgium is another
revisionist who writes often in the DIALOGUE journal. In his numerous
articles, Linguyeneza also asserts that: a “single genocide, hides
another, because the wrath behind the genocide against the Tutsi gave
rise to the wrath which caused the acts of genocide against the
Hutu”.[19] Linguyeneza continues further on: “Rwandans were killed, the
Tutsi Bagogwe, the Tutsi from Bugesera and elsewhere, and the Hutu of
Byumba, Ruhengeri and everywhere else where passed the RPF and this
continues. On one side, people agree to talk of genocide, but what
about the other side. Was it simply a news item?”[20]
Linguyeneza is only one of several Hutu priests who used the DIALOGUE
journal to defend and disseminate revisionist ideas. Mention can also
be made of Father Juvenal Rutumbu of Ruhengeri diocese, a refugee in
France, who wrote extensively in various issues of DIALOGUE, attacking
virulently the Tutsi and the RPF on whom he heaps the responsibility of
all the ills of Rwanda, including genocide.
Reacting to the “Confession of Detmold” (Germany) from 7 to 12 December
1996, Nkiko Nsengimana felt that “As analysed in its logic, the
confession seems imbalanced. The death of very many Hutu exceeds by far
the context of vengeance and blind suppression in which you are placing
it. These are crimes against humanity which have been carefully ordered
by some army commanders of RPF. Don’t forget the people of Byumba who
suffered a heavy toll in the war since October 1990 and from 7 April
1994. While no Tutsis had been killed in their area, with the exception
of the commune of Murambi, they died by tens of thousands of gunshots
and grenades in schools, in places of worship or in any other places
where they were gathered [...]. For the people of Byumba, when we talk
of and condemn the genocide, they genuinely think that it is the
genocide against the Hutu committed by the soldiers of the RPF army. In
fact, these are the only massacres which they experienced. Talking of
isolated acts of vengeance when people have disappeared in such big
numbers could be construed as being also criminal.”[21]
In short, every editorial of DIALOGUE written in Brussels was deeply
revisionist. The examples cited above are not exhaustive; they were
selected from many others, with priority going to those which appeared
in the first few months after the genocide against the Tutsi. They
demonstrate the extent to which the DIALOGUE journal in Brussels was
and continues to be attached to the Hutu genocide ideology, with an
incredible loyalty to the government which committed the genocide.
The journal claims a deep commitment to human rights, but displays
remarkably little concern for the rights of the victims, survivors and
opponents of the genocide against the Tutsi.
2. In the KIVUs and elsewhere in Africa
Let us now return to François Nzabahimana and his report on his mission
to Goma and Bukavu on August 29, 1994, on behalf of the Rwandan
Committee of Action for Democracy (CRAD), entitled “Rwanda or Political
urgency.” Here too, Nzabahimana talks of “genocides” in the plural, but
this time, he adds an alleged genocide against the Batwa!! “GENOCIDES
were committed, the country was destroyed. There was the degeneration
of a people”. [22]
On this basis Nzabahimana urges that it is first necessary to establish
who is responsible for the Rwandan conflict: “The search for the truth
is the only thing that can bring about some compensation. No
politician, no political party, no country, no matter how strong should
be spared. Only the truth will bring back the political, economic,
social and religious life.”[23]
Nzabahimana demands first and foremost, that the RPF be held
accountable, then the United Nations, Belgium and finally the United
States. He finds the responsibility of these actors to be clear, but
that of the Government which prepared the genocide of the Tutsi is yet
to be proved. Nonetheless, Nzabahimana is convinced that “everybody
killed: members of FAR, RPF, political parties’ militia, RPF squads and
Hutu and Tutsi.”[24]
It is difficult to imagine that a person like Nzabahimana does not know
the definition of the word “genocide”; according to him, everybody
planned the extermination of everybody else. Here we have a champion of
revisionism, indeed.
Having denied the genocide, Nzabahimana focuses again on the issue
closer to his heart: the situation of the refugees in the camps. He
accuses the international community of having abandoned a people who
are the victims of RPF and who are branded by RPF as “killers when the
accountability in fact lies elsewhere.”[25] Where? Again with the RPF,
and the international community: “Every day, thousands of people die in
the camps, there is total human degeneration—the relations with
humanitarian aid bodies are tense, often full of hatred and dangerous,
there is the impression that these institutions are biased in favour of
RPF, the people have the impression that the international community
has taken them hostage.”[26]
The message sent by Nzabahimana is easy to understand and without
ambiguity: “The refugees cannot return to Rwanda because of fear of the
RPF; they fear also that accountability may not be correctly
established, that those who are the true culprits may go unpunished and
that, as a result, the war may start all over again.”[27] Here,
Nzabahimana implies that the refugees will not go back as long as the
RPF is ruling alone. In any case, the people are not in a hurry to go
back in these conditions: “the RPF will have to wait for 5
years.”[28] In his view, it is therefore necessary that accountability
be established, particularly that of the RPF for starting a war in
October, 1990: “for many people in Bukavu and Goma, that is when their
misery started and the RPF will always be held responsible.”[29]
Nzabahimana accuses the RPF of murders and massacres before 6 April
1994, and of the massacres of Hutu intellectuals and politicians
between April 6 and April 9, 1994. He even accuses the RPF of being
responsible for the death of some Tutsi. What cynicism! He then accuses
the UN which, according to him, was an accomplice of the RPF for not
having condemned its acts and murders. He accuses Uganda and Burundi;
he accuses Agathe Uwilingiyimana.
According to him, it is as if Agathe Uwilingiyimana deserved to be
killed, and the Belgian peacekeepers died very stupidly. He accuses
virtually everybody—except for those who were responsible for the
genocide!
Nzabahimana concludes by saying that all these accusations were the
facts gathered from “reliable people in Bukavu and Goma,” including
employees and leaders of NGOs, members of cooperatives, religious
people, peasants, etc… In reply to the question: “what should be done
for the refugees to return?”
He claims they unanimously replied that it was necessary “to quickly
bring out the truth and the responsibilities, put in place a government
recognized by the population which excludes those who were responsible
for the massacres from both sides, the people choosing their leaders,
trying those guilty of the massacres by an international tribunal,
countries which have the trust of the population to be entrusted with
military security.”[30]
Annexed to Nzabahimana’s report was a Goma declaration August 24, 1994
of a “Commission de la Société Civile Rwandaise Exilée au Nord-Kivu
pour un retour rapide, collectif et organisé au pays.” (Commission of
Rwandan Civil Society exiled in North Kivu for a quick, Collective and
organised return home)
According to this Commission, the Hutu chose to run away from the RPF
because they had experienced massacres by the RPF since 1990. They
feared the tyrannical rule and the revenge of the RPF, as well as the
reprisals of soldiers whose kin were killed; they feared the insecurity
inside the country and human rights violations; they feared a
self-imposed government from outside, an ideological inquisition,
etc.[31]
The Commission spelled out the conditions for the return of the
refugees: an equitable sharing of power between Hutu and Tutsi,
security (total demilitarization of the country, recovery of
properties, putting a stop to statements which sow fear and vengeance,
abolishing lists of alleged genocide perpetrators and ceasing to make
new lists, and giving dignified and official burials to the people who
died since October 1, 1994, including President Habyarimana.[32]
As stated earlier, the leitmotiv of NGOs from the North and those based
in Zaire was the need for a negotiated return of the refugees. To
pursue this objective, a meeting was organized in Bukavu with the head
of ACT, a Flemish Democrat Christian NGO, and the PPE Group Foundation.
The meeting was attended by, of course, François Nzabahimana, as
chairman of the Rwanda Action Committee for Democracy (CRAD), Paul
Mbaraga (then a journalist with Deutsche Welle) and Samuel Hitimana
(delegate from MDR, Belgium section). There were also Europeans such as
Bernard STASI, vice- president of the Development and Cooperation
Commission of the European Parliament, Rika DE BACKER, former CVP
Minister and ACT Chairman, and Alain DE BROUWER, Advisor in charge of
Africa at the l’Internationale Démocrate Chrétienne (IDC). The
objective of the meeting was to “listen to the voice of Rwandan
refugees, the bulk of the population, and support any initiative meant
for the peaceful and safe return of the refugees.” [33]
According to accounts, allegedly collected by this delegation, the
refugees unanimously maintained that they wanted to return, but return
together, freely and in security, without any processing by the RPF.
In the delegation’s view, the prevailing fear of insecurity in Rwanda
was the result of accounts told by those who attempted to return
individually; the refugees do not recognize the genocide of Tutsi
alone, but genocides.
They noted that Associations and NGOs were very active in Bukavu. They
discussed the causes of and the solution of the Rwandan crisis. They
felt that the solution lies in negotiations with the RPF. They expect
much from partnership with European NGOs. The European members
supported the decisions of the meeting, namely the Bukavu Charter (a
series of ten conditions) for a quick and peaceful return of the
refugees detailed below.
In addition, this Charter demanded the support of the International
Community for the future organ representing refugees. This
representation was no other than RDR (Rally for the Return and
Democracy in Rwanda) and whose first president was François Nzabahimana
himself. The ten (10) conditions were as follows:
* Establishment of a legitimate government of national unity, a
National Assembly and one territorial administration which is
representative of the people, in a Collective institutional
framework between the RPFand the Rwandan community in exile, based
on the Arusha Peace Accords;
* Formation of a national army based on the Arusha Accords (4th
Protocol) ;
* Expanding the mandate of MINUAR II so that it may ensure internal
security and oversee the formation of this national army and the
establishment of a new law and order force nationally and locally
(communal police) ;
* Establishment of an international tribunal outside the country for
trying all war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during
the war from October 1, 1990;[34]
* Creation of a permanent body for the enforcement of the respect of
human rights whose mandate and compositions should be accepted by
both the RPF and the Rwandan community in exile;
* Establishment of an independent judicial system for identifying and
trying offences outside the jurisdiction of the international
tribunal. This can only be done after the formation of a legitimate
government of national unity;
* Reactivating a genuine process of plural democracy in the spirit of
the Arusha Accords ;
* Prompt return of occupied land and properties ;
* Stop to summary executions and to the institutionalisation of the
spirit of vengeance inside the country and release of all political
prisoners ;
* Rejection of the illegal lists of killers published by the
combatants because they expose individuals to arbitrary judgements
and even to summary executions locally or to the refusal of visas
to travel abroad, and a stop to all publications and writings in
the media which can be provocative”.
Finally, the Bukavu Charter made an urgent appeal to the international
community to facilitate a quick dialogue:
* It asks the international Community to become involved for the
fulfilment of the above mentioned conditions;
* It calls for the review of some of the negative attitudes towards
the refugees based on the unilateral statements of RPF which lead
to the embargos being imposed on the granting of visas, the
restrictions of free movement of the refugees and the refusal to
recognize their basic rights;
* It calls for the international community’s assistance in carrying
out a census of the refugees in order to project the real size of
the population in exile and improve the services they receive;
* It advocates for an immediate organisation of an international
conference on the Rwandan refugees to which their representatives
would be invited; and
* It requests its support for the future structure representing
refugees.
It should be noted at this juncture that the Bukavu meeting left open
this urgent practical question because it wanted to recognize the
on-going structuring exercise of the refugees’ communities and the
“government in exile”. We should note also the still missing balance
between the various partners, including the armed forces. Point 5 above
is important: the needs of the refugees’ communities in terms of
external communication are crucial: any follow up of the Bukavu agenda
will have to bear on this point.[35]
Nzabahimana himself announced the results of this Bukavu meeting in the
journal DIALOGUE, at the same time as he announced his resignation from
the Editorial Committee of the journal:
“[...] I was also involved in other activities aimed at finding a
peaceful solution to the Rwanda conflict. At the end of a meeting held
in Zaire, the Rwandan community in exile established the Rally for the
Return and Democracy in Rwanda (RDR). This organisation aims at
‘mobilizing all the Rwandans for the return of the refugees in dignity
and to work towards the establishment of institutions which are
representative of all the components of the population and guarantors
of security and individual freedoms of every citizen”.[36]
Nzabahimana concludes his editorial and announcement of resignation by
saying: “Having been elected President of this clearly political
organisation, I have decided to resign from the Editorial Committee of
DIALOGUE magazine”.
Nzabahimana was relying on the support of Alain De BROUWER; advisor
in-charge of Africa at the IDC, for whom: “the Bukavu meeting has
proved that in the camps, there were reasonable groups which were ready
for a dialogue and that even the former interim government had carried
out self-criticism and was able to restructure on new foundations
[...]. For the time being, there should be strengthening of links
between European and Rwandan NGOs operating in the refugees’ camps:
this is an essential factor for peace and the reconstruction of the
social fabric.”[37]
In providing this support, De BROUWER was either being ignorant, naive,
disingenuous or iniquitous. For him to say that he found in the camps
reasonable people ready for dialogue, including Jean Kambanda, means
that he did not know Kambanda was the prime minister of the “interim
government” which had committed genocide against the Tutsi just a few
months before. Or that he knew it, and was trying to free this
government of guilt and present it as “converted”. When and how could
they be converted while they never admitted the crimes they had
committed by exterminating the Tutsi?
The Rwandan Civil Society in Exile in Kivu (Rwandan NGOs and Human
Rights Associations) made several declarations in support of RDR
agenda. The SCRE in South Kivu appealed for massive, voluntary and
organised return of refugees. In its report dated September 5,
1995,[38] they described the exile “of more than half the population”
as something caused by the October 1990 war. It maintained that the
refugees wanted to return home but that the conditions were not
favourable because of insecurity, injustice against the Hutu,
occupation of properties, etc.
This report insists that the obstacles preventing the return of the
refugees must be removed by the international community and the
government in Kigali: before going back home, refugees were waiting for
individual and collective security to be secured, that sound and
equitable justice to be restored, that soldiers (the RPA) return to
barracks, for a law and order force “in which everybody recognised
himself” to be restored, and for the re-establishment of trust between
Rwandans inside the country and those in exile. The report also
insists that all this was only possible if the international community
facilitated dialogue between the Rwandan community in exile and the
authorities in Kigali.
Another appeal to the international community was made in another
report of the Civil Society in Exile through its President, Monsignor
Habyarimana. During their meeting on December 11-14, 1995, they asked
the international community to convince the authorities in Kigali to
accept the return of the refugees, or else impose sanctions: an
economic, diplomatic and military embargo. From the government in
Kigali, they demanded security, respect for human rights and returning
refugees’ properties.
Meanwhile, in its continued efforts to deny the genocide, the RDR was
continuing to try to explain what it considered to be the cause of the
Rwandan conflict.
On August 31, 1995, the RDR reaffirmed that the origin of the Rwandan
conflict was of a political and ethnic nature, i.e. the struggle for
power between the Hutu and the Tutsi. It blamed the RPF for having
attacked Rwanda in October 1990 and of being responsible for “the
deadly interethnic clashes and massacres of people in the two enemy
camps”. We note here that the RDR is continuing in August 1995, to
avoid use of the word “genocide”
The RDR accused the RPF of creating unrest in a peaceful and
economically sound country in Africa: by attacking Rwanda, the RPF
seized power forcefully and as a result, sent in exile millions of
people who were now living in a precarious situation. The RDR insists
that prior conditions must be met for the return of the refugees:
security, stopping accusations against refugees as genocide
perpetrators, disarming the RPA and FAR, negotiating with the refugees,
a neutral international force, a commission of inquiry on the death of
Habyarimana and Ntaryamira, a national army (composed of APR and FAR),
power sharing, preparation of elections, etc.
This report was signed by Aloys Ngendahimana, who was the RDR’s
Vice-President for Social Affairs. Ngendahimana was the Director
General in the Ministry of Interior in the Habyarimana government that
planned the genocide, and the secretary general in the “interim
government” of Rwanda which supervised the genocide.
The following anecdote is indicative of the sympathy and moral support
the RDR could hope for among European NGOs. On April 24, 1996, Sylvie
SERVAES, a consultant with MISEREOR[39], visited the refugees at
Mugunga. She is said to have told one military captain, Anastase
Bizumuremyi of the FAR in Goma that she found the refugees in the camps
happier that the people living in Rwanda whose faces looked gloomy.[40]
According to the report of their conversations, the refugees told
Servaes that they had done no wrong to the Tutsi, but that it was
rather the RPF that was the source of all the ills for the Hutu since
its attack of Rwanda in 1990, killing about three million people.
She recognized that it was difficult for the West to know the real
culprits, and noted that her mission was to help both communities to
reconcile. But she confirmed that the concept of genocide was really a
political tool, and that Europe wanted to help the Hutu but that it was
waiting for them to do something. She hinted that Europe would like to
help the leaders of the refugees, since the United States of America
were on the side of RPF.
One has to wonder whether Sylvie Servaes was aware that the “leaders of
the refugees” were genocide perpetrators!
A similar note was sounded a few months later when the Brussels
journal, DIALOGUE published a July 3, 1996, open letter from Bishop
MUNZIHIRWA, clearly a spokesperson of the Hutu, to the US Ambassador.
The letter accused the big powers of supporting the minority (Tutsi),
and warned that if nothing were done by these powers to resolve the
question of refugees, neither Rwanda nor the Great Lakes region would
see peace.
Also, in its journal, REVEIL, belonging to a refugee organisation
called the League of Rwandan Women for the Defence of the Right to
Life[41] accuses the RPF of not restoring justice. The league
recognizes that justice had been paralysed by the war and the
massacres, but still avoids the word genocide. The women’s league
dwells on the issues of insecurity prevailing inside Rwanda, and
alleging illegal arrests and detentions.
The League maintains that only a few women took part in the
“massacres”, again avoiding the word genocide. (It either did not know
what women did during the genocide, or, else it was ashamed of
recognizing it. In reality women did a lot of harm, particularly to
other women and children.) The League points the finger at the RPF of
deliberately preventing the justice system from functioning and of
rejecting foreign lawyers in order to delay trials.
It defends the imprisoned nuns whom they consider innocent and claims
in general terms that “priests and nuns are detained without evidence.”
In fact, among the first people to be convicted of genocide by Belgian
courts, were two Benedictine Nuns, Kizito and Mukangango. A catholic
priest Anastase Seromba was convicted and got a life sentence from the
ICTR.
Once established, the RDR acted as if it were part of the SCRE. Among
its numerous statements, special mention should be made of its letter
to the Secretary General of Amnesty International written from Nairobi
on August 28, 1995, and signed by Chris Nzabandora, entitled “Call for
vigilance in favour of the Rwandan refugees expelled from Zaire”. Here
the RDR claimed, that the 15,000 refugees ‘expelled’ from Zaire August
19-24, 1995, were threatened by the RPA, and need the protection of
Amnesty International to escape the fate of those who had taken refuge
at Kibeho and whose camps were demolished. In this letter the RDR
accused the UN of being responsible for this because it had lifted the
arms embargo imposed on Rwanda.
In the same letter, the RDR also claimed that, the refugees,
traumatized by the war, did not want to return to their country. It was
useless to force them to go back since it would be “to throw them in
the hands of RPF from whom they had run away”. A few lines further, the
RDR contradicts itself by saying that “many refugees continue to
return”! It then reverts to the reasons which prevent the refugees from
returning home: ill-treatment in the prisons in Rwanda; lack of
judicial institutions even though money is spent on weapons; and that
the RPF cannot deliver justice since it also had blood on its
hands.[42]
On the same date, August 28, 1995, the office of the powerless Prime
Minister Kambanda of the genocidal interim government in Bukavu issued
a press release in which it vigorously condemned “the atrocities meted
out on the refugees expelled from the camps in Zaire”. It blamed these
atrocities on the UN Security Council and the international community
for having done nothing to facilitate the voluntary return of the
refugees.
On September 2, 1995, in Bukavu, Kambanda’s office also issued a
“Memorandum on the conditions for the return of Rwandan refugees to
their country,” signed by Kambanda and addressed to Mrs SADAKO OGATA,
High Commissioner of UNHCR who was visiting the region. Kambanda called
upon the High Commissioner for a quick and fair settlement of the
Rwandan problem.
He explained the major problems faced by Rwandan refugees in the camps
and the conditions for a final solution to the Rwandan conflict or at
least, alternative solutions to the forced repatriation carried out
earlier by the Zairian government. Kambanda defined the causes of the
refugee crisis as: the death of Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, and the
immediate resumption of hostilities by the RPF, the result of which was
the exodus of “more than half the population” of Rwanda. And this was
the cause of food shortages and the inertia of agriculture in Rwanda.
Kambanda denounced some States for ignoring the principle of the
presumption of innocence of detained people denounced by the RPF, which
itself stood accused and could not be judge and jury at the same time.
His conditions for a final solution of the Rwandan conflict were the
same as those set by the RDR.
Regarding alternative solutions to forced repatriation, Kambanda asked
that the UNHCR find other countries of asylum, or create protected
humanitarian zones in Rwanda itself: he proposed the prefectures of
Cyangugu, Kibuye and Gisenyi for the refugees in Zaire, and Kibungo for
those in Tanzania, Butare, Gikongoro, South Gitarama and Kigali rural
for those in Burundi.
From these zones, Kambanda said, the refugees would go back to their
properties under the watchful supervision of the international
community, and await the organisation of an International Conference on
Rwanda with a view to a lasting settlement of the conflict.
