Citation
International Decision-Making in the Age of
Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1993
Briefing Book
Volume 1
Compiled and produced by the National Security Archive, at George Washington University
For the Critical Oral History Conference at The Hague, Netherlands,
June 1-3, 2014.
Co-sponsored by:
Briefing Book produced with generous support from the
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
For more information, see www.nsarchive.org, or contact Emily Willard/Michael Dobbs/Tom Blanton at 202.994.7000
International Decision-Making
in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1993
Critical Oral History Conference
Table of Contents
Volume 1
Welcome Letter
Biographies of Participants
Conference Agenda
Chronology of Key Events
Declassified Document List
Declassified Documents, by Session
Volume 2
Declassified Document List
Declassified Documents
*Please note that the contents of this briefing book are embargoed (for public release)
until the start of our conference, Monday, June 2, 2014, 9.30 a.m.
International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide
Rwanda 1990-1994
The Hague, June 1-3, 2014
Conference Participants
Major-General (retired) Henry Anyidoho served as the Deputy Force
commander and Chief of Staff for UNAMIR in Rwanda. He has also
served in international peacekeeping operations in Lebanon, Liberia and
Cambodia. Following his time in Rwanda, he was posted to the Ministry
of Defense in Ghana. He served as the Chairman of the Ghana Telecom
Board of Directors and is the author of the book, Guns over Kigali (1997).
Michael Barnett served as the political officer at the US Mission to the
United Nations assigned to cover Rwanda in 1994. His 2003 book,
Eyewitness to a Genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda, draws on his
experiences from this period. Barnett is currently a member of the Council
on Foreign Relations and a University Professor of International Affairs
and Political Science at The George Washington’s Elliott School of
International Affairs in Washington, DC.
Ambassador Jean-Christophe Belliard served as the French government
representative to the Arusha peace negotiations, while posted to the
French embassy in Tanzania between 1991 and 1994. He represented the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Goma (DRC) during Operation Turquoise.
He has also served as French ambassador to Ethiopia and French
Representative to the African Union. He is currently director of African
Affairs at the French Foreign Ministry.
Dr. Jean-Hervé Bradol was the representative of the humanitarian group
Médecins sans Frontiéres (MSF) in Rwanda during the genocide in 1994,
and lobbied western governments for military intervention to stop the
killing. He was President of MSF-France from 2000 to 2008. He is
currently the Director of Research at MSF and editor of Medical
Innovations in Humanitarian Situations: The work of Médecins sans
Frontiéres. He recently co-authored a study of MSF work in the Great
Lakes region between 1992 and 1997.
Colette Braeckman covered the events leading up to the Rwandan
genocide as a prominent Belgian journalist and Africa specialist for the
French language newspaper Le Soir. She has published numerous articles
on Rwanda, both before and after the genocide, and a series of books on
Central Africa, including Rwanda: Histoire d’un Genocide (1994) and
Rwanda-Burundi: les Racines de la Violence (1996). She is a member of
the editorial board of Le Soir.
Ambassador Prudence Bushnell served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs in the US State Department from 1993 to 1996,
and was responsible for the day-to-handling of the Rwandan crisis in
1994. Since then she has served as Ambassador to the Republic of Kenya
(1996-1999) and Guatemala (1999-2002), and Dean of the Leadership and
Management School at the Foreign Service Institute (2002-2005). Today,
she is the CEO of Sage Associates, and consults on a range of
international and leadership issues.
Jean-Philippe Ceppi was the first foreign journalist to use the term
“genocide” in relation to events in Rwanda in an article published in the
French daily Libération on April 11, 1994, describing the Gikondo
massacre. He has covered Africa since 1989 for French and Swiss news
outlets as well as the BBC French service. Ceppi is the founder of the
Swiss Investigative Reporters Network and a correspondent for Swiss
radio.
Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire (Retired), was the Force Commander
of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1993 and 1994.
His book, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in
Rwanda,was awarded the Governor General’s Literary Award for NonFiction in 2004. Since his retirement from the military, he has written and
spoken extensively about humanitarian assistance and human rights. He is
the President of the Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire Foundation,
founder of the Child Soldiers Initiative and a member of the Canadian
Senate.
Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari was the Nigerian representative on the
UN Security Council in 1994, and President of the Council in May 1994.
He was also coordinator of the non-aligned caucus. He served as Nigerian
ambassador to the United Nations from January 1990 to October 1999. He
was a senior advisor to the Secretary General from 1999 to 2007, working
on both Africa and Iraq, and Joint United Nations-Africa Union Special
Representative on Darfur since 2010.
Dr. James Gasana was Rwanda’s Minister of Defense from 1992 to 1993
when he was forced to flee the country by Hutu hardliners. As Minister of
Agriculture and Environment from 1990 to 1992, he drew attention to the
political instability caused by environmental and economic factors,
including the refugee crisis. He is author of Rwanda: Du Parti-État à
L’État Garnison. He is now a consultant on environmental issues for
leading international organizations, including the Food and Agriculture
Organization.
Professor André Guichaoua is a French sociologist and specialist in the
Great Lakes region who was present in Rwanda at the beginning of the
genocide. He served as an expert witness in Arusha for the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. His books include a detailed study of the
events of April 1994, based on ICTR documents, entitled Rwanda: De la
guerre au genocide (2010) that will soon appear in English.
David Hannay served as the Ambassador and Permanent Representative
of the United Kingdom to the UN from 1990 to 1995. He was elevated to
the House of Lords in June 2001. He has since served as Chair of the
Board of the United Nations Association UK from 2006 to 2011 and is
now Chair of the All Party Group on Global Security and NonProliferation. Lord Hannay is also a member of the Top Level Group of
UK Parliamentarians for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and NonProliferation.
Ambassador Colin Keating was President of the UN Security Council in
April 1994 when the Rwandan genocide started. He served as New
Zealand Ambassador to the UN from 1993 to 1996 and a member of the
Security Council in 1993 and 1994. He was Council president during the
month of April in 1994 when the genocide started. In 2005, Keating
became the founding Executive Director of Security Council Report, an
independent non-profit organization based in New York.
Ambassador Karel Kovanda served as a non-permanent member of the
UN Security Council in 1994 and 1994. Ambassador Kovanda was the
first UN ambassador to use the term “genocide” to describe events in
Rwanda. He has also served as Czech ambassador to NATO and Deputy
Director General of External Relations in the European Commission from
2005 to 2010. Kovanda currently works in the private sector.
Ambassador Joyce Leader served as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the
US Embassy in Kigali. Leader has also served as US Ambassador to the
Republic of Guinea and Director of the Office of Refugee Assistance to
Asia and the Near East. She wrote Rwanda’s Struggle for Democracy and
Peace, 1991-1994, which was published in 2001 by The Fund for Peace
where she was a Senior Fellow.
Ambassador Patrick Mazimhaka held the position of Vice-Chairman of
the Rwandan Patriotic Front from 1993 to 1998, and was the principal
RPF negotiator in Arusha. He served as Minister of Youth, Sports and
Cooperatives between 1994 and 1996 when he was made Minister of
Rehabilitation and Social Affairs. Other senior positions include Special
Envoy of the President of Rwanda. He is now an independent consultant.
Edward Mortimer was the main commentator and columnist on foreign
affairs for the Financial Times from 1987 to 1998. He has also written for
The Times of London and from 1998 to 2006 and served as chief
speechwriter and director of communications to UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan. Mortimer is currently Senior Vice-President and Chief
Program Officer at the Salzburg Global Seminar and chair of the Sri
Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice.
Ambassador Ami Mpungwe served as Tanzania’s facilitator for the
Arusha peace negotiations between 1992 and 1993, and Director for
Africa and the Middle East in the Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Other diplomatic posts include High Commissioner to South Africa,
Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia from 1994 to 2000. He currently operates
in the private sector and, among others, chairs the boards of TanzaniteOne
Mining Ltd, MultiChoice Tanzania, Chamber of Mines and sits on the
Council of the University of Dar es Salaam.
Monique Mujawamariya was a prominent Rwandan human rights
activist prior to the April 1994 genocide. She met with President Clinton
in December 1993, and lobbied the US government on behalf of genocide
victims following her escape from Rwanda in April 1994. She founded
the Rwandan Association for the Defense of Human Rights and Public
Liberties in 1990, and was the target of an assassination attempt in 1992.
She now lives in South Africa.
Jean-Marie Vianney Ndagijimana is a lawyer. He served as Rwandan
Ambassador to Addis-Ababa from January 1986 to October 1990, and to
Paris from October 1990 to April 1994, but broke with the provisional
Rwandan government after the start of the genocide. He served as Foreign
Affairs Minister in the first post-genocidal government from July 1994 to
October 1994. He now is the spokesman of the Committee for Unity,
Peace and Reconciliation in Rwanda (Inteko y’ubwiyunge mu Rwanda).
He lives in France.
Bacre Ndiaye is a Senegalese lawyer who served as Special UN
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions between
1992 and 1998. In August 1993, he authored a special report on human
rights violations in Rwanda. He served as Director of the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights at the UN (1998-2006) and Deputy
Special Representative in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2007-2008).
He is currently a senior aide to the High Commissioner for Human Rights
in Geneva.
Venuste Nshimiyimana was a UNAMIR press officer in 1993 and 1994,
and an eyewitness to the killings at the Ecole Technique Officiele in
Kigali, at the start of the genocide. A prominent Rwandan journalist, he
now works for the Africa Department and Global News Division of the
British Broadcasting Corporation.
Ambassador Ahmedou Ould Abdallah was the special representative of
the UN Secretary-General in Burundi from 1993 to 1995. He has also
served as the special representative of the UN Secretary-General in West
Africa based in Dakar and is a member of many international recognized
organizations like Transparency international and Search for Common
Ground. He is currently the President of the Centre for Strategy and
Security in the Sahel-Sahara region.
As an academic and human rights activist, Filip Reyntjens publicized the
existence of death squads linked to President Habyarimana in October
1992. He is the author of numerous books on Rwanda, including Rwanda,
trois jours qui ont fait basculer l’histoire (1995) and The Great African
War (2009). He served as an expert witness to the International Criminal
Tribunal of Rwanda and the International Criminal Court. He is currently
Professor of African Law and Politics at the Institute of Development
Policy and Management at the University of Antwerp.
Iqbal Riza served as the Assistant Secretary-General in the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations at the UN starting in March 1993 until January
1996 under Kofi Annan. He went on to become the Chief of Staff to
Annan while he was the UN Secretary General until he retired in 2005.
Since then Riza helped to start the Alliance of Civilizations at the UN and
has been a Special Adviser to the current UN Secretary-General Ban Kimoon.
Ambassador David Scheffer served as Senior Adviser during the first
Clinton administration and advisor to the US Representative to the UN,
Madeleine Albright at the time of the Rwandan genocide. From 1997 to
2001 he was the US Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues and led
the US delegation in the UN talks that established the International
Criminal Court. Scheffer is currently Director of the Center for
International Human Rights at Northwestern University in the United
States.
Ambassador John Shattuck became Assistant Secretary of the U.S. State
Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor in 1993
where he played a large role in the establishment of the International
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia. He also served as US
Ambassador to the Czech Republic and as CEO of the John F. Kennedy
Library Foundation, and Tufts University, where he taught human rights
and international relations. He is currently the President of Central
European University.
Johan Swinnen was Belgium’s Ambassador to Rwanda from 1990 to
1994. Since then he has served as Ambassador to the Netherlands, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Spain. He also served as the Director
of the Diplomatic Department in the Belgian Ministry of Defense and
Coordinator for External Policies in the Belgian Foreign Ministry since
January 2013. He is writing a book on his experiences in Rwanda.
Don Webster served as the Senior Appeals counsel and Senior Trial
Attorney at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda from 1999 to
2012. He served as the Senior Trial Attorney and lead prosecution council
in the case of Prosecutor v. Karemera et al, where the vice president of the
MRND party at the time, Édouard Karemera was found guilty of
genocide. Webster now resides in New York City.
Conference Staff
Mike Abramowitz directs the National Institute for Holocaust Education
at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC. From 2009 to
2014, Abramowitz directed the Museum’s Center for the Prevention of
Genocide. Prior to coming to the Museum he worked as a reporter and
editor for The Washington Post, serving as the Post’s White House
correspondent (2006-2009) as well as the National Editor (2000-2006).
Tom Blanton is the Director of the National Security Archive at George
Washington University in Washington, DC. He first came to the Archive
in 1986 as its first Director of Planning and Research. Blanton has
published and co-authored many books, and his articles have appeared in
notable international publications such as The New York Times, The
Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal and The Boston Globe.
Michael Dobbs is a senior advisor to the Center for the Prevention of
Genocide at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, and director of the
Rwanda documentation project. He is the author of five books, including a
biography of Madeleine Albright and a Cold War trilogy, including One
Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of
Nuclear War. He was previously a diplomatic reporter and foreign
correspondent for The Washington Post, posted in Yugoslavia, Poland,
France and the Soviet Union, where he covered the collapse of
communism.
Nadia Ficara was recently named director of Donor Travel Programs and
the VIP Speakers Bureau at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in
Washington, DC, after having served as director of Special Events since
2006. Shortly after starting at the Museum, she developed the International
Travel Program. In the past two years, she has worked with the Center for
the Prevention of Genocide to develop its Bearing Witness programs.
Ficara previously worked for the World Presidents’ Organization for ten
years as the senior special events manager.
Cameron Hudson is the acting director of the Center for the Prevention
of Genocide at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC.
Prior to that, he served as the Center’s policy director, overseeing
initiatives on early warning and the responsibility to protect. Hudson has
also served as the chief of staff to the President’s Special Envoy for Sudan
(2009-2011) and as the director for African affairs on the staff of the
National Security Council at the White House (2005-2009).
Marie-Laure Poiré is the Manager for Events and Communications at the
Hague Institute for Global Justice. She previously spent time at The
Center for Transatlantic Relations, at Women in International Security
(WIIS) and also at The Alliance for Peacebuilding designing and
implementing programs to educate those from the private, public and
nonprofit sectors on national and international security issues, as well as
on leadership and professional development.
Kristin Scalzo is currently a research assistant at the Center for the
Prevention of Genocide at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in
Washington, DC. She previously interned at the National Security Archive
for the Genocide Prevention Project. Scalzo has focused her research on
genocide prevention and peace and conflict resolution in Africa.
Emily Willard is the Research Associate for the Genocide Prevention
Project at the National Security Archive. She is currently researching the
international response to the conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia. Previously,
she worked on the Archive’s Evidence Project conducting research on
Guatemala, Mexico, and El Salvador, and the Colombia Documentation
Project. Emily contributed to the publication of the Archive’s document
collections, Colombia and the United States, and Mexico-United States
Counternarcotics Policy. Willard is also a 2014 Rotary Peace Fellow.
Dr. Abiodun Williams was appointed the first President of The Hague
Institute for Global Justice on January 1, 2013. He has previously served
as Senior Vice President of the Center for Conflict Management at the
United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Washington, DC (2011-2012).
From 2001-2007, Williams served as Director of Strategic Planning in the
Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General, where he was a principal
advisor to Secretaries-General Ban Ki-moon and Kofi Annan. He has also
excelled in academia and has published three books on conflict prevention
and multilateral negotiations.
Draft Agenda
International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide
Rwanda 1990-1994
The Hague, June 1-3, 2014
We are planning a mixture of formal and informal activities for our conference, based on the formula
previously used by the National Security Archive. There will be four primary working sessions of the
conference, divided into two sessions each on Monday, June 2, and Tuesday June 3. Each session will
be three hours long, with a coffee break in the middle (precise time to be determined by the moderator.)
During the first day, we will focus predominantly on the lead-up to the genocide, between October 1990
and April 1994, with the theme, “Failure to Prevent.” During these sessions, we will ask whether it was
possible for the international community to foresee and prevent the gathering catastrophe in Rwanda.
The second day will focus on the international response to the genocide (“Failure to Protect”). We will
pay particular attention to the role played by the United Nations Security Council. We will close with a
“lessons learned” session, looking at the similarities/differences between Rwanda and contemporary
mass atrocities. It is important to note that we are striving for greater historical understanding, not
apportionment of blame.
We want to keep the discussion informal and dynamic. In keeping with our desire to create a relaxed
atmosphere, we encourage casual or business/casual attire. Participants will be encouraged to intervene
multiple times, and pose questions and comments to each other, rather than making prepared speeches.
The goal is to expose participants to the views of decision-makers and eyewitnesses representing a wide
variety of different vantage points, and learn from each other’s experiences. The working sessions will
be closed to the press, but an audio record will be kept for historical purposes. (All participants will
have an opportunity to review, and if necessary correct, a transcript of their remarks prior to
publication.) The draft agenda below outlines some proposed subjects for discussion, but we welcome
further suggestions.
Simultaneous English-French interpretation will be provided.
Sunday, June 1
7 p.m. Dinner
● Welcoming remarks and informal discussion.
Contact:
Michael Dobbs, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. mdobbs@ushmm.org. +1-202-656-9282
Draft Agenda
2
Monday, June 2: Failure to Prevent
9.30 a.m. - 12.30 p.m. Working Session 1
“Peacemakers and Peacekeepers: The promise and perils of Arusha, 1990-1993”
We will examine whether international decision-makers and diplomats were aware of the potential for
disaster in Rwanda during the pre-genocide period. Were the concerns of diplomats and other observers
on the ground in Rwanda adequately communicated to the highest levels of government? Did we have a
coherent strategy for dealing with the challenges of democratization in Africa in the immediate
aftermath of the Cold War? Was the crisis exacerbated by policy differences between Paris, Brussels,
and Washington involving conflicting priorities and national interests?
● Background to Arusha, e.g. Mitterrand’s La Baule speech, June 6, 1990; introduction of multiparty system; RPF invasion of October 1 1990.
● Political negotiations. (July 1992 - January 1993)
● Massacres of Tutsi and RPF offensive of 8 February 1993.
● Military negotiations in Arusha. Signing of Arusha agreements, August 1993
● Conversation between “Peacemakers and “Peacekeepers”
12.45 p.m. – 1.45 p.m. Lunch
2 p.m. - 5 p.m. Working Session 2
“The Failed Peace: October 1993-April 1994”
We will look at the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement, with a particular focus on the role of
UNAMIR. Did UNAMIR have sufficient resources, and a sufficiently broad mandate, to accomplish its
mission? Was there a breakdown in communication between Kigali and New York? Was the Arusha
agreement poorly designed or poorly implemented? Was there a Plan B in case the peace agreement
failed to hold?
● UNSC vote to authorize peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, October 5, 1993
● Assassination of Burundi president Melchior Ndadaye (October 21, 1993) and arrival of
UNAMIR in Kigali.
● Jean-Pierre warning, January 10, 1994
● Belgian call for a strengthening of UNAMIR, February 25, 1994
● Shootdown of Habyarimana plane, killing of Belgian peacekeepers, and beginning of the
genocide April 6-11. 1994.
7 p.m. Dinner
Draft Agenda
3
Tuesday, June 3: Failure to Protect
9.30 a.m. - 12.30 p.m. Working Session 3
“Inside the UN Security Council, April - July 1994”
We will examine the record of the U.N. Security Council in supervising the deployment of UNAMIR
and responding to the upsurge in violence in Rwanda following the April 6 assassination of President
Habyarimana? Were UNSC members adequately informed about what was going on in Rwanda? Who
took the decision to withdraw UNAMIR, and what were the decision-making processes between the US
government? Are there structural weaknesses in the way the Security Council operates, such as lack of
an independent intelligence capability?
● What did we know-and when did we know it?
● The UNAMIR withdrawal decision, April 11-21, 1994
● Debating the G-word, April 21-May 5, 1994
● Ending the genocide, May 15-July 18, 1994. Operation Turquoise and the victory of the RPF
● Unresolved mysteries and controversies.
12.45 p.m. – 1.45 p.m. Lunch
2 p.m. - 5 p.m. Working Session 4
“Lessons from Rwanda”
We will seek to draw broader lessons from the Rwanda tragedy, examining its relevance for modern-day
crises. Was the Rwanda genocide sui generis, or does it reflect broader challenges facing the
international community following the end of the Cold War? What does Rwanda teach us about the
mechanics of genocide and mass atrocity? How much influence did the international community have
over events in Rwanda? Did it use its influence wisely and/or effectively? What role did domestic
politics, and internal political splits (cohabitation in France, divided government in the United States,
multi-party coalition in Rwanda) play in the Rwanda tragedy? What were the missed opportunities and
lessons for prevention? What progress, if any, have we made over the last two decades?
1
International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1994
Chronology of Key Events
1990
June 19: At a summit of Francophone African leaders at La Baule, in France, French President
Mitterrand declares that French government assistance to African nations would be conditioned on their
progress toward democratization.
July 5: President Habyarimana announces a package of political reform initiatives including separation of
church and state and the preparation of a new charter under which multiple political parties could be
recognized.
October 1: Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invades Rwanda from Uganda and attack government forces
(FAR) at Kagitumbe. Offensive is halted with the help of the Belgian, Zairean and French troops.
1991
Date: Massacre of Tutsi and opponents in the prefectures of Ruhengeri, Gisenyi, Kibuye and Byumba.
February 19: Addressing a key cause of instability in the region, the governments of Rwanda, Uganda,
Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire, along with the OAU and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, initial
the Dar es Salaam Declaration, which commits the Government of Rwanda to offer voluntary repatriation
of refugees.
March 29: Ceasefire agreement signed at N’Sele, Zaire. OAU to supervise ceasefire with multi-national
military observer group, as the ceasefire is violated almost immediately.
June 10: A new constitution is promulgated to allow for democratic reforms.
1992
March 4: massacre in Bugesera, attacks leave 300 dead and 15,000 displaced.
March 6: CDR formation announced
April 16: Habyarimana allows opposition parties to join the GOR, finally creating a coalition
government.
July 12: At Arusha, Tanzania, the RPF and GOR agree to the deployment of the NMOG between their
forces as peace talks begin. For the rest of this month, pressure from all sides is coming into the country
to agree to a cease-fire, while rallies and road blocks occur in Kigali.
August 18: The RPF and the Rwandan government agree to the Protocol on the Agreement of the Rule of
Law, the first of five protocols that will be negotiated over the next year culminating in the Arusha Peace
Agreement.
November: Escalation of extremist Hutu militia violence - demonstrations by opponents of the regime.
1993
January 9: GOR-RPF sign conclusion of power-sharing accord.
2
January 20-22: Tutsi and opponents massacred in the prefectures of Ruhengeri, Gisenyi, Kibuye and
Byumba.
February 8: RPF breaks cease-fire and advances towards Kigali.
February 22: Government declares cease-fire. Rwanda and Uganda ask UNSC for military observers at
the border.
March 7: A new ceasefire accord is negotiated, calling for renewed talks at Arusha.
March 12: UNSCR 872 encouraging the talks in Arusha to continue.
April: UNHCR special rapporteur, Bacre Ndiaye, on illegal, summary or arbitrary executions visits
Rwanda.
April 7: President and PM sign a joint declaration on human rights.
May: UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reports to the Security Council and recommends
setting up a UN observation mission on the border between Rwanda and Uganda.
June 9: Protocol on refugee return signed in Arusha.
June 22: UNSC establishes peacekeeping mission at Rwanda-Uganda border, known as UNOMUR.
June 24: Peace talks in Arusha are suspended – breakdown comes over issues related to force integration.
July 16: New government appointed – Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a protégé of MDR President
Twagiramungu, becomes prime minister. New Foreign Minister Gasana is from same MDR faction.
August 3: Accord on military integration signed in Arusha.
August 4: Arusha Peace Accords signed in Arusha, Tanzania.
August 10: Report published by Bacre Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights
in Rwanda identifying that the massacres fulfill the treaty definition of genocide, that reports of violence
are increasing, extremist propaganda is widespread and militias are being organized.
September 16: Joint GOR/RPF delegation goes to NY to lobby UNSC for deployment of UNAMIR.
October 3: Black Hawk Down incident in Mogadishu, Somalia
October 5: UN Security Council Resolution 872 authorizes UNAMIR mission in Rwanda
October 23: Assassination of Melchior ndadaye, Hutu, the first democratically-elected president of
burundi, by factions of tutsi-dominated army; the various massacres leave 100,000 dead, and cause the
exodus of 700,000 people, of whom 500,000 arrive in Rwanda.
October 22: Force Commander Roméo Dallaire arrives in Kigali, Rwanda.
November 16: UN peacekeepers raise UN flag in Rwanda.
November 17-18: massacres in Ruhengeri, in five separate locations.
November 23: Special Representative to the Secretary General Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh arrives in
Kigali.
3
December 3: Dallaire receives letter signed by group of senior RGF and Gendarmerie officers discussing
potential sabotage of peace process.
December 20: UNSCR 891 extending UNOMUR.
December 28: RPF battalion moves to the CND Parliament building escorted by Belgian and Tunisian
peacekeepers.
1994
January 5: President Habyarimana installed but disagreement between parties blocks formation of the
BBTG and National Assembly. Over the next few months, the BBTG will try to be installed multiple
times but due to political infighting, party splits and violence, it is unsuccessful.
January 10: Dallaire sends fax to UN Secretariat in New York regarding meeting with informant in
Kigali. Annan sends a cable back that same day refusing Dallaire permission for pre-emptive raids on
arms caches, and orders him to request meeting with President Habyarimana.
February 14: German, Belgian, French and US Ambassadors meet with President Habyarimana to urge
quick establishment of transitional institutions.
February 21: Hutu-supremacist CDR party demonstrates for right to participate in Transitional National
Assembly. On the same day opposition political party leader (PSD), Felicien Gatabazi is assassinated.
The next day CDR President Martin Bucyana is also assassinated. Violence escalates.
February 23: The parties again try to install the transitional government, but fail to do so.
February 25: Belgian FM Claes calls for a strengthening of UNAMIR after his visit to Rwanda.
March 19: Deputy Assistant Secretary Prudence Bushnell and Director of the Office of Central African
Affairs Arlene Render arrive in Kigali to push for the political transition, stay until March 23.
March 22: UNAMIR completes Phase II deployment, troop strength now at 2,539
March 25: Ceremonies for the installation of the transitional institutions scheduled to take place, but
cancelled due to a number of outstanding issues.
April 5: UN Security Council passes Resolution 909 extending UNAMIR mandate for six weeks with a
review period.
April 6: President Habyarimana of Rwanda, President Ntaryamira of Burundi, and a number of
government officials are killed in a plane crash on their approach to the airport in Kigali. President
Habyarimana’s death sparks violence and widespread massacres in Kigali that soon spread throughout the
country.
April 7: Start of massacre of political opponents, Hutu in favor of power-sharing and Tutsi. This includes
the kidnaping, torture and murder of ten Belgian peacekeepers while trying to protect the Prime Minister,
Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who is also executed by government forces.
April 9: Former Parliament speaker Theodore Sindikubwabo announces the formation of an interim
government and declares himself interim president.
April 9: Evacuation of foreign nationals begins.
4
April 10: Ambassador David Rawson closes the U.S. Embassy in Kigali as corpses in the streets of Kigali
start to be collected.
April 11: Article in French daily Liberation written by journalist Jean-Philippe Ceppi uses the word
“genocide” for the first time to describe the situation.
April 12: Rwandan Defence Minister speaks on Radio Mille Collines, calling for the Tutsi to be
eliminated.
April 14: Evacuation of the last foreign nationals and the withdrawal of Belgian UNAMIR troops is
announced.
April 21: The UN Security Council approves the withdrawal of approximately 2,000 UNAMIR
peacekeeping troops in Rwanda due to security conditions. Only 450 remain to provide security to
humanitarian workers and displaced persons in Kigali and throughout Rwanda.
April 27: At a general audience, Pope John-Paul II calls on ‘those responsible to work generously and
effectively to put a stop to this genocide.’
April 28: Oxfam press release refers to the massacres in Rwanda as ‘genocide.’
April 30: Massacres condemned by the UN Security Council, but 4 states, including the US and the UK
refuse to include the term ‘genocide’ in the Resolution. Boutros Boutros-Ghali calls in vain for the
Security Council to ‘act forcefully’ to ‘put an end to the massacres’ and questions the wisdom of the
reduction in UNAMIR manpower.
May 4: French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe calls on the United Nations to give UNAMIR more troops.
In an interview on ABC Nightline, Boutros-Ghali affirms that ‘genocide’ is taking place in Rwanda.
May 12: Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch Africa publishes an article entitled ‘How
governments can stop the genocide in Rwanda’ in the New York Times.
May 15: French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe uses the term ‘genocide’ when speaking to the press after a
meeting of the Council of Ministers of the European Union.
May 17: The UN Security Council passes a new resolution (918) approving the deployment of 5,500
UNAMIR troops to Rwanda to assist the humanitarian operations.
May 22: Kigali airport taken by the RPF.
May 25: The UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali states that the response to the crisis in
Rwanda is a failure for the UN and the international community. He refers to the massacres in Rwanda as
genocide, inferring that the killings have explicitly targeted the Tutsi population.
June 7: UN Commission on Human Rights special envoy Rene Degni-Segui begins a week-long mission
to investigate human rights abuses in Rwanda.
June 8: UN Security Council Resolution 925 admits that ‘acts of genocide’ have been committed in
Rwanda.
June 12: OAU condemns ‘crimes against humanity.’
June 14: Gitarama taken by the RPF, as the ‘interim government’ flees towards Kibuye and Gisenyi.
5
June 17: France announces its plan to the UN Security Council to deploy 1,000-2,000 troops to Rwanda
as an interim peacekeeping force until UNAMIR troops arrive.
June 22: The UN Security Council approves the proposal to dispatch 2,500 French troops to Rwanda, for
no more than two months and operating under a Chapter VII UN peacekeeping mandate.
June 24: Forces for the French-led operation are deployed into western Rwanda through Goma and
Bukavu in eastern Zaire.
June 28: Back from his mission in Rwanda, UN Human Rights Commission rapporteur René DegniSégui confirms that the term genocide can be applied to the Tutsi massacres and calls for the
establishment of an international criminal court.
July 1: Security Council adopts Resolution 935 calling for a committee of impartial experts to examine
and analyze evidence of ‘possible acts of genocide.’
July 3: The UN Secretary-General authorizes France to create a ‘secure humanitarian zone’, comprising
20% of Rwandan territory in the south-west of the country (Cyangugu, Gikongoro, Kibuye).
July 4: Kigali is taken by the RPF. This is also the start of a massive exodus of Rwandans, fleeing
advancing RPF forces, towards the north-west region (Ruhengeri, Gisenyi) occupied by the ‘interim
government.’
July 15: The Clinton Administration publicly declares that it no longer recognizes the Government of
Rwanda (GOR), primarily on the basis of the GOR’s support of the acts of genocide. Rwandan officials in
Washington, DC, are asked to leave the country within the week, and the GOR’s financial assets in the
U.S. are frozen.
July 18: Unilateral ceasefire by the RPF. Establishment of Government of National Unity in Rwanda as
Pasteur Bizimungu is to be inaugurated as President of Rwanda on July 19.
Session 1
“Peacemakers and Peacekeepers:
The promise and perils of Arusha, 1990-1993”
Documents List
Page No.
1-1
1-19
1-27
1-31
1-32
1-33
1-35
1-36
1-37
1-47
1-54
1-68
1-80
Date
Author
Title
Dangers of
5/22/1990 Nsengiyumva Democratization
Mittterand's La Baule
6/6/1990 Mitterand
Speech FRENCH
Mittterand's La Baule
6/6/1990 Mitterand
Speech ENGLISH
Source
ICTR
evidence
public
statement
public
statement
French
MartresAssessment of Political
Parliamentary
10/24/1990 Galinie
Situation FRENCH
Investigation
French
MartresAssessment of Political
Parliamentary
10/24/1990 Galinie
Situation ENGLISH
Investigation
10 Commandments of the ICTR
12/10/1990 Kangura
Hutus
evidence
"We are at the limit of the French
Anglophone front"
Parliamentary
1/23/1991 Mitterrand
FRENCH
Investigation
"We are at the limit of the French
Anglophone front"
Parliamentary
1/23/1991 Mitterrand
ENGLISH
Investigation
Freedom of
GOR Outlines Strategy to Information
5/13/1992 Flaten
Negotiations to End War Act
Mood of the Military and
ICTR
7/27/1992 Nsengiyumva Civilians
evidence
Freedom of
Internal Insecurity: an
Information
8/21/1992 Leader
Ongoing Problem
Act
INR/AA'S AFRICAN
Freedom of
TRENDS - 9/18/92 (NO. Information
9/23/1992 Ehrenreich
19)
Act
Reyntjens report on pro- Freedom of
US embassy Habyarimana death
Information
10/22/1992 Brussels
squads
Act
Notes
excerpt of full document, pages
2-19 only
French language (original)
English language (translation)
excerpt of full document, pages
1-2
the last 7 pages were withheld
in full as non-responsive
excerpt of article 21 page only
Page No.
Date
Author
1-82
10/30/1992
1-83
10/30/1992
1-84
11/16/1992 SecState
1-89
11/20/1992 Flaten
Title
Arusha Accords - Article
21 Excerpt
Arusha Accords - Article
51 Excerpt
Defense minister James
Gasana travels to
Washington
1-96
1/15/1993 Bagosora
Challenges to integrating
the Rwandan army
Splits in Rwandan
government delegation
1-99
Quesnot2/8/1993 Delaye
Increased support for
Rwandan army FRENCH
1-101
Quesnot2/8/1993 Delaye
Increased support for
Rwandan army ENGLISH
"The Rwandan army no
longer fights" FRENCH
"The Rwandan army no
longer fights" ENGLISH
"We must get out - via the
UN" FRENCH
"We must get out - via the
UN" ENGLISH
1-102
2/26/1993 Joxe
1-104
1-106
2/26/1993 Joxe
Mitterrand3/3/1993 Vedrine
Mitterrand3/3/1993 Vedrine
1-107
4/19/1993 Flaten
1-112
5/20/1993 Gasana
1-105
Arusha and Beyond
Rwandan Defense
Minister Looks for
Peacekeepers
1-116
6/1/1993 Bagosora
Negotiation Strategy
1-118
8/4/1993 Bushnell
Peacekeeping in Rwanda
Report on human rights
abuses
1-120
8/11/1993 Ndiaye
Source
Notes
United
Nations
United
Nations
excerpt of article 51 only
Freedom of
Information
Act
Freedom of
Information
Act
ICTR
evidence
French
Parliamentary
Investigation French language (original)
French
Parliamentary
Investigation English language (translation)
Mitterand
Archive
French language (original)
Mitterand
Archive
English language (translation)
Mitterand
Archive
French language (original)
Mitterand
Archive
English language (translation)
Freedom of
Information
Act
Freedom of
Information
Act
ICTR
evidence
Freedom of
Information
Act
United
Nations
Excerpt of page 16 only
1-1
Forletterhead
[seeoriginalJ
REPUBLIC
OF RWANDA
Ministry
of National
Defence
KIGALI,22 May 1990
Rwandan Army
No.042/ G2.2.0
Military
Headquarters
G2
To : Chief
ofStaff
Rwandan Army
Re: Reflections
on outrent
situation
I havethehonour
toforward
herewith
myreflections
onthecurrent
situation
whieh
is partoftheon-going
changes
ushered
in bywhatiscustomarily
ealled
the"Wind
fromtheEast"
or"Democratisation,,.
I havedealt
w/thvar/ous
issues,
att/mes
expresshag
a personal
opinion
witha
viewtohighlighting
thefactors
battanspeed
uptheprocess
ofchange
inour
ëountry.
I haveprobably
contr/buted
noth/ng
newbutI believe
my reflections
could
contain
onepoint
ortheother
thatisrelevant
tothesubject.
3.
If,inthecourse
ofmyreflections,
I havegonebeyond
whatisallowed
(Gutandukira)
orhurtsomepeople,
I crave
their
indulgence,
forI haveonlyone
intention
¯ tocontribute
toSedebate.
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6877
I haveperhaps
proposed
nosolutions
tothevarious
problems,
themoresoasit is
difficult
fora single
person
tofindsolutions
toproblems
thataresodaunting.
However,
I havestated
mypoints
of viewwhereappropriate.
I hopethese
reflections
willhelpbroaden
debate
aspartofthequest
forsolutions
to somecurrent
problems.
(Signed)
NSENGIYUMVA Anatole
Lt. Col.BEMS
G2 EM AR
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The2eo-strate~ic
andpoliticai
situatior
in theworldin Africa
in nethbourin
c_ountries
to Rwanda
andin Rwanda
itself
An analytieal
essay
INTRODUCTION
f,
V.f ~ , ,,_,/y t i
~
..
..
’~~"
Theworld’s
atten{ion
isriveted
on thechanges
ushered
in bywhatis nowknown
asthe"Wind
fromtheEast",
anditseffects.
TheWestprefers
tocallit
Democrat]satlon,
a termthathasbeenadopted
byailthemedia
ailoverthe
world.
Theso-called
"Wind
fromtheEast"
tookitsfisein theWarsaw
Pactcountries,
beginning
withPoland,
Hungary,
EastGermany,
etc.Rurnania
tried
toresist
but
theCaucescu
regime
wasdramatically
sweptaway,as we know.
2.
Thewindof Perestroika
blewacross
thegreat
Soviet
Union
which
shattered
the
status
quohitherto
considered
a virtually
unchanging
reality
inthesocialist
and
communist
system.
Events
intheSoviet
satellites
weresignificanfly
influenced
by
changes
intheSoviet
Union.
Suchchanges
arestill
underway
anditisdifficult
to
predict
howfarthcywillgo.
3.
The"WindfromtheEast"or thewaveofdemocratization
sweptthrough,
and
continues
tosweep
through
theAfrican
continent
andthetestofthe
Third
World.
China,
Mongolia,
Nepal,
LatinAmerica,
etc.,areundergoing
profound
changes
thatwillgather
momenturn.
InthecaseofAfrica,
one-party
systems
of
govemment
arebeing
called
to question.
Theforces
of change
areat work
everywhere.
EvenSenegal,
whichbasbeena multiparty
democracy
forsometime
now,basalsofeltthejolts
».
ofthe"Wind
fromtheEast
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Protests
bystudents,
state
employees,
trade
unionists
andeventhemilitary
(in
Côted’Ivoire)
havechallenged
govemments
anddemanded
change.
Changes
areunfolding
everywhere
- in Senegal,
Niger,
Nigeria,
Mali,
Benin,
Gabon,
Central
African
Republie,
Zaire,
Kenya,
Tanzania,
Zambia,
Zimbabwe,
etc.Benin,
Gabon,
Zaire
andCôted’Ivoire
haveaccepted
multiparty
politics
and
initiated
theprocess
ofehange.
Govemments
in somecountries
suchas Tanzania
areplanning
to initiate
gradual
changes
inlinewiththeaspirations
oftheir
people.
Others
likeKenya
and
Zimbabwe
arestill
clinging
to one-party
systems.
4.
Thesituation
in neighbouring
countrie~
a)
In Zaire
profound
changes
areunderway.
President
Mobutu,
afterholding
popular
consultations,
basopted
formultiparty
politics,
appointing
a
Premier
Commissaire
d’Etat
[First
StateCommissioner]
andforming
a
new govemment.
Mostofthebarons
oftheMobutu
regime
whichhasbeenin powerfor
twenty-five
years
havebeenleRhighanddry.
TheMPRis nolonger
the’Party-State’
andPresident
Mobutu
has
relinquished
theoffice
of MPRChairman.
Otherveryprofound
measures
havebeentaken
as partofthe
process
ofchange.
However,
thesituation
hasnotimproved
much.President
Mobutu
hasdemanded
therecognition
ofonly
three
political
parties
inZaire.
Nevertheless,
several
political
parties
haveapplied
forreeognition.
Someareevendemanding
that
Mobutu
should
stepdown.
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LOC)I 6880
University
students
andothers
ininstitutions
ofhigher
leaming
are
continually
protesting
andclashing
withtheforces
of lawandorder.
Such
protests
bavebeenstaged
in Kinshasa,
Kisangani,
Bukavu
and
Lumumbashi,
andseveral
people
havebeenwounded
andevenkilled
in
theclashes,
contrary
tooffieial
statements.
Itistherefore
apparent
thatthe
situation
hasnotataUretumed
tonormal
ar~dthechanges
initiated
in
Zaire
arenotlikely
tobeaspeacef-u!as
0nem!ght
çxp_eeL_____
r~A)
Thepresence
andinfluence
offoreign
nationals
inZaire,
particularly
that
of mulattos
andRwandans_are
already
contested
by somesegments
of the
Zairian
population.
Thisdoesnotaugur
wellforourcountry.
b)
Thesituation
inBurundi
should
beviewed
asanexception.
In fact,
Burundi
is undergoing
changes
albeit
against
another
backdrop;
herethe
changes
weretriggered
before
the"Wind
fromtheEast"
sweptthrough
the
African
continent.
First,
there
wastheputsch
byMajorPierre
Buyoya
who
overthrew
theBagaza
regime.
Up tillthen,
thechange
of regime
and
establishment
oftheThird
Republie
in Burundi
couldbeconsidered
asa
revolution
engineered
fromwithin.
President
Buyoya
announced
sweeping
changes
at aillevels.
As regards
thequestion
whether
theethnic
problem
wasgoing
tobe tackled
as partof
suchsweeping
changes,
MajorBuyoya’s
answer
wasthat"there
is no
ethnie
problem
in Burundi
andthere
willneverbeanyunder
my regime".
He wasgoing
to be quickly
disillusioned.
He wasindeed
taken
unawares
by theNtega-Marangara
events.
He thenhadto admit
thattheHutu-Tutsi
problem
doesexistin Burundi.
Supported
by hisRwandan
andZairian
counterparts,
President
Buyoya
hadtoinitiate
profound
changes
inorder
to confront
andputan endto theNtega-Marangara
events,
andcushion
their
effects.
He appealed
fornational
unity.
A government
ofnational
unity
composed
of practically
thesainenumber
ofHutuandTutsi
was
WS-02-279
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formed.
A Hutuwasappointed
PrimeMinister.
TheBumndioe
68~1
Govez~Tzent
iscu~ent]y
working
witha viewto consolidating
national
unity,
which
isthepriority.
Onthequestion
ofmultiparty
politics,
President
Buyoya
hasasserted
that
thesystem
would
notsupport
hisefforts
toconsolidate
national
unity.
In
other
words,
theintroduction
of multiparty
politics
inBurundi
isfornow
outofquéstion.
In spite
ofPresident
Buyoya’s
efforts
toconsolidate
national
unity,
heisfaeing
tierce
opposition,
particularly
fromtheTutsi
whosectheir
privileges
being
encroached
uponby therising
Hutuelite.
Tracts
denouncing
Buyoya’s
betrayal
of theHutucausearecontinually
beingcireulated.
OutGovernment
is threatened
by suchdetractors
who
areadvocating
theendof boththeBuyoya
regime
andtheGovemment
in
Kigali,
accusing
thelatter
ofapartheid.
Nevertheless,
theideaofnational
unity
is gradually
gaining
ground
inBurundi,
although
thecurrent
changes,
thatisthe"Wind
fromtheEast",
mustnotjeopardize
theprocess.
Indeed,
multiparty
politics
inBurundi
willonlyrecreate
conflicts
between
PALIPEHUTU
Hutu and the UPRONATutsiand Hutu.The
PALIPEHUTU
already
consider
President
Buyoya’s
efforts
insufficient
andviewhimas a hypocrite.
Rejected
byextremist
Tutsi
and
misunderstood
byextremist
Hutu,
thePresident
is caught
ina erossfire.
Soin spite
ofthewindofchange
thatisblowing
through
Burundi,
the
country
isstill
farfrom
political
stability.
In Tanzania,
theGovemment
isstill
clinging
totheone-party
system.
But
President
Mwinyi
hasalready
stated
thattheideaofmultiparty
politics
willbestudied
witha viewtoascertaining
whether
itwillsuitthe
Tanzanian
people.
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6~~2
SomeTanzanian
parliamentarians
bavealready
called
formultiparty
politics.
Former
Tanzanian
President
Mwalimu
Julius
Nyerere
basalready
stated
thattheone-party
eraisnowa thing
ofthepast.
However,
heisthe
Chairman
of ChamaChaMapinduzi
andwashitherto
fiercely
opposed
to
multiparty
politics.
University
of Dar-es-salaam
students
bavealready
staged
protests
demandirig
changes
intheTanzanian
political
system.
Wetherefore
will
soonwitness
thejoltsofthe"Wind
fromtheEast"
nowblowing
timidly
overTanzania.
Letus waitandsechowthesituation
willevolve.
d)
InUganda,
theintemal
situation
isstill
farfromnormal.
Inspite
ofthe
NRA’s
unquestionable
butsporadic
successes,
therebellion
isstill
strong
inthecountry,
particularly
inthenorth,
eastandwest,
ontheRuwenzori
hills.
Opposition
members
in Govemment
bavestarted
protesting.
Several
officers
bavebeenarrested
andaccused
ofcorruption,
of attempting
to
overthrow
theMuseveni
regime
or of conniving
withrebels
to betray
the
country.
President
Museveni’s
regime
is supported
mainly
by people
fromthe
south,
including
theBanyankole,
theBanyarwanda,
theBaganda
and
others.
Foreigners
(Rwandans)
still
holdprivileged
offices
intheUgandan
public
service.
SomeUgandans
arenothappy
withthissituation.
The
aeronym
"’RNA"
is already
construed
as "theNyankole-Rwandese-Army".
Thecoining
speaks
foritself.
Factors
ofdestabilisation
aretherefore
not
lacking
inUganda,
inspite
ofthe
faetthatthemultiparty
system
isstill
in
place.
WS-02-279
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e)
LOQ’! ~~83
InKenya,
thesituation
isquite
explosive.
Theopposition
isalready
very
active
wîththeMWAKENYA
andothers.
TheChurch
hasfallenoutwith
theGovernment.
Thediscord
hasbeenfurther
exacerbated
by therecent
assassination
ofMinister
Robert
Oukowhich
hasbeengiven
a political
slant
andcontinues
toheighten
tensions
between
theGovemment,
the
Church
andtheopposition.
TheKenyan
Govemment
has,foritspart,
categorically
rejected
multiparty
politics
while
theopposition
isclamoring
forit.Besides,
thestatements
oftheUSAmbassador
inNairobi
area
it
strong
signal.
TheKenyan
Govemment
hasvoiced
itsindignation
butthe
message
isclear
andhasbeenunderstood.
I believe
Kenya
iswitnessing
a
veryexplosive
political
situation
anditwiiïsoonbevisited
bythe"Wind
fromtheEast",
inspite
of theGovemment’s
stance
onmultiparty
politics.
5.
Thesituation
in Rwand~
Rwanda
is going
through
a difficult
period
onaccount
oftheeconomie
crisis
which
hashitailseetors
andthefoodshortage
affecting
practically
theentire
COUntry.
Thesituation
isexacerbated
byother
adverse
factors
suchas theexpulsion
of
illegal
Rwandan
immigrants
fromTanzania,
thethreat
by Rwandan
refugees
to
retumhomeby force
ofamas,
thesleazy
internal
opposition
which
is using
some
press
organs
asa toolfornegatively
sensitizing
thepopulation,
etc.Asregards
"democratisation",
theRwandan
masses
arestill
stauneh
supporters
of theMRND
anditsChairman-Founder.
Buttheevents
thatareroeking
theworld
are
beginning
tosowideas
in theminds
of the"liberals".
TheMRNDis being
putto
question,
cheerleading
is criticised,
theTCD(Travaux
communautaires
de
développement)
[Community
Development
Work]areconsidered
unproductive
anda waste
oftime,
theauthorities
arecriticised
insomepress
organs,
theHead
WS-02-279
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$
1-9
LO01
6884
ofState
isnotspared,
norarehisfamily
andclose
aides,
thesecurity
services
are
being
dragged
through
themud,etc.
