Citation
The International Response to Conflict and
Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda
Experience
Synthesis Report
by
John Eriksson
with contributions by
Howard Adelman
John Borton
Hanne Christensen
Krishna Kumar
Astri Suhrke
David Tardif–Douglin
Stein Villumstad
Lennart Wohlgemuth
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda
March 1996
Contents
Preface
Introduction
Chapter 1:
Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors
Chapter 2:
Early Warning and Conflict Management
Chapter 3:
Humanitarian Aid and Effects
Chapter 4:
Rebuilding Post–Genocide Rwanda
Chapter 5:
Overall Findings and Recommendations
Annex 1:
Terms of Reference
Annex 2:
Chronology
Annex 3:
Abbreviations
Preface
Within a period of three months in 1994, an estimated five to eight hundred thousand people were
killed as a result of civil war and genocide in Rwanda. Large numbers were physically and psychologically afflicted for life through maiming, rape and other trauma; over two million fled to neighbouring countries and maybe half as many became internally displaced within Rwanda. This human
suffering was and is incomprehensible. The agony and legacy of the violence create continuing suffering, economic loss and tension both inside Rwanda and in the Great Lakes Region.
For several years preceding the massive violence of 1994, the international community contributed
to efforts to find a peaceful solution to escalating conflict and it provided substantial assistance to
alleviate the human suffering. During the nine months of the emergency in 1994, April to December, international assistance for emergency relief to Rwandese refugees and displaced persons is
estimated to have cost in the order of US$1.4 billion, of which about oneo third was spent in
Rwanda and two–thirds in asylum countries. This accounted for over 20% of all official emergency
assistance, which in turn has accounted for an increasing share, reaching over 10% in 1994, of overall international aid.
This growth reflects the worldwide proliferation in recent years of so–called complex emergencies.
These tend to have multiple causes, but are essentially political in nature and entail violent conflict.
They typically include a breakdown of legitimate institutions and governance, widespread suffering
and massive population displacements, and they often involve and require a range of responses
from the international community, including intense diplomacy and conflict resolution efforts, UN
policing actions, and the provision of multilateral and bilateral humanitarian assistance by official
and private agencies. A complex emergency tends to be very dynamic, characterized by rapid
changes that are difficult to predict. Thus complex issues are raised regarding the timing, nature and
scale of response. The Rwanda complex emergency shares all these characteristics and more.
Although some evaluations of international assistance for complex emergencies have been carried
out, experience from the planning and execution of large–scale aid for relief, rehabilitation and
reconstruction has not been extensively documented and assessed. Recognizing both the magnitude
of the Rwanda emergency and the implications of complex disasters for constricted aid budgets, the
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its development cooperation wing, Danida, proposed a
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda.
This initiative resulted in the launching of an unprecedented multinational, multi–donor evaluation
effort, with the formation of a Steering Committee at a consultative meeting of international agencies and NGOs held in Copenhagen in November 1994. This Committee1 is composed of representatives from 19 OECD–member bilateral donor agencies, plus the European Union and the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) secretariat of the OECD; 9 multilateral agencies and
UN units; the two components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC
1
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America, Commission of the
EU, OECD/DAC secretariat, IOM, UN/DHA, UNDP, UNHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, IBRD, ICRC,
IFRC, ICVA, Doctors of the World, INTERACTION, Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, VOICE.
Several other countries supported the evaluation, but did not participate actively. France suspended its participation in
the Steering Committee in December 1995. The cost of the evaluation has been met by voluntary contributions from
members of the Steering Committee.
and IFRC); and five international NGO organizations.
Objective of the Evaluation2
The main objective of the evaluation is to draw lessons from the Rwanda experience relevant for
future complex emergencies as well as for current operations in Rwanda and the region, such as
early warning and conflict management, the preparation for and provision of emergency assistance,
and the transition from relief to rehabilitation and development.
In view of the diversity of the issues to be evaluated, four separate evaluation studies were contracted to institutions and individuals with requisite qualifications in the fields of (i) emergency assistance planning and management; (ii) repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees; (iii) history and
political economy of Rwanda and the surrounding region; (iv) institution and capacity building in
development; (v) conflict and political analysis; and/or (vi) socio–cultural and gender aspects. Institutions and individuals were also selected for their proven ability to perform high quality, analytical
and objective evaluative research.
The institutions and principal individuals responsible for the four reports are listed below. Space
precludes listing all team members for each study, which ranged from four persons for Study I to 21
for Study III; in all, 52 consultants and researchers participated. Complete identification of the
study teams may be found in each study report. Several of the studies commissioned sub–studies
that are also identified in the respective study report.
Study I:
Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors
The Nordic Africa Institute (Uppsala, Sweden)
Tor Sellström and Lennart Wohlgemuth.
Study II:
Early Warning and Conflict Management
Chr. Michelsen Institute (Bergen, Norway)
York University (Toronto, Canada)
Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke.
Study III:
Humanitarian Aid and Effects
Overseas Development Institute (London, United Kingdom)
John Borton, Emery Brusset and Alistair Hallam.
Study IV:
Rebuilding Post–Genocide Rwanda
Center for Development Information and Evaluation,
US Agency for International Development; Development Alternatives, Inc.;
Refugee Policy Group (Washington, DC, USA)
Krishna Kumar and David Tardif–Douglin.
_
Evaluation oversight was performed by the Steering Committee (which held four meetings between
December 1994 and December 1995), and by a Management Group, comprised of one lead bilateral
agency for each study: Study I: Claes Bennedich, Sida, Sweden; Study II: Jarle Hårstad, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Norway; Study III: Johnny Morris, ODA, United Kingdom; and Study IV: Krishna
2
See Annex I for the full Terms of Reference.
Kumar, USAID/CDIE, USA; and Niels Dabelstein, Danida, Denmark as chair. The evaluation
teams were responsible to the Management Group and the Steering Committee for guidance regarding such issues as terms of reference and operational matters, including time frames and budget
constraints, and they were obliged to give full and fair consideration to substantive comments from
both groups. The responsibility for the content of final reports is solely that of the teams.
The approach taken to this evaluation has reflected two concerns:
?
to try, through involving experienced outsiders, to examine as objectively and critically as
possible an experience about which it is impossible for any person with humane values not to
be deeply affected;
?
to engage leading Africans in a critical review of the analysis, findings and recommendations
while they were still in draft.
For this last reason, a panel of distinguished experts from Africa has provided a critique of the
report through participation in two panel discussions with the authors of the reports and selected
resource persons. The panel comprised: Reverend José Chipenda, General Secretary, All–Africa
Conference of Churches, Kenya; Dr. Adama Djeng, President, International Commission of Jurists,
Switzerland; Professor Joseph Ki–zerbo, Member of Parliament, Republic of Burkina Faso; and Dr.
Salim A. Salim, Secretary General, Organization of African Unity, Ethiopia. Also, Mr. Gideon
Kayinamura, Ambassador of Rwanda to the UK; Ms. Julie Ngiriye, Ambassador of Burundi to
Denmark; and Ms. Victoria Mwakasege, Counsellor, Embassy of Tanzania, Stockholm, made significant contributions through their participation in the December 1995 Steering Committee
Meeting.
While the Steering Committee is particularly grateful to these African participants for contributing
their wisdom and keen insights at one stage of the evaluation process, it is also acutely aware of the
fact that African researchers and institutions were not, with the exception of selected sub–studies,
involved in its execution. This omission constitutes a deficiency that cannot be rectified at this juncture. However, the Steering Committee is committed to disseminate the evaluation widely among
African leaders and organizations and anxious that they participate fully in discussions about the
evaluation’s recommendations.
The following resource persons have commented on drafts at various stages and/or participated in
panels or workshops: Mary B. Anderson, Consultant, USA; Hanne Christensen, Independent
Bureau for Humanitarian Issues, France; John Eriksson, Consultant, USA; Professor André
Guichaoua, Université des Sciences at Technologies de Lille, France; Sven Hamrell, Dag
Hammarskjöld Foundation, Sweden; Larry Minear, Humanitarianism and War Project, Brown
University, USA; Professor Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Colegio de México, México; and Stein
Villumstad, Norwegian Church Aid, Norway.
The Synthesis Report was prepared by John Eriksson, with contributions from the authors of the
four study reports and assistance from Hanne Christensen and Stein Villumstad in the preparation
of findings and recommendations.
This evaluation was initiated on the premise that in spite of the complexity and chaos that characterize Rwanda’s experience, it would be possible to identify applicable lessons to be learned by the
international community in attempting to respond to future complex emergencies and in its
continuing attempt to help Rwanda rebuild its society. The international teams who have produced
this evaluation believe they have identified such lessons. It will be up to the governmental and non–
governmental leaders of the international community for whom this evaluation has been prepared to
apply the lessons.
Niels Dabelstein
Chairman of the Steering Committee for
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda
Introduction
Structure of the synthesis
The Synthesis Report is comprised of five chapters. The first four summarize the main themes, issues and conclusions of each component study of the evaluation, beginning with an historical
overview of the causes and development of the crisis in Chapter One; an analysis of early warning
and attempts to contain the conflict in Chapter Two; an evaluation of the international humanitarian
response in Chapter Three; and an assessment of the prospects for reconstruction and development
in Chapter Four. These chapters have been prepared by the lead authors of the respective studies.
Chapter Five presents main findings and recommendations addressed to members of the international community.
The fifth chapter as well as this introduction are based on the four study reports and also draw on
contributions from the panel of African experts, the resource persons and members of the Steering
Committee. The individual study reports contain more in–depth analyses as well as a number of
additional conclusions and recommendations. Thus not every study recommendation is reflected in
this volume. While the bulk of the issues addressed in the Introduction and Chapter Five come directly out of the four studies, some are “cross–cutting” in nature, deriving from an overview of all
four studies, or reflect the complementary perspectives of the African panel, resource persons and
Steering Committee members.
The majority of the recommendations set forth in the last chapter are framed to be applicable to future complex emergencies. In view of the continuing crisis in Rwanda as well as the grave situation in neighbouring Burundi, a number of the recommendations are also very relevant to the immediate future. Further elaboration is provided in Chapter Five.
The overwhelming reality of the genocide
The planned, deliberate effort to eliminate the Tutsi population of Rwanda that culminated in the massive slaughter3 of April–July 1994 fully meets the definition of genocide articulated in the
“Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” adopted by the UN
General Assembly in 1948 (see the summary of key articles of the Convention in Chapter One,
below). In this evaluation, the overwhelming reality of the genocide soon became clear in ways that
had not been envisaged at the outset. As a result, the approach of a ÒtraditionalÓ evaluation with
emphasis on impact, efficiency and cost–effectiveness analysis was not always appropriate or sufficient, but had to be supplemented with qualitative analysis of cause–and–effect assessed in relation
to contractual obligations or international legal norms. Similarly, the documentary research and,
especially, the interviews and field work, repeatedly demonstrated how the genocide, its victims
and its perpetrators, shaped the prospects for rehabilitation and recovery, probably for decades to
come.
A basic premise of the evaluation was that it would yield applicable lessons for the international
community, both in responding to emergencies and helping to rebuild societies. Despite the unique
3
References in the evaluation to numbers killed in Rwanda during this three–month period are expressed in terms of a
range of five to eight hundred thousand. Single estimates that have some reasonable basis behind them fall within this
range. Some estimates fall outside the range, but there are reasons to doubt their validity.
character of the Rwanda experience, it also shares many of the characteristics of other complex
emergencies. An evaluation of this experience should therefore be able to frame recommendations
that have relevance for complex emergencies more generally.
The dynamic nature of the crisis
The dynamic nature, unpredictablity and complexity of the Rwanda crisis raise many difficult issues for the international community in terms of timing, nature and scale of response. For
Rwanda, with almost two million refugees just outside its borders, the crisis is far from over.
Most of the field research for this evaluation was conducted in the spring and early summer of
1995. Efforts have been made to update the field work findings through documentary research and
long–distance communication. However, as the situation continues to evolve, there is an inescapable tradeoff between timeliness and completeness. There has already been sufficient experience
regarding the response of the international community to yield findings with important implications
for the future.
The range of responses to the Rwanda crisis may be categorized as follows:
?
the international community’s responses to the civil war and the civil violence that preceded
the crisis of April–July 1994;
?
the early warning information available to the international community about a likely genocide and reactions to such warnings;
?
the international responses to the genocide that started after the April 6, 1994 shooting down
of President Habyarimana’s plane;
?
the international humanitarian assistance to the survivors inside Rwanda and to the huge refugee communities in neighbouring countries;
?
the international assistance to repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons, and to recovery and reconstruction of the Rwandese government and society after the
upheaval.
The continuation of the crisis has imposed a limitation for the evaluation with respect to this last
category. A complete evaluation of the repatriation and rehabilitation experiences of refugees who
fled from Rwanda in 1994 has not been possible. Most have resisted repatriation due to intimidation
from camp leaders and the perpetrators of genocide, and out of fear of reprisals inside Rwanda. An
assessment of the impact of assistance for recovery and reconstruction has not been possible because until recently little of the pledged assistance had been committed and disbursed.
A related limitation is incomplete analysis of the important regional context. While account is taken
of the recent evolution of the Rwanda crisis and its implications for the surrounding Great Lakes
Region, neither the Synthesis nor the four studies have analyzed the situation in Burundi and the
other Great Lakes countries sufficiently to provide a definitive assessment. Notwithstanding this
deficiency, several of the recommendations set out in Chapter Five are believed to be relevant for
the international communityÕs response to the current crisis in Burundi and should receive urgent
attention. These considerations are discussed further in the fifth chapter.
The audience: the international community
The audience for this evaluation is the “international community,” defined to include all those who
are affected by, and/or respond to, a “complex emergency” (as defined in the Preface). This includes governments, official international and inter–governmental organizations, nono governmental organizations (NGOs) and the components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement4. The audience includes such entities based in neighbouring countries, the region and the
world–at–large. The governmental and official entities can be further differentiated as bilateral
donor agencies; various elements of the United Nations; international financial institutions; and
other inter–governmental organizations such as the OECD, the European Union and OAU. In addition to entities at the apex of bilateral and multilateral policy–making, such as foreign ministries
and the UN Security Council and General Assembly, included are organizations devoted to such
functions as the protection of human rights and refugees, to the provision of humanitarian emergency aid, and to longer–term development aid. Some organizations concentrate exclusively on one
of these functions and others combine two or more functions.
The primary audience for the evaluation is the leadership and management of the above–mentioned
entities who make decisions regarding responses to complex emergencies. In the last chapter of the
Synthesis, recommendations are targeted to the greatest extent possible to specific entities for suggested follow–up responsibilities.
Some salient findings and issues
To set the stage for the following chapters, several significant findings and issues that emerge from
the evaluation are set out below:
1.
A complex, interacting combination of factors, some based in the history of Rwanda and others more proximate, contributed to the genocide in Rwanda.
2.
There were significant signs that forces in Rwanda were preparing the climate and structures
for genocide and political assassinations. However, people both in the region and the broader
international community ignored, discounted or misinterpreted the significance of these signs,
thereby not only indicating an unwillingness to intervene, but communicating that unwillingness to those who were planning genocide. Key actors in the international community thus
certainly share responsibility for the fact that the genocide was allowed to begin.
3.
Moreover, as it began, through hesitations to respond and vacillation in providing and equipping peacekeeping forces, the international community failed to stop or stem the genocide,
and in this regard shares responsibility for the extent of it.
4.
Thus the essential failures of the response of the international community to the genocide in
Rwanda were (and continue to be) political. Had appropriate political decisions been taken
early on, it is apparent that much of the humanitarian operation subsequently required would
have been unnecessary. In effect, humanitarian action substituted for political action. Since
key political issues have yet to be resolved, the crisis continues, as does the necessity for mas-
4
The components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movement include the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) along with the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
sive allocation of humanitarian resources.
5.
As the extent of flight of people from Rwanda became clear, the international humanitarian
assistance system launched an impressive and, on the whole, effective relief operation. In
spite of the extreme challenges of massive cross–border population movements, the international response saved many lives and mitigated large–scale suffering. Nonetheless, improved
contingency planning and coordination, increased preparedness measures and adoption of
more cost–effective interventions could have saved even more lives, as well as relief resources.
6.
Several distinct factors shape the current prospects for Rwanda’s recovery. These include the
following:
a.
Overt rearming and reorganization of the former leadership, military and militia in or beside
internationally–supported camps in Zaire have posed a threat of war in the region for well
over a year. However, with recent arrests of a number of former Rwandese government officials by Zairian authorities and proposed joint plans with UNHCR to begin substantial repatriation in the latter part of January 1996, a significant barrier to repatriation may be reduced.
The inability or unwillingness of numerous refugees to return also results from insecurity,
harsh detention and uncertain or conflicting government policy inside Rwanda.
b.
While some donors have been quite forthcoming, the failure of the international community
as a whole to provide adequate support for the government of Rwanda has also undermined future stability and development efforts. In particular, insufficient attention and resources
have been given to the survivors of genocide and the war inside Rwanda.
c.
An essential element of reconstruction in Rwanda must be the establishment of an effective system of justice through which perpetrators of genocide are held, and seen to be accountable
and punished, thus thwarting the “culture of impunity” that has been allowed to persist over
the decades by Rwandese governments and by the international community.
The return of pre–1994 refugees, many of whom left Rwanda after the 1959 “social revolution,” raises serious problems regarding property, land use rights and other requirements for their successful economic and social integration. These issues and those surrounding successful repatriation of
the 1994, “new caseload” refugees, weigh heavily on the government.
d.
Real and lasting resolution of problems in the Rwandese political arena will be achieved only
in the broader context of:
(i)
the creation of a domestic inclusive political system that reflects the underlying principles of
the Arusha Accords, and
(ii)
the Great Lakes Region, itself confronted by similar issues, especially in Burundi, where
politicallyo motivated violence has created an explosive situation that threatens regional
security and stability.
Chapter 1
Historical Perspective:
Some Explanatory Factors
5
The purpose of Study I, which this chapter summarizes, is to present a historical background to the
developments in contemporary Rwanda that culminated in the genocide beginning in April 1994.
The study relies on available written materials supplemented by interviews with established scholars on Rwanda (both Rwandese and foreign).
The review of this historical background has not led to any easy answers or to pinpoint one or two
ultimate reasons for the tragic events. On the contrary, it has rather led to the conclusion that recent
events result from a cumulation of events of the past, with one factor forming a building block for
the next, and all actors and factors interrelating and interacting.
However, this summary is used to highlight a few specific developments in RwandaÕs history that
we think have been of decisive importance, and need to be understood in order better to comprehend what led to the tragedy in 1994 and what is going on in Rwanda today. We think that they are
all important and hesitate to stress one more than the other. The scholarly debate on Rwanda has
often been “reductionist”, trying to establish whether one or the other factor has been more important – a debate that has helped to clarify the different standpoints, but has led to little conclusive result. The aspects to be stressed are:
1)
The build–up of indigenous social and political structures towards the end of the pre–
_colonial period, in particular under the reign of the Tutsi king Rwabugiri during the second
half of the 19th century. Rwabugiri’s administration (1860–1895) imposed a harsh regime on
the formerly semi–autonomous Tutsi and Hutu lineages, confiscating their lands and breaking
their political power. Rwabugiri amplified feudal labour systems, in particular the uburetwa,
i.e. labour in return for access to land, a system that was restricted to Hutu peasant farmers
while exempting Tutsi. He also manipulated social categories, and introduced an “ethnic” differentiation between Tutsi and Hutu based on historical social positions. Polarization and
politicization of ethnicity thus began before the advent of European colonialism.
2)
The German colonial (1899–1916) and Belgian trusteeship (1916o 1961) policy of indirect rule, favouring the strengthening of Tutsi hegemony and resulting in a political and
administrative monopoly in the hands of the aristocratic Tutsi overlords of the Nyiginya clan
from the 1920s. Under the influence of the so–called hamitic thesis, this policy culminated in
1933 with the introduction of compulsory identity cards, reinforcing and accelerating the late
pre–colonial process towards a separation of Tutsi and Hutu (and Twa). From then on, all
Rwandese had to relate to “their” respective ethnic group, which in turn determined avenues
and fortunes in society. Under European colonialism, a policy of “ethnogenesis” was actively
pursued, i.e. a politically–motivated creation of ethnic identities based on socially–constituted
categories of the pre–colonial past. The minority Tutsi became the haves and the majority
5
This summary of Study I, Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors, was prepared by Lennart Wohlgemuth
and Tor Sellström.
Hutu the have–nots.
3)
The abrupt change by Belgium only some 25 years later, when – under the influence of the
general decolonization process in Africa, the build–up towards political independence in the
Congo (Zaire) and in a belated attempt to redress past injustices – the colonial administration
(and the Catholic church) shifted support from the minority Tutsi to the majority Hutu. This
eased the way for the so–called peasant, or Hutu, revolution of 1959–61, through which
Rwanda underwent a profound transition from a Tutsio dominated monarchy to a Hutuo led
independent republic in less than three years. The replacement of one political elite by another
introduced a new dimension of political and social instability and a potential for future ethnic
violence. The events of 1959–61 also forced tens of thousands of Tutsi into exile in neighbouring countries, from where groups of refugees began to carry out armed incursions into
Rwanda, sowing the seeds of the country’s ethnically–defined refugee problem.
4)
The Rwandese society developed over the centuries into a remarkably organized state,
with a high degree of authoritarian social control from the centre, largely due to extreme
population pressure, in addition to complex agricultural production systems and competition
for land between crop–farmers and cattle–owners. This was not only the case with the core
Tutsi–_dominated pre–colonial feudal kingdom (i.e. excluding the northern and south–western areas of present Rwanda) o in which a vertical chain of command through layers of chiefs
regulated the economy and the life of peasants through various social contracts – but also during the German and Belgian administrations, through which a policy of indirect rule continued, and strengthened, the control from above.
What is important in the context of this study is, first, that the highly–organized and centralized Rwandese state formation over the years constrained the scope for the emergence of
nono governmental organizations and independent interest groups. Political parties did appear
on the scene towards the end of the 1950s, but on the whole the development of an independent, NGO–based civil society has been largely dwarfed by the state. Thus, along with the
oppression and exploitation of Rwandese women farmers – who carry out most of the agricultural work and become physically drained through constant pregnancies – there are, for example, in male–dominated Rwanda only a few associations of rural women to voice their interests.
Second, – and most importantly – the political culture of centralized social control has facilitated policies aiming at mobilization or manipulation of the rural people, for peaceful as well
as violent purposes. Subjugated receivers of instructions from above and without means to
disobey, the peasant population has largely joined campaigns launched by the government,
whether the essentially constructive umuganda labour regime from the mid–70s or the later fatally destructive interahamwe militias.
5)
Increasing intra–Hutu tensions – mainly between groups from the northern Gisenyi and
Ruhengeri regions and those from the rest of the country – developed during the First and
Second Republics (1962–1990) and came to form an important factor underlying the cleavage
between Hutu in the 1990s. In addition to competition over political spoils, at the core of this
division is the historical fact that the northern Hutu were independent until the first decade of
the 20th century, when they were militarily defeated by combined German and Tutsi–led
southern Rwandese troops. To this day, the northerners form a distinctive Hutu sub–culture in
which the awareness of a pre–Tutsi past is more pronounced than in other parts of Rwanda.
President Habyarimana’s informal council – or akazu; constituted around his wife and brothers–ino law o represented this independent Hutu tradition, deeply suspicious of any reconciliatory gestures towards the exiled Tutsi community and, therefore, also essentially hostile to
the Hutu political groups favouring a dialogue with the Tutsi–led Rwandese Patriotic Front
(RPF). The slow and often flawed democratization process in 1990–94 was to a great extent
due to this intra–Hutu division. The akazu was also behind the genocide from April 1994, preparing the tragic events through instructions to presidentiallyo appointed bourgemestres (mayors), building up the interahamwe militias and mobilizing the Burundian Hutu refugees who
poured into southern Rwanda after the assassination of the Burundian Hutu president
Ndadaye in October 1993.
6)
The economic slump starting in the late 1980s and the effects of the actions subsequently
taken by the government in consultation with the international donor community, i.e. the
structural adjustment programmes of 1990 and 1992. The economic deterioration, largely due
to a sharp decline of world market prices for coffee – Rwanda’s prime export earner – as well
as to unfavourable weather and economic policies such as increased protectionism, price controls and other regulations, affected the whole society. In US dollar terms, GDP per capita fell
by some 40 percent over the four years 1989–1993. The slump hit the Rwandese peasantry
particularly hard. Combined with the effects of the civil war from October 1990, continued
demographic pressure on available resources and decreasing agricultural yields, the economic
crisis introduced yet another element of stress and instability into the Rwandese political and social fabric. The international community, including the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, overlooked these potentially explosive social and political consequences
when designing and imposing economic conditions for support to RwandaÕs economic
recovery.