Could it be that Kambanda hoped the UNHCR would recreate something
similar to the French-controlled “Zone Turquoise” i.e. a safe area for
genocide perpetrators? Kambanda of course, said not a word to Ogata on
the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi and his own role in it—the
realities which would see him convicted in 1998 to life in prison for
genocide by the UN-ICTR.
In general, the above mentioned memoranda, namely those of the Rwandan
civil society in exile; the RDR, the Rwanda Protestant Churches settled
in South Kivu, the Rwandan Catholic Community working for the refugees
in the Archdiocese of Bukavu (which were for the most part the same
presentations made during the visit of Mrs SADAKO OGATA, all had one
point in common: they pretended to be working hand in hand to find a
solution to the Rwandan problem, “based on the truth, honesty, justice
and reconciliation.”
It is regrettable that in their explanations, all of these memoranda
without exception, denounced only the RPF and the Government in Kigali,
and failed completely to recognize the crimes committed by the genocide
perpetrators. The basis of their message, therefore, is other than the
honest truth, which makes it hard to believe that their interest in
justice and reconciliation was genuine.
In Goma, on August 4 – 9, 1995, there was a meeting of FAR’s high
command to assess the progress of the RDR, worldwide and their
activities report had among other things publications, including the
one in Cameroon. It was well received by the FAR in Zaire.[43]
This “inventiveness” of the RDR, from its section in Cameroon, was the
publication in May 1995 of a document entitled “La Verite sur le Drame
Rwandais” (The Truth about the Rwandan Tragedy).[44] The Cameroon
section of RDR made its own analysis of the situation. Naturally, it
avoided the use of the word genocide, preferring to refer to the
“Rwandan tragedy” whose victims were primarily the Hutu. As far as this
section of RDR was concerned, there was no genocide committed against
the Tutsi, but a “civil war of ethnic nature which led to interethnic
massacres”. These massacres, as the document say, resulted in
200,000-500,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu “killed” against 1,500,000 Hutu
“exterminated.”[45]
It was not by accident that these words were used here. It was in fact
the position of the RDR since its birth: no mention should be made of
the genocide against the Tutsi by the Hutu, but only of one against the
Hutu by the RPF. That is why the word “exterminated” was used when
talking of the Hutu and the word “killings” when talking of the Tutsi,
thus deliberately reversing the facts.
But as it is always difficult to defend the “indefensible”, the RDR
section in Cameroon found itself entangled in contradictions while
trying to explain the causes of the “tragedy”. At a certain point, the
authors of the document had to recognize that Hutus killed Tutsi simply
because they were Tutsi. So they justify these killings by arguing
that, the Tutsi showed sympathy towards RPF INKOTANYI: “The demons of
hatred between the Tutsi and the Hutu became active as the Tutsi
continued to manifest sympathy and complicity with the RPF, who were
carrying out selective massacres during their attacks.”[46]
The Tutsi were killed, they insist, because the Tutsi seemed proud of
having their children in the army of RPF rebels and did not hesitate to
justify the war which, according to them, was to enable them to get rid
of the hegemony of the Hutu majority. For their part, young Hutus were
enthusiastic to join the ranks of the Rwandan Armed Forces in order to
fight the INKOTANYI.
On the other hand, the RDR says the Hutu population was astounded as
they observed, dumbfounded, the unity of action and thought between the
Tutsi inside the country and the RPF when the RPF battalion, which was
to be stationed in Kigali, was received triumphantly by Tutsi who had
come from all the corners of the country.
This welcome, so the RDR Cameroon branch says, also turned into a kind
of pilgrimage to the Parliamentary hill where the battalion was
accommodated. “All the Tutsi inside the country came in succession to
this hill to greet their “heroes” and their “liberators.”[47]
For the RDR Cameroon branch, “the arrogance and triumphalism of the
Tutsi” justified that they be exterminated.
According to the RDR Cameroon branch, the causes of any evil that
occurred in Rwanda are therefore the October 1990 war, the selective
massacres of the Hutu by RPF, the support of the Tutsi to RPF, the
arrogance and triumphalism of the Tutsi, the assassination of Hutu
leaders by RPF, particularly Gapyisi of MDR, Gatabazi of PSD, Bucyana
of CDR and Rwambuka Fidèle of MRND and many others, and finally, the
killing of President Habyarimana, also by RPF.[48]
These false accusations, by genocidaires against the RPF for massacres
and assassinations have now had a long life, showing up in works of
many Rwandan writers like Marie- Beatrice Umutesi and others, and of
various European academics, lawyers and writers. These falsehoods, have
also found their way into the indictments of Judges Bruguiere of France
and Merelles of Spain.
Concerning the causes of the exodus of the Hutu from Rwanda, the
explanation from the RDR Cameroon branch, is similar to that of given
by Rwandan NGOs and the Civil Society in exile: the “RPF military
victory and its coming to power in Kigali seem therefore to be in line
with the Collective and premeditated logic of the western powers in
collusion with President Yoweri Museveni. What was nonetheless not
taken into account by this logic was the choice imposed on the Rwandan
civilian population by the deadly war of RPF which forced them to
become displaced inside their own country first, and then forced into
exile. This was one of the bitterest choices which could only be
justified by the survival instinct of a people who for four years had
experienced war, torture, massacres and extermination at the hands of
RPF who were presented or considered as liberators by some uninformed
quarters in the West or in Africa. Today, facts are there to be seen:
more than 80% of the people of Rwanda have voted against the RPF by
choosing, against their wish, to go into exile and the resultant
misfortunes: they have said no to dictatorship, to torture and to
various atrocities by RPF. Today, life is a nightmare and misery in the
refugees’ camps where there is destitution, hunger, thirst, death,
horror, for more than four million persons uprooted from their land and
properties. Contrary to the declarations by some western quarters
sympathetic to the propaganda of RPF, it is not Hutu leaders who called
on the people of Rwanda to flee their country; it is rather this same
RPF who forced them into it and who still keep them in exile
deliberately.”[49]
The RDR Cameroon branch buttressed its arguments with documents
published by other revisionists of the genocide, both Rwandan (François
Nzabahimana, SOLIDAIRE-Rwanda, Dr. Nsengiyaremye Dismas, etc) and
foreign (Bishop Christophe Munzihirwa of Bukavu in Zaire, Filip
Reyntjens and others), to assert that the main cause for the refugees
not to return home was once again the RPF: “continued large scale
massacres by RPF against the backdrop of increasing insecurity created
by the new national army composed mostly by the Tutsi, the Rwandan
Patriotic Army (RPA), undisciplined and thirsting for material gains
and blind revenge, the climate of insecurity worsened by lack of a
judicial apparatus, leading to illegal detentions, torture and summary
executions. The illegal and arbitrary occupation of buildings and land
by the former Diaspora who returned in a disorderly manner, reprisals
and revenge by the members of RPF justified by the massacres, true or
alleged, of their Tutsi brothers by the Hutu, etc.”[50]
Concerning the conditions to facilitate the return of the refugees, the
RDR Cameroon branch presented the same as those contained in the Bukavu
Charter (See above): the Hutu would rather endure the misery of exile
than submit to the RPF usurpers. With this reasoning it is surprising
that this same RDR was asking this alleged usurper of power to accept
dialogue and negotiations with the refugees. A logical solution to this
contradiction would be to suspect that the RDR thinkers hoped that such
negotiations would ultimately lead to the fall of the “Usurper”.
The association called SOLIDAIRE-RWANDA or “DUFATANYE” in Kinyarwanda,
was a member of the Rwandan Civil Society in exile (SCRE) and was born
in Bukavu on 8 September 1994.[51] Its President, Froduald Gasamunyiga,
was Vice President of RDR at its birth, while its General Secretary,
Stanislas Mubiligi, was a Catholic priest. Gasamunyiga had been
appointed to be the Director General of the Rwanda Development Bank
during the genocide. Mubiligi has since abdicated from his ministry,
maybe to devote his time to wicked politics.
According to Jean Kambanda’s testimony to the ICTR investigators, on
September 22, 1997 this association was initiated by the “genocidal
interim government” in exile, in order to gather accusations against
RPF. The sponsors of this association claimed that “it aimed at
bringing together all men and women of good will, of all nationalities,
who are willing to contribute through non-violent methods to the search
for solutions to the numerous and thorny problems of Rwanda caused by
the war imposed on Rwanda since 1990 and by the ensuing exile of more
than 90% of the population of Rwanda.”[52]
The RDR has also always insisted on another point, that of involving
the international community in the repatriation, resettlement and
rehabilitation of the refugees. It is therefore not surprising that
SOLIDAIRE, from their founding statement mentioned above, had also
among its objectives “to contribute to the rehabilitation of the
Rwandan refugees in their dignity and their rights, to work for
solidarity among the Rwandan refugees on one hand, and between them and
the International Community on the other, to inform the Rwandan
refugees and the International Community on the socio-political
developments of the Rwandans.”
Nzabahimana, who was the first President of the RDR, spelled out the
primary condition for the return of the refugees as the
re-establishment of the truth about the Rwandan crisis. Even though he
did not mention it, the truth he was referring to was the truth about
the genocide. Judging from his various writings and those of other
genocide deniers, the truth to be re-established was that the RPF was
responsible for both the genocide against the Tutsi, and the exile of
the Hutu as well as all the ills to which they were subjected to in the
camps.
Another association quite close to SOLIDAIRE, at least with regard to
its motivation, was SOCAR ASBL (Solidarité Chrétienne pour Aider les
Rwandais). It was created with “the primary objective of searching for
and promoting truth, justice, respect of human rights, moral and
spiritual recovery for all the victims of the Rwandan tragedy and
reconciling information, in collaboration with all those who are
engaged in the peaceful fight for the return of peace and human dignity
in Rwanda.“[53]
This association used biblical verses from the Old and the New
Testaments[54] to explain the problem of Rwanda which, according to it,
dates as far back as 1928 “when the Tutsi seized power from the Hutu
and that the rule of Tutsi Banyiginya and Abega [Clans] since then
dominated and deliberately ill-treated them.” But contrary to its
primary objective of promoting truth, peace, justice, moral and
spiritual recovery of all the victims of the Rwandan tragedy, SOCAR
accuses the Tutsi for being the immediate cause of what it called the
Rwandan “wound” by killing Habyarimana, “the father of the nation” and
turning Rwanda into a country of “nightmares of tears and blood.”[55]
SOCAR’s message No.1 did not mention “the genocide against the Tutsi”
and at no single time did it use the word, and naturally so since the
Rwandans it set out to help were Hutu refugees to whom it addressed a
message of hope that one day they would “reverse the situation of those
who today are in power, eating, drinking and dancing with joy and sing
their victory, without mercy.”[56]
This is a strange message from an association ostensibly founded by
Christian Rwandan refugees from all Christian churches! It should be
pointed out that this message was sent for dissemination to all the big
names of this world: church leaders starting with Pope Jean Paul II,
and more than 25 Heads of State and Government.[57]
In its second message[58], SOCAR wrote to Paul Kagame, then Vice
President of the Republic of Rwanda. It pointed out to him that he was
“at the throat” of the nation and cautioned him against any attempt to
strangle it, calling upon him to protect it, instead. SOCAR made a
number of recommendations to Kagame aimed at re-establishing peace in
Rwanda, “not through guns but through forgiveness, mercy and
reconciliation.” It gave him the names of persons he could contact or
from whom he could get inspiration if he really was for the interest of
the Rwandan people: Pope Jean Paul II, Bishop Desmond Tutu, Martin
Luther King and many other historical figures.
It is worthy to note that a copy of this message of SOCAR to Kagame was
sent to the “President of the Republic of Rwanda in Exile”. This is
Theodore Sindikubwabo, who had mobilised the Hutu to exterminate the
Tutsi in 1994. SOCAR’s good moral lessons, if they have and believe in
any, would have been more useful to the perpetrators of the genocide
than to the person who had the courage to stop the genocide. The
signatories of this message are the same as for the previous one.
On June 1, 1996, SOCAR wrote to the “Rwandan Community
Abroad”,[59] inviting them to work with SOCAR to find a lasting
solution to the Rwandan problem. It thanks the international community
for what it has done so far to help the Rwandan people, from the Arusha
Accords until the date of the letter. Among the people the letter
mentions as resourceful are various well-known genocide revisionists
such as the White Father Serge DESOUTER, Prof. Filip REYNTJENS, Luc De
TEMMERMAN, etc.
SOCAR hoped that with the aid of the above individuals, the truth “will
be known, that it will come out in great day light, that it will impose
itself on the world in the interest of this battered and currently
demonized people”[60]. SOCAR meant to confirm the theses held by all
the revisionists who pretend that there was no genocide against the
Tutsi but rather the Hutu, or, at a pinch, a double genocide for which
the RPF is responsible.
Besides SOCAR, another association was created called “SODERWA”
(Solidarity for the Defence of Accused Rwandans). As its name states,
the objectives[61] of SODERWA were: to contribute in any way
(documentation, evidence, facilitation through contacts with third
parties) to the clarification and investigation of cases brought before
the courts where Rwandans were accused; to act as liaison between
accused Rwandans, their lawyers, and their compatriots and any other
persons interested in giving evidence or intervening in their cases; to
enlighten Rwandans on the guidelines of a fair and equitable trial
(defence of legality, authenticity of evidence, etc); carry out
investigations and inform the public about the analysis of the “Rwandan
tragedy,” targeting especially the decision makers on the issue as well
as the relevant jurisdictions; constantly inform potential persons
liable to trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
of their rights and, finally, promote a culture of solidarity among
Rwandans.[62]
Rwandan journalists in self-imposed exiled in Zaire, Burundi, Tanzania
and Kenya and elsewhere, were not left behind. They too, claimed that
they were part of Civil Society. A report by the French NGO REPORTERS
SANS FRONTIÈRES[63] questioned why journalists (about forty were
identified) who had worked for the hatred media were not only free but,
far from hiding, were carrying out their activities abroad without any
remorse.
At the time, Joel Hakizimana was the only journalist who had been
arrested. However, these journalists who were well known to have
collaborated with the extremist media considered themselves to be
members of the Civil Society. In September 1994, in the camps at Goma
and Bukavu (Zaire) and in Nairobi (Kenya), these journalists resumed
their activities.
The major former actors of RTLM, Radio Rwanda and several hatred
newspapers (Interahamwe, Kangura, La Médaille…) formed the Association
of Rwandan Journalists in Exile (AJRE), the main organisation led by
Jean Baptiste Hategekimana. It edited and published the magazine
Amizero. The bimonthly Kangura resumed its publication in Nairobi,
Kenya.
Founded on September 14, 1994, the Association apparently encountered
no problem in obtaining a licence from the Zairean authorities. Yet,
the composition of the Executive Committee as well as the list of the
founding members of this Association, speaks volumes about the nature
of this group.
On the Executive Committee, the president of the association was
Jean-Baptiste Hategekimana, who was, as mentioned earlier a founder and
leader in the “SCRE”. Hategekimana is one of the most virulent hate
journalists Rwanda has known in its recent history. He worked for the
official Rwanda Press Agency, and for various extremist publications
including Kangura, Zirikana and Interahamwe. Vice-President Thacien
Hahozayezu had writen for various extremist publications, ending up as
the Editor in Chief of the newspaper Interahamwe, to reinforce his
commitment to the militia which had the same name. He is now believed
to be within the ranks of the FDLR.
The Executive Secretary was Anselme Bigirimana who had worked with
National Television. One of his former colleagues described him as
“pathological anti-Tutsi”. Gaspard Gahigi was elected to the position
of “Radio Advisor.” Before and during the genocide, he was the Editor
in Chief of Umurwanashyaka[64] magazine, which was the ruling MRND
party’s mouthpiece, before the MRND disbanded it to let its journalists
join RTLM, where he assumed a similar post. He is thought to have since
died in Zaire.
Florent Kampayana, the association’s treasurer, worked for Radio Rwanda
before and during the genocide. He was famous in Rwanda for his
dehumanising discourse against the RPF and Tutsi in general. In one of
his broadcasts on the National Radio Rwanda which I can remember from
early 1991, he said RPF fighters had tails and drooping ears.
The other three members of the Executive Committee had all previously
worked for the official Rwanda Information agency, (ORINFOR). Those
are, Emmanuel Ngirwanabagabo, National Television, Advisor, Television
and Charles Ruvugabigwi, La Relève, Advisor, Print Media.
Contributing Members of AJRE : Oswald Ahigombaye, NTV; Jean-Baptiste
Bamwanga, Radio Rwanda; Valérie Bemeriki, RTLM; Assumani Gakusi; Gérard
Gatare, NTV; Habimana Kantano, RTLM ; François-Xavier Hangimana,
Ijambo; Julienne Icyimanizanye, NTV; Samuel Kalinda, NTV; Jean Léonard
Karuranga, NTV; Cyprien Musabirema, Radio Rwanda ; Cyprien
Ngendahimana, Radio Rwanda; Jean-Baptiste Ngerejaho, Radio Rwanda;
Viateur Nkundibiza, Radio Rwanda; Ananie Nkurunziza, RTLM; Ntamukunzi
Jean-Baptiste, Orinfor; Telesphore Nyirimanzi, Radio Rwanda; Alexis
Nzamwita, Orinfor; Jean-Baptiste Nubahumpatse, Orinfor ; Issa
Nyabyenda, Kangura; Nzabonimpa Abdallah, Radio Rwanda; Emmanuel
Rucogoza, RTLM; Ephrem Rugiririza, Radio Rwanda; Innocent Rwabuhungu,
Umurwanashyaka/Interahamwe; Francois Rwabutogo, La Medaille –
Nyiramacibiri; Etienne Sendegeya, Radio Rwanda ; Joseph Serugendo,
Radio Rwanda/RTLM and Emmanuel Uwihoreye, Radio Rwanda.
The role of all these individuals in inciting the population to the
genocide against the Tutsi in 1994 is public knowledge in Rwanda. It
was alleged that the General Assembly held on June 18, 1995 in Goma was
characterized by a conflict within AJRE between the “hardliners and the
more “open” tendency of the Association. The former were determined to
fight the government in Kigali by all means, and the latter were
anxious to initiate a dialogue with the Government of National Unity.
One of the covert activities of some members of AJRE was the
establishment of a network of informers tasked with undermining the
repatriation of the refugees. In addition, following this General
Assembly, a reshuffle was carried out within the Editorial Team of
Amizero, an AJRE liaison magazine, in order to make this publication
more “presentable.”
This magazine was launched early November 1994, by Gaspard Gahigi, as
the publishing Manager. Gahigi had been tasked to be AJREs Advisor for
audiovisual media.
Besides Gahigi, the other editors of this magazine were Valérie
Bemeriki (RTLM, AJRE member), Kantano Habimana (alias Hatana, RTLM,
AJRE member), Jean Baptiste Hategekimana (President of AJRE), Thacien
Hahozayezu (Vice President of AJRE, and deputy chief editor of
Amizero), Gerald Ngendahimana, Etienne Sendegeya, Jean Baptiste
Bamwanga and Ephrem Rugiririza as reporters.
According to the Editor in Chief, the circulation of Amizero was 500
copies, 350 of which were meant for the refugees’ camps, 50 for NGOs,
50 for the town of Goma and 50 for “export”. At least five issues of
the magazine were published between November 7, 1994 and August 28,
1995. In the issue “zero” of November 7-14, 1994, the tone was given:
glorification of the RTLM, “immortal radio”. Copies were distributed in
the camps through a well-organised network of activists.
On September 1, 1994, Kangura reappeared on the scene. The editorial
team consisted of three persons: Hassan Ngeze, Pablo Ngabidasunikwa and
Jacques Turana. Headed by Hassan Ngeze, the bimonthly deliberately
continued the editorial line followed before the genocide started. It
continued the numbering of the issues of Kangura from N^o59, the last
issue published in Kigali in April 1994, such that the new issue
published in exile was N^o 60! Initially Kangura was printed in Nairobi
by Nairobi Printers, but some of the last issues I saw (68 to 71)
appear to have been printed in Brussels.
From reliable sources, this information of printing in Brussels was
false, only aimed at creating confusion so as to hide the source of
financing and other covert operations, which enabled the newspaper to
carry on its activities and the individuals to travel constantly
between Goma and Nairobi, to publish Kangura and have it translated.
Published first in French (approximately a third of the articles) and
in Kinyarwanda, Kangura was later published in English as well. Copies
– some hundreds –were distributed freely in the camps by Hassan Ngeze
himself. In other camps, it was sold more or less in openly through ad
hoc distribution networks. But gradually, Nairobi became the centre of
its publication, as part of the Rwandan intelligentsia in exile lived
there.
The “international” edition in English targeted more particularly the
Kenyan public.
Kangura gladly used threats to mobilize its troops. In the first issues
(60-61-62), the style was very aggressive and revengeful. It even
announced the “imminent return to Kigali, (…), if necessary by arms.”