Nevertheless,
relations
withourneighbours
areasgoodaseverinspite
ofthe
current
upsanddowns(therefugees
in Uganda,
theexpulsion
ofRwandans
from
Tanzania,
Tutsi
extremism
in Burundi,
thecalling
toquestion
ofthe
presence
of
Rwandans
inZaire).
However,
I cansaythaton thewhole,
there
areseveral
factors
favourablé
toa political
conflagration
inRwanda.
I willreturn
tothisissue
in subsequent
pages.
II.
Causesof the"WindfromtheEast"
Someanalysts
saythe"WindfromtheEast"sprung
inPoland
withthe
birthof LechValensa’s
SOLIDARITY
tradeunionmovement.
Others
assert
thatthe"Wind
fromtheEast"
tookitsfisein Mosçow
thanks
to
Mikhail
Gorbatchev.
Still
others
areadvancing
thetheory
thatPopeJohn
PaulIIplayed
a major
roleinthebirth
ofthe
"Wind
fromtheEast".
AI1
these
anaiysts
areprobably
right
toa certain
extent.
LechVaiensa,
Mikhail
Gorbatchev
andJohnPaulIIailplayed
an obviously
decisive
role,
eachin
hisownway,in bringing
about
thechanges
thatarenowsending
shock
waves
across
theglobal
politieal
speetrtun.
2.
I,personally,
findtheorigins
ofthe
"Wind
fromtheEast"
elsewhere:
the
"WindfromtheEast"
sprung
in theWest.
Indeed,
itis noteworthy
thattheeoldwarbetween
capitalism,
and
socialism/eommunism
neverended.
Eachsystem
carried
on fighting
under
different
guises,
eachundermining
theworkofthe
other,
taking
advantage
ofevery
chink
ineachother’s
armory
toinfiltrate
theranks
ofthe
other
withitsweapons
ofintoxication,
publicity,
espionage,
etc.Andthe"Wind
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LO01 6~8
5
fromtheEast",
tomymind,
isnothing
butthevictory
ofthe
capitalist
system
overthesocialist/communist
system.
Afterall,
havehuman
rights
anddemocratic
freedoms
notalways
beenthe
warhorse
of theWest?
Aretheynottheprincipal
demands
people
from
theEasthavebeenclamoring
forsince
thebegirming
oftheprocess
of
change?
NowthattheEasthasjoined
theranks
ofthe
West,
thelatter
is
e
nowwinnmg
thecoldwar.
III. WhytheWindfromtheEastis ra2ing
in theSouth.
particularly
overAfricn
AsI pointed
outearlier,
thechanges
thatoccurred
intheEastshattered
an
order
hitherto
considered
as immutable.
Thisentailed
manyconsequences.
Thus,theEastandWestarenowcoming
totermswithoneanother.
But
theEast
isstill
soul-searching
ina period
offlux.
Itistherefore
preoccupied
withitsownproblems.
As such,
theWestbasa certain
latitude
to actandtodo manythings,
including
especially
demanding
changes
inAfrica
inorder
toestablish
therein
Western
systems
orproWestern
systems.
2.
In fact,
theWhiteman
hasalways
considered
Africa
asnothing
buta
reservoir
ofcheap
rawmaterials
thattheyabsolutely
needtocontrol.
Theyhaveneversupported
thewaveof Afriean
States’
independence
which
hasenabled
African
peoples
to takecontrol
oftheir
destinies
andto
havea sayin themanagement
of their
immense
resources.
Furthermore,
theexistence
oftheEastem
Bloekdidnotmakethings
easy
fortheWestsince
itoffered
Africans
an alternative
whenever
theWestern
Block
felIoutwithoneAfrican
country
ortheother.
Ailthisnowbelongs
tothepast.
Africans
nolonger
havea choice,
forboththeEastandthe
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6886
West,
andailStates
haveto reconcile
withoneanother
andspeak
thesame
language.
White
people
or Westemers,
haveat lastachieved
their
cherished
dream
andnowtheskyis thelimit.
Theyareleaving
nostone
untumed
tohaveabsolute
control
overAfrica’s
rawmateriais.
Thatiswhy
theyarenowirnposing
onAfrica
a system
theytanfully
control
’
multiparty
politics
known
by themagicname"Democratisation".
Thisis
my explanation
of thefamous
"WindfromtheEast"raging
overAfrica.
IV.
HowfarwilltheWind_go?
In my opinion,
thewaveof"democratisation"
should
be viewed
fromthe
historical
standpoint.
There
wasa waveof conquests
followed
by
colonisation;
there
wasthestruggle
forindependence
followed
bythe
accession
toindependence
inthe1960s,
particularly
inthecaseofAfrican
countries;
nowit isthewaveof"democmtisation".
Thiswavewill
therefore
goasfarastheprevious
waves.
There
isnoreason
whythe
~-
process
willendinmid-course,
whenconditions
areripeforittorunits
2.
Theone-party
system
wasinherited
fromthesystem
in force
inthe
Eastem
Bloek
countries.
Nowthesystem
isobsolete
in those
countries
whieh
arealready
adopting
multiparty
systems.
Afriean
countries
too,
particularly
given
Westemers’
unflinching
determination,
as underscored
above
(andwhynotthewholeworld)
willbe on thesarnewavelength
willy-nilly.
3./ "iSomeStates
wilt,
ofcourse,
bedefiant,
ashasalways
beenthecase,
but
~,"~
/Ilthey
will
always
up being
by
wind
of
intothe
same
camp
astheend
others.
Itispulled
onlya along
matter
ofthe
time
and
ittime,
aildepends
on
.
,~
~~.
~\theprocess
adopted
byeachcountry
toinitiate
theinevitable
changes.
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V°
Whataretheforeseeable
co.nseouence~?
LO01
6687’
Theconsequences,
areto my mind,
diverse,
foreseeable
and
unforeseeable.
a,
I pointed
outearlier
thattheEastem
Block
wasanalternative
to
African
countries
andothers,
whentheWestwanted
to impose
its
ladytothedetfiment
ofany
given
African
country.
Thiswasalso
thecasewhena pro-Eastem
Block
country
considered
thatits
interests
werenolonger
whattheyweresupposed
to be.The
country
inquestion
sought
refuge
intheWest.
Thissituation
eased
relations
between
theNorth
andtheSouth.
Nowailthisbelongs
tothepast.
Thecountries
oftheNorth
(EastWest)willhenceforth
speak
thesaine
language.
TheSouth
basno
choice
butto yield.
A system
thatI could
call"economic
and
ideological
neocolonialism"
willcorne
intobeing,
forwe nowbave
toactinaccordance
withthewishes
oftheNorth.
There
isneither
WestnorEast.Everybody
is nowunder
thesameroof.
b.
There
willbenewdevelopments
in conflicts
ailovertheworld.
For
example,
theUS supported
UNITAin Angola
to thwart
theSoviet
Union’s
communist
influence
in thatcountry.
TheUS backed
Zaire
toprevent
sociaiists/communists
fromlaying
claim
tothat
country’s
immense
rawmaterials.
TheSoviet
Unionsupported
theANCandallliberation
movements
inordertoextend
socialist/communist
influence.
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LO01 68~,8
In Mozambique,
theWestsupported
RENAMO
forthesaine
reasons
asitdidUNITA
in Angola.
AilthiswilIchange
drastically
asthefears
ofeither
block
arenolonger
justified.
2,
I cantherefore
state
unequivocally
thattheprofound
changes
advoeated
by
ailandsundry
willbaveverydisruptive
consequences
inseveral
areas,
to
thebenefit,
ofthe
North
and,ofcourse,
tothedetriment
ofthe
South,
particularly
Afriean
eountries.
3.
A goodexample,
as concems
African
countries,
is theimposition
ofthe
multiparty
system.
In fact,
mostAfrican
countries
werenotprepared
for
thesystem.
Besides,
wevividly
recall
thedevastation
caused
bymultiparty
politics
inAfrica
lessthanthirty
yeasago.Therootcauses
ofsuch
~
riskofaresurgence
ofthe
saine
demons
ofregional,
ethnic,
tribal
division,
etc.Suchdivisions
actually
playintothehands
ofthe
Whiteman
whohas
~oefl--- daestruction
bavenotentirely
disappeared.
Wetherefore
cannot
mieoutthe
J~
lways
upheld
the"divide
andmie"doctrine,
ofcourse,
tothedetriment
of
~~~/~
t~
/
’ / Afrîcan
eountries.
Canthelatter
reject
sueha doctrine?
I believe
Afdcan
tcountries
haveverylittle
orno leeway
atail.Theybavenochoice
butto
~o withtheoutrent
andhopeforbrighter
daysahead.
I saysobecause,
asI
pointed
outearlier,
thechanges
inAfrica
arenottheworkofchance.
Did
French
Prime
Minister
Michel
Roeard
notstate
rabatFrance
wassupporting
African
peoples
whorevolted
against
theirgovemments
sinee,
ashe
pointed
out,theywereaspiring
to greater
democracy
andfreedom?
Need
welooktoofarafield
tounderstand
whythemn’est
first
started
in
countries
ofFrench
allegiance?
Itisaila carefully
orchestrated
plan
which
theWestis,by theway,bentonexecuting.
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VI. The case of Rwanda
LO01
6889
Asconcerns
Rwanda,
I would
liketo express
a personal
opinion
on the
changes
ushered
in by the"WindfromtheEast"
andtheir
consequences
onRwanda.
I wiUstate
whether
suchchanges
areinevitable
in our
country,
whether
simple
readjustments
tanbe madein lieuof such
changes,
or,whether
ourcountry
issimply
notaffected
bythesaid
changes.
2.
I willstart
withthelastpoint.
Ourcountry
cannot
beunaffected
bythe
C~we are dealingwi~a powerfulw ave of such magnitudeas I
pointed
outabove;
ourcountry
cannot
establish
itsownsystem
inisolation
wh~oudng
countfies,
Africancountries
and evencountries
all
overtheworld
arebeing
swept
by thesaine
wave.
Outcountry
will
inevitably
beaffected
bythiswavewhich
isalready
atout"door.
3,
Thechanges
arethere__fore
inevitable
inourcountry.
Thequestion
ishow
to effect
them.Wherever
~e"WindfromtheEast"is blowing
and
P~ in Africa,
it ailstarts
withprotests,
students
demanding
scholarship
increments,
better
living
conditions,
followed
byState
employees
demanding
a payfise.
Ailof thisthendegenerates
intostreet
protests
cailing
forprofound
changes
inthepolitical
system
inthecountry,
theintroduction
ofmultiparty
politics,
change
ofpolitical
authorities
and
theirreplacement
by newpeople
"withcleaner
hands",
promotion
of
moral
rectitude
inpolitics,
etc.
Infact,
thecalls
onpolitical
authorities
tostepdownleadtodemands
by
theactive
population,
suchthatthose
in power
carmot
remain
indifferent,
especially
since
extemal
pressure
isincreasingly
being
brought
tobearon
political
leaders
toinitiate
profound
changes.
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LO01
6890
Toeffect
thenecessary
changes,
weneedfactors
thatactasstimuli
of
change
which
thepeople
andparticularly
those
working
inthebackground
tanusetoincite
thepeople
torevoit
soastotrigger
changes.
Suchfactors
alsoexist
inourcountry
andareknown
as:
-
Regionalism,
Ethnie
problems,
Rwandan
refugees,
Relations
withneighbours,
Situation
inrelation
toneighbouring
eountries,
Rwandans
of thediaspora,
Thepress,
Functioning
ofinstitutions,
Various
political
problems.
These
areonlysomeofthefactors
I havetried
toanalyse
witha viewto
ascertaining
ordepicting
thesituation
inourcountry
inthelight
ofthe
above
factors
thatarecongenial
tochange
aspartofthe
"Wind
fromtheEast"
or
"Democratisation",
thetermpreferred
byvarious
users.
I willconclude
this
analysis
byidentifying
foreseeable
changes.
a)
.,.~~~~is
scourge
basnever
disappeared
fromRwanda~.
Itis currently
at itspeak.
Whenit isnot"North-South",
it is"Gisenyi-Ruhengeri",
or "Bugoyi-Bushiru",
etc.The"North-South"
problem
iscurrently
usedby someindividuals
whoare
always
intent
on causing
disorder.
Thedemands
of"Southemers"
arenotalways
clear
buttheyconsider
themselves
victims
of discrimination
infavour
of
"Northemers".
Theyseizeeveryopportunity
to showhowunfair
thegovemment
is to"Southemers".
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LO01 689-1
Northemers
, in tum,claimthatthegovemment
favours
"Southemers"
whoare
insatiable
andungrateful,
while
"Northemers"
areatthereceiving
end.Theythink
theydeserve
morethanwhattheyaregetting.
There
isanother
strain
of
regionalism
according
to whichCyangugu
is viewed
as oneof themostpampered
préfectures
onaccount
oftheministerial
postheldby Simeon
Nteziryayo.
Virtually
noregion
ofthecountry
issatisfied
withitssituation.
Andthis
state
of
affairs
isexploited
bya certain
media...ofthe
South.
TheGisenyi-Ruhengeri
problem
is alsocurrent.
People
fromRuhengeri
(notall,
of course)
believe
thattheGovemment
of Second
Republie
hasdenied
themtheir
fairshare
ofthecake.
Theysaymostofthecakebasbeengiven
mainly
to people
fromGisenyi.
Thelatter
think
itisrather
Ruhengeri
thatispampered,
andthat
being
a native
ofGisenyi
isa disadvantage,
since
people
fromGisenyi
do not
enjoy
certain
advantages;
theysaysotorefute
theviewthatnatives
ofGisenyi
enjoy
ailtheadvantages.
Thisisa persistent
problem.
I think
thisGisenyiRuhengeri problem is a non-~erately fueled by people
bentondividing
thepeople
withmalicious
intent,
otherwise
there
should
notbe
anyproblem
between
Gisenyi
andRuhengeri.
Itis akinto theBugoyi-Bushiri
problem
whieh,
fortunately,
isnotfueled
by toomanyfanatics.
Butthedemons
of
division
wantto fantheproblem
in order
to always
create
hotbecls-of-tënsïon.~
_2]aey
oeêïie-ètingtike
~osewho
arebenton creating
a"Kingogo
probïëm".
Ïknow
thatthisproblem
doesnotexist.
Wemustdoailittakes
tomakesureitisnipped
inthebud.Regionalism
inourcountry
istherefore
still
verymuchalive
anditis
veryfavourable
toinstability.
~~~.
b)
Ethnicproblems
TheHutubelieve
theSecond
Republic
hasfavoured
theTutsi,
andtheysayso
\
loudandclear.
TheTutsi
control
thecountry’s
economy,
theyattend
thebest
schools
inthecountry
andinlarge
numbers,
too.Private
schools
founded
bythe
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LO016892’
Tutsi
arethemost
prosperous,
andpriority
isgiven
toTutsi
children
during
enrolment.
These
aresomeofthe
grievances
ofthe
Hutu.
Butherethey
forger
that
noHutuhasever
been
denied
theopportunity
toengage
inbusiness
andto
prosper,
thatnone
haseverbeen
prevented
from
founding
a private
school
and
running
itsueh
that
ittanbeprosperous.
They
also
forgët
that
itisactually
the
Hutu
whointervene
infavour
ofTutsi
«hildren
toenable
them
togetenrolled
in
secondary
andhighschools.
L
Ailthisisdisregarded
bytheHutuwhoaccuse
theGovernment
ofbeing
too
supportive
oftheTutsi.
Thelatter
also
claim
that
they
arevictims
of
discrimination
andthat
theyareunder-represented
ingoveming
bodies.
Some,
if
notmany,
think
theproblem
oftheir
fellow
refugees
hashOtbeenproperly
resolved
andtheyarealways
complaining.
SomeTutsi
arenever
tired
ofpicking
ontheHutu
inonewayortheother,
quickly
forgetting
the1972-1973
years
and
theprecious
assistance
given
tothembytheSecond
Republic.
Sucha haughty
and
provocative
attitude
irritates
theHutu
whoareforever
asserting
that
another
purge
would
besalutary.
Theyare,ofcourse,
~.Etlmic
problems
arerealproblems
that
risk
being
exploited
formalicious
purposes
bythose
seeking
thedownfall
of
theGovernment
oruntimely
changes.
c)
Thereîu~ee
problem
I have,
onseveral
occasions,
dwelled
ontheRwandan
refugee
problem
andthe
threat
they
pose.
I haveamply
demonstrated
theconditions
under
which
theycan
return
tothecountry
byforce,
their
chances
ofsuccess
andthefactors
that
are
favourable
orunfavourable
tosucha return.
Oneachoccasion,
I have
concluded
that
they
will
notreturn
byforce
inthenear
future
butI bave
said,
however,
that
inthemeantime
they
arecapable
ofcausing
barre.
I will
hOtrestate
ailthe
arguments
I advanced
andwhich
seem
toprove
meright,
atleast,
thus
far.
Butthe
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LO01 6893
refugees
continue
todemand
theright
toretum,
threatening
toattack
thecountry
[
inthebargain.
Negotiations
between
Rwanda
andUganda,
on therefugee
problem
areon course.
Thesaidnegotiations
havehOtyeteometofruition.
Somepeople
areplacing
their
hopes
inthembutothers
think
these
areonlydelaying
tactics.
Somethink
President
Museveni
isonlydistracting
Rwanda
so asto gaintimeto
puthishouse
in order
andthenunleash
"hisrefugees"
on Rwanda
andsupport
themuntil
theyregain
power.
Thisisthekindofnegotiations
hehadinNairobi
withTitoOkello’s
Government
before
he eaptured
Kampala
andUganda.
I havenoreason
tosubscribe
tothissortofreasoning
butwiUtheoutrent
whirlwind
thatisshattering
ailforecasts
oncurrent
problems
notadversely
affect
therefugee
problem
suchthatitcould
takeondimensions
notdesired
bythe
Government.
,,a
i
I cannot
becategoricai
on thispoint,
butI wishto simply
point
outthatthe ~~-’’
~~(/’~/
refugeeproblemas a verysensitive
and complexone whichcouldbecomea ~ V)~Ç/
destabilization
factor
andthusplayinto~ehands
ofthose
seeldng
todestabilize
the country.
’~
d)
Relations
withneiehbour
s andRwandans
of thediasporr
1)Relations
withneighbouring
countries
areverygood,
ifnotexcellent.
Butwe
areaware
thatthese
countries
arehosttoRwandan
refugees
hostile
toour
Govemment,
themostvirulent
being
those
living
in Uganda.
Since
ai1the
refugees
areinpermanent
contact
withoneanother,
it isnecessary
tokeepa
watchfial
eyeonailofthembecause
their
attitude
towards
ourcountry
and
theirgrowing
demands
could
affect
relations
between
thehostcountry
and
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1 - 19
Le discours de La Baule (1990)
La Baule, le 20 juin 1990
ALLOCUTION PRONONCEE PAR M. FRANCOIS MITTERRAND PRESIDENT DE
LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE A L'OCCASION DE LA SEANCE SOLENNELLE
D'OUVERTURE DE LA 16ème CONFERENCE DES CHEFS D'ETAT DE FRANCE
ET D'AFRIQUE
Majesté, Laissez-moi vous remercier pour la présidence que vous avez exercée depuis la
Conférence de Casablanca. Je salue ceux qui nous rejoignent dans notre Conférence pour
la première fois. Je ne ferai pas de distinction. Mais je noterai cependant la présence de la
Namibie, ce qui marque bien qu'il y a aussi des évolutions heureuses : l'accession à
l'indépendance est l'une des formes essentielles de la liberté et la Namibie en est le
meilleur symbole.
Depuis la conférence de Casablanca, beaucoup de choses se sont passées.
Vous avez parlé, Majesté, des maux dont souffre l'Afrique. Chacun le sait, ils sont
nombreux. Cela repose sur des réalités difficiles et parfois angoissantes. La crise est
d'abord économique. Elle s'aggrave sans cesse. Vous savez que la production par tête
diminue chaque année, que la part de l'Afrique dans la concurrence mondiale recule, que
les investissements se font plus rares, qu'ici ou là la famine resurgit, que la dette s'alourdit.
Bref, on est installé cruellement dans le cycle infernal "dette-sous développement", tandis
que la population croit. Comment voulez-vous que les systèmes scolaires et sociaux
puissent résister à la poussée de la démographie dans de telles circonstances ?
Vous avez eu raison de le dire tout à l'heure, se tourner vers l'Afrique et porter accusation
révèle une grande injustice de ceux qui, avec complaisance, parfois même avec
satisfaction, dénoncent les mœurs, les traditions, le système politique, la manière de vivre
de l'Afrique. Si j'ai moi-même des observations critiques à faire, comme je le ferai à
l'égard de mon pays, je refuse de m'engager dans ce procès. Je préfère examiner avec vous
la manière dont on pourrait préparer l'avenir immédiat. Car je suis de ceux qui pensent que
si responsabilités il y a, on ne peut ignorer celles qui incombent à la société internationale
et particulièrement aux pays les plus riches.
Sont-ils sans pitié ou simplement indifférents ? Nous attendons encore, en dépit des
efforts répétés de la France et de quelques autres, le plan mondial qui permettrait
d'examiner, sur une distance de cinq à dix ans, la manière de parer aux maux successifs
qui viennent pour une large part des pays riches pour atteindre les pays en voie de
développement, pauvres ou moins pauvres, mais en tout cas très endettés.
Examinons par exemple, l'effondrement des cours des matières premières. Je me répète
d'une année sur l'autre. Mais comment ne pas se répéter ? Nous sommes contraints de
tenir le même discours puisque les faits n'ont pas changé. Si on se met à la place des
responsables africains, on se dit comment faire ? On établit un budget, on tente de
1 - 20
planifier sur deux ans, trois ans, cinq ans et en l'espace d'une semaine, quand ce n'est pas
au cours d'une simple séance d'un après-midi dans une ville lointaine, tout s'effondre.
Les monnaies de base ont connu des évolutions qui ont constamment dérangé vos
prévisions ; vos productions ont connu des évolutions saisissantes vers la baisse. On
s'interroge : comment le financier le plus avisé du monde, pourtant si prêt à se faire
donneur de leçons, agirait-il ? Quelle solution trouverait-il pour compenser les pertes,
arrêter le désastre ? On s'étonne après cela de la fuite des investissements étrangers... Et
que penser de la fermeture des marchés en Occident ? Faut-il s'étendre sur le débat au sein
du GATT à propos du maintien du protectionnisme, sur les produits agricoles, les produits
textiles et combien d'autres ? Il y a là une spirale qui empêche les pays africains de
retrouver un équilibre hors duquel tout leur est interdit. Le développement, bien entendu,
la prospérité, l'équilibre politique, le temps et l'espace nécessaires pour procéder aux
réformes politiques attendues.
Il est vrai que l'Afrique est l'oubliée de la croissance, la laissée pour compte du progrès ;
je dis ceci d'une façon rapide car, dans tel ou tel pays, on observe des efforts récompensés
par le succès. Nous n'allons pas nous attarder pour tenter de désigner le coupable. Les
responsabilités sont partagées. Dans mon esprit, elles commencent par l'insouciance ou
l'irresponsabilité des pays, qui par solidarité internationale et dans leur intérêt, devraient
comprendre qu'une large et audacieuse politique Nord-Sud s'impose. Elles continuent par
les défaillances de nombreux pays africains qui n'ont pas pu ou qui n'ont pas su prendre à
temps les mesures qui pouvaient leur convenir. Prenons-en acte ; posons-nous ces
questions.
La première question est sous-jacente dans les campagnes qui se développent, un peu
partout dans le monde, contre la politique de la France faut-il que la France renonce afin
de ne plus être exposée aux critiques nombreuses qui la frappent ? Faut-il qu'elle rapatrie
chez elle tous les moyens et qu'elle les consacre à ses ressortissants nationaux ? Faut-il
qu'elle se replie, faut-il qu'elle cherche en elle-même ses seules ambitions. Je vous dirai ce
que je pense de la politique de la France et de la manière dont elle est conduite. Mais je
répondrai par avance à cette question : la France est décidée à poursuivre sa politique et
donc à aider l'Afrique, quoi qu'il en soit et quoi qu'on en dise. Elle ne se retirera pas de
l'œuvre engagée depuis si longtemps et qui, sous des formes différentes au travers de
l'histoire, l'a associée à un grand nombre de ces pays. La France restera fidèle à son
histoire dont, d'une certaine manière vous êtes, et à son avenir dont vous serez, je l'espère
aussi.
Permettez-moi quelques rappels simples. La France est toujours le premier des pays
industriels avancés dans l'aide aux pays en voie de développement. Le premier, nettement,
devant tous les autres. C'est vrai que des pays comme le Canada ou l'Allemagne font un
effort tout à fait estimable. Mais, c'est vrai que d'autres grandes puissances restent à
quelque distance et même parfois à une longue distance. Notre aide à l'Afrique en 1990 est
supérieure à celle de 1989 qui, elle-même, était en accroissement par rapport aux années
précédentes.
La quatrième Convention de Lomé, à laquelle nous avons pris une part si évidente, a
permis d'augmenter de 45% les engagements financiers de la Communauté. Dans toutes
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les enceintes internationales, j'ai plaidé pour le développement que je considère comme un
élément indissociable des progrès de la démocratie. Nous sommes allés partout, le
ministre des Affaires étrangères, le ministre de l'Economie et des Finances, le ministre de
la Coopération, le ministre de la Francophonie notamment, pour plaider le dossier de
l'Afrique. Et nous devons répéter, encore une fois, les mêmes choses simples.
A Toronto, nous avons mis au net un plan qui permettrait de réduire ou d'abolir la dette
des pays les plus pauvres et nous avons préconisé trois façons de faire en annonçant
aussitôt celle que nous avions choisie.
A Dakar, peu de temps après, nous avons annulé nos créances publiques à l'égard de
trente-cinq pays d'Afrique. Cet exemple a été suivi par quelques uns. A la tribune des
Nations Unies, j'ai demandé qu'un plan fut élaboré et décidé en faveur des pays dits
intermédiaires, ceux qui sont peut-être moins pauvres, mais si endettés que le bénéfice de
leur travail est absorbé par le service de la dette.
A Toronto, à Dakar, à New York, j'avais déjà indiqué que la France ne s'en tiendrait pas
là. Je pense que dès maintenant, il convient de ne plus faire que des dons à 100% aux pays
les moins avancés. Une conférence de ces pays se tiendra à Paris, cet automne, j'aurai
l'occasion d'y revenir. Je pense qu'il convient de limiter à 5%, ce qui revient à une
réduction de 50%, les taux d'intérêt de tous les prêts publics aux pays dits intermédiaires
de l'Afrique sub-saharienne.
C'est une décision unilatérale de la France. Elle n'a pas été négociée, ni avec vous, ni avec
nos partenaires de ce fameux club des pays les plus riches qui se réunira dans quelques
semaines à Houston. Mais j'ai l'intention, à Houston précisément, de demander à nos
partenaires, aux six autres pays industrialisés, d'aller plus loin. J'ai l'intention de leur
demander d'abord s'il leur est possible de reprendre à leur compte des dispositions du type
de celle que je viens d'énoncer ; ensuite, d'allonger de toute façon les délais de
remboursement des pays les plus endettés par des moyens divers qu'il conviendra de
choisir.
Et j'en reviens à ce projet dix fois traité et dont il faudra bien comprendre qu'il est
nécessaire, celui d'un fonds spécial mondial. J'avais proposé qu'il fut financé par des
nouveaux droits de tirages spéciaux. Je pense que les pays peuvent renoncer à certains de
leurs droits pour alimenter une sorte de fonds mondial de garantie qui servirait à amorcer
la pompe pour que, désormais, un nouveau cours des choses préside à la marche des
affaires internationales. Mais, rien ne se fait au hasard. Peut-être à certaines époques
l'argent se répandait avec prodigalité, sans contrôle. Moi, je n'ai pas connu ce temps-là. Je
veux dire que je n'étais pas responsable au temps ou ces pratiques ont pu exister.
Vous savez bien, Madame et Messieurs, comment les choses se passent, comment les
décisions sont prises. Il peut même arriver que des difficultés naissent à ce propos entre
nous. Pas exactement entre vous et moi, mais entre nos hauts fonctionnaires lorsqu'ils
discutent âprement de la valeur de tel projet, de son financement, de ses modalités. Il vous
arrive même parfois de reprocher à la France, par ses exigences et par sa rigueur,
d'exprimer je ne sais quel relent de l'époque coloniale, bien que nous ne prétendions pas,
et vous le savez bien, dicter la politique que vous avez à faire. Les crédits du Fonds d'aide
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et de coopération qui sont placés sous la tutelle du ministre de la Coopération et qui
servent à développer des projets font l'objet d'une instruction interministérielle, avec un
luxe de précautions de toutes sortes. Les crédits sont alloués au fur et à mesure des
réalisations. On constate, sur place, ce qui se fait, en collaboration avec les responsables
de chacun de vos pays. Il en est de même pour les crédits, prêts et dons gérés par la Caisse
centrale de coopération économique. Ce sont des institutions sévères ou des organismes
parfois rébarbatifs qui accumulent les étages administratifs, mais qui sont quand même
bien nécessaires. Ils permettent en tout cas d'avoir la conscience tranquille. Pour vous
comme pour nous cette aide est menée avec la rigueur nécessaire, pour qu'elle soit utile à
vos peuples.
A tout cela, Madame et Messieurs, vos Etats participent et contribuent. Ils font entendre
leurs voix, ils font connaitre aussi leurs objections et ils acceptent parfaitement tout ce qui
leur permettra de mener leur action sous le contrôle de chefs d'Etat dont je peux dire que
j'ai souvent constaté le scrupule sur la manière dont ils devaient gérer les crédits qui
doivent servir au développement de leur peuple. Si l'on doit constater un certain nombre
de défaillances à travers le temps, je ne vois pas, ayant fait un examen approfondi de cette
situation, ce qui pourrait être vraiment remarqué au cours de ces dernières années. Pour la
balance des paiements, il arrive qu'une contribution soit consentie par la France aux Etats
lorsqu'ils ont constaté que leur programmation se heurte à des décisions souvent
spéculatives qui ruinent, en l'espace de quelques heures, la patience et la prévision de
plusieurs années.
Là encore, c'est notre ministère des Finances qui intervient. Il a des instructions
financières pour chaque pays. Le ministère des Affaires étrangères et celui de la
Coopération y prennent part : dans un système aussi précis, par où serait passée cette
"évaporation", dont on parle sans arrêt, dans un procès de type cartiériste, comme une
sorte d'invitation en sourdine à voir la France arrêter, cesser de pratiquer la politique qui
nous rassemble aujourd'hui et qui fait de nous des pays amis et solidaires, nous qui
représentons ensemble, sur la scène internationale, un front de quelque 30, 35 pays. Mais
sur ces 35 pays, presque tous sont sous-développés. Peut-on dire : que c'est de leur faute,
et oublierait-on cette indifférence des peuples riches ou plutôt de leurs dirigeants, cet oubli
de leur responsabilité et de leur intérêt, car c'est du développement des termes de
l'échange qu'eux mêmes tireront les moyens de leur prospérité ?
Je n'ignore pas les interrogations que suscitent chez vous les événements qui ont
bouleversé l'Est de l'Europe. Vous craignez que bien des capitaux ne se détournent de
l'Afrique. C'est une inquiétude que l'on peut comprendre, car les moyens des pays qui sont
vos amis ne sont pas illimités. Eh bien, il dépend de nous qu'il n'en soit pas ainsi. La
France fait son devoir. C'est vrai que si l'on ne rétablit un climat de confiance dans la
marche en avant des pays de l'Afrique, il est difficile d'espérer la venue d'investissements
étrangers, privés. On peut prendre des mesures de toutes sortes, notamment fiscales, mais
ne s'agit-il pas aussi d'un problème politique ?
Si l'on veut redonner confiance dans les chances de l'Afrique ce sera par une stabilité
retrouvée, avec des administrations en bon état de marche, avec une gestion scrupuleuse et
un certain nombre de dispositifs, soit anciens, soit nouveaux qu'il conviendra de
déterminer au cours des heures de travail que nous aurons cet après midi et demain.
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Prenons un cas : celui de la zone franc. Je crois que l'on peut considérer que cette zone
franc est un facteur de stabilité pour l'Afrique noire. Je crois que les pays qui participent y
sont très attachés. Eh bien, la France aussi. Périodiquement, l'idée d'une dévaluation du
franc CFA est relancée par de grandes institutions internationales.
On dit que vous y êtes hostiles, moi aussi. Cela ne réglerait aucune de vos difficultés. Je
crains que cela ne puisse aboutir qu'à alourdir les charges de vos dettes et à renchérir vos
importations. Certains d'entre vous se posent la question de savoir si l'Union économique
et monétaire européenne ne modifierait pas la relation du franc CFA avec les autres
monnaies de l'Europe. Je vous dis dès maintenant que ce qui vaut pour le franc CFA par
rapport au franc vaudra demain par rapport à la monnaie européenne si celle-ci, comme
nous l'espérons, voit le jour. Je puis m'en porter garant. Ainsi disposerez-vous d'une vaste
zone qui vous apportera certaines formes de sécurité dans le trouble général qui s'empare
de l'Afrique. Vous savez que l'Europe dispose d'un Marché commun et qu'elle est à la
recherche d'une monnaie unique.
Or la zone-franc a une monnaie mais elle n'a pas de Marché commun. Il y a pour l'instant
d'un côté un marché commun sans monnaie et de l'autre une monnaie sans marché
commun. Il y a là peut-être une situation dont la contradiction pourrait toucher à l'absurde.
Ne devriez-vous pas, Madame et Messieurs, rechercher l'unification de vos marchés et
l'harmonisation de règles administratives, juridiques, fiscales et douanières dans des
ensembles suffisamment vastes ? Il serait peut-être trop ambitieux de considérer
l'ensemble de l'Afrique noire. La réalité historique et géographique devrait aboutir à
plusieurs ensembles et ce serait déjà un grand progrès.
En tout cas, nous sommes prêts à vous aider pour mettre en œuvre ce mouvement que je
crois indispensable si l'on veut pouvoir disposer de l'instrument politique, géographique,
économique qui nous permettra d'avancer dans la lutte contre la crise. Mais je tiens à dire
ceci : de même qu'il existe un cercle vicieux entre la dette et le sous-développement, il
existe un autre cercle vicieux entre la crise économique et la crise politique. L'une nourrit
l'autre.
Voilà pourquoi il convient d'examiner en commun de quelle façon on pourrait procéder
pour que sur le plan politique un certain nombre d'institutions et de façons d'être
permettent de restaurer la confiance, parfois la confiance entre un peuple et ses dirigeants,
le plus souvent entre un Etat et les autres Etats, en tout cas la confiance entre l'Afrique et
les pays développés. Je reprends à mon compte l'observation, à la fois ironique et sévère,
de Sa Majesté le Roi du Maroc lorsqu'il évoquait la manière dont la démocratie s'était
installée en France. Cela n'a pas été sans mal, ni sans accidents répétés. Elargissant le
propos, je reprendrai les termes de l'un des chefs d'Etat avec lequel nous donnions hier
soir : l'Europe dont nous sommes, nous Français, avait à la fois le nazisme, le fascisme, le
franquisme, le salazarisme et le stalinisme. Excusez du peu...
Etait-ce les modèles à partir desquels vous aviez à bâtir vos Etats, vous qui n'avez disposé,
dans la meilleure hypothèse que d'un quart ?
Il nous a fallu deux siècles pour tenter de mettre de l'ordre, d'abord dans notre pensée et
ensuite dans les faits, avec des rechutes successives ; et nous vous ferions la leçon ?
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Il nous faut parler de démocratie. C'est un principe universel qui vient d'apparaitre aux
peuples de l'Europe centrale comme une évidence absolue au point qu'en l'espace de
quelques semaines, les régimes, considérés comme les plus forts, ont été bouleversés. Le
peuple était dans les rues, sur les places et le pouvoir ancien sentant sa fragilité, cessait
toute résistance comme s'il était déjà, et depuis longtemps, vidé de substance et qu'il le
savait. Et cette révolution des peuples, la plus importante que l'on eut connue depuis la
Révolution française de 1789, va continuer.
Je le disais récemment à propos de l'Union Soviétique cette révolution est partie de là et
elle reviendra là. Celui qui la dirige le sait bien, qui conduit avec courage et intelligence
une réforme qui, déjà, voit se dresser devant elle toutes les formes d'opposition celles qui
s'y refusent, attachées au système ancien et celles qui veulent aller plus vite. Si bien que
l'histoire reste encore en jeu. Il faut bien se dire que ce souffle fera le tour de la planète.
Désormais on le sait bien : que survienne une glaciation ou un réchauffement sur l'un des
deux pôles et voilà que le globe tout entier en ressent les effets. Cette réflexion ne doit pas
rester climatique, elle s'applique à la société des hommes !...
Enfin, on respire, enfin on espère, parce que la démocratie est un principe universel. Mais
il ne faut pas oublier les différences de structures, de civilisations, de traditions, de mœurs.
Il est impossible de proposer un système tout fait. La France n'a pas à dicter je ne sais
quelle loi constitutionnelle qui s'imposerait de facto à l'ensemble de peuples qui ont leur
propre conscience et leur propre histoire et qui doivent savoir comment se diriger vers le
principe universel qu'est la démocratie. Et il n'y a pas trente six chemins vers la
démocratie.
Comme le rappelait M. le Président du Sénégal, il faut un Etat, il faut le développement et
il faut l'apprentissage des libertés... Comment voulez-vous engendrer la démocratie, un
principe de représentation nationale avec la participation de nombreux partis, organiser le
choc des idées, les moyens de la presse, tandis que les deux tiers d'un peuple vivraient
dans la misère. Je le répète, la France n'entend pas intervenir dans les affaires intérieures
des Etats africains amis. Elle dit son mot, elle entend poursuivre son œuvre d'aide,
d'amitié et de solidarité. Elle n'entend pas soumettre à la question, elle n'entend pas
abandonner quelque pays d'Afrique que ce soit.
Ce plus de liberté, ce ne sont pas simplement les Etats qui peuvent le faire, ce sont les
citoyens : il faut donc prendre leur avis et ce ne sont pas simplement les puissances
publiques qui peuvent agir, ce sont aussi les organisations non gouvernementales qui
souvent connaissent mieux le terrain, qui en épousent les difficultés qui savent comment
panser les plaies. Nous ne voulons pas intervenir dans les affaires intérieures. Pour nous,
cette forme subtile de colonialisme qui consisterait à faire la leçon en permanence aux
Etats africains et à ceux qui les dirigent, c'est une forme de colonialisme aussi perverse
que tout autre. Ce serait considérer qu'il y a des peuples supérieurs, qui disposent de la
vérité, et d'autres qui n'en seraient pas capables, alors que je connais les efforts de tant de
dirigeants qui aiment leur peuple et qui entendent le servir même si ce n'est pas de la
même façon que sur les rives de la Seine ou de la Tamise. Voilà pourquoi il faut procéder
à une étude méthodique de tout ce qui touche à la vie économique. Il faut mettre en place
des dispositifs douaniers qui empêcheront des évasions de capitaux qui viennent souvent
justifier les critiques entendues. De ce point de vue encore, la France, si vous le souhaitez,
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est prête à vous apporter l'aide humaine et technique, à former des fonctionnaires, à se
trouver auprès d'eux. J'ai vu naître la plupart de vos Etats, j'ai connu vos luttes pour en
finir avec l'état colonial.
Ces luttes vous opposaient souvent à la France, et seule la sagesse des dirigeants français
et africains a évité, en fin de compte, le drame d'une guerre coloniale en Afrique noire. Il
fallait bâtir un Etat, une souveraineté, avec des frontières garanties internationalement,
telles que les avaient dessinées les compas et les règles des pays coloniaux, dans les salons
dorés des chancelleries occidentales, déchirant les ethnies sans tenir compte de la nature
du terrain. Et voilà que ces Etats nouveaux, doivent gérer les anciennes contradictions
héritées de l'histoire, doivent bâtir une administration centrale, nommer des fonctionnaires
après les avoir formé, gérer des finances publiques, entrer dans le grand circuit
international, souvent sans avoir reçu des anciens pays coloniaux la formation nécessaire.
Et on aurait à raisonner avec ces Etats, comme on le ferait à l'égard de nations organisées
depuis mille ans comme c'est le cas de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de l'Espagne ou
du Portugal !
Les mœurs, les traditions aussi respectables que les vôtres, l'histoire et la nature de ces
peuples, leur propre culture, leur propre façon de penser, tout cela pourrait se réduire à
une équation décidée dans une capitale du nord ?
Vraiment, je fais appel à votre raison, et je pense que nous nous connaissons assez pour
savoir que rien ne sera fait entre nous en dehors du respect et de la considération que nous
nous devons. S'il y a contestation dans tel Etat particulier, eh bien ! que les dirigeants de
ces pays en débattent avec leurs citoyens. Lorsque je dis démocratie, lorsque je trace un
chemin, lorsque je dis que c'est la seule façon de parvenir à un état d'équilibre au moment
où apparait la nécessité d'une plus grande liberté, j'ai naturellement un schéma tout prêt :
système représentatif, élections libres, multipartisme, liberté de la presse, indépendance de
la magistrature, refus de la censure : voilà le schéma dont nous disposons.
Nous en avons discuté plusieurs fois et hier soir encore en particulier. Je sais combien
certains défendent scrupuleusement leur peuple et cherchent le progrès y compris dans les
institutions. Plusieurs d'entre vous disaient : "transposer d'un seul coup le parti unique et
décider arbitrairement le multipartisme, certains de nos peuples s'y refuseront ou bien en
connaîtront tout aussitôt les effets délétères".
D'autres disaient : "nous l'avons déjà fait et nous en connaissons les inconvénients". Mais
les inconvénients sont quand même moins importants que les avantages de se sentir dans
une société civiquement organisée.
D'autres disaient : "nous avons commencé, le système n'est pas encore au point, mais nous
allons dans ce sens". Je vous écoutais. Et, si je me sentais plus facilement d'accord avec
ceux d'entre vous qui définissaient un statut politique proche de celui auquel je suis
habitué, je comprenais bien les raisons de ceux qui estimaient que leurs pays ou que leurs
peuples n'étaient pas prêts. Alors qui tranchera ? Je crois qu'on pourra trancher en disant
que de toute façon, c'est la direction qu'il faut prendre. Certains ont pris des bottes de sept
lieues, soit dans la paix civique soit dans le désordre, mais ils ont fait vite.
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D'autres marcheront pas à pas. Puis-je me permettre de vous dire que c'est la direction
qu'il faut suivre. Je vous parle comme un citoyen du monde à d'autres citoyens du monde :
c'est le chemin de la liberté sur lequel vous avancerez en même temps que vous avancerez
sur le chemin du développement. On pourrait d'ailleurs inverser la formule : c'est en
prenant la route du développement que vous serez engagés sur la route de la démocratie.
A vous peuples libres, à vous Etats souverains que je respecte, de choisir votre voie, d'en
déterminer les étapes et l'allure. La France continuera d'être votre amie, et si vous le
souhaitez, votre soutien, sur le plan international, comme sur le plan intérieur. Vous lui
apportez beaucoup. Quand je constate, par exemple, que le flux de capitaux qui va du Sud
pauvre vers le Nord riche est plus important que le flux de capitaux qui va du Nord riche
au Sud pauvre, je dis qu'il y a quelque chose qui ne va pas.
Le colonialisme n'est pas mort. Ce n'est plus le colonialisme des Etats, c'est le
colonialisme des affaires et des circuits parallèles. Nous parlons entre Etats souverains,
égaux en dignité, même si nous ne le sommes pas toujours en moyens. Il existe entre nous
des conventions de toutes sortes. Il existe des conventions de caractère militaire. Je répète
le principe qui s'impose à la politique française chaque fois qu'une menace extérieure
poindra, qui pourrait attenter à votre indépendance, la France sera présente à vos côtés.
Elle l'a déjà démontré, plusieurs fois et parfois dans des circonstances très difficiles.
Mais notre rôle à nous, pays étranger, fut-il ami, n'est pas d'intervenir dans des conflits
intérieurs. Dans ce cas-là, la France en accord avec les dirigeants, veillera à protéger ses
concitoyens, ses ressortissants mais elle n'entend pas arbitrer les conflits. C'est ce que je
fais dans le cadre de ma responsabilité depuis neuf ans. De la même manière, j'interdirai
toujours une pratique qui a existé parfois dans le passé et qui consistait pour la France à
tenter d'organiser des changements politiques intérieurs par le complot ou la conjuration.
Vous le savez bien, depuis neuf ans, cela ne s'est pas produit et cela ne se produira pas.
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The La Baule Speech (1990)
La Baule, June 20, 1990
…
In any case, we are ready to help you establish this movement, which I believe to be
indispensible in order to obtain the political, geographic, and economic instruments that would
permit us to continue battling the crisis. But I would like to say the following: just as there is
a vicious cycle between debt and under-development, there is another vicious cycle between
economic crisis and political crisis. One nourishes the other.
This is why we should examine how to proceed together so that, politically, a certain number of
institutions and ways of acting allow trust to be restored, sometimes trust between a people and
its leaders, most often between one state and other states, in any case the trust between Africa
and the developed countries. I’d like to borrow His Majesty the King of Morocco’s observation,
both ironic and serious, as he described the way in which democracy was established in France.
It was not without evil, or repeated accidents. Expanding my talk, I will borrow the words of one
of the Heads of State here this evening: the Europe we come from, we French, had, at the same
time, Nazism, fascism, Francoism, Salazarism, and Stalinism, no less…
Were these the models on which you have built your states, you who have taken, in the best case,
just a quarter of a century?
It took us two centuries to try to create order, first in our thoughts and then in reality, with
successive descents; and we are teaching you about it?
We have to talk about democracy. It’s a universal principal which seemed so incontrovertible
to the peoples of central Europe that in the space of a few weeks, the regimes considered the
strongest were overthrown. The people were in the streets, in the squares, and the ancient power,
sensing its fragility, gave up all resistance, as if it had already been void of substance for a long
time and it knew it. And this revolution of the peoples, the most important one we have seen
since the French Revolution of 1789, will continue.
I said recently about the Soviet Union that this revolution has come from there and it will return
there. The one who governs there knows it well, he who is, with courage and intelligence,
leading a reform that, already, is facing every kind of opposition, that which, attached to
the former system, refuse the reform, and that which wants to go faster. So the story is still
unfinished. It must be said that this wind will go around the world. We already know it well: one
of the poles freezes or heats up and voilà: the entire globe feels the effects. This thought does not
have to remain climate-related, it applies to the society of men!...
Finally, we can breathe, finally we have hope, because democracy is a universal principle. But
we cannot forget the differences in structures, in civilizations, in traditions, in customs. It is
1 - 28
impossible to propose a ready-made system. It is not for France to dictate some constitutional
law that would then be de facto imposed on people who have their own consciousness and their
own history and who must know how to lead towards the universal principle that is democracy.
And there are not thirty six paths to democracy.
As Mr. President of Senegal reminded us, development is needed and freedoms must be
learned…How can you engender democracy, a principal of national representation with the
participation of numerous parties, organize the exchanging of views, the resources for the press,
when two thirds of the population would be living in misery. I repeat, France does not intend to
intervene in the interior affairs of friendly African nations. It has its say, it intends to pursue its
work with aid, friendship, and solidarity. It does not intend to be questioned, it does not intend to
abandon any African country.