7)
The refugee crisis, starting in 1959 and developing into a constant political and social
problem throughout the history of independent Rwanda. Tens of thousands of Tutsi in
several waves from the Hutu revolution onwards were forced into exile in neighbouring countries. Largely due to the intransigence of the Rwandese Hutu–led governments regarding their
demands to return, and to the unwelcoming policies of some of the host countries, the exiled
Tutsi communities became over the years increasingly militant. In turn, this led to the creation
of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), the military attack on Rwanda in October 1990 and
the ensuing civil war.
8)
The two–generations–old unsolved issue of impunity for genocidal and other violent
crimes in Rwanda is of crucial importance in this context. The International Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly in 1948, confirmed by the International Court of Justice in 1951 and ratified by Rwanda in 1975, stipulates that persons committing genocide shall be punished, “whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals”. In
addition to the crime of genocide as such, punishable acts according to the Convention are
conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to
commit genocide and complicity in genocide. In Rwanda, those who over the years have been
responsible for ethnic mass killings have not, however, been brought to justice. For the psychological health of the people, and the political health of the country, the crimes must be addressed. If a culture of impunity is allowed to continue, the spiral of violence seems almost
bound to be repeated in the future.
9)
Linked to the problem of impunity is the legacy of fear that exists in the Rwandese social
fabric as a result of repeated mass killings since 1959, and which has its origins in the process of ethnogenesis and division between privileged Tutsi and under–privileged Hutu during
the colonial period. With the creation of the ethnicity issue followed a social construct of
Tutsi superiority and Hutu inferiority, contempt and mistrust, which ultimately permeated the
entire society and developed into a culture of fear. It largely contributed to the outburst of violence at the time of Rwanda’s independence, when the tables were turned and the fear among
the majority Hutu gave way to a fear among the minority Tutsi. Since then, it has been repeatedly exploited for purposes of political manipulation.
10) Developments in Rwanda are, finally, closely related to developments in the Great Lakes
region, comprising Rwanda, eastern Zaire, Uganda, north–western Tanzania and Burundi.
This is the historical region of the Banyarwanda, i.e. the people who speak the language of
Rwanda, Kinyarwanda, and who throughout modern history share a common heritage. It was
violated by European powers, who at the turn of the century divided the region and the people
into Belgian, British and German colonial dominions, with far–reaching consequences for
later, including the most recent, events. Thus regional political, economic, social and cultural
dynamics – taking the form of, among other things, cross–border flows of refugees, weapons,
ideas and fears – must be borne in mind when considering solutions to Rwanda’s problems, as
well as the problems of – above all – Burundi and Zaire. If not, the ghastly events in Rwanda
in 1994 could easily draw the entire region into similar, or still greater, human tragedies.
All these factors, sometimes fuelled and sometimes constrained by interventions from the international community, led to the political manipulation of ethnicity in the 1990s, which in turn led to the
genocide from 6 April 1994. This study of the history of Rwanda will hopefully help the reader to
understand that the causes of polarized ethnicity are not easily defined. On the one hand, the conclusion should not be drawn that such ethnicity stems only from differences based on ancestry, culture or social position. As shown in the full report of Study I, the complexity of the pre–colonial
society was such that differences could just as well be explained by lineage, clan, occupation, class
etc. On the other hand, neither can the conclusion be drawn that the contemporary antagonistic
cleavages along ethnic lines are attributable solely to specific events during the colonial period, nor
in the period thereafter. There are no simple answers. The present can be explained only as a product of a long and conflict–ridden process, in which many factors contribute to the total picture.
Chapter 2
Early Warning and Conflict Management
6
Study II, which this chapter summarizes, examines the effectiveness of international monitoring
(early warning) and management of the Rwanda conflict. Using the techniques of critical policy
analysis, the study weighs the formulation and execution of policies against their stated objectives
as well as accepted international norms for the behaviour of states and organizations. The research
is based on a number of sub–studies, secondary sources (books and articles by academics and journalists, media studies, reports, etc.) as well as considerable primary data collected through interviews and document searches in the UN system (New York and Geneva), the NGO community, and
visits to national capitals in Europe and North America (Paris, Rome, Brussels, London,
Washington and Ottawa), and in Africa (Nairobi, Kigali, Kampala, and Dar–es–Salaam).
The study begins with the refugee problem prior to 1990, follows the civil war, then covers the
build–up to the coup on 6 April 1994. The following 10 weeks are traced to understand the tardy
international response to the genocide of more than a half a million persons mainly belonging to the
minority Tutsi community, but including moderate Hutu political opponents of the regime. The concluding historical analysis reviews the security issues of the refugee camps in Zaire and the displaced persons camps in the south–west corner of Rwanda.
Actions and reactions in the developing conflict
By failing to deal with the festering refugee problem prior to 1990, both the Rwandese and the
Ugandan governments set the stage for future conflict. Although the issue of Rwandese refugees in
Uganda defied easy solutions, opportunities that existed remained unexplored or were not aggressively pursued. With the exception of Tanzania, the regional states were either indifferent or part of
the problem. States further afield showed little interest. UNHCR was overburdened, understaffed,
and lacked political or economic leverage to develop the requisite pressure to help resolve the issue,
which, at that time, seemed minor in the global scale of refugee problems.
However, the refugee problem was becoming explosive. The build–up of tension leading to the
1990 invasion by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) forces was accompanied by many tell–tale
signs, but was inadequately monitored. When the invasion was a fait accompli, however, it caused
considerable international concern and reaction, both in the region and in Europe. France and Zaire
came to the aid of the Rwandese government. Other actors, including Belgium, the OAU, and key regional states initiated diplomatic efforts to defuse the conflict.
One source of concern related to the principles at stake. The RPF forces who attacked across the
border from Uganda consisted not only of refugees invoking their right of return, but constituted a
significant segment of the army of Uganda. The invasion violated basic norms designed to ensure
6
This summary of Study II, Early Warning and Conflict Management, was prepared by Astri
Suhrke and Howard Adelman.
stability in relations among states; these are particularly well–developed in African regional international law. Moreover, those who undertook the early diplomatic rounds recognized that the ethnopolitical situation in the Great Lakes Region was delicately balanced, had recurringly exploded in
Rwanda and Burundi, and could do so again.
The initial diplomatic efforts eventually led to the Arusha peace talks, initiated and led by the OAU
and Tanzania. The process received considerable international attention and support and resulted in
a comprehensive settlement. The United Nations assumed formal responsibility for overseeing the
implementation of the Arusha Accords, but failed, however, to make adequate use of the OAU and
local African states in this regard. As a consequence, there was a disjuncture between the mediation
and implementation phases that contributed to undermining the Accords.
From 1990 onwards, civil violence against the minority Tutsi community and regime critics gradually escalated. Observers commonly linked the violence to the civil war, either as retaliatory measures or as warnings to the advancing RPF forces. However, two authoritative reports – one by an
independent International Commission of Inquiry, and another prepared for the UN Commission on
Human Rights o suggested a more radical and comprehensive design that foreshadowed events to
come. Both reports determined that the killings were genocidal in nature and that existing authorities were substantially involved. As the war continued and the outlines of a peace formula took
shape, additional reports indicated that Hutu extremists were organizing and arming themselves to derail the peace process and massacre “internal enemies”. The creation of documented structures of
violence (death squads, death lists, and, later, hate propaganda inciting violence) provided warnings
of a potential genocide.
The UN Commission on Human Rights took little notice of its own report. Except for pointed diplomatic protests by Belgium, the findings of the international human rights inquiry were mostly filed
away in national ministries and the UN system. With the partial exception of Canada, no state observed the recommendation to impose strict human rights conditionality on aid transfers. Some states were indifferent, others were concerned but concluded that the ongoing democratization process and the peace talks required their continued economic and political support, particularly since
the peace agreement under negotiation would produce a new governmental structure that it was
hoped would address human rights abuses. In this way, donors became hostage to their own policies.
Human rights organizations and states were also at odds on the issue of arms supplies. In 1992 and
1993, the former recommended that states (France and Uganda were obvious targets) cut off all
arms supplies to the parties in the conflict. France openly defended its role and the right of a sovereign state to support a beleaguered friendly government. Uganda denied any involvement in helping
the rebel army, yet its territory constituted the rear base for the RPF forces.
Would aid conditionality and an international arms embargo in the 1990o 93 period have defused
the conflict and prevented the genocide? Effective use of human rights conditionality is difficult,
requiring fine–tuned and timely intervention. Arguably, there were windows of opportunity, particularly in mid–1992, when more pressure could have been put on the Habyarimana regime to deal
with the extremist forces as well as the critical issue of impunity. Also military assistance (direct
and indirect) to the Rwandese protagonists could have been calibrated better with the continuing
peace process, particularly in dealing with the central issue of extremist forces who opposed the
Arusha process and resultant Accords.
Though such speculations are debatable, firmer conclusions can be drawn about what did happen.
By not standing firm on human rights conditionality, donors collectively sent the message that their
priorities lay elsewhere. By permitting arms to reach the Rwandese protagonists, the possibilities
for demilitarizing the conflict were reduced. Arms supplies reinforced the determination of both
parties to seek a military and forceful solution to a political conflict. They strengthened the RPF’s
ability to advance militarily. They permitted the government to equip and expand its armed forces
as well as para–military units, both of which became involved in the genocide.
When, as a result of the Arusha process, the Hutu extremists were excluded from the key
instruments of the Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) and marginalized in the political
process, alternative strategies were not developed to defang those extremists. The UN force
(UNAMIR) sent to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement was given a mandate tailored to a classic, minimalist peacekeeping operation. Yet the force faced a situation considered by
many – including some of those who planned the operation – as dangerously unstable. As the architects of the Arusha Accords had foreseen, conditions in Rwanda suggested a mandate with broader
powers to protect civilians and seize arms caches. Further, the UN Security Council established a
force that was structured and financed to satisfy a cost–conscious United States, increasingly
unwilling to support UN peacekeeping, rather than to meet the needs on the ground. The force was
inadequately supported and slowly deployed relative to the need for speed o considered essential to
maintain the peace process – though relatively rapidly given the normally cumbersome UN procedures. The operation had no flexibility to respond to changing circumstances, in particular those caused by the crisis in neighbouring Burundi in October 1993.
In the months immediately preceding the genocide, many additional signs indicated that the implementation of the Arusha Accords was faltering and that massive violence was being planned. The
air was full of extremist rhetoric on radio, in public rallies and at official cocktail parties. There
were assassinations and organized violence. Detailed intelligence reports were passed to New York
and the Belgian military authorities by the unofficial UNAMIR intelligence unit documenting the
military training of militias, hidden arms caches, and plans for violent action. Unequivocal warnings reached the UN Secretariat in January regarding a planned coup, an assault on the UN forces to
drive them out, provocations to resume the civil war, and even detailed plans for carrying out genocidal killings in the capital. The cable was placed in a separate Black File, designed to draw
attention to its content, and circulated to several departments in the UN Secretariat. However, senior
officials in the Secretariat questioned the validity of the information and made no contingency plans
for worst–case scenarios. Similar intelligence failures were evident on the state level, particularly in
France and Belgium, both of which had a considerable capacity for overt and covert information
gathering in Rwanda at the time.
Thus pieces of information were available that, if put together and analyzed, would have permitted
policy–makers to draw the conclusion that both political assassinations and genocide might occur,
and that the scale would be different from past patterns (1959–1963; 1991–1993) of “just” hundreds
or thousands of victims. Yet this analysis was not done. Although some had available fragments of
prescient and significant information, the enormity of the genocide took virtually all by surprise.
The failure to anticipate planned and targeted mass murder was particularly significant given the
political commitment and actual involvement of the UN in Rwanda, the legal right and moral obligation to act to prevent genocide according to the Genocide Convention, and the enormous cost of a
miscalculation.
While mandated to help implement the peace agreement, the UN made no preparations to deal with
a breakdown of the Accords, except to withdraw. Nor were there contingency preparations to deal
with the plans to scuttle the Accords or the massive violence plotted by the extremists. Generally,
the UN Secretariat interpreted UNAMIR’s mandate and terms of engagement narrowly, and on several occasions denied the Force Commander permission to search for and seize arms caches. When
developments in early 1994 further eroded the peace accords, the Secretary–General and the
Security Council threatened to withdraw the UN force, hence strengthening the hands of the extremists. No member of the Security Council came forward to suggest a different course of action. On
the contrary, the Council kept UNAMIR on a tight leash with only a three months’ authorization,
accompanied by admonitions of caution and cost–cutting.
Crisis and response
In the months before the crisis struck, UNAMIRÕs presence contributed to a false sense of security
in Rwanda. When events came to a head on 6 April, the UN collectively failed. There was an absence of leadership at UN headquarters in New York. The Secretary–General, travelling at a brisk
pace through Europe, misread the nature of the conflict. The understaffed and overstretched
Department of Peace–Keeping Operations seemed paralyzed. In the Security Council, the killing of
10 Belgian peacekeepers created a political surge to withdraw, although this was not recommended
by UNAMIR’s Force Commander nor African countries contributing troops. Information on the
genocide under way was already available when the final decision was made to reduce the force
drastically.
Once the direction and magnitude of the genocide became undeniable, the UN reversed itself and accepted an obligation to protect civilians. However, the realization of this peacekeeping mission
_(UNAMIR II) was hampered by the unwillingness of key members to pay for or provide troops,
and to match troops with equipment in an expeditious manner. The force was deployed only after
the genocide and the civil war had ended.
France’s role in Rwanda was significant but marked by multiple contradictions. While warning the
Security Council in early 1993 that massacres were a real possibility, France supported a regime
that was deeply compromised by human rights violations. France urged the UN, rather than the
OAU, to take the lead in monitoring and implementing the peace agreement, but subsequently did
little to support UNAMIR I. Nor did France pledge support for UNAMIR II, even though the
French Foreign Minister was the first cabinet member of a government holding a permanent seat on
the Security Council to identify the massacres as genocide (16 May 1994). With the aid of some of
its African ex–colonies, France subsequently undertook a unilateral intervention, Op_ration
Turquoise, endorsed by a Chapter VII Security Council resolution. The action saved many lives and
undoubtedly prevented an additional mass outflow of refugees from the south–west of Rwanda, but
came very late – two and a half months after the genocide commenced and when the civil war was almost over. Further, the intervention was open to misinterpretation, and did not serve to disarm the
extremists or prevent suspected organizers of the genocide from escaping.
After massive numbers of refugees, retreating government forces, and the assumed perpetrators of
the genocide crossed into Zaire and Tanzania in April–July 1994, UNHCR warned the UN in New
York about the attendant security problems in the refugee camps. The Secretariat took the unprecedented step of examining the issue in a peacekeeping context, but the Security Council proved
unsupportive. After significant delays, the problem fell back into the hands of UNHCR, which -
resorted to a novel and reasonably effective solution to police the refugee camps. The arrangement
did not and could not deal with the broader security threats posed by the existence of militarized
communities in exile, and this problem was left to fester.
The large concentrations of internally displaced persons in south–west Rwanda presented a domestic version of similar problems. These came to a head when the Kibeho camp was closed in April
1995. The operation resulted in the killing of large numbers of men, women and children, mostly by
Rwandese government forces firing on IDPs, but also by extremists within the camp. The disastrous
outcome notwithstanding, the coordinated efforts that went into the planning of the Kibeho operation by UN agencies, NGOs and the new Rwandese government were steps in the right direction.
Although the execution was faulty, the faults were not inherent in the decision–making model of
coordination, which could be utilized in the future. Similarly, the arrangement for providing security for refugees in Zaire exemplifies a workable solution to a difficult problem.
During the whole conflict, but especially after the coup on 6 April, the overall failure of the media
to report accurately and adequately on a crime against humanity significantly contributed to international disinterest in the genocide and the consequent inadequate response.
Early warning
Whatever the failures in media coverage, prime responsibility for the failure to read the signals and
to respond adequately cannot be placed on the media. Why were the signals that were sent ignored?
Why were they not translated into effective conflict management? Failures of early warning are
attributable to many factors. The UN was poorly organized to collect and flag information about
human rights violations and certainly genocide. There was a failure in both the UN system and the
NGO community to link human rights reports to dynamic analyses of social conflict so as to provide strategic policy choices. There existed an internal predisposition on the part of a number of the
key actors to deny the possibility of genocide because facing the consequences might have required
them to alter their course of action. The mesmerization with the success of Arusha and the failure of
Somalia together cast long shadows and distorted an objective analysis of Rwanda. The vast quantity of noise from other crises preoccupied world leaders. The confusion between genocide as a
legal term, referring primarily to an intent, and the popular association of genocide with massive
murder in the order of hundreds of thousands, created confusion. Finally, a general desensitization
developed with respect to mass slaughters, and the possibility of a massive genocide actually occurring seemed beyond belief.
Major states with the capacity to monitor and anticipate the crisis were either not interested, or, if
interested, were unwilling to undermine a friendly government. In such a situation, international
organizations exist in part to pick up the slack, but neither the UN nor the OAU did so in the
Rwanda case. The UN had poorly–developed structures for systematically collecting and analyzing
information in a manner relevant to preventive diplomacy and conflict management. The newlyo formed inter–agency arrangement for early warning (HEWS) was oriented mainly towards humanitarian operations; it was not equipped to detect or analyze political and military warning signals.
Within the Secretariat, information collection and policy analysis was divided among the DPA,
DPKO and DHA. There was also a disjuncture between information collection, analysis, and the
development of strategic policy options. Thus DPA was assigned the responsibility for monitoring events in the region, but not for developing related strategic policy options. One of the most significant sources for early warning, the UN human rights monitoring system, was not part of the information–gathering structure in the Secretariat and, arguably, became isolated from the decision–
making process. In the field, the UN had no formal capacity for collecting intelligence; never- theless, UNAMIR, through the initiatives of both the Canadian Force Commander and the Belgian
Kigali–sector Commander, succeeded in running minimalist, if irregular, intelligence operations.
The other main organization concerned – the OAU – had virtually no capacity at all for early warning data collection and policy analysis.
The shortcomings of early warning in the Rwanda case go further. The issue is not better quantitative data or formal modelling. More simply, the UN lacks a system for drawing on existing information sources, in the region and outside, from specialists in state agencies, academic institutions, rights monitoring agencies, and the various agencies of the UN itself. The UN lacks a specialized
unit, without operational responsibilities, for analyzing such information and translating that analysis into evolving strategic options that can be channelled directly to the Secretary–General. Both the
UN and NGOs failed to relate human rights monitoring to analysis of the development of social
conflict and, hence, to assess the direction of events. When the UN became involved in a peacekeeping mission, the monitoring of political developments was not linked with contingency pre-_paredness. Without contingency planning, the UN was left with a short time–frame and few resources to respond to sudden changes in the situation. This point is critical for two reasons: even
under the best of circumstances, it is impossible to pinpoint specific future outcomes of complex social conflict; secondly, the absence of contingency planning limits both what the decision–makers
will hear and the options they are willing to consider.
Despite the shortcomings of early warning, at the critical stage the relevant actors dealing with
Rwanda knew that the situation was unstable and dangerous. Yet the sustained and careful attention
so necessary to successful conflict management was lacking. In part, early action is problematic and
preventive diplomacy is inherently difficult because outcomes are uncertain, reflecting the typical
complexity of cause–and–effect relations in social conflict. Moreover, policy–makers who are continuously faced with actual crises are disinclined to pay attention to hypothetical ones, even though
experience tells us that “prevention is better than cure”. The lack of international investment in
early conflict regulation signified a more fundamental disinterest in Rwanda. The UN Security
Council authorized only a minimalist peacekeeping force, and the Secretariat insisted that UNAMIR maintain a low profile. When the crisis struck, and it became clear that massive genocide
was under way, there was still no effective international action.
Conflict management
Throughout, some individual and collective actors did the most with the least under difficult or adverse circumstances. Human rights NGOs monitored the situation. Tanzania struggled to turn the
Arusha process into effective preventive diplomacy. UNAMIR I tried to function proactively despite tight reins prior to 6 April; many remaining units – along with the ICRC – bravely sought to
save civilians once the killings started.
This could not compensate, however, for the overall failure of the international community to attempt to prevent or stop the genocide, or its very inadequate efforts to mitigate it. In one sense, the
inaction can be seen as a result of the propensity of states to be guided by narrow self–interest rather than moral obligations to uphold international norms of justice. However, this propensity has
historically varied over time and place; its prominence in the Rwanda case, therefore, requires additional explanation.
No state involved in the conflict happened at the time to have the optimal combination of interest,
capacity and neutrality that could have generated appropriate early warnings and translated them
into conflict–mitigation strategies. More fundamentally, the Rwanda conflict occurred in a period
when the United Nations was acting in an expansive yet highly selective fashion, reflecting a structural mismatch between the responsibilities of international institutions and interests of states in the
post–Cold War world.
Revitalized by the end of the Cold War, the UN in the 1990s rapidly expanded its peacekeeping
operations throughout the world. Rwanda was added to the list in October 1993. However, the
framework for peacekeeping was set by the distribution of power in the Security Council, which
represented the world as it was half a century ago. Apart from France, the major powers on the
Council were uninterested in a small Central African country that was marginal to their economic or
political concerns, and peripheral to international strategic rivalries. By their power of veto and finances, the Permanent Five controlled the peacekeeping and enforcement operations of the UN.
The only state with a demonstrated ability to energize the Council in a crisis – the United States –
was haunted by memories of Somalia and determined not to get involved in another African conflict. It was also preoccupied with crises elsewhere, especially in Bosnia and Haiti. The lack of
interest in Rwanda on the part of the major Western states left France to define a large part of the
policy field; the result was to magnify the consequences o negative as well as positive o of unilateralism.
Within the UN system as a whole, there was no locus for assessing key policy questions. How, for instance, can the democratization process be promoted without exacerbating ethnic and regional
tensions or creating excuses for human rights violations? How are extremists to be controlled?
Moreover, there was too little effort at policy coordination when opportunities appeared.
The rationale for UN peacekeeping is that it provides a neutral force, independent of partisan interest. However, partisan interests can provide motivation and energy to be directed at a problem when
a commitment to conflict resolution per se is lacking. This is the conundrum. Without either kind of
interest, the UN as a collective actor was unable to mount an adequate peacekeeping force expeditiously and cut through the byzantine problems endemic to UN peacekeeping. The mixo ando match
system of deployment was slow and inadequate. Lacking a powerful patron in the Security Council,
the Rwandese operation was subject to cumbersome and bureaucratic procedures that involved delays and inflexibility, and gave insufficient autonomy to the leadership in the field.
The international community might have responded better had the early warning systems generated
a clearer anticipation of forthcoming events. On the other hand, conflict management is a function
of interest and capacity, not only to ensuring that information is collected and communicated, but to
react. In this respect, regionalism appears as a critical and positive force that was not sufficiently
recognized or utilized. Structures of conflict resolution and peacekeeping could have been strengthened by more involvement of regional and sub–regional actors – the OAU and the sub–regional
grouping of the states in the Great Lakes area o in the decision and management structures. After
all, these actors had definite interests in the conflict and a critical stake in the outcome.
Strengthening regional mechanisms for conflict resolution and peacekeeping will require financial
support from richer states since most of the world’s conflicts occur in regions where the parties
have the fewest resources to deal with them.
The consequence of these cumulative fault lines in the international system was an inability to stop
or significantly mitigate a genocide of immense proportions.
Chapter 3
Humanitarian Aid and Effects
7
Scope and method
Study III, which this chapter summarizes, examines the provision of humanitarian aid and physical
protection by the international community in response to the Rwanda crisis. It combined a detailed
technical assessment of the principal sectors and phases of the response with an attempt to draw out
the principal conclusions and policy lessons from the experience. The period covered was broadly
that from April 1994 until late 1994 for operations inside Rwanda, but for refugee operations in
Tanzania and eastern Zaire it extended to July 1995. Humanitarian operations prior to April 1994
were described but not evaluated and insecurity in Burundi and the limited time available resulted
in refugee operations in Burundi not being evaluated. Time pressures also obliged the study to focus
on the main refugee concentrations in Ngara, Goma and Bukavu. Consequently, refugee movements
into Karagwe in Tanzania and Uvira in Zaire were not considered.