Gaspard Gahigi of Amizero, declared to Agence France-Presse on November
30, 1994, with regard to his activities at RTLM and the charges
levelled against him: “These are stories; we did not incite anybody
into killing. But it was war time against the backdrop of an ethnic
conflict. And before sentencing us, we should first be tried.” He then
added that RTLM was no longer broadcasting “but that they had all the
equipment” and that “it was not excluded that they could start
broadcasting again under a different name”, because the “war is still
on”. Indeed, for a few days in March 1995, from the camp of Mugunga,
there were some broadcasts monitored, between 6 and 9 hours in the
morning and evening, in FM through a mobile short range
transmitter.[65]
Notes
_______________________
[1] At the time of writing this book, Monsignor Simon Habyarimana, is
based in Italy, in the Diocese of Florence Before and during the
genocide, he was the Vicar-General of the Catholic Diocese of Ruhengeri
under Bishop Nikwigize. He is known for his extremist views full of
hate against the Tutsi.
[2] Before the genocide, Immaculee Nyirabizeyimana, was the deputy
speaker of the Rwandan Parliament (CND). At that time the speaker was
Dr. Theodore Sindikubwabo. Since the later was nominated Rwanda’s
president, Nyirabizeyimana presided over the swearing ceremony of the
new president as the Acting speaker of Parliament, a post she held
until July 3, 1994.
[3] This is a journalist known for his virulent anti-Tutsi propaganda
and an organizer of his colleagues in exile.
[4] See document: “RWANDA, RENCONTRE DE FROIDMONT 20 et 21 Mai 1994,
Compte Rendu Provisoire”. It is in the Author’s archives
[5] These meetings were being held at the time when the RPA was gaining
ground against the FAR. On May 19, 1994 the RPA captured the Kigali
International airport and the biggest military barracks of Kanombe
[6] RWANDA, RENCONTRE DE FROIDMONT, p. 22.
[7] Ibidem, p.24.
[8] F. Nzabahimana, Propositions sur la situation du Rwanda, 17 June
1994, p.1.
[9] About a hundred people attended this meeting. The signatories of
the Namur Declaration of 30 July 1994 included: Nkizamacumu Désiré,
Mukangayabo …., Niyoyita Vestine, Mukarubayiza Domitille, Ntawumenya
Monique, Mushamba Augustin, Mugirishyaka …, Uwinkindi Jeanne, Sakindi
., Karengera Dan., Nyirandayisaba Louise, Mutesi, Nahimana Eugène,
Ukobizaba M., Mukandanga., Nimbeshaho, Nduwumwe Corneille,
Ntawuhungurwaje C., Mukasine Kagabo, Bicamumpaka Hy., Bingoma D.,
Kalima Aimable, Manirakiza Fabien, Jean Marie.., Nduwayo Leonard,
Mbahunzineza Martin, Habyarimana G, Nzakamwita Manassé, Hitimana
Célestin, Niyitegeka Antoine, Carine …, Harerimana G., Akimpaye ,
Kagabo Jean, Niyitugabira Eustache, Hitimana Samuel, Nzabonimpa Joseph,
Kayihura J. Claude, Turatsinze Léopold, Uwitonze Paul, Muhutu
Elimereck, Nizeyimana Ladislas, Mugengasaro Augustin, Bizimana Justin,
Nkuranyabahizi Gabriel, Bareke Grégoire Baltazar Munyampuhwe, Eugène
Shimamungu, Ngaboyisonga Martin, Hakizimana Emile, Mukasine Louise,
Niyibizi Shadrak, Bisalinkumi Ezéchiel, Sengarambe François, Nzabanita
Floribert, Sindambiwe J.Bosco, Ugirashebuja Christian, Twagirayezu
Valère, Twagiramungu Bernard, Habimana Jean de la Croix, Marie Assumpta
Uwamahoro, Mbaraga Paul, Katoto Straton, Kabanda Louis, Twagirayezu
Evode, Gatsinzi Jean Bapt., Munyemanzi Boniface, Cyiza Prosper,
Ruzindana Anthère, Hakizimana Emile, Nimbeshaho Anselme, Nzisabira
Jean, Ntavyohanyuma Pie, Uwamungu Benedict, Ayingeneye Angeline,
Mujawamariya Assumpta, Niringiyimana Madeleine, Mme VANDERHEYDEN
Patricia, Vincent Karengera, Vanderheyden Patrick, Vanderheden Martin,
Nsabimana Jean, Akimana Claudia, Franzen Damien, Mukazana Patricie,
Harelimana Alexandre.
[10] Details are in Dialogue, N° 184, July-August 1995 (p.150)
[11] In French they call it DIALOGUE followed by an acronym ASBL, which
means non-profit making association.
[12] VERDIER R., DECAUX E., CHRETIEN J.P, Rwanda, un génocide du
20^ème S, Harmattan, 1995, p.129
[13] Five hundred copies of this issue were allegedly distributed
freely to Rwandan refugees and the displaced living inside Rwanda (see
No .178, p. 19).
[14] Filip Reyntjens “Sujets d’inquiétude au Rwanda” published in
October 1994.
[15] During the first year of the publication of DIALOGUE in Brussels,
the editorials of this magazine often were written by Fr Guy Theunis or
by Charles Ntampaka, and sometimes by François Nzabahimana.
[16] Refer to. “LES CAMPS DE REFUGIES DE GOMA: MORT ET ESPERANCE” p. 5.
(Author’s archives)
[17] See: Que faire pour sortir le Rwanda de l’impasse? (Dialogue No.
178, October 1994, (p.27-28)
[18] See Dialogue No. 185, p. 34-35
[19] DIALOGUE, N^o189, p. 43
[20] Ibid., p. 47
[21] Dialogue No. 197, p. 38
[22] “Le Rwanda ou l’Urgence Politique” (p.8)
[23] Ibid. p. 8
[24] Ibid. p.4
[25]Ibid. p. 5
[26] Ibid. p. 6
[27] Ibid. p.7
[28] Ibid. p.7
[29] Ibid. p.13
[30] Ibid. pp. 20-21
[31] Ibid. p.22
[32] Ibid. p. 23
[33] Mission report in authors archives (Rapport succinct concernant
la rencontre de Bukavu sur le thème crucial du retour des réfugiés
Rwandais, 23-28/10/1994 p.2 One of the delegates on this mission, Paul
Mbaraga, told me it was members of the IDC who were organisers of this
trip since are even the ones who contacted him.
[34] The participants at the Bukavu meeting insisted that the members
and services of this international tribunal should be enabled to
communicate directly with the population. Some underscored the serious
damage done to the efforts for peaceful solutions to the impunity of
the authors of the massacres in Burundi for the past 30 years.
[35] See Rapport succinct concernant la rencontre de Bukavu sur le
thème crucial du retour des réfugiés Rwandais, 23-28/10/1994, p. 9-10.
[36] See DIALOGUE No. 183 of May-June 1995, p.2. this part of the
editorial is also an Extract from the Declaration of the Creation of
RDR, Mugunga, 3 April 1995.
[37] Ibidem, p.15
[38] The document is in the author’s archives
[39] MISEREOR is the overseas development agency of the Catholic Church
in Germany. MISEREOR is mandated by the Catholic Church in Germany: to
fight the causes of hardship and misery as manifested chiefly in
countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the forms of hunger,
disease, poverty and other forms of human suffering, enabling the
people affected to lead a life of human dignity; and to promote
justice, freedom, reconciliation and peace in the world.
See http://www.misereor.org/about-us.html
[40] The document which was a note to the FAR’s head of intelligence is
in the Author’s archives
[41] From some issues in the author’s archives, it appears that Marie
Beatrice Umutesi was one of the writers of this propaganda organ.
[42] During the visit of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs
SADAKO OGATA, to the Great Lakes region also on August 31, 1995, RDR
produced another document in Bukavu: “Memorandum on the voluntary
return of Rwandan refugees to their country”. It was signed by RDR Vice
President in charge of Social Affairs, Mr Aloys Ngendahimana. The
memorandum explained the Rwandan problem by referring to the “History”
of Rwanda (Parmehutu). It denied that the genocide began on 6 April
1994 but said that there were clashes between the two camps and that
many innocent lives were lost! It avoided saying that those who were
killed were Tutsi but further on, it suggested that those who fled were
Hutu. Quite normal since the others had been exterminated, they could
not flee! On the situation inside Rwanda, the memorandum repeated what
had been told to Amnesty International about security. Concerning the
return of the refugees, the memorandum suggested that it was the
responsibility of RPF and the International Community.
[43] [Annexe 3] Goma, du 04 au 09 Août 1995 RÉUNION DU HAUT
COMMANDEMENT DES FAR RAPPORT D’ACTIVITES DU “R.D.R.” Author’s archives
[44] The publication is in the author’s archives.
[45] La Verite sur le Drame Rwandais p.21.
[46] Ibid La Verite…p.23-4
[47] Ibid La Verite p.24
[48] Ibid. La verite…p.25
[49] Ibid. La verite…p.39-40
[50] Ibid. La verite…p.49
[51] The document announcing the establishment of Solidarité
Internationale pour les Réfugiés Rwandais (SOLIDAIRE-RWANDA ASBL or
DUFATANYE) is in the authors archive.
[52] SOLIDAIRE was created with the very similar objectives to those of
the RDR. It should be recalled that the latter has always militated in
favour of creating conditions supposedly to build the confidence of the
refugees.
[53] See Message No 001/96 de la SOCAR au Peuple Rwandais et aux Amis
du Rwanda, Bukavu, April 6, 1996 p. 1. SOCAR stated that its mission
was “to mobilize every Christian so that he/she may be an active
architect of peace, truth and justice”.
[54] Ibid, It referred to, among others, Lev. 24,19-20. Rm 12, 19-21 to
preach about non-revenge.
[55] Ibid, p.3
[56] Message numéro 001/96 de la SOCAR… (p. 2).
[57] This message was signed by Etienne SHYIRAMBERE (Dean of SOCAR),
Evangelist Oscar ILIZABALIZA, (Deputy Dean) and Albert RUKERANTARE
(Executive Coordinator of SOCAR)
[58] This message was an open letter addressed to H.E. Paul Kagame,
Vice President of the Republic of Rwanda. It was dated 16 June 1996 and
signed by Etienne Shyirambere, Albert Rukerantare and Evangelist Oscar
Ilizabaliza, Dean, Deputy Dean and Executive Coordinator of SOCAR
respectively
[59]Ref. No. 006/2d.1c-01/SOCAR/96 addressed to the Rwandan Community
Abroad, c/o Dr. Jean Baptiste Murenzi, Joseph Nzabonimpa, Mrs. Marie
Madeleine Bicamumpaka, Mr. Floribert Nzabanita, Mr. Michel Hakizimana
[60] Ibidem, p.3.
[61] See Minutes of the Constitutive Assembly of Solidarité pour la
Défense des Rwandais Accusés “ SODERWA ” asbl, Bukavu, 25 February
1996, p.2
[62] The Assembly held on 25 February 1996 elected the following
members of the Coordination Committee: André Kaggwa Uwumukiza
(Chairman), Deogratias Hategekimana (Vice-chairman), Emmanuel
Mbarushimana, (Secretary Treasurer), Charles Ntagozera (Legal Counsel)
and Dismas Nzanana (Information Advisor).
[63] “Rwanda: l’impasse? La liberté de la presse après le genocide 4
juillet 1994”
[64] This paper started in 1991 when MRND was really engaged in hate
media. Most journalists, who were in this paper, ended-up working for
RTLM Radio in 1993.
[65] See Report of REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES entitled “Rwanda:
l’impasse ? La liberté de la presse après le génocide, 4 juillet 1994 –
28 août 1995 ”
Chapter X: Fast moves from European NGOs to rehabilitate felons
As the genocide perpetrators regrouped in the fall of 1994 to pursue
their cause from their base in the refugee camps of eastern Zaire, they
were fortunate to have friends in the Europe who were ready, able and
willing to help on the crucial media front. In Belgium, far away from
Goma and Bukavu, these were the publishers of an ad hoc magazine called
‘Traits D’Union Rwanda’, (TUR) who knew what to do next.
In November 1994, the fifth edition of this magazine TUR was published
in Ghent, Belgium. This 63-page issue entitled ‘African Points of
View on the Reconstruction of Rwanda’ centred on several interviews
with Rwandan political figures, of whom ‘all the (political) tendencies
(were) represented’— as if they were all morally equivalent.
The ‘tendencies’ were determined by the editorial team. According to
them, on one side you had the RPF represented by the Rwandan government
with figures such as Vice-president Paul Kagame, Prime Minister Faustin
Twagiramungu, Deputy-Prime Minister and Minister of Public Service –
Alex Kanyarengwe, Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga, and the Ministers
of Industry and Agriculture.[1]
On the other side you had the Hutu extremists now in exile, including
former Prime Minister Jean Kambanda, Stanislas Mbonampeka who had
served as the Minister of Justice in 1992 and 1994 after the genocide,
Generals Augustin Bizimungu and Gratien Kabiligi and former Prime
Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye, and Defense Minister James Gasana.
In its ‘reportage’ the magazine also included contributions from
members of its staff as well as reports from the ‘field’, from NGO
workers and human rights activists in various parts of the country and
the refugee camps in Zaire. Finally, regional figures from Burundi,
Tanzania and Zaire were interviewed.
The Editor, Jean Vandaele, saw a multitude of Rwandan ‘stories’ because
‘the realities lived by Rwandan people…are so divergent that it is
equally hard to reconcile the differences of their truths.’ In his
view, there were two ‘main stories…one is that of the government in
Kigali, the other is that of the remaining political and military
leaders in the refugee camps’[2]. The two stories have little in
common and ‘it is certainly not the intention of this publisher to
stand as a kind of trial[3].’
To Vandaele credible sources can be found among ‘people who do not
really have much interest or stake in either version’[4] such as NGO
workers, whom he saw as guardians of truth as far as regional
information is concerned. He called on the ‘reader, European
politician, journalist, Rwandan minister or former minister, to have a
‘radical change of mind…to do what is needed to solve the conflict and
promote solidarity with Rwanda’.[5]
The particular significance of this issue can be seen in the fact that
it was translated into English, something that had not been done for
all other issues which were all in French. TUR had been previously
published by COOPIBO, but in this special edition, ten other
organizations aided in the publication, some through organizational
assistance and others through financial contributions.
These ten organizations were:
Broederlijk Delen: a Belgian organization focused on “Issues of the
South” including rural development, human rights and democratization;
Coopibo: A Belgian NGO specializing in gender issues, small scale
farming and sustainable agriculture and which later merged with
Vredeseilanden;
Freres des Hommes-Toulouse: A French organization that focuses on three
areas of ‘intervention’: peasant agriculture, solidarity economy and
civil democracy;
Groupe Developpement: A French organization founded by businessmen with
ties to Christian orders such as Jesuits and the Salesians;
ICCO: (The) Inter-church Organization & Development Cooperative,
Focused on rural microfinance;
NOVIB: an organization based in the Netherlands “fighting for a just
world without poverty.” It later merged with Oxfam;
Oxfam UK: An English organization working for ‘sustainable livelihood,
peace-building and education;
SOS-FAIM: A Belgian organization whose goal is “to contribute to the
fight against poverty in countries of the South”;
Talitha Koum: A Belgian Christian organization;
Vredeseilanden: Flemish for “Islands of Peace”; an organization
involved in promoting sustainable agriculture.
Funding was also provided by the provincial government of East
Flanders, home to the “Rwanda-Consortium”: COOPIBO, SOS-Faim, and
Vredeseilanden.
Who were the journalists of this special issue of TUR and how were they
connected to Africa? Editor John Vandaele was a reporter for the
Belgian newspaper “De Morgen”, writing about Africa and globalization.
François Misser, a correspondent for BBC Africa specializing in Central
Africa and who also writes for the ‘New African’, interviewed members
of the Rwandan government. Paul Van Goethem, who later worked for the
UNDP in Belgium and elsewhere in Africa, interviewed Rwandans in Zaire.
Dominique Evrard, a worker for several non-government organizations,
interviewed two figures, the Zairian Archbishop of Bukavu Christopher
Munzihirwa, and former Rwandan Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye.
The only Rwandan writer was Gaspard Karemera who was the Magazine
Editor of ‘Imbaga’ in Rwanda and is now the head of the Association of
‘Rwandan Journalists in Belgium.’ Wim Coessens, editor of ‘De Morgen’
also helped with promoting the project.
The first article in this issue is Francois Misser’s report on Rwanda.
He sets the scene by describing a country oppressed by the Government.
“An RPA-barrier filters the already scarce traffic at the entrance to
each village” but “even if they thought it useful to deploy large
number of troops, the soldiers do not seem to be in the least worried
by the rumours of a possible attack by the ‘Interhamwes.”[6]
Misser also mentioned in his article that there is a “tendency to
consider all inhabitants of a certain region as Interhamwes.”[7]
As for the residents, the message sent by this reporter was that part
of the population is poised for flight, whether because so many others
had already fled to Zaire, or because of rumours of a possible armed
return of Interahamwe and FAR. “Some farmers still have their doubts
whether war has really stopped, as proclaimed by Paul Kagame. Other
people express their wish for a dialogue to be organized with Rwandans
abroad in the name of peace.”[8]
Jean-Pierre Godding, an expatriate who had lived in Rwanda, wrote in
this special issue of TUR that “The RPF soldiers are somewhat
considered as an occupying force. At present they are living in the
numerous neighbourhoods and communities of the country, from which they
start their regular looting in several centres. Shouldn’t they be
barracked in large centres? Shouldn’t they be controlled by an
international force?”
This is an idea echoed by Stanislas Mbonampeka who says that “Security
in Kigali has to be guaranteed by foreign forces, not by the UN because
they have lost people’s confidence… (FAR and RPF) troops must be
completely disarmed.”[9]
In this 5^th issue of TUR, former Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye
is reported to have said that concordant witnesses “confirm the serious
exactions committed by RPF-soldiers and the government’s incapability
of assuring public order and the safety of persons and goods.” As a
matter of fact, Nsengiyaremye insisted the behaviour of the RPF
reminds them, “in a strange way, of the recent behaviour of the MRND,
they both adopt the same logic: they take absolute power without
sharing, seizing and maintaining it by force and terror, even if this
at the cost of the entire population and the country…The prolongation,
a purely RPF-decision, of the transition period and the putting off of
elections till doomsday, places Rwanda in a system of a permanent coup,
where there is no hope of political change by other ways than by power
coups and cyclic political violence.”[10]
This point of view was that of the genocidaires and their supporters,
who preferred to portray congruence between the government which
planned genocide and the one which stopped it. It is very essential to
take note of Nsengiyaremye’s belonging to the Hutu-power faction, like
Jean Kambanda.
Misser’s article is followed by Paul Van Goethem’s writing about the
situation and power struggle in the Zairian refugee camps. He begins
“In another refugee camp near Goma, people talk about rivalling
militia, and the UNHCR treats them like bandits.”[11]
Goethem presents the matter as if the Interahamwe were well behaved
people. He goes on to describe the power structure in Rwandan refugee
camps and describes a tense atmosphere where aid workers (all
Anglophone, he notes) are threatened with death by an “extremist
militia, either with or without a political background, which keeps the
masses of refugees in their power by means of terror.“[12]
There are other figures, he says, who have influence over Rwandan
refugees; “a number of groups…exercise a certain power. The interim
government of Jean Kambanda, the former mayors and prefects, the
militia…many of these refugees ‘spontaneously consult (them), they do
not have more than some moral power.”[13] Yet “members of the interim
government cannot be considered as the representatives for the refugee
population since, according to some observers on the spot, certain
members of Jean Kambanda’s interim government even encouraged the
massacres.”[14]
Van Goethem therefore presented an ostensible alternative to the
government which left Rwanda after committing genocide: “A number of
Rwandan intellectuals from the NGO-sphere distanced themselves from
this government. They prefer a leadership that has got nothing to do
with the massacres and that is able to accelerate the negotiations with
Kigali. But they cannot make their voices heard since most of the
structures in the refugee camp are still under the command of the
former government. These intellectuals consider the present commanders
of the Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR) as valuable mediators for the
RPF.”[15]
The FAR leadership is thus presented as credible figures for
negotiating with the RPF and leading the refugees back to Rwanda, a
topic that resurfaces throughout the magazine. After all, “some of
these military men have condemned the massacres from the very beginning
and have no blood on their hands.”[16]
Van Goethem summarized his interview with General Augustin Bizimungu by
accepting at face value what the supreme commander of the army told
him, that: “let aside the Presidential Guard, the army is not involved
in the butcheries, since it took their force to try and stop the
RPF-attacks.” Bizimungu also told him that they were trying to do
something about the militia, since they are well-aware of the fact that
they are discredited.
Much as he was told the army was innocent, political parties are blamed
as responsible for “massacres” as ‘they created the militia in order to
safeguard their interests.”[17] A nostalgic Jean Pierre Godding
specifically mentions the “former Unitarian MRND”[18] a party known to
have been at the helm of genocide.