This also about liberty: it is not only states that can provide it, it is citizens. Therefore, we must
ask their opinion. And it is not only public powers that can act, it is also non-governmental
agencies who often know the situation on the ground the best, who embrace the inherent
difficulties, who know how to heal the wounds. We do not want to intervene in interior affairs.
For us, this subtle form of colonialism, which consists of permanently teaching and giving advice
to African states and those who lead them, is as perverse as all other forms of colonialism. To
do this would be to believe that there are superior peoples, who hold the truth, and others, who
would not be capable of it, but I know about the efforts of so many leaders who love their people
and intend to serve them, even if not in the same way as on the banks of the Seine or the Thames.
That is why we must begin a methodical study of everything to do with economic life. We must
put customs arrangements in place that would prevent the tax evasion and other financial crimes
that often justify the criticism we hear. Again, from this point of view, France, if you wish, is
ready to offer aid in people and technology, to train officials, to be beside them. I have seen the
birth of most of your states, I have known your battles to put an end to the colonial condition.
These battles often pit you against France, and only the wisdom of French and African leaders,
at the end of the day, prevented the tragedy of a colonial war in Sub-Saharan Africa. It was
necessary to build a state, a sovereignty, with internationally-guaranteed borders, the ones that
were drawn and regulated by colonial countries, in gilded lounges of western Chancelleries,
tearing apart ethnicities without understanding the nature of the terrain. And here we are: the new
states have to manage the old contradictions inherited from history, they have to build a central
administration, train and appoint civil servants, manage public finances, enter into the grand
international circuit, often without having received the necessary training from the old colonial
countries.
And we have to deal with these states, as we would with nations that have been organized for a
thousand years, as is the case with France, Great Britain, Spain, or Portugal!
1 - 29
Customs and traditions just as deserving of respect as yours, the history and nature of these
peoples, their own culture, their own way of thinking, could all this be reduced to a solved
equation in a northern capital?
Really, I appeal to your reason, and I think that we know each other well enough to know that
nothing will happen between us without respect or disregarding the esteem in which we hold
each other. It there is dissent in some particular country, well then the leaders of the country will
discuss it with their citizens. When I say democracy, when I chart a course, when I say that this
is the only way to get to a state of equality when the need for greater freedom is apparent, of
course I have a plan ready: representative system, free elections, multiparty politics, freedom of
the press, independent judiciary, rejection of censorship: here is the plan that we have.
We have discussed this many times, and here, tonight, again in particular. I know how much
some scrupulously defend their people and seek progress, including in their own institutions.
Many of you said, “If you transpose the single party and arbitrarily decide on a multiparty
system, some of our populations will refuse it, or else will immediately suffer from its
deleterious effects.”
Others said, “We have already done this and know about its disadvantages.” But the
disadvantages and still less important than the advantage of feeling that one is in a civically
organized society.
Others said, “We have started, the system is not there yet, but we are going in this direction.”
I am listening to you. And, as I agreed more easily with those of you who defined a political
system close to the one I am used to, I understood the reasons of those who believed that their
country or their population was not ready. So who will decide? I believe that we could decide by
saying that, in any case, this is the direction in which we all must go. Some have put on the seven
league boots, either in civic peace or in disorder, but they have acted quickly.
Others are walking step by step. May I say that the most important thing is to go in the right
direction. I am speaking to you as one citizen of the world to other citizens of the world: it is the
path of freedom that you are advancing on at the same time as you advance along the path of
development. Moreover, the thought can be reversed: by taking the road towards development,
you are committed on the road towards democracy.
To you free people, to you sovereign states that I respect: choose your path, determine the
steps and the pace. France will continue to be your friend, and if you wish, your support,
internationally as well as domestically. You bring a lot to the relationship. When I see, for
example, that the flow of capital that goes from the poor South towards the rich North is bigger
than the flow of capital that goes from the rich North to the poor South, I say that there is
something wrong.
1 - 30
Colonialism is not dead. This is no longer the colonialism of states, it is the colonialism of
business and of parallel channels. We are speaking as sovereign states, equal in status, even
if not always in means. There are all kinds of conventions between us. There are military
conventions. I repeat the principle of the French policy: every time a foreign menace appears,
that could attack your independence, France will be by your side. We have already demonstrated
this many times, and sometimes in very difficult circumstances.
But our own role, as a foreign country, even though we are friends, is not to intervene in
domestic conflicts. In these cases, France, with the country’s leaders, will ensure the protection
of its citizens, its nationals, but does not intend to arbitrate conflicts. This is what I have been
doing as part of my responsibilities for nine years. In the same way, I will always forbid a
practice that sometimes existed in the past which consisted of France trying to organize domestic
political changes by plot or conspiracy. You know well that, for the last nine years, this has not
happened, and this will not happen in the future.
1 - 31
- ..-1:>4-
4.A.4. Extrait du message de l'attache de defense it. Kigali,
24 octobre 1990,
Appreciation de la situation politique
Declassifie
TERTIO : APPRECIATION DE LA SIlUATION POUrIQUE.
LA snuATION ·m DCMINEE PAR LA DF.STABILISATEIJRS •
- LES MEDIAS, LES REPRESENrATIONS DIPLOMATIQUE5 VOISINES DU RWANDA
VOLONIAIBEMENr OU ~ SE FONr LES PORTE-PAROU DES ENVAHISSEURS au ME1'fE LES SOt1l'IERiENT 0UVERmfENI'.
.
i
CECI VD!Nl' D'E:XBE A1TES'I'E PAR LA MANIERE DONT· R. F. I. A moo 0JMPlE
CE MAnN DE LA ~ DE LA ~ION DES DROITS DE L 'HOMME DIRIGEE
PAR ~ mElt DE NATIONALI'l'E FRANCAISE. Eli m'El', ALORS QUE CE JURIS'IE DEI.IVBE MANIFE:Sl»IENr UN CER"lIElCAT DE Be:mm: CONDUI'IE AU GOUVERNEMENr ~ QUI S '~CE DE RESE1VEB. ~ MEl! J FIJRS ammONS DE
~ ADX susm:rs, CElTE srATION NE BErIEN1' QUE LES ELEMENI'S NEGATIFS DE $:Ii BA'PPORT.
- u:s BP.I,J;ES amINUENl' A .EN'IBEIEm. LA aJNEUSICN EN BRANDISSAm' LA
MENACE D'DN DEPART RAPIDE DE LEtJBS RESSORI'ISSANl'S El' DE LEURS PARAQiUTISl'ES SI LE PBESIDENr HABYABIMANA NE SE RESCm PAS A DES CAP1'1ULAT!ONS
EX' ORBITANIES El' IMJSIIE'lEIiS.
CES DEDX CX!!I?ORTEMENl' SON! DE NAl'tJBE A DECOORAGER LES AI1lOlUTES
, . GOUVERNEMENrALES DISPOSEES A FAIBE D'IMPORTANIES
mNCFSSIONS. EUES
NE
.
.
mJVENr AI!£l'IRE EN PARXIOJUER QUE IE:R m lIoftSE UN W.NIXJN TmUTORIAL,AU mIF D'EIABTTR UN'CESSEZ-LE-FEIJ, AU PROFIT D'EWAHTSSEORS 'lUrSIS DESIRE1JX DE BEPRmJRE IE POOVOfR PERDU m 1959. EU.ES PEIJVENT D'AUTANT MJINS L' mm:rmE QUE CEIlX-cI HECI.mAISSANr us FEAT J'TFS RYANDAISES
REl'ABLlRAIEN! PBOBABL.:E1iENl AD mRD-EST IE BEGIME HCNNI DO PREMIER ROYAUME 'lUl'SI OOLS'Y EST JADIS INSTALLE ; CE 'BEI'ABIIS~ AVOUE OU DmuISE
• ~~ 1""," 1"- ,e
mrRAINIANT VL'ELIMINATION ImSIQOE A L'INIERIEUR DO pm DES 'lUl'SIS,
500.000 A 700.000 PmSONNEs, PAR'LES BUroS 7.000.000 D'INDIVIDUS.
L'IN'IERVENI'IClf
PmIsIBLE DO". PB!S1DENt ZAIROIS NE DEVBAI! PAS CLA.
.
RIFIER LA SIl'CIAtICf{. iN EFFEl' II. N'EST PAS IMPOSSIBIE QUE CE DEBNm,
DEVAN! LA DEMISStat BELGE,m RiS~ DE L'O.U.A. ~ PAR MU-
SEVOO EN P.ARTrcm.IEX, DEX:IDE P9.pR 1m ~ DE PBFSTIGE LClCALD'm'I'ERVEmR A.. mtlVEAtJ, 'EN PBmNT-SOOS SA 'IUIEu.E LERWANDA, SANS m AVOIR
Im.IMNrriS~u:s·'aEt1lmJNS AClUEUES AU SEIN DE
HUNAD'IE BXNH!QOE DES
snmLENl'
PAYS DES' GaANDS
~ SA ~
LA C.E.P.G·.L.
(CQfLACS : ZAIRE - BURUNDI - mwIDA)
DE SE MANUJ:.SI:ER.
f:1.LE
POURRAIT SE
nsER PAR LE 'BElOOR DES 'l'ROOPES ZAIBOISES.
SIGNE : OJL. GAUNIE./.
G. HAmES.
"
.:
• I
1 - 32
4.A.4. Excerpt from the defense attaché in Kigali’s message,
October 24th, 1990,
Assessment of the political situation
Declassified
TERTIO: Assessment of the political situation.
The situation is dominated by the combination of two destabilizing behaviors.
-
-
The media and the diplomatic representatives of Rwanda’s neighbors, have
become, voluntarily or involuntarily, spokespeople for the invaders, or have
even supported them openly.
This has just been attested to by the way in which R.F.I. became aware
this morning of the mission of the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights, led by Mr. FEDER, a French national. In fact, while he obviously
issued a certificate of good conduct to the Rwandan government, which
strives to maintain the best conditions of treatment for suspects, this station
retained only the negative items of his report.
The Belgians continue to maintain confusion, brandishing the threat of a rapid
pull-out of their citizens and their parachutists if President HABYARIMANA
does not agree to exorbitant and unjustified capitulations.
These two behaviors are of a nature to discourage the governmental
authorities ready to make important concessions. They cannot accept, in
particular, abandoning some territory, in order to establish a cease-fire, to the
profit of the Tutsi invaders eager to retake the power they lost in 1959. They
can even less admit that these invaders, disregarding Rwandan reality, will
probably reestablish the Honni regime of the first Tutsi kingdom, once installed
in the northeast. This reestablishment, explicit or disguised, would result (in all
likelihood) in the physical elimination of Tutsis in the interior of the country,
500,000 to 700,000 people, by the 7,000,000 Hutus.
The foreseeable intervention of the Zairian president will not necessarily
solve the situation. Indeed, it is not impossible that Zaire, before the Belgian
departure and in particular the hesitation of the O.A.U. [Organization of African
Unity], sustained by MUSEVENI, could decide, for reasons of local prestige, to
intervene once again, taking RWANDA under its supervision, without really
having the means to do so. Current meetings within the C.E.P.G.L. (Economic
Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes: ZAIRE – BURUNDI –
RWANDA) seem to demonstrate the probable manifestation of an intervention. It
could materialize through the return of Zairian troops.
SIGNED: COL. GALINIE./.
G. MARTRES.
1 - 33
"F
............
KANGURA,
¢’.-"
......
~7"7:
K~)I 37990
KEY:
Theextracts
arewritten
innormal
prînt.
No 6 December
1990:
.~#.-°
Page8: The I0 commandments:
t.Eve,ry
HummustknowthatanyTutsi
woman,
wherever
sheis,isworking
forherTutsi
ethnic
group.
Inconsequence,
every
Humwhodoesthefollowing
isa traitor:
-whoespouses
a Tutsiwoman
-whotakes
a Tutsi
woman
asa eoncubine.
-who
takes
a Tutsi
woman
aslais
secretary
orlais
protegee.
2. ~ .m2~Lknt/lg~~t,~m/~tu.~
are.mo_r.g_w.orth.y_mad~ore
con~ien~tious
in their
ro~r~wives,andmothers.
Are theyhot pretty,
goodsecretaries
andmorehonesff
3.Hutuwomen,
be»i~lant
andbring
yourhusba.nds,
brothers
andsonstotheir
senses.
4.Every
Hutu
mustknowthat
every
Tutsi
isdishonest
inbusiness.
Fieonlyaires
atthesupremacy
oflais
ethnic.
"The
night
willDetold
bytheonewhospent
it."
OEiteral
translation
ofa Rwandan
proverb.)
Consequently,
znyHumwhodoesthefoUowing
isa traitor:
-whomakes
analliance
with
Tutsis
inhisbusiness.
-whoinvests
hismoney
ortheState’s
money
ina company
ofaTutsi;
-wholends
or borrows
money
froma Tutsi;
-who
gives
favors
toTutsis
inbusiness
(granting
importing
licenses,
banking
loans,
building
plots,
State
markets...)
. «.
5.Strategical
posts
aswell
aspolitical,
administrative,
economical,
military,
andsecurity
ones
must
beputinhands
ofHutus.
6.The
educadon
sector
(pupils,
students,
teachers)
mustbeHuminthemajority.
7. TheRwandan
~ed__E.~c:g&..must.be.exclusi.vely
Hum.Theexperience
of theOctober
1990
warteaches
usthat.
A soldier
caa’t
takea Tutsi
woman
asa wife~
8.Hutus
muststoptaking
pityonTutsis.
9.-TheHutus,
wherever
theyare,mustbeunited,
interdependent
andworried
about
thecondition
oftheir
Hutu
brothers.
- TheHutus
oftheinterior
andfrom
outside
must
constantly
look
forfriends
andallies
forthe
Hutucause,
starting
bytheir
Bantou
brothers.
- Theybavetoconstantly
counteract
Tutsi
propaganda.
1 - 34
!il
..
5799’
- ThêHutusmustbe firrnandvi~__ag~t..t.h_e_ir_ço.r~_n_9n~çmy_Tutsi.
I O. Th¢1959Social
R-evolution,-’~e
1961Refcrendum,
andtheHumIdeology,
mustbe taught
to
every
Humandat ailthelevels.
EveryHummustwidely
di~ase
thepresent
ideology.
AnyHumwhowillpersecute
IrisHumbrother
forhaving
re,ad?diffused
andtaught
thisideology
ïsa trakor.
No 23 October
i"991:
Lastpage:
Colonel
Rweudeye’s
photograph:
Captiort:
" We willalways
remember
Colonel
P.,wendeye,
whosacrîficed
himseff
forthemass,
and
we ~ avenge
himandlaismates."
No 2.5November
19.9!:
In theeditoriM:
Wc Hutus,
arenowangry.
It is nowevident
thatifthat
continues
likethat,themasstantakepartin thatwarimme~y
No 26 November1991:
The cove~
. Spedal:
Tutsi,
God’s
race.
ç~Vï~ch
arms’ïhould
we useto vanquish
Inyenzi
forever?
(A machete
is drawninfrontofthis
title.)
IftheHum1959Revolution
should
be brought
back,forus to vanquish
Inyenzi-Ntutsi.
1 - 35
1 - 36
– VERBATIM –
from the 6 pm meeting on Wednesday, January 23 at the Elysée Palace
PARTICIPANTS –
President of the Republic – Mr. ROCARD – Mr. DUMAS – Mr. JOXE – Mr.
CHEVENEMENT – General SCHMITT – General FORRAY – Admiral COATANEA
– Prefect FOUGIER – Mr. BIANCO – Admiral LANXADE – Mr. VEDRINE – General
MONCHAL – General MENU –
SECTION ON RWANDA:
DEFENSE MINISTER – Situation in RWANDA
I have found that certain Europeans have moved back to RUHENGERI, a very dangerous
city, because our troops are present; people are taking risks and it’s our troops that have
to come to their aid; whence our presence…
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
These are normal circumstances!
The nature of the conflict is indiscernible, UGANDA’s role is ambiguous.
The Ugandan Tutsis are moving to conquer RWANDA, it’s worrying.
I would like it if we made contact with UGANDA. It’s not in our interest for the
Rwandan border to yield. If it’s to do with tribal battles we say nothing; if it’s an
aggression we have to intervene and rescue the French people held by the Tutsis. I had a
telephone conversation with President HABYARIMANA.
CEMP
Forty of the surrounded Europeans in RUHENGERI are French aid workers present on
the orders of their administration.
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
We are authorized to intervene to liberate them.
CEMP
One hundred French troops are committed to this action. We let the Rwandans try to get
the rebels to leave and we retrieve our citizens.
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
We cannot limit our presence.
We are at the edge of the English-speaking front. UGANDA cannot just do as it pleases.
We must tell President MUSEVENI: it’s not normal that the Tutsi minority wants to
impose its rule over the Hutu majority…
Until tomorrow at 6 pm.
UNCLASSIFIED
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FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0673
INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 01 OF 04 KIGALI 01981
E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, RW, UG
SUBJECT: GOR OUTLINES STRATEGY TO NEGOTIATIONS TO END WAR
1.
CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. IN DISCUSSIONS MAY 10-11 WITH A/S COHEN,
RWANDA'S NEW FOREIGN MINISTER OUTLINED A TWO-PRONGED
APPROACH TO ENDING RWANDA'S WAR WITH THE RWANDAN
PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF): DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF
RESULTING IN A PEACE TREATY ON THE ONE HAND AND
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KIGALI 01981 01 OF 04 131453Z
PAGE 02
NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH UGANDA ON THE OTHER. HE
SUBSEQUENTLY INCORPORATED INTO HIS STRATEGY COHEN'S
SUGGESTION FOR A NON-AGGRESSION TREATY WITH UGANDA. THE
FOREIGN MINISTER SAID ALL ISSUES WERE NEGOTIABLE. COHEN
SAID IF ALL PARTIES REQUEST US TO, THE U.S. WOULD
PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS AND PROVIDE TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE ON DEVELOPINGHS
MQCK MUSEVENI IN" TO FUTURE COMMITMENTS WITHOUT FORCING
HIM TO ACKNOWLEDGE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR. RWANDA'S
NEW MINISTER OF DEFENSE ASKED FOR U.S. HELP WITH THE
DEMOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY, DEMINING THE BORDER AREA,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 12 MAY 2012
DATE/CASE ID: 27 APR 2005 200103014
C2
RELEASED IN PART
1.4(B), 1.4(D)
131453Z
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UNCLASSIFIED
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OPENING THE NORTHERN CORRIDOR AND HAVING UGANDA WITHDRAW
AID FROM THE RPF. END SUMMARY.
TWO-PRONGED APPROACH
3. AMBASSADOR HERMAN J. COHEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
AFRICA, DISCUSSED PROSPECTS FOR RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS TO
END THE GOR-RPF WAR AND RELATED ISSUES IN A JOINT
MEETING MAY 10 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BONIFACE NGULINZIRA
AND DEFENSE MINISTER JAMES GASANA. ALSO PRESENT AT THE
MEETING FOR THE U.S. WERE AMBASSADOR FLATEN, DCM LEADER,
ECON OFFICER ZORICK. PRESENT FOR THE RWANDAN SIDE WERE
AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. ALOYS UWIMANA AND A NOTETAKER
FROM EACH OF THE MINISTRIES.
4. THE FOREIGN MINISTER OUTLINED TO AMBASSADOR COHEN
THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT'S TWO-PRONGED STRATEGY FOR
RESOLVING THE WAR WITH THE RPF. HE SAID THE APPROACH
WOULD INVOLVE BOTH POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH THE RPF AND
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KIGALI 01981 01 OF 04 131453Z
PAGE 03
NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH UGANDA. HE TOLD COHEN
HE WILL GO TO KAMPALA THE WEEK OF MAY 18 (PROBABLY MAY
18-21) TO MEET AND DISCUSS DATES AND LOCATION FOR FUTURE
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF AND TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS WITH
UGANDA. (NOTE. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE INTERIOR
MINISTER AND THE MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR REFUGEE
AFFAIRS WILL ACCOMPANY THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON THIS
TRIP. MDR AND PL PARTY LEADERS MAY ALSO PARTICIPATE.
END NOTE.)
5. THE MJ WGZLT IN A
PEACE TREATY SIGNED BY THE TWO PARTIES. THE FIRST PHASE
WILL BE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE,
WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE FOR THE
NEGOTIATIONS. A MECHANISM FOR MONITORING THE CEASE FIRE
WILL BE NECESSARY IF THE CEASEFIRE IS TO BE EFFECTIVE.
HE MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF NEUTRAL OBSERVERS OR A
TEAM CONSISTING OF THE TWO PARTIES. THE SECOND PHASE
WILL BE THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE THAT WILL HAVE TO EXAMINE
SIX ELEMENTS: REFUGEES, NATIONAL UNITY, THE
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS, A NATIONAL CONFERENCE, THE
PARTICIPATION OF THE RPF IN THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE
INTEGRATION OF THE TWO ARMIES. THE FOREIGN MINISTER
STRESSED THAT ALL OF THESE ELEMENTS ARE NEGOTIABLE. THE
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 38
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 39
MINISTER SAID THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE DIRECT AND
WITHOUT MEDIATORS BECAUSE MEDIATORS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO
INFLEXIBLE POSITIONS. FACILITATORS TO PROVIDE A NEUTRAL
VENUE OR OBSERVATION MIGHT, HOWEVER, BE USEFUL.
6. IN HIS TOAST TO AMBASSADOR COHEN AT A DINNER LATER
THAT EVENING, THE MINISTER CLARIFIED HIS CONCEPT OF
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MEDIATION: HENCEFORTH MEDIATORS, INCLUDING THE U.S.,
WOULD FACILITATE MEETINGS RATHER THAN SERVE AS AN
OBLIGATORY CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
7. UGANDA, THE MINISTER SAID, WOULD BE KEY IN THE
PROCESS. THE GOAL OF RWANDA'S NORMALIZATION EFFORTS
WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO ABANDON ITS SUPPORT FOR
THE RPF AND TO HAVE UGANDA ENCOURAGE THE RPF TO ACCEPT
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AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 04 KIGALI 01981
E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, RW, UG
SUBJECT: GOR OUTLINES STRATEGY TO NEGOTIATIONS TO END WAR
THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. NO RESULTS CAN BE EXPECTED
WITHOUT UGANDA'S PARTICIPATION AND COMMITMENT TO
INTERNATIONAL NORMS OF SECURITY AND TO THE SOVEREIGNTY
OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.
COHEN BRIEFS ON TALKS IN UGANDA
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KIGALI 01981 02 OF 04 141135Z
I
A/S COHEN
8.
RESPONDED FAVORABLY TO THE STRATEGY OUTLINE BY THE
MINISTER. HE AGREED THAT MUSEVENI WAS KEY AND COULD BE
VERY USEFUL.
9. RPF READY TO NEGOTIATE. COHEN TOLD THE FOREIGN
MINISTER THAT THE RPF IS READY TO NEGOTIATE AND THAT IT
HAS AGREED TO ACCEPT THE INVITATION OF FRANCE TO THE
NEXT NEGOTIATING SESSION IN PARIS. HOWEVER, HE SAID,
THE RPF DOUBTS THE FREEDOM OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO
NEGOTIATE. HE SAID THE RPF CITED THE CONSTITUTION, THE
CONTINUING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT, AND THE OBSTACLE OF
THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY AS THE BASIS FOR ITS SKEPTICISM.
COHEN SAID HE URGED THE RPF TO FIND OUT AT THE
NEGOTIATING TABLE WHETHER ITS ANALYSIS IS CORRECT.
UNCLASSIFIED
1.4(B)
1.4(B)
UNCLASSIFIED
10. RPF DEMANDS. COHEN REVIEWED FOR THE RWANDANS THE
RPF DEMANDS: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE N'SELE ACCORDS,
INCLUDING THE RIGHT OF REFUGEES TO RETURN; INTEGRATION
OF THE ARMIES; AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE TO PROTECT
RETURNING REFUGEES; A NEUTRAL OBSERVER GROUP FOR A
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
KIGALI 01981 02 OF 04 141135Z
PAGE 03
CEASEFIRE; THE PRESENCE OF THE U.S. AT NEGOTIATIONS
BECAUSE OF DOUBTS OVER THE NEUTRALITY OF THE FRENCH; AND
A CEASEFIRE (ONE THAT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY MEAN LAYING
DOWN ARMS). THE ONLY NON-NEGOTIABLE DEMAND, HE SAID,
WAS THE RIGHT OF REFUGEES TO RETURN.
U.S. ROLE IN TALKS
11. AMBASSADOR COHEN TOLD THE RWANDANS THAT THE U.S.
HAS FULL CONFIDENCE IN THE FACILITATING ROLE OF THE
FRENCH IN NEGOTIATIONS. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE RPF
HAD ASKED FOR A U.S. PRESENCE AND SAID THE U.S. IS READY
TO BE PRESENT PROVIDING ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE
FRENCH, ARE READY FOR THE U.S. TO PARTICIPATE. COHEN
SAID THE U.S. CAN FURNISH TECHNICAL EXPERTS TO HELP WITH
DEFINING THE TERMS OF A CEASEFIRE AND WITH THE ISSUE OF
INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES.
INTEGRATION OF FORCES AND DEMOBILIZATION
12. COHEN NOTED THAT PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA BELIEVES
INTEGRATION OF THE ARMY WILL BE THE MOST DIFFICULT
ASPECT OF THE RPF'S DEMANDS. COHEN RECOUNTED HIS
SUGGESTION FOR LINKING INTEGRATION WITH DEMOBILIZATION:
FIRST INTEGRATE ALL THE FORCES AND THEN DEMOBILIZE AN
EQUAL PROPORTION OF BOTH FORCES. THE DETAILS, HE SAID
CAN BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE HELP OF EXPERTS. BUT
EVERYONE WHO RETURNS, REFUGEES AND SOLDIERS, MUST BE
REINTEGRATED INTO RWANDAN SOCIETY. IN RESPONSE TO THE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
KIGALI 01981 02 OF 04 141135Z
PAGE 04
MINISTER'S QUESTION, COHEN SAID THE RPF HAD NOT
INDICATED HOW IT THOUGHT INTEGRATION MIGHT TAKE PLACE.
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 41
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 42
13. RWANDA'S NEW MINISTER OF DEFENSE, JAMES GASANA,
NOTED SEVERAL DIFFICULTIES TO REINTEGRATION OF THE
ARMIES: MANY RPF FIGHTERS HAVE SERVED IN THE ARMY OF
ANOTHER COUNTRY, RAISING THE QUESTION OF LOYALTY;
VARIATIONS EXIST IN THE LEVEL AND QUALITY OF TRAINING OF
THE TWO FORCES; COHEN'S SUGGESTION RISKED LEAVING
MINORITY TUTSI OVERREPRESENTED IN THE ARMY.
CONFIDENTIAL
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ACTION AF-01
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INFO
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H-01
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ADS-00
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326892 141136Z /38
P 131444Z MAY 92 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0675
INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 04 KIGALI 01981
E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, MARK, RW, UG
SUBJECT: GOR OUTLINES STRATEGY TO NEGOTIATIONS TO END WAR
NON-AGGRESSION ACCORD
UNCLASSIFIED
HA-09
NSCE-00
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UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 43
14. DEFENSE MINISTER GASANA (WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE
PRESIDENT'S POLITICAL PARTY) ELABORATED ON THE ROLE
UGANDA AND ITS ARMY HAS PLAYED IN THE WAR: THE NRA
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02
KIGALI 01981 03 OF 04 141135Z
I.4(D)
16. THE LAST ELEMENT, COHEN SAID, WOULD AVOID THE
ARGUMENT OVER WHERE THE TROOPS ARE AND PERMIT THE
CEASEFIRE TO BE IMPLEMENTED. HE SAID THE ENTIRE ACCORD
COULD BE DEPOSITED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL WHICH WOULD ENGAGE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
IN PROVIDING GUARANTEES.
17. THE RWANDAN FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM
OVER SUCH AN ACCORD. HE ASKED WHETHER SUCH AN ACCORD
COULD BRING CHANGES ON THE GROUND, WHAT THE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
KIGALI 01981 03 OF 04 141135Z
PAGE 03
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD DO IF IT WERE BROKEN, AND
WHETHER UGANDA WOULD ACCEPT. HE SAID THERE WOULD BE NO
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
WAY RWANDA COULD LET MUSEVENI GET AWAY WITHOUT ACCEPTING
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR IF THERE WERE NO IRON-CLAD
GUARANTEES OF PEACE.1
HE NOTED THAT SIMILAR
ACCORDS WITH COMMITMENTS WERE USED IN ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA
AND ARE UNDER DISCUSSION IN MOZAMBIQUE.
I
18. LATER THE SANE DAY, HOWEVER, THE FOREIGN MINISTER
IN HIS
HAD ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF
TOAST TO COHEN LATER THAT EVENING, HE STATED THAT RWANDA
WOULD NEED POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FROM
FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO SIGN AN ACCORD
1 - 44
1.4(D)
1.4(D), 1.4(B)
1.4(B)
U.S AID REQUESTED
19. IN SUMMING UP AID RWANDA WILL NEED TO ACCOMPLISH
ITS PLAN, THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE TOLD COHEN THAT U.S.
HELP WOULD BE NEEDED:
- - TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO WITHDRAW SUPPORT FROM THE RPF
SO SINCERE NEGOTIATIONS CAW PROCEED;
-- TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO OPEN THE NORTHERN CORRIDOR SO
RWANDA'S ECONOMY CAN BEGIN TO RECOVER;
- - TO ASSIST IN DEMOBILIZATION BY PROVIDING
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
KIGALI 01981 03 OF 04 141135Z
PAGE 04
REINTEGRATION TRAINING AND REHABILATION FOR HANDICAPPED
VETERANS; AND,
- - TO HELP WITH DEMINING AREAS NEAR THE FRONTIER SO
CIVILIANS CAN RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND BEGIN FARMING
AGAIN.
COMMENT
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 45
NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 01
ACTION AF-01
INFO
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01981
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INR-01
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C-01
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141136Z
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ADS-00
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NSAE-00
SS-01
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P 131444Z MAY 92 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0676
INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 04 OF 04 KIGALI 01981
E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, MARK, RW, UG
SUBJECT: GOR OUTLINES STRATEGY TO NEGOTIATIONS TO END WAR
20. THE FOREIGN MINISTER APPEARS READY TO TAKE
NEGOTIATIONS TO END THE WAR IN A NEW DIRECTION. THE
INTENTION TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY WITH THE RPF AND TO
NEGOTIATE SEPARATELY WITH UGANDA ARE TWO IMPORTANT
DEPARTURES FROM THE POSITION OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT
THAT SHOULD OPEN NEW AVENUES OF DISCUSSION FOR ALL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
KIGALI 01981 04 OF 04 141136Z
PAGE 02
PARTIES. AMBASSADOR COHEN MADE IT CLEAR TO RWANDA THAT
THE U.S. IS WILLING TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH ITS
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF AND UGANDA AND HE OFFERED SOME
UNCLASSIFIED
HA-09
NSCE-00
TRSE-00
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 46
SUGGESTIONS ON SEVERAL POINTS. HE DID NOT GET INVOLVED
WITH NEGOTIATING DETAILS, SUCH AS TERMS OF A CEASEFIRE,
BUT DID OFFER U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WHEN THE TIME
COMES.
21.
1.4(B)
THIS POSITION CONTRASTS
SHARPLY WITH THAT PRESENTED TO AMBASSADOR COHEN BY THE
PRIME MINISTER AND HIS CABINET OFFICIALS. IT MAY SIGNAL
DIFFICULT INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS AHEAD, EVEN THOUGH THE
NEW STRATEGY FOR NEGOTIATIONS WAS PRESENTED AS A
TRANSITION GOVERNMENT POSITION. END COMMENT
FLATEN
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 47
KigalL
27 July1992
Republicof Rwanda
Ministry
of Defence
RwandanArmed Forces
S taffHeadquarters
Intelligence
Service
(G2)
Memorandum
to the ArmyChiefof Staff
[ CONFIDENTIAL]
SUBJECT: MOOD OF THE MILITARY AND CIVILIANS
l. Thepolitieal
situation
of outcotmtry
andtheongoing
warhavearoused
martycomments
by
soldiers
andcivilians
alike.
Coming
in thewakeof certain
political
events
andpressure
fromthccnemy,
thecommênts
have
created
a certain
moodwhich
mustbebrought
toyour
attsntion
a.,;
itiscertainly
a marrer
ofconcern.
Youwiltfindbelowsomeof thecomments,
followed
by my opinion
andviews.
2. Thesc
commcnts
v«hich
areoftcnmadcby bothcivilians
andsotdiers
havebeengenerated
by
various
issues,
(A)The Arusha
Accords
(1)Tlaecommen~s
ruade
by civilians
on these
Accords
aremanybutI needhotmemion
them
sineetheyareruadepubliely,
evenovertheradioduring
newsprogrammes
broadcast
by
political
parties
ortlle
coverage
ofrallies.
Ina nutshell,
manypeople
severely
criticize
thecontents
of l:heAccords
which
onlyfavour
the
RPFtothedetriment
ofRwanda.
Theyaretherefore
calling
fortheir
review
so thatthepoints
which
donotfavour
usshould
berevisited.
Mostof thosewhocriticize
theAccords
areworried
aboutthepossible
merger
between
the
RwandanArmedForcesand RPF elements
Thecivilian
population
isopposed
tothiseventuality
andbelieves
thatit isa devious
wayof
seizing
powerin Rwanda
fromwithin.
Evenmembers
of someopposition
political
parties,
especiaUy
theMDR,arehotin favour
of any
merger
between
theRwandan
ArmedForces
andRPFarmed
,«tements.
In fact,ailthosewhoare
against
themerger
believe
thatourcountry
isbeing
soldtotheenemy.
Thepeople
aretherefore
afraid
ofaUthis,
Someofthemareevensaying
thattheyareimmediately
going
togetready
tofleebefore
theINKONTANYI
arrive,
~.dding
thatprior
totheir
flight
they
Joinder
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1 - 48
willmassacre
theTutsi.
(2)As forthemilitary,
manysoldiers
virulently
disapprove
of anymerger
between
the
INKONTANYI
and the Rwandan
ArmedForces.Officers
are amongthosedenouncing
this
provision
oftheArusha
Accords
opining
thattheycould,
ew~ntually,
putup withtheabsorption
of a fewINKONTANYI
elements
in theArmy,in proportion
to theTutsipopulation
in this
country.
If theTutsiaccount
for14 percent
of Rwandans,
theINKONTANYI
to be absorbed
should
represent
14 percent
ofthefuture
Rwandan
Armed
Forces.
To gobeyond
that,saytheOfficers,
infact,
theother
soldiers
aswell,
would
amount
to selling
thiscountry
totheenemy,
whatthe
Military
would
notallow.
In their
conversations,
someoffîcers
go asfaraswondering
whether
things
should
staytheway
theyare,
inother
words
whether
civilian
authorities
should
corttinue
issuing
directives
andtaking
decisions
which
goagainst
theinterests
of theNation,
forthesolepurpose
ofprotecting
the
immediate
interests
ofEeir
parties.
Theywonder
howlongthisisgoing
tolast,
while
expressing
their
worries
overtheinterference
ofpoliticians
inpurely
military
matters.
Theyconclude
that
i~tistimethis
situation
change&
Regarding
themerger
withtheINKONTANYI
or their
absorption,
theofficers
areof theopinion
thattheGovernment,
through
MINAFET
andtheMinistry
of Defence
should,
in a meeting
to
which
moremilitary
officiais
should
beinvited,
endeavour
toexplain
thismatter
andallow
anopen
discussion
thereon
inorder
togetthefeelofandrecord
theworries
andviews
ofsoldiers
onthis
issue.
Suchviews
should
betaken
into
account
infuture
negotiations.
They
saythatitisright
to
do so sincethey,andnotcivilians,
aretheoneswhowillbe required
to workwiththe
INKONTANYI.
In anycase,
themilitary
is apprehensive
about
a possible
merger
between
theINKONTANYI
and
the Rwandan
ArmedForces.
Theyalready
bavea premonition
thatif theINKONTANYI
are
absorbed
ingreat
numbers
theywillmassacre
outsoldiers,
especially
ourcadres.
Some
ofourofficers
areeven
saying
thatbefore
theyfleefromthiscountry
theywillfirst
settle
oldscores
withthose
ofoutleaders
whocaused
thedisaster
bynaively
yielding
toallthedemands
oftheenemy
fighting
us.
(3)Manycivilians
arenowbeginning
to approach
soldiers
telling
themthattheRwandan
Armed
Forces
aretheir
lasthope
andthat
theyshould
therefore
right
thesituation
intimebyputting
an
endtotheintrigues
of irresponsible
civilians
whoareonlyseeking
immediate
retums
under
the
umbrella
ofpolitical
parties,
instead
oftaking
into
account
theinterests
ofailtheRwandan
people.
Therefore,
onthewhole,
there
iswidespread
anxiety
among
civilians
andsoldiers
inviewofthe
possible
merger
between
theRwandan
ArmedForces
and theINKONTANYI.
Manypeople
feel
thatoutleaders
donothave
theinterests
oftheNation
atheart.
(4)Theofficers
object
totheprovision
intheArusha
Accords
thata newa newarmyisgoing
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becreated,
which
provision
ignores
thefactthattheRwandatt
Armed
Forces
already
exist.
They
severely
critieize
thefaetthatevenRadioRwanda
no longer
talksof "TheRwandan
Armed
Forces"
butrather
of "Government
Armed
Forces".
Theofficers
underscore
thatthisreasoning
gives
theimpression
thattheRwandan
Armed
Forces
area faction
on thesamefooting
astheRPF
elements,
a viewtheyloathe.
Theytoodonothesitate
tosaythat"
thiscountry
hasbeensoldout".
(5)Members
ofailpolitical
parties
( save,
ofcourse,
theParti
Liberal)
donotunderstand
atail
thêtmilateral
andunconditional
release
byRwanda
ofprisoners
ofwarandtheacolytes
of the
enemy.
Tomostpeople,
thisisfurther
proof
thatonlytheenemy
isderiving
anybenefit
fromtheArusha
Accords
andthattheGovemment
allows
itselfto
behoodwinked
ailthetime.
Somepeople
believe
thatthere
aresomeindividuals
among
lhenegotiators
oftheAccords
who
areworking
fortheenemy,
offering
theenemy
everything,
tothedetriment
oftheinterests
ofthe
Nation.
Thepeople
aretherefore
asking
theRwandan
Armed
Forces
to dosomething
to putthesituation
right
before
itistoolate.
Greatly
vexed,
someevengoasfarassaying
thatourtroops
should
withdraw
from
thewarfront,
foritserves
nopurpose
toberiddled
withbullets
whenso-called
political
leaders
arebusy
selling
outthecountry
totheveryenemy
whomwe arefîghting.
Thesoldiers
speakalmost
thesainelanguage.
Theywantto knowwhenandunderwhatconditions
their
colleagues
captured
bytheenemywillbe released,
nowthattheenemy
bassecured
theunconditional
release
oftheir
ownpeople.
Thisbas,
ofcourse,
increased
their
demoralization,
espeeially
assome
ofthem
thinkthattheofficers
sanctioned
theoperation
during
theirmeeting
withthePrimeMinister
and
MINAFFET
at theESM.Somesoldiers
aresaying
thatbefore
theyflee,
as theenemy
advances
ingreat
numbers
towards
thecapital,
theywilldealwiththeofficers
whoeasily
gaveintothewishes
ofreckless
civilian
authorities
( I amonly
repeating
whatisbeing
said).
Fortheir
part,
theofficers
feeltheyhavebeentricked
byMINAFFET
andthePrime
Minister.
Indeed,
thcy
donotunderstand
whythese
twoauthorities
metsomanymilitary
offidals
purportedly
toexplain
tothem
theArusha
Accords
andyetforgot,
of course
knowingly,
to speakto themon theunilateral
and
unconditional
release
ofprisoners
ofwar
andtheacolytes
oftheenenay.
Theofficers
saytheyhavethusbeenmisused
because
bothcivilians
andthemilitary
believe
thatthey
wereawareof themanoeuver
whichoccurred
on theveryevening
of themeeting
withtheauthorities
mentioned
above.
Itiswith
a lotofbitterness
that
theyrefer
tothismatter.
B.
Dismissal
of Communal
authorities
(KUBOHOZA)
(1)Somepeople
thinkthatthe"KUBOHOZA"phenomenon
whichconsists,
in particular,
of dismissing
officiais
whoarenotwelllooked
uponbyopposition
political
parties,
espeeially
pro-MRND
bourgmestres,
maycreate
disorder
inthecountry,
iftheGovemment
does
notputanendtoit
intime.
Thisisallthemore
disquieting
assenior
political
leaders,
including
thePrime
Minister,
o:fficially
endorse
andsupport
these
reprehensible
acts.
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1 - 50
People
wonder
whether
thePrime
Minister,
forexample,
still
feels
h~isthePrime
Minister
oftheentire
Government
whenhe goesto theextent
of practising
"KUBOHOZA"l.~nselfby
distributing
MDRbadges
tobourgrnestres
forcibly
converted
during
party
rallies.
People
alsowonder
howworse
thesituation
could
get,iftheHeadofState
doesthesarne
thing
forthe
benefit
of hisparty,
theMRND.
Thesaine
questions
arebeing
asked
aspeople
wonder
whyState
civil
servants
should
berelieved
oftheir
posts
without
compensation,
simply
because
theydohOtbelong
to filesameparty
astheminister.
Manypeople
arefurious
aboutthis,especially
MRNDmembers
whowonder
whether
MRNDministers
arereally
committed
todefending
theinterests
oftheir
party
orwhettter
someofthemarenotthere
only
todefend
their
owninterests.
I alsonoted
theviews
ofsomeoftïcers
who,without
necessarily
taking
sides,
arenevertheless
saying
that
"ifthe
President
doesnotdefend
laispeople,
ifhedoesnotstand
upintimeagainst
thescheming
ofthese
++~_~
pro-enemy
parties,
inother
words
i~too
isonlydefending
hisowninterests
while
ignoring
those
ofthe
++~i Natïon
’ andbluntly
«+++++"~~
abandoning
thosé’who
havesupported
himsofar;well,
ifhefails
toreact
intimeto
these
dramatic
situations
soastosave
theNation
andhonest
people,
heisgoing
tolïnd
hirnself
alone
since
no onewantsto dieforsomeone
whowiUhotreeognize
him".
+’Ahubwo
mazabimubwire
abimenye",
theyadded.
3
Personal
views
( a ) TheArusha
Accords
wereone-sided
Accords
tothebenefit
ofthe
enemy
whotherefore
feels
thatthey
could
go further
anddemand
more.
Theconcessions
thusmadeto theenemymayseriously
mortgage
the
interests
ofthecountry.
Being
aware
ofthis,
thepeople
areprotesting
everywhere.
Manyme;mbers
ofevenopposition
political
parties
aredenouncing
certain
aspects
oftheaccords,
especially
those
provisions
relating
totheformation
ofa newnational
armyandtheunilateral
release
ofprisoners
of warandacolytes
of theenemy,
which
release
wasmadeto thedetriment
of Rwanda.
Soldiers,
ingeneral,
donotatailapprove
oftheaccords,
believing
that
thecountry
hasbeenbetrayed
to
theenemy
andthat,
consequently,
itisnolonger
necessary
tocontinue
fighting,
since
ailthewarefforts
arebeing
negated
bypolitical
leaders
whoareonlyouttodefend
their
owninterests.
( b ) I think
thatthissituation
isserious
andshould
beexamined
moreclosely
inorder
toredress
the
damage
done,
ifthat
isstill
possible.
Asconteras
themilitary,
I think
itisstill
rimetoorganize
a broad-based
discussion
ontheAccords,
especially
withrespect
totheformation
ofthe"newarmy".
Through
sucha discussion
thefeelings
and
concerns
ofsoldiers,
inother
words
thefeelings
andconteras
ofthose
whowillberequired
tolivewith
the INKONTANYI
in the "NewArmy",willbe known.
Inspiration
could
evenbedrawn
fromsomeoftheviews
thatwould
emanate
fromthediscussion,
instead
ofbeing
subjected
todecisions
thatcater
forimmediate
political
interests,
whereas
theconsequences
of
Joinder
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4
1 - 51
suchdecisions
mayseriously
compromise
thefuture
of theRwandan
ArmedForces
andthatof the
country.
TheHeadof State
hadpromised
to holda second
meeting
withmilitoery
leaders.
Whynottakeadvantage
ofthatmeeting
where
everyone
willspeak
their
mindwithout
fearofbeing
rapped
overtheknuckles?
No
longer
beirïg
sureoftheir
future
astransfers
seemtobecontrolled
froma distance
bycireles
outside
the
Rwandan
ArmedForces,
theofficers
areindeed
beginning
to harbour
someobsessive
fear.
So,theyfear
tospeak
their
minds
inthepresence
ofcertain
persons.
This
isthetruth;
itispointless
trying
torunaway
fromit.Thisobsessive
fearnowhounds
someofthem.
c.Theuneasiness
noticed
among
civilians
isalsonoticed
among
soldiers.
Everyone
openly
saysthatthis
country
hasbeenbetrayed
andthatsomething
mustbedonctosaveit.Civilians
arecounting
ontheArmed
Forces
andsomeofthemarealready
approaching
soldiers
to tellthemthatthetimehaseometosavethe
country
formchaos.
Thisis a dangerous
situation
and,under
theeircumstances,
anything
mayhappen,
especially
as people
no longer
hesitate
to saythatif theHeadof Stateis notreadyto assume
his
responsibility
tosavethecountry,
he should
handoverpower.
Thisiswhatpeople
sayopenly.
d. Thesoldiers
ARENOTwilling
to livetogether
withtheINKONT.ANYI
anddo notat ailtmderstand
whywe areasking
themto fight,
sincewe release
theINYENZI
eaptured
at thefrontas wellas the
recruiting
agents
whosupply
eombatants
totheenemy
front.
Ailthîsattnoys
thetroops
whoarebeginning
tocriticize
severely
both
thecivilian
andmilitary
leaders.
Offieers
arebegirming
todistrust
more
andmore
their
superiors
andtheysayso.Thissituation
calls
forreflection
anda remedy.
e. TheArusha
Accords
havecaused
widespread
turmoil
andvexation.
Yet,thewarmaycontinue,
andif
itdoes,
we mayfacethefollowing
problems:
-soldiers
becoming
tired
anddemoralized;
-increasing
economic
hardship;
-theriskofpartners
abandoning
us;
-theriskofpotiticians
causing
chaos,
which
will
betotheadvantage
oftheenemy,
andsoonandsoforth.
Undersuchcircumstances,
thiscountry
mayfallintothehandsof theINKONTANYI,
an eventuality
fraught
withdireconsequences.
Inorder
toprepare
ourselves
forthecontinuation
ofhostilities,
which
inthefinal
analysis
areinevitablc,
in myopinion
thefollowing
measures
mustbetaken:
(1)- recruit
andtrain
enough
soldiers
whose
morale
would
belessaffected.
Theywillbebetter
equipped
tofacetheenemy
whohasbeenperked
upbya series
ofcheap
victori.es
andsustained
propaganda.
(2)- makesurewe haveenough
ammunition
because
a newlackof mnmunition
maycausepractically
irreversible
disaster.
(3)- strive
tostayinthegoodbooks
ofourfriends
andpartners,
espec:ially
France
andtheUnited
States.
Inthisregard,
itisnecessary
toprepare
their
minds,
making
themund~»tand
thatRwanda
isa unique
case,
thatwe areconfronted
withanenemy
whowants
toregain
thepower
itlostandthatanygoodintention
itmaydisplay
isonlya subterfuge
aimed
solely
attaking
overpower
andthereafter
proceeding
toavenge
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1 - 52
’~~!