The study was undertaken by a team of 21 people, representing eight nationalities and a wide range
of backgrounds and experiences. Initial consultations with key UN agencies, the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs began in January 1995. A reconnaissance mission by
five Team members to the Great Lakes region was undertaken in April and the principal block of
fieldwork by more Team members was undertaken during June and July. Within the Great Lakes region a total of 235 donor, UN, NGO and government personnel were interviewed and approximately 140 beneficiaries of assistance. These were complemented by interviews with 245 personnel
of donor organizations, UN agencies and departments, the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement and NGOs in Europe and North America and a document collection that eventually exceeded 2,000 items. A database to enable analysis of financial flows during 1994 was created, and two sub–studies on the 1994 dysentery epidemic and UK TV coverage were commissioned.
Overview of humanitarian relief operations
The protection and humanitarian crisis of 1994 did not begin with the shooting down of the Presidential plane on 6 April, but was preceded by at least three and a half years of developing operations inside Rwanda and in neighbouring countries within the Great Lakes region. By mido 1992,
for instance, attacks by the RPF in the north of the country and ethnic violence and insecurity elsewhere had created 200–300,000 IDPs. Following the February 1993 advance by the RPF, this number increased sharply to perhaps 900,000, though, by the end of the year, 60% of these had returned
to their homes. Large–scale relief operations were mounted, particularly by the ICRC and the
Rwandese Red Cross and WFP undertook a massive airlift of food that transported twice the tonnage carried by the 1994 airlift operations. In October 1993, the attempted coup and subsequent
wave of ethnic violence in Burundi resulted in the death of 50,000 to 100,000 and an influx of almost 700,000 refugees to neighbouring countries, principally southern Rwanda and eastern
Tanzania. Documentation reviewed by the study indicated that the international community’s response to the refugees in eastern Tanzania was poor and exceptionally high rates of mortality
were experienced as a result of the combined effects of inadequate water and sanitation, food
7
This summary of Study III, Humanitarian Aid and Effects, was prepared by John Borton.
supplies and health care. For those who moved into Rwanda the response was better as relief agencies involved in the IDP Programmes were able to rapidly divert personnel and resources to the
Burundian refugees.
The events that followed 6 April were an extraordinary human tragedy consisting of genocide and
civil war that caused the violent death of between 500,000 and 800,000 people, the movement of
over two million Rwandese into neighbouring countries and the temporary displacement of well
over one million people inside Rwanda. This study estimates that approximately 80,000 people died
in the refugee and IDP camps in Zaire, Tanzania and inside Rwanda during 1994, principally from
cholera and dysentery. This figure would probably exceed 100,000 among Rwandese refugees in
Burundi and Rwandese outside the IDP camps if data were available for these populations.
It is highly significant that the number who died as a result of causes that could be considered
avoidable (had the humanitarian response been more effective), was several times lower than those
who died as a result of the genocide and conflict. The critical failings in the international community’s overall response, therefore, lay within the political, diplomatic and military domains rather than the humanitarian domain. Had the international community responded more effectively
in the months prior to, or in the days immediately following, the shooting down of the Presidential
plane on 6 April, many, perhaps most, of those who died would probably have survived and much
of the massive expenditures on the provision of humanitarian assistance been unnecessary.
Over the period April to December 1994, approximately US$1.4 billion was allocated by the international community to the response. Of this amount, approximately 85% was from official sources
with the remainder being provided from private sources. By a substantial margin, the European
Union (principally ECHO) and the US Government (USAID, Department of Defense and the State
Department’s Refugee Bureau) were the largest official sources of funds, accounting for 50% of
total allocations. Approximately 50% of the total allocations were expended by, or channelled through, UN agencies, with just two agencies, UNHCR and WFP, accounting for over 85% of
these. A substantial proportion of the resources channelled through these two agencies were allocated onwards to NGO implementing partners. The Red Cross Movement accounted for 17% of all
flows.
At least 200 NGOs were involved in the response, but estimation of their relative role (i.e. their direct contributions and as partners to UN agencies) proved difficult as a result of inadequate data
and an incomplete response to a questionnaire survey undertaken by Study III. It was clear though
that many NGOs played critical roles and that overall NGOs formed an important part of the response.
Main findings
The response contained many highly commendable efforts, notably: the initial response in Ngara;
the impressive performance of UNHCR Emergency Response Teams in Ngara and Goma; the work
of ICRC inside Rwanda, mainly between April and July 1994, particularly in the field of protection
of survivors and with its hospitals in Kigali and Kabgayi; and the courage and commitment shown
by UN, ICRC and NGO personnel in extremely difficult and often dangerous situations.
Widespread starvation did not occur. For the refugees and many of the IDPs the food aid supply system, dominated by WFP and to a lesser extent the ICRC, was vital to their survival and performed well. Given the magnitude and scale of the population movements and the distance of the
beneficiary populations from coastal ports, this was a substantial achievement. For the non–_dis-
placed population within Rwanda the combination of a good crop and the dramatic reduction in
population meant that locally–available foods were comparatively plentiful.
Humanitarian operations in Kigali and in FAR–controlled areas after 6 April were severely constrained by the high levels of violence. Only ICRC (with MSF support) and the UN Advance
Humanitarian Team were able to operate in Kigali and, though valuable, the volume of humanitarian assistance and protection they were able to provide was limited. The critical need was for security and physical protection, which the much–reduced and ill–equipped UNAMIR force was unable
to provide, though it did succeed in protecting perhaps 25,000 threatened civilians. Between April
and the end of June, only ICRC, CRS/Caritas and to a lesser extent WFP were able to provide
humanitarian assistance in the south and west of the country, though again, the volume was severely
limited. In the RPF–controlled areas in the north and east, ICRC, UN agencies and NGOs had greater access and were able to deliver quite substantial volumes of assistance, though their freedom
of operation was closely controlled by the RPF and many agencies were not allowed to remain inside Rwanda overnight.
The French–led Opération Turquoise that pushed into western Rwanda on 22 June and then concentrated on the creation of a so–called Safe Zone in the south–west remained in the country for two months. The operation protected approximately 14,000 threatened civilians within Rwanda and the
improvement in security in the south–west enabled a dramatic increase in humanitarian assistance
activities by the three agencies that operated during the April–June period to at least 15 agencies by
August. Such efforts served to spread out over a longer time period the number of displaced
Rwandese crossing into Bukavu and to limit their eventual number. Had this not been done, it is highly likely that the mortality rates experienced in Bukavu would have been much higher.
Despite this, judgements of the benefits of Opération Turquoise have to be highly qualified. By concentrating forces in the Safe Zone after the end of June the operation
?
greatly increased the likelihood of an RPF advance in the north–west and thus of a massive
refugee influx into Goma;
?
did not provide the security necessary for humanitarian agencies to operate freely in the northwest and respond to the needs of the large and growing number of IDPs there;
?
diverted attention of donor organizations, UN agencies and NGOs to the needs of IDPs in the
south–west at a critical juncture for those in the north–west.
The positive contribution of Opération Turquoise in reducing and spreading out the movement of
IDPs into Bukavu has to be balanced by the fact that the several hundred thousand Hutu who were
encouraged to remain in IDP camps in the Gikongoro area presented the new government and the
UN with an extremely difficult problem. Though the majority were eventually returned to their
home communes, several thousand IDPs were killed at Kibeho camp in April 1995. The south–west
has arguably remained the most insecure area of the country.
The response of humanitarian agencies to the needs of those concentrated in IDP camps in the
Gikongoro area was initially slow as a result of: the reluctance by some NGOs to be closely identified with the French military; the time needed to establish operational capacity in the area; the focus
of international attention during July and August upon the situation in Goma; and a lack of techni-
cal coordination capacity at field level. The initial lack of food and water and inadequate sanitation
resulted in very high rates of dysentery in many of the camps and the death of perhaps 20,000 IDPs.
Because of the insecurity inside Rwanda and the access problems facing not only humanitarian
agencies but also the international media, the large–scale movement of Rwandese into neighbouring
countries enabled readier access, at the same time as creating substantial humanitarian needs. The
international response to the first major influx, that of almost 200,000 into Ngara District at the end
of April, which was led and closely coordinated by UNHCR, was highly impressive. Substantial
loss of life was avoided.
However, despite the initial successes and the continued impressive performance of most agencies
working in Ngara, the programme has remained fragile as a result of a number of factors. Unlike
Goma and Bukavu, where the initial influx was not followed by new arrivals, refugees have continued crossing into Ngara. The refugee population in Ngara District in May 1995 was 500,000 – double that of May 1994. Consequently, the situation has never quite stabilized and agencies have been
continually needing to increase the scale of their programmes. Another factor contributing to the
post–emergency situation in Ngara was that from mid–July onwards the focus of international attention moved to Goma, resulting in the transfer of resources and personnel away from Tanzania. The
water sector was one where the initially impressive emergency response was not maintained; on a
per capita basis, the amount of water available to refugees by June 1995 was less than half that of
July 1994.
Factors contributing to deterioration have been the constantly expanding refugee population, deterioration of emergency boreholes that were not designed or equipped for long–term service, and a
lack of investment in more sustainable supply systems. Initial expectations that the refugees would
repatriate, the high capital costs involved in developing sustainable supply systems and the
government of Tanzania’s reluctance to see investments that seemed to confirm that the refugees
would be in the country for a long period, have all served to deter the necessary investments.
The number moving into Bukavu during July and August was approximately 300,000. The influx
was not as intense as the initial influxes into Ngara and Goma and, because of the lack of camp sites
for them to immediately move to, the town effectively served as a huge temporary transit camp until
UNHCR, NGOs and the local authorities were able to identify and open new sites. A combination
of the continued operation of the municipal water system, substantial levels of initial assistance
from the people and local agencies in Bukavu, and the fact that many refugees arrived with disposable assets (much of it looted on leaving Rwanda), meant that disease outbreaks were limited and
substantial loss of life did not occur. This result is somewhat paradoxical, because of poor overall
coordination and because Bukavu received substantially less financial and human resources than
were being deployed to Goma.
The Goma influx
The influx into Goma was of unprecedented scale and rapidity: in the space of just five days between the 14th and 18th of July, approximately 850,000 refugees crossed into Goma town and at
points further north. The capacity of the agencies present in Goma was quickly overwhelmed despite an unprecedented and rapid response. Within the first month approximately 50,000 refugees
died as a result of a combination of cholera, dysentery, dehydration and violence. Given the massive scale of the influx, many deaths were likely and the fact that there were not substantially more
is a credit to the agencies involved in the response.
The study assessed the performance of the system both in terms of providing warning of the event
and in preparing for a large influx. This assessment identified a fundamental weakness within the
humanitarian system in that it did not possess a mechanism for monitoring and analyzing information to provide warning of population movements that was either sufficiently integrated or capable
of gathering information in areas that were poorly covered by relief agencies. UNREO and its daily
Sitreps came closest to performing such a role, but UNREO’s capacity directly to collect information was wholly inadequate and it had to rely heavily on relief agencies in different locations providing it with any monitoring that they were carrying out. The reduced UNAMIR force was not able
to monitor the situation in the north–west and the system was therefore reliant upon the ICRC operating out of Goma, whose monitoring of the build–up of IDPs was confined to the area around
Ruhengeri, though within this area there were already 250,000 IDPs by early June. It was not until
the first week of July, when an Oxfam Assessment Mission visited the area between Ruhengeri and
Gitarama, that information became available on IDPs in this area. The Oxfam Team “discovered” another 200,000 and also estimated that another 300,000 were moving westward, following the RPF
capture of Kigali.
UNHCR had deployed a substantial Emergency Response Team to Goma in April but, with the influx into Ngara, part of the Team was redeployed in early May. At the end of June, just two
weeks before the influx, the remainder of the team was withdrawn and the Sub–Office in Goma reduced to a staffing level that the Acting Head of the Sub–Office termed “skeletal”. Following the
Ngara influx the agency had begun contingency planning measures in early May that had included
the build–up of stockpiles of non–food items in Amsterdam for 500,000 refugees. The team in
Goma had begun preparing a Contingency Plan for North Kivu that used a planning figure of
50,000. Identification of a contingency site was hampered by the reluctance of the local authorities
to consider the possibility of a large influx. The difficulties of making adequate preparations in
Goma, coupled with the fact that the Goma airport was able to cope with heavy–lift aircraft, appears
to have led UNHCR to rely more on its ability to respond rapidly by air rather than on the ground
preparations, such as local stockpiling. This relative emphasis on rapid response rather than on–the–
_ground preparedness may also have reflected the agencyÕs conception of the term
ÒpreparednessÓ, which traditionally within UNHCR has effectively meant “contingency planning
aimed at facilitating a rapid response once an influx occurs”. This more narrowly conceived than
that used by other UN agencies.
The North Kivu Contingency Plan was finalized in the third week of June. Follow–up on the
numerous action points by UNHCR Headquarters and the (much reduced) Sub–Office in Goma to
convert the plan into reality was slow. Staff were severely overo stretched and a rapid sequence of events in the three weeks following the finalization of the Plan, including the RPF capture of Kigali
and the creation of the Safe Zone in the south–west, generated additional work. Consequently, the
contingency plan was not “ready–and–waiting” for an influx of even 50,000 by mid–July.
During June sufficient evidence was available from two sources, the ICRC Sub–Delegation in
Goma and the figures being used by an intero agency contingency planning process led by UNREO,
to warrant a substantial increase in the planning figure. Poor relations between the ICRC Sub–
_Delegation and the UNHCR team in Goma appear to have prevented the ICRC estimate of
250,000 IDPs around Ruhengeri reaching the UNHCR Team. The UNREO–led process was initially taken seriously by UNHCR and the agency went to considerable lengths to ensure that a
critical meeting in Nairobi was attended by key staff from Geneva and Goma. However, the meet-
ing ended before it had considered the implications of the various scenarios and despite UNHCR
requesting that the meeting resume the following day (a Saturday) this was not supported by representatives of other UN agencies present. After this fiasco, key UNHCR personnel do not appear to
have taken the UNREO–led process seriously and the final document, which included a “worst
case” scenario of large numbers of displaced moving into eastern Zaire and Burundi, was not copied to the UNHCR Team in Goma. The coincidence between the completion of the UNREO–led
process and UNHCR’s North Kivu contingency plan with the start of Opération Turquoise was
unfortunate as the French operation quickly altered the situation and dynamic of the conflict. As
noted earlier, the concentration of Turquoise upon the Safe Zone in the south–west had a critical impact on the outcome in the north–west.
In the event, the fall of Ruhengeri and the sudden increase of civilians and FAR military moving towards Gisenyi coincided with a joint DHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM and UK–ODA assessment
mission into the north–west that resulted in the first steps in mobilizing a major relief effort. Thus
UNHCR took the decision to deploy a new Emergency Response Team the day before the start of
the influx and, with the exception of a Water and Sanitation Coordinator, the full team was deployed within the next few days.
The scale of the response to the crisis in Goma was extraordinary. Prompted by intense media
coverage of the influx and the subsequent cholera outbreak, the international community poured
assistance into the area. The response involved not just the usual UN agencies and NGOs, but also
civil defence and disaster response agencies from within donor countries, several military contingents providing support to the humanitarian activities and a large number of comparatively inexperienced NGOs. Assessed overall, the results were impressive. The speed with which water was supplied to most camps, health care facilities established and general ration distributions initiated was
commendable.
However, there were several aspects of the response where performance of the system was less impressive and the performance of some agencies was poor. Almost all the non–food assistance arrived by air and so management of the airlift and the limited capacity of the airport became a critical _constraint. UNHCR played a central role in the management of the airlift operation using the
Air Operations Cell in Geneva, which had been established two years previously to coordinate the
Sarajevo airlift. It appears that the Air Operations Cell had difficulty adjusting to a multi–destination operation (Bukavu and Kigali were served as well as Goma), and several agencies complained
that the airlift had been treated as a UNHCR airlift and not as a common resource for all agencies.
Cargoes arriving did not always conform to the priorities established in the field, though this may
have owed more to donors sending whatever was available rather than what had been requested.
There is ample evidence also that the airlift, or at least substantial components of it, such as the US
Air Force operation out of the Entebbe AirHead, continued for several weeks longer than was required.
Coordination of the arrival of critical inputs was not impressive. For instance, while the ability to
pump water from Lake Kivu was quickly increased by a US private company supported by the US
military, the arrival of water tankers to transport it, particularly to the spontaneously settled camp at
Kibumba, which had no water sources, took much longer. Similarly, given the hard volcanic rock in
the area, a critical need was for heavy equipment to construct access roads into the camps to enable
the siting of health facilities and water storage and distribution systems. However, as a result of
commitments by the US Army not being implemented and faulty information flows between Goma
and the US Army base in Germany, it was not until the end of September that the heavy equipment
capability was substantially increased.
The level of violence within the camps was extremely high, with one estimate based on a retrospective survey in one camp suggesting that 4,000 refugees died as a result of violence at the hands of
the militia, undisciplined Zairian soldiers and other refugees. The high levels of insecurity in the
camps directly affected the effectiveness of the relief efforts as most foreign personnel were unable
to remain in the camps overnight and the ability of medical personnel to maintain continuous care
of patients was hampered. The performance of the Zairian authorities and the international community in addressing the violence was also unimpressive. The fact that Western military contingents
were in Goma to assist with the relief efforts but were not mandated to address the problem of insecurity in the camps appeared illogical. It was not until March 1995 that a satisfactory solution was
implemented involving a contingent of the Zairian Presidential Guard, paid and equipped by
UNHCR, and supervised by an international monitoring team.
Many of the military contingents, civil defence and disaster response organizations that worked in
Goma did so in response to a UNHCR request to donor governments to provide eight “Service
Packages”. This was a relatively new concept devised as a means of rapidly increasing management
and implementation capacity within the system, and the intention was that individual governments should assume responsibility for entire packages. The results were very mixed, with several governments providing capacities that were broadly similar, leading to coordination problems. Within the
critical water sector, for instance, there was confusion between the respective roles of the US military, the German agency Technisches Hilfswerk (THW) and Oxfam. At one point Oxfam was informed by UNHCR Headquarters that the US military was responsible for the whole sector and
that the very substantial outlays by Oxfam would not be met by UNHCR.
Principal policy conclusions
The close relationship between the level of security and the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance
highlights the need for coherence in the strategies adopted by the political/military and humanitarian domains. However, the Rwanda crisis has been characterized by the lack of a coordinated political strategy within the international community for “managing” the crisis. Differences between key
members of the UN Security Council and governments of neighbouring countries in terms of their
attitude towards the RPF and the former government and an apparent inability to confront and overcome these differences appear to have been responsible for the lack of a coordinated political approach. Despite this lack of an agreed framework, donor countries were prepared to allocate substantial resources, particularly in the second half of 1994, to humanitarian assistance programmes.
This readiness with which the international community appears prepared to fund humanitarian
assistance programmes contrasts with the lack of concerted efforts to devise coordinated political
solutions to the crisis.
In the absence of a coherent political approach, it seems that humanitarian agencies, encouraged by
the new government and certain Western political leaders, developed and pursued strategies, such
as encouraging the early repatriation of the refugees, that attempted (but failed) to substitute for
political solutions to the crisis. In a society that had just experienced genocide, apparently carried
out by a substantial proportion of the society, the approach adopted by key elements of the
international community of reintegrating Hutu refugees into Rwanda was unrealistic and broadly
unsuccessful. Reports or events that questioned the new government’s commitment to respecting
human rights and threatened to undermine these strategies were suppressed or played down in pub-
lic, though some governments did press the human rights question in private. Despite the massive
loss of life and the expenditure of enormous sums of money, an estimated 1.8 million Rwandese remain in camps outside their country and many observers expect the civil war to be resumed at
some point. A solution remains distant.
The Rwanda case demonstrates the need for much closer linkages between humanitarian and political policies in the principal donor countries and the UN system and also with the neighbouring
countries and regional bodies such as the OAU. The creation of task forces or contact groups composed of key interested parties may serve to encourage closer linkages.
The response was resourced through a variety of mechanisms but ultimately donor organizations
and donor governments accounted for the bulk of the resources provided. The extent to which funding was reactive to events was striking. There was a marked contrast in resource availability between the “tap–on” period from mid–July to September, when funding appeared limitless, and
other periods, when it was less readily available. The factors contributing to this reactive characteristic are many and their relationship complex. Media coverage and the concern of almost all organizations (donor organizations and the military as well as NGOs and UN agencies) involved in the response for “profile” and “visibility” were clearly significant. What was clear from the study is
that the way the system was resourced was sub–optimal, limiting the effectiveness of the response
and substantially increasing eventual costs. Preparedness and contingency planning were not
encouraged, a position not helped by variations in conceptualization of preparedness between
agencies and donors. Investments that would have yielded substantial savings, such as opening road
routes and increasing the capacity of low–cost railway routes, were not made. While donor organizations did provide some “up–front” funding this was quite inadequate in the face of such a large
and highly dynamic emergency and in some cases did not even reach the levels previously agreed
by donor organizations.
Foreign military forces were heavily involved in the response, with some contingents concentrating
solely on provision of security, others concentrating solely on provision of relief assistance or providing support to relief agencies and several other contingents mixing these two roles. For those
contingents providing relief assistance and/or support to relief agencies, logistics support (airlifting,
trucking, etc.) formed the bulk of the military contribution, though several were involved in intermediate services (water production, laboratory services) and in the actual delivery of assistance to
the affected population. Generalizations about the performance of the military are difficult, particularly when they were involved in such a wide range of roles and information on their impact and
cost was so limited. The performance of those contingents assessed was very mixed, with some performing critical roles well while others performed poorly in key sectors and thereby reduced the
effectiveness of the overall response. Information on costs that could be compared to commercial or
NGO activities was difficult to obtain apart from air–lifting, where commercial companies proved
considerably more cost–effective. The Rwanda experience suggests that though the military may be
able to fulfil a useful role in extreme situations, their comparative advantage is often of short duration and restricted to very particular situations. Their use may be questioned from several stand
points, including their predictability, effectiveness, cost and ability to participate collaboratively in
operations involving several agencies and numerous NGOs.
The study reviewed available studies on the impact of the large refugee populations upon their host
communities and complemented these with additional but still limited investigations. It found that within the neighbouring countries there were gainers as well as losers, with the losers often being
those communities in the immediate vicinity of the refugee camps, though farmers were able to take
advantage of cheap labour and the gainers often being those involved in supplying goods and services to the camp populations. The international communityÕs mechanisms for compensating the
local populations for the detrimental effects on their assets, livelihoods and environment were found
to have been inadequate, with losers having to wait long periods before being compensated. In
_several cases the level of services available to refugees after the initial emergency period exceeded
those available to the local population. Actual and perceived differences contributed to resentment towards the refugees within the host community. In the case of Tanzania these may have contributed to the government’s closure of the country’s borders with Burundi and then Rwanda during
1995.
The response involved an unprecedented number of agencies and organizations and this must have increased overall costs and the difficulties of ensuring a coordinated response. The unprecedented
number of NGOs involved reflects not only a genuine and widespread desire to provide assistance
but also the reality that participation in largeo scale, higho profile relief operations has become an
important factor in the formation and development of NGOs. The performance of many NGOs was
highly impressive and many cooperated closely with each other. However, there were numerous
examples where this was not the case. Some NGOs sent inadequately–trained and –equipped _personnel, some undertook to cover a particular sector or need and failed, and others were unwilling to
be coordinated. The conclusion drawn by the study is that the current mechanisms for ensuring that
NGOs adhere to certain professional standards are inadequate.
Approximately 50% of total resources allocated during 1994 were expended by or channelled
_through the UN system, with WFP and UNCHR accounting for 85% of these. With so many UN
agencies, NGOs and other organizations involved in the relief operations, there was a critical need
for a strong capacity at the centre to provide leadership and overall coordination. In regard to
refugee operations, UNCHR came close to fulfilling such a role by virtue of its clear mandate,
support from host governments (particularly in the case of Tanzania), highly–competent technical
coordination personnel, and control over a significant proportion of the funds available for agencies
and NGOs responding to the refugee problem – in large part due to a bold decision by ECHO to
channel all its funds for refugees through UNHCR.
However, coordination arrangements in relation to other areas and levels of the system were less
satisfactory. The fact that the roles of the SRSG, the UNAMIR Force Commander and the
Humanitarian Coordinator/Head of UNREO were limited to operations within Rwanda hampered
coordination between the policies and operations inside Rwanda and those relating to refugees in
neighbouring countries. Within Rwanda UNREO performed several useful functions, though it
suffered as a result of its ad hoc status and lack of clarity over its relationship to DHA and UNDP,
its relationship with operational UN agencies and its relationship to the SRSG. In addition it did not
have adequate resources and some of its personnel (many of whom were UNDP and seconded NGO
personnel), lacked emergency coordination experience. Consequently its role was limited,
principally to that of information sharing. At the préfecture level within Rwanda, UNREO’s Field
Offices provided a useful forum for information sharing among NGOs, but technical coordination
was the responsibility of other UN agencies such as UNICEF, WHO and FAO. As a result of their
initial concentration on developing the capacity of the new government in Kigali, the provision of
technical coordination in the south–west with its 300,000 IDPs was slow.