In the conclusion Vandaele mentions something truthful and serious, but
in passing: “it is quite normal that the MRND drew a blank since they
decided to exterminate their Tutsi fellow citizens.”[19]
Reporters in this issue of TUR seemed to know the plans of camp leaders
and the military in the camps. Vandaele suggests that “the old army
(FAR) should be separated; the militia and the interim government
should be separated from the masses of refugees.”[20]
In addition, the government should be enlarged with elements from civil
society. The role of Rwandan NGO’s is mentioned often. Misser
complains that in “certain organizations, the only people who have
stayed are the guards, drivers, and some occasional secretaries…The
organizations will have to start all over again and attempts are made
to establish contact with the refugees whose return is desirable.”[21]
Vandaele sees progress because ‘NGO-employees in Zaire and Rwanda are
starting to get in touch with each other[22].’ It is suggested ‘NGO’s
can do a lot assisted by the private sector’ and “All signs show that
it will take quite a lot of time for civil society to thoroughly assume
the mediator function and to play an important part in the return of
refugees.” If this return is delayed, civil society will never really
develop to the full and the refugees will not really feel attracted to
return.”[23]
Another political alternative repeatedly mentioned in this issue, is
that of ‘the Third Road-an enlargement of the government in Kigali by
involving moderate members of MRND and the former opposition
parties.’[24]
It is also repeated that “certain donors and NGOs both abroad and in
Rwanda, want an enlargement of the government.” Twagiramungu is asked
if the government could be “enlarged with other tendencies who did not
participate in the massacres.” He responds that “it is possible to
enlarge the government even with people from the MRND who did not
participate in the preparation of massacres or were not involved in
them.”[25]
However, two people suggested by TUR’s reporter Karemera for inclusion
in the government, Dismas Nsengiyaremye and James Gasana, are rejected
by Faustin Twagiramungu. The reason he gave was: “they appear to have
participated in the preparations of the massacres or were involved in
them.” The new Rwandan government’s search for those responsible for
the planning of Genocide was in contrast to TUR emphasis on the
murderers alone, about which Vandaele says: “The militia are not easily
recognizable-well they often carry whistles, but a whistle is easy to
hide, isn’t it?”[26]
The reporters of this special issue of TUR, and the language they use
to describe violence, reveals their political sympathies and
perceptions of the conflict in Rwanda and the genocide which was
unleashed against the Tutsi. Jean Kambanda[27], the lead
respondent/interviewee was asked “Your government is being accused of
genocide. What are you prepared to do to reveal the real historical
truth behind the massacres and war crimes, and to render justice by an
international court?” His reply was “I wouldn’t call it a genocide…I
know that inter-ethnic massacres took place, I admit, but a genocide,
that would rather be a plan to systematically exterminate individuals
belonging to a certain group. I do not think that is the case since it
was the opponents who mutually massacred one another.”[28]
There is not the slightest effort on the side of the interviewer, with
at least a caveat, to demonstrate dissatisfaction with this
unrestrained denial of genocide.
Military figures, like Generals Bizimungu and Kabiligi, were allowed to
evade personal and institutional responsibility, in a question posed as
follows: “The Rwandan army is responsible for the murders of some of
the political leaders and for part of the genocide. What have you done
to stop the bloodshed and to arrest the people responsible for it?”
Gratien Kabiligi responded that: “The army, the entire army was at the
front, the soldiers fulfilled their mission to defend the country. If
the massacres took place, then it is up to the population to
explain.”[29]
Like his immediate subordinate, General Bizimungu also diffused blame.
“Some FAR-members were involved in massacres. I cannot for example
defend the presidential guard…the RPF were killing people at a
tremendous rate…the Tutsi population was chased and murdered…But it is
the entire population who has risen in revolt.”[30]
TUR did publish the views of the RPF and other Rwandan figures accusing
members of the former government of Hutu extremists and the FAR of
genocide. Regarding the claim that, for example, “not all
FAR-soldiers are criminals. Some of them saved Tutsis and opponents…”
the magazine quotes Seth Sendashonga retorting that the FAR “was
generally serving a Nazi-style ideology.”[31] Adding, later, that,
there had been a “premeditated genocide by pitiless people.”
Joseph Matata is the only “human rights activist”, interviewed in this
issue of TUR. He spoke about the genocide extensively. “I can already
say the genocide seems to have been organized by the authorities and
that they have used all possible means: the army, the police, the
media…the entire staff, even at the community level was involved
intimately…It is now safe to say that genocide was planned at the top
level and that the person who governed the country after the President
(Habyarimana)’s death bears the responsibility for the genocide.”[32]
Matata was to change his assessment later.
Portraying villains as victims
The focal question asked to Rwandan figures was the return of the
refugees and what would be necessary for this to take place. On this
point, Faustin Twagiramungu makes the government’s position quite
clear. In response to the question “What does your government do to
remedy the atmosphere of mistrust among some of the refugees?” He
declares: “The majority of the refugees are brainwashed and held
hostage by those who planned and executed the massacres and genocide.”
Gaspard Karemera’s response is “Recent information on massacres and
reprisals and the grip of the army on the country is not very
reassuring for refugees.”[33]
FAR and Rwandan exile figures claimed that the lives of the returning
refugees were in danger, claims echoed in the comments made by TUR
reporters. One such example is when they say the UNHCR held the RPF
responsible for mass graves thus scaring the refugees.[34] Another is a
reference to accusation of ‘butchery’ by the RPA near
Gitarama,[35] which is the only specific reference to a mass murder
case in the entire magazine.
The interim Prime Minister Jean Kambanda, told Van Goethem “People…fled
because they wanted to survive, they did not want to get killed. When
the RPF calls a halt to the killing…only then will people return to
their homeland.’[36] Stanislas Mbonampeka said that refugees could not
return to Rwanda because they saw the RPF as ‘Incarnated devils’ who
“eliminate people discreetly, hiddenly…”[37] General Gratien Kabiligi
said: ‘People know that they have fled, it’s war and the bombs of the
RPF[38].’ And, ‘Refugees who returned are barracked in concentration
camps.’[39]
General Augustin Bizimungu added: “If the RPF would be willing not to
kill civilians, then the population might be encouraged to return
home.” He is backed by Jean Pierre Godding who writes that the
RPF-soldiers belonged to a victorious army that wishes to control the
entire country and to take revenge for the Tutsi massacres.[40]
Perhaps the most virulent comment about the RPF in Rwanda comes from a
Zairian figure: Monsignor Munzihiriwa, the Archbishop of Bukavu who
wrote that: “In Germany we had to distinguish a German from a Nazi…in
Rwanda we should distinguish a Tutsi from a certain RPF members who
wish to seize power by force and eliminating all opposition”.[41] The
bishop’s judgment had been deformed by his friends who had committed
genocide, to make him believe the Tutsi were like Germans and the RPF
the Nazis.
TUR did not attempt to investigate or try to validate various
conspiracy theories, presenting them all without explanation. As
regards the death of President Habyarimana, Van Goethem wrote that
‘High-ranking (FAR) officers could even be said to adhere to the theory
that it was extremist Hutus who killed President Habyarimana.’[42]
Conspiracy theories
Vandaele repeated the claim without attribution that ‘The rumours of
the old Tutsi dream, an empire of the Big Lakes of the Vulcanoes (sic)
is taking shape again. Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the Kivu-region
would be a part of it.[43]
TUR chose to ask many of the figures interviewed about the concept of
an Anglo-Saxon conspiracy, “a geopolitical matter at stake that crosses
the borders of Rwanda.” Stanislas Mbonampeka responded “perhaps they
(Rwandan government) want to introduce the Anglophone influence in
Rwanda and Burundi. But above all, I think that the Anglo-Saxons and
mainly the Americans want to install a stepping stone to Zaire! It is
said that the Americans want to construct a military base in Mutara
near Uganda and Tanzania.”[44]
In his interview with this magazine, James Gasana, a former Rwandan
Defense Minister under Habyarimana, asserted: “One should not
underestimate the importance of Ugandan President Yoweri
Museveni)…Western governments oppose any progress of Muslim
fundamentalism in Sudan to the South. This means one should not
obstruct his ambitions in Rwanda.”[45]
On his part, Kambanda complains “for the last six months the interim
government had suffered from a military embargo, a political embargo
and a diplomatic embargo. “Perhaps it’s no coincidence? Everything was
prepared by the RPF.” Like James Gasana, Vandaele alludes to the
Anglo-Saxon conspiracy theory in his conclusion, by saying that “it
would not be surprising if certain northern countries were not that
eager to have clearness and jurisdiction. Each country will have its
own hidden agenda.”[46]
On the topic of countries with agendas, perhaps the most influential
non-Rwandan politician interviewed in the magazine was Zairian Prime
Minister Kengo Wa Dondo.
Wa Dondo admitted openly to sympathizing with the Rwandan ‘government
in exile’. “We have to prevent the Rwanda problem from swinging. The
Tutsi were chased away 30 years ago. They prepared the re-conquest and
today occupy Rwanda. But they only represent a mere 15 to 20 percent of
the Rwandan population. If the international community does not
intervene rapidly to allow the civil, military and political refugees
to return, the Hutu will rearm and re-conquer Rwanda…”[47]
Wa Dondo recognised that the former government officials in exile used
political pressure on the refugees to prevent them from returning, but
was understanding of their concerns that “This would mean the Kigali
government will be given political legitimacy.” With regard to
questions whether the FAR have been disarmed, Wa Dondo claims, falsely:
“We disarmed between 16,000 and 17,000 soldiers. There are maybe a
hundred or so armed men left…the military…still wear their uniforms and
their uniforms are the same as ours. So people are easily
confused.”[48]
The TUR writers, notably Francois Misser, describe the return of
refugees with discomfort and negativity. Misser tells Twagiramungu that
‘The illegal occupation of goods from the disappeared or refugees
worries the latter and risks creating long lasting tensions.’ In
addition to military occupation, Misser writes that ‘In (certain
regions)…it is the Burundi-refugees, the so-called ‘Burwandans’ who
started working the fields. Most often, it is these refugees or the
refugees from Uganda who own the cows and the goats that have made
their reappearance throughout the Rwandan landscape.’ It is as if
reappearance of the livestock were a bad thing since the perpetrators
of genocide associated cows with the Tutsi.
The Rwandan NGO worker Oreste Mupanda is quoted as saying that ‘Every
other minute you meet so-called Zai-rwandans, Bu-rwandans, and other
refugees…some people are wondering whether the term “insignificant”
ethnic minority, invented by certain colonials…represented reality.
There are so many returned refugees in Kibungo, Bugesera etc…and not
everybody has come back yet!’[49] Godding adds: ‘The new authorities
are living in a world of hypocrisy: on the one hand, they are asking
the population to return, but on the other hand, they have invited the
refugees of the year 1959 to return because they would like to offer
them a piece of land, a job and some place to stay.”[50] In the opinion
of Godding, which he shares with genocidaires like the RDR, it was a
scandal to let in Rwandans who had stayed out of their country for
decades.
TUR made the RPA seem destructive and alien. Misser claims that ‘School
desks have been stolen by RPA-soldiers.’[51] Abbot Andre Sibomana was
also critical saying ‘These elements of the national army are
everywhere. They behave like they are the almighty and civil
administration has little influence on them.’[52] Nowhere did he say
why he was worried or disturbed by the presence of the RPA, whose
vigilance, in fact, was unfavourable to the incursions, the plans which
were being hatched from the camps in Zaire, and understandable given
the presence of FAR and Interahamwe among thousands of internally
displaced people.
Concerning allegations raised by TUR that returning refugees were being
killed; Twiramungu said some NGO’s made these accusations “to justify
humanitarian aid, which today has turned into a flourishing business.
Moreover in the camps and in Europe, some people stick to this
lie.’[53]
Justice and threats
In his summary, Vandaele suggests that Rwandans support the idea of an
impartial international court. He belittles claims of genocide,
claiming “Genocide is growing into some kind of cancer; arbitrarily
misused by everyone…even the government in Kigali refers to the
genocide in and out of season to accuse people.”[54]
However, he says, trials must be held because “it will only then become
clear that not the entire Hutu population bears the collective guilt
for the genocide. And those who have nothing for which to blame
themselves will be relived of all suspicion.”[55]
Rather than focus on the genocide against the Tutsi, Vandaele discusses
allegations of an RPA massacres against the Hutus in Gitarama. “The
survivors know exactly who the five people (who participated in the
butcheries) are. This will also be the case in the villages. It was
only recently that a start can be made with the small fish and then
gradually try and catch the brain behind the massacres.”[56]
All the FAR and former interim government figures ostensibly agree that
there should be trials and a legal process, with the aim of expediting
the return of the refugees. Kambanda accepted an international court
because: “there are criminals on both sides and the truth must be
revealed. I accept it because I was called a criminal many times, since
I was leading a so-called government of killers. Thus we have to find
out who the killers are.”[57]
General Bizimungu is quoted as saying “those who are guilty of the
bloodshed must be found. If we are talking about the genocide but not
about solutions to enable the innocent to return to their homes, then
they will get discouraged and one day they will all rush to Rwanda.”
James Gasana, agreeing with such threats by the General, said “Despair
will rule and that will lead to anything…we have to give them
(refugees) a chance to realize their hopes. When the number of people
who committed the crimes amounts to 30,000 we have to look for 30,000
etc”
Gasana, did not mention anything about the cause of refugees’ despair,
the people who are responsible in exacerbating the situation in the
camps, and neither did he seem to be concerned about the problems of
refugees under siege in the camps by FAR and Interahamwe.
TUR contributors made recurrent references to the threat of force and
return of the FAR to Rwanda. Ephrem Mbugulize, an NGO worker, wrote
that when refugees are asked about return “they answer that they want
‘their army’ to precede them.”[58] A similar position was held by army
officials such as General Kabiligi who said: “The soldiers are part of
the population and you cannot separate a person from his family.”[59]
Indeed, Vandaele writes “the link between the refugees and ‘their’ army
should never be underrated. If that army was banned, this could lead
the scared refugees to an even larger distrust of the outside
world.”[60]
Mbonampeka took a more confident approach: “The Tutsis want all the
power. They cannot seize it in a democratic way…” He threatened that
if the RPF did not negotiate ‘we will have to prepare ourselves to
fight too. It’s the only alternative.’[61] He openly declared to the
TUR that the RPF government would not last six months.
James Gasana took a more long-term view: “when peaceful negotiations
fail, however, one day, even if it takes thirty years, (General
Bizimungu) would behave in the same way as the RPF did.” He also hinted
at terror activities within Rwanda, suggesting that Lake Kivu was not
an obstacle and easy to cross with armed forces. “I believe that when
such activities will take place, they will have to be other than
conventional war.”[62]
Notes
_______________________
[1] Vice-President and Defense Minister Paul Kagame was not interviewed
by Traits D’Union but an interview with him was taken from the
September 1994 edition of Jeune Afrique.
[2] Ibid, pg. 55
[3] Ibid, pg. 58
[4] Ibid, pg. 58
[5] Ibid, pg. 2
[6] Ibid, pg.5
[7] Ibid, pg.6
[8] Ibid, pg.4
[9] Ibid, pg.23
[10] Ibid, pg.26
[11] Ibid, pg.7
[12] Ibid, pg.7
[13] Ibid, pg.7
[14] Ibid, pg.7
[15] Ibid, pg.7
[16] Ibid, pg. 7
[17] Ibid, pg.7
[18] Ibid, pg.40
[19] Ibid, pg.55
[20] Ibid, pg.55
[21] Ibid, pg.5
[22] Ibid, pg.60
[23] Ibid, pg.61
[24] Ibid, pg.60
[25] Ibid, pg.9
[26] Ibid, pg.61
[27] Jean Kambanda later testified to the ICTR that ‘I had to be very
cautious and prepare my approach in the greatest secrecy even as I told
a team of Belgian senators who visited the camps in Zaire in 1994 and a
journalist of the Belgian TUR in September or October of the same
year.’
[28] Ibid, pg 13
[29] Ibid, pg. 31
[30] Ibid, pg. 32
[31] Ibid, pg. 16
[32] Ibid, pg. 41
[33] Ibid, pg. 9
[34] Ibid, pg. 21
[35] The question reads ‘Inhabitants of Mukingi…confirmed that a mass
grave contains the dead bodies of the victims of a butchery committed
by the RPA soldiers. Can’t we assume that the RPA-soldiers committed
these monstrous crimes as a reaction to the Tutsi massacres? (Ibid, pg.
15)
[36] Ibid, pg.12
[37] Ibid, pg.23
[38] Ibid, pg.31
[39] Ibid, pg.32
[40] Ibid, pg.39
[41] Ibid, pg. 52
[42] Ibid, pg. 7
[43] Ibid, pg. 8
[44] Ibid, pg.23
[45] Ibid, pg.19
[46] Ibid, pg.23
[47] Ibid, pg. 49
[48] Ibid, , pg. 49
[49] Ibid, pg. 38
[50] Ibid, pg. 40
[51] Ibid, pg. 5
[52] Ibid, pg.33
[53] Ibid, pg. 9
[54] Ibid, pg. 58
[55] Ibid, pg. 61
[56] Ibid, pg. 61
[57] Ibid, pg. 14
[58] Ibid, pg. 36
[59] Ibid, pg. 31
[60] Ibid, pg. 61
[61] Ibid, pg. 24
[62] Ibid, pg. 19
Chapter XI: A Club of Lovers of Hatred
The “International Forum for the Truth and Justice in Africa of the
Great Lakes Region” is another member of the civil society of
“friends”. According to one part of their propaganda machinery, they
are the ones behind a “Lawsuit filed at Spain’s national court against
high-ranking officials of the state of Rwanda.”[1]
According to this group, “top political-military leaders of the RPF are
responsible for having planned and carried out systematic and selected
killings, not only of the above-mentioned Spanish nationals, but also
of Rwandans and Congolese between 1990 and 2004. Almost seven million
people, mainly women and children, have died during this period.”
Meaning the genocide is the responsibility of the RPF.
On this website they mentioned a few names as an introduction.
Plaintiffs in this legal action are:
- Victims and relatives of Spanish and Rwandan victims;
- Hutu and Tutsi witnesses in exile who have been under
protection until now; Nobel Peace Prize winner Adolfo Pérez Esquivel;
- U.S. Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney;
- The City Councils of Manresa, Figueres and Navata;
- “Nobel Peace Prize nominee” Juan Carrero Saralegui and several
non-governmental national and international organizations. The National
and NGOs organization as mentioned are “City Councils of Ayuntamientos
de Figueres, Manresa and Navata”; Federación de Comités de Solidaridad
con el África Negra de España (12 committees); Centro de Recursos de la
Coordinadora d’ONG Solidàries (47 associations) and Associació Drets
Humans de Mallorca.
The Hutu and Tutsi witnesses in exile are identified as:
- Marie Béatrice Umutesi—“sociologist, writer, Rwandan victim
and refugee;” an unnamed “5 Rwandan victims”, “Assistance Aux Victimes
Des Conflits en Afrique Centrale” (AVICA);
- “Association of Victims Pro Justitia”;
- “Centre de Lutte contre l’Impunité/ Centre for the Struggle
against Impunity and Injustice”(CLIIR); and
- Organization for Peace, Justice and Development in Rwanda
(OPJDR).
Most of these organisations were created to defend genocidaires, as per
the FAR’s plans mentioned earlier. This can be substantiated by a look
into the background and circumstances that led to the creation of each
organisation, into their major activities.
CLIIR
The Centre for the Struggle against Impunity and Injustice (CLIIR), is
an organization which claims to be against impunity. Its founder and
the only person identified as a member and leader of the CLIIR, Joseph
Matata, is a self-proclaimed defender of genocide ideology and
genocidaires. In a Rwandan talk show we had on Radio CONTACT FM, on
March 2, 2008, I told him that I could no longer host people like him,
who deny the genocide against the Tutsi, and propagate and defend hate
without scruple.
In 1994, when Matata was interviewed by TUR Issue N^o 5 as discussed
earlier, he was convinced there were Rwandans who should be held
accountable for the crime of genocide. However, since then he has been
active in Arusha, before the ICTR and in countries like Belgium and
Switzerland as a defence witness for genocidaires. He also appeared
before a French court in Paris in defence of Pierre Péan, a bigot who
says the Tutsi are liars by nature. It was Matata who invented an
insulting definition for the survivors of the genocide, whom he calls a
“syndicate of liars” for denouncing genocidaires. This was in 1995, in
an article published in Dialogue, “Au Rwanda, des “syndicats de
délateurs.”[2]
Matata claims that Tutsi orphans, widows, soldiers and others were
mobilized or forced by the Kigali government to participate in these
“syndicates of liars.”[3] He says the first nucleus of these
“syndicates” was constituted by the RPF during and after the genocide
when they had the first assembly points for the survivors.[4]
Within a year this document of CLIIR and Matata, had been quoted 14
times by SOS Rwanda-Burundi, in a document full of names of RPF members
who should supposedly be prosecuted by the ICTR.[5]
On February 10, 1998, Matata, as defence witness for Jean Paul Akayesu,
told the ICTR that those indicted by the Rwandan courts and by the ICTR
are accused on the basis of orchestrated testimony from so called
“denunciation syndicates”[6] active in Rwanda. The same propaganda
again appeared in a document published by SOS Rwanda-Burundi in January
2005.[7]
On September 3, 2008 the Belgian national Radio and Television Company
(RTBF) aired a documentary by one of their journalists Marianne Klaric
which had the title “Les génocidaires sont parmi nous” which literally
means “the genocidaires are among us”.[8] The friends of evil were not
happy, notably Matata.