O4ne,
thevictims
ofthe1959Revolution
andofthe
events
thatfollowed
that:revolution
upto1973.
These
friends
andpartners
willthereby
helpusweaken
theenemy
whoisstiUasking
formore.
After
this,
wecould
easily
selltheconcept
of representation
within
theRwandan
AtmedForces,
representaUon
basedon the
proportion
of eachethnic
group
intheRwandan
population,
inlieuofa complete
merger
which,
if itever
happens,
willendupinthedisaster
ofa moredeadly
civil
war.Politicians
mustunderstand
this;
(4)- Induce
ourfriends
andpartners
togivepriority
toflacdemocratic
process
instead
ofgetting
bogged
downininsidious
considerations
putforward
bytheenemy.
Clearly,
thiscalls
fora national
consensus
so
thatweallspeak
thesamelanguage
regarding
thewar;
Parties
likethePLandothers
operating
within
itsfoldshould
listen
toreason
bygiving
priority
tothe
intêrests
ofthe
Nation.
Inanycase,
iftheyrail
todoso,themasses
willreact,
nowthatthey
arebecoming
aware
thattheyhavebeendupe&
Mobaction
is difficult
toeontrol.
(5)- thepopulation
andtlaeRwandan
Armed
Forces
having
beenvexexl
by theactions
oftheGovernment
which
onlyengages
inpolitieal
scherning
( I amonlyrepeating
whatisbeing
said),thisGovernment
may
becompelled
toresign.
It would
therefore
benecessary
topersuade
ourfriends
nottoabandon
usunder
thepretext
thatwearenotshowing
anysignofgoodwill.
Tothisend.thedemocratic
process
mustbe keptoncourse
and,whenever
necessary,
shown
to theworld
toprove
that,
inspire
ofourcurrent
difficulties,
wearestill
commit’md
todemocracy
or,rather,
tothe
democratic
process;
f.Inmyopinion,
itisabsolutely
absurd
thatata timewhen
theenemy
isthreatening
thecountry
andswears
toseize
power
inKigali
( theyareabout
50kmawayfromthecapital
) thepeople
inside
thecountry
are
tearing
oneanother
topieces
under
thecover
ofpolitical
parties
andwiththeblessings
oftheleaders
of
these
parties.
Itisnotinsuch
circumstances
thatwewill
beable
tounite
against
theenemy
threatening
us.
Thesequarrels
andthe"KUBOHOZA"
business
thatsomeofficiais
wholeheartedly
support
mustcease.
People,
especially
thebourgmestres,
should
feelsecure,
ifweareasking
themtoensure
security
inside
the
country.
Someofficiais
( e.g.bougmestre
Gatete
andothers
) should
beleftalone,
instead
ofbeing
madevictims
ofthezeal
theyhaveshown
intheinterest
ofthenation.
Government
employees
should
notbevictims
ofinjustices
stemming
frompolitical
parties,
otherwise
they
willbecome
dissatisfied
andswell
theranks
ofthose
whoareagainst
autthority
thereby
worsening
the
climate
ofuneasiness
prevailing
inthecountry.
Inpassing,
I should
point
outthattheemployment
of manyTutsi
andPi[[members
bythegovernment
has
greatly
annoyed
Hutuelements
whohavebeenlaidoff.Tension
ishigh.
4. Conclusions
( a ) Thepeople
areunhappy
andhavebeendemoralized
by thegove:mment’s
action
whichfavours
the
enemy.
Thesoldiers
aredemoralized
andapathetic.
Theyarehotwilling
to worktogether
withthe
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1 - 53
LOOq 04 ~~ ?
INKONTANYI.
( b ) On thewhole,
theclimate
is unhealthy
andmanypeople
areasking
forchange,
goingas far
appealing
tothemilitary
todosomething
tosavethecountry.
TheAruz~ha
Accords
which
areeriticized
by
manypeople
haveonlyadded
fueltofileflames.
( c ) Taking
advantage
ofthissituation
which
isinitsfavours,
theenemy
isputting
pressure
ontheground
andpoliticatly
andwe maybe overwhelmed.
( d ) Something
mustbedonctoresolve
thisimbroglio.
However,
wernust
alsogetready
tocontinue
with
thewar- iftheenemy
optsforit- andmakesurethatourfriends
andpartners
arewelldisposed
towards
us.Diplomatic
action,
beitinformal,
istherefore
a mat-ter
ofabsolute
necessity.
(signed)
Lt.Col.Nsengiyumva
Anatole
G20ffieer
at theStaffHeadquarters
oftheRwandan
Army
Copyto:
-H.E.
thePresident
oftheRepublie.
[CONFIDENTIAL]
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INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 01 OF 06 KIGALI 03478
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, RW
SUBJECT: INTERNAL INSECURITY: AN ONGOING PROBLEM
REFS: (A) KIGALI 3196, (B) KIGALI 3211
(C) KIGALI 3044, (D) KIGALI 2203
1.
C - ENTIRE TEXT.
SUMMARY
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PAGE 02
2. INTERPARTY VIOLENCE SUBSIDED DURING THE PAST WEEK
FOLLOWING TWO WEEKS THAT SAW DEATH AND DESTRUCTION IN
WIDELY SEPARATED PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, COINCIDENT TO A
CALMER POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE AS A BROAD SPECTRUM OF
' RWANDANS ACCEPTED THE ARUSHA ACCORD PRINCIPLES
FUNDAMENTAL TO POLITICAL TALKS WITH THE REBEL RPF.
PARTY YOUTH, THE INTERAHAMWE OF THE PRESIDENT'S MRND
PARTY AND HARDLINE CDR YOUTH, APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN THE
PRINCIPLE ARCHITECTS OF RECENT ROAD BLOCKS AND ATTACKS,
WHILE THE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY, THE MDR, PROBABLY
PROVOKED MOST OF THE RECENT COMMUNE-LEVEL VIOLENCE IN
! THE SOUTH. OBSERVERS CONTEND THAT THE INTERAHAMWE AND
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DATE/CASE ID: 15 JAN 2002 200004465
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THE CDR YOUTH ARE BECOMING INTERCHANGEABLE AND ALLEGE
THAT MILITARY ARE INVOLVED IN THEIR ACTIVITIES. WHILE
THERE HAVE BEEN SOME ARRESTS IN CONNECTION WITH
INTERPARTY DISTURBANCES, THE LACK OF RESPONSE FROM THE
SECURITY SERVICES, STILL CONTROLLED BY THE PRESIDENT'S
PARTY, AND THE LACK OF JUDICIAL FOLLOW-UP ARE
TROUBLING. ALTHOUGH THE VIOLENCE SEEMS TO HAVE SUBSIDED
FOR NOW, WE CAN ANTICIPATE A NEW WAVE OF INTERNAL
INSECURITY, IN SOME FORM OR ANOTHER, AS PEACE TALKS
PROCEED, ESPECIALLY IF INTERNAL DIFFERENCES OVER
POWERSHARING AND INTEGRATION OF FORCES BECOME ACUTE.
END SUMMARY.
INTERNAL INSECURITY EBBS AND FLOWS
3. THROUGHOUT THIS YEAR, INTERNAL INSECURITY HAS
INCREASED IN PARALLEL WITH EACH SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD
IN THE DEMOCRATIZATION AND PEACE PROCESSES AND SUBSIDED
AS INTERNAL POLITICAL FORCES REACHED A NEW LEVEL OF
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PAGE 03
COMMON UNDERSTANDING. THE BUGESERA MASSACRES, FOR
EXAMPLE, TOOK PLACE JUST AS NEGOTIATIONS OVER FORMATION
• OF A MULTI-PARTY GOVERNMENT WERE REACHING THEIR
CONCLUSION. RANDOM LAND MINE EXPLOSIONS REACHED'A PEAK
IN EARLY MAY, JUST WEEKS AFTER THE MULTI-PARTY
TRANSITION GOVERNMENT WAS SWORN IN AND ANNOUNCED ITS
PROGRAM. THE CRAZY WEEKEND IN LATE MAY INVOLVING
INTER-PARTY VIOLENCE AND MILITARY MUTINIES, MIXED IN
WITH A CAR BOMB EXPLOSION (REF D) OCCURRED AFTER THE
FOREIGN MINISTER'S SUCCESSFUL TRIP TO UGANDA WHERE HE
' AND THE RPF AGREED TO TALK AND JUST PRIOR TO THE INITIAL
GOR-RPF TALKS IN PARIS. INTERNAL SECURITY DETERIORATED
AGAIN IN JULY WITH AN UPSURGE IN INTERPARTY VIOLENCE, IN
THE INTERIM PERIOD AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE ARUSHA
CEASEFIRE ACCORD WITH ITS THREE PRINCIPLES AIMED AT
GUIDING AUGUST'S POLITICAL-MILITARY NEGOTIATIONS AND
BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN.
TENSIONS HEIGHTENED
' 4. TENSIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTIES WERE HEIGHTENED
IN LATE JULY WITH CALLS FOR THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT TO
RESIGN. THE CALLS CAME BOTH FROM SUPPORTERS OF
PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA'S MRND PARTY YOUTH, THE
INTERAHAMWE, AND FROM THE HARDLINE HUTU SUPREMACY
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COALITION FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC (CDR).
UNATHORIZED DEMONSTRATIONS, MAINLY IN THE FORM OF
BLOCKING PRINCIPAL ROADS IN THE COUNTRY, DREW ATTENTION
TO THE CDR'S DENUNCIATION OF THE ARUSHA ACCORD AS WELL
AS TO DEMANDS FROM BOTH GROUPS FOR THE RELEASE OF THEIR
MEMBERS WHO HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND FOR THE RELEASE OF
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KIGALI 03478 01 OF 06 210539Z
PAGE 04
MILITARY ARRESTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE MUTINIES OF
RUHENGERI AND GISENYI. •
VIOLENCE BREAKS OUT
5. THE JULY 28 CDR DEMONSTRATION IN KIGALI (REF B)
RESULTED IN A FINAL COUNT OF THREE DEAD, TWO CDR
MEMBERS AND ONE POLICEMAN. INTER-PARTY VIOLENCE THE
WEEKEND OF AUGUST 8-9 NEAR GISENYI (NORTHWEST)
BETWEEN THE MDR AND THE INTERAHAMWE, NEAR KIBUNGO
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AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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SUBJECT: INTERNAL INSECURITY: AN ONGOING PROBLEM
' (SOUTHEAST) BETWEEN THE MDR AND THE INTERAHAMWE, AND
OUTSIDE CYANGUGU (SOUTHWEST) BETWEEN THE CDR AND THE
LIBERAL PARTY (PL) LEFT FOUR DEAD, ALL MDR YOUTH, AND
MANY INJURED. COMMUNE-LEVEL VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH
CONTINUES, WITH MDR LOYALISTS ATTEMPTING TO RID THEIR
i COMMUNES OF MRND AUTHORITIES.
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PAGE 02
THE CDR
KIGALI 03478 02 OF 06 210541Z
6. THE CDR IS NORTHERN-BASED PARTY WHICH DRAWS ITS
SUPPORT FROM BOTH THE PRESIDENT'S MRND AND THE
OPPOSITION MDR AND CLAIMS TO BE THE TRUE SUCCESSOR TO
THE OLD PARMEHUTU PARTY, WHICH PREACHED HUTU
SUPREMACY AT INDEPENDENCE. IT IS PARTICULARLY FEARED
BY MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION FOR ITS KU KLUX
, KLAN-LIKE APPROACH TO ETHNIC RELATIONS. ITS REPEATED
CALL FOR RECOGNITION OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TUTSI AND
HUTU IS WIDELY INTERPRETED AS A CALL FOR
EXTERMINATION OF THE TUTSIS. MANY PEOPLE IN
DIFFERENT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POSITIONS HAVE TOLD.US
. THAT THE CDR IS NOTHING MORE THAN THE MOUTH-PIECE OF
THE PRESIDENT, SAYING WHAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SAY BUT
CANNOT. THIS PARTY, REGISTERED IN MARCH, IS NOT
INCLUDED IN THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT.
7. CDR LEADER, JEAN BOSCO BARAYAGWIZA INSISTS THAT
UNITY BETWEEN HUTU AND TUTSI IS IMPOSSIBLE; THEY CAN
ONLY CO-EXIST. HE IS EXTREMELY CRITICAL OF A SPEECH
, IN WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER CALLED FOR ALL RWANDANS
TO SEE THEMSELVES AS BANYARWANDA RATHER AS HUTU,
TUTSI OR TWA. BARAYAGWIZA TOLD CHARGE THAT ONLY
RECOGNITION OF ETHNIC DIFFERENCES CAN ALLOW RWANDA TO
FIND A SOLUTION TO ITS PROBLEMS. HE SAID THAT HIS
PARTY WANTS PEACE BUT NOT PEACE AT ANY PRICE, A
REFERENCE TO THE CDR'S STRONG OBJECTIONS TO THE
ARUSHA ACCORD PRINCIPLES (REF C). HE BELIEVES THE
GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE WORKING FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE
MAJORITY. THIS, HE EXPLAINED, MEANS WORKING FOR
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PEACE WITHOUT YIELDING TO THE RPF AS HE BELIEVES THIS
GOVERNMENT HAS DONE, AND IT MEANS PREPARING FOR
ELECTIONS WHICH HE SAYS HAVE BEEN ALL BUT FORGOTTEN.
8. BARAYAGWIZA, TOLD CHARGE JUST BEFORE THE FATAL
KIGALI DEMONSTRATION THAT THE CDR WAS NOT INTERESTED
. IN CREATING VIOLENCE AND THAT HIS GROUP WAS AGAINST
DEMONSTRATIONS. RECALLING EARLIER ROADBLOCKS IN THE
. NORTH, BARAYAGWIZA REPLIED THOSE HAD BEEN
UNAUTHORIZED AND THAT THE CDR MEMBERS INVOLVED HAD
BEEN REPRIMANDED. APPARENTLY THE REPRIMAND WENT
UNHEEDED.
THE INTERAHAMWE
9. THE INTERAHAMWE, THE MRND YOUTH, ARE ALSO WIDELY
FEARED BY OPPOSITION MEMBERS WHO BELIEVE THE GROUP IS
MORE A MILITIA THAN SIMPLY THE YOUTH WING OF THE
PARTY. MANY OPPOSITION PARTY MEMBERS CLAIM THEY HAVE
SEEN GENDARMES AMONG INTERAHAMWE GROUPS AND THAT
THESE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN PROVIDING MILITARY TRAINING TO
. THE YOUTH.
10. A SOURCE WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN AN INTERHAMWE
FOUNDER SUPPORTED THIS ALLEGATION TO CHARGE
RECENTLY. ENCOURAGED TO TALK TO CHARGE BY A TRUSTED
COMMON ACQUAINTANCE, THE SOURCE SAID THAT THE
INTELLECTUAL YOUTH GROUP HE STARTED LAST AUGUST IN
RESPONSE TO YOUTH GROUPS LAUNCHED BY OPPOSITION
PARTIES HAD BECOME A MILITIA. HE CLAIMED THE AIMS OF
THE GROUP HAD BEEN PERVERTED BY MEMBERS OF THE
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PAGE 04
PRESIDENT'S FAMILY WHO HAD INSERTED THEMSELVES INTO
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE GROUP. HE CONTENDS THAT 50
MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, WHOSE NAMES HAVE
BEEN PASSED TO THE DEFENSE MINISTER, ARE ACTIVELY
PARTICIPATING IN THE GROUP'S ACTIVITIES AND INVOLVED
IN MILITARY TRAINING FOR SOME MEMBERS OF THE GROUP.
HE BELIEVES MANY MEMBERS OF THE INTERAHAMWE ARE
UNAWARE OF THE ORGANIZATION'S CURRENT THRUST. THE
SOURCE, WHO RESIGNED FROM THE MRND IN JUNE, SAID HE
BELIEVES HIS LIFE IS IN DANGER FROM PERSONS CLOSE TO
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AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 06 KIGALI 03478
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TAGS: PGOV, PINS, RW
SUBJECT: INTERNAL INSECURITY: AN ONGOING PROBLEM
THE PRESIDENT. INDEED, SHORTLY BEFORE HIS
RESIGNATION FROM THE PARTY, A CAR BOMB EXPLODED IN
FRONT OF HIS WORK PLACE WHICH HE LINKS TO PEOPLE WHO
MAY BE INTERESTED IN HIS ELIMINATION.
11. MRND SECRETARY GENERAL, MATHIEU NGIRUMPATSE,
SAID THAT ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE INTERAHAMWE ARE
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PAGE 02
PURE PROPAGANDA. HE SAID A GENDARME COMMANDANT TOLD
HIM THERE WERE 2-3 GENDARMES IN THE GROUP BUT HAD NOT
YET PROVIDED NAMES. NGIRUMPATSE SAID HE WOULD
• REPRIMAND ANY GENDARME FOUND AMONG THE MEMBERS.
12. CHARGE ASKED PRESIDENTIAL CABINET DIRECTOR ENOCH
RUHIGIRA ABOUT ALLEGATIONS OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN
THE INTERAHAMWE. HE REPLIED THAT A PARTY
i INVESTIGATION HAD TURNED UP INVOLVEMENT OF "MILITARY
RESERVISTS". THESE PEOPLE, HE SAID, WOULD BE
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EXCLUDED FROM INTERAHAMWE ACTIVITIES IN THE FUTURE.
KIGALI'S PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ALSO TOLD CHARGE THAT
"MILITARY RESERVISTS" ARE IN THE INTERAHAMWE.
(NOTE: MILITARY ARE PRECLUDED BY LAW FROM JOINING
' POLITICAL PARTIES. END NOTE).
• DIFFERENCES BLURRED?
13. SEVERAL OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT THERE IS NOW
LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CDR AND THE
INTERAHAMWE. THEY CLAIM TO HAVE SEEN MEMBERS OF EACH
GROUP PARTICPATING IN DEMONSTRATIONS ORGANIZED BY THE
OTHER. THE INTERAHAMWE SOURCE TOLD CHARGE THAT, LIKE
THE INTERAHAMWE, THE CDR IS ALSO AN AFFAIR OF THE
PRESIDENT AND HIS FAMILY.
14. QUERIED BY CHARGE, HOWEVER, LEADERS OF BOTH THE
MRND AND THE CDR CONTEND THAT THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS
ARE COMPLETELY SEPARATE AND THAT THEIR IDEOLOGIES AND
AIMS ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENT. CDR LEADER BARAYAGWIZA
IS CRITICAL OF THE MRND FOR FAILING TO PUT HUTU
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INTERESTS FIRST. HE'CLAIMS THAT THE CDR IS COMPOSED
' PRIMARLY OF YOUNG PEOPLE WHO HAVE NOT BEEN "DIRTIED"
IN MRND POLITICS. MRND LEADER NGIRUMPATSE IS EQUALLY
CRITICAL OF THE CDR POLICY OF ETHNIC SEPARATISM AND
CLAIMED TO CHARGE THAT THE CDR IS ACTUALLY A THREAT
TO THE MRND. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT INTERAHAMWE
• MEMBERS MIGHT BE PARTICIPATING IN CDR DEMONSTRATIONS
AND VICE-VERSE, BUT HE SAID SUCH PERSONS, IF IDENTIFIED, WOULD BE PUNISHED. HE CLAIMED SUCH
PARTICIPATION WAS TOTALLY SPONTANEOUS AND NOT
SANCTIONED BY THE MRND.
MDR ACCUSED
15. THE MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTY, THE MDR, IS THE TRUE
SOURCE OF INSTABILITY, ACCORDING TO MRND LEADER
NGIRUMPATSE. HE CLAIMS THAT MDR LEADER FAUSTIN
TWIGIRAMUNGU IS RESPONSIBLE FOR STIRRING UP MDR
YOUTH, THE JDR, AGAINST MRND MEMBERS. HE HAS WRITTEN
LETTERS TO THE PRIME MINISTER ACCUSING TWAGIRAMUNGU
OF URGING MDR MEMBERS AT POLITICAL RALLIES TO TAKE
STEPS TO REMOVE THE MRND AUTHORITIES IN THEIR
COMMUNES FROM THE POSITIONS. HE SAID THAT THE PRIME
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MINISTER HIMSELF HAS CONDONED THE PRACTICE OF
' "LIBERATION" OF COMMUNES IN PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS.
HE BLAMED THE MDR PRIME MINISTER FOR TALKING WITH TWO
VOICES, ONE TO OFFICIALS AND ANOTHER TO THE
POPULATION. HE ALSO ACCUSED THE PRIME MINISTER OF
FOSTERING INTERPARTY FRICTION WITH FORKED-TONGUE
LANGUAGE IN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETINGS.
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SECRET PLANS FOR DESTABILIZATION?
16. MANY RWANDANS ARE CONVINCED THAT THE INTERNAL
SECURITY RAMPANT IN THE COUNTRY IN THE LAST SIX
MONTHS IS NO ACCIDENT, BUT THEY DISAGREE ON THE
SOURCE. BOTH SIDES IN RWANDA'S POLITICAL DIALOGUE
BELIEVE THE INCIDENTS OF INTERNAL INSECURITY FIT WITH
PLANS THE OTHER HAS TO DESTABILIZE THE COUNTRY IN
ORDER TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS.
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TAGS: PGOV, PINS, RW
SUBJECT: INTERNAL INSECURITY: AN ONGOING PROBLEM
17. A TRUSTED SOURCE WHO ADVOCATES CHANGE TOLD
CHARGE OF A "SECRET" GROUP OF 45 PROMINENT RWANDANS
WHOSE AIM IS TO CREATE DISTURBANCES THROUGHOUT RWANDA
THAT WILL DESTABILIZE THE COUNTRY AND SLOW DOWN IF
NOT REVERSE THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS. ALLEGEDLY
INCLUDED IN THE GROUP ARE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
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JOURNALISTS, BUSINESSMEN AND PERSONS IN THE SECURITY
FORCES. AMONG THE NAMES SHOWN TO CHARGE WERE THOSE
OF CDR LEADER BARAYAGWIZA, FOR EXAMPLE, THE WIFE OF
THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL SECRETARY, COL. SAGATWA, AND
GAUDANCE HABIMANA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL POPULATION
PLANNING OFFICE AND CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF THE PRESIDENT.
18. ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY CHARGED
EARLIER THIS YEAR THAT THE OPPOSITION, IN
COLLABORATION WITH THE REBELS, WAS ENGAGED IN A
DESTABILIZATION CAMPAIGN INVOLVING ETHNIC MASSACRES,
STRIKES, PROTESTS, AND SO FORTH, AS THE THIRD PHASE
OF THE REBEL PLAN TO OUST THE GOVERNMENT. MRND
SECRETARY GENERAL, NGIRUMPATSE, TOLD CHARGE THAT HE
ADVISED THE PRIME MINISTER (MDR) IN A LATE JULY
LETTER OF A NEW DESTABILIZATION PLAN DESIGNED TO RUN
THE MRND OUT OF KIGALI AND REMOVE THE PREFET, WHO HAS
THE FULL BACKING OF THE PRESIDENT. (NOTE: THE PRIME
MINISTER REPLIED THAT THE PERSONS NAMED BY
NGIRUMPATSE HAD BEEN FOUND TO BE INNOCENT OF THE
CHARGES. END NOTE.)
SECURITY FORCES ON THE SIDELINES
19. THE ABSENSE OF A STRONG RESPONSE TO THESE MANY
INSTANCES OF VIOLENCE FROM RWANDA'S SECURITY FORCES,
STILL UNDER THE CONTROL OF LOYALISTS OF THE
PRESIDENT'S PARTY, IS TROUBLING. KIGALI'S PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR SHOWED CHARGE A LETTER HE WROTE TO THE
RADIO STATION (WHICH TO OUR KNOWLEDGE WAS NEVER
AIRED), IN WHICH HE DEPLORED THE SLOW RESPONSE OF THE
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! GENDARMERIE TO THE VIOLENCE THAT RESULTED IN THE
DEATH OF TWO CDR MILITANTS IN KIGALI RECENTLY. HE
NOTED THAT THE GENDARMES OFTEN LEAVE THE RESPONSE TO
THE URBAN POLICE, WHO ARE NOT SPECIALIZED IN RIOT OR
CROWD CONTROL. THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TOLD CHARGE HE
BELIEVES THE GENDARME BEHAVIOR IS A RESULT OF THE
FACT THAT MANY SYMPATHIZE WITH THE CDR. HE CLAIMS
THEY ALSO DO NOT WANT TO ENGAGE AGAINST THE
"RESERVISTS", THEIR FORMER COLLEAGUES AND SOMETIMES
SUPERIORS, WHEN THEY SEE THEM AMONG THE RANKS OF
DEMONSTRATORS. HE SPECULATES THAT THE HEAD OF THE
GENDARMERIE, AN MDR STALWART, IS MORE COMFORTABLE
SITTING ON THE FENCE THAN RISKING ACTIONS/DECISIONS
THAT MIGHT UPSET HIS "BOSS".
' 20. THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TOLD CHARGE THAT HIS
OFFICE, RESPONSIBLE FOR BRINGING CASES TO TRIAL, IS
DEPENDENT ON THE GENDARMERIE'S JUDICIAL POLICE BRANCH
• FOR CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS INTO THESE KINDS OF
OFFENSES. HE SAID HE HAS NO CONTROL OVER THE PACE OR
THE METHODS OF THEIR WORK, ALTHOUGH THE BRANCH
NOMINALLY WORKS UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF HIS OFFICE AND
TURNS ITS WORK OVER TO HIM FOR PREPARING CASES. HE
CITED AN EXAMPLE OF A RECENT INCIDENT WHERE HE ISSUED
A MANDATE FOR THE ARREST OF SEVERAL PEOPLE. THE
JUDICIAL POLICE RETURNED EMPTY-HANDED SAYING THEY
COULD NOT FIND THEM.
21. AT ITS MEETING AUGUST 12, THE COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS DISCUSSED THE SECURITY SITUATION AND
DECIDED THAT, TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE, SECURITY FORCES
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NEEDED REORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT, AND TRAINING. THE
COUNCIL ALSO DECIDED THAT MINISTERS SHOULD VISIT
THEIR PREFECTURES OF ORIGIN WITH THE AIM OF DIFFUSING
TENSIONS AND ENCOURAGING COOPERATION AMONG PARTIES.
THREE MINISTERS FROM THREE DIFFERENT PARTIES HAVE
ALREADY MADE SUCH A VISIT IN THE PREFECTURE OF BUTARE
(WHERE THE PREFET IS FROM YET A FOURTH PARTY) TO
ENCOURAGE CALM.
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SUBJECT: INTERNAL INSECURITY: AN ONGOING PROBLEM
JUDICIAL SYSTEM INERT
22. THE APPARENT INABILITY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM TO
PROSECUTE PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH RECENT INCIDENTS OF
INSECURITY, INCLUDING LAND MINE EXPLOSIONS, BOMBINGS,
ROBBERIES, ASSASSINATIONS AND THE MORE RECENT
INTER-PARTY VIOLENCE, IS RAISING A LOT OF QUESTIONS
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BY THOSE WHO THOUGHT THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT MIGHT
BE ABLE TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE. THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
CURRENTLY HEADED BY A MINISTER FROM THE LIBERAL PARTY
HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO INCREASE ITS CREDIBILITY IN
THESE MATTERS SINCE THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT TOOK
OFFICE. BOTH THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR AND MRND LEADER
NGIRUMPATSE, WHO WAS MINISTER OF JUSTICE IN THE FIRST
TRANSITION GOVERNMENT, ATTRIBUTE JUDICIAL WEAKNESS TO
A LACK OF TRAINED JUDGES. INDEED, THE EDUCATION
LEVEL OF JUDGES, WHO ARE DEPENDENT UPON THE PRESIDENT
FOR THEIR APPOINTMENTS, IS LOW AND FEW ARE TRAINED IN
THE LAW, MAKING THEM SUSCEPTIBLE TO POLITICAL
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PRESSURE AND CORRUPTION.
i PARTY RESPONSIBILITY
' 23. MDR LEADER TWAGIRAMUNGU TOLD CHARGE RECENTLY
THAT HIS PARTY PLANS TO MODERATE ITS TONE AND •
ENCOURAGE RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR BY PARTY MEMBERS. AT
A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE ONSET OF RECENT PARTY
VIOLENCE HE TOLD MDR PARTY YOUTH TO LET SECURITY
FORCES TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESTORING ORDER
1 INSTEAD OF TAKING MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS.
KIGALI'S PUBLIC PROSECUTOR NOTED A DISTINCT CHANGE IN
OPPOSITION SPEECHES AT POLITICAL RALLIES. HE SAID
THAT LIBERAL PARTY LEADER MUGENZI, KNOWN FOR HIS
I FIRERY RHETORIC, HAD RECENTLY MADE AN UNUSUALLY
BALANCED SPEECH. HE CLAIMS THAT THE ONLY PARTY
LEADER CURRENTLY MAKING INFLAMATORY SPEECHES IS MRND
LEADER NGIRUMPATSE.
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24. NGIRUMPATSE BELIEVES THE MRND YOUTH MUST STRIKE
.
BACK IF ATTACKED. NGIRUMPATSE DEMONSTRATED HIS
ABILITY TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE INTERAHAMWE WHEN
IT BLOCKED ROADS NORTH AND SOUTH FROM KIGALI JULY
28. HE WENT TO THE SCENE AND INSTRUCTED THE YOUTH TO
DEPART, AFTER BOTH THE KIGALI PREFET (MRND) AND THE
MINISTER OF THE INZERIOR (MDR) HAD FAILED IN SIMILAR
s EFFORTS. BOTH HE AND CDR LEADER, BARAYAGWISA,
HOWEVER, ACKNOWLEDGED TO CHARGE THAT THEIR PARTY
YOUTH HAD ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES NOT ENDORSED BY THE
PARTY, SUGGESTING THAT PARTY LEADERS MAY NOT ALWAYS
BE IN A POSITION TO CONTROL THE ACTIONS OF THEIR
YOUTH.
COMMENT
• 25. ALTHOUGH THE "INVISIBLE HAND" (OR HANDS) THEORY
CANNOT BE RULED OUT, THERE IS NO HARD EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT A CONSPIRACY THEORY OF VIOLENCE FROM EITHER
' THE RIGHT OR THE LEFT. AFTER EIGHT MONTHS OF RIDING
• THE WAVES OF INTERNAL INSECURITY, HOWEVER, IT DOES
APPEAR THAT VIOLENCE OF ONE SORT OR ANOTHER IS MOST
' LIKELY TO ERUPT WHEN TENSIONS INCREASE AS THE SOCIETY
STRUGGLES TO REACH CONSENSUS ON THE DIRECTION OF ITS
NEXT STEP IN THE DEMOCRATIZATION OR THE PEACE
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PROCESS. ONCE THE CONSENSUS, OR SEMBLANCE OF GENERAL
, AGREEMENT; IS REACHED, AS IS THE CASE NOW, WITH
I ALMOST ALL ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIETY READY TO ACCEPT
THE NEARLY REVOLUTIONARY ARUSHA ACCORD PRINCIPLES,
CALM IS RESTORED FOR A TIME. WITH MORE TOUGH SOCIAL
DECISIONS YET AHEAD, HOWEVER, WE CAN ONLY ANTICIPATE
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KIGALI 03478 05 OF 06 210546Z
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FUTURE DISTURBANCES THAT ECHO THIS PATTERN.
26. THE USE OF VIOLENCE BY EITHER SIDE IN THIS
POLITICAL DEBATE IS ANTITHETICAL TO THE USG GOAL OF
SUPPORTING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND PROMOTING
DEMOCRATIC VALUES. IT THREATENS THE VERY FABRIC OF
THE SOCIETY BY STIRRING HATREDS THAT WILL BE
INDEED,
DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO CALM.
NGIRUMPATSE CLAIMS THAT ONE OF RWANDA'S PROBLEMS IS
ON THE ONE
THAT ITS DEMOCRACY IS FOUNDED ON HATE.
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SUBJECT: INTERNAL INSECURITY: AN ONGOING PROBLEM
HAND, WE NEED TO CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE PARTY LEADERS
TO USE MODERATION AND DEMOCRATIC STRATEGIES TO
, ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS, SUCH AS THE MDR PLAN TO USE
PETITIONS INSTEAD OF VIOLENCE TO EXPRESS DISCONTENT
' WITH LOCAL LEADERSHIP. AT THE SAME TIME, WE NEED TO
• EMPHASIZE AGAIN TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE
GOVERNMENT THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY TO
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BOTH THE PROCESS OF PEACE AND THE PROCESS OF
' DEMOCRATIZATION.
27. AMERICAN NATIONALS ARE NOT/NOT DIRECTLY
THREATENED BY THIS RECENT OF INTER-PARTY VIOLENCE,
AND WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE BECOMING TARGETS OF ANY
FUTURE VIOLENCE. THE RISK EXISTS, THOUGH, THAT WE
MIGHT END UP IN THE WRONG PLACE AT THE WRONG TIME.
LEADER
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RELEASED IN PART
NR
STATE 310659 231734Z
INFO LOG-00 ANHR-01 INRE-00 ADS-00 NSAE-00 ONY-00 SSO-00
/002R
DRAFTED BY: INR/AA:ANALYSTS:BMS
APPROVED BY: INR/AA:VJFARLEY
INR/RA:PEOAKLEY
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
INR. CIA, DIA, NSA ONLY
6548FF 231757Z /49
R 231731Z SEP 92
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY BONN
DIA WASHDC
CIA WASHDC 0000
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
CDRUSASETAF VINCENZA IT
SECRET
SECRET
STATE 310659 231734Z
PAGE 02
S E C R E T STATE 310659
DECAPTIONED
NOFORN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: XA, PREL, PINR
SUBJECT: INR/AA'S AFRICAN TRENDS - 9/18/92 (NO. 19)
"ROME FOR FOLAN AND ALSO FOR VATICAN, LONDON FOR
MCKINLEY, BRUSSELS FOR DUBROW, MADRID FOR CLARKE, USNATO
FOR HAMILTON, BONN FOR KLEMP, USCINCEUR AND HQ US
CENTRAL COMMAND FOR POLADS, HQ USEUCOM FOR EC J-5,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 27 JUL 2005 200500286
E8
UNCLASSIFIED
COMMANDER USASETAF FOR G-2"
UNCLASSIFIED
1. (S) TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR AFRICAN TRENDS 9/18/92
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
ESSAY: RWANDA: THREADING A NEEDLE
NOTE: ZAIRE: MOBUTU MANEUVERS TO MAINTAIN CONTROL
NOTE: SOUTH AFRICA: SMALL STEPS TOWARD PEACE
NOTE:
SUDAN: RELIEF CRISIS
NOTE: ANGOLA: THE CABINDA POT KEEPS SIMMERING
A. ESSAY: RWANDA: THREADING A NEEDLE
2. (C) THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE TUTSI-DOMINATED
REBEL RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) ARE LABORING TOWARD
A SETTLEMENT, BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A GENOCIDAL CIVIL
WAR WILL LOOM IF THE ONGOING SERIES OF TALKS IN ARUSHA,
TANZANIA, FAILS. WHETHER THE PARTIES REACH AGREEMENT
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DEPENDS PARTLY ON HOW MUCH POWER PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA
IS WILLING TO CEDE TO THE RPF AND DOMESTIC OPPOSITION
PARTIES. BUT TO BE ACCEPTED BY KIGALI (AND VIEWED AS
LEGITIMATE BY THE RWANDAN PEOPLE). A TRUE SETTLEMENT
ALSO DEPENDS ON THE RPF'S WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A
POWERSHARING FORMULA MORE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TUTSIS'
10-15 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION THAN WITH THE 50-50
SHARE THE RPF HAS BEEN DEMANDING.
3. (C) HABYARIMANA'S SIDE HAS BEEN PUSHED HARDER AND
MORE SUCCESSFULLY TO COMPROMISE. THE GOVERNMENT IS
VULNERABLE TO MILITARY PRESSURE FROM THE RPF AND TO
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE FROM MAJOR WESTERN
DONORS. THE RPF LEADERSHIP BY CONTRAST ENJOYS SANCTUARY
IN UGANDA AND IS NOT SO HEAVILY PRESSED BY KIGALI,
OUTSIDERS, OR THE COSTS OF A WAR WHICH IS FOUGHT ON
RWANDAN SOIL. IT IS LIKELY, THEREFORE, THAT THE RPF
WILL MAINTAIN A MORE INTRANSIGENT NEGOTIATING POSITION.
THIS WOULD PERPETUATE THE CURRENT INSTABILITY AND STIR
PASSIONS THAT COULD LEAD TO THE SORT OF ANTI-TUTSI
GENOCIDE THAT GRIPPED RWANDA AND NEIGHBORING BURUNDI IN
THE PAST.
BACKGROUND
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
(C) DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM. THE NEGOTIATIONS
AND THE CONFLICT
BEHIND THEM ARE MULTIFACETED: HUTU-TUTSI TENSIONS; THE
EFFORT TO DECENTRALIZE POWER AND WEALTH NOW CONTROLLED
BY HABYARIMANA'S INNER CIRCLE; AND THE INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSION, PARTICULARLY THE ROLE OF WESTERN DONORS AND
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UGANDA.
STATE 310659 231734Z
5. (C) THE BASIS OF THE CONFLICT LIES IN ETHNIC
TENSION BETWEEN THE TUTSIS--ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF RWANDA'S
POPULATION OF 7 MILLION--AND THE HUTUS, WHO MAKE UP
ALMOST ALL THE REST. THE TUTSIS THE COUNTRY.S RULING
CLASS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, WERE DISPLACED FROM THEIR
DOMINANT POSITION IN 1959 BY A COMBINATION OF ELECTIONS
AND HUTU UPRISINGS THAT KILLED THOUSANDS OF TUTSIS AND
CAUSED HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS TO FLEE THE COUNTRY.
ACCORDING TO THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FOR
REFUGEES (UNHCR), SOME 400,000 LONG-TERM RWANDAN
REFUGEES--VIRTUALLY ALL OF THEM TUTSIS--LIVE IN
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.
6. (C) THE RPF, BASICALLY A TUTSI ORGANIZATION. TRIED
TO GRAB POWER BY INVADING RWANDA FROM UGANDA ON OCTOBER
1, 1990. AFTER THE SURPRISE ATTACK WHICH SAW THE RFF
STRIKE AS FAR AS KIGALI, THE RWANDAN ARMED FORCES (FAR),
AIDED BY FRANCE, REGROUPED AND FUSHED BACK THE REBELS.
THE RPF STRUCK AGAIN IN JANUARY 1991 AND BRIEFLY
CAPTURED RUHENGERI BUT APPEARED TO WEAKEN IN THE
SUBSEQUENT RAINY SEASON. FOR SIX MONTHS AFTER A MARCH
CEASEFIRE. THE RPF RETREATED TO NORTHERN BORDER AREAS
AND CONDUCTED OCCASIONAL AND LARGELY INEFFECTIVE
HIT-AND-RUN ATTACKS. IN LATE 1991 IT BEGAN PRESSING ITS
ATTACKS WITH RENEWED VIGOR AND EFFECTIVENESS.
7. (C) THE RPF, WHOSE CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF NEGOTIATOR
ARE PROMINENT HUTUS, PORTRAYS ITSELF AS A NATIONALIST
ORGANIZATION OPPOSED TO THE HABYARIMANA REGIME'S
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UNCLASSIFIED
CORRUPTION, ABUSES OF POWER, AND FAVORITISM TOWARD THE
HUTUS OF NORTHERN RWANDA. THE LATTER FORM THE CORE OF
REGIME SUPPORT. THE RPF HAS NO SIGNIFICANT HUTU
SUPPORT, BUT ITS CRITICISMS OF THE GOVERNMENT RESONATE
AMONG THE HUTUS ESPECIALLY IN NEWLY FORMED OPPOSITION
PARTIES.
(C) NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS. THE ARUSHA TALKS ARE
THE LATEST IN A LONG
PROGRESSION OF NEGOTIATIONS DATING BACK TO MID-OCTOBER
1990. THEY FOLLOW A MAY 1992 US OFFER TO PROVIDE
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN CONCERT WITH NEIGHBORING STATES,
FRANCE, AND BELGIUM.
8.
9. (C) EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS FOCUSED UNSUCCESSFULLY ON
ACHIEVING A LASTING CEASE-FIRE. THEY FAILED ALSO TO
MOVE THE TWO SIDES SIGNIFICANTLY TOWARD A POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT. IN PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE
EARLIER ROUNDS, HELD IN DAR ES SALAAM IN FEBRUARY 1991'
THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE TUTSIS'
RIGHT OF RETURN PENDING AN END TO HOSTILITIES AND A
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE TWO SIDES ALSO AGREED TO A
CEASE-FIRE, WHICH WAS SHORT-LIVED. NEIGHBORING STATES
AGREED TO GRANT SANCTUARY TO THOSE TUTSIS WHO PREFERRED
NOT TO RETURN TO RWANDA. AND CITIZENSHIP TO THOSE WHO
DESIRED IT. SUBSEQUENTLY, HOWEVER, POLITICAL
DISCUSSIONS AND THE CEASE-FIRE BROKE DOWN WHEN THE RPF
OBJECTED TO THE PROPOSED TERMS OF SETTLEMENT AND THE
IMPARTIALITY OF MEDIATORS WAS QUESTIONED.
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10. (C) THE CURRENT SERIES OF TALKS BEGAN WITH A JULY
MEETING IN ARUSHA WHICH RESULTED IN A CEASE-FIRE
AGREEMENT. WITH MINOR EXCEPTIONS, THE CEASE-FIRE HAS
HELD. THE PARTIES ALSO SET AN AGENDA CALLING FOR
POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS TO BE CONCLUDED BY OCTOBER 10. A
FOLLOWUP MEETING IN AUGUST LED TO AGREEMENT ON
IMPLEMENTING "THE RULE OF LAW." A FURTHER ARUSHA ROUND
THAT BEGAN SEPTEMBER 7 FOCUSED ON POLITICAL
INTEGRATION--HOW TO BRING THE RPF INTO GOVERNMENT AND
HOW TO MODIFY AND LIBERALIZE THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT.
11. (C) THE NEXT ROUND, TO BE HELD IN ARUSHA AFTER
OCTOBER 1, WILL CONTINUE THE EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
ON POLITICAL INTEGRATION BEFORE IT MOVES TO THE PROBLEM
OF MILITARY INTEGRATION.
HABYARIMANA UNDER PRESSURE
(C) DONORS, TUTSIS, AND REFORMS. AN
EXBELGIAN-TRAINED PARATROOPER WHO TOOK OVER IN A 1973
MILITARY COUP. HABYARIMANA IN THE PAST TWO YEARS HAS
FACED UNPRECEDENTED PRESSURE FROM DONORS AND THE RPF TO
REFORM HIS GOVERNMENT. INITIALLY HE WAS VIEWED AS A
MODERATE ON THE QUESTION OF HUTU-TUTSI RELATIONS BECAUSE
HE HAD REPLACED A HUTU-CHAUVINIST GOVERNMENT LED BY THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT-PARMEHUTU (MDR-PARMEHUTU)
AND HAD APPOINTED TUTSIS TO HIS CABINET. ALTHOUGH
HABYARIMANA'S POLICIES FAVORED NORTHERN HUTUS, MAINLY IN
THE PREFECTURES OF RUHENGERI AND GISENYI, HIS
MDR-PARMEHUTU PREDECESSORS HAD JUST AS BLATANTLY FAVORED
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THE SOUTH.
13.
STATE 310659 231734Z
(C) IN 1975 HABYARIMANA ESTABLISHED THE NATIONAL
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT (MRND) AND
MODIFIED THE CONSTITUTION TO MAKE THE MRND THE SOLE
LEGAL PARTY. FOR 15 YEARS, HOWEVER. INTERNATIONAL
DONORS VIEWED RWANDA AS ONE OF AFRICA'S MOST STABLE AND
ECONOMICALLY SUCCESSFUL COUNTRIES.
14. (C) POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DISCONTENT BECAME MORE
EVIDENT AFTER 1988. THE FALL IN INTERNATIONAL COFFEE
PRICES IN 1989-90 STRAPFED RWANDA ECONOMICALLY AND
HEIGHTENED DONOR PRESSURE FOR SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT REFORMS. INCREASINGLY, HABYARIMANA'S WIFE
AND IN-LAWS WERE CRITICIZED FOR CORRUPTION, AND HIS
POLICY OF FAVORING THE NORTH AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER
REGIONS WAS NO LONGER SEEN AS ACCEPTABLE. JUST AS
IMPORTANTLY, THE COLLAPSE OF EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNISM
DISCREDITED RWANDA'S CENTRALIZED, ONE-PARTY RULE.
15. (C) HABYARIMANA ATTEMPTED TO RESPOND TO THE
CHANGES: ON JULY 5, 1990, HE ANNOUNCED A TWO-YEAR
PROCESS TO MOVE TOWARD MULTIPARTY RULE, AND ON SEPTEMBER
21 HE APPOINTED A COMMISSION OF NATIONAL SYNTHESIS TO
SUGGEST WAYS TO MOVE TOWARD GREATER DEMOCRATIZATION.
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
LESS THAN TWO WEEKS LATER, THE RPF INVASION BROUGHT NEW
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE REGIME TO SOLVE
THE TUTSI PROBLEM.
16.
(C) THE WAR IS COSTLY TO RWANDA. IT HAS DISRUPTED
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PAGE 08
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE NORTH AND HAS DISPLACED SOME
350,000 RWANDANS, ACCORDING TO THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC). KIGALI MUST PAY FOR
AN ARMY THAT HAS INCREASED IN SIZE FROM 5,000 IN OCTOBER
1990 TO ITS CURRENT AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF 30,000. TO
FINANCE THE WAR, KIGALI HAS BEEN FORCED TO SELL
VIRTUALLY ITS ENTIRE COFFEE STOCKPILE AT A TIME WHEN
WORLD PRICES ARE LOW. IT HAS INCREASED BORROWING FROM
INTERNATIONAL DONORS AND FALLEN BEHIND ON ITS PAYMENTS
TO THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. IN THIS SITUATION,
KIGALI IS VULNERABLE TO FOREIGN DONOR PRESSURES FOR
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM.
17. (C) UNDER PRESSURE AS WELL FROM NEIGHBORING STATES
INTERESTED IN AMELIORATING THE PROBLEM OF TUTSI REFUGEES
IN THEIR TERRITORIES. HABYARIMANA IN LATE 1990 AND EARLY
1991 IMPLEMENTED A SERIES OF REFORMS THAT BEGAN TO
LIBERALIZE THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND RESPOND TO TUTSI
COMPLAINTS. HE ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE TUTSI RIGHT OF
RETURN; ANNOUNCED ELIMINATION OF THE NOTATION OF ONE'S
ETHNIC BACKGROUND FROM NATIONAL IDENTITY CARDS (WHICH
HAD LONG ANGERED THE TUTSIS); AND FORMALLY LIFTED PRESS
RESTRICTIONS (THOUGH JOURNALISTS CONTINUED TO BE
ARRESTED AND BEATEN).
18. (C) IN JUNE 1991, HABYARIMANA ACCEPTED MANY OF THE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION OF NATIONAL SYNTHESIS
AND FORMALLY DECLARED RWANDA A MULTIPARTY STATE. HE
RENAMED THE MIND AS THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT
FOR DEMOCRACY AND INVITED THE RPF TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AS
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A LEGAL PARTY AND COMPETE WITH OTHER PARTIES
(CALCULATING THAT THE MINORITY TUTSIS COULD NOT WIN A
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 73
UNCLASSIFIED
SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF THE POPULAR VOTE). TO DATE, 16
PARTIES HAVE REGISTERED, REPRESENTING A BROAD RANGE OF
RWANDAN OPINION.
