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FROM: NEW YORK C04452/NYK 12-May-1994
TO: WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC Immediate
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SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA
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Summary
- With some Council members preferring NZ draft resolution,
both Presidential draft and NZ drafts are on the table
- Working group is meeting now after informals for detailed
consideration
- Adoption of resolution tomorrow is a possibility
- Secretariat reports intense fighting continues in Kigali
(as of Wed)
- "Foreign Minister" of Rwanda is in NY and seeks call on
us. US and UK delegations refuse to meet with him.
Canadians advise they declined approach for visit to
Ottawa and US and Belgium refused visa applications.
Action
- Confirmation that we may vote for a resolution tomorrow
~ Confirmation we should not/not meet with so called
Foreign Minister of Rwanda.
Report
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f
2 Secretariat (Gharekhan) reported on the situation on the
ground saying that intensive fighting continued in Kigali
yesterday. The Hotel Milles Collines also came under attack
from unidentified source. Movements of UNOMUR (existing UN
force established on Uganda side of border) had been
restricted in some places by Ugandan army. (This will impact
on its ability to effectively monitor whether there is any
flow of arms to Rwanda (RPF) from Uganda). Our IFF contains
copy of Gharekhan's speaking notes.
3 As to the availability of troops for an expanded UNAMIR,
Gharekhan said that OAU Sec Gen had advised that he had
received offers of troops from "4 African countries" and
mentioned Tanzania, Ghana and Nigeria in this regard. Fourth
country was not identified because it's decision was not yet
firm.
4 The President (Gambari) reported briefly on his meetings
with RGF "Foreign Minister" and the RPF. Although both
Supported an expanded UNAMIR, the government preferred a
bigger operation to cover the whole of Rwanda and which would
interpose itself between the parties. The RPF wanted a
smaller force with a more limited mandate.
5 Oman opened discussion with what is becoming something of
a precondition for them relating to the need to have a
cease-fire before the Council acts, saying it is
inappropriate for the UN to help if the parties do not "help
themselves by agreeing to a cease-fire". Although the
Russians conceded there were some answers needed in this
context, the line was most strongly countered by Czech,
noting that the existence of a cease-fire was irrelevant to
the mandate under discussion. The majority clearly accepted
that a ceasefire could not be made a precondition.
6 France expressed a preference for the NZ draft but minus
those elements which are not immediately related to providing
humanitarian assistance (ie human rights etc). They proposed
that the focus of discussion be the NZ draft although if
necessary without the reference to Chapter VII. As regards
the arms embargo, (like us) they indicated that they were
either in favour of actually establishing such an embargo
(and setting up the required Council Committee to monitor it)
or leaving the issue where it currently lies with the 30
April Presidential statement (ie not the contradictory
provision proposed in the Presidential draft).
7 UK noted they would not press it, but felt that the
resolution should confine itself to expressing a simple
mandate relating to humanitarian protection only. Second
they favoured leaving flexibility to the Force Commander and
secretariat as to whether, under the changing circumstances,
the force was Kigali centered or border centered (ie focussed
either inside-out, or outside-in). It was unwise to "saddle"
UNAMIR with a particular style, though they understood that
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the preferred technical option was to center in Kigali.
8 UK noted UNOSOM I had illustrated the problems with
becoming focussed solely on Mogadishu port, which resulted in
the Council "getting stuck for months" on that issue. UK
favoured setting a force limit "of up to []" in number which
would also allow some flexibility for deployment of less than
that number. Lastly, UK stressed need for at least some
preliminary costings on which the Council could act. (To
satisfy this concern, Gharekhan noted that secretariat would
be presenting a brief report tomorrow).
9 US confined itself to asking alot of (good) questions but
which are difficult to answer yet. How many troops are
available? What skilis do they have? What equipment do they
bring? How quickly could they be deployed? What countries
would provide logistical support etc? (We know from the
Canadians that secretariat has approached both US and Spain
asking for them to join the present sole effort by Canada in
flying regularly into Kigali to resupply UNAMIR.)
10 China exhibited its traditional reluctance to contemplate
using the words "Chapter VII" operations but interestingly
accepted that an expanded UNAMIR, focussed on humanitarian
assistance, would need "sufficiently strong rules of
engagement". It accepted that UNAMIR could not be axpected
to have the complete cooperation of the parties and might
need to use force but this did not mean that it should not
use every effort to gain voluntary cooperation.
11 For our part, we focussed on 4 issues: the scope of the
mandate, the concept of operations, the quantum of force
required and the arms embargo. On the mandate, we said
France that the framework for the operation should be
humanitarian not peace-enforcement and that this meant there
was a focus on two tasks, protection of civilians and
protection of humanitarian assistance operations. On the
concept of operations, we noted the two approaches, either
"outside-in" or “inside-out" and that this was essentially a
technical question (on which some flexibility could be
displayed).
12 As regards the quantum of the force required we put the
view that stating whether the operation was subject to either
a Chapter VI or Chapter VII mandate was not the real issue.
What is really important is to be very explicit that the
operation has the right degree of authority to use force to
carry out its mandate and that this is reflected in the rules
of engagement. On the arms embargo we agreed with French
position as above.
13. President summed up the discussion by noting that there
was general agreement to focus on a humanitarian mandate and
to contemplate a phased deployment (ie so that it was not
held up till the entire force was in place), that there was a
flexible concept of operations and that the arms embargo be
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in * ‘ . . .
implemented. For Nigeria, it was also important, he noted,
to place the expanded mandate in a political context (ie
Arusha).
14 Working Group then convened and is meeting now.
comment
15 If it would take many days to negotiate an omnibus
resolution dealing with all possible issues, then on balance
it would be preferable to move rapidly ahead at this stage
and secure an expanded force. We could return to the other
issues as a matter of priority in the context of a report
from the Human Rights Commissioner and the special session of
the Commission.
16 We do not discount possibility that Council may finalise
a resolution tomorrow. It is pleasing that there is much
Support for the NZ draft.
"Foreign Minister" of Rwanda Visits
17 The "Foreign Minister" of "interim government" of Rwanda
(Jerome Bicamumpaka) is in New York and has sought a call on
us. UK and US delegations have declined to meet with hin,
even at Junior levels. Canadians advise that they have
reports from their embassies about his recent visits to Bonn
and to Paris which indicate that he is engaged solely ina
propaganda exercise aimed at promoting extremist Hutu views.
Canadian view is that he is not interested in serious
discussion of the problems and on this basis they indicated
to the Rwandan Ambassador in Ottawa that a visit would not be
welcome. They put it to him that he would be better off
seriously negotiating a cease-fire and not travelling
overseas to enlist political support.
18 We are not entirely clear how the "Ministerial"
appointment has been made, but Canadians emphasise that
constitutionally it is the Arusha Peace Accord which provides
the legitimacy for any such appointments and since this has
clearly not been applied, the appointment is not
constitutional. We know also that Belgium and US have
refused visas for purpose of visits to Brussels and
Washington respectively. By contrast some likeminded members
of the Council (Spain, Czech) and some others, France and of
course the President, are seeing him.
19 We would propose that we do not meet Minister given the
circumstances of continued reports of massacres in
"government" held areas. Grateful your views.
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