In his memorandum, Matata on behalf of his centre and “friends”, blamed
the media for being manipulated by the extremist Tutsi in Kigali and
the Anglo-Saxons. He claims that the world has been duped by the RPF
and its supporters into believing the Hutu planned and carried out
genocide against the Tutsi. He blames KLARIC for having produced the
documentary under the influence of some Rwandan Tutsi survivors of
genocide and the agents of the Rwanda’s Directorate of Military
Intelligence (DMI).[9]
In a 12 page document in 1997 titled: “ANALYSE DE LA SITUATION QUI
PREVAUT AU RWANDA EN RAPPORT AVEC LA REPRESSION DU GENOCIDE, the
“syndicates of liars” is mentioned six times.[10]
The same vitriolic discourse is in a 1998 memo—supposedly, for the US
Government and Congress[11]. With his obsession of blaming genocide
survivors and the government of Rwanda for all evils, Rwanda’s
diplomatic missions are also named “bureaus (comptoirs) of lies,
intrigues and disinformation.”
Typical of all genocidaires who do not recognise the post-genocide
Rwandan government and its members as truly Rwandan, Matata quotes
unnamed “former Rwandan diplomats” who allegedly told him that the
Rwandan embassies or foreign missions do not represent the “Rwandan
nation” but “an apartheid regime, and a group of mafia.”[12]
The same discourse is in Matata’s open letter to Madame Karine GERARD,
Présidente de la Cour d’Assises de Bruxelles, on 20 June 2005,
concerning the case against genocidaires Etienne NZABONIMANA and Samuel
NDASHYIKIRWA.[13] In CLIIR’s COMMUNIQUE N° 88/2006, Matata reproduced
most of the material found in Pierre Pean’s book, Noir Fureur F/Blancs
Menteur.
In several footnotes and in the text, there is a recycling of the hate
propaganda and vilifying of certain individuals who have been at the
fore front in naming and shaming the genocidaires and their
friends.[14]
Without quoting Matata, Charles Ndereyehe invokes the “syndicates of
liars” theme to call attention to the innocence of people who have been
arrested and accused of genocide, in a paper entitled “The rule of law
and human rights in the Great Lakes” which he presented to a conference
organised by unspecified NGOs of Belgium, France, Germany and
Holland.[15]
This paper was a compendium of the usual genocide denial
themes—conspiracy theories like the “Hima Empire”, genocide being used
by survivors as a commercial capital— and used as sources other friends
of evil like James Gasana, SOS Rwanda-Burundi, and the CLIIR. Ndereyehe
concludes his last paragraph that “civil society” is the redeemer and
hope for their cause.[16]
In the same paper, Ndereyehe attacks the ICTR saying that since its
establishment, “no RPF member has been tried before this international
jurisdiction, despite the abundant double-checked and confirmed
testimonies and trustworthy documents.” His only reference is
“SOS-RWANDA-BURUNDI: Lists of members of RPF-Inkotanyi/RPA suspected of
premeditating crimes against humanity which fall within the field of
competence of the ICTR, Dossier nº 1, June 1998.” And, as mentioned
above, the only source of information for SOS Rwanda-Burundi is Joseph
Matata and his CLIIR, of which Matata signs every press release on
behalf of an unknown membership.
OPJDR
Analysis of the discourse of the “Organization for Peace, Justice, and
Development in Rwanda” (OPJDR) shows that like the CLIIR, it was
created to serve the interests of genocide forces.[17] OPJDR claims to
be “a human rights organization based in the United States, (Delaware)
with a focus on the Great Lakes region of Africa…to conduct
fact-finding investigations into human rights abuses in the Great Lakes
region of Africa, study and seek funding of small development projects
to help refugees scattered in that region of Africa…get involved in the
peace processes in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Sustain contacts
with Organizations, Churches, and Governments…”[18]
OPJDR also claims to have started in November 1995, with the aim of
“assisting and providing information to the International Community for
better assistance to refugees from the Great Lakes region.” Avoiding
talking about genocide against the Tutsi, the OPJDR’s revisionism is
apparent in its founding principles: “to counter the notion that human
rights abuses by one side in the war in Rwanda were somehow more
tolerable than abuses by the other side.”[19]
Dr. Félicien Kanyamibwa and Jean Marie Vianney Higiro are the founders
of this organisation. Kanyamibwa lives in the State of New Jersey and
works with a pharmaceutical company, Hoffman-La-Roche based in Nutley.
Formerly Kanyamibwa was the Secretary General of the FDLR[20] before
metamorphosing to become the secretary general of Democratic Forces for
the Liberation of Rwanda (RUD-URUNANA).[21] Kanyamibwa and Jean Marie
Vianney Higiro, at some point were at the top administration of the
FDLR, the latter being the President.[22]
Ideologically, OPJDR toes the line of RDR and its sibling FDLR. It is
an organisation led by people who are also leaders in armed movements
with genocide links. OPJDR maintains close relationship with an
American politician, Cynthia McKinney.
This former congresswoman served six terms as member of US House of
representatives for the Democratic Party before her defeat in the year
2002. She became a US Presidential candidate in 2008, for the Green
Party.[23]
McKinney’s association with “friends” like OPJDR and Carrero is clear
and purposeful. In a letter of February 06, 2008 McKinney describes her
association with these merchants of hate in a jubilant tone. “While in
Congress, I was involved in truth-seeking in the role of the United
States government and the United Nations in what the world knows as the
Rwanda Genocide. Outraged by what I learned, I agreed to testify in
court in Spain on behalf of the truth. Today, I learned that that
participation and that search for truth was worth it. Forty members of
the Rwandan Army have been indicted for genocide. And the judge found
that the current President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, was
complicit–although he enjoys immunity as a sitting Head of State.
Here’s the story I just received from my friends in Spain and across
Europe.”[24]
McKinney is a regular recipient of OPJDR communications. Copies of the
below-mentioned letters were either, written or copied to her, as well
as published on the website of “Inshuti”. There is a letter signed by
Felicien Kanyamibwa and Jean Marie-Vianney Higiro where the OPJDR tells
the recipients that former Rwandan Prime Minister Rwigema should be
inadmissible for asylum under U.S immigration law given his alleged
involvement in “a crime involving moral turpitude”, and “conduct that
is defined as genocide for purposes of the International Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.”[25]
Knowing that the signatories of the letter are active participants in a
movement which promotes genocide denial and hate against Tutsi, it is
startling to see how they advocate morality and good conduct. But
whenever they mention the word genocide, beware: it is not against the
Tutsi, but against the Hutu.
In another OPJDR letter to Cynthia McKinney dated February 13, 2001,
the advocacy is to “Set up an international commission to investigate
the genocide of Hutu committed by the RPF in Rwanda and
DRC.”[26] Insinuating genocide, McKinney writes about “Killings
targeting Hutus had been brought forth by this organisation.[27]
In a letter of March 21, 2002 to Mr. Okot Obbo, UNHCR
Representative-Kenya, and copied to Cynthia McKinney and Kenneth Roth,
Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, OPJDR declares: “To foreign
observers Rwanda looks peaceful, but to Rwandans, the country is a
jungle run by a brutal dictatorial regime that oppresses and kills
people. Current Rwandan leaders use the genocide of Tutsis as its
justification of the violation of human rights and international
law.”[28]
In 2000, as Rwanda and the world were commemorating the genocide of the
Tutsi for the sixth time, the OPJDR was blaming the crime on the RPF
and anyone other than the actual perpetrators. They urged the “USA, the
European Union, the UNDP, the World Bank” and other institutions, to
stop funding the “genocidal and warmongering policy by the Rwandan
government and its Rwandan Patriotic Army, whom they accused of
“genocide against the Hutus” also condemning it for the persecution and
“assassinations of certain Tutsis.”[29]
Blaming the RPF for genocide is clear in their discourse: “those
responsible for the 1994 Rwandan tragedy–extermination policy against
the Hutus… including the creation of concentration camps– persecution
of Hutu leaders within the RPF-led government, just because of their
ethnic background and –genocide against the Hutus.”[30] This denial of
an established historical fact is joined with the denial that there are
people who committed genocide. Most often, they say that most detainees
are innocent and suffer only because they are Hutu: “The crime by most
of them is to be from the ethnic Hutus”[31]
On November 7, 1999, the OPJDR rejoiced when that a leading
genocidaire, Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, was wrongly released by the ICTR,
on procedural grounds. With great pleasure OPJDR announced that
“Barayagwiza cannot be prosecuted there or anywhere else if the
international law is applied and his human rights are respected. The
case of Jean Bosco Barayagwiza has uncovered a can of worms of the
injustice against Rwandans. At Arusha, most of the detainees were
illegally arrested and abusively charged. Furthermore all the 150,000
prisoners in Rwanda were illegally arrested…”[32]
The big lie is the OPJDR’s standard operating procedure, but they find
little lies useful as well. In a 1998 propaganda piece entitled “The
nomination of a representative of the Rwandan Government to the ICTR is
illegal, immoral and against Justice” the OPJDR asserted, that Louise
Arbour, the former prosecutor for the international tribunal “was a
victim of violence of militias and organizations close to the RPF
government of Rwanda.”
The ICTR authorities denied that this happened. Another fib is where
they write that signatories of this communiqué were in Arusha, whereas
they were not.[33]
Notes
_______________________
[1] Source:
http://www.veritasrwandaforum.org/material/comunicado_en.pdf
[2] Revue- Dialogue, Octobre-Novembre 1995
[3] “Aujourd’hui sous le nouveau régime rwandais, des veufs, des
orphelins, des militaires, des miliciens tutsi et des simples citoyens
ont été sensibilisés (pour certains rescapés du génocide), forcés (pour
d’autres rescapés de la guerre et la répression aveugle qui perdure
encore), encouragés et sollicités pour se constituer en “associations
ou syndicats de délateurs“. Ces “Syndicats de délateurs” sont
couramment utilisés dans la constitution de faux témoignages
et …intimider et éliminer des éventuels et futurs opposants au nouveau
régime “pro-tutsi”.CLIIR, COMMUNIQUE n° 1/96 Rwanda: MISE EN GARDE
CONTRE “LES SYNDICATS DE DELATEURS”Jodoigne, 8 May 1996
[4] Les premiers noyaux des sont apparus pendant le génocide et les
massacres dans les camps de “rassemblement de la population rescapée”.
CLIIR,“Rwanda: Les syndicats de delateurs” Bruxelles, Mai 1997 In this
document, the expression syndicats de délateurs appears 21 times.
Source: www.grandslacs.net/doc/0609.pdf
[5] This document of 7 June, 1998 is titled: “LISTE DES MEMBRES DU FPR-
INKOTANYI / APR SOUPCONNES D’AVOIR PREMEDITE ET COMMIS DES CRIMES
CONTRE L’HUMANITE QUI SONT DE LA COMPETENCE DU TRIBUNAL PENAL
INTERNATIONAL POUR LE RWANDA (T.P.I.R)-DOSSIER No
1” http://www.inshuti.org/sosdroit.pdf
[6] See: ICTR/BACKGROUND—THE TRIAL OF JEAN-PAUL AKAYESU, FORMER MAYOR
OF TABA COMMUNEArusha, 1st September 1998 Fondation Hirondelle (FH)
[7] It has a title: “LE RWANDA 2004 FACE A LA DECLARATION UNIVERSELLE
DES DROITS DE L’HOMME” On pages 48, 63, 67 and 68,
[8] Mémorandum adressé le 12 septembre 2008 aux responsables de la RTBF
pour protester contre la campagne de délation et d’étouffement de la
vérité. Joseph Matata, Bruxelles, le 12 septembre 2008. The document is
available
onhttp://www.droitdereponse.be/lettrecliir.html or http://www.musabyima
na.be/index.php?id=11&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=236&cHash=ecb0e0e432
[9] Ibid. He says in French, “En regardant le reportage que Madame
KLARIC a réalisé en Belgique et au Rwanda sous le haut patronage de
quelques rescapés Tutsis du génocide rwandais et des agents de la
DMI,… »
[10] CLIIR Communiqué n° 10/97 du 25 mars 1997
[11]CLIIR, Memorandum adressé au Gouvernement et au Congrès américains
le 3 juillet 1998www.grandslacs.net/html/tm/ongfbc.html
[12] “…la Junte militaire du Général KAGAME a déguisé les missions
diplomatiques rwandaises en ” comptoirs ” de mensonges, intrigues,
désinformation, repaires des commandos chargés de la chasse à l’homme
et aux opposants politiques. ” Les ambassades rwandaises ne
représentent plus la nation rwandaise, mais une idéologie ethnisante
d’extrême droite, un régime de l’apartheid, un groupe mafieux “.
Available on CLIIR, Mémorandum adressé au Gouvernement et au Parlement
Belge à l’occasion de la visite au Rwanda du Premier Ministre, du
Vice-Premier et Ministre Louis Michel et du Ministre de la
Défensehttp://www.rdrwanda.org/francais/droits_de_la_personne/clir/CLIR
31032000.htm
[13] See: www.opjdr.org/matata_joseph.htm
[14] See:“Les héros du génocide rwandais sont assassinés, emprisonnés
et persécutés au lieu d’avoir des médailles: Le Cas du prêtre Wenceslas
MUNYESHYAKA diabolisé injustement” Matata Joseph, Bruxelles, le 9
janvier 2006 See:www.grandslacs.net/doc/3898.pdf For more links of
family and friends of evil go
tohttp://perewenceslas.centerblog.net/rub-VICTIMES-DE-L-EGLISE-DU-RWAND
A.html and
onhttp://www.musabyimana.be/index.php?id=11&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66&cHash
=ecb0e0e432 andhttp://www.geraldfoci.net/wenceslas.htm
[15] See: L’ETAT DE DROIT ET LA SITUATION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME EN
AFRIQUE DES GRANDS LACS: Etude de cas sur le RWANDA dans la
conférence sur : “TOLERANCE ET RESOLUTIONS DES CONFLITS EN AFRIQUE
CENTRALE” organisée par les Asbl de l’Allemagne , Belgique, France et
Hollande à Bruxelles le 3 Juillet
1999http://www.rdrwanda.org/francais/documents/RDR/Conference03071999.h
tml
[16] Ibid. Les forces démocratiques de l’Afrique Centrale,
organisations politiques ou Société Civile, doivent s’unir pour
mobiliser les peuples de cette région et les éduquer à l’exercice de
leurs droits. In the language of the likes of Ndereyehe, “democratic
forces” and “people” means Hutu.
[17] Most of their Propaganda materials are found on RDR websites
like www.rdrwanda.org or www.inshuti.org
[18] See: http://www.opjdr.org/
[19] See: http://www.opjdr.org/About%20us.htm
[20] See, for example: COMMUNIQUE SE/N°04/JUL/2003 “Simulation of rebel
attacks by the Rwandan Government” which Kanyamibwa signed as the
Secretary General of FDLR on July 28, 2003. It is available
on www.fdlr.org andwww.grandslacs.net/doc/2760.pdf
[21] One example is where; on September 1, 2007 he signed a Press
Release NR RUD/SG/09/01urging the government of the DRC to engage the
government of Rwanda to negotiate with the armed opposition groups.
Available
on http://www.rud-urunana.org/documentation/RUD-SG-Com3Sept2007TxtEng.p
df
[22] Communiqué n°: 02/PP/Juin/04 signed on June 10, 2004, by Anastase
Munyandekwe
http://www.fdlr.org/comm/Aucun_element_des_FDLR_capture.htm
[23] See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cynthia_McKinney
[24] Cynthia McKinney Celebrates: Kagame charged in Spain. A letter by
Cynthia McKinney February 06, 2008
See.http://www.taylor-report.com/articles/index.php?id=35
[25] “Mr. Pierre Celestin Rwigema owes the World an explanation for
crimes committed by his Rwandan Government.” July 29,
2000 http://www.inshuti.org/rwigema3.htm
[26] General Kagame’s visit to the United STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND
http://www.inshuti.org/opjdr4.htm
[27] The RPF local defence units massacre Hutu civilians in Rwanda—
June 25, 2000
http://www.inshuti.org/opjdr2.htm
[28] The letter with a theme GREAT LAKES REGION REFUGEES LIVING In
KENYA and signed by Japhet Mwizerwa is available
on http://www.inshuti.org/opjdr7.htm Note: This phrase, as it is
without change, had been written to another personality and copied to
McKinney and Roth. See: Forced repatriation of rwandan refugees living
in Tanzania, March 5,2002 http://www.inshuti.org/opjdr6.htm
[29] Rwandans Commemorate Six Years of Extermination, Exile, and
Despair April 7, 2000http://www.inshuti.org/six.htm
[30] The OAU-IPEP report: too much carrot and not enough stick for the
criminal Rwandan Patriotic Front government July 13,
2000 http://www.inshuti.org/oau.htm . in their previous communication
They said this anniversary was a reminder to the international
community that “the tragedy in Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region has
been going on since October 1, 1990 with the invasion of Rwanda by the
elements of the National Resistance Army of Uganda. And, the RPF
government, responsible for the massacres.
See: Rwanda: a very sad anniversary, July 2, 2000 Available
on http://www.inshuti.org/opjdr3.htm
[31] The freedom of Misago must open the doors of Rwandan
prisons, June180, 200
http://www.inshuti.org/misago4.htm
[32] Jean Bosco Barayagwiza: The Epitome of Injustice in Rwanda
(OPJDR), Arusha November 7, 1999
http://www.inshuti.org/barayag5.htm Also
on http://www.rdrwanda.org/Rwanda/infos/OPJDR07111999.html
[33] Signed by Felicien Kanyamibwa Claiming to be in Arusha— October
31, 1999 http://www.inshuti.org/ictr.htm
Chapter XII: Carrero, a Mockery to the Nobel Peace Prize
In this chapter, I will focus on Juan Carrero Saralegui, the
self-proclaimed seeker of justice. He was mentioned early on, in this
book, as the person, who financed the English, Spanish and Catalan
translation Marie-Beatrice Umutesi’s book.
Who is Carrero? It was a question I asked myself because his name crops
up almost everywhere you find the activism of Rwandan genocidaires.
Carrero was born on February 18, 1951 in Arjona, Spain. He studied
philosophy at the university, and by the time he was 19, he and some
friends established a commune on the S’Olivar farm in Mallorca. This
would later be the place where his foundation is born.
On his commune, Carrero spent four years studying theology. Carrero
then spent three years in the Argentinean Andes teaching children. He
worked there with his wife and his Argentinean friend Adolfo Perez
Esquivel.[1] Esquivel, later received a Nobel Peace Prize, and Carrero
has used his association with Esquivel to give legitimacy to his own
work.
Though he is regarded as a non-violent activist, Carrero has
effectively become a spokesperson for those who have close links to
people who committed the genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994,
many of whom are effectively fugitives from justice, while retaining
their ability to get their message out, through people like Carrero.
Carrero prides himself on being Spain’s third conscientious objector,
and the founder and president of the S’Olivar Foundation, which
provides or has become a platform for much of the rhetoric of genocide
denial, as well as hate ideology against the Tutsi and the government
of Rwanda, disseminated by the RDR. Carrero has gained some legitimacy
by courting high-powered “friends”, and by describing himself as a
candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000—though we shall see below
how this nomination came about.
Carrero describes himself as the voice for those who have none. As he
says, “I am convinced that my place is with the losers, in this case
with the Rwandan ‘genocidalists’, who have been abandoned by almost
everyone”.[2] He chooses to be their spokesman.
Looking at Carrero helps untangle the web of denialist ideology that
continues to disseminate hate. He and many of his friends aim to gain
legitimacy for their cause by distorting the history of what has
happened in Rwanda. They make use of much of the hate ideology being
spewed by organizations like the RDR. The infamous Inshuti website
features much of his writings.
The Inshuti website defends Carrero by claiming that that he “never
negated either the French responsibility or that of the Interahamwe
Hutu militia.” They just say he puts the events into context, since the
issues of the French and the Interahamwe have been used “to cover up
those of the United States government and its allies in the Central
African Region.”[3]
This is a common trick used by deniers to give some sort of
immunization to what they have to say. Carrero, and others like him
want to indict the RPF as conspirators of the “genocide”, yet he and
many like him deny much of the events of the genocide, and argue if
there was one at all.[4]
The S’Olivar Foundation, which is based in a small Catholic community
in the Mallorca valley of Estellencs, was founded in 1992, and calls
itself a non-denominational cultural NGO, subscribing to the
non-violence movement. The foundation was ostensibly formed in reaction
to what the founders saw as the passivity and inaction of the
international community in Somalia at the time. Their stated goal was
to help alleviate the suffering, while dealing with the underlying
causes. Driven by religious notions, they felt a responsibility to
unite against tragedies taking place around the world.[5] Carrero talks
of his faith as “a faith that asks us that we do not personally defend
ourselves from evil but that at the same time asks that we defend those
who are defenceless.”[6]
Right after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the S’Olivar Foundation, under
the leadership of Carrero, became one of the founding NGO’s of a
consortium called the “Round Table for Rwanda”, which then established
the “Coordinadora de Prevencion Activa de Conflictos”(the Coordinator
for the active prevention of conflicts, or CPAC). In 1995, Carrero
reportedly visited Rwanda and Burundi for a month to analyze the
situation in the region, acting as the CPAC’s representative.[7]
It is crucial to look critically at the underlying mission of the
S’Olivar Foundation and whom they represent. On their website, they
ask, ”how can we not endeavour to prevent new cases of genocide as
terrible as those of Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire…”[8] The inclusion of
Zaire is a clear reference to the denial ideology put forth by the RDR,
which charges the RPF with genocide against Hutu refugees there.