19. (C) AFTER NINE MONTHS OF SOMETIMES-ACRIMONIOUS
NEGOTIATIONS. HABYARIMANA IN APRIL 1992 AGREED TO A
COALITION GOVERNMENT, GIVING 11 OF 20 CABINET SEATS TO
FOUR OPPOSITION PARTIES. HE HAS ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION
TO HOLD PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS NEXT
APRIL' ALTHOUGH THIS SCHEDULE DEPENDS UPON THE RESULTS
OF THE ARUSHA TALKS.
20. (C) DESPITE THE REFORMS, THE PRESIDENT RETAINS
ULTIMATE POWER AND APPOINTS THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
CABINET. KEY PORTFOLIOS--DEFENSE, INTERIOR, AND CIVIL
SERVICE--ARE HELD BY MRND LOYALISTS. ALTHOUGH THE
PRESIDENT NOW SHARES WITH A SUPERIOR COUNCIL OF
MAGISTRATES THE AUTHORITY TO APPOINT AND REMOVE JUDGES,
HE CONTINUES TO MANAGE A CENTRALIZED POLITICAL SYSTEM
AND APPOINTS LOCAL ADMINISTRATORS DOWN TO THE
BURGOMASTER LEVEL.
(C) MULTIPARTY COMPLEXITY. ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT
RETAINS ULTIMATE
AUTHORITY, THE OPPOSITION PARTIES IN THE GOVERNMENT-OFTEN WORKING AS A BLOC--DO INFLUENCE DECISIONMAKING.
21.
22. (C) THE LARGEST AND APPARENTLY MOST POPULAR
OPPOSITION PARTY IS THE REFORMED DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN
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STATE 310659 231734Z
PAGE 10
MOVEMENT (MDR), WHICH IS BASED ON THE OLD
MDR-PARMEHUTU. LIKE ITS PREDECESSOR, THE MDR APPEALS
MAINLY TO SOUTHERN HUTUS. ALTHOUGH IT INCLUDES A
CONSERVATIVE WING THAT EXUDES MDR-PARMEHUTU'S HUTU
CHAUVINISM, ITS CORE LEADERSHIP IS FAR MORE LIBERAL AND
IS ACTIVELY SEEKING A SOLUTION THAT WOULD END THE WAR
AND ACCOMMODATE THE RPF. PRIME MINISTER DISMAS
NSENGIYAREMYE IS FROM THE MDR, ALONG WITH THREE OTHER
CABINET MEMBERS INCLUDING MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND COOPERATION BONIFACE NGULINZIRA.
23. (C) THE LIBERAL PARTY (PL) AND THE SMALLER SOCIAL
DEMOCRATIC PARTY EACH HOLD THREE CABINET POSITIONS
WHILE THE MINUSCULE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY HAS ONE.
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
THE PL HAS A HEAVY TUTSI MEMBERSHIP ALTHOUGH SOME OF
ITS LEADERS ARE HUTUS. LIKE THE MDR, IT FAVORS
MODIFYING THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS IN ORDER TO
ACCOMMODATE THE RPF. LAST DECEMBER-JANUARY, FRUSTRATED
WITH THE PL'S INITIAL REFUSALS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
GOVERNMENT, HABYARIMANA LASHED OUT AT IT AS BEING THE
INTERNAL WING OF THE RPF. OTHER HUTUS SHARE HIS VIEWS.
24. (C) WHAT THE OPPOSITION PARTIES HAVE IN COMMON
WITH THE RPF IS A DESIRE TO LIMIT THE PRESIDENT.S
POWERS. THEY ALL FAVOR MODIFYING THE CONSTITUTION TO
INCREASE THEIR OWN POWERS. BUT AS PART OF THE APRIL
AGREEMENT WITH HABYARIMANA THAT GAVE THEM A CABINET
MAJORITY AND THE PREMIERSHIP, THEY AGREED NOT TO TAKE
MOVES TO CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION.
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PAGE 11
25. (C) THE DEGREE OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES'
INFLUENCE IS DEMONSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT THE RWANDAN
GOVERNMENT DELEGATION TO THE ARUSHA TALKS HAS BEEN LED
BY FOREIGN MINISTER NGULINZIRA. HE PUT FORWARD
PROPOSALS TO THE RPF IN THE SEPTEMBER TALKS THAT WOULD
SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT. THE
PROPOSALS STATED. INTER ALIA, THAT: ALL PRESIDENTIAL
ACTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN ONLY WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE
CABINET; THE CABINET WOULD INCLUDE THE RPF; AND ANY
AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF
WOULD HAVE LEGAL PRECEDENCE OVER THE CURRENT
CONSTITUTION AND CURRENT LAWS. THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH
APPARENTLY WERE NOT APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY HABYARIMANA.
MAY WELL BE REJECTED BY KIGALI.
26.
(C) THE HUTU RIGHT AND THE GENOCIDE CARD.
HABYARIMANA ALSO FACES PRESSURE FROM HUTU CHAUVINISTS
CONCERNED WITH RETAINING ACCESS TO THE NATIONAL WEALTH.
ANTI-TUTSI FEELING, SUBMERGED DURING MOST OF
HABYARIMANA'S TENURE IN OFFICE, REEMERGED AFTER THE RPF
INVASION.
27. (C) THE MOST OBVIOUS POLITICAL MANIFESTATION OF
HUTU SUPREMACISM WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT EARLIER THIS YEAR
OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION (CDR)
AS A POLITICAL PARTY. THE CDR'S CLEAR MESSAGE IS THAT
HUTUS AND TUTSIS ARE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT PEOPLES WHO
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
CAN DO NO BETTER THAN UNEASILY COEXIST. THE CDR APPEALS
MAINLY TO NORTHERN HUTUS WHO HAVE BENEFITED MOST UNDER
THE HABYARIMANA REGIME AND WHO ARE THREATENED BY THE RPF
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PAGE 12
FIGHTING. HABYARIMANA'S WIFE AND SOME OF HER FAMILY ARE
THOUGHT TO BE ACTIVE SUPPORTERS OF THE CDR.
28. (C) BECAUSE OF THESE FAMILY TIES, HABYARIMANA
SOMETIMES IS DESCRIBED AS A PRISONER OF THE FAR RIGHT.
HIS REFORMS SUGGEST THAT THIS VIEW EXAGGERATES THE
TRUTH. NONETHELESS, CREDIBLE REPORTS OF OFFICIAL
PARTICIPATION IN ANTI-TUTSI COMMUNAL VIOLENCE ARE
DISTURBING IN A SMALL COUNTRY WITH SUCH A CENTRALIZED
ADMINISTRATIVE AND SECURITY SYSTEM. SINCE THE RPF
INVASION. THERE HAVE BEEN AT LEAST FOUR EPISODES IN
WHICH 300 OR MORE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN KILLED IN ANTI-TUTSI
VIOLENCE, THE MOST RECENT IN KIBUYE PREFECTURE LAST
MONTH. THE THREAT OF GENOCIDAL VIOLENCE IS LIKELY TO
REMAIN DESPITE FORMAL POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE
OPPOSITION AND THE RPF.
RPF PRESSES ITS ADVANTAGE
29. (C) COMPARED WITH KIGALI'S DECISIONMAKERS. THE RPF
LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO BE MORE UNIFIED, FOR NOW, AROUND A
HARDLINE NEGOTIATING POSITION. SINCE 1990, IT HAS
SKILLFULLY COMBINED ITS POLITICAL AND MILITARY
STRATEGIES. AFTER BEING PUSHED INTO THE HINTERLANDS OF
RUHENGERI AND THE AKAGERA AND VOLCANOES NATIONAL PARKS
IN MID-1991, THE RPF CONSISTENTLY REJECTED HABYARIMANA'S
REFORMS AND HIS INVITATION TO RETURN TO RWANDA TO
PARTICIPATE IN ITS MULTIPARTY SYSTEM. WHEN IT RETURNED
IN STRENGTH TO THE BATTLEFIELD LATE IN THE YEAR, THE RPF
CONCENTRATED ON BUILDING A GUERRILLA EFFORT RATHER THAN
ON STRIKING SUCH MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS AS RUHENGERI
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AND KIGALI.
STATE 310659 231734Z
30. (C) THE FAR, WHICH HAS BECOME MORE UNDISCIPLINED
AND INEFFECTIVE AS IT HAS GROWN LARGER, HAS PROVED
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
INCAPABLE OF DISLODGING THE REBELS. EARLIER THIS YEAR
IT APPEARED TO BE SAVED FROM COLLAPSE ONLY BY THE
PRESENCE OF FRENCH MILITARY ADVISERS.
31. (C) THE RPF HAS SUCCEEDED THROUGH WAR AND
DIPLOMACY IN WINNING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO NEGOTIATE
AN RPF ROLE IN A FUTURE RWANDAN REGIME. EVEN THE
FRENCH, WHO HAVE LONG BEEN STAUNCH SUPPORTERS OF
HABYARIMANA' SUPPORT THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT THAT IS
AT LEAST MINIMALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE RPF.
32. (C) THE PROBLEM IS FINDING THAT SETTLEMENT. RPF
NEGOTIATING POSITIONS HAVE ALTERNATED BETWEEN VAGUENESS
AND OBSTINACY. MUCH OF THE RPF'S ENERGY HAS BEEN
DIRECTED TO CRITICIZING THE CORRUPTION AND HYPOCRISY OF
THE HABYARIMANA GOVERNMENT, AN EASY TASK. THE RPF
ENTERED THE ARUSHA ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS CALLING FOR
SCRAPPING THE CONSTITUTION AND REPLACING THE PRESIDENT
AND NATIONAL LEGISLATURE WITH AN APPOINTED, ALL-POWERFUL
NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF RECONCILIATION THAT WOULD RULE THE
COUNTRY DURING A FOUR-YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD.
33. (C) THE RPF REJECTS INVITATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN
THE MULTIPARTY SYSTEM, PARTLY BECAUSE HABYARIMANA
CONTINUES TO HOLD REAL POWER. IT HAS EVEN REJECTED A
FORMULA THAT WOULD REDUCE HABYARIMANA'S POWERS
SIGNIFICANTLY.
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STATE 310659 231734Z
34. (C) THE RPF IS RELUCTANT TO COMMIT TO A MORE
LIBERAL MULTIPARTY SYSTEM WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT
GUARANTEES, BECAUSE IT COULD NOT WIN SIGNIFICANT POWER
THROUGH ELECTIONS WITHOUT FORMING A COALITION. EVEN IF
ALL THE TUTSIS RETURNED TO RWANDA, THEY WOULD CONSTITUTE
NO MORE THAN 14 PERCENT OF RWANDA'S TOTAL POPULATION.
35. (C) WHEN THE TALKS TURN TO MILITARY INTEGRATION,
THE RPF IS LIKELY TO TAKE AN EVEN HARDER OPENING LINE.
PAUL KAGAME, THE RPF MILITARY COMMANDER AND DE FACTO
LEADER OF THE REBELS. IN A JULY STATEMENT SAID: "WE
SHALL INSIST ON A 50-PERCENT STAKE IN THE NATIONAL
ARMY. THERE WILL BE NO COMPROMISE ON THAT BECAUSE WE
ARE NOT A DEFEATED ARMY." ALTHOUGH POLITICAL AND
MILITARY LEADERS IN KIGALI HAVE AGREED AMONG THEMSELVES
TO THE NECESSITY OF INTEGRATING RPF FIGHTERS INTO THE
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 77
UNCLASSIFIED
ARMY, THE RPF'S OPENING POSITION IS A NONSTARTER.
36. (C) AT BOTTOM, THE RPF WANTS A SHAPE OF POWER AS
WELL AS SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR RPF MEMBERS AND TUTSIS
IN GENERAL. IT DOES NOT BELIEVE IT CAN ACHIEVE THESE
AIMS WITHOUT A NEGOTIATED ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD GIVE IT
PARTICIPATION IN THE KIGALI GOVERNMENT OUT OF PROPORTION
TO TUTSI NUMBERS FOR A LONG (FOUR-YEAR) TRANSITION
PERIOD. THE RPF LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO REALIZE THAT ITS
POSITION CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF DEMOCRATIC
IDEALS, BUT IT IS ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE THE
GOVERNMENT'S BOTTOM LINE BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER A
SETTLEMENT IS ACCEPTABLE.
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STATE 310659 231734Z
PRESSURING THE RPF
37. (C) THE RPF HAS BEEN FAR LESS WILLING THAN THE
GOVERNMENT TO COMPROMISE, PARTLY BECAUSE IT HAS HAD
LITTLE TO LOSE BY CONTINUING ITS STRUGGLE. ALTHOUGH IT
HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO WIN THE WAR OUTRIGHT, IT HAS
DEMONSTRATED ITS ABILITY TO INTENSIFY THE REBELLION IF
THE POLITICAL TRACK BOGS DOWN. RPF INTRANSIGENCE
DEPENDS TO A LARGE DEGREE ON UGANDA. WHICH CONTINUES TO
PROVIDE LOW LEVELS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND POLITICAL
SUPPORT AND IS THE SITE OF THE RPF'S HEADQUARTERS.
38. (C) ALTHOUGH UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI HAS LITTLE
BUT CONTEMPT FOR HABYARIMANA AND CLEARLY FAVORS A
SOLUTION THAT WOULD LEAVE THE RPF WITH A
DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF POWER, HIS SUPPORT FOR THE RPF
MAY BE SOFTENING. WHILE MUSEVENI DOES NOT YET APPEAR TO
HAVE REDUCED MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS, UGANDA AND
RWANDA SIGNED A NONAGGRESSION TREATY IN AUGUST THAT
PROVIDES FOR RWANDAN MONITORING TEAMS ON THE UGANDA SIDE
OF THE BORDER.
39. (C) MOREOVER, IN THE SEPTEMBER NEGOTIATIONS IN
ARUSHA, UGANDAN OBSERVERS JOINED OBSERVERS FROM RWANDA'S
OTHER NEIGHBORS TO TRY TO PRESSURE THE RPF TO ACCEPT THE
GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS. MUSEVENI EVEN SENT WORD THAT HE
DID NOT APPROVE OF THE RPF PROPOSAL TO EXCLUDE
HABYARIMANA AND THE MRND FROM THE TRANSITION
GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THE RPF MIGHT CONTINUE TO RECEIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
SUPPORT FROM TUTSI SYMPATHIZERS IN THE UGANDAN ARMY AND
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FROM WEALTHY TUTSIS IN THE REGION AND THE DIASPORA, THE
ONLY CLEAR WAY TO PRESSURE THE RPF APPEARS TO BE THROUGH
KAMPALA.
40. (C) BY HOLDING TO A HARD LINE, THE RPF RUNS OTHER
RISKS. FIRST, IT MAY ALIENATE THE INTERNAL PARTIES THAT
SHARE ITS INTEREST IN LIMITING PRESIDENTIAL POWERS. IT
ALSO RISKS OFFENDING THE FOREIGN ACTORS--STATES IN THE
REGION, THE US, FRANCE, AND BELGIUM--WHOSE ATTENTION HAS
GIVEN THE RPF/TUTSI ISSUE A NEW DEGREE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGITIMACY. IT IS LIKELY THAT, WHILE PROFESSING A
WILLINGNESS TO TALK AND BY BEING TACTICALLY FLEXIBLE.
THE RPF WILL SEEK TO DELAY SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS AS LONG
AS POSSIBLE AND WAIT FOR KIGALI AGAIN TO LOWER ITS
BOTTOM LINE.
41. (C) BUT THE RPF IS IN A CATCH-22 SITUATION: IT
WILL RISK A HUTU BACKLASH IF IT IS GENERALLY SEEN BY THE
HUTU MAJORITY--OR BY HARDLINE HUTUS CLOSE TO
HABYARIMANA--AS MOVING TO REASSERT TUTSI HEGEMONY OVER
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. ANTI-TUTSI ATTACKS DEMONSTRATE
THAT' NO MATTER WHAT IS AGREED TO IN POWERSHARING TALKS,
THE RPF MUST TREAD A FINE LINE IF IT WISHES TO RETURN
PEACEFULLY TO RWANDA. IN THE END, THE RPF MAY DECIDE
THAT THE RISK OF RETURNING IS TOO GREAT. (EHRENREICH)
B. NOTE: ZAIRE: MOBUTU MANEUVERS TO MAINTAIN CONTROL
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ACTION AF-01
10
CHANNEL: n/a
HANDLING:
n/a
DOC_NBR: 1992BRUSSE13386
Case Number: 200203990
BRUSSE 13386 221605Z
DODE-00 EUR-01
AID-01 AMAD-01. CIAE-00 C-01
ADS-00
NSAE-00
INRE-00 INR-01 L-03
H-01
SCT-03
P-01
PRS-01
PM-02
OMB-01 PA-02
/030W
USIE-00
TRSE-00
T-01
SS-00
SP-00
713E6D 221739Z /38
R 221607Z OCT 92
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6163
INFO AMEMBASSY KIGALI
INFO LOG-00
HA-09
NSCE-00
SNP-00
UNCLAS BRUSSELS 13386
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C CAROL FULLER AND EUR/NE
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, BE, RW
SUBJECT: FALLOUT FROM REYNTJENS/KUYPERS REPORT ON RWANDAN
DEATH SQUADS
REF: BRUSSELS 13324
1. RESPONSE TO THE REYNTJENS/KUYPERS REPORT ON RWANDAN
DEATH SQUADS WITH POSSIBLE LINKS TO PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA
(REFTEL) HAS NOT BEEN LONG IN COMING. CONSERVATIVE
CATHOLIC "LA LIBRE BELGIQUE" REPORTED ON OCTOBER 22 THAT
NINE INDIVIDUALS IMPLICATED. IN THE "RESEAU ZERO" DEATH
SQUADRONS HAVE INFORMED THE NEWSPAPER THAT THE STATEMENTS
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
BRUSSE 13386 221605Z
PAGE 02
ARE "TOTALLY FALSE" AND THAT THEY WILL BE INITIATING LEGAL
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST KUYPERS, REYNTJENS, AND SCHEERS (THE
THIRD AUTHOR OF THE REPORT) FOR DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER
THROUGH THE BRUSSELS LEGAL FIRM OF CRUYPLANTS ELOY MASSART
AND HUPIN.
2. THE NINE RWANDANS LISTED IN THE REPORT ARE: THREE
BROTHERS-IN-LAW OF PRES. HABYARIMANA PROTEE ZIGIRANYIRAZO,
Page - 1
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L. DARTS
DATE/CASE ID: 1 APR 2003 200203990
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
Date Printed:
09 Jan 2003
CHANNEL: n/a
HANDLING:
n/a
DOC_NBR: 1992BRUSSE13386
Case Number: 200203990
SERAPHIN RWABUKUMBA, AND COLONEL ELIE SAGATWA;
PRESIDENTIAL SON-IN-LAW ALPHONSE NTIRIVAMUNDA; HEAD OF
MILITARY TRAINING COLONEL ANATOLE NSENGIYUMVA; DIRECTOR OF
THE CABINET OF THE MFA COLONEL BAGOSORA, FORMER CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE ARMY COLONEL LAURENT SERUBUGA; COMMANDER OF
THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD MAJOR LEONARD NKUNDIYE, AND CAPTAIN
PASCAL SIMBIKANGWA.
3. POST IS SEEKING TO OBTAIN A COPY OF THE
REYNTJENS/KUYPERS REPORT FOR FORWARDING TO THE DEPARTMENT.
GELB
UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
Page - 2
UNCLASSIFIED
10
Excerpt from full Arusha Accords Agreement: Article 21
1 - 82
Excerpt from full Arusha Accords agreement: Article 51
1 - 83
1 - 84
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
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AD 16
RELEASED IN FULL
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ORIGIN AF-01
INFO
LOG-00
H-01
NSCE-00
SNP-00
STATE
AMAD -01
INRE-00
OMB-01
SP-00
372632
162310Z
CIAE-00
INR-01
PA-01
TRSE-00
PFIP-0 1
L-03
PER-01
T-01
C-01
ADS-00
PM-02
USIE-00
EUR-01
MMP-00
PRS-01
/027R
HA-09
NSAE-00
P-01
1020
DRAFTED BY: AF/C: CSFULLER (AF)
APPROVED BY: AF/C: RMPRINGLE
AF/RA: AXMARLEY
7B0217 162312Z /38
0 162314Z NOV 92
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY HARARE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC// USDP//
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 372632 162310Z
PAGE 02
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN
CONFIDENTIALSTATE 372632
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR RW
SUBJECT: RWANDAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE ON INTEGRATION OF FORCES
1.
C - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. THE RWANDAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE TOLD US HIS
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DAMS
DATE/CASE ID: 22 SEP 2008 200103014
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
DELEGATION HAD NOT FOUND THE NICARAGUAN MODEL FOR MILITARY
INTEGRATION VERY APPLICABLE TO THE RWANDAN CASE AND THAT
THEY WILL BE LOOKING FOR OTHER MODELS. THE RWANDANS
CLEARLY FEAR DESTABILIZATION FROM THE INTEGRATION PROCESS
AND ARE CLINGING TO THE UNREALISTIC HOPE THAT THE RPF WILL
ACCEPT LATER INTEGRATION INTO THE ARMY ON THE BASIS OF
ATTRITION. MOREOVER, THE GOR HASN'T YET COME TO GRIPS
WITH THE FACT THAT THE RPF WILL PROBABLY NOT ACCEPT A
SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE ARMY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE
RWANDANS RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATING SENIOR
RPA OFFICERS INTO THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN LARGER
NUMBERS AND THE HELPFUL IMPACT THIS PARTICIPATION COULD
HAVE ON SECURITY ISSUES. END SUMMARY.
THE NICARAGUAN TRIP
3. PASSING THROUGH WASHINGTON AFTER A WEEK-LONG VISIT TO
NICARAGUA, RWANDAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE JAMES GASANA ASKED
TO MEET WITH AF/RA MILITARY ADVISER LTC MARLEY ON NOVEMBER
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STATE 372632 162310Z
PAGE 03
14. LTC LAURENT RUTAYISIRE, DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL
SECURITY AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, ALSO PARTICIPATED IN
THE CONVERSATION, BUT AMBASSADOR UWIMANA, THE THIRD MEMBER
OF THE DELEGATION, ONLY SAT IN BRIEFLY. THE DELEGATION
DID NOT FIND THE NICARAGUAN DEMOBIIZATION MODEL APPLICABLE
TO THE RWANDAN CASE, PRIMARILY BECAUSE THEY FOUND IT
"IDEOLOGICAL" RATHER THAN "ETHNIC," FOCUSSED ON THE POLICE
RATHER THAN THE ARMY, AND AIMED AT ELECTIONS RATHER THAN
POWER SHARING. MARLEY SUGGESTED ZIMBABWE'S PLAN MIGHT BE
MORE APPLICABLE. WE LATER LEARNED THAT THE GOR MAY
AUTHORIZE AMBASSADOR UWIMANA TO VISIT EL SALVADOR SINCE
ITS MODEL MIGHT BE MORE RELEVANT TO THAT OF RWANDA.
UWIMANA IS AWARE THAT THE ZIMBABWE PLAN INTEGRATES THE
ARMY, BUT DOESN'T KNOW IF THE MINISTER WILL TRAVEL THERE
OR NOT.
INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION
4. THE DELEGATION EXPRESSED FEARS THAT THE PROCESS OF
INTEGRATING THE RPA INTO THE SECURITY FORCES WOULD LEAD TO
DESTABILIZATION. IN THEIR VIEW, A "DISPROPORTIONATELY"
HIGH PERCENTAGE OF RPA SOLDIERS WOULD UPSET THE ETHNIC
BALANCE AND LEAD TO SECURITY PROBLEMS. SIMILARLY, THEY
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 86
UNCLASSIFIED
FEAR THAT SIMULTANEOUS INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION
WOULD DESTABILIZE FURTHER THE ECONOMY BY SENDING LARGE
NUMBERS OF SOLDIERS INTO UNEMPLOYMENT. THEY BELIEVE THE
RPF SHOULD BE REPATRIATED INTO SOCIETY FIRST, WITH
DEMOBILIZATION OF THE FAR SECOND, AND INTEGRATION OF THE
RPA INTO THE ARMY THIRD AS VACANCIES APPEAR THROUGH
ATTRITION. MARLEY POINTED OUT THAT THE RPF COULD NEVER
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STATE 372632 162310Z
PAGE 04
ACCEPT SUCH AN UNREALISTIC SOLUTION. THE ORDER OF
SOLUTIONS REQUIRES EITHER A) INTEGRATION OF ALL FORCES
FOLLOWED BY RATIONAL DEMOBILIZATION OR B) DEMOBILIZATION
OF A PART OF BOTH FORCES, INTEGRATION OF THE REMAINDER,
FOLLOWED BY ADDITIONAL DEMOBILIZATION OF THE COMBINED
FORCES LATER.
5. GASANA AND RUTAYISIRE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IF SECURITY
IS THE REAL ISSUE FOR THE RPF THAT THEY SHOULD LOOK AT THE
POLICE AND GENDARMERIE, RATHER THAN THE ARMY WHICH SHOULD
BECOME AN APOLITICAL FORCE FOR EXTERNAL DEFENSE. MARLEY
RESPONDED THAT EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SECURITY ISSUES MUST
BOTH BE ADDRESSED. (COMMENT. TO ENSURE SOCIAL STABILITY,
IT WOULD BE BETTER TO INTEGRATE ALL THREE FORCES, BUT FOR
FACILITY OF TRANSITION IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO COMPROMISE
IN SEVERAL AREAS. THE RPF COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, FOCUS ON
OBTAINING HIGHER PERCENTAGES IN THE THE ARMY AND THE
POLICE AND NOT INTEGRATE INTO THE GENDARMERIE. END
COMMENT)
6. MARLEY EMPHASIZED THAT WHATEVER MECHANISM IS DEVELOPED
FOR THE LONG TERM MUST ENGENDER CONFIDENCE IN THE SHORT
TERM. AGREEING ON THE NEED FOR CONFIDENCE, THE RWANDANS
ALSO INSISTED THAT THE RPF MUST BE REALISTIC IN ITS
DEMANDS. SPEAKING BLUNTLY, THEY NOTED THAT THE RPF, AND
TUTSIS IN GENERAL, WOULD BE THE FIRST TO SUFFER IF THE
MECHANISM WERE TO BREAK DOWN.
7. TURNING TO PERCENTAGES OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMY,
THE RWANDANS ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED FOR HIGHER PERCENTAGE
OF RPF PARTICIPATION AT THE DECISION-MAKING LEVELS, BUT
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STATE 372632 162310Z
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 87
UNCLASSIFIED
INSISTED THAT THE PERCENTAGES AT LOWER LEVELS SHOULD BE
KEPT SMALLER. MARLEY AGAIN CAUTIONED THAT IT WAS NOT
REALISTIC TO EXPECT THE RPF TO INITIALLY ACCEPT 12-15
PERCENT PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMY FOR THE PERIOD OF
TRANSITION. HE SUGGESTED THEY CONSIDER THE ZIMBABWE
SOLUTION. (COMMENT. THIS WOULD INVOLVE INTEGRATING
FORCES ON THE BASIS OF THE RELATIVE NUMBERS EACH GROUP HAS
AT THE TIME OF INTEGRATION AND ALLOWING PERCENTAGES TO
SLIP DOWNWARDS ON THE BASIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS OVER TIME.
END COMMENT.)
8. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, GASANA INVITED MARLEY TO
VISIT KIGALI AFTER THE NEXT ROUND OF ARUSHA TALKS, AND
PERHAPS THEN TRAVEL TO RPF-HELD TERRITORY TO VISIT RPF
COMMANDERS. WHEN ASKED WHETHER DAVE RAWSON OR AMBASSADOR
PLATEN WOULD BE THE U.S. NEGOTIATOR AT THE NEXT ROUND,
MARLEY NOTED THAT SINCE THE TIMING IS UNCLEAR, NO FINAL
DECISION HAS BEEN MADE.
COMMENT
9. THE MINISTER AND DIRECTOR GENERAL SEEMED SERIOUS ABOUT
SOLVING THE INTEGRATION QUESTIONS, BUT VERY CONCERNED
ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF PARTICIPATION THE RPF MIGHT DEMAND
AT ARUSHA. THE RWANDAN MILITARY HAS YET TO COME TO GRIPS
WITH THE FACT THAT THEY MAY HAVE TO GIVE THE RPF MORE THAN
12-15 PERCENT PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMY. ON THE OTHER
HAND, THEY HAVE CLEARLY THOUGHT ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF
INTEGRATING SENIOR RPA OFFICERS INTO THE DECISION-MAKING
PROCESS (PERHAPS ON A 50/50 BASIS) AND THE HELPFUL IMPACT
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STATE 372632 162310Z
PAGE 06
THIS PARTICIPATION COULD HAVE ON SECURITY ISSUES.
EAGLEBURGER
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AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 01 OF 03 KIGALI 04811
E. 0. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, RW
SUBJECT: INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES AND DEMOBILIZATION
REFS:
1.
(A) KIGALI 3251, (B) STATE 372632
C - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: WE EXPECT THAT THE NOVEMBER 23 SESSION
OF THE ARUSHA TALKS WILL BE DEVOTED TO THE
INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES RATHER THAN CONTINUATION OF
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KIGALI 04811 01 OF 03 230613Z
THE POLITICAL TALKS, BUT THIS HAS NOT YET BEEN
CONFIRMED BY THE RPF. THE RWANDANS ARE READY WITH A
FIRM PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATION, AND HAVE DONE SOME
GOOD THINKING ON SUBSEQUENT DEMOBILIZATION. THE
TOUGH PROBLEM WILL BE SECURING AGREEMENT ON THE
PROPORTION OF RPF TO BE INTEGRATED INTO THE RWANDAN
ARMY. RWANDAN OFFERS WILL RANGE FROM SEVEN TO
EIGHTEEN PERCENT, THE LATTER BEING THE OUTSIDE LIMIT,
ACCORDING TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, BUT SENIOR
OFFICERS MAY BE A SOMEWHAT HIGHER PROPORTION. THE
MINISTER OF DEFENSE HOPES TO COMPLETE THESE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DARIS
DATE/CASE ID: 22 SEP 2008 200103014
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
NEGOTIATIONS LKLJHCOT YET HAVE
CONFIRMATION THAT THE TANZANIAN FACILITATORS AND THE
RPF ACCEPT THE RWANDAN CONCEPT OF REOPENING THE TALKS
IN ARUSHA ON NOVEMBER 23 WITH THE ISSUE OF
INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES AS THE FIRST AGENDA ITEM.
NEVERTHELESS, SINCE THAT SEEMS TO BE THE DIRECTION IN
WHICH WE ARE GOING, THIS IS A BRIEF SUMMARY OF WHERE
RWANDAN THINKING IS ON THIS S:#9/
4. THE RWANDANS FINALLY GOT AROUND TO ASKING THE
TANZANIANS FOR A CHANGE IN THE AGENDA ON NOVEMBER
19. APPARENTLY THE TANZANIANS TOLD THE GOR THAT THEY
COULD CONTACT THE RPF THEMSELVES. THE TANZANIANS,
ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR MBEZI, ARE MOST UPSET WITH
PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA FOR THE REMARKS HE MADE
NOVEMBER 15 AT A POLITICAL RALLY. AMBASSADOR MBEZI
GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY MIGHT EVEN WITHDRAW
THEIR INVITATION FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS.
IN ANY EVENT, THE TANZANIANS REFUSED TO FACILITATE
CONTACT WITH THE RPF. IN A MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN
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KIGALI 04811 01 OF 03 230613Z
MINISTER THIS MORNING, NOVEMBER 20, HE TOLD ME THAT
HE HOPED TO SPEAK WITH THE RPF IN BRUSSELS DURING THE
COURSE OF THE DAY AND WOULD BE ABLE TO CONVEY THEIR
RESPONSE TO US THIS EVENING OR TOMORROW MORNING.
NEXT STEPS
5. RWANDAN THINKING ON THE INTEGRATION QUESTION HAS
MADE TREMENDOUS STRIDES FORWARD IN THE PAST SIX
MONTHS. THE IDEA AND PRINCIPLE IS NOW ACCEPTED BY
THE MILITARY AND EVEN BY THE THE RIGHT WING CDR
PARTY. MINISTER OF DEFENSE GASANA TOLD ME PROUDLY
THIS AFTERNOON THAT THE MILITARY IS SOLIDLY BEHIND
THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION AS A RESULT OF A SERIES OF
SEMINARS HE HAS SPONSORED.
6. THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE HAS PROPOSED THAT
INTEGRATION BEGIN BY BRINGING RPF OFFICERS INTO THE
HIGH COMMAND. THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE ASSEMBLING
MILITARY UNITS INTO AGREED ASSEMBLY POINTS, STARTING
TWO WEEKS AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT. IT IS
OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WOULD THEN PROPOSE TO
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 91
MOVE UNIT BY UNIT IN EITHER INTEGRATING INTO THE ARMY
OR REJECTING INDIVIDUAL FIGHTERS FROM THE RPF. THOSE
REJECTED WOULD BE GIVEN TRAINING OR OTHER ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITIES. THE KEY PROVISION, ACCORDING TO
GASANA, IS TO ASSURE THAT ALL RPT ALL RPF COMBATTANTS
ARE REPATRIATED, SO NO CADRE IS LEFT BEHIND IN UGANDA
TO RENEW THE WAR.
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KIGALI 04811 01 OF 03 2306132
7. BUT MINISTER OF DEFENSE GASANA IS ALSO ACUTELY
AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES, PARTICULARLY AFTER HIS
VISIT TO NICARAGUA WHERE HE SAW MANY PROBLEMS IN THE
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AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 03 KIGALI 04811
E. 0. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, RW
SUBJECT: INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES AND DEMOBILIZATION
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NICARAGUAN PROGRAM. GASANA
TOLD ME TODAY HE BELIEVES IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO
COMPLETE THE NEGOTIATION IN ONE SESSION, POSSIBLY
EVEN BY THE END OF THE WEEK. HE MET LAST NIGHT AND
AGAIN ZNJQGVALFKL
RYX
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KIGALI 04811 02 OF 03 201516Z
8. AS SOON AS THEY START TALKING NUMBERS, THE TWO
SIDES ARE GOING TO HAVE A PROBLEM. I WOULD SUGGEST,
THEREFORE, THAT THE RWANDAN SIDE WILL TALK PRINCIPLES
INITIALLY AND TRY TO AVOID THE STICKY QUESTION OF HOW
MANY RPF OR WHAT PROPORTION THE RPF MIGHT HAVE IN THE
ARMY.
9. FROM WHAT WE UNDERSTAND, THE RWANDAN MILITARY
BEGAN WITH AN OFFER OF SEVEN PERCENT. THIS WAS
CALCULATED ON THE ASSUMPTION OF THERE BEING 500,000
REFUGEES OUTSIDE OF THE RWANDAN BORDERS WHICH IS
ABOUT ONE-FIFTEENTH OF THE RWANDAN POPULATION.
GASANA TOLD ME TODAY THEY ARE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE UP
TO THE PROPORTION CLAIMED BY THE RPF AS RWANDAN
DIASPORA, THAT IS 1.3 MILLION COMPARED TO A
POPULATION OF 7.2 MILLION, OR UP TO EIGHTEEN
PERCENT. WE HAVE HEARD NO HIGHER NUMBERS CONSIDERED
IN THIS GOVERNMENT YET, EXCEPT FOR HINTS THAT THE
PROPORTION OF SENIOR OFFICERS INTEGRATED WOULD BE
HIGHER. GASANA CONFIRMED THAT SENIOR OFFICERS COULD
BE A SOMEWHAT HIGHER PROPORTION.
10. SO FAR IT APPEARS THAT THE RWANDANS WILL INSIST
ON INTESRATINPL
IV
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KIGALI 04811 02 OF 03 201516Z
PNBFRXTY SIZE. THEY ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT CREATING
WHAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER A CRITICAL MASS OF EX RPF IN
ANY GIVEN UNIT. THEY ALSO FEAR THAT IF THEY ACCEPT
TOO HIGH A PROPORTION OF RPF IN THE ARMY, THERE WILL
BE SECURITY PROBLEMS AS A RESULT, AND THE EX-RPF WILL
BE THE MOST THREATENED.
DEMOBILIZATION
11. THE RWANDAN MILITARY CONTAINS APPROXIMATELY
30,000 MEN. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE RPF EFFECTIVE
STRENGTH IS ABOUT 10,000. MINIMUM ESTIMATES WOULD
REQUIRE REDUCING THAT COMBINED FORCE TO NO MORE THAN
10,000 TROOPS, THUS REQUIRING DEMOBILIZATION OF
30,000 MEN.
12. RWANDAN SOLDIERS ARE ALL GRADUATES FROM PRIMARY
SCHOOL BUT, EXCEPT FOR SOME OF THE NONCOMMISSIONED
OFFICERS, THEY HAVE NO SECONDARY EDUCATION.
13. THE SIMPLEST WAY OF DEMOBILIZING GOR FORCES WOULD
BE TO MOVE THEM IMMEDIATELY INTO SECONDARY SCHOOLS.
WE UNDERSTAND THE CURRENT ANNUAL INTAKE OF NEW
SECONDARY STUDENTS IS ABOUT 10,000. ADDING 10,000
DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS TO EACH NEW INCOMING CLASS FOR A
COUPLE OF YEARS WOULD PRETTY MUCH TAKE CARE OF THE
PROBLEM. IT WOULD STRAIN THE RESOURCES OF THE
EXISTING SECONDARY SCHOOLS, BUT OUR EXPERIENCE WITH
SELF-HELP PROJECTS IS THAT CLASSROOMS CAN BE BUILT
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KIGALI 04811 02 OF 03 201516Z
VERY QUICKLY, IN A MATTER OF WEEKS, AND VERY CHEAPLY,
FOR AROUND USD 2,500 PER CLASSROOM.
14. SPECIAL CARE WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN FOR RPF
SOLDIERS. THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM WILL BE THOSE WHO
ARE RWANDAN BY BIRTH AND LEFT RECENTLY TO JOIN THE
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 93
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 94
RPF. THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RETURN TO THEIR HOME
COMMUNES WITH SECURITY. BUT THEY COULD BE
ACCOMMODATED IN SECONDARY BOARDING SCHOOLS ALONG WITH
OTHER DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS FROM THE GOR AND RPF.
RWANDANS ARE WELL AWARE OF THE SPECIAL SENSITIVITY
FOR THESE PEOPLE, AND EVEN THE MILITARY IS PREPARED
TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR REINTEGRATION.
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AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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TAGS: PREL, RW
SUBJECT: INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES AND DEMOBILIZATION
15. THE CONCEPT OF USING SECONDARY SCHOOL AS THE
PRIMARY VEHICLE FOR DEMOBILIZATION HAS BEEN KICKED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
AROUND IN CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE
MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND THE LEADERSHIP IN THE
PARLIAMENT. EVERYONE RECOGNIZES THAT THERE WILL BE
SOME PEOPLE WHO WILL BE UNABLE TO BENEFIT FROM A
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KIGALI 04811 03 OF 03 201517Z
SECONDARY EDUCATION AND THAT ADDITIONAL, PERHAPS
VOCATIONAL, ARRANGEMENTS WILL NEED TO BE MADE FOR
THOSE WHO CAN'T HANDLE ACADEMIC TRAINING.
NEVERTHELESS, THE CONSENSUS IS THAT RWANDAN SOLDIERS
WILL NOT BE WILLING TO RETURN TO THE HILLSIDES, SO
SOME SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE MADE FOR THEM.
FURTHERMORE, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE RWANDAN ECONOMY IS
NOT GOING TO CREATE MANY NEW JOBS DURING THE NEXT
YEAR. BUT AFTER THE WAR ENDS AND PEOPLE BEGIN TO
HAVE CONFIDENCE, NEW JOBS WILL BECOME AVAILABLE.
RWANDA'S OUTPUT OF SECONDARY SCHOOL GRADUATES IS
PATHETICALLY LOW, NUMBERING JUST A FEW THOUSAND A
YEAR. A DEVELOPING ECONOMY WILL BE ABLE TO ABSORB AN
EXPANSION OF THE SECONDARY SCHOOL POPULATION.
16. COMMENT: NEITHER WE NOR THE RWANDANS HAVE ANY
IDEA WHERE THE RPF WILL DRAW ITS BOTTOM LINE ON
INTEGRATION. AND WE DO NOT HAVE A CLEAR IDEA OF HOW
MUCH FLEXIBILITY THERE IS IN THE RWANDAN POSITION.
THE STICKY PART MAY BE, AS SUGGESTED ABOVE, THE
PERCENTAGE OF RPF THAT WILL BE PERMITTED IN. AND THE
RPF WILL BE DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF THE GOR GOOD FAITH
IN INTEGRATING RPF INDIVIDUALS. THE MINISTER OF
DEFENSE WELCOMES THE PROPOSED TRAVEL OF COLONEL
MARLEY TO ARUSHA, AND HOPES HE WILL VISIT KIGALI
AGAIN ON HIS WAY HOME. END COMMENT. FLATEN
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UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 95
1 - 96
CONFIDENTIAL
Kigali,
15January
1993
Noteto HisExcellency
thePresident
of theRepublic
of Rwanda
Kigali
Subject:
Negotiations
in Arusha
from22 November
1992to 9 January
1993
Atmosphere
of thenegotiations
Thenegotiations
heldin Arusha
from22 November
1992to 9 January
1993soughtto
address
thedistribution
of ministerial
portfolios
within
theBroad-based
Transitional
Govemment,
theestablishment
of theTransitional
National
Assembly
(TNA)andprocedures
formaking
appointments
to thejudiciary.
Theatmosphere
of thenegotiations
wasoneof dealings
and
differences
of opinion
amongtheGovemment
delegation,
a logical
consequence
of thepolitical
situation
thatreigned
inthecountry.
Itisworth
recalling
thatintheabsence
ofa consensus
onthe
distribution
of ministerial
portfolios
amongthepolitical
parties
andtheGovemment,
the
delegation
hadto leave
forArusha
withlittle
hopeofreversing
theorder
ofthenegotiations
by
firsttackling
theissueof integration
of theRPFcombatants
intotheRwandan
Armyandthen
goingon to address
theoutstanding
political
issues.
TheRwandan
Government
hopedthereby
andin themeantime
toachieve
a consensus
on thesharing
ofministerial
postsandthoseofthe
Transitional
National
Assembly.
2.
Thenegotiations
ata standstill
As could
beexpected,
RPFemphatically
refused
thatanyother
issue
be discussed
before
the
issue
of power
sharing
within
theExecutive,
theJudiciary
andtheTransitional
National
Assembly
hadbeenfully
dealt
with.
Thisstalemate
aggravated
bythedisquiet
overtheprotest
against
certain
articles
intheprevious
protocol
lasted
morethana week.
Theatmosphere
of thenegotiations
wasfurther
dampened
by thedifferences
of opinion
amongthe Comitéde concertation
[Consultation
Committee],
composed
of Catholicand
Protestant
bishops,
overtheproposal
submitted
to theGovernment
forthedistribution
of
ministerial
portfolios,
andby MRND’s
strong
opposition
to theconclusions
of theCouncil
of
Ministers
heldon 28November
1992.
Anyprogress
in thenegotiations
wasthusblocked.
3.
Resumption
andprogress
of thenegotiations
Themeetingbetween
thePresident
of theRepublic
of RwandaandthePresident
of
Tanzania,
AliHassanMwinyi,cameas a big reliefto theGovemment
delegation
andthe
observers.
Thestatement
by thePresident
of Rwanda
specifying
theacceptance
of theprevious
protocol,
thenomination
ofdeputies
by thepolitical
parties
andtheneedto ensure
a balance
WS04-726(E)
K050-3772-K050-3775
1
1 - 97
between
thepolitical
parties
gotthings
moving
again.
As thenegotiations
progressed,
the
inclusion
of other
political
parties
intheGovernment
emerged
as a crucial
problem,
forseveral
reasons:
(a)TheGovemment
hadremained
silenton theissueof thepolitical
parties
to
included
intheGovemment,
thusgiving
ffeereintoailsorts
ofspeculation.
(b)Thecriteria
to beapplied
totheparties
thatwereoutside
theGovemment
practically
eliminated
ailofthem.
(c)TheMDR,PL andPSDparties
andRPFformeda strongalliance
andrefused
that
CDR,a partydeemed
by manymembers
of thedelegation
to havea majorpolitical
impact,
be
included
in theGovemment.
Despite
thesupport
ofthiscoalition
by theheadofthedelegation,
weinsisted
manythat
timesthatCDRshould
be brought
intotheGovernment;
someimportant
personalities
including
theAmerican
Cohen
wereprepared
to throwtheirweight
behind
thepressure
beingputon RPFto
ensure
thattheproposal
wasaccepted.
In thatconnection,
thedelegation
introduced
other
considerations,
including
a political
codeofethics
andthenational
reconciliation
policy,
ina bid
to soften
RPF’sintransigence.
PDIandCDRwerejustaboutto be accepted
intotheGovemment
whenthenegotiators
received
thestatement
by MDR,PL andPSD thatCDR shouldnotbe
included
in theGovemment.
Theheadof thedelegation
leaned
towards
thisnewstatement.
The
negotiations
againreached
an impasse.
On 3 January
1993,Ambassador
Mpungwe
sentaletter
to
thetwodelegations
setting
outtheposition
oftheTanzanian
Govemment.
Hestated
thatifthetwo
delegations
werestill
unable
to signtheProtocol
of Agreement
between
3 and6 January
1993,
it
wouldbe preferable
forthemto adjoum
thetalksin order
to reflect
further
on theissues
and
continue
theconsultations.
Thetimefactor
wasof strategic
importance.
Moreover,
it couldbe
difficult
forTanzania,
asfacilitator,
tosustain
thecurrent
highlevel
ofinterest,
support
and
assistance
oftheinternational
community
in theRwandan
peace
process.
Fromthenon,al1theobservers,
thefacilitator
andtheheads
ofthetwodelegations
took
counsel
together
ontheRPFproposal
foroneministerial
postto begiven
to RPFandonepostto
theGovemment
side.It wasdecided
to giveonepostto MRNDandoneto RPF.
TherewasNOTmuchdifference
of opinion
on thenumber
of seatsto be accorded
to each
ofthepolitical
forces
intheTransitional
National
Assembly.
4. Observations
Thepolitical
differences
thatwereprevalent
in thecountry
madethemselves
feltin
Arusha,
seriously
clouding
theatmosphere
of thenegotiations.
Thiswasa direct
consequence
ofthecomposition
ofthedelegation
thatcarried
withitallthesensitivities
of thepolitical
parties.
Themembers
ofthevarious
political
parties
present
in Arusha
zealously
viedwitheachotherforbehind-the
scenediscussions
withRPFon partisan
issues
so muchsothatRPFbelieved
itself
tobeandconducted
itself
likean arbiter.
In
WS04-726(E)
K050-3772-K05
0-3775
2
1 - 98
thefuture,
thedelegation
should
comprise
a smaller
number
ofdelegates
andthepolitics
therein
kepttotheminimum
possible.
Thepolitical
party
leaders
gavepriority
totheimmediate
interests
oftheir
parties
atthe
expense
ofthenational
interest.
Thesolidarity
betweenMDR-PSD-PL
and RPF NO LONGERneedsto be proven.Yet,
thissolidarity
isONLYa veryshort-sighted
viewofthings.