As well as supervising UNREO, DHA undertook a wide range of coordinating actions spanning
from the initiation and leadership of the UN Advanced Humanitarian Team to coordination of
Consolidated Appeals and the chairing of the Inter–Agency Standing Committee. Whilst
assessment of the effectiveness of such non–operational coordination is difficult, it was clear that
DHA was substantially more effective in providing coordination than it had been during the
Somalia operations in 1992 when DHA was created. Nevertheless, it was apparent that DHA
experienced substantial institutional and financial obstacles and faces continuing uncertainty over
its future. By virtue of its lack of control over the funding of UN agencies and ambiguity over its
representation in the field, it was unable, despite the best efforts of its personnel, to provide strong
leadership and directive coordination. As a result of all the above difficulties in the area of
coordination, and the dominance in resource terms of WFP and UNHCR, Study III concluded that
the term “hollow core” was an apt characterization of the humanitarian relief system during the
response.
The performance of WFP and UNHCR, the two largest agencies within the UN humanitarian system, was of critical importance to the overall response. Though the Team was impressed by
many aspects of the performance of the two agencies, the relationship between them was subject to
unproductive tensions stemming from the division between them of the general ration supply/distribution chain. Despite development of a detailed Memorandum of Understanding between them,
these tensions persist and are likely to continue, given their different perspectives on the same problems and the inherent difficulty of splitting such a critical function between the two largest agencies. One aspect of this split is that accountability is diluted as each may shift the burden of responsibility for problems encountered onto the other. Such tensions resulted in unnecessary expenditures
and reduced the effectiveness of their combined actions.
Another principal conclusion drawn from the Study is that the present accountability mechanisms within the humanitarian aid system are quite inadequate. The Team found remarkable variation in
the amount and quality of information on the situation in a given area depending on the agencies involved. Thus for some areas, especially the refugee camps, detailed information on morbidity and
mortality was readily available whereas inside Rwanda such information was extremely patchy. In
part this reflected UNHCR’s clear coordination role in relation to refugees and the presence of highly–competent technical coordinators, in contrast to the unclear responsibilities inside Rwanda
and the lack of technical personnel within UNREO. Thus large parts of the response could not be
properly assessed, either because information on process and impact indicators was not available or
it had been collected differently by different agencies. This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs.
While accountability to donors is important, it should not be forgotten that relief agencies should
also be accountable to the populations they are seeking to assist. The Team was struck by the very
limited attempts by agencies to obtain the views of beneficiaries on the assistance they were provided with. Finally, a potentially more disturbing problem is that in a context of increased concern
for profile by, and competition between, humanitarian agencies, the objectivity of their reporting
may suffer as a result of their emphasis on the positive aspects of their programmes and playing
down of the negative.
Chapter 4
Rebuilding Post–Genocide Rwanda
8
This chapter summarizes Study IV, which examines the effectiveness, impact and relevance of
international assistance to Rwanda on repatriation and on rehabilitation, reconstruction and long–
term development of the country. The primary aim of the study was to draw lessons from the experience of the international community in order to formulate specific recommendations for Rwanda
and for future complex emergencies. Two considerations are of particular relevance to this study.
First, its focus, as with the other studies, has been on the activities of the international community.
Second, it focuses, as do all ex-post evaluations, on the completed or continuing activities. It is not
meant to be a needs assessment, therefore the areas in which the international community was not involved are not focused upon. The study is based on interviews with relief and development agencies in the US and Europe, and on field visits to Rwanda and neighbouring countries. During field
visits in late April to early May, a team of 10 relief, refugee and development experts met with agency representatives, government officials and a cross–section of Rwandese. The report is a synthesis of the sectoral and topical reports prepared during the field visit.
Overview of assistance to Rwanda
Aiding the people of a war–torn nation rehabilitate and reconstruct their society is a politically delicate process that requires substantial financial commitment and programmatic coherence from the
international community. It requires a multi–faceted, coordinated effort to rebuild not only economic but also, and perhaps more importantly, social and political institutions devastated by war
and violence, tasks for which the international community is ill–prepared. In the case of Rwanda,
the challenge has been especially daunting because of the genocide, which resulted in the deaths of
five to eight hundred thousand people and the subsequent exodus of two million. As a whole, the
international community has made a considerable effort, with varying degrees of success, to meet
the unprecedented challenge of helping post–genocide Rwanda rebuild.
From April 1994, to the end of the year, the international community focused largely on saving
lives by providing food, shelter and medical and sanitary services to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The vast majority of the assistance was expended to support refugee populations in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi.
Attention within Rwanda began to shift from emergency relief towards rehabilitation and reconstruction in August–September 1994, when the international community began to realize the severity of human and institutional devastation brought about by the civil war and genocide. Even before
that, relief agencies had embarked on more limited programmes of rehabilitation. A significant
early initiative in July was the establishment by UNDP and the Rwandese government of the
“UNDP Trust Fund for Rwanda,” intended to be a streamlined mechanism for channeling donor
funds for the rehabilitation of governmental capacity. This was followed at the beginning of August
by the launching by UNDP of the first comprehensive programming mission for rehabilitation and
reconstruction and at the end of the month by a World Bank Emergency Grant of US$20 million
8
This summary of Study IV, Rebuilding Posto Genocide Rwanda was prepared by David Tardifo Douglin and Krishna
Kumar.
that _funded rehabilitation activities undertaken by FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF and WHO.
Since September 1994, the UN and donor agencies have supported a wide array of projects and
programmes in different sectors and regions throughout the country.
Additionally, many of the 102 international NGOs present in the country in December 1995 moved
into the rehabilitation phase through their initial participation in emergency humanitarian assistance. Much of the initial “first phase” rehabilitation was funded through the January 1995 UN
Consolidated Appeals Process. However, the primary framework for the transition from emergency
to rehabilitation and recovery assistance has been the January 1995 Round Table Conference for
Rwanda Reconstruction, sponsored by UNDP and the Rwandese government, which provided
funds for reconstruction and a mechanism by which disbursement of those funds could be tracked.
Disbursement of financial assistance to the new Rwandese government faced a range of problems o
absorptive capacity, questions of legitimacy and accountability, to name a few, and consequently
has been slow. In light of the potential social, political and economic costs of delays, financial support for national recovery has been surprisingly slow. This is especially so of funds pledged at the
Round Table Conference. Of US$707.3 million pledged, only US$68.1 million had been disbursed
mid–way through the year, which amounted to less than 10 percent of the pledged amount. Only
about one–third of the funds disbursed was left for direct assistance to the government for balance
of payments support, purchase of vehicles and equipment, technical assistance and so on. This
remaining amount, US$22.8 million, represents three percent of the total pledged amount. The
delay in disbursement of pledged funds has been caused by many factors; however, it undermined
the governmentÕs overall capacity to pursue timely initiatives for economic recovery and political
stability. According to UNDP, by September 1995, nine months from the initial pledging conference, about one–third (US$244.3 million) of the initial funds pledged had been disbursed. Partly as
a result of persistent lobbying efforts by UNDP, the level of pledges at year’s end had risen to
_slightly over US$1 billion and roughly half the funds initially pledged had been disbursed. If
Rwanda’s requirements were entirely for traditional project activities, this would be considered a
good record, but in view of the need for flexible, fast–disbursing assistance, disbursements have
been slow to materialize. On the other hand, to provide such assistance – essentially budget support
– many donors need more assurance than they have been given about the transparency and accountability of budget preparation and execution by the government.
Of the more than US$2 billion estimated to have been spent on the Rwanda crisis since April 1994,
the vastly larger share has gone to the maintenance of refugees in asylum countries. Independent
analysis of UN/DHA financial tracking figures and financial information from key individual donors broadly confirms this point. Although such a disproportionate allocation is understandable –
refugees must be supported – it appears to Rwandese who have lived through the horror of genocide
that the international community is more concerned about the refugees than the survivors.
Support for economic and public sector management
The war destroyed the macro–economic and institutional infrastructure necessary for successful and
balanced growth of a modern market–based economy. In spite of this and the numerous difficulties
involved in regaining control of the economy and the public sector, the present government appears
committed to continuing and accelerating reforms begun under the structural adjustment
programmes of the previous regime. In consultation primarily with the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, the government has taken a series of measures – de–monetization and
reduction in money supply, devaluation and reliance on market determination of exchange rates –
that confirm its seriousness about economic reform. It adheres to the principle of keeping the public
wage bill to no more than 50 percent of its pre–war level, but is finding that exceedingly hard to do
for a variety of reasons. It is not clear if the government will be able to exercise the monetary and
fiscal control necessary for economic stability in the future. Special conditions – a large volume of
foreign currency in the economy, and a low stake in the value of the Rwanda franc, for example –
early in the process of reconstruction facilitated monetary reforms.
Maintaining macro–economic policy in favour of growth and development, and keeping public
_recurrent expenditure under control are important challenges for the government as well as for the
international financial institutions. The World Bank has reopened its local mission and initiated an
Emergency Recovery Programme. The IMF has sent consultative missions to Rwanda. Other donors have provided a number of experts to key branches of the government, provided salary supplements and helped furnish offices so the economic and public management apparatus of the government can begin to function again. In spite of the relatively good start in economic management,
there have been frustrating delays in the rate of disbursement of the World Bank Emergency
Recovery Credit, a major component of the Emergency Recovery Programme. The December 1995
resignation of Rwanda’s Central Bank governor, and his request for political asylum, signal turmoil
within the macro–economic management apparatus.
Assistance to agriculture
The war had a devastating effect on agriculture and the rural economy. In response, the international community undertook a variety of agriculture rehabilitation programmes, most notable of
which were the provision of seeds and tools to farm households, the multiplication of local varieties
of major crops, and assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture. In particular, over two seasons each
household received a “package” of bean, sorghum, maize and vegetable seeds and one or two hoes.
Fifty percent of farmers were reached in the first season of seeds and tools distributions, while 80
percent were aided in the second season. Subsequent analyses estimate that 62 percent of farmers received seeds and 72 percent received tools. In conjunction with the distribution of seeds and tools
for the resumption of agricultural production, relief agencies, guided by the World Food
Programme, provided food aid for “seeds protection.Ó This activity was guided by the logic that
provision of food aid would reduce consumption of more expensive selected seeds.
General distribution of seeds and tools, as well as food aid through the first two seasons, is feared
by some Rwandese relief personnel to have begun to induce dependency on the part of some recipients. Continued general distribution into the third season will certainly exacerbate this dependency.
If the WFP follows through on its announced plan, based on a recent WFP/FAO survey, to target
more closely on the vulnerable and needy, the potential for encouraging dependency should be mitigated. However, the criteria by which some aid is to be targeted by some NGOs appear so inclusive
as to be of little use for targeting. Many farmers who have received material assistance for agriculture are squatters on land vacated by persons killed or having fled during the war. An unanticipated
effect of seeds and tools distribution may be to entrench and appear to validate their hold on the
land. This may be an unavoidable part of agricultural rehabilitation in Rwanda, but its potential negative ramifications must be understood. Equitable resolution of property rights and land tenure issues is of paramount importance to peaceful return of refugees and the achievement of peace in
the countryside.
Although seed multiplication has focused primarily on volume and local adaptation, much remains
to be done to re–establish seed development, focusing ultimately on pest and disease resistance.
There has been little progress rehabilitating livestock herds throughout the country. At the same
time there is a serious problem of over–stocking in the north–east. Another area of relative neglect
is the export sector, specifically coffee. Projects have been identified and funds committed for the export sector, and, toward the end of 1995, activities began. But earlier rehabilitation of localized
processing centres and assistance in coffee harvesting and marketing could have rapidly injected
funds into the rural community. The international community has played a very small role in the
rehabilitation of rural enterprises, especially small and medium enterprises.
Rehabilitating the health sector
By mid–July 1994, Rwanda’s entire health delivery system had collapsed and was in complete disarray. Over 80 percent of its health professionals were killed or had fled the country. NGOs, UN
agencies, the ICRC and bilateral donors arrived with trained health professionals, medicines, supplies and equipment. They re–established basic curative services in urban and rural areas and helped
repair and restore damaged water systems. Non–governmental organizations were instrumental in
delivering primary health services to the population. Yet because many NGOs lacked previous
experience in the region, did not conduct proper needs assessments, and were poorly coordinated,
there was much duplication of effort and waste of scarce medical resources. Donors have provided
limited direct assistance to the government for strengthening its management, coordination and
information systems capacity in the health sector. One exception is WHO, which has provided direct technical assistance to the Ministry of Health in health policy formulation, guidelines and health sector reform. Early in the process of rehabilitation, UNICEF prepared a report proposing a
range of programming actions, subsequently undertaken during the year. The Ministry, with assistance from WHO and UNICEF, has reconstituted the country’s vaccine stocks, immunization
equipment and system for immunization. The re–establishment of a safe blood supply has been
made a priority, and the National AIDS Prevention Programme is again receiving some direct support from donors. Implementation of STD/AIDS interventions, however, has been unacceptably
slow given the potential magnitude of the HIV–infection problem in Rwanda. Water and sanitation
systems are being rebuilt with the assistance of donors and NGOs, with most progress in Kigali.
The impact of international assistance for rehabilitation of the health sector has been positive, on
balance. Health delivery systems have largely been brought back to pre–war levels, but weak initial
needs assessments and programme strategy development and ineffectual programme monitoring
and evaluation on the part of some agencies have hampered interventions in the health sector. The
inability or unwillingness of some NGOs formally to engage the Ministry of Health in the project
assessment, design and approval process further diminished successes in the health sector, and has
contributed to a perception on the part of government officials that emergencies are perpetuated so
as to allow relief agencies to “stay in business.” Lack of coordination between NGOs and the government remains an impediment to effective rehabilitation.
Rehabilitating the education sector
International assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction of education, initially focused on the
primary level, has played a limited but valuable role, emphasizing emergency supplies of materials,
rehabilitation of structures and food aid salary supplements to teachers. The UNICEF/UNESCO
Teacher Emergency Programme, “school–in–a–box,” co–designed by UNHCR, was provided to
most of the primary schools that opened in September 1994. WFP, through its programme of food
aid salary supplements to teachers, helped keep teachers on the job in the absence of funds with
which to pay their salaries. In spite of these interventions, international assistance in education has
been largely characterized by ad hoc emergency interventions with limited sustained impact. The
international community’s weakness in support for the rehabilitation and restoration of education is
due in part to the programming limitations of emergency funds. Education activities are, for the
most part, excluded from eligibility for these funds because they are not deemed life–saving. Later
in the year, funding became available through the Round Table process. Of US$18 million requested in January 1995 by the Rwandese government for rehabilitation of the education system,
US$4.1 million had been disbursed (as per Round Table tracking) by year’s end. By then, pledged
assistance to formal education programmes had grown to US$50.4 million. The World Bank
Education Project, which became operational in Spring 1995, had by fall supported the training of
3,000 teachers, rehabilitation of 1,000 schools and provision of 120,000 textbooks.
Assistance to vulnerable populations
Genocide and war altered the countryÕs demographic composition so radically that women and
girls now represent between 60–70 percent of the population. By some estimates, between one–
third and one–half of all women in the most hard–hit areas are widows. Further, several thousand
women were brutally raped. During the initial stages of emergency assistance, women as a group
were not given special treatment. Rather, it was assumed that they, like other beneficiaries, would
benefit from the assistance provided to various sectors. The exceptions were WFP and CARITAS/Catholic Relief Services food support programmes specifically targeted toward vulnerable groups, including female heads of households.
Under existing Rwandese law, property passes through male members of the household. As a result,
widows and orphaned daughters risk losing their property to male relatives of the deceased husband
or father. Consequently, there is an urgent need to change judicial guidelines and legal interpretations of laws pertaining to property, land and women’s rights. Save the Children (UK and US) and UNICEF are supporting the Ministries of Family and Rehabilitation and women’s groups in their
advocacy efforts in this area, as well as funding technical assistance to the judiciary. Numerous
Rwandese NGOs are disseminating information and creating awareness of this problem. However,
one year after the genocide, there were no comprehensive national programmes of family support
for the survivors. Over time, however, those NGOs working in the community began to recognize
the distinctive needs of women – widows, victims of violence and rape, and heads of households –
and developed ad hoc initiatives to support communities in caring for the most vulnerable.
Estimates of the number of unaccompanied children in the region vary between 95,000 and 150,000
although there is substantial debate on the numbers. Some relief agencies believe the number well exceeds the higher figure, while other organizations consider it vastly exaggerated. There is a wide
array of international and national NGOs implementing mostly ad hoc programmes for unaccompanied children. Only the larger and more experienced have developed longer–term comprehensive national programmes that support institutional capacity building and have established strong working relationships with the government. The key areas of intervention are in registration, tracing and
reunification; the provision of foster care; and capacity building. By the end of 1995, over 10,000
children in Rwanda and the camps had been reunited with their families. This resulted from
cooperation between ICRC, which established a data bank with the names of 85,000 children,
sharing the information with other agencies, including Save the Children (UK and US), UNICEF
and UNHCR, which with ICRC played major roles in tracing and reunification.
Some NGOs rushed into the country staking claim to, or opening up new unaccompanied children
centres and orphanages without any long–term planning and without the guidance and direction of a
strong coordinating body. There was also a lack of collaboration with or support of national organ-
izations, which was particularly inexcusable after the situation had stabilized. Creation of centres
for unaccompanied children was a necessary, short–term response that was not intended to be a
long–term solution. Unfortunately, the establishment of centres has provided a livelihood to too
many people to be discontinued easily. The only way current interventions can be sustained is if donors are willing to make long–term commitments financially to support child care institutions.
Psycho–social healing
The brutal nature and extent of the slaughter, along with the ensuing mass migration, swiftly and
profoundly destroyed Rwanda’s social foundation. Vast segments of the population were uprooted,
thousands of families lost at least one adult and tens of thousands of children were separated from
their parents. Because neighbours, teachers, doctors and religious leaders took part in the carnage,
essential trust in social institutions has been destroyed, replaced by pervasive fear, hostility and
insecurity. The social upheaval has affected interpersonal and community interaction across ethnic,
economic, generational and political lines. Some groups, unaccompanied children, for instance, are
relatively visible as “victims of violence,” whereas the victimization of others, such as women and
individuals who were forced to kill, is less apparent.
Relatively little attention has been paid to the problem of psycho–social healing. Donor efforts have
concentrated primarily on trauma counseling for children. In addition, some organizations, mostly
those religious in nature, have attempted to confront the ethnic animosity directly through reconciliation workshops and community healing initiatives, and indirectly within the context of their other
programmes. What few programmes there have been for psycho–social healing have tended to
overlook the needs of women. Also, the international community may be misapplying its experience with post–traumatic stress disorder. Missed opportunities in exploring indigenous concepts of
mental health and methods of healing conceivably stem from initial lack of understanding of
Rwandese society, psyche and culture, and the absence of adequate language skills, so vital to confidential communication.
Promoting human rights and building a fair judicial system
The international community has supported human rights initiatives in three key areas so as to promote the process of national rebuilding: establishment of the International Tribunal for Rwanda,
reconstruction of the justice system and assistance to the UN human rights field operation. The
impetus for these initiatives was the findings of the UN Special Rapporteur and a Commission of
Experts, asked by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to investigate alleged human rights violations during the war. By May 1995, six months from the establishment of the Tribunal, it
had made only limited progress. From the outset, it had been facing problems of logistics, funding
and staffing, which caused long delays. With staffing changes in October 1995, the pace of investigations stepped up. Thirteen months from its establishment, the Tribunal in January 1996 issued its
first indictments of suspected war criminals, eight alleged leaders of the genocide. Despite recent progress, delays in establishing the Tribunal and making it operational have postponed reconciliation, which can hardly be expected to occur in the absence of justice. Further delays will reinforce
the perception that the world is indifferent to the Rwandese genocide.
The justice system of Rwanda was manipulated by the former regime despite constitutional provisions ensuring its independence. Human rights abuses relating to arrests, detention, trial without
counsel and widespread corruption were frequent in the past. If Rwanda is to establish a legal system that helps to ensure the rights of all citizens, it must construct a justice system that substantially improves on that which previously existed in the country. Several assistance initiatives are
under way. These programmes, however, do not approach the level of assistance that was broadly
recognized as being required to “restart” the justice system. The real challenge is not so much that
of marshalling sufficient human and technical resources as of institutionalizing a new political culture in which differences are settled through discussion and accommodation and not through violence and bloodshed. The paralysis of judicial process and the inability to try suspected criminals is
not solely due to lack of staff and equipment, which could be alleviated with outside assistance.
There also appears to be a lack of political will to proceed. Even though conditions have improved
with assistance from ICRC, the Netherlands and UNDP, they remain very harsh for many of the
roughly 60,000 detainees in Rwandese prisons and jails. Also of high priority are improved security
in the countryside and acceleration of progress in resolving property disputes involving pre–1994
(old–caseload) refugees.
The human rights field operation for Rwanda was the first field operation to be undertaken under
the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and to be administratively supported
by the UN Center for Human Rights in Geneva. The Commissioner for Human Rights and the government of Rwanda agreed to the deployment of 147 human rights field officers, one for each of the
country’s communes, although subsequently the 114 field officers were not deployed by commune.
The objectives of the field operation were to investigate the genocide, monitor the human rights situation, help re–establish confidence, and provide technical assistance in the administration of justice.
The human rights operation in Rwanda is perceived among experts and informed people to have failed to accomplish its stated mission. Its impact on the prevention of human rights violations and
promotion of human rights has been minimal. However, it should be recognized that several factors,
many of which were beyond the control of the human rights field operation, contributed to its poor
performance to date. Informants identified the following set of factors: a broad and ambiguous mandate, inferior recruitment procedures, poor preparations prior to deployment, limited logistics and resource support, ineffectual leadership, absence of a coherent strategy, poor coordination between
headquarters and field staff, bureaucratic infighting within the UN system, apathy, if not hostility,
of the Rwandese government, and a highly politically–charged environment. Obviously, the entire
blame for the failure cannot be laid on the leadership of HRFOR and the Centre for Human Rights.
In October 1995, a new chief assumed leadership of the field operation in Rwanda. Initial reports
indicate that he is re–examining and re–evaluating the entire operation to make it more relevant and
effective. It is too early to tell the outcome of his efforts.
Return of refugees and internally displaced persons
After the victory of Rwandese Patriotic Front forces in July 1994, the old caseload refugees, primarily Tutsi who had left Rwanda beginning in 1959, began returning in large numbers. The government has estimated a total of over 700,000 to have returned. Old caseload returnees have benefitted
from international assistance through direct aid to families, rehabilitation of commune structures
and services, and assistance to government ministries, particularly the Ministry of Rehabilitation.
However, the slow process of disbursing funds pledged for repatriation and reintegration at the
Round Table Conference constrains the capacity of the government to facilitate the process.
Further, despite the efforts of the international community, very little has been accomplished in the
repatriation of two million new caseload refugees who fled to Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi largely between April and July 1994. Most of these refugees were intimidated or terrified into flight through a premeditated, orchestrated attempt on the part of hard–line elements of the fleeing government to maintain leverage and a claim to legitimacy. The many accounts, both actual and false,
of violent reprisals, arbitrary arrests and detentions of Hutu in Rwanda have also significantly discouraged repatriation. Only a small number of refugees, not more than 200,000 in 1994 and
100,000 in 1995, according to UNHCR, have returned thus far. While the pace of repatriation can
be accelerated by implementing the recommendations outlined (in the section that follows), and the
recent arrests of former extremist leaders in Zaire may have some effect, the international community should prepare itself for the eventuality that a substantial portion of the refugee population is
still unlikely to repatriate soon for three reasons. First, between 10 to 15 percent of the refugees in
the camps (adult and adolescent) are alleged to have participated directly in mass killing. These refugees and their families would be understandably reluctant to return. Second, the transmigration of
people has been common in the Great Lakes region in the past. Many Kinyarwanda–speaking Òethnic Rwandese” live in Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire. Consequently, refugees are not in totally foreign milieus; there are bonds of history and language that help mitigate refugees’ nostalgia. Finally, the experience of past complex emergencies shows that it usually takes years, even decades, before significant voluntary repatriation takes place. Even then, rather than going back to
their country of origin, many refugees settle in host (or third) countries. It is, therefore, imperative
that the international community demonstrate more realism in planning its initiatives for the refugees than it has done so far by considering a wider range of solutions to the crisis.