The Foundation claims that while its initial mission was to provide
humanitarian funds to needy countries, it had to make a large shift in
1994, due to the, “repeated cases of genocide in Rwanda and Burundi”
and the limitations of the international community’s ability to engage
in humanitarian and development assistance, and its lack of political
will to stop the “tragedies.”[9]
In his writing Carrero calls on citizens of the European Union, as well
as members of what he refers to as the “so-called international
community”[10] to understand their own responsibility in the tragedies
of the region. “The EU is supplying the invading countries, which are
ruled by dictatorships responsible for the genocide, with enormous
financial aid.[11] By this is meant Rwanda’s post-1994 government.
The Foundation says that it aims to, “awaken international public
attention…to exert political pressure at the highest levels of world
power… (for) these actions are in solidarity with the defenceless
victims abandoned to their fate by an international community that
talks of new international order, but which in reality all too often
cruelly and unfairly acts or remains silent due to selfish and shameful
interests or disinterests.”[12]
Given that it was problematic for the genocidaires who metamorphosed
into the RDR to get direct access to international media, it was
crucial for the RDR to have relays that would disseminate this
rhetoric. Carrero and his foundation are proud spokesmen for the RDR.
And, it is no surprise to find that it was the RDR who launched and
mobilised support for Carrero’s candidature for the Nobel Peace Prize.
Carrero’s Friends
The S’Olivar Foundation’s website and Carrero’s writings feature a
great deal of name-dropping about prestigious persons who supposedly
support him and his work. We wonder how many of these persons are aware
of how their names are being used, particularly in light of Carrero’s
rhetoric about Rwanda and genocide against the Tutsi. For example is
Elie Wiesel, a holocaust survivor aware? Archbishop Desmond Tutu?
Mikhail Gorbachev? His Holiness, the Dalai Lama?[13]
Many of the names he mentions appear in curiously ambiguous manner. It
would appear that Carrero deceptively exploits various endorsements of
pious aspects his work to garner additional support, and that in the
end, many people give him support without knowing or understanding the
dangerous and deceitful propaganda that Carrero disseminates with
regard to Rwanda.
On the Inshuti website, there are extensive lists of those who
supported Carrero for his Nobel Prize nomination. Many are probably
oblivious to the threat that he poses to Rwanda, as well as the world
at large, with the genocidal hate ideology that he preaches. It is
obvious that the nomination was designed to further legitimize his
perverse and nefarious ideology.
An Inshuti website letter supporting Carrero’s nomination for the Nobel
Peace Prize claims that thanks to his previous work he had gained the
support of “19 Nobel Prize winners, Commissioner Emma Bonino, the
various political groups of the European Parliament and its President
José María Gil-Robles, dozens of international personalities and
hundreds of NGOs.”[14]
The following, also from Inshuti website, is a list of some of his
supporters for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000, broken up into several
categories.[15]
African organisations and individuals, 14 supports, including:
- Rally for the Return of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda
(RDR), “the world’s foremost organisation of Rwandan exiles”
- Communities from the African Great Lakes region: Rwandan
Community of West Africa, Burundian Community of Canada, Rwandan
Community of the Ivory Coast, Rwandan Association of Toulouse, Rwandan
Congress of Canada.
- Organisation for Peace, Justice and Development in Rwanda
(OPJDR), USA
Missionaries to the African Great Lakes, 17 supports, including:
- 6 Religious congregations with missionaries in the African
Great Lakes region: Sisters of Charity of Saint Vincent de Paul,
Societas Missionariorum Africae (White Fathers) (Spain), Javierian
Missionaries of Spain, Combonian Missionaries (Spain), Nuns of the
Sacred Heart of Jesus(North-Spain), Community of Brothers of Charity
(Kigoma-Tanzania), Missionaries of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary,
- Purificación Risco, winner of the Prince of Asturias Concord
Prize of 1994 (representing the missionaries in Rwanda and Burundi)
- 4 Diocesan Missions Delegations: Tortoise, Majorca, Logroño,
Barcelona
- 6 Missionaries in the African Great Lakes Region:Alberto
Fernández Malanda (lay missionary in Burundi), Jaume Mas Julià
(missionary in Burundi 1976-1997), Jaume Moragues de Oleza (missionary
in Burundi 1951-1988), Miquel Parets i Serra (missionary 1961-1997),
Jaime Cañellas Llompart (ex-missionary in Burundi), Cecili Buele
(ex-missionary in Burundi)
Organizations for cooperation, human rights, peace and humanitarian
aid, 23 supports, including:
- Vicens Ferrer, winner of the Prince of Asturias Concord Prize
of 1997
- Human Rights, Majorca
- Justice and Peace, Barcelona, President of Spain, Majorca,
Manresa
- Munzihirwa Group, Madrid, collective of several dozen NGOs
- Umoya, Committees for Solidarity with Black Africa
- Friends of B.P. Casaldàliga “Araguaia”, Barcelona
- Intermón, general board of directors (member of Oxfam
Internacional)
- Pepe Beúnza Vázquez, first conscientious objector in Spain
- Anita Klum, secretary general, Swiss Fundation for Human
Rights
- Josep Vidal i Llecha association
- Federation of Associations for the Defence and Promotion of
Human Rights, with special consultative status in the UN ECOSOC;
integrated by Association for the United Nations in Spain, Caritas
Española, Institut de Drets Humans de Catalunya, Institute of Political
Studies for Latin America and Africa (IEPALA), Justicia y Paz, Liga
Española Pro Derechos Humanos (Spanish League for Human Rights),
Movement for Peace, Disarmament and Liberty (MPDL), Paz y Cooperación
- Jon Sobrino, SJ, Director of the Monseñor Romero Center /UCA,
San Salvador
- Inshuti, Friends of the people of Rwanda and Burundi
Political institutions and public servants, 53 supports, including:
- Island Council of Majorca, the highest governmental body in
Majorca (28 votes in favour, 2 abstentions, none against)
- Balearic Island Parliament (unanimously approved in plenary
session)
- Spanish Parliament (unanimously approved)
- 2 Town Councils Associations of Majorca: Tramuntana, Plà
- 22 Town Councils of Majorca, 4 Town Councils of Andalucía
- 5 Balearic public servants: Catalina Cirer (government
representative at Autonomous Community of the Balearic Islands), Cecili
Buele (cultural councilor for the Island Council), Pere Sampol i Mas
(Vice President of the Balearic Islands Government), Catalina Mª Bover
i Nicolau (General Director of Organization and Innovation, Balearic
Government), Damià Pons i Pons (Councillor for Culture and Education
for the Balearic Island Government)
- 8 European Parliamentary MPs: Pere Esteve, José Mª Mendiluce,
Jaime Valdivieso, Fernando Fernández Martin, Laura González, Rosa Díez,
Francisca Sauquillo, Theresa Zabell
- Others: Fernando Álvarez de Miranda (Ombudsman, Spain),
Teresa Riera Madurell (Balearic Island deputy at the Spanish
Parliament), José Chamizo de la Rubia (Ombudsman, Andalucía), Rafael
Estrella Pedrola (Spokesperson for the Commission of External Affairs
in the House of Commons)
Jurists, 8 supports:
- Association of Jurists of the Balearic Islands (AJIB)
- Ladislao Roig Bustos, lieutenant prosecutor, Balearic High
Court
- Pere Barceló Obrador, magistrate, Court of Palma
- Margarita Robles Fernández, magistrate, National High Court
of Spain and ex-Secretary of the Interior
- Baltasar Garzón Real, examining magistrate No. 5., National
High Court, Madrid, and examining magistrate for, among others, the
case against Augusto Pinochet in Spain
- Carlos Gómez Martínez, director, Spanish Judicial School
- Jesús Alcalá, professor of international law, member of the
Council of the International Comission of Jurists, Sweden
- Guillermo Vidal Andreu, President of Catalunya High Court
Clergy and religious, 37 supports, including:
- Mns. Teodoro Úbeda, Bishop of Mallorca
- Pere Casaldàliga i Plà, Bishop of Sao Felix do Araguaia, MT,
Brazil
- Anders Arborelius, Bishop, Catholic Bishopric of Stockholm
- 4 Zen Master: Willigis Jäger, Berta Meneses, Fr. Niklaus
Bratsche SJ, Carmen Monske
- Jaime Cabot Bujosa, domestic prelate of John Paul II
- Lluc Sanctuary, Mallorca
- 12 Parishes of Majorca, 1 Parish not of Majorca
Academics and intellectual, 29 supports, including:
- 9 Rectors and Universities: Llorenç Huguet i Rotger
(Universitat de les Illes Baleares), University School of Education –
Ávila (Universidad de Salamanca), Manuel Gallego Diaz (Universidad
Pontificia Comillas de Madrid), José María Martín Delgado (Universidad
Internacional de Andalucía), Jaime Vinuesa Tejedor (Universidad de
Cantabria), Raúl Villar Lázaro (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid), Josefa
Beltrán Bertomeu (Asociación Universitat d’Estiu de les Terres de
l’Ebre), José Gómez Soliño (Universidad de la Laguna), Rafael Puyol
Antolín (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)
- 13 University teachers, including: Dolores Aleixandre Parra
(Universidad de Comillas, Madrid), Ramón Panikkar (University of
California in Santa Barbara, USA), Miquel Tortella i Feliu (Universitat
de les Illes Balears), Joseph Mafokozi (Universidad Complutense de
Madrid)
- 4 University professors: Joan Oliver Araujo Feliu
(Universitat de les Illes Balears-UIB), Gabriel Amengual Coll (UIB),
Josep Maria Terricabres (Universitat de Girona), Ramon Bassa (UIB)
- Javier Sadaba, Doctor of Philosophy and Ethics
- José Luis Sampedro Sáez, Writer, member of the Spanish Royal
Academy, Professor in Economic Structure (retired) of the Universidad
de Madrid; and ex-Senator.
Organizations and individuals involved in social and ecological
action, 18 supports, including:
- Antoni Font Gelabert, member of the Board of Directors of the
Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International, the
Netherlands)
- Diocesan Caritas of Majorca, Diocese of Majorca
- Diocesan Social Action Delegation, Diocese of Majorca
- Xavier Pastor i Gràcia, executive director, Greenpeace Spain
- Grup d’Ornitologia Balear (GOB), environmentalist
organization
- Bartomeu Català Barceló, president, Asociación Proyecto
Hombre; secretary general, Ibero-American Network of NGOs working in
drug dependencies (RIOD); member of the board of directors of the World
Federation of Therapeutic Communities.
Cultural workers, educators and Civil society, more than 60 supports,
including:
- Asociación de Tai Chi Taoista de España Spanish Association
of Taoist Tai Chi, Barcelona
- Michael Douglas, Actor and Ambassador for Peace for the
United Nations
- Fundació Pilar i Joan Miró, Artistic fundation
- Estudi General Lul.lià
- Federació Catalana d’Associacions i Clubs UNESCO
- 14 Education centers
- 5 Neighbourhood Associations of Palma
- 7 Official Association of Balearic Island Administrators,
Social Graduated, Apothecarys, Veterinary Surgeons, Psychologists,
Architects, Philosophy Doctors and Licentiates
All in all, the letter claims that over 4,500 people supported
Carrero’s nomination.[16] There are reasons to remain sceptical as to
whether the listed individuals and associations were aware that they
had been dragged onto the bandwagon of genocide exponents.
In 1996, with the support of the Council of the Island of Mallorca, the
S’Olivar Foundation organized a peace walk from Barcelona to the United
Nations headquarters in Geneva. Though the website does not go into
details about the results of the walk, it does name Mr. Ayala Laso, the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Mayor Zaragoza, the Director
General of UNESCO, as well as unnamed high-ranking officials of the
Europe Parliament, as holding meetings with the members of the
Foundation, receiving documents about the S’Olivar Foundation—thus
suggesting some sort of connection of support.
Later that year the Foundation conducted another peace walk, with
numerous Nobel Prize winners supposedly participating. A complete list
of support for their walk can be found on their website, again
including notables like: Elie Wiesel, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Mikhail
Gorbachev, and the Dalai Lama.[17]
The foundation website claims that the participants in the walk were
received by Mr. Ayala Laso, and that the President of “Madres de la
Plaza de Mayo”, came from Paris to offer their support. [18] The
S’Olivar Foundation website declares that the Dalai Lama signed onto
several documents showing support, and that the President of the
European Parliament, Mr. Jose Maria Gil-Robles added his own personal
support to the European Parliament in support of this cause.
Carrero’s Foundation always talks about its powerful connections. For
instance, that they managed to hold high-level meetings in Burundi in
1996, where they were able to meet with the President of Burundi,
various cabinet members and bishops, as well as the widow of the
assassinated president Ndadaye. In 1996 the Foundation submitted a
petition apparently signed by six Nobel Prize winners to the European
Parliament in Brussels, where they met with leaders of several
political groups, as well as various Members of Parliament.[19]
The Foundation’s website boasts several pictures of influential people.
Many of those pictured are actual supporters of their cause such as
Mrs. Merce Amer, the Mallorcan Councilor. You also have others who are
apparently trying to get closer to what the Foundation seemingly stands
for, like Mr. Matutes, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs[20], or
the President of Amnesty International.[21]
In the beginning of 1997 the Foundation demonstrated in front of the
European Union Council of Ministers as well as the US Embassy in
Madrid, with the “Nobel Prize winners” and Ms. Emma Bonino, who is
mentioned throughout Carrero’s writings. The demonstrations also
included “international personalities and hundreds of NGOs”, the
Foundation claims. This petitioning is said to have gone in tandem with
a fast that lasted 42 days, and “it finally ended by measures approved
by the European ministers.”[22]
It is also important to mention Carrero’s academic friends, whom he
refers to throughout his works. Many of these friends have been
discussed in this book, but their names merit mention in this chapter
on Carrero, so the connection can be drawn between them. Just for
example, Father Serge A. Desouter, and Herman Cohen, the former
American Under-Secretary of State for Africa, are mentioned and quoted
numerous times.[23]
Carrero gains insights as well as “facts” from Desouter and Cohen’s
work. He uses Desouter’s article “The Usurpation of the Term Genocide,”
in many of his writings. In this article, Desouter talks about the use
of the word genocide. He says, “Genocide is a legal term defined by
international law. In the case of Rwanda –and not only there– this term
has also gotten a political and economic connotation because they abuse
the original meaning. Genocide, in this last instance, equals a
safe-conduct in the face of which no one asks questions. Until recently
no one dared to tackle this theme. If you want to talk about genocide
in Rwanda it is understood that one must be clear that this concerns
“the” genocide against the Tutsis. But it rapidly became clear that it
wasn’t only Tutsis who had been killed. To defend their reasoning, a
new social class was invented and signalled out as victims: “the
moderate Hutus.”[24]
Carrero also quotes Christopher Hakizabera. The magazine Mundo Negro
published some of Hakizabera’s writings in April of 2000. Carrero
describes the work that Hakizabera does as valuable, and links his name
to other “worthy” writers such as Desouter, Overdulve and Cohen. This
piece in Mundo Negro claims to illuminate the “criminal elements” of
the RPF. Hakizabera talks about the regretful gullibility of
international organizations when faced with what he calls the
“Machiavellian RPF”. He continues by questioning “THE” genocide, and
implies exaggeration of the atrocities.[25]
Though Carrero never explicitly calls them his “friends” as he does
many others, throughout his writings he takes a stand against
discrediting the Catholic Church and their missionaries in Rwanda. He
asks hypothetically, “Who have a better understanding and knowledge of
the reality of the situation, of the culture and of the local
language?[26]Carrero says that, “the Catholic Church is considered by
the regime to be the institution that gave moral support to the Hutu
revolution in 1959 that permitted the overturn of the prevailing
secular order in Rwanda”.[27]
He talks about the supposed resentment that the RPF had towards the
missionaries. He says, “Frequently, once the opposition is dead, the
Church becomes the only critical voice with moral authority, following
violent campaigns against the church not only in those countries but
also in Europe and America, especially in Belgium.”[28]
Carrero over and over again prides himself on being nominated for the
Nobel Peace Prize, but what is interesting is to know who nominated
him. The nomination was done by those who his organisation refers to as
“most important leaders of the Rwandan resistance, and the Nobel Peace
Laureate Adolfo Perez Esquivel.”[29]
To be precise, his organisation acknowledges:
“This nomination can be considered to be that of the ‘Rwandan people’
and of many other Africans of the Great Lakes. For this reason the list
of supporters is headed by important African collectives, amongst which
stand out the Lobby for the Return of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda
(RDR), the world’s major organisation of exiled Rwandans, the Rwandan
communities of East Africa, of the Coast of Marfil, of Toulouse, the
Burundian community of Canada, and the Organisation for Peace, Justice
and Development in Rwanda.”[30]
Perpetrators of genocide against Tutsis have been trying, and to some
extent have succeeded, to present themselves as victims of
international conspiracy and genocide. Without a doubt, Carrero was
nominated by the Hutu extremists he calls the “Rwandan resistance,” to
represent and fight for their cause and to be a “media figure to lead a
media campaign.”[31]
Carrero is a flattered, if not unwitting tool at the service of
genocide deniers and ideologues of hate. Carrero is described by
“Inshuti”[32] as a wise man, who has intelligently understood Central
African realities, and therefore come to the side of the victims,
aiming to “work towards reconciliation in Rwanda and towards making
sure that an international lawsuit brings to justice the perpetrators
of the genocide that took place in that African region and that justice
is done to the victims.”[33]
Carrero describes himself as being driven by his spirituality. He cites
Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Nelson Mendela, and Jesus as people he
tries to emulate. [34]
Carrero boasts about his nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000.
Meanwhile, the Inshuti website, made it clear that his candidacy would
give them, “the extraordinary possibility of disseminating an analysis
of the African Great Lakes conflict that has been repeatedly silenced,
ignored, even criminalized”.[35]
Carrero says that “for a wide group of people, all the tragedy that is
being suffered today by the populations of this region, and also the
military victory of a few small extremist lobbies, is only possible
because these lobbies and their foreign allies had planned in advance
an international media war, one in which they have been fully
triumphant. My nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize is aimed directly
at what for them is the solution of this unjust situation.”[36]
Rewarding hate
On February 2, 1999, in Sherborn, Massachusetts, Carrero received the
Courage of Conscience Award, which The Peace Abbey awards to
individuals and organizations, “with the desire to promote the causes
of peace and justice, non-violence and love”.[37] The Peace Abbey’s
awards, so they say, are meant to create ‘innovative models for society
that empower individuals on the paths of nonviolence, peacemaking, and
cruelty-free living” and to serve as a model for religious
organizations, communities, and individuals seeking non-violent,
pacifist pathways to peace and social justice.”[38]
There are people who deserved and who have received this award
posthumously, like Mahatma Gandhi, Dr. Martin Luther King, and Bishop
Oscar Romero. Carrero boasts of being the first Spaniard to receive
this award.[39]
Despite being a friend and spin-doctor for genocidaires, Carrero, says
his “life path brings together his cultivation of spirituality and his
struggle for justice in Africa… (As) he follows the trail opened by
Gandhi and Lanza del Vasto”.
He boasts about his 42 day fast which, he says, was meant to bring to
light the events in the Congo, which he calls “the extermination of
hundreds of thousands of Rwandan Hutu in Zaire.”[40]
Carrero has won various other awards for his work. He won the Memorial
De La Paz Y La Solidaridad Entre Los Pueblos, (Memorial award for Peace
and Solidarity between Peoples), in 1996, from the SERPAJ Foundation
(Serving Peace and Justice). SERPAJ is a recognized NGO that has
consultative status in the United Nations and UNESCO. This only
strengthened the legitimacy of Carrero and his foundation. The
foundation also received an award in 1997, on the annual Day of
Non-violence and Peace, by the NGO “Cret Humans y Justicia I pau”
(Human Rights, Justice and Peace).
When Carrero got the Courage of Conscience award from Peace Abbey, he
was presented with a sculpture of a dove of peace preparing to fly from
open hands. The Peace Abby commended Carrero for his commitment to
non-violence, in particular his work in favour of “peace and justice”
in the Great Lakes region.[41]
In a speech at the award ceremony he said to the audience, “I beg you
to help us …that your government will not support for one more day
allies that are responsible of huge crimes against humanity, even
responsible for genocide. I beg you to help us so that our small voice
reaches the North American society through the media. The sooner the
debate opens up here about the implications and responsibilities of the
American administration in regard to this genocide, the sooner we will
be able to stop it.”[42]
Carrero successfully and with impunity disseminates the hate ideology
of those that should have been rightly silenced. Whenever he talks
about stopping genocide, and perpetrators of genocide, I am strongly
convinced that some if not many in his audience hardly realize he is on
the side of the very people responsible for those crimes, and against
those who fought it and still fight it. If people knew this truth,
there would have been cases of protest against his bigotry.