Theobservers
accuse
theRwandan
Government
of NOTBEINGresolutely
committed
to
thenegotiation
process.
Tanzania
mayloseinterest
intheRwandan
case.
5. Conclusion
Thenegotiations
thatareexpected
to culminate
in theconclusion
of thePeaceAgreement
mustfollow
their
course,
although
theprevious
protocol
hadserious
deficiencies
incertain
places.
Anyrelated
implementation
difficulties
couldbecorrected
through
diplomatic
channels,
if need
be,bycalling
fortheintervention
oftheobservers
before
thePeace
Agreement
isfinaUy
signed.
Considerations
thatareaimed
PURELY
attheimmediate
interests
ofthepolitical
parties
should
bowtothesuperior
interests
oftheNation.
ThePresident
oftheRepublic
andthePrime
Minister,
whoareprimarily
responsible
for
handling
thepolitics
of thecountry,
should
strive
towards
reconciliation
andpavethe
way formutualunderstanding
on theessentials
in orderNOT TO widenthechasm
between
thePresident’s
Office
andthePrime
Minister’s
Office
at theriskofdragging
the
country
intoruin.
Col.BEMSBagosora
(signed)
Col.BEMSMuberuka
(signed)
Lt.Col.
BEMNdengeyinka
(signed)
Lt.Col.BEMRwabalinda
(signed)
Maj.BAMGakara(signed)
Copyto:
HisExcellency
thePrimeMinister
Kigali
WS04-726(E)
K050-3772-K050-3775
1 - 99
1 - 100
1 - 101
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC
Paris, February 8, 1993
Advisor to the Presidency
NOTE
to the attention of the President of the Republic
(Care of the Secretary General)
SUBJECT: RWANDA – RPF military offensive.
It has been confirmed that the RPF has launched a generalized offenseive against northern
Rwanda from its Ugandan bases and no doubt also via Zaïre.
Ruhengeri has seen fighting, the Rwandan army has called up all its reserves.
A crisis meeting was held in late morning at the Quai d'Orsay.
The following plan has been submitted for your approval:
1 – On the diplomatic level:
- reminder of our support of the Arusha process and condemnation of this unilateral
breaking of the cease-fire (statement from the Quai spokesperson).
- warning to Museveni (President of Uganda): Mr. Dumas should call him on the phone.
We will also alert Washington, London, and Brussels.
2 – On the military level:
- reinforcement of our support for the Rwandan army, with the exception of any direct
participation of French forces in the confrontations.
- delivery of munitions and equipment
- technical assistance, especially with the artillery
- one company was put on alert at six o'clock in case the security of the French community
necessitates its intervention.
General Quesnot
Bruno DELAYE
HANDWRITTEN NOTE FROM PRESIDENT MITTERRAND: ''AGREED; URGENT. ''
1 - 102
1 - 103
1 - 104
FRENCH REPUBLIC
Feb. 26, 1993
Ministry of Defense
006816
NOTE
for
the President of the Republic
S U B J E C T: RWANDA
I am still concerned about our position in Rwanda and by the role into which our 690 soldiers could find
themselves drawn, for the Rwandan army no longer fights.
There are now 900,000 refugees, practically sleeping outside, between the RPF lines and KIGALI. Their
presence alone contributes to serious unrest and, soon, an uncontrollable situation.
I struggle to see why the RPF would abandon such a close victory, which would, no doubt, not even
require a general offensive on its part.
I do not see, either, how to bring MUSEVENI back to our side, since we do not have the means to put
significant pressure on him.
As for HABYARIMANA, the dispatch of two supplementary companies, after many other
demonstrations of support, has led him to feel he is one of the African leaders best protected by
FRANCE. This is not the best way to persuade him to make the necessary concessions.
Furthermore, he is, by his political intransigence, and his incapacity to mobilize his own army, largely
responsible for the current fiasco.
…/…
If the RPF retakes the offensive, our soldiers could, in a matter of hours, find themselves face to face
with the rebels.
Our only remaining means of exerting strong pressure—excluding direct intervention—seems to me to
be the possibility of our disengagement:
- presented to HABYARIMANA as a threat, it could lead him to relax his position;
- presented to MUSEVENI and to the RPF as a possible response to their own concessions, it would
make them give up a military victory for a solely political victory.
Marcel DEBARGE should, in my opinion, be able to use this argument to facilitate his mission.
Pierre JOXE
1 - 105
1 - 106
March 3rd, 1993
Restricted Council: Wednesday, March 3rd, 1993
(Notes taken by Hubert Védrine)
1. Situation in Rwanda
The President: “We must get out, but by going through the United Nations. We cannot pull back
like this.
It’s up to the Quai d’Orsay to ensure this shift very quickly. Is this possible?
We have to bridge the gap, to slow the advance of the Ugandans. It is urgent to obtain a decision
from Boutros Ghali.
Our soldiers can become United Nations soldiers, but not them alone. We must act very quickly,
in two or three days.”
2. Situation in the former Yugoslavia
The President: “If this were to turn into a NATO monopoly, I would reexamine the very
principle of our participation. Eventually I would ask for an emergency meeting.
We are only involved with the United Nations.
I do not believe that the Americans want a real war (or else, they will have it fought by others).”
1 - 107
1 - 108
1 - 109
1 - 110
1 - 111
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 01
ORIGIN 10-19
UNCLASSIFIED
OASY-00 DODE-00
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01C-02 OMB-01 PA-01
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SP-00
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DRAFTED BY: IO/UNP:LWErNTRAUB:LXW
APPROVED BY: IO:GFWARD
AF/C:CFULLER
IO/UNP:CNPATTERSON
P:EBRIMMER (INFO)
01A773 200205Z /38
P 200200Z MAY 93
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
CONFIDENTIALSTATE 153516
PARIS FOR PERLOW; BRUSSELS FOR DUBROW
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, RW, OAU, UG
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
153516 200203Z
STATE
PAGE 02
SUBJECT: RWANDAN DEFENSE MINISTER LOOKS FOR PEACEKEEPERS
REF: STATE 117028
1.
F16
RELEASED IN PART
B6, Bl, 1.4(D)
STATE 153516 200203Z
AMAD-01 CIAE-00
INFO LOG-00 AF-01
H-01
DOEE-00 EUR-01 HA-09
ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
SNP-00
PRS-01 P-01
PM-02
CORE-00
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T-00
1 - 112
CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: RWANDAN DEFENSE MINISTER GASANA TOLD ACTING
IO A/s WARD THAT AN OAU FORCE OF 50 OFFICERS CANNOT
EFFECTIVELY MONITOR A BUFFER ZONE OF 3,000 SQUARE MILES,
FROM WHICH APPROXIMATELY 1 MILLION PEOPLE HAVE BEEN
DISPLACED. THE OAU FORCE NEEDS TO BE EXPANDED TO 500 AND
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 20 MAY 2015
DATE/CASE ID: 04 NOV 2011 201005065
UNCLASSIFIED
SUPPORTED WITH OUTSIDE (READ UN) EXPERTISE AND DEPLOYED
AHEAD OF A PEACE AGREEMENT, FOLLOWING WHICH IT WOULD BE
REPLACED BY A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE NOW UNDER DISCUSSION
IN ARUSHA. A UN BORDER MONITORING FORCE OF A SIMILAR SIZE
WOULD ALSO BE OF GREAT HELP AND SHOULD BE DEPLOYED
IMMEDIATELY. GASANA OPINED THAT THE FORCES WOULD BE
NEEDED UNTIL ELECTIONS, MEANING A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR OR
LONGER, DEPENDING ON THE OUTCOME OF THE ARUSHA
NEGOTIATIONS. WARD SAID THAT THE USG IS CONCERNED ABOUT
RWANDA'S NEEDS, ESPECIALLY THE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS OF
THE DISPLACED PERSONS, BUT NOTED THAT THE UN IS HAVING
DIFFICULTIES IN STAFFING AND PAYING FOR ITS
ALREADY-ESTABLISHED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. GIVEN THESE
CONSTRAINTS, THE USG WILL TRY TO BE HELPFUL. END SUMMARY.
3. RWANDAN DEFENSE MINISTER JAMES GASANA MET MAY 17 WITH
IO ACTING A/S GEORGE F. WARD. AMBASSADOR ALOYS UWIMANA
AND A MILITARY AIDE WERE ALSO ON THE GOR SIDE. THE USG
SIDE INCLUDED DESK OFFICER CAROL FULLER AND IO/UNP
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 153516 200203Z
PAGE 03
OFFICERS LEON WEINTRAUB AND ROBERT PATTERSON.
4. GASANA DESCRIBED A SITUATION IN RWANDA WHERE UP TO ONE
MILLION PERSONS, APPROXIMATELY ONE-SEVENTH OF THE
COUNTRY'S POPULATION, HAVE BEEN DISPLACED, SOME OF THEM
MORE THAN FIVE TIMES. THE OAU NEUTRAL MILITARY OBSERVER
GROUP (NMOG), WHICH CONSISTS OF ONLY 40 OFFICERS FROM
NIGERIA, SENEGAL, MALI, AND ZIMBABWE, WITH FIVE ADDITIONAL
MEMBERS EACH FROM THE GOR AND THE RPF, IS "VERY, VERY
WEAK," AND UNABLE TO MONITOR A BUFFER ZONE NOW CLOSE TO
3,000 SQUARE MILES, AN AREA RECENTLY ENLARGED BY A FACTOR
OF TEN. IN ADDITION TO SUCH OVERWHELMING OBJECTIVE
CIRCUMSTANCES, GASANA ALLEGED THAT THE FIVE RPF MEMBERS IN
THE NMOG MISUSED THEIR PRESENCE (FOR INTELLIGENCE
PURPOSES). HE ALSO NOTED THE OAU'S LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, CLAIMING THAT MANY OF THE
INEXPERIENCED OAU OFFICERS HAVE TAKEN SIDES IN THE
CONFLICT. GASANA EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION AS WELL WITH THE
OAU'S INABILITY TO PROVIDE SOLUTIONS FOR RWANDA'S
PROBLEMS, CITING RWANDA'S OBLIGATION TO PAY FOR THE OAU
MONITORING PRESENCE IN HIS COUNTRY. HE IS LOOKING FOR
NELP FROM THE UNITED NATIONS, HE STATED.
5.
THE RPF MAY SAY THEY HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM THE BUFFER
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 113
UNCLASSIFIED
ZONE, GASANA SAID, BUT THEY HAVE ONLY CHANGED THEIR
UNIFORMS FOR CIVILIAN CLOTHES. THAT IS WHY THE OAU FORCE
NEEDS TO BE EXPANDED, ASSISTED WITH UN TECHNICAL
EXPERTISE, AND DEPLOYED AHEAD (AND IN ANTICIPATION) OF A
PEACE AGREEMENT. ONLY IN THIS MANNER CAN DISPLACED
PERSONS BE ENCOURAGED TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND FURTHER
MASS POPULATION MOVEMENTS PREVENTED, THE DEFENSE MINISTER
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04
CONTINUED.
STATE 153516 200203Z
6. A MONITORING FORCE ALONG THE COUNTRY'S 180 KM
MOUNTAINOUS BORDER WITH UGANDA WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL FOR
THE SAME REASON, GASANA SAID. HE CLAIMED THAT ANOTHER
CEASEFIRE VIOLATION LIKE THE RPF ATTACK OF FEBRUARY WOULD
THREATEN MANY MORE THAN ONE MILLION PEOPLE. HE ADDED THAT
HE IS WAITING FOR A REPORT FROM THE SYG'S TEAM THAT HAD
ALREADY BEEN IN UGANDA AND WOULD NEXT DISCUSS THIS ISSUE
WITH THE OAU IN ADDIS ABABA.
7. WARD TOLD GASANA THAT HE HOPES THE UN CAN STRENGTHEN
THE OAU PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS IN RWANDA, BUT THE UN IS
ALREADY HAVING DIFFICULTIES IN STAFFING AND PAYING FOR
ONGOING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN KUWAIT, SOMALIA, AND
CYPRUS. EACH SUCH OPERATION FURTHER BURDENED AN ALREADY
OVERSTRETCHED UN SYSTEM, EXPLAINING TO SOME DEGREE THE
GREAT RELUCTANCE OF THE UNSYG TO MOVE RAPIDLY TOWARD
ESTABLISHING A UN PEACEKEEPING PRESENCE IN RWANDA. WE
WILL HAVE TO WATCH THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CLOSELY, WARD
SAID, AND FIND THE MOST "MANPOWER EFFICIENT" MEANS FOR
ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM. HE THEN ASKED GASANA WHAT
SPECIFIC KIND OF HELP HE MIGHT LOOK FOR FROM THE UN.
8. GASANA REPLIED THAT AROUND 500 UN TROOPS ARE NEEDED TO
DEPLOY ALONG THE UGANDA-RWANDA BORDER AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE. SIMILARLY, HE SAW A NEED FOR AN ENLARGED UMOG
OF AROUND 500 OAU TROOPS IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE PRIOR
TO THE SIGNING OF A PEACE AGREEMENT. THE OAU TROOPS WOULD
SERVE IN RELATIVELY SMALL UNITS TO FACILITATE EASE OF
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 05
STATE
153516 200203Z
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 114
UNCLASSIFIED
MOVEMENT WITHIN THEIR AREAS OF OPERATION AND WOULD REMAIN
UNTIL A POTENTIAL UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE (SUCH AS IS NOW
BEING DISCUSSED BY THE PARTIES IN ARUSHA) IS FORMED AND
ARRIVES FOLLOWING THE PEACE AGREEMENT. AT THAT POINT, THE
UN BORDER FORCE AND UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE SHOULD BE
COMBINED UNDER A JOINT COMMAND AND REMAIN UNTIL TRAINING
AND INTEGRATION OF THE ARMY HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND
ELECTIONS HELD. THE GOR WOULD LIKE ELECTIONS TO BE HELD
WITHIN A "SHORT TIME" OF ABOUT ONE YEAR, BUT THE RPF HAS
SUGGESTED A THREE-TO-FOUR YEAR PERIOD. GASANA SUGGESTED
THAT THE TOTAL UN STRENGTH WOULD NEED TO BE 1,800,
IMPLYING A NEED FOR 800 SUPPORT PERSONNEL IN ADDITION TO
THE TWO 500-PERSON GROUPS (COMMENT: IN HIS ANSWER TO THE
SAME QUESTION POSED BY AF IN AN EARLIER MEETING, GASANA
CITED A TOTAL FIGURE OF 1,000. END COMMENT).
1 - 115
UNCLASSIFIED
9. GASANA SAID THAT HE HAD PLANS TO SEE THE SYG AND THE
UNSC PRESIDENT IN NEW YORK MAY 18, WHERE HE WOULD FURTHER
OUTLINE HIS IDEAS. WARD SAID THE USG WOULD REMAIN
ATTENTIVE TO RWANDA'S NEEDS AND WOULD WATCH THE DISPLACED
PROBLEM WITH DEEP CONCERN FOR SECURITY. IT WOULD BE
DIFFICULT TO FIELD NEW UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES, HE SAID,
UT WE WILL TRY TO BE HELPFUL WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE
POSSIBLE.
10.
B6
COMMENT:
I
HE CLARIFIED AFTER THE MEETING THAT HIS
SUGGESTIONS OF 500 TROOPS ON THE BORDER AND ANOTHER 500
FOR THE OAU NMOG WERE ONLY EARLY PLANNING FIGURES AND NOT
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
153516 200203Z
STATE
PAGE 06
SET IN STONE. HE CONTINUED SOMEWHAT RUEFULLY THAT THE GOR
HAS NOT SEEN THE DRAFT REPORT OF THE UN TECHNICAL MISSION
ON THE BORDER FORCE WHICH SUGGESTS A FIGURE OF 80 TROOPS,
AND THAT THE GOR'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROPOSAL COMES ONLY
FROM THE RPF'S FORMAL RESPONSE LETTER OF APRIL 19.1
/ END
COMMENT. I CHRISTOPHER
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
B1
1 - 116
CAS~NoXT¢--.¢~.!.~.X
....
K0342 5" "
Ex~-xrm
NO.~~.....a.~...7..~
.........
DATE
"
A D M ITTED
f..7...]’..~..~
~.o,~,
7,
Arusha,
1 June1993
Mr.Minister
of Foreign
Affairs
andCooperation
Headof theRwandan
Govemment
Delegation
Negotiation
Strategy
Mr.Minister,
We,members
of the"Strategy
Committee"
setup by youat thebeginning
of the
latest
round
ofnegotiations,
whose
points
ofviewthusfarhavebeentaken
intoaccount
soasto ensure
a smoother
running
of thenegotiations,
would
liketo sendyouthisletter
to explain
ourpoint
of viewon theissue
of proportions
within
theNational
Army.This
follows
yourstatements
during
theplenary
session
chaired
by theRepresentative
ofthe
Negotiations
Facilitator
on Monday
attemoon,
31 May1993.
Considering
that,
oncemade,yourstatements
during
thenegotiations
arefinal,
andthattheyengage
theresponsibility
of theentire
nation,
wehadalready
asked
you,
duringa meeting
of theStrategy
Committee
on 18 May1993,forwhichyouhadan
express
invitation,
toconsult
thedelegation
youlead,
andabove
ailthe"Strategy
Group",
before
making
anyconcessions
on pre-agreed
positions.
Thatwasin reaction
to your
unnecessary
offerof 1,200postsfortheRPFin thegendarmerie
at a timewhenthe
discussions
wereat thestageofdealing
withtheprinciples
andmodalities
of theRPF
joining
thatcorps.
Againyesterday,
youcannot
imagine
howastonished
weweretohearyouexpress
satisfaction
withtheFacilitator’s
proposed
proportions
forthearmy,
namely
a range
of
35-40/60-65%,
totheRepresentative
of theFacilitator
andin front
of theObservers
and
especially
theRPFdelegation.
Thatcomes
at a timewhentheRPFstaunchly
defends
its
position
of 50%.
It is in thatcontext
of harmonizing
thepoints
of viewof theentire
Govemment
delegation
thatweasked
youtoshedlight
onthree
essential
points
forus:
Whichauthorities
or bodydecided
to change
theGovemment’s
position,
which had been a maximum of 33 %/67% with regard to the
proportions?
2,
Whichnegotiation
strategy
should
be usednowthatyouhaveexpressed
satisfaction
withtheproposed
range,
which
seemingly
nolonger
offers
the
delegation
thepossibility
to propose
35 % as themaximum
percentage
to
concede
to theRPF?Indeed,
themaximum
percentage
continues
to be
within
therangeof morethan40 % in statements
madewithin
thesame
session.
WS04-719 (E)
K050-3989.K050.3991
1 - 117
Whichinformation
should
be broadcast
at a laterstageonRadioRwanda,
giventhescopeof thedisparity
between
themaximum
agreed
to by the
Govemment
(33%) andtheminimum
thatyouhaveaccepted
(35
3,
Whenyoustated
thatGovemment
officiais
hadagreed
on theproposed
range,
we
understood
thatourSelect
Cabinet
first
needed
togiveapproval
before
youcould
proceed
withnegotiations
onthatpoint.
According
toinformation
whichColonel
Bagosora
andProf.Runyinya
were
entitled
toreceive,
which
wasrequested
through
theproper
channels,
it hasnowbecome
obvious
thatsuchisnotthecase,
andthatyourconviction
regarding
theproportions
does
notcornefromtheGovemment,
northeSelectCabinet
whichrepresents
it forthe
purposes
ofthese
negotiations.
Giventheabove,andtaking
intoaccount
standard
negotiation
procedures,
especially
whensuchanimportant
issue
isunderconsideration,
weaskvou,withutmost
urgency,
to request
authorization
fromtheSelect
Cabinet
to negotiate
therangeof
proportions
youdetermined
at 35-40160-65
%, whichattributes
to theRwandan
Armed
Forces
a smaller
quotathanoriginally
agreed
within
theGovemment.
In so doing,
you
willnormalize
theprocedures
decided
uponforthese
negotiations.
We willagreeto proceed
withyouin thesenegotiations
onlywhenwe become
informed
oftheGovemment’s
position
onthatpoint
asit conforms
toyourstatements.
Otherwise,
fromthepoint
youno longer
seemto takeintoaccount
theopinions
andconsiderations
of thedelegation
members,
including
thoseof us members
of the
Strategy
andNegotiation
Group,
we wi|lleave
youtoassume
those
responsibilities
alone.
Sincerely,
Forthemembers
of theStrategy
Committee,
Colonel
Théoneste
Bagosora
[Signed]
CC"
HisExcellency
thePresident
of theRepublic
ofRwanda,
ThePresident
of theNational
Assembly
[CND],~
HisExcellency
the PrimeMinister,
~
WS04-719(E)
K050-3989-K050-3991
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 118
United States Dep
State
Washington, D.C. 20520
RELEASED IN PART
B3, CIA
CORELRENTIAL
MEWRAMISAM
TO:
August 4, 1993
Richard Clarke
Susan Rice
Jennifer Ward
Sara Sewell
Richard Brennan
James Woods
Vince Kern
LTC Mike Harvin
ADM Frank Bowman
LTC Piotter
LCDR Robert Williams
Gordon Adams
George Ward
John Brims
David Jensen
Joseph Snyder
Susan Zelle
Steven Simon
Alex Margulies
Joe Bowab
NSC
OSD/PK/PE
OSD/ISA/AFR
JCS/J•5
OMB
TO
10/PHO
IO/UNP
PM
PM/ISO
PM/DRSA
CIA'
USUN
p
B3
rnderturtn•
David Shefford
Bruce Thomas
Esther Brimmer
Rick
-
FROM:
AF - Prudence Bushnell
SUBJECT:
Peacekeeping in Rwanda
We'invite you to attend a meeting on'Friday, August 6: at 2
pm at the State Department, room 3519, to determine whether the
USG should support a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. You
'have already received an analysis of all the various options in
a paper dated July 26 (circulated to all addressee offices and
attached for your convenience). It seems increasingly apparent
that the least expensive option that will meet our peacekeeping
objectives is the one recommended by Ambassador Flaten (option
five). Based on the latest developments in the field, we
CaRELUEPTIAL
DECL: OADR
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN L. MILLS
DATE/CASE ID: 12 FEB 2003 200101636
i310-""
a) 043 rib
UNCLASSIFIED 63 Lc
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 119
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2-
believe that this limited approach will provide the necessary
level of security at a much lower cost (approximately $8
million for one year) than the much larger PKO forces (costing
approximately $37.5 million) contemplated in the other
principal options.
,
With today's signing of a peace agreement in Arusha, time
is of the essence. The two sides are counting on deployment of
a neutral international force to help establish a climate of
security and confidence during which they can launch a
transition government and start the military integration and
demobilization process. A good beginning may make the
difference between success and failure. Without it, the risk
of renewed war and continuing emergency aid requirements
(predicted to cost the USG at least $35 million this fiscal
year) will be greatly increased.
Attachment:
As stated.
Drafted:AF/C:R
8/3/93, 7-2080
W-SECB 4944
Clearance:AF/C:KA
e
CONFIDENTIAI.
UNCLASSIFIED
1 - 120
EXCERPT from Full Document
necessary conclusions. History now seems to be repeating itself, and the errors of the past should be
avoided.
10. Ending arbitrary arrests and detentions
77. Arbitrary arrests and detentions and unacknowledged detentions must be stopped and those responsible
for such violations punished. These are the violations that foster and pave the way for summary executions.
Despite the assurances he was given by the competent authorities during his mission to Rwanda, the
Special Rapporteur has in fact received allegations indicating that civilian are still being held in military
camps.
11. The genocide question
78. The question whether the massacres described above may be termed genocide has often been raised. It
is not for the Special Rapporteur to pass judgement at this stage, but an initial reply may be put forward.
Rwanda acceded to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on 15
April 1975. Article II of the Convention reads:
"in the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another [page 23] group.
79. The cases of intercommunal violence brought to the Special Rapporteur's attention indicate very clearly
that the victims of the attacks, Tutsis in the overwhelming majority of cases, have been targeted solely
because of their membership of a certain ethnic group, and for no other objective reason. Article II,
paragraphs (a) and (b), might therefore be considered to apply to these cases.
80. The violations of the right to life, as described in this report, could fall within the purview of article III
of the convention, which reads:
"The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
81. Similarly, article IV states: "Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts ... shall be punished,
whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals".
12. Additional measures for protection of the right to life and restoring a lasting peace
(a) Preparations for demobilizing military personnel
82. Once peace has been restored, a large number of military personnel will have to be demobilized, within
both the Rwandese Armed Forces and the FPR. Preparations for their reintegration into the socioeconomic
life of the country should not be left until that time; many of these men were unemployed youngsters who
enlisted because the army gave them the possibility of eating. According to reports, some of the recruits
were also delinquents. In view of the fact that all these persons have learned how to handle weapons and
Session 2
“The Failed Peace: August 1993 – April 1994”
Documents List
Page
No.
Date
Author
2-1
7/14/1993 Albright
2-7
7/19/1993 Flatten
2-17
7/26/1993 State-OSD
2-21
7/26/1993 Marley-Aiston
2-29
8/19/1993 Leader
2-49
8/27/1993 Leader
2-58
9/16/1993 GOR-RPF
2-62
9/18/1993 Albright
2-67
10/1/1993 Flatten
2-73
2-75
11/19/1993 Dallaire
1/11/1994 Dallaire
2-77
1/11/1994 Annan/Riza
2-79
2/2/1994 Aiston
2-83
2/14/1994 Annan
2-87
2-90
2-92
Title
Possible Peacekeeping Operation
in Rwanda
Transition Government Extended
MDR Splits
Source
Freedom of
Information Act
Freedom of
Information Act
Peacekeeping in Rwanda and the
Criteria of PRD-13
Freedom of
Information Act
Preliminary peacekeeping options in
Rwanda
The Rwandan Peace Process
Problems and Prospects for
Implementing the Peace Accord
UN Reconnaissance Mission Head
Discusses throughs on UN
Involvement in Rwanda
Joint Memorandum on Neutral
International Force
Rwanda Joint RPF Government
Delegation Asks USG support for
quick deployment of an NIF
Washington Visit of President
Habyarimana
Draft rules of engagement for
UNAMIR
Request for Protection for Informant
Freedom of
Information Act
Contacts with Informant
ICTR evidence
Official-Informal
Freedom of
Information Act
Letter from Foreign Minister of
Belgium
Risk of genocide in Rwanda and
2/25/1994 Willems to UN reply from UN FRENCH
Risk of genocide in Rwanda and
2/25/1994 Willems to UN reply from UN ENGLISH
3/14/1994 Claes
Call for strengthening of UNAMIR
Notes
last page deleted
because just
clearance notices drafted by KAiston
last two pages
deleted because just
clearance notices drafted by KAiston
Freedom of
Information Act
Freedom of
Information Act
Freedom of
Information Act
Freedom of
Information Act
Freedom of
Information Act
ICTR evidence
ICTR evidence
ICTR evidence
Belgian Senate
Report
Belgian Senate
Report
ICTR evidence
excerpt of first page
and article 17
("genocide fax")
reply to "genocide
fax" from DPKO
international funding
of Rwanda's
demobilization
program
includes French
language copy of
letter from Claes
French language
(original)
English language
(translation)
Page
No.
Date
2-93
3/15/1994
Author
Title
Rwanda Refugee Fact Sheet
2-96
4/1/1994 Secstate
2-98
4/5/1994 UNSC
2-100
2-105
4/6/1994 Bushnell
4/6/1994 ICTR
2-106
4/6/1994 ICTR
2-107
4/7/1994 ICTR
2-108
4/7/1994 Dallaire
Demarche on Rwanda Resolution
UNSC Resolution 909 to Extend
UNAMIR
Bushnell Personal Notebook - First
Days of Genocide
General map of Kigali - city center
Map of Camp Kanombe area
showing airport, etc.
Sketch of PM & Joyce Leader
houses (MAP)
Significant Incident Report Reported Death of President of
Rwanda
2-114
4/7/1994 Delaye
Attack against the presidents of
Rwanda and Burndi FRENCH
2-117
4/7/1994 Delaye
2-119
2-123
4/7/1994 US Brussels
4/7/1994 (Kagame)
2-124
4/7/1994 Dallaire
2-125
Booh4/8/1994 Booh/Dallaire
2-132
4/8/1994 US Brussels
2-134
4/8/1994 US DoD
2-135
2-137
2-140
2-142
2-145
2-147
Attack against the presidents of
Rwanda and Burndi ENGLISH
Belgian MFA on Situation in
Rwanda
Kagame Message to Dallaire
UNAMIR response to RPA 6 point
message
An Update on the Current Situation
in Rwanda and Military Aspects of
the Mission
Claes asks SYG for change in
UNAMIR Mandate, asks for USG
views and support
Rwanda Current Situation Next
Steps Action Memorandum
Source
Freedom of
Information Act
Freedom of
Information Act
Notes
United Nations
Bushnell Personal
Archive
ICTR evidence
ICTR evidence
ICTR evidence
ICTR evidence
French
Parlimentary
Report
French
Parlimentary
Report
Freedom of
Information Act
Dallaire Memoir
French language
(original)
English language
(translation)
ICTR evidence
ICTR evidence
note points 6, 13 and
15
Freedom of
Information Act
Freedom of
Information Act
warning of possible
genocide against the
"Kigali Livré à la Fureur des Tueurs
Tutsis; French
Hutus" (Kigali Delivered the Fury of Libération (France) language, no
4/11/1994 Ceppi
Hutu Killers)
news
translation available
Talking points on Rwanda and
Freedom of
4/11/1994 DoD Harvin
Burundi
Information Act
4/12/1994 Dusaidi
RPF Press Release
ICTR evidence
Colonel Blames Right Wing Military Freedom of
4/12/1994 Leader/Brazeal for Kigalis Nightmare
Information Act
Communique issues by the
Command of the Forces Armees
4/12/1994 Rutasira et al Rwandaises
ICTR evidence
"A crime of genocide has been
4/13/1994 Dusaidi
committed"
ICTR evidence
Page
No.
Date
Author
2-149
4/15/1994 US DIA
2-162
4/25/1994 French FM
2-167
4/25/1994 French FM
2-171
4/3/2003 ICTR
Title
Ned from Kigali and an Analysis of
What Happened Following the
President’s Death and Why
Note from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, April 25, 1994, Attack of
April 6, 1994 FRENCH
Note from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, April 25, 1994, Attack of
April 6, 1994 ENGLISH
[Genevieve - Turatsinze's wife Testimony before ICTR]
Source
Notes
Freedom of
Information Act
French
Parlimentary
Report
French
Parlimentary
Report
French language
(original)
ICTR evidence
English language
(translation)
SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
2-1
D21
RELEASED IN FULL
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ACTION AF-01
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8161
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECRETSECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003423
STATE FOR AF DAS BUSHNELL AND IO/UNP
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA AND DAS SEWELL
JCS FOR J3, J5
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NSC
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, UN, RW
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PEACEKEPING OPERATION IN RWANDA
REF: A) STATE 210975, B) USUN 2899, C) USUN 3028, D)
USUN 3046, E) KIGALI 2414
1.
CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
SECRET
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PAGE 02
USUN N 03423 01 OF 02 141950Z
2. (C) SUMMARY: IN ANSWER TO REF A, THERE ARE PROS AND
CONS BEING DISCUSSED WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
REGARDING A UN INTERPOSITIONAL FORCE IN RWANDA, REFERRED
TO IN THE (PENDING) ARUSHA ACCORD AS A NEUTRAL
INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF). PROBABLY, THE BEST WAY
FORWARD WILE, BE TO DEVISE AN IMAGINATIVE WAY FOR THE UN
TO HELP THE OAU UNDERTAKE THE MAJOR PART OF THE
PEACEKEEPING TASK, ALLOWING THE OAU TO TAP INTO UN
EXPERTISE, BUT AVOIDING PAYING FOR THE PKO THROUGH
ASSESSMENTS ON UN MEMBER STATES. THIS NIF IS SEPARATE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DARTS
DATE/CASE ID: 15 DEC 2005 200103014
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
FROM, BUT COMPLEMENTARY TO, UNOMUR (THE OBSERVER AND
MONITORING GROUP ON THE UGANDAN SIDE OF THE BORDER).
END SUMMARY.
HISTORY
3. (C) THIS CABLE WILL DISCUSS THE SECOND STAGE OF
MULTILATERAL ACTION IN RWANDA. AS DOD AND STATE WILL
RECALL, THE MANDATE AND OPERATING PRINCIPLES FOR THE
FIRST STAGE--A BORDER MONITORING GROUP--WAS NEGOTIATED
BY REPRESENTATIVES OF DOD/OSD/ISA, JCS, AND STATE'S AF
AND IO BUREAUS WITH A HIGH LEVEL FRENCH DELEGATION IN
NEW YORK JUNE 11 (REF B). ONCE THE USG AND FRENCH HAD
REACHED A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS, THE FRENCH PRESENTED A
TEXT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH WAS TAKEN UP IN
INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS (REF C) AND ADOPTED (REF D).
4. (C) THE SECOND STAGE OF MULTILATERAL ACTION IN
RWANDA CANNOT BE THOROUGHLY ANALYZED UNTIL AN AGREEMENT
SECRET
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USUN N 03423 01 OF 02 141950Z
PAGE 03
BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IS FINALIZED AND
SIGNED AT ARUSHA, TANZANIA. THE ARUSHA ACCORD MAY BE
SIGNED BY THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE RWANDAN
PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) AS EARLY AS JULY 15. REPORTEDLY,
THE ACCORD WILL CALL FOR THE UN TO SEND A NEUTRAL
INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF) TO INTERPOSE ITSELF IN THE
70-MILE WIDE BUFFER ZONE BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES' FRONT
LINES. THIS WILL CREATE THE ATMOSPHERE OF STABILITY
WHICH WILL ENABLE THE ALMOST ONE MILLION DISPLACED
PERSONS TO RETURN SAFELY TO THEIR HOMES. THE OAU IS
CURRENTLY IN THE BUFFER ZONE WITH A NEUTRAL MONITORING
AND OBSERVING GROUP (NMOG), WHICH BY ALL ACCOUNTS IS
NOT/NOT DOING A VERY GOOD JOB.
PRD -13
5. (S) THE PROPOSED NIF (ALTHOUGH NOT FULLY FLESHED
OUT) SEEMS TO GO A LONG WAY TOWARDS FULFILLING THE
CRITERIA IN PRD-13. A) THE THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL
ORDER INCLUDES INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION BY REBEL FORCES
LOCATED ACROSS THE BORDER IN UGANDA AND A HUMANITARIAN
DISASTER INVOLVING ALMOST ONE MILLION DISPLACED WHO HAVE
FLED THEIR HOMES IN THE FACE OF VIOLENCE. B) THE
UNCLASSIFIED
2-2
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF INTEREST IS DEMONSTRATED BY
THE PRESENCE OF OAU FORCES IN RWANDA, SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 846 ESTABLISHING A BORDER MONITORING GROUP,
AND THE TANZANIAN-FACILITATED PEACE TALKS IN ARUSHA
WHICH ARE OBSERVED BY SEVERAL CONCERNED COUNTRIES
INCLUDING THE U.S. C) THE CLEAR OBJECTIVES, WHICH
SHOULD BE CLARIFIED BY THE ARUSHA ACCORD, SEEM TO BE
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PAGE 04
USUN N 03423 01 OF 02 141950Z
THOSE OF A CLASSICAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN WHICH A
CEASEFIRE EXISTS AND BOTH SIDES ACCEPT THE PKO. THIS
PROPOSED FORCE DOES NOT APPEAR TO SPILL OVER INTO PEACE
ENFORCEMENT. THE PEACEMAKING HAS ALREADY BEEN (ALMOST)
ACCOMPLISHED BY THE TANZANIANS. D) THIS IS THE AREA
WHERE SOME QUESTIONS REMAIN. PARTICULARLY, THE
QUESTIONS OF FINANCING AND WHETHER THE MANDATE SHOULD BE
TAKEN UP BY THE UN OR OAU ARE STILL AT ISSUE.
PRO
6. (U) THE SECRETARIAT, AS WELL AS SOME MEMBERS OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE DONOR COMMUNITY, ARE WILLING TO
ACCEDE TO THE ANTICIPATED REQUEST FOR A UN-LED NIF.
THEY SAY THERE IS A MORAL OBLIGATIO
N FOR THE UN TO HELP
BRING PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICTS WHEN ASKED. THIS
IS ONE CASE WHERE BOTH PARTIES ACTUALLY SEEM TO BE
DISPLAYING THE WILL TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND MOVE
TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AS OPPOSED TO OTHER AREAS
SECRET
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UNCLASSIFIED
2-3
PAGE 01
ACTION AF-01
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2-4
USUN N 03423 02 OF 02 141950Z
OASY-00 HA-09
H-01
INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 C-01
TEDE-00
INR-00 10-19
L-03
ADS-00 NSAE-00 01C-02 OMB-01
PM-02
PRS-01 P-01
RPCS-01 SNP-00 SP-00
PA-01
SS-00
TRSE-00 T-00
USIE-00 CORE-00
/043W
D6E86C 141951Z /38
O 141944Z JUL 93
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8162
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003423
STATE FOR AF DAS BUSHNELL AND IO/UNP
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA AND DAS SEWELL
JCS FOR J3, J5
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NSC
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, UN, RW
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PEACEKEPING OPERATION IN RWANDA
(E.G. ANGOLA, BOSNIA, GEORGIA) WHERE THE GOODWILL OF THE
PROTAGONISTS IS QUESTIONABLE. THE CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN
HOLDING FOR QUITE SOME TIME. UN PEACEKEEPERS IN RWANDA
WOULD HAVE A REASONABLY GOOD CHANCE OF EFFECTIVELY
SECRET
SECRET
USUN N 03423 02 OF 02 141950Z
PAGE 02
BRINGING PEACE TO MILLIONS OF SUFFERING PEOPLE. TURNING
AWAY FROM THIS CALL FOR HELP COULD HAVE TRAGIC HUMAN
CONSEQUENCES.
7. (U) FINANCIALLY, THE SECRETARIAT REALIZES IT WILL
COST LESS TO PUT A PKO IN PLACE FOR A LIMITED TIME
ALLOWING THE POPULATION TO RETURN TO ITS VILLAGES, THAN
TO PAY FOR THE FEEDING AND UPKEEP OF ONE MILLION PEOPLE
IN REFUGEE CAMPS.
8. (C) SUPPORTING THE NEED FOR A UN ROLE, THIS POINT OF
VIEW CITES THE POOR JOB THE OAU HAS BEEN DOING TO DATE.
THE OAU HAS BEEN DRAGGING ITS FEET IN PROPOSING CONCRETE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
WAYS TO SHORE UP ITS OPERATION, DESPITE A VISIT BY A
SECONDED OFFICER FROM UN DPKO. THERE ARE COMPLAINTS
THAT THE OAU IS INEXPERIENCED, CORRUPT, INCOMPETENT,
LACKING IN FUNDS, ETC. THE UN HAS THE EXPERTISE TO BE
MORE EFFECTIVE. UN SYG BOUTROS-GHALI EXPRESSED THIS
POINT OF VIEW TO THE PERMREPS OF FRANCE, BELGIUM AND THE
U.S. IN THE SPRING. OF THE P-5, THE FRENCH ARE MOSTLY
STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF HAVING A UN-LED PKO, SINCE THEY ARE
STAUNCHLY AGAINST THE OAU, WHICH IS ALSO OUT OF FAVOR
WITH THE GOR.
CON
9. (C) ARGUING ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, RUSSLA
AND THE UK ARE LEARY OF UNDERWRITING ANOTHER COSTLY
PKO. BOTH HAVE SAID THEY DO NOT HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE
MERITS OF THE FORCE, ONLY WITH THE FINANCING. HOWEVER,
SECRET
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PAGE 03
USUN N 03423 02 OF 02 141950Z
RUSSIA MIGHT GO SO FAR AS TO VETO A RESOLUTION PUTTING
THE BURDEN ON THE UN. ALSO, THE SECRETARIAT FEARS THE
ARUSHA ACCORD'S REQUEST MAY BE FOR A BIGGER (READ "MORE
EXPENSIVE") PKO THAN IS FEASIBLE. THEY MAY NOT BE ABLE
TO RUSTLE UP THE REQUISITE NUMBER OF TROOP
CONTRIBUTORS.
10. (S) PRD-13 DISCUSSES THE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION
THAT REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CAN POTENTIALLY MAKE TO
PEACEKEEPING ONCE THEY ENHANCE THEIR COMPETENE AND
EXPERIENCE. BY HANDING THE RWANDA NIF TO THE UN, THE
OAU LOSES AN OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN ON THE GROUND HOW
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS SHOULD AND SHOULD NOT BE DONE.
FAILURE TO LEARN QUICKLY, OF COURSE, RUNS THE RISK OF
DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE LIVES AND WELL-BEING OF
MILLIONS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS.
IMAGINATIVE ALTERNATIVES NEEDED
11. (C) IF THE UN AND THE OAU CAN FIND A WAY TO RUN AN
OPERATION JOINTLY, MUCH LIKE THE OAS AND UN HAVE DONE IN
HAITI, THERE MAY BE THE POSSIBILITY OF FUNDING SUCH AN
OPERATION THROUGH VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS, OR THROUGH
CONTRIBUTIONS IN KIND. THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS, WHO
HAVE THE KEENEST NATIONAL INTERESTS IN RWANDA, HAVE
UNCLASSIFIED
2-5
UNCLASSIFIED
EXPRESSED RELUCTANCE TO CONTRIBUTE, BUT SHOULD BE
PRESSED TO DO SO. OTHERS SUCH AS THE SCANDINAVIANS MAY
BE WILING TO CONTRIBUTE. AFRICAN MILITARY CONTINGENTS
WITH PRIOR UN PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCE COULD BE SOUGHT,
AND PLACED UNDER SOME TYPE OF JOINT COMMAND TO TARE
SECRET
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PAGE 04
USUN N 03423 02 OF 02 141950Z
ADVANTAGE OF THE UN'S PRIOR EXPERIENCE. MILITARY
OFFICERS FROM NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES COULD BE RECRUITED
BY THE UN AND SECONDED TO THE RWANDA OPERATION. ANY OR
ALL OF THE ABOVE WOULD GO AGAINST PRECEDENT FOR UN
PRO'S, AND WOULD REQUIRE IMAGINATIVE INNOVATIONS.
ALBRIGHT
SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
2-6
2-7
2-8
2-9
2 - 10
2 - 11
2 - 12
2 - 13
2 - 14
2 - 15
2 - 16
UNCLASSIFIED
2 - 17
July 26, 1993
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
JOINT'STATE-OSD MEMORANDUM CONCERNING
PEACEKEEPING IN RWANDA AND THE CRITERIA OF PRD-13
A.
THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
Criterion Met: Yes
The civil war in Rwanda has displaced one million people
from the northern portion of the country, and only massive
humanitarian assistance (estimated at $100 million this year)
has prevented widespread famine. The war has produced
thousands of military and civilian casualties and has sparked
episodes of ethnic violence, with the continuing threat of
ethnic massacres -- a recurring problem in the region. These
conditions clearly qualify as a humanitarian disaster requiring
urgent action, coupled with violence and the threat of future
violence.
B.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF INTEREST FOR DEALING
WITH THE PROBLEM ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS
Criterion Met: Yes, but an international consensus does
not exist yet on the specific means required to resolve the
problem
The UN, the OAU, and several regional and Western powers
have displayed a common interest in resolving this problem,
through both multilateral diplomatic means and through
participation in multinational military observer missions. The
OAU and Tanzania have sponsored year-long peace talks, with the
UN, U.S., France, Belgium, Germany, and neighboring African
countries participating as active observers. The UN recently
approved a Rwanda/Uganda border-monitoring force and is
studying further action, and the OAU has fielded a Neutral
Military Observer Group (NMOG) to monitor the ceasefire.
CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN L. MILLS
DATE/CASE ID: 24 SEP 2002 199903054
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
2 - 18
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 Although an international community of interest exists
regarding the need for a positive resolution to the civil war,
a consensus still needs to be developed among members of the UN
Security Council and the broader international community about
the specific means to Accomplish that objective. In addition,
countries which have been actively involved in the peace
process have differing approaches to the problem.
C. CLEAR OBJECTIVES, UNDERSTANDING OF MISSION'S CHARACTER
Criterion Met: Probably, if the mission and objectives are
well-defined in the peace accord and approving resolution.
As currently envisioned, the proposed Neutral International
Force (NIF) would fit a traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping
model, assuming the force is blue-helmeted.
o
Both sides have requested and consented to the force
o
A ceasefire is in place and has been holding since March
o
Hostilities have been suspended and the parties are
already separated by a buffer zone monitored by the NMOG
The primary mandate of the NIF would be to assure
implementation of the peace accords. The force would keep the
parties apart, supervise cantonment and disarmament of troops,
store heavy equipment, and oversee force integration and
demobilization.
If the situation deteriorated and peace enforcement became
necessary, it is not clear that the UN would have the will or
resources to respond adequately.
If the operation were not blue-helmeted, it is not clear
that all parties would consent or that peace could be
maintained. This could significantly alter the proposed force
objectives and the character of the mission.
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
B1
UNCLASSIFIED
2 - 19
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 D. MEANS AVAILABLE
Criterion Met: No, not at this time
While it might be possible to gain adequate financial and
troop support for a Rwandan peacekeeping mission, the means are
not clearly available at this point. Generating them from the
international community would require a significant investment
of U.S. effort.
The two sides have been discussing an international force
of about 2,500 men. The estimated cost of such a force, at UN
reimbursement rateg, would be roughly $37 million for one
year. Assuming an assessed UN operation, no financial
resources currently exist to pay the U.S. assessment; our only
option would be to increase our arrears. (In addition, goods
and services could be made available through the UN
Participation Act.)
/([
Russian officials have suggested funding the force through
voluntary contributions. If a voluntary fund were established,
it is unclear who would contribute and in what amounts. I
To provide assistance to a non-assessed operation, we might
tap FY-93 fallrint FLIP funds, if available; however, there will
be numerous claimants for these scarce funds. In addition, we
might be able to move funds into the non-assessed security* • I•
• •
assistance •e
authority. Further, if there are funds available in DoD, it
misfit ne *possible to provide commitments in kind (goods,
services, and personnel).
,
The availability of funding would directly affect the
likelihood of attracting necessary force contributions. The
OAU already has a small contingent in Rwanda, which they plan
to expand to 240 men. However, African nations may not want to
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
2 - 20
CONFTORNTIATt
-4contribute additional troops unless they are reimbursed at UN
rates, and it would be difficult to raise sufficient voluntary
funds to provide more than "at cost" reimbursement. At
present, aside from the African countries participating or
expected to participate in the NMOG, only Canada has expressed
an interest in contributing troops in Rwanda. Other possible
sources of troops still need to be examined.
Adequate means might be found if the peacekeeping force
were small enough. We are currently examining options for a
more modest PKO. The Russians might accept an assessed
operation for the UN portion, which would not add significantly
to U.S. arrears. Alternatively, it would be easier to raise
voluntary funds for such an operation.
Whatever the cost of the peacekeeping mission, it must be
weighed against the cost of doing nothing. Estimates for
humanitarian assistance to the displaced this year alone exceed
$100 million, with the U.S. having already contributed or
pledged over $34 million. A successful peacekeeping operation
would allow the displaced to return home, thereby significantly
reducing current humanitarian relief costs and obviating the
need for future relief.