Lastly, the record of the international community in facilitating the return of internally displaced
persons has been mixed. The camps posed a potentially explosive threat to national security and
essentially prolonged the transition from emergency to rehabilitation and reconstruction. The government maintained that massive repatriation of refugees would not be feasible until the IDP camps
had been disbanded. The international community agreed to the need for closures, but was unprepared for the aggressive tactics employed by the government. The tragic events at the Kibeho camp,
in which thousands of displaced persons were killed, epitomized the gulf between government exigencies and relief agencies’ moral stance and mandates, and the tragic consequences of the lack of
real communication. The Kibeho incident, about which facts are scanty, weakened an already tenuous relationship between government and relief and development agencies, making the coordination
and cooperation necessary for large–scale rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts that much more
difficult.
The consequences of genocide
Post–genocide Rwanda is dramatically different from pre–genocide Rwanda. The genocide has
transformed the social, political and economic landscape of Rwanda. It has also profoundly affected
the existing political and cultural institutions. But, above all, it has undermined the social trust that
binds people together. Just as the Holocaust redefined the Jewish identity, so has the Rwandese genocide left a profound impact on the psyches of both Tutsi and Hutu.
The International community took steps to investigate the genocide and punish the culprits by
establishing an International Tribunal; however, it has largely failed to incorporate the implications
of genocide in the design and implementation of assistance programmes in Rwanda. It has treated
and continues to treat the present crisis like other civil wars in which the international community
intervened and assisted the suffering population. Such an approach has distorted assistance priorities, undermined the effectiveness of assistance programmes and alienated the present government.
For example, the international community has tended to overlook the plight of the survivors of the
genocide; by and large, they have not been treated any differently from other segments of the population. On the other hand, the international community has spent immense resources on the refugees. It is not that the refugees do not deserve assistance but that such assistance should be balanced
with assistance to survivors.
The international communityÕs apparent lack of understanding of the psychological impact of genocide has also contributed to the distrust – and even the open hostility – of the Rwandese government towards the UN human rights field operation. Its legitimacy has been vastly compromised because it is perceived as one–sided, focusing on current human rights violations instead of on crimes against humanity. Overall, limited mandates of the bilateral and multilateral agencies, the
established modalities for allocating resources, and the procedures for delivering aid in the field are
institutional factors that have led to the inability of the international community to respond adequately to the unique consequences of genocide. However, beyond institutional roadblocks, the cultural insensitivity of the international community at times devalued the tragic social and human
dimensions of the genocide as perceived by the Rwandese. Perhaps the most lamentable example
was the rush to promote reconciliation over the understandable resistance of those who had suffered
immensely.
Long–term development of Rwanda
In examining the question of long–term development of Rwanda, two considerations should be kept
in mind. First, the success of Rwanda’s march towards a politically stable and economically sustainable society will depend upon a complex set of conditions and circumstances. For example,
Rwanda will be shaped by its distinctive social, cultural and economic institutions, emerging regional alignments and interests, and the vision shown by its leadership. The international donor
community can influence such factors, but cannot control them. Second, the transition process is not
likely to be a smooth one. Rather, as has been the case with many complex emergencies, the process is most likely to be characterized by periods of ups and downs, stagnation, and even regression.
There is a need to take a long–term perspective.
A broad consensus seems to be emerging that the country should give top priority to building an
effective judicial system based on the rule of law; ensuring physical security to returning refugees
and survivors of genocide; and promoting rapid economic growth in agriculture and small business
sectors. In this regard, past social and economic policies can not be the model for Rwanda’s future
integrated development, which emphasizes human resources. The government will have to face the
problem of ethnicity and political participation, and encourage a culture of tolerance and respect for
democratic principles and human rights.
However, it appears increasingly probable that efforts at the national level alone are not sufficient to
solve the refugee return problem. Because of the growing political and ethnic tensions in Burundi,
the presence of two million Rwandese refugees in neighbouring states, and the high population density of the country, a regional approach will be key to longer–term resolution of the crisis. Such an approach may require resettlement of populations and greater regional political and economic integration. Whether Rwanda, its neighbours and the international community will take the bold steps
necessary to achieve a durable regional solution to this complex problem is a question that history
alone can answer.
Conclusion
International response to the humanitarian crisis provoked by the civil war and genocide has been
generous and, in the emergency phase, rapid. Greater ambiguity about objectives, the legitimacy
and capacity of the new government and the durability of peace, coupled with more deliberate (and
hence time–consuming) processes for development assistance, have led to delays in assistance for
reconstruction and development. In some cases simple political miscalculations have led to dead-
lock between government and donors.
Finally, the international community cannot be expected to do everything, nor should it try to do so.
Most of the responsibility for reconstruction, rehabilitation, reconciliation and recovery belongs to
the Rwandese. The ultimate determinant of the durability of solutions will be the degree to which
they themselves believe in them and have, or would have, instituted them even without outside
assistance. Nonetheless, the international community has already brought and can bring many resources to bear on the crisis. How these are used can tilt the balance in favour of peace and reconciliation and away from war and destruction.
Chapter 5
Overall Findings and Recommendations
Introduction
This chapter presents the critical findings and recommendations that emerge from the four study
reports summarized in the previous chapters. While these reports are the main sources for this
chapter, it also draws on discussions with the resource persons and panel of African experts.
Though the four teams had different tasks and carried out their research in different ways, using
different materials, each came to roughly the same understanding of a set of factors that inform and
underlie their reports and inform the presentation that follows.
Some cross–cutting issues
The “continuum” of relief, rehabilitation and development
The Rwanda crisis in some respects does not represent a linear “continuum” from relief-torehabilitation-to-development. Rehabilitation efforts necessarily began soon after the new
government assumed power in July 1994. Massive relief operations continue, 18 months later, in
refugee camps on Rwandese borders. In other respects, a shift from one stage to the next has
occurred, as for example, when IDPs, who had been sustained by relief for almost a year, returned
to home communes where they received agricultural rehabilitation assistance and should now be
moving to self–sustaining status.
The evaluation did not systematically address all the issues surrounding the relationships between
relief, rehabilitation and development in the Rwanda crisis. However, the studies have identified
instances where linkages between relief and development were and were not taken into account. In
the first example, there has probably been on balance an adverse impact on the development status
of local populations surrounding the massive refugee camps in Tanzania and Zaire. While the relief
operations have created employment and provided an injection of income into local areas, these
effects will end with the repatriation of refugees. On the other hand, physical security, infrastructure
and the environment have deteriorated for local populations, who also tend to perceive services to
refugees as being superior to their own. Another example suggests a positive relationship in which
the forging of a “Corridor Group” by WFP with the Tanzanian Railways Corporation and
Tanzanian Harbours Authority resulted in more efficient transport of massive food shipments and
should also rebound to the longer–term efficiency of Tanzania’s transportation system.
The third example refers to the continued free provision of seeds and tools kits to Rwandese
farmers. Study IV raises the issue of whether this effort has gone beyond the point of rehabilitation,
potentially creating dependency among farmers and inhibiting the development of private channels
of production and distribution. It is possible that the continuation of this programme, without effective targeting on needy farmers, may be detrimental to Rwanda’s longer–term agricultural
development prospects.
The impact of previous development aid
It is clear that substantial development aid to Rwanda over a 30-year period before the crisis did not
prevent it. On the other hand, the crisis can not be attributed to aid as a primary cause. While the
evaluation did not attempt to assess the net influence on the crisis of development aid, it did undertake some analysis of a major preo crisis component of aid. The Structural Adjustment Programme
of 1991 contained some provisions that should have ameliorated tensions (a “safety net”) and others
that may have fanned resentment (civil service and parastatal reform, and abolition of the coffee
equalization fund, had the government implemented the abolition). It is not clear whether other
donor–supported programmes favoured one political or ethnic group more than another. The
evaluation did not systematically examine this question, which could be a worthwhile subject for
future research and analysis.
It should be noted that UN/DHA has initiated, in collaboration with Brown University, a research
project to study the role of development assistance activities in conflict–prone settings.
Responsibility of the crisis country
Throughout the various phases of a complex emergency the constituted authority of the country in
crisis always bears major responsibilities for resolving it. This has been true at virtually every stage
of the Rwanda crisis since there has always been a duly constituted authority, with perhaps the
exception of several weeks during May–July 1994. The responsibilities range from protecting
human, civil and refugee rights to peaceful conflict resolution; to ensuring an open and fair system
of justice; to creating a stable and open enabling environment for economic activity; to protecting
the poorest and the most vulnerable. As concluded by Study IV, the responsibilities for
rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction belong to the Rwandese.
A current example is repatriation. With the possibility of significant external impediments being
removed by the recent arrests in Zaire of former extremist leaders, political, judicial and economic
conditions inside Rwanda have become even more important for successful repatriation. However,
the international community, which has urged progress on these fronts, needs to continue to find
ways to assist Rwandese and their government in their efforts to rebuild society.
Upholding international law: a reproach and admonishment to UN member states
The Rwanda crisis is replete with instances of violation of international law by some member states
as well as derelictions of responsibility of others to champion action directed at violators.
The types of international law that were violated fall into three broad categories
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First and foremost is The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1948. The perpetrators of
genocide in Rwanda clearly stand guilty of violating the Convention. The rest of the
international community violated the spirit if not the letter of Article VIII of the Convention,
which states that “Any contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United
Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider
appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in Article III”.
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Second is International Humanitarian Law, in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
their additional Protocols of 1977. Member states have an obligation to disseminate
knowledge of international humanitarian law as widely as possible and to adopt any national
measures and enact any legislation to provide for effective implementation of international
humanitarian law.
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Third are international norms, particularly well–developed in African regional international
law, regarding the rights of refugees to repatriate and stability of relations among states.
Member states must take invasions across borders seriously, initially at sub-regional and
regional levels, to defuse and contain the resulting conflict. The international community must
also support states most directly concerned to ensure that refugees are not left in limbo, but
within a reasonable time obtain secure membership in a state. Had effective and prompt action
successfully addressed these issues involving Rwanda and Uganda in the 1980s and in 1990,
the tragedies of the ensuing years could have been averted.
Member states must uphold and adhere to these international laws and norms.
Findings and recommendations
The following presentation of key findings and recommendations is grouped into six sections
relating to major issues and phases of the Rwanda crisis.
A.
Critical Findings and Recommendations
B.
Detection, Prevention and Suppression of Genocide and Civil Violence
C.
Management of Relief
D.
Supporting the Rebuilding of Society
E.
Roles of the Media
F.
The Regional Dimension
The first section consists of seven critical sets of findings and recommendations that require high
priority attention by key actors of the international community, such as the UN Secretary–General
and members of the Security Council, heads of bilateral and multilateral agencies and NGO network organizations, and representatives of the components of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement. The recommendations in the following five sections are not necessarily less
important than those in the first section, but they tend to be more operational in nature or they may
in some cases require further review or study before being acted upon.
Various members of the international community, prompted by their experience with complex
emergencies, including that of Rwanda, have launched initiatives that could well lead to the
adoption of some of the recommendations presented below. These initiatives include studies,
discussion papers, working groups and task forces intended eventually to produce new policies,
strategies and operating procedures. Among the groups involved in such efforts are the Inter–
Agency Standing Committee of the UN System, the OECD Development Assistance Committee
(DAC), the European Union and the World Bank, as well as several bilateral agencies. One product
resulting from reviews conducted by the ICRC and the IFRC, together with several NGO
organizations affiliated with the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, has been the
promulgation of a new “Code of Conduct” for the provision of humanitarian assistance. The
UNHCR is currently developing new guidelines on contingency planning and, in consultation with
WFP, will soon be issuing new guidelines for food distribution.
The issue of funding
Implementation of a number of the following recommendations will require additional financial
support from member states of the international community. With several major contributors far
behind in their financial obligations to the UN system, it may be argued that it is not a propitious
time to put forward recommendations with financial implications. These recommendations are
nonetheless made in the belief that leadership will emerge from the international community that
will understand that their implementation will save financial resources and lives.
However, the increased effectiveness promised by these recommendations will not be realized
without the political will from member states that will be required to adopt some of the
recommendations, nor without the will, dedication and competence of agency managers to carry
them out.
Follow-up to the evaluation
As part of an assessment of the efficacy of this evaluation, the evaluation Steering Committee will
be reconvened in six to eight months, or between July and September 1996. The purpose of the
meeting will be to assess the reactions of the international community to the evaluation, the degree
of implementation of its recommendations and the lessons to be learned from the evaluation process
itself.
Some positive findings
Evaluations tend to focus on negative findings in an attempt to draw lessons and recommendations
for the future. While the main findings and recommendations of this chapter tend to fall into that
category, the positive experiences in the responses of the international community to the Rwanda
_tragedy should not be ignored. Preparation for response to future complex emergencies should also
build on these positive experiences. Following is a selection of some of the salient “positive
lessons” that emerge from the evaluation studies and materials provided by Steering Committee
members.
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The support and intensive mediation efforts provided by the government of Tanzania and the
Organization for African Unity to the negotiation of the Arusha Accords.
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The Report of the International Commission of Investigation of Human Rights Violations in
Rwanda, undertaken by the NGO, International Federation of Human Rights (known by its
initials in French, FIDH), in early 1993, and the first international group to implicate the
government in planning systematic killings of Tutsi.
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The protection of tens of thousands of Rwandese during the height of the genocide by the
residual UNAMIR Force and by ICRC.
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Examples of effective UN coordination of emergency relief operations in Ngara, Tanzania
(UNHCR) and in the Integrated Operations Centre (IOC) in Rwanda (DHA/UNREO).
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Cost–effective preparedness planning and provision of potable water by Oxfam in Goma,
Zaire.
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Block funding from ECHO for UNHCR Rwanda operations that strengthened the
effectiveness of the latter’s coordinating role with its NGO implementing partners.
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Establishment of a “Corridor Group” by WFP for negotiation and maintenance of a cost–
effective “Southern Transportation Corridor” for the transport of food aid supplies through
Tanzania.
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The Netherlands, as the third largest bilateral country donor to post–genocide Rwanda in
absolute terms at US$64 million and the largest relative to its GNP, with about 25% of the
total contributed to strengthening the justice system and 25% to the fasto disbursing UNDP
Rwanda Trust Fund, established by the government and UNDP in July 1994. With
contributions of US$125 million and US$119 million, the US and Germany were the first and
second largest bilateral country donors, respectively. The World Bank at US$224 million and
the European Union at US$333 million, exceeded any one country total (based on UNDP data
as of _20 December 1995).
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A fast-disbursing World Bank Emergency Grant for relief and rehabilitation in Rwanda,
effectively channelled through four UN agencies (FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF, and WHO),
beginning in August 1994.
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Largely through the work of international NGOs, supplemented by assistance from UNICEF
and WHO, primary health care centres in Rwanda were relatively quickly rehabilitated in the
summer and autumn of 1994, which alleviated massive human suffering and helped prevent a
possible outbreak of epidemics.
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UNICEF support for the establishment and operation of a Rwandese National Trauma Centre
to train teachers and counsellors in dealing with the aftermath of genocide trauma in children
and parents.
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A government–sponsored International Conference on “Genocide, Impunity and
Accountability: a Dialogue for a National and International Response,” held in Kigali, 2–6
November 1995, with financial assistance from Ireland and the US, and with a key objective
being to identify alternative forms of justice and degrees of penalties for those who
participated in the genocide.
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Last but by no means least, the many Rwandese who resisted the genocide and who risked or
lost their own lives in trying to save others.
A.
Critical Findings and Recommendations for the Attention of the UN
Secretary–General and Security Council, Heads of Donor Agencies and
NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and
Member States
Finding A–1:
Lack of Policy Coherence
Humanitarian action cannot substitute for political action. This is perhaps the most
important finding of this evaluation.
One of the hallmarks of a complex emergency is that the political/diplomatic (including conflict
resolution), human rights, humanitarian, military/peacekeeping, and development aspects get inextricably intertwined – before, during and after the peak of the crisis. The Rwanda experience is
a prime example. The problem in Rwanda was that policy and strategy formulation by the
international community seldom, if ever, took these elements into account in an integrated manner.
Among the member states and within the UN system there were:
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conflicting interests or relative lack of interest among Security Council members in a crisis
involving a country of marginal strategic importance;
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discrepancies between the Office of the Secretary–General and the Security Council;
?
inadequate strategy formulation and communication within the Secretariat and disjointed relationships between its political, military and humanitarian functions;
?
disjointed relationships between the Secretariat and the field level; and
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at the field level, tension between agencies and unclear division of labour among them.
As observed in Study II, one crucial manifestation of the lack of policy coherence was a pattern of
behaviour in New York headquarters marked by not drawing on critical information coming from
the field in order to formulate a full range of strategic options for the Secretary–General and the
Security Council. This pattern contributed to the fateful 21 April Security Council decision to
withdraw the bulk of the UNAMIR forces from Rwanda. The Secretariat and the Security Council
continued to see the issue in terms of an intervention between two opposing armies engaged in a
renewed civil war rather than the need to protect civilians from systematic killings. With a Security
Council unwilling to contribute troops or to finance member states willing to do so in a crisis that
was of strategic marginality to the major powers, that lacked clear terms of reference and
obligations and where the parties to the conflict were once again at war, the Secretariat rejected the
requests of the UNAMIR Force Commander for increased resources and the latitude to protect
civilians. Other factors, such as the “shadow of Somalia” that restrained the US in the Security
Council, and cumbersome and inflexible UN procedures, also played a role in leading to this
outcome, but greater coherence in policy formulation would have at least clarified the central issue
at stake and might have overcome the “shadows.”
As noted in Study III, some agencies worked on the premise that refugees would return quickly,
while other agencies maintained that the refugee situation would be a protracted one. There was no
overall agreed understanding of the complexity of the situation, the preponderance of factors weighing against early repatriation and the resulting policy implications.
The underlying problem has been and continues to be political. But the international community
failed to come to grips directly with the political problem. Thus it has in effect, and by default, left
both the political and the humanitarian problems generated by the Rwanda crisis in the hands of the
humanitarian community. This is untenable. It puts burdens on the latter that it cannot and should
not assume.
Recommendations for Policy Coherence:
a.
Foster Policy Coherence in the UN Security Council and General Assembly
To the UN Security Council and General Assembly
First and foremost, a crisis of an essentially political nature requires action at a political level
effectively to address it. However, the consequences of such a crisis are often humanitarian in
nature and require humanitarian action. To ensure that the humanitarian dimension is adequately
considered in decisions regarding complex emergencies, it is recommended that the Security
Council establish a Humanitarian Sub–Committee. Its purpose would be to inform fully the
Security Council of developments and concerns regarding humanitarian dimensions of complex
emergencies and to make appropriate recommendations, taking into account both inter–related and
distinctive aspects of political, military and humanitarian objectives.
In the General Assembly an integrated approach to complex emergencies could be fostered through,
for example, its incorporation in principles of a “new international humanitarian order”, to be taken
up again by the UNGA in 1996.
b.
Ensure Policy Coherence in the UN Secretariat
To the UN Secretary–General and Security Council
Constitute a team of senior advisers for all complex emergencies, charged with synthesizing crisis
information and bringing coherent policy options to the Secretaryo General. The purpose of this
team would be to ensure that humanitarian, political and peacekeeping concerns are all taken into
account in formulating options for the Secretary–General, the Security Council and in the General
Assembly; it would not be charged with making operational decisions regarding humanitarian
action. Its duties and responsibilities should be distinct from those of the Secretary–General’s Task
Force on UN Operations. The team should consist of the Undero Secretaries General for Political
Affairs (DPA), Peacekeeping (DPKO), Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). It should also draw on
information and counsel from the High Commissioners for Human Rights and Refugees, the
Directors–General of UNICEF and WFP and the components of the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent movement. The team should:
(i)
Reinforce the discipline of the UN civil service as an impartial and independent resource,
presenting analyses and options to member states for UN crisis-response based on the
identified needs of that crisis, not on the supposed reactions of any one or more governments.
(ii)
Formulate the essential framework for an integrated UN line of command between
headquarters and the field, and within the field, for political action, peacekeeping and
humanitarian assistance to ensure that the system speaks with one voice and that there is
mutual reinforcement among the three types of actions.
Finding A–2:
Insufficient Support for Prevention and Suppression of Genocide and Protection of Victims
While there are arguments on both sides, a case can be made that with a modest expansion of peacekeeping forces with a clear mandate to protect civilians, the international community could have
halted or at least substantially checked the killings, especially during the first weeks. Some
suggestive evidence in support of this proposition is provided by the experiences of the greatly–
reduced UNAMIR force and the French Opération Turquoise, whose protective efforts in Kigali
and in south-western Rwanda saved tens of thousands. In addition ICRC protected similar numbers
through repeated calls for respect of humanitarian principles and regular visits where persons at risk
stayed.
Among the reasons this option of modest expansion was not pursued were the already described
lack of policy coherence at the top of the system as well as a lack of understanding of the situation
and the risks of intervention. Cumbersome procedures and a gap in the UN Charter Chapters regarding peacekeeping and related operations contributed to this lack of understanding: the Rwanda
situation was defined in April as having moved from a low–cost, consensual peacekeeping mission
to a crisis where only a full–fledged, high–risk enforcement operation would have an impact. The
consequences of this assessment were particularly important because the Security Council had a
low threshold for risk in the case of Rwanda, reflecting the country’s strategic marginality to the
major powers.
Recommendation:
Effective Prevention and Early Suppression
To the Security Council, the Secretaries–General of the UN and the OAU and the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, in Consultation with the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement, and to Member States
a.
Urgently develop a UN-sponsored programme through governments, NGOs, and other
organizations to sensitize leadership of the international community to genocidal conspiracy
and incitement anywhere and to obligations of all governments to prevent and suppress it.
Adopt in the General Assembly criteria for proclaming a Genocide Emergency when justified
and review Article VIII of the Genocide Convention with a view to strengthening the
obligation of Contracting Parties.
b.
Develop standard operating procedures for UN peacekeeping operations, with a clear mandate
to protect civilians when large numbers are threatened by violence; in effect, a “6.5” mandate
between the UN Chapter VI and VII mandates. In addition:
(i)
Establish procedures for rapid deployment of forces under UN authority as both deterrent and
actual capability; encourage and support development and first use of rapid–response
capabilities under regional organizations like the OAU and the OAS, with UN authorization
and support where needed.
Provide terms of engagement sufficiently broad to political and military field officers,
including those of “6.5 mandate” operations, to permit them to respond to changing
circumstances with innovation and dispatch.
(ii)
(iii) Expand the use by the UN and regional organizations of speciallyo trained civil policemen
and policewomen in complex emergencies.
(iv) Deployment, by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, of an independent Human Rights
Monitoring Unit along with every UN peace operation. Member states must provide the
requisite funding for this initiative, which is already in force but has been impeded by lack of
funding.
(v)
Ensure ICRC access for monitoring the application of international humanitarian law and
humanitarian basic principles by all parties concerned.
Finding A–3:
Non–Reading and Mis–Reading of Early Warnings of Genocide
There were increasing warning–signs from NGOs, academics, the UN Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, UNAMIR and others of intent and preparation for
an organized genocidal attack on Tutsi and an assassination of moderate Hutu from early 1993
onwards. But the apex of the international community in the UN Secretariat and Security Council
did not recognize the signs for what they were, nor did they strategically analyze them. Lack of any
effective response to these increasingly open indications gave intending perpetrators no reason to
pause in their preparations; the weakness of UN peace forces both in numbers and mandate
provided further reassurance.
Recommendation:
A More Effective Conflict Early Warning System
To the UN Secretary–General
Establish a unit for strategic analysis of early warning of conflicts, including genocide and political
assassination, directly under the Office of the Secretaryo General, drawing on, but not substituting
for, the information provided by UNHCHR, UN/DHA and a worldwide network of states, regional
organizations, institutes and NGOs. This unit should have the capability to analyze, interpret and
develop strategic options to be presented to the Secretary–General, but should not have other
operational responsibilities. The head of this unit should have guaranteed direct access to the
Secretary–General. The unit would not substitute for a Humanitarian Early Warning System (see
Recommendation C–2, below).
Finding A–4:
Insufficient Reliance on Regional Organizations and Sub–Regional Groupings
Despite rhetoric emanating from the international community about greater reliance on regional and
sub–regional organizations, such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the Economic
Community of the Great Lakes Countries (Communauté économique des pays des Grands Lacs –
CEPGL), and the neighbouring states individually, these were given neither the mandate nor the
resources nor the actual cooperation at some critical stages in the Rwanda emergency. In fact, as
brought out in Study II, the OAU, which had played a vigorous and effective role in mediating the
Arusha Accords, was discouraged by the UN Security Council and Secretary–General from playing
a significant role in their monitoring and implementation. Given the paucity of its own resources
and the limited capacity of its member states to contribute financially, the OAU would have had to
rely on financial and/or mat_riel support from the UN or wealthier states outside the region. But
with such support the OAU could have played the more significant role it was willing to play in
conflict resolution and peace monitoring efforts, a role that could have made a major difference to
the genocidal outcome.