Notes
_______________________
[1] http://www.spainview.com/people/biog_juancarrero.html
[2] Carrero, J. (1997). The Reasons for an Acceptance. Mallorca:
Foundation S’Olivar. www.inshuti.org
[3] Inshuti. (1999, November 19). Letter of Support to the candidature
of Juan Carrero Saralegui for the Nobel Peace prize of the year 2000.
Manresa, Catalonia, Spain., www.inshuti.org
[4] Inshuti. (1999, November 19). Letter of Support to the candidature
of Juan Carrero Saralegui for the Nobel Peace prize of the year 2000.
Manresa, Catalonia, Spain., www.inshuti.org
[5] S’Olivar Foundation. (n.d.). The Birth of the Foundation.
Retrieved 03 12, 2009, from
Pangea:http://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/INDEX.html
[6] Saralegui, J. C. (2002). The Case of the Great Lakes Region. Paths
and Stumbling Blocks to Peace in Africa. Madrid: Conference on
Anthroplogy and Missionary Work., http://www.inshuti.org
[7] S’Olivar Foundation. (n.d.). Solidarity. Retrieved 03 12, 2009,
from Pangea:http://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/INDEX.html
[8] S’Olivar Foundation. (n.d.). A Range of Aspirations and Activities.
Retrieved 03 12, 2009, from
Pangea:http://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/INDEX.html
[9] S’Olivar Foundation. (n.d.). Solidarity. Retrieved 03 12, 2009,
from Pangea:http://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/INDEX.html
[10] Casoliva, J. and Carrero, J. (2001, January 22). Ndadaye,
Habyarimana, Ntarymira, Kabila…Eight years, four Presidents
assassinated. Avui Newspaper., www.inshuti.org
[11] Casoliva, J. and Carrero, J. (2001, January 22). Ndadaye,
Habyarimana, Ntaryamira, Kabila…Eight years, four Presidents
assassinated. Avui Newspaper., www.inshuti.org
[12] S’Olivar Foundation. (n.d.). Solidarity. Retrieved 03 12, 2009,
from Pangea:http://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/INDEX.html
[13] See for example CAMPAIGN FOR THE NOMINATION OF JUAN CARRERO
SARALEGUI FOR THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE OF THE YEAR 2000
on http://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/0601.HTM
[14] Inshuti. (1999, June). Campaign for the nomination of Juan Carrero
Saralegui for the Nobel Peace prize of the year 2000. Mallorca,
Spain., www.inshuti.org
[15]See: MESSAGES AND LETTERS OF SUPPORT TO THE CANDIDATURE OF JUAN
CARRERO SARALEGUI FOR THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE OF THE YEAR 2000—By the
Committee for the Nobel Peace Prize 2000 for Juan Carrero Saralegui
Mallorca(Spain), July 2000. Available on http://www.inshuti.org/
[16] Inshuti. (1999, June). Campaign for the nomination of Juan Carrero
Saralegui for the Nobel Peace prize of the year 2000. Mallorca,
Spain., www.inshuti.org Similar names and organisations are
onhttp://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/0602.HTM on this weblink they
say: “We have received many support letters; in this document we only
enumerate SOME OF THEM that we consider more representatives. This
selection has been realized to present a small document.”
[17] S’Olivar Foundation. (n.d.). List of Support for the Walk from
Assisi to Geneva and for the Fast of Denunciation and Political
Pressure http://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/INDEX.html
[18] S’Olivar Foundation. (n.d.). Activities in
1996. http://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/INDEX.html
[19] S’Olivar Foundation. (n.d.). Activities in
1996. http://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/INDEX.html Also Joan
Carrero’s SECOND LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF UNITED STATES of June 26,
1997 onhttp://www.inshuti.org/usaa.htm
[20] S’Olivar Foundation. (n.d.). Initial
Activities. http://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/INDEX.html
[21] S’Olivar Foundation. (n.d.). Activities in
1996. http://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/INDEX.html
[22] S’Olivar Foundation. (n.d.). Activities in
1997. http://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/INDEX.html
[23] Saralegui, J. C. (2002). The Case of the Great Lakes Region. Paths
and Stumbling Blocks to Peace in Africa. Madrid: Conference on
Anthroplogy and Missionary Work., www.inshuti.org
[24] Saralegui, J. C. (2002). The Case of the Great Lakes Region. Paths
and Stumbling Blocks to Peace in Africa. Madrid: Conference on
Anthroplogy and Missionary Work., http://www.inshuti.org
[25] Saralegui, J. C. (2002). The Case of the Great Lakes Region..
[26] Saralegui, J. C. (2002). The Case of the Great Lakes Region..
[27] Carrero, J. C. (2000). The African Great Lakes: Ten Years of
Suffering, Destruction and Death. European Commission., www.inshuti.org
[28] Carrero, J. (1998). Once More the Empire: The Extermination of the
Hutu People. Majorca: Foundation S’Olivar of
Estallencs., www.inshuti.org
[29] See:The Nobel Peace prize, an instrument at the service of the
people, Bernat Vicens
Spokesman for the Nomination Committee December 17, 1999
on http://www.inshuti.org/instrum.htm Also
onhttp://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/060402.HTM
[30] The Nobel Peace prize, an instrument at the service of the people,
Bernat Vicens
Spokesman for the Nomination Committee December 17, 1999
on http://www.inshuti.org/instrum.htm Also
onhttp://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/060402.HTM
[31] Ibid.
[32] His spin doctors say “For many of the most lucid scholars of the
situation in the African Great Lakes region, Juan Carrero is a face of
the suffering of the victims in the Great Lakes region, and the voice
of the thousands and thousands of African brothers and sisters who
suffer the greed and lust for power of a minority in this area and
their non-African allies. See: Campaign for the nomination of Juan
Carrero Saralegui for the Nobel Peace Prize of the year 2000 by
Committee for the Nobel Peace Prize 2000 for Juan Carrero Saralegui
Mallorca (Spain)June 1999 onhttp://www.inshuti.org/nobel2a.htm
[33] Ibid, “Spirituality, Non-Violence …
[34] Ibid;
[35] Inshuti. (1999, November 19). Letter of Support to the candidature
of Juan Carrero Saralegui for the Nobel Peace prize of the year 2000.
Manresa, Catalonia, Spain., www.inshuti.org
[36] Carrero, J. (1997). The Reasons for an Acceptance. Mallorca:
Foundation S’Olivar., www.inshuti.org
[37] See: http://www.peaceabbey.org/awards/cocrecipientlist.html also
onhttp://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/0403.HTM
[38]See: http://www.peaceabbey.org/abbey/about.htm
[39] Letter of presentation by Bernat Vicens, Spokesman for the
Nomination Committee Palma, May
1999http://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/0601.HTM In another letter
that appeared on this Web link, with title: ‘Campaign for the
nomination of Juan Carrero Saralegui for the Nobel Peace Prize of the
Year 2000’ by Adolfo Perez Esquivel on 29-04-1999, he directs people
more general information on www.pangea.org/olivar , and about the
African Great Lakes region in particular on www2.minorisa.es/inshuti .
[40] “Spirituality, Non-Violence and the Struggle for Justice in
Africa” This is a text Carrero’s foundation sent to my assistant David
Druce on
[41] S’Olivar Foundation. (n.d.). Awards and
Recognitions. http://www.pangea.org/olivar/ingles/INDEX.html
[42] Carrero, J. (1999, February 02). Speech delivered upon receiving
“The Courage of Conscience” Award. Sherborn, MA, USA: The Peace Abby.
Chapter XIII: Indifference to the demons of race
The genocide against the Tutsi, which took place in Rwanda should not
be allowed to happen elsewhere. Commenting on this genocide Boutros
Ghali rightly said: “The world’s nations must not say that the
challenge is too remote, or too dangerous, or that it fails to meet the
criteria for action. It may seem better not to know. It may seem safer
not to act. It may seem easier to look away. But these are the acts of
complicity. Common humanity places a duty upon us all, a duty we must
fulfil.”[1]
But there has been a serious problem of the international community
undergoing an unprecedented moral crisis. Referring to the genocide in
Rwanda, Mr. Kofi Annan articulates: “Nobody should feel he has a clear
conscience in this business. If the pictures of tens of thousands of
human bodies rotting and gnawed on by the dogs do not wake us up out of
apathy, I don’t know what will.”[2]
The former UN-Secretary General also admitted that “the fundamental
failure in Rwanda was not the lack of information but the lack of
political will.”[3]
According to Susan Rice, the former United States’ Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs, and now her country’s National Security
Advisor, there was such a huge disconnect between the logic of each of
the decisions they took along the way during the genocide and the moral
consequences of the decisions taken collectively. Expressing contrition
Ms. Rice says: “I swore to myself that if I ever faced such a crisis
again, I would come down on the side of dramatic action, going down in
flames if that was required.”[4]
Rice is in a better position now to convey a message to nations to take
preventive measures against racist hatred, which is the foremost cause
of genocide.
Racism is all about belief. Belief that race is the ‘primary
determinant of human traits and capacities and that racial differences
produce an inherent superiority of a particular race;[5] or, that each
race has distinct and intrinsic attributes.[6] UNESCO’s ‘Declaration on
Race and Racial Prejudice’ says: “Racism includes racist ideologies,
prejudiced attitudes, discriminatory behaviour, structural arrangements
and institutionalized practices resulting in racial inequality as well
as the fallacious notion that discriminatory relations between groups
are morally and scientifically justifiable; it is reflected … in
anti-social beliefs and acts; it hinders the development of its
victims, perverts those who practise it, divides nations internally,
…and gives rise to political tensions between peoples; … and,
consequently, seriously disturbs international peace and security.”[7]
Justifying evil or indifference?
Let us return now to that April 2008 meeting in The Hague, with its
roster of genocidaires and its genocide deniers, still seeking to
justify themselves. This has been proven in this book.
While I was in The Hague after that meeting, I met with Dr. Helen
Hintjens, a Senior lecturer at the Institute of Social Studies at The
Hague. She had been present at the meeting, with some of her students.
She explained to me that she had not been able to stay at the meeting
to the end, because after the first intervention by one of the
speakers, Christiaan de Beule, had triggered in her what she called “a
visceral reaction:” which is nausea caused by a combination of sadness
and anger.
What made Helen leave before the end of the meeting was De Beule’s
behaviour. De Beule had been invited as a so-called specialist on the
Great Lakes region. But, Helen said, “When he spoke about the events
that took place in Rwanda between 1990 and 1996, he avoided uttering a
single word about the genocide against the Tutsi.” Dr. Helen told me
that for her, a meeting of people who deny or demean the genocide
cannot claim to promote peace.
In the course of our discussion, I explained to her that she would not
have been surprised by De Beule’s utterances if she had known his
position on the genocide against the Tutsi. De Beule is a Belgian
national; one of the founders of the SOS-Rwanda-Burundi association. De
Beule, his wife, and his colleagues are well known for their
determination to negate the genocide against the Tutsi and to propagate
the ideology behind the genocide.
The writings and communiqués of SOS Rwanda-Burundi are about genocide
denial, and are clear. One has but to search on Google or Yahoo for the
name Christian De Beule and SOS Rwanda-Burundi to understand their line
of thought and to know that the RDR and its friends give them support
in their intentions.
The fact that the DUR and Dusabane Press Release defended the
organisers as having no connection with associations which protect
genocidaires, combined with the genocidaires’ language that they used,
is proof enough that the meeting aimed at genocide denial.
As a matter of fact, important persons in the planning and execution of
the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda were present at the meeting,
and so were members of associations that propagate the genocide
ideology.
If Helen had known who those Rwandans present at the meeting were, she
would not have been irked or surprised by De Beule’s utterances. Among
those present, particular attention should be focused on a few key
individuals and their role before, during and after genocide. The first
is Charles NDEREYEHE already mentioned earlier in this book. He is
currently residing in the Netherlands.
Charles Ndereyehe was born in 1949, son of Ntahontuye and Rushyizekera,
and comes from an area called Bugarura district in the former Ruhengeri
prefecture. During the genocide committed against the Tutsis in 1994,
he was Director General of the National Agricultural Research Institute
(ISAR) whose head office is at Rubona, in Butare. He has been accused
of acts of genocide and his name is on the list of persons suspected of
crimes of genocide in Rwanda in 1994 who are living abroad, published
by the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Rwanda.
Ndereyehe frequently writes articles advocating the double-genocide
thesis. He is among the very few founding members of the RDR. He is one
of the planners of the genocide against the Tutsi from the time he was
the head of the “Cercle des Républicains Progressistes” (CRP), an
organization which was planning evil well before the genocide began.
In the early 1990s, during the war that preceded the Tutsi genocide of
1994, Ndereyehe was the Director of the Gikongoro Agricultural
Development Project (GADP). Between 1991 and 1993, before being
appointed ISAR’s Director, Ndereyehe recruited several militia from
Ruhengeri and hired them as agents of the GADP, with the mission to
block Nzamurambaho’s PSD which was popular in Gikongoro, in favour of
the MRND and the CDR. His recruits were clearly meant to carry out the
genocide, and they effectively spearheaded the genocide in Gikongoro,
with the support of those who were recruited in a similar manner by Mr.
Kamodoka, Director of Kitabi tea factory, a notorious extremist like
Ndereyehe.[8]
During an interview with Mr. Nyirubugara (on YouTube)[9] Ndereyehe is
refered to as an “Opposition Leader in Exile” or as a representative of
the political opposition in exile, an expression reminiscent of
Sindikubwabo who called himself “President of the Republic of Rwanda in
Exile” while he was in Bukavu. That was before his government in exile
was replaced or overthrown by the RDR. Ndereyehe was among the founders
of the RDR, which now has its headquarters in this city of The Hague.
In the same interview, Ndereyehe confirms that he has similar
objectives to those of the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation
of Rwanda), a genocidaire movement which has been committing crimes
against humanity on DRC territory and which intends to return to Rwanda
to pursue and finish the genocide of the Tutsi who survived in 1994.
Ndereyehe’s answers given during the interview show clearly that it is
in fact impossible to distinguish the RDR from the FDLR. When asked if
he is still a member of the RDR, Ndereyehe replied that he belongs to
the RDR which forms one body with the FDU.
Asked about the accusations made against him by Rwanda of collaborating
with the FDLR, he replied in the affirmative since they have the same
reasons for fighting, and added that if the RPF does not accept
negotiations, they will all take up arms. The information I learned
while I was in Holland is that Ndereyehe is in charge of Dusabane, and
serves as “the real” president of Forces Démocratiques Unifiées
(FDU-Inkingi).[10]
That, I think, was the reason Nyirubugara chose Ndereyehe to interview
about the meeting, rather than Cyriaque Mbonankira of the DVA, or
Ignace Rukeribuga and François Kanyamihanda, purportedly in-charge of
Dusabane. The latter are only agents heading NGOs on behalf of the RDR,
while Ndereyehe is the power behind the scene.
Ndereyehe had come to the meeting with other RDR officials who live in
Holland, including Vincent Ruhamanya and the President of RDR-Hollande
Stanislas Niyibizi. The official chairperson of RDR and FDU, Victoire
Ingabire, was not at the meeting.[11] At a time when the President of
the FDLR, Dr. Ignace Murwanashyaka fears operating in the open, the
powers of his presidency seem to be in other hands. It will be recalled
that when Ndereyehe was president of the whole of RDR, Dr.
Murwanashyaka was heading the branch of RDR in Germany. The president
of the FDLR is, if truth be told, a former student and a current tool
of Ndereyehe and the like.
Once again, history is teaching us a lesson: there are people who
planned the genocide such as Ndereyehe and members of CRP, and who had
given their support to Sindikubwabo and Kambanda to carry out genocide
as top men in Rwanda. When the latter arrived in Eastern Congo, the
RDR, made up of former members of CRP, pushed them aside and
Sindikubwabo later died in isolation, of AIDS, whereas Kambanda was
arrested in Nairobi for the ICTR, and thrown into prison before he
understood what was happening. Sindikubwabo and Kambanda are both from
the former prefecture of Butare, like Murwanashyaka.
It is not only in the FDU that Ndereyehe manipulates people. He is one
of the few remaining free and alive among the most responsible
personalities in genocide policy making, before and after 1994. Others
have either scattered or have been arrested. After a tactical
abstention from its leadership, Ndereyehe was elected by the Second
Congress of RDR held on August 22-23, 1998 in Paris, and became
President of the organisation.[12]
At this Congress, participants maintained their genocide denial
position. “The genocide against Tutsi and massacres of Hutu in 1994 for
which the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) bears overwhelming moral,
political and criminal responsibilities continue to serve as the main
asset of RPF regime as well as a justification for the rampant genocide
it is currently carrying out on the Hutu component of the Rwandan
people.”[13]
It is clear that Ndereyehe and his fellow ideologues still needed
someone not tarred by the genocide in 1994 that could thus front for
them in their propaganda. They therefore created the UFDR (Union des
Forces Démocratiques Rwandaises), initially with Faustin Twagiramungu
as its President and Ndereyehe as Vice-president, but in reality the
latter was the real chief.
In the communiqué publicising the statutes of the UFDR, article 1
stipulates that the UFDR’s first objective was a diplomatic and media
offensive. This could perhaps explain the nomination of Ingabire
Victoire to become President of the UFDR. The UFDR was made up of the
RDR (Rassemblement pour le Retour des Réfugiés et de la Démocratie au
Rwanda) and of the FRD (Forces de Résistance pour la Démocratie).
In 2002, when the UFDR changed its leadership at the top, Eugène
Ndahayo became President, Victoire Ingabire the Vice-president and Jean
de Dieu Turikumana became the Executive Secretary, seconded by
Ndereyehe to maintain their power. The UFD-Rwandais was replaced by the
FDU-Inkingi. The most important was to maintain the words “Forces” and
“Démocratique” in their organisations’ appellation.
A closer look into the 2008 Hague meeting reveals that it was part of a
long series of other meetings which preceded it, and a preparation of
others to follow. In actual fact, before this one, under the DVA which
claims that one of its objectives is “sustainable development” as well
as the protection of the environment, on October 2, 1999, similar
associations held another meeting in Utrecht in Holland, with the
watchword that “peace is essential for sustainable development.” Those
associations were Ndereyehe’s Dusabane and the CODAC, which sources
confirm is under the patronage of Victoire Ingabire, and URAHO which
was an association of women related to these two. Ndereyehe was the
guest of honour at the Utrecht meeting.
The continuous name changes, of these organisations and associations—
is a Machiavellian strategy to mislead public opinion into believing
that their objective is “Truth and Reconciliation of Rwandans.” The
strategy is designed to hoodwink people, so that the genocide ideology
may quietly continue unimpeded, toward its long-term goal of toppling
the present Rwandan government and completing the extermination of the
Tutsi.
The CDR at the meeting for peace!
The second most important actor, in the preparation of the 1994
genocide, who attended the April 2008 meeting in The Hague, was Jean
Baptiste Mugimba. Apparently, as I came to learn, some genocide
survivors in The Hague recognised him and called out his name, which
perturbed him so much that he hastened to leave as soon as the meeting
ended. Mugimba arrived at the meeting with his family and his
family-in-law. Mugimba is a former employee of the National Bank of
Rwanda, and a founding member and the Secretary General of the CDR from
its inception.
Among the participants there was also a certain Balthazar MUTWE.
Mugimba and Mutwe are not ordinary people in the history of the 1994
genocide. They are among the first fifty founding members of the
Coalition pour la Défence de la République (CDR). It is a pity that
with time, some of those dreadful people might fall into oblivion!
What people tend to forget but which is of great importance, is that
apart from being a founding member of the CDR, Mugimba was and still
remains its secretary general, since he has never been replaced. He is
the one who, at the time of electing the CDR’s original executive
committee, declared Martin Bucyana as President. Mugimba and Ferdinand
Nahimana, Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze, Félicien Kabuga, Joseph
Serugendo, Pierre Basabose, Laurent Sebapira, Augustin Hatari, Jean
Baptiste Bamwanga, Major Faustin Ntilikina and Antoine Ibambasi, are
all either wanted by justice or already convicted for founding Radio
RTLM and extremist parties on April 8, 1993.[14] Also present at The
Hague meeting was Dr. Jacques Gasekurume, another member of the CDR,
Kigali branch.
Like father like son. The very fact that it was Olivier Nyirubugara who
was at the Peace palace to interview some participants at the end of
the April 2008 meeting is revealing. His Internet site www.olny.nl is
used by deniers of the genocide, including himself and his own father.
According to reliable information at my disposal, Olivier Nyirubugara
is the son of Charles Nkurunziza, former Minister of Justice in
Habyarimana’s government during the 1970s. After Joseph Kavaruganda was
assassinated by the Presidential Guards on April 7, 1994, Nkurunziza
was nominated to replace him as President of the Constitutional Court
in the Interim Government which carried out the genocide.