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
2 - 21
United States Department o
Washington, D.C. 20520 •
July 26, 1993
RELEASED IN FULL
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL:OADR
TO:
AF/FO - DAS Bushnell
FROM:
AF/RA - LTC Anthony Marley
AF/C - Kevin Aiston
SUBJECT:
Preliminary Peacekeeping Force Options for Rwanda
This memorandum is only a preliminary examination of
peacekeeping force options in Rwanda. Its purpose is to serve
as a basis for further discussion and analysis. The stated
costs for each option are rough estimates only, and assume
reimbursement of OAU forces at UN rates.
Background. The Government of Rwanda and the rebel Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) are soon expected to sign peace accords
ending nearly three years of civil war in that central African
country. The proposed peace agreement calls for a "Neutral
International Force" (NIF) to act as a peacekeeping force
during the transitional period. The actual size of the NIF
will be dependent on the outcome of a planning survey; current
estimates among Arusha participants range up to 2,500
personnel. The costs of the NIF will largely depend on the
ultimate size of the force.
The NIF's mandate will include supervision of the
encampment and disarming of combatant forces, supervision of
the demobilization of excess military forces, monitoring of the
integration of forces into the new national army and
gendarmerie, and monitoring of internal security to permit the
return of up to 1.5 million displaced persons and refugees.
The NIF's geographic span of control will encompass the
entirety of Rwanda (10;169 square miles, approximately the size
of Maryland). NIF peacekeepers would be required for
approximately 10-12 months, while observers could expect to
remain in Rwanda for the 22 month transition.
The Rwandan Government, the RPF, and the Organization of
African Unity have all indicated that they look to the United
Nations to provide the NIF peacekeeping force. The Rwandan
Government has also indicated that "the people" need to see
non-African participation in the peacekeeping force and has
made clear that it does not trust the OAU, which it regards as
pro-RPF.
CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN L. MILLS
DATE/CASE ID: 12 FEB 2003 200101636
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
2 - 22
CONFIDENTIAL
-2There are currently 50 OAU Neutral Military Observer Group
(NMOG) monitors in Rwanda acting as an interpositional force in
the buffer zone. The NMOG may be expanded to a force of 240
personnel in the near future, but its essential mandate is not
expected to change. NMOG is charged with monitoring of
military activities by the two sides to ensure that they do not
conduct offensive military activities, reinforce forward units,
or move additional weapons or munitions in the vicinity of the
neutral buffer zone.
Options. Six options are currently being considered for a
peacekeeping force for Rwanda:
- UN-only Peacekeeping Operation. (OAU personnel
Option
could form an important part of a UN force, both numerically
and in command positions.)
Force composed of approximately 2500 peacekeepers would cost
approximately $2.5 million per month in reimbursable salaries,
plus $375,000 per month in operating costs, plus an estimated
$3 million in round-trip transport costs, or about $37.5
million for one year. If a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda
were conducted on an assessed basis, the estimated cost to the
U.S. would be roughly $11 million for one year.
• Advantages•
- The only force trusted by all parties
- The UN is the most experienced international peacekeeping
organization
- Has a PKO planning and management directorate within the
Secretariat
- Bureaucratic funding mechanisms exist to finance UN
peacekeeping operation& (both within USG and other countries)
- Could provide an easy, needed success to UN peacekeeping
efforts
- Canada, among others, has reportedly informally indicated
a willingness to provide troops for an UN operation in Rwanda
- Would satisfy UN SYG Boutros-Ghaliss earlier insistence
that if the UN were involved in an operation, it must be in
command of the entire operation
- Would, allow France to withdraw its troops froM Kigali
(approximately 350 soldiers to ensure the security of the
capital) without losing face
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
2 - 23
CONFIDENTIAL
-3- Might allow training of OAU Secretariat personnel through
seconding them to the UN operation as deputies
- A UN PKO is cost effective when compared to the cost of
caring for the displaced population. A successful PKO would
allow the displaced to return home, thereby significantly
reducing current humanitarian relief costs (estimated at $100
million this year, with the U.S. pledged to contribute over $34
million) and obviating the need for future relief.
- Supports USG policy (per PRD-13) of emphasizing the UN as
the primary body to conduct peacekeeping
•
Disadvantaces:
- Russia (and possibly UK) may oppose and possibly veto an
assessed UN operation due to financial constraints (neither
contributes significantly to the humanitarian aid bill)
- Finding enough contributions for a voluntary UN operation
would be problematic
- UN peacekeeping management directorate is already
stretched exceedingly thin due to the abundance of current UN
peacekeeping efforts worldwide
- May prove difficult to find enough states willing to
provide military forces to participate in the operation
- UN peacekeepers could not be in place and operational for
an estimated 4-6 months
- DoD does not want to risk having to provide its own
resources, as might be required by a UN operation
- Ignores USG policy to promote regional peacekeeping
institutions
Option 2 - OAU-only Peacekeeping Operation
An OAU force composed of approximately 2500 personnel,
operating independently of the UN, could be expected to cost
the international community at least the same amount as a UN
operation (approximately $2.5 million per month reimbursed to
donating countries plus $375,000 per month in operating costs),
as it is unlikely that African countries will be willing to
provide significant numbers of military troops to the OAU on a
continuing basis without being reimbursed at UN rates. Cost
for a one year operation, including estimated round-trip
transport costs of $3 million, would be $37.5 million.
•
Advantages:
- Avoids adding another peacekeeping operation to the
heavily committed United Nations
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
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CONFIDENTIAL
-4- Avoids risking Russian Security Council opposition
- If the operation succeeded, it would, provide a confidence
building experience to the OAU as an international institution
- Would demonstrate that the OAU and its member states are
serious about taking responsibility for solving Africa's
problems
- Supports USG policy goal to promote regional peacekeeping
institutions (although at perhaps too rapid a pace)
• Disadvantages:
- The Rwandan Government thinks the NMOG is pro-RPF and
therefore it opposes an OAU-only force
- The OAU SYG Salim Salim has stated that the OAU will not
undertake a peacekeeping mission
- African states will need massive external assistance
(materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they
could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- The OAU lacks experience in planning large peacekeeping
efforts
- The OAU Secretariat is not staffed to supervise/manage
major peacekeeping operations
- The OAU lacks the communications equipment required to
manage such an operation (Satcom communications, HF radios)
- The OAU is severely resource-constrained and lacks
funding mechanisms to support such a major endeavor; funding
would be ad hoc, on a bilateral and uncertain basis
- May well lead to a collapse of the peace in Rwanda
Option 3 - Hybrid UN-OAU Peacekeeping Operation (UN Observer
Force and OAU Peacekeeping Force)
Estimated costs to the international community of approximately
$3 million per month (70 UN observers at a per diem rate of
$120 per day equals $252,000; 2400 peacekeepers reimbursed at
approximately $2.4 million per month, plus $375,000 per month
for operating costs), plus estimated round-trip transport of $3
million. Estimated cost for a one year operation would be $39
million.
• Advant-ges:
- Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the
Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- A small number of UN observers could probably be deployed
more quickly than a full UN peacekeeping operation, and at
least a small OAU force would already be on the ground
CONFIDENTIAL
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UNCLASSIFIED
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CONFIDENTIAL
-5- Would provide UN planning expertise to the OAU
- Might minimize Russian opposition (especially if it is
conducted as a voluntary rather than an assessed operation)
- Provides the OAU a UN-supervised peatekeeping learning
experience and possible peacekeeping success
- Active UN involvement, and participation of non-African
observers, would probably make this acceptable to both Rwandan
parties
- UN involvement would provide a face saving way for the
French to withdraw their forces from Rwanda
- Would demonstrate the OAU's acceptance of responsibility
for addressing Africa's problems
- Supports USG policy goal of promoting regional
peacekeeping institutions
•
picadvantages:
- Might not be trusted by the Government of Rwanda
- The UN has indicated to the OAU that if the UN were
involved in a peacekeeping operation, the UN must be in command
of the entire operation
- OAU SYG Salim Salim has indicated that the OAU does not
support the concept of a "dual command," and would defer to
the UN for operational command.
- African states will need massive external assistance
(materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they
could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- The OAU is not currently staffed to manage a large
peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (no military or peacekeeping
directorate)
- The OAU Headquarters lacks the communications equipment
necessary to manage a major peacekeeping operation in Rwanda
Option 4 - Hybrid UN-OAU-Franco-Belgian Force
Combined forces would consist of a 750 man OAU force in the
buffer zone augmented by 250 UN troops, paid Eor through a
voluntary fund; retention of the 81 man UN force on the
Uganda-Rwanda border which is paid through UN assessments; and
an 800 man "International Force" consisting of one Belgian and
one French battalion whose costs would be borne directly by the
contributors. The costs to the international community would
be approximately $1.1 million per month in reimbursable
salaries (for UN and OAU forces), $225,000 in operating costs
per month, and $1.2 million in UN and OAU round-trip transport,
for an estimated total of $17.1 million for a one year
operation. (Note - this option has a total of 1881 personnel
rather than 2500, which also has a direct impact on costs.)
CONFIDENT7AL
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
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MFIDENTTAL
-6• Advantages:
- Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the
Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- Requires a greatly reduced manpower requirement on the
United Nations (331 peacekeepers versus up to 2500 peacekeepers)
- Would provide UN planning expertise to the OAU
- Bureaucratic funding mechanisms exist to support the UN,
which could serve as a conduit to provide funding for the
operation
- Might minimize Russian opposition
- Provides the OAU a UN-supervised peacekeeping learning
experience and a probable peacekeeping success
- Active UN involvement and participation of non-African
observers would probably make this acceptable to the Government
of Rwanda
- Supports USG policy goal of promoting regional
peacekeeping institutions
•
pisadvantaaes:
- Would probably be rejected by the Rwandan Patriotic
Front, which considers France an ally of the Government
- France and Belgium might object on fiscal grounds
- France has indicated that it cannot provide voluntary
contributions to UN peacekeeping operations
- France has indicated its desire to withdraw its troops
from Rwanda
- Belgium has expressed its reluctance to contribute troops
to a Rwandan peacekeeping operation due to its colonial
association with Rwanda
- African states will need massive external assistance
(materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they
could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- The OAU is not currently staffed to manage a large
peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (no military or peacekeeping
directorate)
- The OAU might object to the bilateral aspect of the
Franco-Belgian force participating in the operation
- The OAU has been reluctant to accept the peacekeeping role
- OAU SYG Salim Salim has indicated that the OAU does not
support the concept of a "dual command"
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
2 - 27
CONFIDENTIAL
-7Option 5 - Small UN NIF in Kigali/Expanded NMOG in DMZ
Two separate forces: A small UN force of about 300 men to
assure security in Kigali for the installation of the joint
transitional government and an expanded NMOG of about 240 men
with a broader mandate to act as an effective buffer force and
provide security in the DMZ. The total cost is estimated at
$620,000 per month, plus round-trip transport of approximately
$725,000, or roughly $8, million per year.
• Advantages
- Is roughly one-fifth the cost of the other force options
actively being considered
- Would allow the post-peace coalition transitional
government to begin functioning. If the coalition government
works out, the parties' confidence may be high enough to allow
force integration without additional deployment of peacekeepers.
- Does not require any command relationship between the UN
and OAU, thereby avoiding the bureaucratic resistance of both
organizations.
- An expanded NMOG could provide the security necessary
for holding of local joint elections in the DMZ and for a
gradual return of the displaced to their homes.
- Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the
Rwandan PKO, thereby significantly boosting confidence levels
- Could probably be deployed more quickly that a
full-scale UN PRO
- Requires far less manpower from the UN
- The small UN force on the ground could evaluate the need
for a larger force for the cantonment/disarmament/force
integration/demobilization stage of the PKO
- Would allow the OAU to consult with the UN force and
benefit from its PKO expertise
- Would probably minimize Russian opposition (particularly
if conducted as a voluntary operation)
- Active UN involvement and participation of non-African
forces would make this option more acceptable to the Rwandan
government.
- UN involvement would provide a face-saving way for the
French to withdraw their forces, as the RPF has demanded.
- Would demonstrate the OAU's acceptance of responsibility
for addressing Africa's problems.
- Advances the USG's goal of promoting regional PKOs
- Canada, among others, has informally indicated a
willingness to provide troops for a UN PKO in Rwanda
- Despite the OAU's limited PKO experience, they may have
the capability to fulfill the modest role required of the NMOG
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
2 - 28
CONFIDENTIAL
-8•
Disadvantages
- Deployment of additional peacekeeping forces sometime in
the future might well be required to complete the cantonment/
disarmament/force integration/demobilization stage.
- The OAU may not have the funding on hand to expand the
NMOG and, if additional funding is required, it would have to
be on an ad hoc, bilateral basis.
- Even for an operation this small, funding of the UN
portion could prove problematic.
- It may be impractical to include troops from more than
one country in a UN force this small, and it could prove
difficult to find one country willing to accept the
responsibility of contributing all 300 UN troops.
- The UN peacekeeping management directorate is already
stretched exceedingly thin due to the abundance of current UN
PROs
Option 6 - Conduct No International Peacekeeping Operation:
There would be no cost to the international community for
peacekeepers or observers, but humanitarian aid costs would
probably continue at or above current high levels (at least
$100 million this year, with the USG pledged to provide $34
million in humanitarian aid).
• Advantage:
- Reduces peacekeeping costs to international community
• Disadvantages:
- Will perpetuate massive relief costs, which in Rwanda are
approximately 3 times higher than the cost of a 2500-man PKO
- Will most likely lead to the collapse of the peace in
Rwanda, which risks regional destabilization
- International inaction would highlight the
marginalization of Africa
- Would set a bad precedent; other countries in conflict
might prove unwilling to accept a negotiated settlement if the
international community is unwilling to provide peacekeeping
support
- Ignores USG policy goals of conflict resolution and
democratization (in Rwanda, the latter is wholly dependent on a
successful end to the civil war)
- Nullifies the US investment in resolution of the Rwandan
civil war, including more than one year of diplomatic effort
CONFIDENTIAL
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UNCLASSIFIED
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AMEMBASSY DAKAR
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AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2//
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 01 OF 08 KIGALI 03060
LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
, TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
SUBJECT: THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PAACE ACCORD
Page: 1
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARRY R. MELONE
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JAN 2002 200004465
UNCLASSIFIED
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. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: RWANDA TOOK A GIANT STEP FORWARD IN ITS
TRANSITION FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY WITH THE
SIGNING AUGUST 4 OF A PEACE ACCORD BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA AND THE RPF REBELS. THIS
REVOLUTIONARY DOCUMENT ENDS NEARLY THREE YEARS OF WAR
AND TRANSFERS TO A MULTI-PARTY GOVERNMENT HEADED BY
AN OPPOSITION PRIME MINISTER POWERS MONOPOLIZED FOR
NEARLY TWENTY YEARS BY THE PRESIDENT AND HIS FORMER
SINGLE PARTY. THE PEACE ACCORD PROVIDES A BLUEPRINT
FOR A COMPLEX, TIGHTLY SCHEDULED 22-MONTH TRANSITION
PERIOD INTENDED TO END IN MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS. KEY
TO LAUNCHING THIS PROCESS IS THE ARRIVAL IN KIGALI OF
A CREDIBLE NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF) THAT
WILL PERMIT FRENCH FORCES TO LEAVE AS AGREED. THE
BROAD-BASED TRANSITION GOVERNMENT WILL INHERIT
SIGNIPICANT PROBLEMS AND WILL FACE NUMEROUS OBSTACLES
TO IMPLEMENTING THE ACCORD. HOWEVER, RWANDANS HAVE
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KIGALI 03060 01 OF 08 191247Z
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DEMONSTRATED THEIR DETERMINATION TO KEEP THEIR
TRANSITION ON COURSE. CONTINUED GOOD WILL ON ALL
SIDES SHOULD ENABLE RWANDANS TO SUCCEED IN THE
DIFFICULT TASK OF MAKING THE PEACE PLAN WORK.
NEVERTHELESS, THEY WILL NEED SUSTAINED BILATERAL AND
MULTI-LATERAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE ITS
SUPPORT FOR THE PROCESS DIPLOMATICALLY, MATERIALLY,
AND FINANCIALLY. END SUMMARY.
PEACE PROCESS
3. WITH THE SIGNING AUGUST 4 OF A PEACE ACCORD
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA (GOR) AND THE
RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) REBELS, RWANDANS ENDED
NEARLY THREE YEARS OF CIVIL WAR AND COMMITTED.
THEMSELVES TO A TWO-YEAR TRANSITION PROCESS INTENDED
TO END IN MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS. THE SIX PROTOCOLS
OF THE PEACE ACCORD, METICULOUSLY WORKED OUT DURING A
FULL YEAR OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO
SIDES, COMMITS RWANDA TO DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM,
RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, THE RULE OF LAW,
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE MAJORITY HUTU AND
MINORITY TUTSI ETHNIC GROUPS AND THE RIGHT OF
REFUGEES TO RETURN.
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4. THE TWO SIDES AGREED ON A POWER-SHARING FORMULA
FOR THE GOVERNMENT THAT WILL MANAGE THE TRANSITION
PERIOD AND TRANSFERRED TO IT THE POWERS FORMERLY HELD
SOLELY BY THE PRESIDENT. THIS GOVERNMENT, TO CONSIST
OF THE FIVE PARTIES NOW IN THE GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS
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THE RPF, IS TO OVERSEE THE DISENGAGEMENT AND
DISARMAMENT OF THE TWO ARMIES, EFFECT INTEGRATION AND
DEMOBILIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES, ESTABLISH
INTERNAL SECURITY, ASSURE THE REINTEGRATION OF WAR
DISPLACED, REVITALIZE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE CIVIL
SERVICE, STRENGTHEN THE JUDICIARY, ORGANIZE THE
RETURN AND REINSTALLATION OF LONG-TIME REFUGEES,
DRAFT A NEW CONSTITUTION, CONDUCT A CONSTITUTIONAL
REFERENDUM, HOLD LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS, AND,
FINALLY, HOLD LEGISLATIVE AND PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS.
5.
AN APPOINTED MULTI-PARTY PARLIAMENT, THE
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DAKAR
DAR ES SALAAM
HARARE
KAMPALA
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LAGOS
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LONDON
NAIROBI
PARIS
TUNIS
VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2//
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
SUBJECT: THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND
• TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, IS TO WORK SIDE BY
SIDE WITH THE BROAD-BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT TO
ACCOMPLISH THIS MAMMOTH PROGRAM. AMONG ITS CRITICAL
ROLES WILL BE INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
PEACE ACCORD, AND, IF APPROPRIATE, AMENDMENT OF THE
PEACE ACCORD IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE TRANSITION
GOVERNMENT AND INITIATION OF JUDICIAL ACTION AGAINST
THE PRESIDENT OR MOTIONS OF CENSURE AGAINST THE PRIME
MINISTER.
6. THE TIMETABLE IS TIGHT. A NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL
FORCE (NIF) IS TO BE IN PLACE IN KIGALI AND TWO
COMPANIES OF FRENCH TROOPS WITHDRAWN BEFORE MID
' SEPTEMBER WHEN TRANSITION INSTITUTIONS -- THE
BROAD7BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT (BBTG), THE
TRANSITIONAL ASSEMBLY (TNW), KAFDNTHE JOINT HIGH
CTMMANDS OF THE ARMY AND GENFARMERIE -- ARE TO BE PUT
INPLACE. WITHIN THE FOLLOWING MONHH, DISENGEGEMENTR
AND DISARMAMENT OF TZJ ARMED FORCES SHOULD BE
COMPLETE. WITHIN THE NEXT NINE MONTHS, INTE4-589,
TRAINING FOR THE ARMED FORCES, THEIR REDEPLOYMENT AND
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KIGALI 03060 02 OF 08 191248Z
DEMOBILIZATION OF THOSE NOT CHOSEN FOR THE ARMED
FORCES SHOULD BE COMPLETED. ORGANIZED RETURN OF
REFUGEES SHOULD HAVE BEGUN. AS IF THIS WERE NOT
ENOUGH, JUDICIAL AND CIVIL SERVICE REFORM, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REFERENDUM MUST ALSO TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE 22-MONTH
TRANSITION PERIOD ENDS IN LEGISLATIVE AND
PRESIDE TIAL ELECTIONS.
STARTING POINT
-Q7. THE BROAD-BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE
OVER AT A TIME WHEN THE RWANDAN ECONOMY IS ON ITS
KNEES AS A RESULT OF NEARLY THREE YEARS OF WAR. THE
COUNTRY IS NEARLY BANKRUPT. ITS BUDGET IS SERIOUSLY
IN DEFICIT -AS A RESULT OF ARMS PURCHASES WHICH HAS
CAUSED THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF TO SUSPEND THEIR
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM. IT HAS LITTLE HARD
CURRENCY TO PURCHASE IMPORTS. THE JOB MARKET IS
SERIOUSLY CONSTRICTED WITH LIMITED OPPORTUNITIES FOR
OFF-FARM EMPLOYMENT. THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IS SADLY
UNDERDEVELOPED AND LAND FOR NEW FARM ACTIVITY IS
VIRTUALLY NONEXISTENT. WAR-DISPLACED, WHO NUMBERED
NEARLY ONE MILLION FOLLOWING A FEBRUARY OFFENSIVE BY
THE RPF, WILL NEED FOOD ASSISTANCE AT LEAST THROUGH
' DECEMBER, SOME THROUGH JUNE, AND HELP IN
REESTABLISHING THEMSELVES ON THEIR FARMS. DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS AND GENDARMES AND RETURNING
REFUGEES WILL NEED PRODUCTIVE WORK. WEAPONS ARE
READILY AVAILABLE MAKING ARMED BANDITRY, POLITICAL
' CLASHES AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE A CONTINUAL THREAT.
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8. DESPITE THESE LIABILITIES, HOWEVER, RWANDA WILL
BRING SOME IMPORTANT ASSETS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE PEACE ACCORD. DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A CIVIL SOCIETY ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY.
POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE FLOURISHED FOR TWO YEARS AND
ARE REACHING AN IMPORTANT STAGE IN THEIR EVOLUTION
WHERE THE PARTY MEMBERS ARE BEGINNING TO HOLD THEIR
LEADERS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR ACTIONS AND DECISIONS.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY; ONCE A MONOLITH TO THE SINGLE
PARTY OF THE PRESIDENT, HAS ALREADY EXPERIENCED
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PLURALISM WITH THE DEFECTION OF NEARLY ONE-THIRD OF
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INFO LOG-00
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AMEMBASSYSBUUSSLS 40300
AMEMBASSYNBUJUMBURA 037?
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 00410
i AMEMBASSY DAKAR UQPQ
RUFHDRJXAMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 4014
AMEMBASSY HARAJE
RUT
KMXAMEBAYSY KAMPALA 4193
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEM-6 )8)9,&23
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
RUQR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2//
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KIGALI 03060 03 OF 08 191249Z
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 08 KIGALI 03060
LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
SUBJECT: THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND
ITS MEMBERS TO OTHER PARTIES. A NUMBER OF HUMAN
RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS EXIST END HAVE SOUNDED ALARM
BELLS AND CONDUCTED INVESTIGATIONS INTO ABUSES BY
BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RPF DARING THE TENSE
YEARS OF WAR. WOMEN'S ASSOCIATIONS, ASSOCIATIONS OF
ENTREPRENEURS AND COOPERATIVES FLOURISH THROUGHOUT
THE COUNTRY.
9. IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS, RWANDA HAS EVEN HELD
MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS OF SORTS. IN COMMUNES WHERE
LOCAL OFFICIALS WERE DEEMED TO HAVE HAD A ROLE IN
ETHNIC OR POLITICAL VIOLENCE, INDIRECT ELECTIONS THAT
INVOLVED POLITICAL PARTIES IN HEAVY LOBBYING AND
HORSETRADING RESULTED IN NEW LOCAL LEADERSHIP. AN
ARRANGEMENT WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE
RPF LED TO INDIRECT AND DIRECT ELECTIONS OF LOCAL
LEADERS IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE BETWEEN THE TWO
ARMED FORCES.
10. THE ONE EXCEPTION TO THIS ALREADY LAUNCHED
PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IS THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM.
SO FAR THIS INSTITUTION REMAINS IN THE HANDS OF
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KIGALI 03060 03 OF 08 191249Z
PAGE 03
INEXPERIENCED MAGISTRATES AND INCOMPETENT PRMSECUOORS
WHO, 1?3:-73 91 5#384 )-:( 91 :43$3,5:-), REMAP
FCBJECTNTO CORRUPTION AFD, IF W
LEIPART, LOYAG TO
ORHE 0
OERHRULI G PARTY THAT APPOINTED THEM. THE NEW
GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE A MAMMOTH TASK IN THIS AREA IN
ORDER TO INSTILL A RULE OF LAW.
PROBLEMS AHEAD
11. BASIC MISTRUST. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RWANDAN
PEACE ACCORD WILL INEVITABLY HAVE ITS UPS AND DOWNS.
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DELAYS WILL, NO DOUBT, SET BACK THE TIMEFRAMA
ENVISIONED IN THE PEANE ACCORD. U
EERLYING MOST OF
THESE ROUGH SPOTS WILLSBE THE FUNDAMENTAL MISTRUST
AMONG ALL PARTIES. ALT
UGH THE LEJJRS OF BOTH
SIDES HAVE SIGNED THE PEACESACCORD, NEITHER SIDE
TRUSTS THE INTENTIONS OF THE OTHER. HISTORIC
RIVALRIES BETWEEN THE MAJORITY HUTU, WHO PREDOMINATE
INSIDE THE COUNTRY, AND THE MINORITY TUTSI, WHO
PREDOMINATE WITHIN THE RPF, CONTINUE TO FUEL
ANTAGONISM. ON THE ONE HAND, DOUBTS PERSIST ABOUT
WHETHER THE RPF IS COMMITTED TO DEMOCRACY OR TO A
' TAKEOVER OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RESTORATION OF
TUTSI RULE. ON THE OTHER HAND, DOUBTS ALSO PERSIST
ABOUT THE COMMITMENT OF THE PRESIDENT AND HIS CLOSE
ENTOURAGE TO SHARING GOVERNANCE OF THE COUNTRY WITH
THE RPF. MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL ADJUSTMENTS WON'T BE
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PAGE 04
EASY. AS ONE RWANDAN NOTED RECENTLY, POINTING TO THE
' HEAD TF THE ELITE RWANDAN PARACOMMANDO UNIT: "THIS
MAN LOST HALF HIS UNIT DURING THE WAR, AND MOW WE AE
ASU
NG HIM TO INTEGRATE HIS FORCES WITH THOUA OFTOHAV
EQMDMYJNTJ
JXN
' RVIWPTUZLJ/6/-8781 #'0)73 0,3 #3
4
8,:80-):90;& 2,747
($8YJD„#1$4-73,3$:63040.3 .8,85"4-DEYPGNATEWJS POLITICAL
BASE. UNGESS HE PARTY CAN DEVISE A FORMULA FOR
OVERCOMING ITS DIFFERENCES AND REUNITE, THE BBTG
RISKS TAKING OFFICE WITH ITS CREDIBILITY AND
LEGITIMACY COMPROMISED. THE VOLATILE AND COMPLICATED
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FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4492
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASEY BAMAKO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY HARARE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHAA
AMEMBASSY LA9 039
AMEMBAS Y LILONGWE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
' AMEMBASSY TUNIS
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2//
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 04 OF 08 KIGALI 03060
LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
SUBJECT: THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND
i INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION WILL ONLY BECOME MORE
COMPLEX WITH THE ADDITION OF THE RPF AS A POLITICAL
' PARTY. WHEN THE POWER'SHARING PROTOCOL WAS CONCLUDED
LAST JANUARY, THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY RESISTED THE
POWER-SHARING FORMULA ON GROUNDS THAT IT LEFT THEM IN
' A PERMANENT MINORITY SITUATIONJM RECENTLY THE
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POLITICAL FORCES IN RWANDA SHATTERED THIS IMAGE OF
PERMANENT AND STATIC POLITICAL ALLIANCES AS
DEMONSTRATED IN THEIR MANEUVERING TO NAME THE PRIME
MINISTER FOR THE BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH
THE PEACE ACCORD ALLOWS FOR SUCH SHIFTING ALLIANCES
AMONG THE PARTIES, ITS SPECIFICITY ABOUT WHICH
PARTIES WILL BE IN THE GOVERNMENT AND HOW MANY TNA
DEPUTIES EACH WILL APPOINT ALLOWS LITTLE LEAWAY FOR
EVOLUTION, REALIGNMENTS OR BREAKAWAYS WITHIN
PARTIES. THUS THE PEACE ACCORD IS LIKELY 00 EXERCISE
SOME CONSTRAINT ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE PARTIES.
13. THE ROLE OF THE RPF. ONE OF THE BIGGEST UNKNOWNS
IN THE INTERNAL POLITICAL EQUATION IS THE IMPACT THE
RETURN OF THE RPF WILL HAVE ON THE POLITICAL SCENE.
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KIGALI 03060 04 OF 08 191300Z
MANY OF ITS LEADERS ARE FAR FROM BEING POLITICAL
UNKNOWNS. MANY HAVE A LONG HISTORY OF ASSOCIATION
WITH PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA, WITH HIS MILITARY AND
WITH SOME OF THE DARKER INCIDENTS IN RWANDAN
HISTORY. MANY PEOPLE QUESTION WHETHER LHE RPF IS
COMMITTED TO POWER-SHARING AND THE DEMOCRATIC RULES
OF THE GAME OR WHETHER THEY WILL RESORT TO VIOLENCE
IF THE PROCESS GOES AWRY. WHETHER THEIR SOMEWHAT
RIGID IDEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ISSUES AND TO CONTROL
OF PARTY MEMBERS WILL BE COMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES WILL BE KEY TO THE RPF'S
ACCEPTABILITY TO THE RWANDAN PUBLIC.
14. HUTU EXTREMISM. AT THE SAME TIME, HUTU
EXTREMISTS WHO OPPOSE RECONCILIATION WITH THE RPF AND
OBJECT TO ACCORDING GREATER PARTICIPATION IN RWANDAN
SOCIETY TO TUTSIS ARE ALSO AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY.
SINCA ITS FORMATION 18 MONTHS AGO, 5#3 :$4, AN
AVOWEDLY ANTIGAOUTSI POLITICAL PARTY, PTAYD AN
EXTRAMELY D
SRUPTIVE, INDEED VIOLENT/ ROLEM
DEMOBILUZED SOLDIERS AND GENDARMES COULD FUEL RENEWED
CDR ACTIVITY, LRGELY DORMANT SINCE THE FEBRUARY
OFFENSIVE. THE AVAILABILITY OF GUNS AND GRENADES
DOES NOTHING TO REDUCE ANXIETY ON THIS POINT.
15. POLITICAL VIOLENCE. TWO GOVERNMENT
• FFICIALS,
FORMER PRIME MINISTER DISMAS NSENGIYAREMYE AND
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C
DEFENSE MINISTER JAMES GASANA LEFT RWANDA SADDENLY
AND UNANNOUNCED WITHIN THE PAST MONTH. GASANA SAID
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KIGALI 03060 04 OF 08 191300Z
HE FEARED FOR HIS LIFE AND SPECULATION EXISTS THAT
NSBNGIYAREMYE MAY HAVE BEEN SIMILARLY MOTIVATED. IN
MAY, A WELL-KNOWN POLITICIAN FROM THE PRINCIPAL
OPPOSITION PARTY WAS ASSASSINATED AND THE CRIME
REMAINS UNSOLVED. THESE INCIDENTS, AND OTHERS
INVOLVING LESS PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS, STIR ANXIETIES
ABOUT THE POSSIZLILITY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AXD
RANDOM TERRORISM CONTINUING DESPITE THE END OF THE
WAR.
16. INTERPRETATION OF THE ACCORD. ALL OF THE
PROBLEMS MENTIONED THUS FAR WILL INEVITABLY MAKE
INTERPRETATION OF THE SOMETIMES CONTRADICTORY AND
OFTEN AMBIGUOUS ARTICLES OF THE PROTOCOLS DIFFICULT
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AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
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AMEMBASSY HARARE
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
' AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
KAMPALA
KINSHASA
LAGOS
LILONGWE
LONDON
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AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
' USCINCEUR
USMISSION
KIGALI 03060 05 OF 08 191305Z
NAIROBI
PARIS
TUNIS
VAIHINGEN GEREca2//
USUN NEW YORK
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 05 OF 08 KIGALI 03060
LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
LAGS: REL, PGOV, RW
SUBJECT: THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND
AT BEST. ALREADY DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
ARTICLE OUTLINING THE PROCESS FOR NOMINATING A PRIME
MINISTER PRECIPITATED CONSIBERABLE MISUNDERSTANDING,
INDEED, ONGOING ACRIMONY. INTERPRETATION OF THE
PEACE ACCORD IS VESTED IN THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY. IF NECESSARY, THE TNA IS TO REFER TO THE
POLITICAL-MILITARY COMMISSION SET UP UNDER THE
CEASE-FIRE ACCORD OF JULY 1992. THE COMPOSITION OF
THIS COMMISSION, CURRENTLY THE "GOVERNMENT" AND THE
"RPF", HAS YET TO BE MODIFIED AND ITS ROLE REDEFINED
IN A WAY THAT MAKES IT CONSISTENT WITH A POST-PEACE
ACCORD MISSION. THIS COMMISSION IS THE ONLY
TRANSITION ORGAN WHICH INCORPORAHES INTERNATIONAL
OBSERVERS WHO MELPED BROKER THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.
17. RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS. THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH
IMPLEMENTING RWANDA'S PEACE ACCORD WILL BE ENORMOUS.
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KIGALI 03060 05 OF 08 191305Z
PAGE 03
DEMOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES,
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REINSTALLATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURN AND
REINTEGRATION OF REFUGEES, WILL ALL HAVE LARGE PRICE
TAGS. BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RPF WILL
UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE OUTSTANDING DEBTS. RWANDA CANNOT
FINANCE THESE ACTIVITIES WITHOUT HELP FROM THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. ALTHOUGH SOME FAT CAT
REBELS, WHO ALLEGEDLY FINANCED THE RPF, MIGHT BE
CONVINCED TO INVEST THEIR FUNDS IN PEACE INSTEAD OF
WAR, THIS WILL BE INSUFFICIENT. MULTI-LATERAL AND
BILATERAL AID, OVER WHICH RWANDANS HAVE NO CONTROL,
WILL BE CRUCIAL TO THE PROCESS. FUNDS WILL BE NEEDED
FOR BUDGET SUPPORT AS WELL AS FOR THE PROJECTS
ASSOCIATED WITH IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE ACCORD.
RWANDA'S TRADITIONAL DONORS MUST REMAIN ENGAGED, BUT
NEW SOURCES OF FUNDING MUST BE FORTHCOMING AS WELL.
WORLD BANK AND IMF PARTICIPATION WILL BE CRITICAL.
AN IMPLEMENTATION PROCEEDS, THE RWANDANS WILL
IFEVITABLY HAVE TO LOWER THEIR SIGHTS AND ALTER THEIR
PROCEDURES
NNACCORDANCE W TH RESOURCE AVAILABILITY.
EACH NEW SET OF ALTERNATIVES, HOWEVER, &40( 4-88,&
THE SPECTRE OF MISTRUST AND QUESTIONS ABOUT MOTIVES
THAT PLAGUED THE NEGOTIATIONS AT ARUSHA AND RESULTED
IN A LONG DRAWN-OUT PROCESS. INORDINATE DELAYS COULD
TEMPT ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER TO RESORT TO RENEWED
CONFLICT.
18. NIF: THE TIMETABLE KEY. THE PRESENCE OF A
NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN KIGALI--AGAIN A FACTOR
TOTALLY OUTSIDE RWANDAN CONTROL--IS THE KEY TO
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KIGALI 03060 05 OF 08 191305Z
UNLOCKING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPLEX RWANDAN PEACE
PLAN. UNTIL A CREDIBLE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IS IN
PLACE, THE TWO COMPANIES OF FRENCH TROOPS IN KIGALI
WILL NOT DEPART. UNTIL THE NIF ARRIVES AND THE
FRENCH DEPART, THE RPF HAS SAID IT WILL NOT COME TO
KIGALI. UNTIL THE RPF IS WILLING TO COME TO KIGALI,
THE GOVERNMENT HAS SAID NO TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS
CAN BE PUT IN PLACE. AS THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD
DIPLOMATS RECENTLY: "IN THE ABSENCE OF A NIF, OUR
HANDS ARE TIED. WE CANNOT BEGIN TO IMPLEMENT THE
PEACE ACCORDS" MEANWHILE, TWO ARMED FORCES CONTINUE
TO FACE EACH OTHER ACROSS A NARROW DEMILITARIZED ZONE
IN NORTHERN RWANDA.
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; 19. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. RWANDA HAS SET ITSELF ON
A TWO-YEAR TRANSITION PROGRAM WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY
TURN OUT TO BE EVEN LONGER. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4494
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AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY HARARE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
' AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
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LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT
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TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
SUBJECT: TTE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND
PEACE PLAN DEPENDS ON CONTINUING FINANCIAL AND
MATERIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUMITY. RETAINING THE INTEREST AND COMMITMENT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SUCH A PROTRACTED
PROCESS IS UNLIKELY TO BE EASY. RWANDA IS ALREADY
COMPETING FOR ATTENTION WITH SOMALIA AND LIBERIA IN
AFRICA AND WITH YUGOSLAVIA AND COUNTRIES OF THE
FORMER SOVIET UNION IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. THE
FORMER COLONIAL MASTER, BELGIUM, HAS ALREADY REDUCED
ITS INVOLVEMENT AND COMMITMENT TO THIS COUNTRY
SIGNIFICANTLY. THE FRENCH APPARENTLY WANT TO REDUCE
• THEIR COMMITMENT AS WELL, ALTHOUGH THEY SEEM TO WANT
U.S. BUDGET
TO RETAIN THEIR POLITICAL INFLUENCE.
PROBLEMS DO NOT BODE WELL FOR OUR ABILITY TO MAKE
COMMITMENTS IN A COUNTRY WHERE OUR DIRECT INTERESTS
ARE MINIMAL.
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE
20. FRAGILE PEACE. THE PEACE IN RWANDA IS FRAGILE.
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PAGE 03
A CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES HELD FOR THE MOST
PART OF THE PAST YEAR, WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE
UNDERWAY IN ARUSHA. THE EXCEPTION WAS FROM
FEBRUARY 8 TO MARCH 9 THIS YEAR WHEN AN RPF OFFENSIVE
' BROUGHT RPF FORCES TO WITHIN 20 MILES OF THE CAPITAL
AND FORCED THE DISPLACEMENT OF NEARLY ONE MILLION
PEOPLE. WHETHER TRUE OR NOT, NO ONE DOUBTS THAT THE
RPF HAS THE MILITARY SKILL AND MIGHT RESORT TO
DAMAGING VIOLENCE AS LONG AS IT HAS ACCESS TO ITS
WEAPONRY. THIS COMMON BELIEF APPEARS TO BE ACTING AS
A DETERRENT TO ETHNIC AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE THAT
PLAGUED RWANDA DURING THE WAR. POLITICAL YOUTH
n GROUPS ARE FOR NOW QUIET. THE HUTU EXTREMIST
POLITICAL PARTY HAS KEPT A LOW PROFILE SINCE THE
RPF'S FEBRUARY OFFENSIVE. BUT GUNS AND GRENADES HAVE
PROLIFERATED THROUGHOUT THE SOCIETY AND ARE EASILY
' ACCESSIBLE TO THOSE WHO SEEK THEM. EVEN AFTER THE
FIGHTING FORCES DISARM, AS CALLED FOR IN THE
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DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS, A RESURGENCE OF VIOLENCE
CANNOT BE RULED OUT. THE IMMINENT PRESENCE IN KIGALI
OF 600 RPF TROOPS TO GUARD RPF PARTICIPANTS IN
TRANSITION INSTITUTIONS KEEPS THE FEAR OF RENEWED
VIOLENCE ALIVE.
21. THE RWANDAN OPTION. NEVERTHELESS, AGAINST ALL
THESE ODDS, RWANDANS HAVE MADE REMARKABLE PROGRESS IN
THE LAST 24 MONTHS, PASSING FROM A SINGLE PARTY
DICTATORSHIP AT WAR TO A MULTI-PARTY GOVERNMENT LED
BY AN OPPOSITION PRIME MINISTER THAT HAS CONCLUDED A
PEACE ACCORD. IN THE PROCESS,RWANDANS HAVE CRAFTED
A UNIQUE PATH TO DEMOCRACY. IN CONTRAST TO BURUNDI,
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KIGALI 03060 06 OF 08 191252Z
WHERE ELECTIONS ARE TO LEAD THE WAY TO SOCIAL CHANGE,
' RWANDANS WROPOUE TO TRANSFORM THEIR SOCIETY FIRST.
. THE RWANDAN WAY, WHERE ELECTIONS ARE TO FOLLOW THE
UNLEASHING OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES AND THE TRANSFER OF
POWER AWAY FROM THE ALL-POWERFULL PRESIDENCY,MAY
1 WELW PROVE MORS DISFICULT TO MANAGE. FIFTEEN MONTHS
OF POWER-SHARING'HAS BEEN ANYTHING BUT A SMOOTH
RIDE. NEVERTHELESS, THE RWANDAN WAY IS WORKING FOR
RWANDA. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND PARTY LEADERS HAVE
DEMONSTRATED THEIR STAYING POWER AND THEIR COMMITMENT
TO THE TRANSITION PROCESS. THEY HAVE GAINED A WEALTH
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FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4495
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Page: 16
UNCLASSIFIED
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I Document Number: 1993KIGALI03060
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
1 AMEMBASSY
I AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
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BAMAKO
BONN
BRAZZAVILLE
BRUSSELS
BUJUMBURA
CAIRO
DAKAR
DAR ES SALAAM
HARARE
KAMPALA
KINSHASA
LAGOS
LILONGWE
LONDON
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
USCINCEUR
USMISSION
KIGALI 03060 07 OF 08 191255Z
NAIROBI
PARIS
TUNIS
VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2//
USUN NEW YORK
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 07 OF 08 KIGALI 03060
LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
SUBJECT: THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND
OF EXPERIENCE IN POLITICAL MANEUVERING AND COALITION
BUILDING THAT WILL SERVE THEM WELL WHEN THE RPF JOINS
THEM IN GOVERNING.
22. GOOD WILL. THE DOGGED.PERSISTENCE RWANDANS HAVE
DEMONSTRATED DURING THEIR YEAR-LONG PEACE
NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR 15-MONTH EXPERIMENT WITH
MULTI-PARTY GOVERNMENT IS TESTIMONY TO THE GOOD WILL
ON ALL SIDES TO MAKE THE TRANSITION WORK, DESPITE THE
OBSTACLES THEY WILL INEVITABLY ENCOUNTER ALONG THE
WAY. WITH THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE ACCORD, RWANDANS,
INCLUDING THE RPF, COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO PEACE AND
TO A DEMOCRATIC OUTCOME FOR THE TRANSITION PROCESS.
RWANDANS ARE TIRED OF WAR, THEY ARE TIRED OF A
STAGNANT ECONOMY, AND THEY ARE READY FOR A CHANGE
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THAT WILL GIVE THEM A CHANCE AT PEACE AND
PROSPERITY. RWANDANS KNOW THAT THEY CANNOT AFFORD TO
CONFIDENTIAL
• CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03
KIGALI 03060 07 OF 08 191255Z
CONTINUE FIGHTING. NO ONE ACQUAINTED WITH RWANDA
WOULD PREDICT AN UNTROUBLED TRANSITION PERIOD.
LEADERSHIP WILL PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN KEEPING THE
: PROCESS ON TRACK THROUGH THE DIFFICULTIES THAT LIE
AHEAD. SUPPORT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY,
I BOTH BILATERALLY AND THROUGH MULTI-LATERAL
INSTITUTIONSISUCH AS THE U.N., ;5#3 294)$ ?-,( -,$ 5#3
IMF, WILL IMPROVE THE ODDS.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
23. SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE PLAN IN
RWANDA WILL EFFECTIVELY END THREE YEARS OF CIVIL WAR,
OFFER HOPE FOR STABILITY IN THE SUB-REGION, BRING
RWANDA'S DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS TO THE BRINK OF
LEGISLATIVE AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, LAY THE
GROUNDWORK FOR FULL MINORITY PARTICIPATION IN RWANDAN'
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE, GIVE THE ECONOMY THEO
CHANCE T
PICK UP, AND MOVE TOWARD RESOLUTION OF A
LONG-STANDING REFUGEE PROBLEM. RLANDANS HAVE MAVPED
OUT THE PATH THEY INTEND TO FOLLOW. BUT THEY CANNOT
COMPLETE THE TRIP WITHOUT THE HELP OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.
24. THE UNITED STATES HAS PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE
IN PROMOTING DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO WARRING
FACTIONS AND, IN ITS ROLE AS OBSERVER AT THE PEACE
TALKS, SUPPORTED THE TWO SIDES THROUGH THE YEAR-LONG
NEGOTIATING PROCESS. IN KEEPING WITH OUR POLICY OF
PROMOTING CONFLICT RESOLUTION, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND
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PAGE 04
KIGALI 03060 07 OF 08 191255Z
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE U.S. SHOULD:
-- CONTINUE TO PROMOTE AND ASSIST THE RWANDAN PEACE
PROCESS, USING DIPLOMATIC, FINANCIAL, AND MATERIAL
MEANS;
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-- ENCOURAGE CONTINUED COMMITMENT OF ALL SIDES TO
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE ACCORD DESPITE THE
DIFFICULTIES THAT WILL INEVITABLY SURFACE;
-- ENCOURAGE ALL SIDES TO RULE OUT RECOURSE TO
VIOLENCE AS A METHOD OF RESOLVING DIFFERENCES;
-- ENSURE TIMELY DEPLOYMENT OF A CREDIBLE NEUTRAL
INTERNATIONAL FORCE WHOSE SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND
COMMAND STRUCTURE ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THE JOB BOTH
SIDES EXPECT IT TO ACCOMPLISH;
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ACTION AF-01
KIGALI 03060 08 OF 08 191253Z
INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 C-01
OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00 EUR-01
HA-09
H-01
TEDE-00 INR-00
10-19
LAB-04 L-03
ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 01C-02 OMB-01 PA-01
PM-02
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/049W
E4904E 191253Z /38
P 191143Z AUG 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4496
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY HARARE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
CONFIDENTIAL
' Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
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UNCLASSIFIED
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CONFIDENTIAL
. PAGE 02
KIGALI 03060 08 OF 08 191253Z
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2//
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 08 OF 08 KIGALI 03060
LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
SUBJECT: THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND
-- ENCOURAGE THE OAU TO ENLARGE ITS MILITARY
OBSERVER GROUP IN RWANDA (NMOG), INCLUDING
PARTICIPATION OF ANGLOPHONE TROOPS, AND EXPAND ITS
MANDATE TO ACCOMMODATE POST-PEACE ACCORD MISSIONS;
-- ENCOURAGE THE U.N., ITS AGENCIES, AND ITS MEMBER
STATES TO BE RESPONSIVE TO RWANDA'S NEED FOR HELP IN
IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE ACCORD;
-- EXERT PRESSURE ON THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF TO
PARTICIPATE FINANCIALLY IN IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE
ACCORD PROGRAMS;
' -- PROVIDE FUNDING FOR DEMOBILIZATIO MF ARMED
FOJCES AMDREINTEGRATION OF RETURNING REFUGEES.
-- WORK CLOSELY WITH OBSERVERS OF THE PEACE
NEGOTIATION PROCESS, ESPECIALLY THE FRENCH, TO HELL
CREATE A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE AMONG THE POLITICAL
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KIGALI 03060 08 OF 08 191253Z
FORCES IN RWANDA THAT WILL PERMIT SUCCESSFUL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE ACCORDS.
