Citation
3415 – 21-?06
After consulting with NAM members, France submitted its adapted draft resolution to send
a “multinational force” (MF) to Rwanda. It added that a dialog with the RPF on their position
in re: deploying the MF continues. It was suggested that there are differences between the
RPF views in New York and in Rwanda (New York is more critical).
A long, at times heated debate followed, focusing on further modifying the draft. Against
this background, the positions of various members on the French draft became clearer. The
informal consultations resulted in a draft with further amendments, its submission “in blue”
and a decision that it will be voted on on Wed 22 June am, at the earliest, pm that day at the
latest.
The different views among SC members concerning the draft further diverged rather than
converged. This was the result of the following warnings:
- The UN Secretariat’s: that if the RPF doesn’t change its negative view of the MF,
UNAMIR might find itself in complications and difficulties (a “less friendly” attitude of
the RPF to UNAMIR is allegedly already apparent) – some delegations pointed out
informally the difference between this evaluation by the UNAMIR Commander and
the SG’s letter of 19 June.
- Warning of the RPF itself, in its letter addressed to SC members (namely that if FR
decides on the MF, then UNAMIR must withdraw because the RPF couldn’t guarantee its safety).
On top of that, in a meeting with the SC President on 21 June, the OAU representative also
gave priority to UNAMIR over the MF.
Absent instructions of a number of SC members, one cannot anticipate the result of the
voting. Currently known views, however, exclude it being adopted by consensus.
The most critical views are those of NZ. Its reservations in re: the MF were repeated again
(emphasizing that this is the position of the Government). NZ repeated its preference for
UNAMIR. Cast doubts, on basis of NGO reports in the country, that the MF would help
resolve the humanitarian situation. Appealed to FR to offer its troops to UNAMIR.
In response, the FR Amb stated that FR would prefer an operation under UN command but
not in the current situation. Incorporating FR soldiers into UNAMIR would expose that
operation to mistrust of the RPF. Moreover, from the military point of view, the MF is
expected to face a number of difficult and unexpected situations. This is why FR prefers a
“national” command.
China recalled the need for agreement of the parties with the MF deployment. Nig and Br
voiced similar positions. (Russia didn’t insist on this condition any more.) Nigeria stated that
it will not stand in the way of adopting the resolution but clearly expressed its misgivings on
the objectives and goals of the French proposal.
Delegation comments:
a. France virtually forced the decision to vote on the draft on 22 June. NZ, Pak and Br
indirectly warned that not only they themselves but even the SC as a whole are not
yet ready to make a decision in so delicate a matter.
b. We drew France’s attention on 20 June to the discrepancy between their intention of
completing the operation within two months and the SG’s estimate that UNAMIR will
not be in a position to fulfil its mandate sooner than in three months. France did not
budge and a number of delegation therefore warned on 21 June of the “Somalia
syndrome” (the withdrawal of UNITAF when UNOSOM II wasn’t yet ready to assume
responsibility for fulfilling its mandate).
c. Discussions on Rwanda (but also on other points of the SC agenda) are particularly
recently very time consuming. This is why, in the absence of Amb. Kovanda, the
Delegation exceptionally requested HQ to provide a short presentation (not just
speaking points).