Nkurunziza has been one of the pillars of genocidal ideas ever since he
fled to Zaïre, in 1994, before proceeding to Europe where he continues
with his hate ideas. Actually, after the defeat of the genocidaire
government in 1994, Nkurunziza went into exile in Bukavu where he was
one of the advisers of the Theodore Sindikubwabo, President of the
Republic of Rwanda in exile.
Nkurunziza was then a member of a team of hard line propagandists,
whose assignment was to justify the genocide against the Tutsi. This
group was headed by Jean Francois Nsengiyumva, who had been appointed
the Director of ORINFOR during the genocide; Alberto Basomingera who
was Chief of the Customs Department and Chairman of a Commercial bank
(BACAR) during the genocide, and Ananie Nkurunziza, who was a former
reporter of RTLM.
Nyirubugara seems to share the same ideas as his father; his ideas and
actions are characterized by hatred against the Tutsi and by active
pursuit of the genocide ideology, as can be seen on his website.
As demonstrated above, the FAR played a crucial role in the
establishment and growth, and in the ideology and propaganda strategy
of the RDR. In early April and May 1995, the FAR’s department of
military intelligence and two lawyers assigned the task of writing an
account of Rwandan history—the same Charles Nkurunziza cited above, and
Alberto Basomingera, published their first materials.
In doing so, Nkurunziza and Basomingera attempted to provide a legal
backing to the denial of Tutsi genocide, particularly by legally
justifying the crime. Initially, both men acted as legal advisors to
Dr. Theodore Sindikubwabo, the nominal leader of the government that
orchestrated the genocide.
Their documents later greatly influenced the RDR’s press releases and
public statements, especially in their attempts to deny the genocide.
A text published in Bukavu in May 1995 by the “Charles
Nkurunziza Group” includes the following statement that has
become central to RDR ideology and propaganda: “It is not the
Hutu who were the authors of the genocide; rather, it is the Tutsi
who wanted to exterminate the Hutu, so that they will never have to
share power. This is the truth that any person of good will and who
loves justice should know to contribute to the restoration of the
Rwandan people’s rights….”[15]
In a report published in April 1995, Albert Basomingera, formerly the
Dean of the Faculty of law at the National University of Rwanda in
Butare and a consultant to the World Bank, argues that there was no
plan to commit genocide in Rwanda. He contends that “it was the
discovery of the RPF’s brigades and arms caches that partly explains
the violence and the intensity of the reaction of the populace and not
the premeditation of genocide…[S]uch reaction is rather that of
self-defence.”[16]
Linking the death of Hutu President Juvénal Habyarimana to the
genocide, Basomingera argues that “it should be recalled that even some
large-scale attacks by the RPF had already provoked popular ‘punitive’
reaction against true or suspected RPF’s accomplices in the regions
where the President enjoyed popularity…What was then expected in the
event of the assassination of that same head of State?”[17]
Basomingera furthermore defends Dr. Leon Mugesera, who, in a famous
speech in November 1992 when he was MRND vice-chairman for Gisenyi
prefecture, incited people to exterminate Tutsi. Basomingera supports
the incendiary discourse of Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines
(RTLM), arguing, “It is tendentious to claim that the incriminated
radio only called to the extermination of the Tutsi.”[18]
Reinforcing racist stereotypes used to de-humanise Tutsi, Basomingera
defends RTLM depictions: “With regard to the term ‘serpents’, it was
used to designate the Tutsi even before independence, referring partly
to their cunning, malicious and spiteful nature and partly the
dishonesty they are said to have been imbued with.”[19]
Basomingera and Nkurunziza continue to propagate the views expressed in
these original documents, which have served as a touchstone for RDR
ideology. In May 2002, as a defence witness at the ICTR for Andre
Ntagerura, former Transport minister before and during the genocide,
Nkurunziza told the Tribunal that he did not observe any massacres
between April and July 1994 but alleged that mass killings by RPF
soldiers led to “revenge by the government.”[20]
Nkurunziza, who was Rwanda’s Justice Minister from 1977 to 1984 and
Deputy Minister of Transport during the genocide, argued that the
government set up roadblocks simply to bring calm and security because
the justice system in the country had broken down.[21]
Underlying the importance of genocide denial for his discourse,
Nkurunziza argued, “The massacres that bloodied the countryside were
done by the RPF,”[22] claiming that he had never heard of the FAR nor
the Interahamwe militias killing Tutsi.[23]
Notes
_______________________
[1] B. Ghali, op.cit;
[2] Gérard Prunier, Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (London,
1995), p.267
[3] Ann M. Simmons, U.N. Secretary General Defends Decisions On Rwanda,
(Los Angeles Times- May 5, 1998) Available
on: http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/4621/rwanda2.html and
[4] Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide: The Atlantic Monthly,
September 2001
See:http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200109/power-genocide
andhttp://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/oppenheimer/209j/rwanda.pdf
[5] Read on en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Racism
[6] Read on en.wiktionary.org/wiki/racism
[7] Adopted and proclaimed by the General Conference of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization at its
twentieth session, on 27 November 1978 Source: Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights: A
compilation of International Instruments, Volume one (First Part) New
York and Geneva 2002-p.132. Also, available
on. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/race.htm
[8] Charles Ndereyehe is also among the obnoxious signatories appearing
twice on N^o96 & 823
See: http://friendsofevil.wordpress.com/2013/08/27/obnoxious-petitioner
s-and-friends-of-evil/
[9] See: http://www.olny.nl/RWANDA/Videos/Hague_Peace_Conference_26_Apr
il_2008.html#ndereyehe
[10] Ndereyehe is described by Nyirubugara as “an agronomist who
entered politics in the mid-1990s in eastern DR-Congo. He was then
among the senior leaders of the Hutu opposition movement known as
Rassemblement pour le Retour et la Démocratie (RDR). He currently lives
in the Netherlands and is still active within another umbrella body
known as Forces Démocratiques Unies.”
See:http://www.olny.nl/RWANDA/Videos/Hague_Peace_Conference_26_April_20
08.html
[11] According to reliable sources in Holland and Brussels, it seems
that Ingabire was being isolated since she no longer takes part in
FDU’s decisions. Inkingi would be under the leadership of Ndereyehe
because of its FDLR branch, whose influential people in the army in DRC
recognize his leadership.
[12] At the RDR’s 2^nd ordinary congress held in Paris from 22 to 23
August 1998, Ndereyehe became the head of the organisation with Claver
Kanyarushoki as his deputy. See Press Release signed by Ndereyehe in
Brussels, August 24, 1998 announcing RESOLUTIONS OF THE RDR SECOND
ORDINARY
CONGRESS. http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/24August19
98.html
[13] Ibid. Press Release 24 August
1998. http://www.rdrwanda.org/english/press_releases/RDR/24August1998.h
tml
[14] Case No : ICTR-97-27-I THE PROSECUTOR OF THE TRIBUNAL AGAINST
HASSAN NGEZE AMENDED INDICTMENT (para 4.3)
[15] The report prepared and published in Bukavu-Zaire, by the ‘Charles
Nkuruziza Group’ has the title “Les Aspects Essentiels du Problème
Rwandais” (Essential Aspects of the Rwandan Problem) for the so-called
ministry of Justice of the Rwandan Government in Exile.
[16] Groupe Albert Basomingera, “A propos du rapport final de la
commission des experts du conseil de sécurité des Nations unies pour
le Rwanda: Conclusions au génocide au prix d’une mise à l’écart de
certains faits, d’altération d’autres et d’interprétation
tendancieuse,” also for the so-called ministry of Justice of the
Rwandan Government in Exile, Bukavu-Zaire, April 1995.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid. Basomingera
[20] See: “Cyangugu Trial: Prosecutor Challenges Former minister’s
Credibility” (Internews,
May 29, 2002)
[21] Ibid.
[22] See “Cyangugu Trial Adjourned to July” (Fondation Hirondelle, News
Agency May 29, 2002)
[23] Ibid.
Chapter XIV: A Final Appeal and Conclusion
Israel Charny rightly reminds us of a very important concept: personal
interests can ultimately lead many people who are not initially bigoted
or violent into participating in the actual commission of genocide.
Charny also says: “There may be ostensibly upright citizens who
identify themselves with the search for truth and justice, yet who join
forces with the deniers and revisionists because of conscious and
unconscious economic or political interests or other aspects of
expanding their power that are served by their co-operation with those
who have committed genocide…”[1]
Charny’s profound warning strikes a chord when one looks at what
happened in 2003, when four Dutch NGOs (OXFAM-NOVIB, CORDAID, ICCO and
KERKINAKTIE) published a report titled “Rwanda Monitoring Project”. The
report was mainly prepared for the Dutch and British governments, who
are major donors to the Government of Rwanda.
The report strongly criticized the Rwanda Government, and was designed
to put pressure on those Governments to restrict such financial aid.
The report was supported by some people, like the Belgian Filip
REYNTJENS who is continuously predicting a grim future for Rwanda and
Burundi. In his writing of May 2008, Reyntjens maintains that there is
dictatorship in Rwanda, and that the Rwanda government does not
acknowledge the segregation that exists in the country’s politics,
whereas the population itself suffers from Tutsi domination, and the
Hutu do not feel equally represented as the Tutsi.[2]
His assessment was contrary to that of the World Bank, which applauded
Rwanda and Tanzania for their progress in good governance and fighting
corruption over the last decade. [3]
According to those Dutch NGOs, lasting peace in the Great Lakes region
will only be possible if what they call the “Inter-Rwandan dialogue”
(Le dialogue inter-rwandais) comes as a solution to “the inter-Rwandan
conflict” (Le conflit inter-rwandais),[4] as has happened in Burundi
and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
Those NGOs praised the Concertation Permanente de l’Opposition
Démocratique Rwandaise/ Permanent Consultation of the Rwandan
Democratic Opposition (CPODR) with its headquarters based in Belgium.
Founded on April 12, 2002, the CPODR is made up of the UFDR (RDR
together with FRD) as well as the ADRN-Igihango (FDLR combined with
ARENA,[5] Nation Imbaga Nyarwanda and URD.)[6]
The NGOs’ reason for promoting this CPODR was its “claims to be willing
to cooperate with the ICTR and to condemn the Tutsi genocide of 1994 as
well as its ideology”. The NGOs attributed great importance to the
COPDR as a potential interlocutor for the Rwanda government. They also
say that the COPDR has written to the Rwanda Government requesting
negotiations, but has not yet gotten any response. They do not hide
their disapproval of Governments and donors who support the Rwandan
Government.
These Dutch NGOs had watched with indifference while the 1994 genocide
against the Tutsi was being perpetrated before the entire world, by
those same people they were now defending. They now express discontent
when they see that the Rwandan Government—which stopped the genocide
and has since built national unity and sanity—does not want to
negotiate with impenitent genocidaires. The NGOs conclude their chapter
on negotiations by requesting the Governments which support the Rwandan
Government not to abandon the COPDR, but to act as intermediaries in
the inter-Rwandan dialogue instead. This is certainly an idea which
serves well the philosophy of the RDR and FDLR—to treat genocide as a
mere political conflict rather than a crime.
During the same year 2003, which interests were those NGOs pursuing
when they went to meet the genocide master planners and purveyors of
its ideology? In all political or other negotiations there are always
what are known as “give and take” situations. What does it imply, when
the COPDR, says it would be ready to “cooperate with the ICTR and
denounce genocide?”
Genocide is a crime that must be denounced and punished; it is not a
conflict which can be resolved through dialogue and political
negotiations. Hence it is incomprehensible, except for a person who
does not recognize the value of the human being, that the same
Government which fought against genocide would be forced into
negotiations with supporters of genocide and its ideology.
A Ugandan journalist, Andrew Mwenda, says: “It is unacceptable to
attempt to create moral equivalence of the crimes of the Nazis with
those who saved Western civilisation from fascism. Churchill and
Roosevelt, whatever their acts or omissions cannot be put in the same
dock with Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. Scholars like Gerald
Punier and my own friend Prof. Rene Lemarchand who argue, (wrongly)
genocide of the Tutsi against Hutu cannot make a similar argument in
regard to Churchill and Roosevelt.”[7]
Those who think so, and request Governments to support politicians of
crime and wickedness should also be denounced for complicity in the
crime, since they do it consciously. On reading their report carefully,
one realizes that these NGOs have espoused the ideas of those they
qualify as “most important.” They know fully well that these are
genocidaires, but they pretend to be unaware of this truth. Opening
negotiations with the Rwanda Government is part of the FDLR’s and RDR’s
raison d’être. What is new here is that they have found someone to
pursue it on their behalf, and it is not the first time. Concerning the
opening of negotiations, the contents of the Dutch NGOs report, in
2003, is quite reminiscent of what the FAR planned in the camps in
1994-95.
In their report, the Dutch NGOs claimed that peace and security in the
Central African region depended on dialogue with the groups that today
make up the FDU-INKINGI. Ndereyehe, in his interview with Nyirubugara,
was inviting the RPF to accept a dialogue with them; otherwise there
would be war (since it was refugees who had attacked Rwanda in the
first place, talking about the RPF).
Such a dialogue sounds like the one of TUR N^o 5 in 1994, which gave a
platform to the genocidaires. At that time, Kambanda had declared that
“the international community must put pressure on RPF so that it enters
into negotiations with them or else they will do like the RPF (p. 12).
The same idea was expressed by James Gasana (p. 19). As for Stanislas
Mbonampeka, he arrogantly declared that if the international community
does not force the RPF into negotiations, he was ready for war. The
same Mbonampeka declared in TUR that the Government in Kigali could not
last more than six months (p.24), or could not go beyond May 1995.
In the same journal, Generals Augustin Bizimungu and Gratien Kabiligi
as chiefs of the defeated army, who had crossed the border with all
their armament, were also making menacing demands for dialogue. (p.32)
At the March 31, 2005 Rome negotiations between the FDLR and the DRC
government under the aegis of the Catholic Sant’Egidio
Community,[8] the FDLR had promised to abandon its military activities
and to call on its members to go back home. They have yet to implement
this promise.
With regard to those groups belonging to the COPDR, what do they mean
if they say they are ready to cooperate with the ICTR and disassociate
themselves from genocide and its ideology? What cooperation with the
ICTR do they have in mind? In whose name would that cooperation be? The
only bona fide contribution to the ICTR would be a genuine commitment
to combat genocide and the culture of impunity.
Meanwhile, it is incontestable that none of the leaders of the RDR,
FDLR, or any other hypocrites and hate mongers like Paul Rusesabagina
have ever gone to the ICTR to testify against the genocidaires. The
truth is that, on the contrary, most members of the RDR leadership are
in the hands of the ICTR, being prosecuted for genocide. Some have been
given heavy sentences by that tribunal and Rwandese justice. There are
many examples, and the RDR and the FDLR know it more than anyone else.
In any case, as explained earlier, the RDR was founded with the
objective of defending the genocidaires who were and are still in the
hands of the ICTR. Even today, those people wanted by the tribunal
still count on the support of the RDR and its network of “friends of
evil.” The notion of cooperation between the RDR/FDLR and the ICTR is
mere stage management.
The RDR treats the ICTR as an arena in which to continue preaching
their hate ideology and genocide denial. On the December 23, 1995,
they published a document which was meant to be a “Message of the RDR
to Rwandese Refugees”,[9] signed by Laurent Hitimana, who was the
vice-president of that group of criminals in the area of Goma.
In that message, the RDR said it supported the ICTR. But what it wanted
from the Tribunal is “the truth” about the events which plunged Rwanda
into mourning (…) “when the RPF Inkotanyi attacked Rwanda.” In order to
make the world understand Rwanda’s problem and so that the truth may be
known, the RDR contacted lawyers.
The same document says that RDR will put whoever must appear before the
ICTR into contact with those lawyers: “Let the accused, defend
themselves courageously, since, they will be doing it in the name of
the Rwandese people. Let them understand that they are giving testimony
to the ills the RPF has subjected the Rwandese people to; and we shall
keep showing them our solidarity”. The document goes on to say that the
RDR is determined to “denounce and accuse members of the RPF, starting
with their leaders” (…) “they are responsible for the ills which have
befallen us all.”
It was within that logic that those within the CPODR collaborated with
judges Jean-Louis Bruguière (Frenchman) and Fernando Andreu Merelles
(Spanish), to accuse the present leaders in Rwanda with the intent to
prove that the RPF military also killed in the same manner as the
genocidaires. Perhaps the judges reason that both sides are criminal
and should negotiate to nullify their crimes.[10]
In the text of indictment and arrest warrant issued by the Spanish
judge, perpetrators of genocide are clearly presented as victims and
their hate ideology valued as facts.
Since its inception, the RDR has had agreements with Belgian lawyers so
that they give assistance to the genocidaires. One of them is Luc de
Timmerman, a name well known in genocidaire circles. When refugees were
still in the North and south Kivu provinces of the DRC, these lawyers
had established their office in Goma where they worked with members of
the RDR as mentioned earlier in this book.
I believe there was officious collaboration between the RDR and some
officials at the ICTR aimed at including RDR agents among workers of
the Tribunal, with the mission of “defending” the accused. In fact the
Tribunal’s staff in Arusha included RDR’s leaders such as Aloys
Ngendahimana, the RDR’s Vice-president in charge of social affairs, and
Thaddée Kwitonda, at one time in-charge of Kashusha camp near Bukavu.
The latter is also among the founder members of the CDR, to mention but
a few. There are several others.
The Dutch NGOs which claim that the RDR is “very important” should read
carefully the communiqués of this organisation written and available on
the Internet in French, English and Kinywarwanda—and listen to
broadcasts by those they defend. The discourse in all of their
literature is replete with racism and genocide ideology. In these
documents, the massacres and the genocide (which they prefer to call
“the tragedy that befell Rwanda”) are constantly attributed to the RPF,
a line the RDR/FDLR have been using from their beginning, like the
“government in exile” and the FAR before them.
For the genocidaires, the country called “Rwanda” is a country of
“killers”. In their opinion, whoever is accused of genocide by the ICTR
or elsewhere represents the Rwandese people. But in order to feel
represented by a genocidaire one has to approve the latter’s criminal
acts, and be proud of them. But that admiration of criminals does not
make perpetrators of such acts “most important”.
In the minds of those who subscribe to the ideology of the COPDR, which
is supported by the Dutch NGOs, “the Rwandan” means the one who is
counted among the genocidaires, or is related to them, or supports
them. Anyone outside the group has no claim to Rwanda.
These are ideas of those who harbour the ideology of the extermination
of the Tutsi, who affirm that the Rwanda of today is ruled by
foreigners; exactly as the PARMEHUTU choir Abanyuramatwi were singing
in their song “Turatsinze”, in the early 1960s, that its victory meant
“Gahutu, wherever you are Rwanda is yours. Truly, Rwandans have
recovered their own country.”
For Dutch NGOs to think that the RDR or FDLR have dissociated
themselves from the genocide ideology is at best a nice fantasy, which
in reality changes nothing. It is possible that these NGOs might have
been deceived by their protégés about their supposed conversion; but
just hearing such promises is not sufficient grounds in order to
believe them and disseminate them as truth.
I have sought to demonstrate how critical support has been extended to
the genocidaires, by a range of different organisations, associations
and individuals. Imagine a person like Juan Carrero Saralegui operating
under the false veneer of “Nobel Peace Prize nominee”, without anyone
bothering to know who nominated him. Carrero could be a
stick-in-the-mud or not, but clearly he has proudly supported
genocidaires in denial and spreading their ideology using his NGOs. He
is not the only one, but has gained prominence because he lacks the
pangs of conscience, and has thrived because of indifference from the
international community.
Humbly, I appeal to NGOs and to civil society in general to see the
need to do more research, and be more careful if they are to avoid
being duped into supporting people and organisations known to have a
direct link to the genocide that was committed against the Tutsi in
Rwanda. The discourse of hate exuded on their websites and blogs
provides enough tools of analysis. Indifference is fatal and will never
fulfil the promise of “Never Again.” What is required is the will to
say: NO SUPPORT TO FRIENDS OF EVIL.
Notes
_______________________
[1] ISRAEL W. CHARNY, A classification of denials of the Holocaust and
other genocides, Journal of Genocide Research (2003), 5(1), p.17
[2] Political annals of Rwanda and Burundi, 2007-2008.
[3] The East African June 30-July 6, 2008
[4] “Rwanda Monitoring Project” Report, 2003 p.28-30
[5] Means: “Alliance pour la Renaissance de la Nation (Alliance for
National Renewal.)
[6] Means: “Union des Rwandais pour la République et la Démocratie”.
[7] See: Mwenda Will Ingabire be Rwanda’s saviour? February 24, 2010
onhttp://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/the-last-word/the-last-word/3-
the-last-word/2527-will-ingabire-be-rwandas-saviour-
[8] International Crisis group report: The Congo: Solving the FDLR
problem once and for all. Onhttp://www.grandslacs.net/doc/3739.pdf
and http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/VBOL-6CBGHQ?OpenDocu
ment
[9] The document is in the author’s archives.
[10] The Spanish authorities break away from Judge F. Andreu Merelles;
The New Times, February 10, 2008.
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Friends of evil (Chapter 14): A Final Appeal and Conclusion
Slavery in the DR Congo: FDLR are the masters
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