Recommendation:
Strengthen and Involve the Mediation and Peacekeeping Capacities of Regional and Sub–
Regional Organizations and Local Parties
To the Secretaries–General of the UN, OAU and OAS for Follow–up and to Member
States for Necessary Action
a.
Ensure that regional participation in preventive diplomacy carries over into peacekeeping so
as to establish continuity between mediation and peacekeeping.
b.
Allocate adequate resources to regional and sub–regional organizations and neighbouring
states to enable them to be effective in preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping, taking into
consideration that most of the world’s conflicts occur in regions where these parties have the
fewest resources to deal with them.
c.
Ensure that the UN sanctions action, sets parameters and monitors implementation of forceful
intervention and, where needed, helps finance and otherwise support such actions, but remains
the body of last resort for implementation.
d.
Accelerate current plans for strengthening OAU’s peacekeeping functions with the support of
the UN.
Finding A–5:
Flawed Human Rights Mechanisms and Performance
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights/Centre for Human Rights and the UN Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, were involved in the different
phases of the Rwanda crisis. The performance of these mechanisms has been mixed for a number of
reasons, including a lag in evaluating and reporting accounts of threatened genocide and failure of
member governments to take action when reports were submitted. The Human Rights Field
Operation for Rwanda, the first under the High Commissioner and back–stopped by the Centre, has
encountered a range of internal and external problems, enumerated in Study IV, that have impeded
its effectiveness. One underlying factor has been lack of regular budgetary funding, which has
_created uncertainty and staff discontinuity.
Recommendation:
Strengthen Human Rights Machinery
To the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Member States
a.
Establish a small high–calibre unit under the High Commissioner for Human Rights, with the
sole function of analyzing and interpreting information on indications of conspiracy to
genocide and all other escalating violations of human rights. This unit should have direct
access to the proposed early warning unit in the Secretary–General’s office (see
Recommendation A–3). Its performance will partly depend on the effectiveness of an
adequately–funded field presence for information–gathering and fact–finding.
b.
Effective human rights machinery must have adequate standing procedures for vigilance over
threatened genocide and for prompt investigative action. It requires adequate budgetary
resources, clear mandates and qualified professional staff at both headquarters and field
levels.
c.
In seeking improved effectiveness of human rights machinery, complementarity should be
ensured with activities of other organizations mandated for protection of victims of conflict or
other vulnerable groups.
d.
Fund and conduct an independent evaluation of the Human Rights Field Operation for
Rwanda and charge it with making highly professional and specific recommendations for
optimal UN machinery and response to threatened genocide and human rights deprivations.
Finding A-6:
Contingency Planning, Preparedness Measures, Choice of Interventions and Donor Response
Humanitarian response of official multilateral and bilateral agencies and NGOs to massive
population displacements, triggered by the Rwanda genocide, was extraordinary. While it is
impossible to estimate what the toll would have been in the absence of these efforts, it undoubtedly
would have been staggering from starvation alone. Even so, an estimated 80,000 died in camps in
Zaire, Tanzania and inside Rwanda in 1994, primarily from cholera and dysentery. It is true that
agencies and NGOs had to confront extremely difficult and often dangerous conditions in Goma,
Zaire, and an inhospitable physical and political environment as well. Nonetheless, more attention
to needs and capacities assessments, contingency planning, preparedness measures, and adoption of
the most cost–effective interventions by UN agencies, NGOs and donor governments, including
military _contingents providing humanitarian assistance, would have resulted in better allocation of
relief resources and, more importantly, could have saved even more human lives.
One problem regarding such concepts as contingency planning and preparedness measures is lack
of consistent working definitions among agencies. As discussed in Study III, it is important that
preparedness be broadly conceived to include the advance placement of key technical and logistics
staff and adequate mapping and communications equipment. The development and promulgation by
UNHCR of “service packages” was an important innovation during the Rwanda crisis. In
continuing efforts to improve this approach, better standby arrangements for larger strategic
equipment items, such as bulldozers and water tankers, are needed.
It is important to underline that donor governments can be just as deficient in inadequate planning
and preparedness as other agencies. Study III found instances of donors being prepared to fund
transportation of inappropriate commodities (bottled water being an egregious example) and others
where UN agencies had made timely identification of appropriate needs, but donor governments did
not live up to their commitments to provide them, or did not provide them in a timely manner. Long
delays in providing water tanker trucks and bulldozers to the Goma area are the most serious
examples, examples that did result in deaths that could have been prevented.
Recommendation:
Policy and Funding for Preparedness Measures
a.
To the UN Inter–Agency Standing Committee and Agencies, Bilateral Donors,
OECD/DAC, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGO Network
Organizations, and to Member States for Necessary Support
Each group to whom this recommendation is addressed should develop policy guidelines and
_operating procedures appropriate to their functions for undertaking needs and capacities assessments, contingency planning, preparedness measures and procurement of supplies and equipment
for cost–effective interventions (e.g., bucket chlorination for water purification, oral rehydration
salts), as well as for cost–effective investments in mitigating critical logistical bottlenecks, such as
key transportation links.
However, there should be as wide agreement as possible on consistent working definitions of
contingency planning and preparedness measures to be used by agencies and organizations involved
in humanitarian relief operations. The UN Inter–Agency Standing Committee, with the participation
of NGO implementing partners, would be a logical forum to agree on a common set of definitions
from those that have been developed by such agencies as DHA and UNHCR. Consultations should
also take place with the components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movement
and with OECD/DAC.
In order to fulfil its purpose of anticipating possible developments, contingency planning should
project a range of scenarios and analyze factors bearing on the likelihood of each scenario. An
important basis for drawing up contingency plans should be information and analysis drawn from
the integrated humanitarian early warning capacity recommended in C–2 below. Just as important,
the contingency plan must then be updated to reflect relevant changes in the environment.
Preparedness measures should be conceived broadly, to include needs for advance placement onthe-ground of technical and logistics staff, adequate mapping, appropriate communications
equipment and standby arrangements for larger strategic equipment. They also require a
coordinated approach, and should therefore come under the sphere of improved coordination efforts
as recommended in C–3 below.
b.
To the UN Inter–Agency Standing Committee and Agencies, Donor Governments,
Bilateral Agencies and OECD/DAC
i.
Donors should be prepared to provide increased up–front funding to agencies for contingency
planning and preparedness measures for major complex emergencies and honour pledges to
do so. For activities that draw on funds channelled through the UN, the existing contingency
fund overseen by DHA should be expanded and procedures for its utilization streamlined.
ii.
Donor funding sources and implementing agencies need to be brought together, perhaps
through OECD/DAC, to seek a common understanding regarding mutually acceptable levels
of investment in contingency planning and preparedness measures and accompanying levels
of risk.
iii.
Donors should be prepared to fund costs for appropriate and cost–effective interventions and
they should implement expeditiously commitments made to agencies to supply equipment and
supplies.
Finding A–7:
Slow and Restricted Recovery Aid
In the aftermath of the genocide, donors were generally not well–prepared to assist in the recovery
_of Rwanda. Significant pledges of development aid were made by the beginning of 1995, but the
flexible, fast-disbursing aid needed by the government to restore basic capacities was slow in
materializing.
Among the reasons for this lag have been: donor government concerns regarding the legitimacy of
the post–genocide government; normal agency procedural requirements that resulted in prolonged
processing, leading to delayed commitments and disbursements; frequent turnover of key personnel
and political rivalries within the government; and continuing incidents of violence within Rwanda.
But a major factor has been the inability to achieve a mutual understanding between donors and the
new government over their respective requirements and constraints. To provide fast–disbursing aid
(programme or budget support), donors need assurance about the transparency and accountability of
the government’s budget preparation and execution processes.
Recommendation:
Rapid Availability of Flexible Resources for Key Functions
To the Bilateral Donors, Multilateral Development Banks, UN/DHA, UN Development
Agencies and the OECD Development Assistance Committee
a.
Initiate, at the earliest possible stage, consultations between donors and the government to
address concerns on both sides, and to agree on the conditions under which donors will
provide assistance.
b.
Develop guidelines through DAC for countries recovering from complex emergencies that:
l
ask donors to allocate designated resources to “recovery funds” as a category distinct from
emergency relief funds on the one hand, and longer–term development funds on the other.
l
provide rapid and flexible procedures for disbursing recovery funds along the same lines as
procedures for emergency assistance;
l
indicate how basic donor accountability requirements can be met in provision of fastdisbursing and untied recovery funds without reo introducing protracted processes and
requirements that recovering countries will not be able to meet; and
l
propose procedures dealing with such matters as utilization of NGOs, donor coordination,
etc., tailored to the circumstances of complex emergencies.
B.
Detection, Prevention and Suppression of Genocide and Civil Violence
This section presents additional findings and recommendations that relate to issues dealt with by
Study II.
Finding B–1:
Flawed Use of Conditionality
Some members of the international community did attempt to influence the government of Rwanda
to curb increasing violations of human rights during the three–year period preceding the genocide.
These efforts included diplomatic representations and, in one case, clear warnings that economic
and military aid would be reconsidered unless the situation was rectified. While a few human rights
cases were attended to, for the most part these efforts had no impact on the escalation of civil
violence. In principle, most bilateral donors made economic aid, which had become very substantial
by the early 1990s (almost US$50 per capita), conditional upon observance of human rights, but in
practice virtually no donor reduced aid with specific and exclusive reference to human rights
violations. Canada did indicate that its reductions were a result of human rights violations, even
though other factors influenced the decision. Some bilateral donors hoped that “positive
conditionality,” by promoting democratization through support for a free press, local human rights
organizations and the justice system would check human rights violations. However, violations
continued to increase in severity. Severe drought and massive population displacements caused by
the RPF offensive of early 1993 resulted in a substantial shift to humanitarian aid, which provided
less leeway for conditionality. By suspending aid in late 1993 and early 1994 with reference to
bookkeeping and project feasibility rather than human rights criteria, donors sent the message that
human rights conditionality was preached but not practised.
Recommendation:
More Effective Conditionality
To the OECD Development Assistance Committee, UN Inter–Agency Standing
Committee and International Financial Institutions.
Identify and be prepared to implement consistently a range of measures intended to pressure a
government to halt severe civil violence and human rights violations. Between diplomatic
representations at one end of the range and intervention of peacekeeping forces at the other, are
such measures as implementation of economic and military assistance conditionality, freezing of
foreign bank accounts and application of selective embargoes. As noted in the finding above,
assistance conditionality may be either “positive” or “negative.” An approach often used in
conjunction with positive or negative conditionality is policy dialogue through day–to–day contact
or in more formal settings, such as Consultative Group and Round Table meetings that bring all
major donors together with the government.
Economic conditionality imposed by outside actors must be formulated with a view to its likely
impact on human rights conditions and conflict in the receiving country. Actual measures adopted
must be tailored to the specific situation, taking into account the possibility that a given measure
might increase rather than decrease violence. For this reason, a systematic study of past experience,
including an in–depth study of Rwanda, regarding timing, nature and effects of both positive and
negative conditionality would be highly desirable.
Drawing from such a study, the formulation of a clear and uniform policy will require consultations
within and among such bodies as the OECD Development Assistance Committee, the Development
Committee for the Bretton Woods institutions and regional development banks, and the UN InterAgency Standing Committee.
Finding B–2:
Illegal Arms Trade Fuelled the Violence
Outside arms suppliers contributed to and exacerbated the conflict in Rwanda in violation of the
spirit if not the text of the Arusha Accords, preceding cease–fire agreements and the UN arms
embargo. After the genocide, continued rearming of former government military and militia, as
reported to have been occurring in Zaire, increased the threat of repetition of the cycle of massive
violence. The recently established International Commission of Inquiry, charged with investigating
these reports, will hopefully lead to a cessation of such arms shipments.
Recommendation:
Enforce Arms Embargoes
To the UN Secretary–General, Member States and the Media for Necessary Action
?
Investigate and penalize breaches of arms embargoes agreed to by treaties or instituted by the
UN.
?
Establish or tighten controls on arms export licences so as to halt arms sales to countries
committing acts of violence against their citizens.
?
Carefully review findings of the International Commission of Inquiry charged with
investigating reports of supply of arms and related matériel to former Rwanda government
forces in the Great Lakes region. Take action as appropriate.
?
Encourage the press to investigate and publicize instances of arms sales and shipments that
are illegal or are made to countries that commit acts of violence against their citizens.
Finding B-3:
Flaws in the Peace Process
As reflected in the Arusha Accords process, negotiations and peace agreements entail risks, tending
to further polarize those who reject the agreements. In particular, the problem posed by Hutu
extremists who were left out of the AccordsÕ powero sharing arrangements was not addressed, or
even sufficiently recognized as a serious problem by the international community at the time.
Implementation and monitoring requirements, including the peacekeeping force called for by the
Accords, received insufficient attention and action by the international community. In particular, the
UN failed to make adequate use of the OAU and local African states, who had been intensively
involved in negotiations, in the implementation phase.
Recommendation:
Sustainable Peace Agreements
To the Secretaries–General of the UN, OAU and OAS for Follow–up and to Member
States for Necessary Action
Peace agreements require careful follow–up and monitoring to ensure their consolidation and
implementation. This may require special measures to speed up demobilization of the warring
parties, disarm or neutralize opponents of the agreement, and provision of incentives to maintain
momentum. Regional organizations and neighbouring states should be actively involved at every
stage of the process.
?
The UN Secretariat should undertake a study, in consultation with OAU and OAS, with a
view to developing guidelines on follow–up and monitoring of peace agreements. Any
guidelines would have to take into account the complexity of such agreements and the need
for follow–up to be tailored to their unique characteristics.
C.
Management of Relief
This section presents additional findings and recommendations that relate to the management of
humanitarian relief assistance to refugees outside Rwanda and to displaced persons and survivors of
genocide and violence within Rwanda. These are topics covered by Study III.
While not framed as a finding or recommendation, there is an issue of balance between attention to
relief needs of refugees and survivors within the country. Given the refugees’ near total lack of
resources of their own, it is perhaps understandable that the largest portion of international relief
assistance committed for the Rwanda crisis has been allocated to ÒoutsidersÓ rather than to
“insiders,” even though those in need of relief within the country may have at one point
considerably outnumbered those outside. Given both their visibility (e.g. in international media) and
immediacy of their needs, international attention focused initially on refugees, then on the internally
displaced and finally – and belatedly – on survivors.
While some agencies sought to achieve a balance between humanitarian aid provided to refugees
and those in need inside the country, a real problem was that information on the needs of vulnerable
groups, such as widows and unaccompanied children9, within Rwanda was much poorer than
information on needs of refugees. Also, agencies’ organizational capacities to serve these needs
were generally less well developed, especially in the early months, within Rwanda. By the autumn
of 1994 donor attention within Rwanda was shifting from relief to rehabilitation and recovery.
Finding C–1:
Insecurity in Refugee Camps
Physical protection of refugees and displaced persons in camps can be problematic even in
“normal” circumstances. In the Rwanda crisis, this issue quickly became of paramount importance.
The continued dominance of former commune and other leaders, some of whom were perpetrators
of the genocide, and the presence of armed elements in refugee camps, inflicted more trauma,
insecurity and diversion of resources destined for bona fide refugees; and posed a security threat to
relief agency staff. Occasional ostentatious or other forms of reckless or imprudent behaviour of
agency staff unnecessarily increased the risk of security problems as well. Experience from
complex emergencies has shown that behaviour of staff and the way they choose to interact with the
beneficiary community has a major influence on the refugees’and their own security.
Recommendation:
Refugee Camp Security
To the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Under Secretary–General for
Humanitarian Affairs and Heads of NGO Network Organizations for Follow–up, in
Consultation with the Components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, and to the Security Council, Member States and Donor Agencies for
Necessary Action and Support
In situations where the international community has assumed humanitarian responsibility at refugee
and/or IDP camps, take the following actions with respect to camp security measures:
9
As noted in Chapter 4, great efforts have been made over the past year by ICRC, UNICEF,
UNHCR and by NGOs such as Save the Children (UK and US), to trace unaccompanied children.
a.
Give UN peace missions authority and the appropriate means to ensure protection, in
coordination with host governments or otherwise, of camp populations and staffs of relief
organizations.
b.
Work with host governments to take other measures, such as disarming camp residents, separating genuine refugees from those not entitled to refugee status, barring arms trading,
preventing military training of residents, expelling hostile leadership from camps, halting the
operations of hate media, and splitting up large camps into smaller ones at a greater distance
from the border.
c.
Advise official and non–governmental agency staffs on prudent patterns of behaviour that will
not invite security problems as well as on how effectively to maintain an open and continuous
dialogue with the beneficiary community.
Finding C–2:
Inadequate Early Warning of Population Displacements and Sudden Increases in Relief Needs
Detailed study of the information flows and decisions leading up to the Goma influx reveal that an
integrated mechanism for gathering and analyzing information that could provide advance warning
of large population displacements did not exist. The UNREO Information Cell came closest to
fulfilling such a role but its objective was to collect and share information for coordination rather
than warning purposes. It was heavily dependent upon a) relief agencies or UNAMIR contingents
being present in an area and b) providing regular monitoring reports on developments/events in
their area. These conditions were not met in much of north–west Rwanda during the critical period
of May and June 1994. Study III also highlighted the need for information to be circulated as
widely as possible among all agencies involved in the response, including NGOs, and to all agency
sub–offices, many of which did not receive situation reports sent to headquarters.
Recommendation:
Development of an Integrated Humanitarian Early Warning System
To the UN Secretary–General and Inter–Agency Standing Committee, in Consultation
with the Components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and
NGO Network Organizations
Establish an Integrated Early Warning Cell, adequately resourced, within the DHA region
coordination office once emergency operations have commenced. All agencies – governmental,
inter-governmental and NGO – operating in the region should be encouraged to feed reports on
developments within their area of operation into the Cell.
?
Where coverage of areas is incomplete the integrated early warning cell should have capacity
to place field observers/monitors to complement relief agencies or, in those areas where
security is very poor, to call upon aerial reconnaissance capacity through standby
arrangements with suitable military forces.
?
Information from all sources should be combined and analyzed and the likelihood of events
requiring substantial humanitarian responses estimated.
?
Reports containing information on key developments in each area and assessments of
likelihood of substantial population displacements should be disseminated widely to all sub–
offices of agencies involved in the response that have a proven record of treating sensitive
information confidentially. In extremely fluid and tense situations, reporting should be daily.
Finding C–3:
Mixed Performance in Coordination
Coordination mechanisms existed at many different levels within the system.
At least seven UN agencies and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs were directly involved in
the response. Collaboration and coordination among UN agencies was affected by overlapping
mandates and a regrettable rivalry. Overall coordination was characterized by what Study III termed
a “hollow coreÓ with a small, ad hoc, not highlyo regarded body with a coordination mandate only
within Rwanda (DHA/UNREO) attempting to coordinate very large operational agencies (notably
WFP and UNHCR) supporting refugees in neighbouring countries as well as programmes inside
Rwanda. Responsibility for technical and sectoral coordination within Rwanda was further split
between UNICEF and WHO. All these agencies relied to a significant degree upon NGO
implementing partners, some 250 organizations, which presented coordinating agencies with
extremely wide variations in terms of experience, professional qualifications and attitudes toward
coordination efforts (see Study IV, Chapter 6).
There was also lack of clarity in division of responsibilities among senior UN officials who had
various leadership and coordination functions (i.e. UNAMIR Force Commander, Special Representative of the Secretary General, Humanitarian Coordinator/Head of UNREO, Special Envoy of
the High Commissioner for Refugees) and their relationship viso ˆo vis senior personnel from UN
agencies and departments. Such overlaps and lack of clarity hampered operational effectiveness.
At lower levels there were instances of successful coordination, notably in relation to refugees
where UNHCR’s Technical Coordinator structure performed well and the agency’s ability to
encourage NGO cooperation and team efforts among all agencies was enhanced by substantial
financial support from ECHO. The best case of operational coordination was Ngara where UNHCR,
backed up by the government of Tanzania, limited the number of NGOs working in camps and
provided strong leadership. Within Rwanda, in a context where a large number of NGOs were
involved in operations, the DHA/UNREO–supported Integrated Operations Centre (IOC) was
obliged to adopt a less directive approach to coordination but nevertheless, by providing excellent
information and facilitating collaboration among agencies, was able to achieve an impressive level
of coordination.
Recommendation:
Effective Coordination Among and By Official Agencies
To the UN Secretary–General and Inter–Agency Standing Committee
Three options are formulated below to address the weaknesses identified in the above finding. The
options vary in the degree of reform required. Each has relative advantages and disadvantages.
(i)
Strengthen and extend existing inter–agency coordinating arrangements and mechanisms
through:
a)
use of inter–agency Memoranda of Understanding (such as that between UNHCR and WFP);
b)
strengthening DHA by assuring its funding base and giving it responsibility for providing
common services to UN and other agencies (air cell management responsibility, integrated
humanitarian early warning system, etc.);
c)
structure UN coordination meetings as inclusive task forces, chaired by DHA, and to which
representatives of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, major bilateral donors and key
NGOs would be routinely invited to participate;
d)
reducing the number of senior officials with coordination and leadership roles and clarifying
lines of authority of those present.
(ii)
Considerably strengthen the central coordinating role of UN/DHA. Under this option
humanitarian assistance funding for UN agencies and their NGO implementing partners
would be channelled through DHA, which would decide on priorities and determine the
amount of funds each agency would receive. To perform effectively this expanded role, DHA
would need additional expert staff, including those with technical backgrounds, to be posted
to the field as well as headquarters.
(iii) Consolidate in a new, expertly–led and –staffed and fully operational mechanism of the
United Nations, the emergency response functions of the principal UN humanitarian agencies
(UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF and DHA). This is the option recommended by Study III.
Option (i) would be the least costly and disruptive, but the findings of Study III suggest that these
efforts would not be enough to eliminate the confusion and competition experienced during the
Rwanda emergency. Option (ii) would entail some additional cost but it would also strengthen the
coordinating function at one focal point, with control over resource allocation. This would not
_require the creation of additional organizations but would strengthen one that is already there.
Option (iii) would ensure coordination by centralizing all policy and operational responsibility in
one agency/department. It should be noted that this agency/department need not be created outside
the existing agency structure, but could be created within one of the existing agencies, such as
DHA. Nonetheless, it would be the most disruptive of the three options. It has also been argued that
there is a value to having some specialized institutional competence as well as possible cross_fertilization from having relief and development functions in the same agency (as in the cases of
UNICEF and WFP). A similar case has been made regarding the value of having relief and refugee
protection functions in the same agency, as currently is the case in UNHCR. But an opposite case
can also be made that the two functions can come into conflict and compete for attention and
resources, suggesting that each would be performed better in separate agencies.
Whichever option is chosen, a plan of action should be formulated, including a full review of staff
needs by a special panel of international experts, governments and NGOs. A report containing the
reasoning for selecting the option as well as the plan of action should be submitted by the
Secretary–General to the General Assembly.
Finding C–4:
Mixed NGO Performance
The performance of NGOs in providing humanitarian assistance was mixed. A number behaved
professionally and compassionately and delivered high–quality care and services. But, as reported
by Study III, other NGOs performed in an unprofessional and irresponsible manner that resulted not
only in duplication and wasted resources but, in a few egregious cases, in unnecessary loss of life.
Recommendation:
Professional NGO Performance
To address the problems identified in the above finding, it is imperative that NGOs operating in
complex emergencies:
?
field qualified professional staff with previous work experience in such settings and
appreciation of the need to be sensitive to the local culture;
?
establish partnership with local organizations;
?
include at least some staff or advisors with considerable experience in the country or sub–
_region;
?
be prepared to work collaboratively with UN, donor and host–government officials.
a.
To Heads of Non–Governmental Organizations, their Network Associations and the
Components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
A set of standards is being developed by several NGO networks that is intended to supplement the
Code of Conduct promulgated by ICRC, IFRC and NGO associations. Both the Code of Conduct
and set of standards should be widely disseminated and promoted among NGOs, official agencies
and governments.
b.
To above Entities, UN Inter–Agency Standing Committee, Donor Agencies and OECD
Development Assistance Committee for Followo up and to Member States for Necessary
Action
While voluntary adoption and implementation of the Code of Conduct and standards is clearly
preferable to edicts imposed on NGOs from outside, the Rwanda experience indicates that it will
not be enough to rely on voluntary adoption alone. Some form of regulation or enforcement is
needed. Two options are formulated below, followed by a brief discussion of pros and cons of each.
(i)
Self–managed regulation. Under this option, NGO networks could be assisted in acquiring
greater capacity to monitor member compliance with the Code and standards.
