Citation
DL. D. ms.
MDHIAN 1639
SR
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1481 : Ris ren
OF 2603307 APRIL 94 È US me Op ser
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BRUSSELS, KANPÂTE ROME, DAKAR
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ADDIS ABABA, ÂCCRA,-NAIROBI- -- —:
INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, UKMIS GÉNEVA 3
INFO PRIORITY SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS, -ACTOR
AS
MY TELNO 1471: RWANDA
SUMMARY
1. Secretariat brief on developments. Situation in Kigali
remains very tense. Massacres continue, particularly in the
south. Withdrawal of UNAMIR continues. Remaining force
strength now 450 all ranks. RPF present unilateral ceasefire
declaration to UN and OAU at Arusha.
2. Council President briefs on his conversation with
Director-General of Medecins sens Frontieres. Appalling
atrocities taking place in Bhutare. Some Council members
suggest some sort of inquiry. I encourage focus on regional
diplomatic efforts.
DETAIL
3. During informal consultations of the Security Council on
25 April, Ghärekhan (Secretary-General's Special Political
Adviser) gave a briefing on developments in Rwanda. The
situation in Kigali remained very tense. There had been
intensive shelling. There was no change in the positions of
both sides,. The RPF controlled the hills around Kigali and the
north and north-east of the country. The north-west, west and
south of the country were held by Rwandan Government Forces.
The RPF were reported to have taken Byumba and were also
advancing from Rwamagana to Kigali, but their advance was being
slowed by the RGF, The RGF in turn were advancing from
Gitarama to Kigali. Massacres and Killing of civilians,
particularly in the south, continued.
4 Gharekhan saîd the withdrawal of UNAMIR was continuing.
Some 1,000 personnel had now withdrawn. The present force
Level was 450 of all ranks. On 22 April the |
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MDHIAN 1639
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Secretsery-General's Special Representative CSRSG)I and the : »
Deputy Force Commander had Left Kigali for Arusha. The
Secretary-General of the OAU and the OAU Facilitator, as well
as a number of other observers, were present. Arrangements had
been made by UNAMIR to take an RGF delegation from Goma in
Zaire to Arusha. But when the plane Landed the RGF delegation
was not there and the plane had to return. The
Secretary-General of the RPF had arrived in Arusha and had
presented to the OAU facilitator and to the UN a unilateral
ceasefire declaratiñion taking effect from 12 midnight on
25 April. But the continued observance of the ceasefire by the
RPF was Linked to a number of conditions.
5, Gharekhan noted that Peter Hansen (Under-Secretary-General
at the Department of Humanitarian Affairs) had arrived in
Kigali on Saturday for a first-hand Look at the humanitarian
situation, Conditions in Kigali were severe. The Force
Commander was negotiating with both sides on the safety of
civilians still în the Anahoru Stadium.
6. Keating (New Zealand, Council President) saiïd he had been
briefed by the Secretary-General of Medecins sans Frontieres
CMSF) on events in Bhutare over the weekend. MSF had been
running.'a hospital with large numbers of people wounded, many
seriously. Soldiers had come into the hospital and rounded up
atl the Rwandan hospital staff end doctors and killed them.
The next day they had returned and killed all the patients.
The MSF Director-General had said this was the worst atrocity
seen by MSF since it was established. He had appealed to
Keating to relay the information to the Security Council and to
consider establishing sefe areas or safe havens where Rwandan
civilians might take refuge. In response to a question,
Kesating confirmed that the soldiers who had committed this
atrocity were Rwandan Government soldiers, some wearing regular
army uniforms, others in the uniform of the Presidential Guard.
7e. Gambari (Nigeria) asked whether the intention was for the
UNAMIR forces who had withdrawn to remain în Naïñrobi so that
they could be redeployed quickly if the situation improved.
Gharekhan replied that the troops could not be kept
indefinitely in Nairobi. They would be transported to their
home countries as soon as this could be arranged. By 26 April
Less than 200 would be Left îin Naïrobi.
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8. Cardenas (Argentina) said that there was a_ danger that
public opinion would think the Security Council indifferent to
events in Rwanda. It was important for the Council therefore
to make it clear, particularly to the media, that the UN was
aware of the gravity of the situation and was attempting to
negotiate a ceasefire. We also needed to think about the
humanîitarian aspects. Was there anything further the Council
could do? Perhaps we should think about safe areas. Yanez
(Spain) agreed. Marker (Pakistan) was wary of discussion of
safe areas. But it was true that there was à need to get the
Council's concern across. At the very Least the Council should
Say it was shocked at the atrocities reported by MSF.
9. I said that the Security Council was in an unenviable
position. Some took the view, 1 thought wrongly, that the UN
was to blame for the situation in Rwanda. It was unfortunate
that the Secretary-General of the OAU had written to the
Secretary-General in the way he did. Whether or not UNAMIR
personnel had withdrawn from Kigali, they could have done
nothing to prevent massacres äin the countryside. We had to
think carefully what we could do. There was no point în
promising what we could not deliver. The key was to encourage
neighbouring countries to continue their efforts to facilitate
a political solution. The resolution we had just adopted gave
us the peg for this.
10. There was then a somewhat confused discussion as to what
else the Council could realistically do. Yanez (Spain) said
that in previous cases of horrific crimes the Council had taken
measures to bring the perpetrators to justice or at Least to
investigate more fully. There was the War Crimes Tribunal for
Yugoslavia which had been preceded by the Commission of
Experts, In Liberia, 8 Commission of Inquiry had been
established following the Harbel slaughter. The Council should
reflect on how it could respond to the massive violations of
humanitarian Law being committed in Rwanda. Gambari said that
the key was to get back to the core of the problem: the
abandonment of the Arusha process. What the Council should be
doïng was to facilitate and encourage a return to this process,
Albright CUS) said that under any other circumstances the
Council President would ask the Permanent Representative of
Rwanda to come în and brief on why his Government had failed to
turn up at Arusha. Bizimansa (Rwanda) said that the Secretariat
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had described some of the events over the weekend but had not
highlighted one point. There had been a meeting in
Dar es Salaem on 6 April after which the President of Rwanda
had perished. But one member of the previous Rwandan
Government had remained în Dar es Salaam: the Minister of the
Interior. On instructions from the interim government he had
pérennes from Dar es Salaaem to Arushs, Contrary to press
| /reports therefore there head been a Rwandan Government presence
[|
|
11. I undertlined the need for the Security Council to make
efforts in parallel with those of the Secretary-General to
encourage the governments of neighbouring countries, all of
whom had representatives in New York, to get the peace process
back on track. I was perfectly willing to seek my Government's
views on some kind of enquiry into the events in Rwanda. But
whatever evidence was found, not much could be done with it
until there was peace and stability in the country. . Cardenas
agreed. The need was for the Council not to project
indifference, but to encourage regional powers to help bring
” about a solution.
COMMENT
12. If you have views on Yanez' idea for an enquiry into the
massacres, grateful to receive them by 27 April.
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