(ii)
An international accreditation system. Under this option, core criteria for accreditation would
be developed jointly by official agencies and NGOs. These criteria would need to be adapted
and supplemented for a specific complex emergency. This is the option recommended by
Study III.
As stated, the second option is stronger than the first in terms of enforcement, but it raises a number
of issues that would have to be resolved, such as selection of an entity to administer accreditation,
funding, reporting relationships, etc. Self–regulation under the first option would be encouraged if
donors and donor governments agreed to restrict their funding and tax–free privileges to agencies
that have adopted the Code and standards. Similarly, host–country governments could restrict
registration, work permits and duty–free importation privileges to adopting agencies. If
implemented, these incentives and disincentives would compensate for the enforcement weakness
of the first option. Donors and governments must, of course, be prepared to hold NGOs accountable
to the Code and standards and employ disincentives in the event of non–compliance. The media
have played and can play a positive role by exposing instances of unprofessional and irresponsible
conduct by NGOs.
Finding C–5:
Military Contingents
Military contingents from OECD countries have played increasingly significant roles in support of
humanitarian operations in complex emergencies o both in the provision of relief assistance and in
support of relief agencies. They played such roles in Rwanda and eastern Zaire. However, in view
of the inability of Study Team III to obtain sufficiently precise and comparable data on costs and
performance, it was not possible to make definitive comparative assessment. The Rwanda
experience with military contingents does raise questions about predictability, effectiveness, costs
and ability to participate collaboratively in operations involving several official agencies and
numerous NGOs.
Recommendation:
Systematically Assess Comparative Cost–Effectiveness of Use of Military Contingents in
Humanitarian Relief Operations
To Donor Countries and Agencies and OECD/DAC
Undertake a systematic study of the performance and costs of military contingents in humanitarian
relief operations as compared with that of official agencies, NGOs and the private sector performing
the same functions.
Finding C–6:
Weak Accountability
The availability and quality of performance data and reporting by official agencies and NGOs
involved in emergency relief operations were highly variable. In some locations (e.g. Goma) the
situation was more satisfactory but in others (e.g. within Rwanda) available data did not provide a
sufficient basis for assessing impact or performance, or – just as importantly – for making
adjustments in programme activities. A tendency by some official agencies and NGOs to emphasize
or inflate positive accomplishments and play down or ignore problems resulted in distorted
reporting. Even basic data on staff, finances and activities were difficult or impossible to obtain
from a number of NGOs.
While the evaluation teams did not undertake an in–depth review of the evaluation procedures of
agencies, they did become aware of efforts by both UN/DHA and UNHCR to evaluate their operations in the Rwanda crisis. Such efforts led DHA in mid–1995 to embark on a programme of evaluations and lessons-learned studies covering the full range of its operations.
The availability and quality of data collected and made available by donor governments varied
_considerably. Some donors rarely if ever provided data to the UN/DHA Financial Tracking
System. Donors tended to compound the problem by asking for information with widely varying
formats from agencies and NGOs they funded.
Recommendation:
Ensure Accountability
a.
To the UN Inter–Agency Standing Committee, Bilateral Donors and Multilateral
Development Banks, OECD/DAC and Heads of NGO Network Organizations
Several options are formulated below to address the problems identified in the above finding. An
additional recommendation is addressed to donor governments and bilateral agencies.
(i)
By strengthening the effectiveness of official agency coordination and standards of NGO
conduct along the lines recommended in C–3 and C–4, above, accountability would be
strengthened, especially if implementation of these recommendations includes standards for
data collection and reporting. The current Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct commits
signatories to “hold ourselves responsible to both those we seek to assist and those from
whom we accept resources.” Full implementation of this commitment would entail
establishment of NGO mechanisms for consultation with people affected by humanitarian
emergencies.
(ii)
Establish a unit in UN/DHA that would have no other responsibilities but to conduct the
following functions:
?
undertake regular field–level monitoring and evaluation of emergency humanitarian
assistance, and review adequacy of standards followed;
?
serve as ombudsman to which any party can express a concern related to provision of
assistance or security;
?
set up and manage on behalf of the international community a database on emergency
humanitarian assistance operations; and
?
prepare periodic status reports for the public domain.
(iii) Identify a respected, independent organization or network of organizations to act on behalf of
beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance and member states to perform the functions described
in option (ii) above. This is the option recommended by Study III.
Option (i) would entail least cost and disruption to the humanitarian assistance system, but it would
not provide one focal point for a database or for dissemination of information throughout the
system. Option (ii) provides the focal point but as part of a UN unit it could be viewed as lacking
independence. Option (iii) provides both independence and a focal point but poses issues in terms
of selection of the entity, accessibility, and reporting relationships (its own accountability). While
both options (ii) and (iii) would have cost implications, their contribution to effectiveness and
accountability should also be kept in mind. It is essential that either option be adequately resourced.
It should also be noted that option (iii) need not require the creation of a new entity, but could well
entail the selection of an existing institution to assume the functions outline above.
b.
To Donor Governments, Bilateral Agencies and OECD/DAC
Donors have a responsibility to improve accountability both to their taxpayers and to the
beneficiaries of their assistance. They have a responsibility to improve their own performance
information and reporting (including on any humanitarian role played by military contingents), but
they also have a leadership role in promulgating consistent standards, including adequate
breakdown of data by activity and area, for the humanitarian assistance community as a whole.
Finally, donors have a responsibility to standardize among themselves the formats they use for
reporting requirements of agencies to whom they provide funding.
?
The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD should develop guidelines for
adequacy, consistency and standardization of performance data and reporting on humanitarian
assistance activities.
?
Ensure adequate support to the DHA Financial Tracking System and prompt provision of
requested data.
Finding C–7:
Adverse Impacts on Local Populations and Environment
There were clear environmental and other costs imposed by the large refugee camps on local
populations in the neighbouring countries of Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi as well as on local populations surrounding displaced person camps. Some of these costs resulted from flawed agency
policies, e.g. not taking into account environmental impact of fuelwood requirements of the massive
refugee population. Moreover, armed elements in refugee camps posed a security threat to local
populations. While certain groups and enterprises derived at least some temporary benefits from
hosting large refugee or displaced populations, these were distributed unevenly.
Recommendation:
Minimize Adverse Local Impacts
To the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Director–General of the World Food
Programme, UNICEF and Other UN Development Agencies, NGO Implementing
Partners and Bilateral Donor Agencies, in Consultation with the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGO Network Organizations
Prepare and issue standard operating policies and procedures that will minimize and mitigate
adverse impacts of relief operations (whether refugee or IDP) on surrounding populations and their
environment. These will have implications for donors as well as UN agencies and NGOs. The
following specific recommendations, drawn in part from Study III, are relevant:
(i)
Provide food that minimizes cooking requirements (e.g. flour) or includes milling costs in the
transportation and storage costs funded by donors.
(ii)
Establish a quick-disbursing fund, or draw from the existing UNHCR Emergency Response
Fund, to provide early compensation to host communities adversely affected by refugee
concentrations.
(iii) Provide other kinds of assistance, such as fuel for cooking, extension of camp infrastructure
and services (water supply, health care, etc.) to surrounding local populations and
rehabilitation of physical infrastructure damaged in meeting relief needs (e.g. roads and
airstrips).
Effective implementation of Recommendation Co 1 on ÒRefugee Camp SecurityÓ will also address
security threats to host populations.
Finding C-8:
Inequitable Food Distribution
The use of former leadership in many camps as an expedient mechanism for food distribution
reinforced its power and resulted in rations being manipulated by extremist leaders and diverted
from refugee consumption. There is evidence that in such circumstances direct distribution of food
to the household results in a higher proportion of rations actually being received by intended
recipients. While the evidence in terms of impact varies and may depend on cultural context, direct
distribution to women is an option that should be explored.
Circumstances often confronted by agencies and NGOs in the face of rapid influxes of large masses
of refugees and displaced persons made it difficult to implement quickly alternative distribution
systems. The fact that the former leaders and their command structures often arrived intact with
refugees, accompanied by high levels of insecurity and violence, especially in the large camps,
made it extremely hazardous to distribute food directly. Difficult terrain and lack of heavy equipment that precluded establishing more than one distribution site per camp in the Goma area also
made direct distribution to families, particularly in the large camps, unfeasible. Yet, some
organizations were able to move to direct distribution systems considerably earlier than others in
spite of the difficulties.
Recommendation:
Equitable Food Distribution
To the High Commissioner for Refugees, Directoro General of WFP, NGO
Implementing Partners, in Consultation with the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement
Develop and get inter-agency and, to the extent feasible, from the relevant governmental
authorities, advance agreement on operational guidelines for food distribution. These guidelines
should provide for direct distribution of food at household level if there is a risk of exploitation of
the food distribution system by camp leadership. They should also recommend exploring the
desirability and feasibility of direct provision to women.
D.
Supporting the Rebuilding of Society
This section presents additional findings and recommendations that relate to efforts of the international community to assist in the rehabilitation and rebuilding of a society attempting to recover
from a complex emergency. These are topics covered by Study IV.
Unfavourable comparisons have made between international assistance provided to Rwandese
refugees outside the country and assistance provided for rehabilitation and recovery within the
country. As indicated in previous sections, there are a number of reasons that explain the relatively
large amount of assistance devoted to refugee assistance and the relatively small, but growing
amount of aid devoted to recovery and development. Nonetheless, some of the delay in provision of
external resources for rebuilding Rwanda’s decimated human, institutional and governance
capacities resulted from lack of mutual understanding between government and donors of their
respective requirements and constraints. The level of attention and resources required for recovery
and development must be defined through a process involving a meeting of the minds of
government and international community.
As noted previously, the country’s authorities and communities have primary responsibilities for
achieving and shaping society; external support should aim at strengthening their institutional
capacities. Clear understandings between donors and recipient country need to be achieved
regarding re-establishment of capacity as well as minimal legitimate accountability requirements
and the temporary need for expatriate involvement in implementation.
Finding D–1:
Non–Functioning Justice System
One prerequisite to repatriation of the majority of the huge number of refugees living just outside
Rwanda is a functioning justice system that will put an end to the long–prevailing “culture of
impunity.” A functioning system will have to assess degrees of guilt among those accused of
participating in the genocide and political killings as well as resolve disputes over property owned
by recent Hutu refugees but now occupied by former Tutsi refugees.
Some donors have been slow to provide support in this area and in a few cases are precluded by
their own legal restrictions from support to certain elements of the justice system such as law
enforcement and penal institutions. The international community has also been slow in providing
the resources needed for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to indict and try
expeditiously those Rwandese accused of crimes against humanity who are living in exile.
The government has also been slow in taking certain essential actions, such as appointment of
Supreme Court and lower–level magistrates, in expediting due process procedures for almost
60,000 detainees and ameliorating the extremely harsh conditions of their confinement. It is hard to
avoid the conclusion that, as observed in Study IV, paralysis of the judicial process and inability to
try suspected criminals has resulted not just from lack of staff and equipment but also from lack of
resolve. The government’s enthusiastic sponsorship of the International Conference on “Genocide,
Impunity and Accountability: a Dialogue for a National and International Response,” 2–6
November 1995, signalled resolve, but much more remains to be done.
Recommendation:
Expand Support for Justice System and Law Enforcement
To Bilateral Donors and Multilateral Agencies, the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights and the OECD/DAC for Follow–up and to Member States for Necessary Action
a.
Develop with the host government a comprehensive plan for assisting reconstruction of the
justice system, including assistance to civilian law enforcement and penal institutions.
b.
Review and adjust legislative restrictions that preclude some donors from providing assistance
for justice and law enforcement systems in order to permit such assistance to countries
attempting to recover from a complex emergency.
c.
Strengthen the International Criminal Tribunal mechanism:
?
In the short–term this requires that the Tribunal has an adequate budget and delegated
authority to carry out its responsibilities.
?
The Tribunal’s effectiveness also requires that UN member states give prompt and full
cooperation to its requests.
?
For the longer-term, the proposed International Criminal Court must be established on a
permanent basis in order to expedite the prosecution of those accused of genocide and other
crimes against humanity.
Finding D–2:
Barriers to Repatriation
Very few of the over two million refugees who fled from Rwanda in the aftermath of genocide have
returned to Rwanda. Much of their resistance to repatriation is due to actual fear of returning,
whether grounded or not. This fear, in turn, springs from several major sources. Attempts by
refugees to repatriate, or even discuss repatriation, have been met by threats, intimidation and
repression by camp leaders and militia. Physical insecurity and a nono functioning justice system
inside Rwanda have also been major factors discouraging repatriation. Both actual and false
accounts of violent reprisals, arbitrary arrests and harsh detentions have contributed to this outcome.
Lack of detailed and widely–promulgated government policies regarding re-occupation of property
and land have also discouraged repatriation. Lack of basic services and productive employment
have also been sources of concern. Finally, the relatively large numbers of people in refugee camps
who were involved to some degree in the genocide and killings have undoubtedly resisted
repatriation, especially in the absence of clear policies regarding degrees of guilt and corresponding
penalties for participating in the killings. For all these reasons, the view in some quarters of the
international community that major repatriation and reintegration could occur quickly was clearly
unrealistic and mistaken.
The recent arrests in Zaire of extremist leaders, as well as an agreement to accelerate voluntary
repatriation, may portend weakening of a major repatriation barrier. But even if these developments
turn out to be significant, several additional substantial impediments remain within Rwanda.
Recommendation:
Remove Barriers to Repatriation
To the High Commissioner for Refugees, the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Bilateral Donors and Multilateral Development Banks and Agencies and NGO Network
Organizations for Follow–up, and to Member States for Necessary Support
Implementation of Recommendation Co 1 on ÒRefugee Camp SecurityÓ will remove the source of
intimidation and repression that has acted as one important barrier to voluntary repatriation.
The following measures would both alleviate the concerns of refugees and improve conditions for
people inside the country. The government of Rwanda must play a very active part in these efforts:
(i)
Support the government’s current efforts to establish and promulgate degrees of guilt and
punishment for participation in the genocide and other killings, as well as efforts to strengthen
the justice system in other ways (see Recommendation D–1, “Expand Support for Justice
System and Law Enforcement”).
(ii)
Insist on compliance with the rule of law and observance of fundamental human rights
principles, and monitor closely abuses by the government.
(iii) Provide expanded support for strengthening local capacities to provide basic governmental
and related services, such as education, health and agricultural research and extension, and for
income–generating activities (e.g. microo enterprise, rural works programmes, etc).
(iv) Provide further support, as appropriate, to the government to develop and implement land
tenure and property rights legislation, especially the right of women to inherit and own land;
and to develop clear procedures and identify institutions for dispute settlement.
(v)
Provide support for experts under auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
to work with authorities and local NGOs to design and implement human rights training and
education programmes, in accordance with OAU, UN and Red Cross Conventions.
(vi) Facilitate establishment by the government of broadly–based “peace committees” in
communes to monitor security of returnees; screening of returnees should be performed in
close proximity to home communes, so as to give them confidence in the process.
Finding D–3:
A Potential for Reconciliation
Women’s groups and some elements of the church have been providing support to the vulnerable
and building bridges across ethnic boundaries. Some church denominations have made an effort to
examine critically their role and behaviour during the crisis. But the role of the church as a whole as
an agent of healing and reconciliation will be limited until it confronts and admits more directly that
some of its elements were involved in the genocide and assassinations. Attempts at reconciliation
will make little progress until tangible progress is made in administration of justice.
Recommendation:
Support to Reconciliation Efforts
To Bilateral Donors, Multilateral Agencies and NGO Network Organizations
As the International Tribunal and the national system of jurisprudence begin to make progress in
rendering justice, support should be expanded for local NGOs involved in activities attempting to
open dialogue and build bridges among groups in society. This will be a long process marked with
reversals as well as gains. In addition to women’s groups and religious movements, there is an
urgent need to work with young people who have been profoundly affected by genocide and
conflict. This “intermediate generation” will become decision–makers and opinion leaders in
coming years. Unless they are actively involved in the reconciliation process, seeds for future
violence will flower. Education of children and teachers (in problem–solving, non–violent conflict
resolution, etc.) has a critical role to play in the process of reconciliation. The international
community has a challenge and an opportunity to support innovative efforts in this area.
E.
Roles of the Media
This section presents a finding and recommendation on the roles of the media, a subject that is
addressed in both Study II and Study III.
Finding:
The Mixed Impact of the Media
By and large, the international media chose not to report on (or to publish, if news reports were
filed) evidence of plans and organizing for large–scale massacres. This contributed to failure by the
international community to perceive the genocide for what it was and to insist on an adequate
response. This failure occurred in spite of local media, which became dominated in the early 1990s
by a radio station and newspaper whose vitriolic propaganda incited hatred and violence.
Inadequate and inaccurate reporting by international media on the genocide itself contributed to
international indifference and inaction. However, intense media coverage of certain aspects of
emergency relief operations, particularly in Goma, influenced both political decision–makers and
agencies to make ad hoc decisions that were not always in line with sound operating principles and
resulted in a skewed emphasis on some relief activities at the expense of others. Neglect of the
survivors and some instances of sub–optimal placement of relief resources reflected, in part,
unbalanced and inaccurate reporting by the international media.
However, international media coverage also influenced agencies to act urgently and responsibly,
and raised awareness of politicians and the public at large, which in turn helped to generate funds.
Recommendation:
Assess the Roles of the Media
To the Media
The media, individually and through professional associations, should review their reporting on
Rwanda to explain and draw lessons for responsible reporting of future complex emergencies.
Organize a conference for and by the international media, under sponsorship of an organization
such as Reporters sans frontières, to examine media reporting on Rwanda and draw lessons for
responsible reporting on future complex emergencies.
F.
The Regional Dimension
The Great Lakes region, which includes the countries of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and
Tanzania, is important to the evaluation for two reasons: first, Rwanda has been and continues to be
significantly affected by socio–political developments in the region; and second, the intensifying
crisis and open conflict in Burundi, which shares a number of causes with the Rwanda crisis, is
currently threatening to explode with grave repercussions for the stability of Rwanda and the
region.
Another reason why a regional perspective is important is brought out in Study I: the two major
population groups in Rwanda, Hutu and Tutsi, are part of a larger regional population group, the
Banyarwanda. The Banyarwanda share the same language and culture and are found in large
numbers in the border regions of Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania, as well as in Burundi, where they are
close relatives of the predominant Barundi. While some Banyarwanda, especially in Tanzania, have
become citizens and integrated into society at large, their fate and legal status have been more
uncertain in Uganda and Zaire where they have been subject from time to time to discriminatory
policies and actions. Over the decades there have been substantial and often destabilizing
movements of Banyarwanda across national borders of the region. Recurring political upheavals
and violence in Rwanda and Burundi have been major reasons, but not the only ones, for such
population shifts. These movements have often imposed substantial burdens on receiving countries.
The current deterioration of the situation in Burundi has been described in very grave terms in the
recent initial report by the Special Rapporteur for Burundi of the UN High Commission on Human
Rights. The report underlines a “real danger that the deteriorating situation could explode any time
in the country, with consequences as grave as those seen previously in Rwanda.” A crisis in
Burundi of the proportions of the Rwanda crisis would constitute an immense calamity for the Great
Lakes region, for Africa and for the world. Further underlining the critical nature of the situation are
recent proposals by the UN Secretary–General to station a modest UN rapid–reaction force in
neighbouring Zaire, with the ability to intervene in Burundi, and an international police force to
guard relief workers. The Secretary–General of the OAU has given highest priority to Burundi and
engaged in intensive dialogue with its leaders to try to find ways to halt the escalating violence.
As shown in Study I, economic factors have interacted with socioo political factors in contributing
to the recurring crises and violence that have impacted upon the region. Economic growth has been
overwhelmed by rapid population growth, increasing fragmentation of land holdings, adverse
weather, and destruction accompanying political violence and conflict.
In sum, a sustainable solution to the socio–political problems of any country of the Great Lakes
region, but particularly Rwanda and Burundi at its heart, cannot be found in that country in isolation
but must address and involve the region as a whole. Similarly, sustained socio-economic
development of the region, accompanied by expanding human and civil rights for all groups, offers
a main hope for stability and an end to the cycles of violence.
Two collective efforts on the part of the international community to address the problems of
Rwanda and Burundi on a regional basis are noteworthy:
?
The Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in The
Great Lakes Region, held in Bujumbura, 12o 17 February 1995.
?
The Cairo Conference of Heads of State from the Great Lakes Region, held in Cairo, 28–29
November 1995.
The Plan of Action of the Bujumbura Conference and the Declaration signed by the heads of state at
the Cairo Conference endorse a number of measures and commitments that are contained in the
recommendations set forth above.
Recommendation F–1:
Immediate and Urgent Measures for Burundi
To the Secretaries–General of the UN and OAU, Bilateral Donors and Multilateral
Development Banks and Agencies, Member States (including Governments of the Great
Lakes Region), Components of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, NonGovernmental Organizations and the Media
The following evaluation recommendations should command immediate attention for their
applicability to the crisis in Burundi:
?
Provide support to further strengthen OAU mediation and peacekeeping functions. (See
Recommendation A–4)
?
Expedite contingency planning and preparedness measures for humanitarian relief, learning
from the Rwanda experience. (See Finding and Recommendation A–6)
?
Support measures to ensure the physical security of refugees, displaced persons and relief
workers who are attempting to provide humanitarian assistance. (See Recommendation C–1)
?
Provide adequate support for the deployment of effective human rights machinery in the field,
with adequate standing procedures for vigilance over threatened genocide and for prompt
investigative action. (See Recommendation A–5)
?
Expand assistance to Burundi for the restoration of an effective system of justice in order to
break the vicious cycle of impunity (including support for assistance by magistrates from
other African countries, as suggested by the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in
Burundi). (See Recommendation D–1)
?
Identify and be prepared to implement consistently a range of measures intended to put
pressure on those who are inciting and perpetrating escalating civil violence. (See
Recommendation B–1)
The international community should not send mixed signals to Burundi that would allow for
manipulation of their potential contradictions. Rather, it should speak consistently and with one
voice with respect to the positions it takes and the actions it implements.
Recommendation F–2:
Formulate a Supportable and Sustainable Development Strategy for the Region
To the Secretary–General of the OAU, Governments of the Great Lakes Region, the
World Bank and African Development Bank, Bilateral Donors, UN Specialized Agencies
and NGO Network Organizations
A sustainable, long–term solution to the cycles of civil and ethnic violence must involve the people
and be a regional one. The countries of the Great Lakes Region must take the lead in developing
this solution. But strong support from bilateral and multilateral development agencies and international NGOs is also essential.
Given the difficult–to–explosive situations facing Rwanda and Burundi and some other parts of the
region, a recommendation to formulate a sustainable development strategy for the region may seem
foolish and unrealistic. However, if the premise of the finding above is accepted, that the sustained
development of the region offers a main hope for ending the cycles of violence, then embarking on
such an effort is imperative.
Several tracks will be required:
?
First, the international community should provide full support to the implementation of the
recommendations of the Bujumbura and Cairo Conferences cited above.
?
Second, as noted in the Introduction, the evaluation did not undertake an ino depth
examination of the regional dimension. Further research and analysis on this subject would be
highly desirable as it would provide a firmer basis for the formulation of development
strategy options. It would be very important to involve an African research institution in the
work, perhaps teamed with a research institution based in Europe and/or North America.
Funding and oversight would need to be provided by a donor agency or group of agencies.
The research should be initiated as soon as possible, so it could make a contribution to the
third track.
?
Third, an essential element of formulating a development strategy for the region would be
actively to engage the population of the region in the formulation process. This should include
dialogues in the form of meetings at local, national and regional levels that draw in a wide
range of non–governmental and governmental representatives to discuss needs, priorities,
alternative solutions and resources. Part of the dialogue should include such issues as how to
ensure human, civil and other kinds of rights that will bring security and stability to the
region; what kind of political system can best serve the deeply–divided societies of the region;
culturally-sensitive approaches to non–violent conflict and dispute resolution, etc. Institutes
and resource persons from other divided societies in other regions could be invited to
participate. There are successful precedents, including in such African countries as South
Africa and Togo, to the kind of broadly participatory development planning process outlined
above.
?
Fourth, based on the strategy emerging from the second and third tracks, a carefully–planned
major donor conference should be called to marshal external support.
The challenges that this process will confront are formidable. However, in the absence of such an
effort it is difficult to envision how a brighter future for Rwanda and its neighbours can be
achieved.
Annex 1
Terms of Reference:
Evaluation of Emergency Assistance
to Rwanda
Justification
1.
More than one million people have died and more than two million have been displaced as a result of the conflict in Rwanda. The human suffering is of an incomprehensible scale. The recent escalation of the conflict and violence has received wide international concern and
attention. The international community has provided substantial assistance to alleviate the
human suffering and has contributed to efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.
2.
Natural and man–made catastrophes claim an increasing share of the stagnating international
aid. Total emergency assistance will in 1994 exceed US$5 billion or about 10% of ODA.
Donor assistance to the Rwanda emergency alone amounts to more than US$840 million during the first nine months of 19948. Total needs for 1994 are well beyond US$1 billion, corresponding to about 2% of ODA.
3.
In recent years an increasing number of countries have experienced emergencies caused by a
combination of natural and man–made disasters or by conflict. These emergencies are inherently complex, of prolonged duration and cause large–scale human suffering and economic losses. Although some evaluations of emergency assistance have been carried out, experience
from planning and execution of large–scale relief activities and their effects is not, as yet,
extensively documented.
4.
There are two obvious reasons for evaluating the emergency assistance to Rwanda:
i)
The donor community needs to account for the relevance, effectiveness and impact of the substantial share of overall aid.
ii)
Despite the uniqueness of each emergency, valuable lessons for planning and execution of future relief operations can, and should, be derived.
Objectives
5.
The main objective of the evaluation is to draw lessons from the experience in Rwanda that
will be relevant for future complex emergencies as well as for the operations in Rwanda and
the region, including their prevention, the preparation for and provision of emergency assistance, and the transition from relief to development.
8
As of October 1994. The amount does not include substantial in–kind contributions. DHA
Rwanda Financial Update no. 3
Context
6.
The emergency relief activities covered by the evaluation were and are carried out in the con-
text of three fairly distinct scenarios9, each with its clear implications. In each scenario the nature of events and political context changed, new groups of the population required assistance, geographical focus shifted quickly, access to areas and people was opened up or closed,
and operational challenges shifted. A key concept which justifies framing the evaluation
according to the three scenarios is the humanitarian space10. The humanitarian space sets the
framework for humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies and influences parameters for
setting priorities, access to target groups, security and need for protection and a range of possible activities within the continuum emergency prevention – emergency relief – reconstruction – rehabilitation – development.
7.
The three scenarios can be categorized by the following events and contexts:
?
Mass killings, mass movements and social collapse. The major focus was on mass displacement within Rwanda, access to affected people in Rwanda and containment of the killings,
and on refugee flow into Tanzania.
?
Stabilization of refugee/displaced situation, authority vacuum, military offensive and new
mass movements. The major focus was on stabilization of emergency assistance to refugee
camps inside Rwanda (Sector 4) and in Tanzania, new refugee flow into Zaire due to major
military offensive, establishment of security zones and access to affected people in all areas of
Rwanda.
?
Consolidation and attempts at reo establishment of authority. The major focus was and is on
supporting basic political and social functions, repatriation, rehabilitation and reconstruction.
8.
New developments may quickly bring about yet another scenario that will influence future
emergency relief activities. As will be seen in the following sections, both the second study on
prevention efforts, and the third study on actual provision of emergency assistance, are relevant to each of these scenarios.
Scope
9.
The emergency relief activities covered by the evaluation comprise the continuum: emergency
prevention; emergency preparedness and delivery; repatriation, rehabilitation and reconstruction; and the relationship between emergencies, emergency aid and long–term development.
The continuum will be covered through a multidimensional approach with four component
studies, each of which represents a dimension of a very complex emergency in Rwanda seen
in a regional context. Focus will be on the linkages among political, military and humanitarian
assistance by the international community.
10.
The first study, the historic background, will outline the roots and course of events of the conflict within Rwanda society and seek to identify possibilities of reconciliation, the ultimate
conflict/emergency–resolution in the country.
9
The term scenario (sequence of events) is used as an analytical tool to portray main
components of a complex situation.
10
The term humanitarian space refers to the degree of access and acceptable conditions for
humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian space is limited by e.g. actions of war, unsafe
environment, physical destruction and political constraints. Humanitarian space may be
created and widened through negotiations of mercy corridors, zones of tranquillity, safe
havens and other mutually agreed arrangements; through involvement of sanctions and
military force to varying degrees; or through crosso border operations from neighbouring
countries.
11.
The second study will focus on the relevance and effectiveness of emergency–prevention efforts, including mechanisms for monitoring and responding to approaching emergencies
(early warning system) and conflict management. It will aim at assessing the need and mechanisms for early action and systematic containment efforts in situations of approaching emergencies, not only for Rwanda but other countries as well.
12.
The third study will assess mechanisms for and effectiveness of preparation and coordination
of emergency assistance programming, the impact of emergency assistance. It will, with due
consideration of the complexity and dynamics of the emergency, concentrate on the effectiveness of coordinated action as well as timely and appropriate assistance through numerous
channels to people in dire need. It will further assess contingency plans for possible new
emergency scenarios.
13.
The fourth study will assess the planning and preparation for repatriation and rehabilitation to
recreate and consolidate the capacities of emergency victims, reconstruct their communities
and launch sustainable development programmes in their societies in order to ensure a level of
living which is more secure than the pre–disaster situation.
14.
Certain specific issues, in particular human rights as well as gender issues in humanitarian
assistance, special needs of unaccompanied children and the role of the military in providing
logistical support for humanitarian assistance, are cross–cutting and will be given special
attention in the four studies.
15.
The results of the four studies will be synthesized in a final report that will present the findings and lessons learnt for each element of the continuum taking into consideration the complexity of the various scenarios. Within this perspective, the lessons learnt from the evaluation
will be useful in dealing with future disasters, including Rwanda, to the benefit of everybody
concerned; victims, affected societies, aid organizations and donor countries.
Approach
16.
Given the present complex political context of the evaluation, the evaluation will be carried
out in an objective, sensitive and perceptive manner with varied and balanced consideration of
both positive and negative aspects. The evaluation will be oriented towards lessons learnt
from the Rwanda emergency assistance experience that could be applicable to programme–
adjustment and policy–formulation affecting responses to present and future complex emergencies, rather than a report oriented to assigning accountability for past actions or lack of action.
17.
The evaluation will be based on documentation, including results of recent and ongoing reviews and evaluations, from involved national, bilateral and multilateral agencies and NGOs
at headquarters and field level, interviews with these agencies’ representatives, Rwandan offi-
cials and experts, and with field workers and recipients, and on other fact–finding as necessary and appropriate. Fieldwork will be limited and will be planned and organized in close
collaboration with the agencies concerned so as not to interfere with emergency relief activities and not duplicate existing or ongoing surveys and studies. Alternative sources of information will be explored, including lessons from other emergencies.
18.
In view of the diversity of the issues to be evaluated, the separate studies, each with separate
terms of reference and reports, will be contracted to independent institutions or individuals
with requisite qualifications in the fields of i) emergency assistance management, planning,
and implementation, ii) repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees, iii) regional and specifically Rwanda’s history and situation, iv) institution and capacity building, v) conflict and
emergency analysis, vi) socio–cultural and gender aspects.
Management of the evaluation
19.
The overall management of the evaluation will be entrusted to a Steering Committee comprising the interested members of the international aid community. The Steering Committee will,
based on the objectives and scope as defined here, design and manage the evaluation, and present the final report to all donors and to the agencies involved as subjects of the evaluation.
The Steering Committee will be responsible for raising funds. The Evaluation Unit of Danida
will be the lead agency and overall coordinator.
20.
The Steering Committee will meet at least four times to:
a)
finalize the TOR and approve short list of qualified evaluators (institutions/individuals) and approve budget and funding (mido December 1994);
b)
discuss and provide feedback on study reports and approve outline of synthesis report (midJuly 1995),
c)
discuss and provide feedback on draft synthesis report (end November 1995);
d)
present the final report to the international community (end December 1995).
21.
Each study will be managed by a lead agency: Study I: Sweden; Study II: Norway; Study III:
United Kingdom; Study IV: United States of America. The four lead agencies with Denmark
in the Chair will constitute a management group and will contract, assign and supervise the
work of consultants/institutions within these terms of reference and the resources available.
Each lead agency will seek close cooperation and coordination with relevant UN and other
international and national agencies.
22.
The costs of the evaluation will be met by voluntary contributions from interested parties. For
purposes of budget administration the procedures and practices current in the lead agencies
will be adopted. Danida will make arrangements for administration of contributions within the
established budget.
Duration
23.
The evaluation will commence in January 1995 and last until December 1995. Interim study reports will be ready for discussion in the Steering Committee, and with the concerned parties, at the end of June 1995. The final evaluation reports: a synthesis report and the various
study reports, will be available at the end of December 1995.
Annex 2
Chronology 11
Based mainly on Dorsey 1994, Reyntjens 1994:1 and McHugh 1995.
1860: The new mwami, Kigeri Rwabugiri (1860–1895), expands his power in the central kingdom
and in the western region. He also expands the system of clientship.
1880s: The first European explorers arrive in Rwanda.
1895: New mwami: Mibambwe Rutarindwa.
1896: Mwami Rutarindwa is assassinated and succeeded by Yuhi Musinga.
1899: Germany establishes colonial rule in Ruanda–Urundi and the territory becomes part of
German East Africa. The first missionaries arrive.
1910: The frontiers of the Belgian Congo, British Uganda and German East Africa – including the
territory of Ruanda–Urundi – are fixed at a conference in Brussels.
1911: A popular uprising in northern Rwanda is crushed by the German Schutztruppe and Tutsi chiefs, leaving continuing bitterness among northern Hutu.
1916: Belgium takes over the territory, which after the First World War is administered under a
League of Nations mandate.
1931: Mwami Musinga is deposed by the Belgians in favor of his son, Charles Rudahigwa Mutara.
1930s: A process of “Tutsification” results in a monopoly of political and administrative power in
the hands of Tutsi. Ethnic classification through the introduction of identity cards.
1957: The Bahutu Manifesto, a document criticizing the Tutsi monopoly, is issued by nine Hutu
intellectuals.
1959: The jacquerie takes place – a social revolution by the Hutu population supported by Belgium.
Tens of thousands of Tutsi flee into exile. The same year, mwami Mutara Rudahigwa dies mysteriously in Bujumbura. He is succeeded by his brother, Kigeri Ndahindurwa.
1960: Rwanda’s first local elections result in an overwhelming victory for the party Parmehutu.
Mwami Kigeri Ndahindurwa chooses not to return from the independence celebrations in the
Congo.
1961: The monarchy is formally abolished by a referendum. On 25 September, the first parliamentary elections in Rwanda are held. Parmehutu receives 78% of the vote.
11
Reproduced from Study 1, Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors
1962: On 1 July, Rwanda and Burundi gain independence from Belgium. The first President of
independent Rwanda is Grégoire Kayibanda from the Parmehutu party.
1963: Armed attacks by Tutsi exiles from Burundi, the so–called inyenzi, deepen ethnic tension in
Rwanda. In the violence, which escalates in November–December, some 1,000 Tutsi are killed and
there is a new wave of Tutsi refugees to Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire.
1973: Coup d’état; Major–General Juvénal Habyarimana assumes power. He founds a new party,
the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (Mouvement Révolutionnaire National
pour le Développement, MRND). Beginning of the Second Republic.
1978: MRND becomes Rwanda’s only party under a new constitution. Habyarimana is confirmed
as President in 1978, 1983 and 1988, with more than 99% of the vote.
1987: A military coup takes place in Burundi. President Bagaza is overthrown and Major Pierre
Buyoya takes power.
1988: In April, ethnic tensions in Burundi cause a wave of refugees into Rwanda. In connection
with a conference on Rwandese refugees, held in Washington D.C., the Rwandese Patriotic Front
(RPF) is founded.
1990
July: A first breakthrough in negotiations between Rwanda, Uganda and UNHCR on the repatriation of Rwandese refugees in Uganda is achieved.
5 July: President Habyarimana recognizes the necessity of a separation between the MRND party
and the state.
1 September: A protest letter denouncing the one–party system is published by 33 intellectuals.
24 September: A National Commission is set up to prepare for the introduction of a multi–party system.
1 October: Uganda–based RPF invades the northern parts of Rwanda, demanding the right to settle
thousands of (mainly Tutsi) refugees and political reforms, such as introduction of a multio party system. In the war that follows, several RPF leaders are killed and the attack is repulsed.
Mid–October: Local Hutu take revenge on Tutsi in the commune of Kibilira (in Gisenyi). More
than 300 people are killed.
24 October: A cease–fire concluded in Mwanza, Tanzania, a week earlier is violated.
27 October: The heads of state of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire agree to form a military
peace–monitoring force as a first step to end the civil war in Rwanda.
End of October: There is a stalemate in the war. RPF abandons conventional fighting and reverts to
guerrilla warfare.
October–November: Thousands of RPF “collaborators” are arrested. Most of them are released in
March/April 1991.
13 November: President Habyarimana announces the introduction of multi–partyism and the abolition of ethnic identity cards. The ID cards were, however, never abolished.
20 November: A cease–fire is concluded in Goma, Zaire. An agreement on an OAU observer force
is signed.
1991
January–February: Trials of arrested RPF “collaborators” start. Several prisoners are sentenced to
death, but no executions are carried out.
23 January: RPF raid in Ruhengeri. Prisoners are liberated, some of whom join the RPF.
29 March: A cease–fire between RPF and the Rwandese government is reached. An agreement on
the integration of RPF in a transitional government is signed.
28 April: MRND holds an extraordinary congress, where multi–partyism is accepted and the name
and status of the party are changed. New name: Mouvement Républicain pour le Développement et
la Démocratie (still abbreviated MRND).
10 June: A new constitution is introduced.
18 June: A law on multi–partyism is promulgated.
31 July: The domestic opposition denounces plans to hold elections, insisting that ample time must
be allowed for preparations.
16 September: OAU summit in Gbadolite, Zaire. The earlier cease–fire agreement is amended.
Early November: Widespread ethnic violence.
17 November: A Committee of Consultation organizes political demonstrations in Kigali against
the government and the one–party system. Some 10,000 people participate.
Early December: The Rwandan Catholic church takes a political stance, calling for serious talks
with RPF and formation of an independent transitional government.
30 December: Formation of the Nsanzimana government with one minister from Partie Démocrate
Chrétien (PDC) and the rest from MRND.
1992
8 January: Demonstrations in Kigali against the government and the one–party system with some
30,000 participants.
Beginning of March: Ethnic violence in Bugesera. At least 300 killed.
13 March: New negotiations between the government and main opposition parties.
March: CDR (Coalition pour la Défence de la République) and MRND militias are built up by
extremist Hutu supporters.
16 April: Inclusion of all major opposition parties in the government (MDR, PSD, PL, PDC). Prime
Minister: Nsengiyaremye.
May: A major RPF attack on Byumba results in a wave of Hutu peasants from the north moving
southward (some 350,000 people).
2 June: Government army forces begin looting in several towns in anticipation of losing their jobs if
the government signs a peace pact with RPF.
9 June: After talks in Brussels and Paris between RPF and all government parties except MRND, an
agreement to hold a peace conference to end the two years of civil war is reached.
10 August: Formal opening of the peace conference in Arusha, Tanzania.
10–18 August: Negotiations on the Arusha protocol on the rule of law.
7–18 September and 5–30 October: The second Arusha protocol on transitional institutions is discussed.
November: Political violence by extremist Hutu interahamwe militia escalates.
End of November: A demonstration, in favour of the peace–talks and against Habyarimana’s veto to
the protocol on transitional institutions, takes place despite the governmentÕs attempts to stop it.
24 November–9 January 1993: A protocol on power–sharing and a transitional parliament is discussed in Arusha, but President Habyarimana refuses to sign it.
1993
21–26 January: Ethnic violence in the north–west. Some 300 people are killed.
8 February: RPF occupation of an important zone in the préfectures of Ruhengeri and Byumba. As
a consequence, almost one million people are displaced. The French reinforce their troops in
Rwanda by 300 men.
25 February–2 March: Peace negotiations between RPF and the opposition parties within the government on the withdrawal of all French troops and their replacement by UN or OAU troops.
7 March: A new cease–fire agreement is signed in Dar–es–Salaam, Tanzania.
Mid–March: The 300 extra French troops are withdrawn.
15 March: Peace talks are taken up again in Arusha (and continue until 24 June).
April: The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) warns that the 900,000 displaced people in Rwanda face a major humanitarian catastrophe. ICRC says that famine is imminent.
1 June: Presidential elections in Burundi. New President: Melchior Ndadaye (Hutu).
9 June: Agreement concerning refugees and internally displaced people. An estimated 500,000 displaced people are reported to return home.
24 June: Arusha protocol on inclusion of RPF in the army and the gendarmerie, and specifications
on the transitional institutions.
8 July: The Hutu extremist Radio T_l_vision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) starts broadcasting.
16 July: The Prime Minister’s transitional mandate expires.
17 July: A new government is formed with Agathe Uwilingiyimana as Prime Minister. This results
in a division within MDR.
23–24 July: Extraordinary congress of MDR. Its president, Faustin Twagiramungu, is excluded
from the party.
25 July: A more detailed agreement (on military matters) is signed in Kinihira. It is also agreed that
Twagiramungu will be Prime Minister when the new transitional government is established.
4 August: Rwanda’s government and RPF sign an accord in Arusha to end the civil war, allowing
for power–sharing and the return of refugees.
5 October: The UN Security Council approves a 2,500–strong peacekeeping force to Rwanda, the
UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).
17–18 October: 37 MRND supporters are killed in the Ruhengeri area.
21 October: A military coup takes place in Burundi, in which Hutu President Ndadaye is killed. The
ethnic violence that follows results in tens of thousands of dead and some 600,000 Burundis fleeing
into neighbouring countries. Escalated political and ethnic violence in Rwanda.
1 November: The UN starts placing UNAMIR forces in Rwanda.
30 November: At least 20 people are killed when RPF forces break the cease–fire and attack government troops in north–western Rwanda.
28 December: 600 RPF soldiers arrive in Kigali in accordance with the Arusha agreement.
1994
30 December 1993–5 April 1994: Transitional government fails to take off, with each side blaming
the other for blocking its formation.
6 April: President Habyarimana of Rwanda, President Ntaryamira of Burundi and a number of government officials are killed in a plane crash in Kigali. President Habyarimana’s death sparks violence and widespread massacres in Kigali, which spread throughout the country. The violence soon
escalates, mainly targeting Hutu moderates and the Tutsi population.
7 April: Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana is killed by government forces. Ten Belgian UN
peacekeeping soldiers, who were guarding her, are killed. As a result, Belgium withdraws its forces.
The 600 RPF soldiers in Kigali leave their headquarters.
8 April: RPF forces in northern Rwanda launch an offensive. Former Speaker of parliament
Theodore Sindikubwabo announces the formation of an interim government and declares himself interim President. Prime Minister: Jean Kambanda (MDR).
11 April: Relief officials estimate that as many as 20,000 people have been killed in Kigali alone in
five days of violence. With foreign journalists out of Rwanda, news from the country is restricted.
12 April: The interim government moves from Kigali to Gitarama as RPF threatens the capital.
21 April: The UN Security Council resolution No. 912 reduces the UNAMIR peacekeeping force in
Rwanda from 2,500 to 270 men with an unchanged mandate.
End of April: An estimated 250,000 people stream across the Rwandese border to seek refuge in
Tanzania, reportedly the largest mass exodus of people ever witnessed by UNHCR.
30 April: UN Security Council affirms the need to protect refugees and help restore order, but does
not mention peacekeepers. At least 100,000 people have been killed and more than 1.3 million have
fled their homes.
17 May: The UN Security Council passes a new resolution (No. 918), approving the deployment of
5,500 UNAMIR troops to Rwanda.
22 May: RPF forces gain control of the airport in Kigali and the Kanombe barracks, and extend
their control over the northern and eastern parts of Rwanda.
17 June: France announces its plan to the UN Security Council to deploy 2,500 troops to Rwanda as
an interim peacekeeping force until the UNAMIR troops arrive.
22 June: The UN Security Council narrowly approves a resolution (No.929) to dispatch 2,500
French troops to Rwanda (Opération Turquoise) for a two–month operation under a UN peace_keeping mandate.
28 June: The UN Human Rights Commission’s special envoy releases a report stating that the massacres were pre–planned and formed part of a systematic campaign of genocide.
4 July: RPF wins control of Kigali and the southern town of Butare. Its leadership states that it intends to establish a government based on the framework of the Arusha Accords. French troops in
south–western Rwanda receive orders to halt the RPF advance.
5 July: The Frencho led operation has established a Òsafe zoneÓ defined roughly by the pr_fectures
of Gikongoro, Cyangugu, and Kibuye. As RPF advances towards the west, the influx of displaced
persons into the zone increases from an initial 500,000 to an estimated one million within a few
days.
13–14 July: As a result of RPF’s advance in the north–west, an estimated one million people begin
to flee towards Zaire. Approximately 10,000–12,000 refugees per hour cross the border and enter
the town of Goma. The massive influx creates a severe humanitarian crisis, as there is an acute lack
of shelter, food, water, and non–food relief items.
15 July: Members of the Hutu government escape to the French “safe zone”. UN Security Council orders cease–fire.
18 July: RPF announces that the war is over, declares a cease–fire and names Pastor Bizimungu as
President with Faustin Twagiramungu as Prime Minister.
19 July: The new President and Prime Minister are sworn in, and RPF commander Majoro General
Paul Kagame is appointed Defence Minister and Vice–President.
End of July: The UN Security Council reaches a final agreement on sending an international force
to Rwanda.
24 August: End of Opération Turquoise. UNAMIR forces take over from the French.
October: The UN estimates that there are now about five million people in Rwanda, compared to
_7.9 million before the war.
8 November: UN Security Council adopts a resolution (No. 955) on the establishment of an international court for war criminals of Rwanda.
24 December: An exile government is announced among Hutu refugees in Zaire.
1995
22 April: Soldiers of the RPF army carry out a massacre at the Kibeho camp for internally displaced
persons in Rwanda.
April: Refugees are forced to return to their home districts from the camps for internally displaced
persons.
23–26 August: Zaire expels refugees from the Goma camps and threatens to expel all refugees.
UNCHR takes up a discussion with Zaire. 28 August: Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu resigns.
31 August: New Prime Minister, Pierre–Céléstin Rwigyema, and ministers approved in a cabinet
reshuffle.
7 September: The UN Security Council adopts a resolution on the establishment of an International
Commission of Inquiry on the sale and supply of arms and related matériel to the former Rwanda
government forces in violation of the UN embargo implemented on 17 May 1994 (Resolution 1013
1995).
13 September: Zaire closes its borders with Rwanda following bomb explosions in Goma.
17 October: A Supreme Court is established by an act of the Parliament.
2–6 November: An international conference on “Genocide, Impunity and Accountability” is held in
Kigali.
7 November: Clash between the army and Hutu rebels on Lake Kivu Island. Many people are reported killed.
23 November: The prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Judge Goldstone,
signs his first indictment.
28–29 November: A summit meeting of leaders of the Great Lakes Region takes place in Cairo,
Egypt.
14 December: The UN Security Council extends UNAMIR’s mandate in Rwanda for an additional
three months to 8 March 1996 (Resolution 1019). The Force will be reduced from 2,100 men to
1,400 and concentrate its activities on the return of refugees.
Annex 3
Abbreviations
AIDAP
DAC
CDIE
CIDA
CRS
Danida
DHA
DPA
DPKO
EC
ECHO
EU
FAO
FAR
HRFOR
IASC
IBRD
ICRC
ICVA
IFRC
IDA
IDP
IMF
InterAction
IOM
MSF
NGO
OAS
OAU
ODA
OECD
OFDA
RPF
Sida
UNAMIR
UNDP
UNESCO
UNHCHR
UNHCR
UNICEF
UNREO
USAID
VOICE
Australian International Development Assistance Program
Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
Center for Development Information and Evaluation (USAID)
Canadian International Development Agency
Catholic Relief Services
Danish International Development Assistance
(UN) Department of Humanitarian Affairs
(UN) Department of Political Affairs
(UN) Department of Peace–Keeping Operations
European Commission
European Community Humanitarian Office
European Union
(UN) Food and Agriculture Organization
Force Armée Rwandaise
(UN) Human Rights Field Operation for Rwanda
(UN) Inter–Agency Standing Committee
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
International Committee of the Red Cross
International Council of Voluntary Agencies
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
International Development Association
Internally Displaced Person
International Monetary Fund
American Council for Voluntary International Action
International Organization for Migration
Médecins sans frontières
Non–Governmental Organization
Organization of American States
Organization for African Unity
(UK) Overseas Development Administration
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
Rwandese Patriotic Front
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations International Children’s Fund
United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office
United States Agency for International Development
Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation in Emergencies
WFP
WHO
(UN) World Food Programme
(UN) World Health Organization