25. KINSHASA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
LEADER
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P_1
MEMORANDUM OF THE JOINT MISSION
"GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA -RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT"
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF A NEUTRAL
INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO RWANDA
NEW YORK SEPTEMBER 16, 1993
0.
RELEASED
IN FULL
Nature and Mission of the Neutral International Force
(NIF)
On June 11, 1993 the Government of Rwanda and the
Rwandese Patriotic Front submitted a joint request to the
Secretary General of the United Nations, asking him to
establish and deploy quickly a Neutral International Force
(NIF) of which the United Nations would assume responsibility
and command.
This request and the Protocol of Agreement between
the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on
the Integration of Armed Forces of the two Parties outline the
various missions they would wish the NIF to carry out. These
missions relate particularly to catering for the overall
security of the country and supervising the process of the
formation of the National Army and National Gendarmerie
(Article 54).
Article 72 of the above-mentionned Protocol of
Agreement links the establishment of Transitional
Institutions, namely the Broad-Based Transitional Government
and the Transitional National Assembly as well as the process
of disengagement and reintegration of Armed Forces, with a
prior deployment of the NIF. The timetable of the
implementation of the Peace Agreement, which stipulates that
Transitional Institutions must be put in place within
thirty-seven (37) days after the signing of the Peace
Agreement (Article 7 of the Peace Agreement), has not been so
far respected because the NIF is not yet established and
deployed.
Considering that the two parties have entrusted the
NIF with a key role in the framework of the implementation of
the Peace Agreement, they decided to send a joint mission to
appeal to the United Nations Secretary General and the
Security Council so that a positive reply can be given as
quickly as possible, in the shape of a Resolution voted by the
Security Council for the establishment and deployment of a
Neutral International Force to Rwanda.
A. The deployment of such a Force is necessary and ur t
because of the following main reasons:
.—7-
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER
DATE/CASE ID: 09 APR 2004 200301834
UNCLASSIFIED
.
UNCLASSIFIED
2 - 59
Page 2
I- Political reasons:
1)
The people of Rwanda urge that the delay in the
timetable of the implementation of the Peace Agreement be
addressed promptly because, if it were to be further
extended, that delay, especially in the establishment of
Transitional Institutions, would make the whole Peace
process collapse.
2)
The political good will that motivates both parties may be
seriously undermined if Political Institutions are not put
in place quickly.
3)
The 50,000
respective
because of
conditions
fighters of the two parties still in their
positions may end up violating the ceasefire
nervousness due to their difficult living
if political decisions are not reached soon.
II- Humanitarian reasons
1)
The return of the displaced persons in to their property
can only take place after the disengagement of the forces
currently deployed in war zones. The disengagement and
mine clearing operations can only be supervised by the
NIF;
2)
The rainy season is again about to start while the
displaced persons are still homeless despite the fact that
the two parties have already reached a Peace Agreement;
3)
Those displaced persons should be resettled as quickly as
possible because, if they were to miss the planting season
of September-October 1993, there is likely to be famine.
4)
The repatriation of the Rwandese Refugees who are eager to
come back to their motherland can only occur after the
establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional Government
responsible for planning and carrying out that
repatriation. The establishment of that Government is
closely linked with the deployment of the NIF as seen
above.
5)
The beginning of the school year in September-October,
1993 must be effective otherwise school children living in
the areas affected by the war will miss school for the
fourth year in a row with a real risk for them to become
illiterate. There is another category of school-age
children who have not been able to start school for three
consecutive years.
III- Economic reasons
The disengagement of the Armed Forces of the two
parties shall allow the reopening and use of the Transit Roads
of the Northern Corridor (Mombasa-Kampala-Kigali-Bujumbura),
and thus contribute to boosting trade within the region
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
2Page
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3
13- Size of the NIF
The size (numbers) of the NIF should be determined
in relation with the following factors:
1)
The importance and complexity of the missions ascribed to
the NIF;
2)
The hilly landscape of Rwanda which makes mobility
extremely difficult;
3)
The big numbers of the armies of the two parties
(over 50,000 troops) whose disengagement, demobilization
and integration must be supervised;
4)
The presence of one RPF battalion in Kigali and thus the
danger of bringing the soldiers of the two armies together
in the Capital City while they are not yet integrated may
jeopardize the whole peace process as witnessed in other
conflict regions. As a result the presence of a Neutral
International Force with sufficient personnel in Kigali is
appropriate.
C- Duration of the NIF mission in Rwanda
The Transition period shall last twenty-two (22)
months.
However there may be possibilities of considering
the deployment modalities and disengagement modalities (end of
the mission) in two stages for either case.
1)
Deployment
In order to avoid further delay in the establishment
of Transitional Institutions, it is suggested to deploy as
soon as possible the first elements of the NIF and, if
possible, by end of September or early October, 1993.
The other contingents would be deployed a little bit
later in order to strengthen the first contingents and thus
help them carry out . all the missions ascribed to the NIF.
2)
Disengagement of the NIF
The end of the mission of the NIF may be viewed in
two stages:
Great reduction of personnel may occur at the end of the
integration process of the armed forces of the two parties
as well as at the end of the demobilization process.
The rest of the reduced personnel may be kept in place
until general elections to be organized at the end o the
Transitional Period.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
2 - 61
Page 4
D- CONCLUSION
The Joint Mission Government of Rwanda - Rwandese
Patriotic Front, considering the insistent request of the
people of Rwanda pleading for the establishment of those
Transitional Institutions responsible for the implementation
of the Peace Agreement, appeals for the understanding of both
the UN Secretary General and Security Council, and submits to
them the following request:
1)
The Security Council urgently adopt a resolution
favorable to a rapid deployment of the Neutral
International Force in Rwanda;
2)
To envisage a gradual deployment of the personnel of the
NIF whose first elements would be expected in Rwanda
before October 10, 1993.
3)
As provided for in Article 53 of the Protocol of Agreement
on the Integration of Armed Forces of the two parties, the
members of the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG)
should be incorporated within the first elements of the
NIF (the NMOG offers the advantage of.having one company
currently present in Rwanda).
Done in New York, September 16, 1993.
Dr. Anastase GASANA
Minister for Foreign
Affairs and Cooperation
Chairman of the Joint
Delegation Government of
Rwanda-Rwandese
Patriotic Front (RPF)
Patrick MAZIMHAKA
Commissioner for
External Relations in RPF
Vice-Chairman of the
Joint Delegation
Government of RwandaRwandes Patriotic Frontr
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
2 - 62
X2 5
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PAGE 01
ACTION 10-16
USUN N 04553 01 OF 02 180026Z
INFO LOG-00 AF-01
EAP-01 EUR-01
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PM-02
PA-01
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OASY-00 DOEE-00
ARA-01 CIAE-00 C-01
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EF64F9 180026Z /38
P 1800102 SEP 93
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9698
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY ASMARA
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY KIGALI
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BONN
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004553
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USUN N 04553 01 OF 02 180026Z
PAGE 02
STATE FOR IO/UNP, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J5
E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL MOPS, UN, RW, UG
SUBJECT: RWANDA: JOINT RPF-GOVERNMENT DELEGATION ASKS
USG SUPPORT FOR QUICK DEPLOYMENT OF AN NIF
REF A) STATE 281611 B) KIGALI 3326
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARRY R MELONE
DATE/CASE ID: 13 DEC 2006 200103014
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
1. SUMMARY. AMB. ALBRIGHT MET WITH THE JOINT RWANDA RPF DELEGATION ON SEPT 16 TO HEAR THEIR PLEA FOR THE
RAPID SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL AND DEPLOYMENT OF A
NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
ARUSHA ACCORDS. INITIALLY SAYING THE GOVERNMENT OF
RWANDA SAW THE NEED FOR A SIX BATTALION FORCE (4200), FM
GASANA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WITH TWO BATTALIONS, THE
TEMPORARY GOVERNMENT COULD TAKE OVER, AND WITH FOUR
BATTALIONS (2800), DISARMAMENT COULD BEGIN. END SUMMARY.
2. ON SEPT 16, AMB. ALBRIGHT RECEIVED A JOINT
GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA-RPF DELEGATION LED BY FOREIGN
MINISTER GASANA. GASANA WAS ACCOMPANIED BY RWANDA NEW
QORK PERMREP, RPF COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS
MAZIMHAKA, AND RWANDAN AMBASSADOR TO KAMPALA
KANYARUSHOKI. GASANA WAS THE ONLQ SPEAKER. AMB HICKS
AND NOTE TAKER ALSO SAT IN ON THE MEETING.
3. THE PURPOSE OF THE DELEGATION'S NEW YORK, AND NEXT
WEEK WASHINGTON, VISIT WAS TO DRUM UP SUPPORT FROM
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USUN N 04553 01 OF 02 180026Z
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SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF AN
INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF) TO RWANDA TO ALLOW FOR THE
INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THEN
DISARMAMENT OF TROOPS. DURING HIS HALF-HOUR MEETING
WITH AMB. ALBRIGHT, GASANA REITERATED THAT RWANDA
APPRECIATED THE US BILATERAL AND SECURITY COUNCIL ROLE
IN RESOLVING THE CONFLICT IN RWANADA, AND THAT "THE
SECURITY COUNCIL IS GOD" IN TERMS OF DECIDING RWANDA'S
FATE. NOTING THAT HIS JOINT DELEGATION WAS A RESULT OF
PRESSURE FROM THE PEOPLE TO PUT A PERMANENT END TO THE
CONFLICT, GASANA ELABORATED THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND
HUMANITARIAN REASONS TO ASSURE THE EXPEDITIOUS DISPATCH
OF THE NIF.
4. RWANDA'S PROBLEM WAS A POLITICAL ONE, STATED
GASANA. BY INSTALLING THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, THIS
POLITICAL PROBLEM COULD BEGIN TO BE ADDRESSED. GASANA
HINTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE UNREST AND/OR BREAKING OF THE
CEASE-FIRE. ON THE HUMANITARIAN AND ECONOMIC SIDE, THE
DISPLACED PERSONS WERE PRESSING TO RETURN HOME. IT
MIGHT BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTROL AND RESTRAIN THEM.
SEPTEMBER WAS THE RAINY/PLANTING SEASON. IF THE
REFUGEES DID NOT REACH HOME IN TIME TO PLANT, THERE WAS
RISK OF A WIDESPREAD FAMINE BEGINNING IN
UNCLASSIFIED
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Excerpt: pg. 1 & pg. 7
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Excerpt: pg. 1 & pg. 7
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CHANNEL =.n/a
RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)
DATE = 1994/02/02 00r00:00
DOC-NBR = 1994STATE026678
FROM = STATE
LOCATOR = TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
OFFICE = ORIGIN AF
REFERENCE = n/a
SUBJECT = OFFICIAL - INFORMAL
TAGS = AMGT, RW
TO = KIGALI
>>
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ORIGIN AF-01
STATE
026678 020002Z
INFO LOG-00
OASY-00 ADS-00
ONY-00
SSO-00
/001R
1517
DRAFTED BY: AF/C: KCAISTON
APPROVED BY: AF/C: AXRENDER
AF/C: RJFENDRICK
209163 020053Z /38
R 020001Z FEB 94
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KIGALI
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 026678
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM AF/C - K. AISTON
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: AMGT RW
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL - INFORMAL
1. (LOU) DEMOBILIZATION: AFTER WE RECEIVED YOUR AIDAC
CABLE ON UNDP/WORLD BANK TURF BATTLES OVER DEMOBILIZATION
(KIGALI 0159), I SPOKE TO LINDA LLOYD, AF/EPS MARLENE
Page: 30
Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DAMS
DATE/CASE ID: 21 SEP 2004 200402105
UNCLASSIFIED
uNc,104§§4AP
Date Printed:
15-Jun-2004
DOC_NBR: 1994STATE026678
2 - 80
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URBINA, AND IO TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM. THERE WAS GENERAL
AGREEMENT THAT UNDP AND THE BANK SHOULD COORDINATE THEIR
EFFORTS AND NOT WORK AT CROSS PURPOSES AND THAT POST HAS
A VALID CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBLE DELAY IN THE UNDP
ROUNDTABLE. AS YOU KNOW, LINDA ATTENDED THE UNDP MEETING
IN NEW YORK ON JAN. 24. SHE SAID SHE MADE IT CLEAR THAT,
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026678 020002Z
STATE
PAGE 02
GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL DEMOBILIZATION, WE
DID NOT WANT TO SEE A DELAY IN UNDP ROUNDTABLE. JEROME
CHEVALLIER FROM THE BANK WAS THERE, SO HE KNOWS OUR
POSITION NOW. AT THE SAME TIME, AF/EPS PASSED YOUR
CONCERNS TO DEAN KLINE AT THE USED OFFICE. HE SAID HE
WOULD CONSULT WITH TREASURY AND REPORT BACK TO MARLENE
BEFORE PASSING OUR CONCERNS TO BANK OFFICIALS. LINDA HAS
DRAFTED A FRONT CHANNEL ON THE NEW YORK MEETING, WHICH IS
IN THE CLEARANCE PROCESS, AND EPS PLANS A REPORT AFTER
THEY HEAR BACK FROM DEAN.
2. (LOU) DEMOBILIZATION (SUITE): WE HEAR THROUGH THE
GRAPEVINE THAT YOU ARE THINKING OF ATTENDING THE
DEMOBILIZATION ROUNDTABLE IN GENEVA. PLEASE LET US KNOW
IF THIS IS SO. (OR MAYBE YOU ALREADY MENTIONED THIS TO
ME AND I FORGOT?) AT THIS TIME, WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF
SENDING ANYONE FROM AF, SINCE AID IS ALREADY GOING AND
THEY'RE THE ONES WHO WILL BE PUTTING UP WHATEVER MONEY WE
HAVE TO CONTRIBUTE. (AS FOR A POSSIBLE ESF CONTRIBUTION,
WE ARE STILL HOLDING OUR MEMO TO THE SIXTH FLOOR PENDING
RECEIPT OF THE INFO ON WHAT OTHER DONORS MIGHT BE DOING.)
3. (C) HOUPHOUET MARGINALIA: WE UNDERSTAND THAT
HABYARIMANA WILL PROBABLY ATTEND THE HOUPHOUET FUNERAL IN
COTE D'IVOIRE. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT WE HAVE PROPOSED
THAT A/S MOOSE MEET WITH HIM ON THE MARGINS OF THE
FUNERAL. WE WOULD USE THE BRIEF MEETING TO REINFORCE OUR
MESSAGE THAT THE RWANDANS BETTER GET THEIR ACT TOGETHER
AND FORM THE NEW GOVERNMENT ASAP. WE'LL KEEP YOU ADVISED.
4.
(U) ENDLESS YEAR-END REPORTS: I JUST WANT TO TAKE
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026678 020002Z
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TIME OUT TO COMMEND YOU FOR YOUR TIMELY SUBMISSION OF A
WHOLE SLEW OF SOMETIMES ONEROUS YEAR-END REPORTS,
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-
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8
BEGINNING WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, THROUGH THE MPP,
THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS, AND THE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS PLAN. (I'VE PROBABLY FORGOTTEN ONE OR TWO.)
CHURNING THESE THINGS OUT IS HARD ENOUGH WHEN YOU'RE AN
SEP POST, BUT IT'S DOUBLY DIFFICULT WHEN YOU'RE SWAMPED
WITH POLITICAL WORK, AS YOU ALL HAVE BEEN RECENTLY, AND
WHEN ALL THE REPORTS SEEM TO BE DUE AROUND THE SAME
TIME. PLEASE PASS MY THANKS TO YOUR STAFF, WITH SPECIAL
KUDOS FOR JOYCE FOR HER HUMAN RIGHTS/DEMOCRACY WORK AND
LAURA FOR THE ECON TRENDS REPORT. JUST A REMINDER,
THOUGH, THAT WE NEED YOUR RESPONSE TO OUR FEEDBACK CABLE
ON THE MPP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AS WELL AS THIS YEAR'S
POST REPORTING PLAN ....
B1
CAME BY TO TALK RWANDA/BURUNDI WITH ME LAST WEEK. HE
SAID HE THINKS HABYARIMANA IS TO BLAME FOR THE CURRENT
IMPASSE AND IS BEHIND THE PARTY SPLITS. I TOLD HIM THAT
WE THINK ALL SIDES SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMPASSE.
THE GOOD THING ABOUT OUR POSITION IS THAT IT'S NOT ONLY
RIGHT, IT ALSO ALLOWS US TO MAINTAIN OUR UNIQUE POSITION
.AS AN UNBIASED HONEST BROKER WHOSE ADVICE AND ADMONITIONS
ARE RESPECTED BY ALL SIDES. AS YOU KNOW, THIS MADE US
VERY EFFECTIVE IN ARUSHA AND SHOULD ONCE AGAIN WORK TO
OUR ADVANTAGE AS WE PUSH THE VARIOUS PARTIES TO FORM THE
NEW GOVERNMENT.
6.
(LOU) WERTHEIM CALLS: JOE WERTHEIM CALLED RECENTLY
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
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STATE 026678 020002Z
TO REPORT THAT HIS WORKERS AT THE TEA FACTORY ARE VERY
NERVOUS AND READY TO HIT THE ROAD IN THE EVENT FIGHTING
RESUMES. THE TUNISIAN UN (FORMER NMOG) MONITORS
APPARENTLY TOLD JOE'S LOCAL MANAGERS THAT BOTH SIDES ARE
AT HIGH ALERT. JOE ALSO REPORTS THAT THE LOCALS SAY
THEY'RE HEARING MORE GRENADE EXPLOSIONS NOW THAN EVER
BEFORE (EXCEPT DURING ACTUAL FIGHTING, I PRESUME). ALL
IN ALL, JOE (UNDERSTANDABLY) SOUNDED PRETTY CONCERNED.
.
7. (U) ARD BRIEFING: JUST THOUGHT YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT
I BRIEFED THREE AID CONTRACTORS FROM THE ASSOCIATES IN
RURAL DEVELOPMENT (ARD) LAST WEEK, PRIOR TO THEIR
DEPARTURE FOR RWANDA TO BEGIN WORK ON THE USAID DIG
PROJECT. THE TEAM WAS HEADED BY HARLIN HOBGOOD, WHO IS
APPARENTLY AN OLD USAID HAND, AND INCLUDED PASCAL
Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Page: 32
UNCLASSIFIED
uNcla§IVILD
tiAte Printed:
15-Jun-2004 DOCNBR: 1994STATE026678
2 - 82
CHANNEL: n/a
HANDLING: ONLY
8
BLACQUE-BELAIR AND A THIRD PERSON WHOSE NAME I DIDN'T
GET. ANYWAY, THEY SEEMED WELL-BRIEFED ALREADY AND
GENERALLY VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE.
CHRISTOPHER
CONFIDENTIAL
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Page: 33
Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
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Telex Nr 64, from MINAFET to DELBELONU
(sent by chef de cabinet of foreign ministry, M. Willems, while Claes is still
in Kigali) February 25, 1994
Source: http://www.senate.be/www/webdriver?MIval=/publications/
viewPub.html&COLL=S&LEG=1&NR=611&VOLGNR=7&LANG=fr
« La forte dégradation de la situation sur le plan de la sécurité au Rwanda
appelle les réflexions suivantes :
1. Les assassinats politiques, les troubles qui s'ensuivent, la détérioration du
climat de sécurité, pourraient bien mener à un nouveau bain de sang.
2. Il faudrait accroître la pression diplomatique et politique en vue de parvenir
à faire respecter strictement les accords d'Arusha dans un climat serein.
3. Le représentant spécial du secrétaire général au Rwanda, M. Booh Booh,
semble avoir perdu de sa crédibilité sur place.
4. Dans le cadre de son mandat actuel, la MINUAR ne peut maintenir
fermement l'ordre public. Un sérieux problème de crédibilité se pose.
Des démarches ont déjà été effectuées à un haut niveau à New York, mais elles
sont restées sans résultat. La dernière déclaration du président du Conseil
de sécurité concernant le Rwanda (le 17 février 1994) « la MINUAR ne
sera assurée d'un appui suivi que si les parties appliquent intégralement et
rapidement l'accord de paix d'Arusha » laisse présager une possible inactivité
ou un arrêt de l'opération.
5. Quand, à la suite des assassinats et des troubles, la MINUAR a décidé au
début de cette semaine de placer l'opération sous alerte rouge, cela a eu pour
conséquence que tous les Casques bleus ont reçu l'ordre de se retirer dans
leurs campements et d'attendre passivement. Si la situation devait effectivement
dégénérer et que les ordres précités de la MINUAR restaient en vigueur, il
serait inacceptable pour l'opinion publique que des Casques bleus belges
puissent devenir au Rwanda les témoins passifs d'un génocide et que les
Nations Unies n'entreprennent rien.
6. Si les conditions se détériorent, les Nations Unies et la Belgique ne peuvent
pas, en réalité, se permettre de se retirer du Rwanda. La MINUAR devrait
pouvoir jouer un rôle plus énergique et adopter sur place un profil plus marqué
2 - 88
afin de renforcer la crédibilité de la communauté internationale.
7. La question qui se pose est de savoir si cela est possible sans un nouveau
mandat du Conseil de sécurité. Si l'on doit tenter de renforcer la MINUAR
par un nouveau mandat (une nouvelle résolution du Conseil de sécurité),
on peut s'attendre à des difficultés, vu la politique actuelle des États-Unis
en la matière. En ce moment, une extension de l'opération (Casques bleus,
financement) semble exclue à leurs yeux. Au demeurant, dans les deux
résolutions elles-mêmes (872, 893), on met nettement l'accent sur le caractère
limité ou récessif de l'opération (sans mettre en péril la capacité de la
MINUAR de remplir sa mission).
8. Il devient très important d'examiner comment on pourrait renforcer l'action
dans le cadre du mandat actuel (intégration de Casques bleus autrichiens ?
Une plus grande marge de décision pour Dallaire ? Déplacement provisoire
de Casques bleus venant d'autres opérations dans la région ? ...), et comment
augmenter efficacement la pression diplomatique et politique.
9. J'aimerais recevoir vos remarques à propos de tout ceci. J'insiste sur le fait
que cela doit servir de base à une décision concernant de nouvelles démarches
éventuelles, mais qu'aucune position n'a encore été arrêtée à ce sujet » (523b).
Reply from Ambasssador Noterdaeme, Telex 326. February 28, 1994
La réponse sur la question du renforcement de l'action des Nations unies est
négative. L'ambassadeur Noterdaeme déclare dans son télex nº 326 du 28
février 1994 qu'il a « sérieusement réfléchi à la manière dont on pourrait
infléchir l'action des Nations unies au Rwanda ». Il ajoute : « J'en ai parlé en
détail avec les principaux membres du Conseil de sécurité et avec le secrétariat
des Nations unies. Il y a en théorie 4 éléments sur lesquels on pourrait jouer :
1) L'élargissement du mandat ou le renforcement des effectifs de la
MINUAR : « très improbable »
Non seulement les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni s'y opposent, mais ils auraient
même tendance c'est ce que confirment leurs délégations à retirer tout
simplement la MINUAR « en cas de difficultés » (telle pourrait même être
l'attitude de l'ensemble du Conseil de sécurité). Il y a là-derrière « une logique
financière » (les États-Unis n'ont jamais voulu plus de 500 hommes pour la
MINUAR).
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Il y a également une logique politique : les opérations au Rwanda, au Libéria
et au Mozambique relèvent du Chapitre VI; en d'autres termes, le Conseil de
sécurité des Nations unies ne peut pas imposer de solution (en Yougoslavie et
en Somalie, cela s'est avéré impossible, même dans le cadre du Chapitre VII).
2) Les règles d'engagement
Le secrétariat des Nations unies « n'est pas enclin à adapter les règles
d'engagement » :
militairement, c'est trop dangereux; les Nations unies n'ont jamais autant de
moyens que les parties;
politiquement : si les Nations unies recourent à la force, elles prennent parti
(ne sont plus neutres) » (524b).
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Telex #64, from MINAFET to DELBELONU
(sent by Foreign Ministry Chief of Staff, M. Willems, while Claes is still in Kigali) February
25, 1994
Source:
http://www.senate.be/www/webdriver?MIval=/publications/
viewPub.html&COLL=S&LEG=1&NR=611&VOLGNR=7&LANG=fr
“The situation’s significant deterioration, in terms of security in Rwanda, calls for the following
reflections:
1. The political assassinations, the ensuing unrest, and the worsening of the climate of safety,
could well lead to a new bloodbath.
2. It will be necessary to increase diplomatic and political pressure in order to achieve strict
enforcement of the Arusha Accords in a calm environment.
3. The Special Representative of the General Secretary in Rwanda, Mr. Booh Booh, seems to
have lost his local credibility.
4. Under its current mandate, UNAMIR cannot firmly maintain public order. There is a serious
credibility problem.
Steps have already been taken at a high level in New York, but they have remained without
result. The Security Council president’s last declaration concerning Rwanda (February 7th,
1994), “UNAMIR will be assured of consistent support only if the parties implement the Arusha
Peace Agreement fully and rapidly,” suggests possible inactivity or stoppages of the operation.
5. Amidst assassinations and unrest, UNAMIR decided at the beginning of this week to put the
operation on red alert, and consequently all the Blue Berets received the order to withdraw
to their encampments and wait passively. If the situation had indeed degenerated and the
aforementioned orders had stayed in effect, it would have been unacceptable, in the public
opinion, for Belgian Blue Berets to be passive witnesses to genocide in Rwanda and for the
United Nations to do nothing.
6. If conditions deteriorate, the United Nations and Belgium cannot really afford to withdraw
from Rwanda. UNAMIR should be able to play a more active role and adopt a more marked
profile in order to reinforce the international community’s credibility.
7. The question is to know whether this is possible without a new mandate from the Security
Council. If attempting to strengthen UNAMIR requires a new mandate (a new Security Council
2 - 91
resolution), we can expect difficulties, given the current policy in the United States on the matter.
At this time, an extension of the operation (Blue Berets, financing) seems impossible in their
view. Moreover, in the two resolutions themselves (872, 893), emphasis is clearly placed on the
limited or recessive character of the operation (without putting UNAMIR’s capability of fulfilling
its mission at stake).
8. It has become very important to examine how we could strengthen the action within the
framework of the current mandate (integration of Austrian Blue Berets? A larger margin of
decision for Dallaire? Provisional deplacement of Blue Berets from other operations in the
region? …), and how to effectively augment diplomatic and political pressure.
9. I would appreciate your remarks about all this. I insist that this must serve as a base for
any decision concerning eventual future steps, but as of yet no stance has been reached on this
subject.” (532b).
Reply from Ambassador Noterdaema, Telex 326. February 28, 1994
The response is negative on the question of strengthening the United Nations action. Ambassador
Noterdaeme, in his telex #326 on February 28th, 1994, declares that he has “thought seriously
about the way we could influence the United Nations’ action in Rwanda.” He adds, “I talked
about it in detail with the principal members of the Security Council and with the Secretary of
the United Nations. In theory, there are four elements on which we could draw:
1) The expansion of UNAMIR’s mandate or the strengthening of its numbers: ‘very improbable’
Not only are the United States and the United Kingdom against it, they may even, according to
their delegations, withdraw UNAMIR altogether ‘in case of difficulties’ (this could even be the
attitude of the entire Security Council.) There is a ‘financial logic’ behind this (the United States
never wanted more than 500 men for UNAMIR).
There is also a political logic: the operations in Rwanda, Liberia, and Mozambique are covered
under Chapter VI; in other words, the United Nations Security Council cannot impose a solution
(in Yugoslavia and Somalia, this proved to be impossible even under Chapter VII).
2) The rules of engagement
The United Nations Secretary “is not inclined to adjust the rules of engagement.”
Militarily, it is too dangerous; the United Nations never has as much power as the parties;
Politically: if the United Nations uses force, it takes a side (is no longer neutral)” (524b).
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CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 01
ORIGIN 10-16
STATE 086165 012359Z
UNCLASSIFIED
2 - 96
RELEASED IN PART
Bl, 1.4(D)
OASY-00
AMAD-01 ARA-01 CIAE-00 C-01
INFO LOG-00 AF-01
H-01
DODE-00 DOEE-00 ANHR-01 EAP-01 EUR-01 HA-09
ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
TEDE-00 INR-00 L-01
PRS-01 P-01
PM-00
01C-02 01G-04 OMB-01 PA-01
USIE-00
SA-01
TRSE-00
T-00
SS-00
SP-00
SNP-00
/046R
PMB-00
DRAFTED BY: IO/UNP:SWZELLE:SWZ
APPROVED BY: EUR/WE:AHEAPHY
AF/C:AISTON/RENDER
EUR/WE:ACARSON
IO:GFWARD
IO/PHO:DJENSEN
IO/UNP:JCSNYDER
P:SBRIMMER
374035 020000Z /38
O 012359Z APR 94
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 086165 012359Z
PAGE 02
CONFIDENTIALSTATE 086165
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON RWANDA RESOLUTION
REF A) USUN 1187; B) STATE 83633
1.
CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2.
THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.
UNITEDSTATESDEPARTMENTOFSTATE
REVIEWAUTHORITY:ARCHIEMBOLSTER
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 12 APR 2016
DATE/CASEID:06MAY2011 201005065
E392
UNCLASSIFIED
3. EMBASSY IS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A DEMARCHE TO THE FRENCH
GOVERNMENT EARLY TUESDAY MORNING TO ENLIST FRENCH SUPPORT
FOR EXTENDING THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE
MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR) FOR A SHORTER LENGTH OF TIME
UNCLASSIFIED
2
- 97
B1
/ THE VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION WILL BE HELD ON
TUESDAY AFTERNOON IN NEW YORK. TALKING POINTS FOR THE
DEMARCHE FOLLOW BELOW.
TALKING POINTS:
Bt
- -DESPITE THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S RECOMMENDATION FOR A 6
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 086165 012359Z
PAGE 03
MONTH EXTENSION, WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT A 2 OR POSSIBLY 3
MONTH EXTENSION WOULD PROVIDE AN INCENTIVE TO THE PARTIES
TO RESOLVE THE FINAL ISSUE, INSTALL THE TRANSITION
INSTITUTIONS, AND GET ON WITH THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING
THE ARUSHA PEACE ACCORDS AND REBUILDING THEIR COUNTRY.
--WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS NOW
ADVOCATING A 6 MONTH EXTENSION OF ALL PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS WHICH COME UP FOR RENEWAL IN ORDER TO
FACILITATE LOGISTICAL ARRANGEMENTS; WHILE WE AGREE IN
PRINCIPLE, WE FEEL THAT IN THE CASE OF UNAMIR, A SHORTER
TIME FRAME WOULD PUT MORE PRESSURE ON THE PARTIES TO REACH
AGREEMENT.
--THE UNITED NATIONS HAS BEEN A FIRM SUPPORTER OF THE
PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA, AND WE NOTE THAT THE PARTIES ARE
CLOSE TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE COMPOSITION OF A
TRANSITION GOVERNMENT; NEVERTHELESS, THERE HAVE BEEN LONG
DELAYS AND WE MUST SEND A STRONG POLITICAL SIGNAL THAT
FURTHER DELAYS ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE. TALBOTT
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
2 - 98
UNITED
NATIONS
S
Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL
S/RES/909 (1994)
5 April 1994
RESOLUTION 909 (1994)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3358th meeting,
on 5 April 1994
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 establishing the
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), as well as its resolution
893 (1994) of 6 January 1994,
Recalling its resolutions 812 (1993) of 12 March 1993, 846 (1993) of
22 June 1993 and 891 (1993) of 20 December 1993,
Recalling also its statement dated 17 February 1994 (S/PRST/1994/8),
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 30 March 1994
(S/1994/360),
Welcoming the valuable contribution to peace being made in Rwanda by
UNAMIR,
Expressing its deep concern at the delay in the establishment of the
broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly,
Emphasizing that the Security Council, in resolution 893 (1994) of
6 January 1994, authorized the deployment of a second battalion to the
demilitarized zone as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of
30 December 1993 (S/26927), and that the international community has thus done
its part in ensuring that conditions exist for implementing the Agreement,
Considering that the fact that the transitional institutions have not been
established constitutes a major obstacle to the implementation of the Arusha
Peace Agreement,
Concerned at the deterioration in security in the country, particularly in
Kigali,
94-16662 (E)
/...
2 - 99
S/RES/909 (1994)
Page 2
Concerned also at the deterioration of the humanitarian and health
situation,
1.
Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General on Rwanda dated
30 March 1994;
2.
Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994, on the
understanding that the Security Council will, within the next six weeks, review
the situation in Rwanda, including the role played in that country by the United
Nations, if the Secretary-General informs it in a report that the transitional
institutions provided for under the Arusha Peace Agreement have not been
established and that insufficient progress has been made for the implementation
of phase II of the Secretary-General’s plan contained in his report of
24 September 1993 (S/26488);
3.
Regrets the delay in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement,
and urges the parties to resolve their latest differences without delay with a
view to the immediate establishment of those transitional institutions still
required for the continuation of the process, and particularly the
implementation of phase II;
4.
Welcomes the fact that, despite the difficulties encountered in
implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement, the cease-fire has been respected, and
commends in this respect the essential contribution made by UNAMIR;
5.
Recalls nevertheless that continued support for UNAMIR, including the
provision of an additional 45 civilian police monitors as described in
paragraph 38 of the Secretary-General’s report, will depend upon full and prompt
implementation by the parties of the Arusha Peace Agreement;
6.
Welcomes the continued efforts by the Secretary-General and his
Special Representative to help promote and facilitate dialogue between all
parties concerned;
7.
Commends the efforts of Member States, United Nations agencies and
non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other
assistance, encourages them to continue and increase such assistance, and again
urges others to provide such assistance;
8.
Commends in particular the efforts of the Organization of
African Unity and its agencies, as well as those of the Tanzanian facilitator,
in providing diplomatic, political, humanitarian and other support for the
implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Council;
9.
Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to continue to monitor
the size and cost of UNAMIR to seek economies;
10.
Decides to remain actively seized of the question.
-----
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PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC
PARIS April 7, 1994
Advisor to the Presidency
NOTE
to the attention of
the President of the Republic
(c/o the Secretary General)
SUBJECT: Attack against the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi
1) Yesterday evening, the airplane of the Rwandan president, Juvénal Habyarimana, with
the President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, also on board, crashed in Kigali near the airport.
The plane was returning from Dar es Salaam, where a meeting had taken place of regional heads
of state, dedicated specifically to Rwanda and Burundi, and, in its final approach, came under
fire. According to the Belgians, it was either rocket or missile fire.
The two presidents are dead, as well as all other passengers (a dozen) including the
Rwandan Chief of Staff and two Burundian ministers. The three crew members—all
French—were also killed.
The attack is attributed to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
2) In Kigali, the presidential guard threw itself into the hunt for the opposition. We have
received information, not yet confirmed, of arrests of ministers and figures, Hutu or Tutsi, who
are political adversaries of President Habyarimana. A clash between the Rwandan army and the
RPF in the capital seems inevitable. For the time being, the interior of the country is calm.
Transitional institutions have not yet been able to be put in place, and the president's
death leaves the country without any recognized authority (the government and parliament had
not been installed). We fear a military coup d'etat.
In Bujumbura the president of the Assembly has taken charge of the country, in
accordance with the constitution. The situation in Burundi is calm and authorities are developing,
in their public declarations, the view that what happened to the Burundian president was an
accident. It seems that it was not planned for him to be on board President Habyarimana's plane
on the return from Dar-es-Salaam.
2 - 118
3) An interministerial meeting took place this morning in the Quai d’Orsay. The
following points were addressed:
- The French position: Matignon and the Quai d'Orsay would like France, in this new
Rwandan crisis that risks being extremely deadly, to not be on the front line, and to limit our
actions to UN interventions, so that the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR) can perform its security mission in Kigali (which, until now, it has not really done).
- Security of the French community: For the time being, our nationals are not threatened
and no evacuation is envisaged. If that were to be the case, we would act in collaboration with
Belgium and UNAMIR (1500 men on the ground, including 450 Belgians).
The Defense Ministry has, however, already sent out two companies and one health
unit (Bangui, Libreville and Ndjaména).
- Family of President Habyarimana. They are, for the time being, under the protection of
the presidential guard. If they wish, they will be welcomed at our ambassador's residence, subject
to your instructions.
Bruno DELAYE
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APRIL 7, 1994
(Message delivered around 1315)
…There was a third message from Kagame, a straightforward ultimatum. The killings
throughout the city had to cease immediately or he would order his troops to intervene.
The message had six brief lines:
A.
RPF is prepared to secure Kigali;
B.
Force Commander should not rely on his Belgian Staff;
C.
UNAMIR should pull its forces out of the DMZ to reinforce Kigali;
D.
RPF prepared to assist UNAMIR;
E.
If CND is attacked RPF will move on Kigali; and
F.
If situation is not secured by last light 7 April, definite RPF attack.
Source: Dallaire, Roméo Lt. Gen. Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. New
York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003, p 247.
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Communiqu6
issuedby theCommand
of theForcesArm~esRwandaises
Following
thetragic
events
of 6 April
1994,
which
haveplunged
thecountry
into
moumîng,
caused
numerous
innocent
vîctims
and.ledtogreatdistress
fortheRwandan
people
as a whole,
andfollowing
thehideous
murder
of tenUNAMIR
soMiers
andother
.,
foreign
nationals,
theComm~.d
of theForces
ArméesRwandaises
consider6~that
it is
..
morethanhighrimetoputanendtothistragedy.
"Fothiseffect,
itwould
behighly
desirable
fortheCommand
of theForces
Afin~es
Rwandaises
to meetimmediatêly
withtheRPFCommand
so as to examine
togethër
how
topacify
thecountry
withnofurther
delay,
eontribute
totherapid
establishment
ofthe
Broad
Based
Tran_,dtional
Institutions,
andavoid
anyfurther
pointless
bloodshed.
TheCommand
of the ForcesArméesRwandaises
recognises
UNAMIR’s
unflagging
efforts,
sometimes
foiled,
forthetotal
implementation
of theArusha
Accords
and
requests
itserveasa go-between
fortheabove-mentioned
meetings.
Inorder
tofacilitate
dialogue
andstopthewaveofpanic
thathasswept
through
the
population,
irisdesirable
thatthefighting
besuspended.
Toachieve
thi’Sgoal,
theForces
Afin~es
Rwandaises
wishto propose
a trucetoRPFforces
thatwouldbegin
on 13 April
1994at12o’cloek.
ws.4~-259
(E),doc
K002-5191
1
2 - 146
I(02361
31
On behalf
of theCommand
of theForces
Afin~es
Rwandaise«,
thefi¢ldoffioers
who
attended
themeeting:
- Colonel
IAonidas
Rusafira
[Signed]
î«
<
- Colonel
BEMMarcel
Gatsinzi
[Signed]
- Colonel
BEMSF~licien
Mubemka
[Signed]
f.
f..
- ColonelBEMSG Aloys Ntiwi~[Signed]
-._
- Colonel
AndréKanyamanza
[Signed]
«.,,
>..-- ..~.
.~,_.-,:
-.
-Colonel
Joseph
Murasampongo
[Signed]
__
./
.
,,:. _
¯.
- Colonel
Edouard
Hakizimana
[Signed]
.~.
,-
...%
- Lieutenant
Colonel
BEMEphrem
Rwabalinda
[Signed]
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- Lieutenant
Colonel
BEMSAugustin
Rwamanywa
[Signed]
ï
-.7--
-~Lieutenant
Colonel
Emmanuel
Kanvandekwe
[Signéd]
..~
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/1
Kigali
12April1994
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2 - 147
2 - 148
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 01
ACTION AF-01
BUJUMB 01299 01 OF 05 160220Z
INFO LOG-00 COR-01
H-01
HA-09
ADS-00 NSAE-00
PRS-01 P-01
USIE-00 RPE-01
AMAD-01
TEDE-00
NSCE-00
SNP-00
PMB-00
OASY-00
CIAE-00 C-01
LAB-01
10-16
INR-00
PA-01
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TRSE-00
SS-00
SP-00
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3CA1E4 160223Z /38
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 01 OF 05 BUJUMBURA 01299
C O R R E C T E D COPY (SUBJECT LINE)
E.O. 12356: OADR:DECL.
TAGS: PINS, PINR, PGOV, MOPS,RW
SUBJECT: NED FROM KIGALI AND AN ANALYSIS OF WHAT HAPPENED
FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH AND WHY
REF: NAIROBI 6551
CONFIDENTIAL
BUJUMB 01299 01 OF 05 160220Z
1. THIS IS A JOINT STATE/DIA CABLE THAT ATTEMPTS TO
PROVIDE A CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNTING OF EVENTS FROM THE
TIME OF PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA'S DEATH AT ABOUT 21:30
P.M. ON 6 APRIL UNTIL THE DEPARTURE OF THE LAST U.S.
CONVOY OUT OF KIGALI AT 13:00 P.M. ON 10 APRIL. THE
RECOUNTING OF EVENTS COMES FROM A LOG MAINTAINED BY
ECONOFF WITH INPUT FROM OTHER EMBOFFS AND DISCUSSIONS
WITH VARIOUS THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS. THIS REPORT
DOES NOT PRETEND TO BE 100 PERCENT ACCURATE BUT ONLY
PROVIDES THE EMBASSY TEAMS' UNDERSTANDING OF EVENTS
THAT TRANSPIRED IN A CONFUSING AND DANGEROUS
ENVIRONMENT.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASEID:07JUN2006 200103014
Ll
RELEASED IN FULL
P 150830Z APR 94
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3355
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USDA() YAOUNDE CM PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ-4// PRIORITY
JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
PAGE 02
2 - 149
UNCLASSIFIED
EUR-01
L-01
PM-00
T-00
UNCLASSIFIED
2. WE WILL ALSO ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN WHY CERTAIN EVENTS
TOOK PLACE AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE MILITARY AND
PROVIDE AN ASSESSMENT AS TO WHERE THE COUNTRY IS
HEADED NOW.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS:
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6
9:00 P.M.
FIRST EXPLOSION HEARD, UNAMIR
REPORTS IT IS HEADING TOWARD THE
AIRPORT TO INVESTIGATE.
9:30 P.M.
RADIO RTLM REPORTS THAT THE
PRESIDENT'S PLANE IS SHOT DOWN.
9:35 P.M.
GENDARME DETACHMENT AT KANOMBE
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03
BUJUMB 01299 01 OF 05 160220Z
AIRPORT REPORT THAT THEY WERE IN
COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRESIDENT'S
PLANE JUST BEFORE IT CRASHED.
COMMUNICATION WAS CUT WHEN THE
ELECTRICITY WENT OUT FOR SEVERAL
MINUTES AT THE AIRPORT.
10:45 P.M.
RPF SAYS ITS FORCES IN THE CND
COMPOUND ARE ON ALERT.
11:30 P.M.
COL MARCHAL (UNAMIR KIGALI SECTOR
COMMANDER) TELLS ECONOFF THAT
PRESIDENT IS CONFIRMED DEAD.
12:00 P.M.
CONTACTED RSO IN BUJUMBURA TO
ADVISE THAT SECURITY SITUATION IN
KIGALI WAS DETERIORATING RAPIDLY.
THURSDAY, APRIL 7
5:00 A.M.
HEAVY MORTAR FIRE HEARD, FOLLOWED
BY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE
PRESIDENTIAL GUARD UNITS BEGIN
ENTERING HOMES, LOOKING FOR
OPPOSITION MINISTERS. TACTICS USED:
PRESIDENTIAL GUARD THROWS GRENADES
INTO HOMES, FORCING OCCUPANTS OUT;
SOLDIERS THEN SHOOT FLEEING
UNCLASSIFIED
2 - 150
UNCLASSIFIED
2 - 151
OCCUPANTS.
FIRST REPORTS THAT GOR FORCES HAVE
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04
BUJUMB 01299 01 OF 05 160220Z
CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT.
6:00 A.M.
PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL AMERICAN
WARDEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED
9:45 A.M.
FIRE FIGHT BEGINS ON KIMIHURURA
BETWEEN PRESIDENTIAL GUARD AND
UNIDENTIFIED GOR FORCES. (RPF STILL
HAS NOT FIRED ON ANY GOR FORCES).
10:00 A.M.
DCM LEADER'S HOUSE OCCUPIED BY
SEVERAL PRESIDENTIAL GUARD SOLDIERS
WHO ARE LOOKING FOR THE ACTING
PRIME MINISTER.
CONFIDENTIAL
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3C93CF 152244Z /38
P 150830Z APR 94
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3356
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USDAO YAOUNDE CM PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ 4// PRIORITY
JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
-
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 05 BUJUMBURA 01299
CORRECTED COPY (ADDING SUBJECT LINE - PLEASE
CORRECT ALL SECTIONS)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356: OADR:DECL.
TAGS: PINS, PINR, PGOV, MOPS,RW
SUBJECT: NEO FROM KIGALI AND AN ANALYSIS OF WHAT HAPPENED
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02
BUJUMB 01299 02 OF 05 152233Z
FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH AND WHY
11:00 A.M.
SOLDIERS LEAVE DCM'S HOUSE,
THREATENING HER AGAINST USE OF HER
TELEPHONE.
11:05 A.M.
WILLARD MUNGER OF MUDENDE
UNIVERSITY REPORTS THAT CIVILIANS
HAVE ENTERED UNIVERSITY COMPOUND
AND BEGUN KILLING TUTSI STUDENTS,
INCLUDING THE SON OF THE MINISTER
OF AGRICULTURE. ECONOFF CONTACTS
GISENYI GENDARMES ASKING FOR
ASSISTANCE.
11:10 A.M.
GAKONI ORPHANAGE REPORTS ETHNICALLY
MOTIVATE KILLINGS ON ITS COMPOUND;
28 INITIALLY REPORTED DEAD. ECONOFF
CONTACTS UNAMIR DMZ COMMANDER, COL
YAATSE, ASKING IF A UN PATROL CAN
BE SENT IMMEDIATELY TO ASSIST
AMCITS AT THE ORPHANAGE.
12:00 P.M.
EMBOFFS BEGIN RECEIVING REPORTS
THAT MINISTER OF INFORMATION, LABOR
AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, AND AGRICULTURE
ARE DEAD.
12:20 P.M.
EMBOFFS BEGINNING HEARING REPORTS
FROM VARIOUS CONTACTS THAT MINISTER
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03
BUJUMB 01299 02 OF 05 152233Z
OF LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND
ACTING PRIME MINISTER ARE BOTH
DEAD; UNAMIR GUARDS PROTECTING THEM
HAVE ALSO BEEN KILLED; 7 OF THE 10
BELGIAN SOLDIERS PROTECTING ACTING
PRIME MINISTER REPORTEDLY CUT UP
INTO PIECES RATHER THAN BEING SHOT.
UNCLASSIFIED
2 - 152
2 - 153
2 - 154
2 - 155
2 - 156
2 - 157
2 - 158
2 - 159
2 - 160
2 - 161
2 - 162
2 - 163
2 - 164
2 - 165
2 - 166
2 - 167
RW/VARIOUS/940422A
MINISTRY
OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
____
FRENCH AMBASSADOR
IN RWANDA
REPUBLICOFRANCE
Paris, April 25, 1994
6.E.I. Note from the Minstry of Foreign Affairs,
April 25, 1994, Attack of April 6, 1994
A/S: RWANDA.
Declassified
The attack, which cost the life of President HABYARIMANA, and which was the
immediate cause of the calamities Rwanda is going through now, is probably the responsibility
of the RPF. The future of the country and of the sub-region depends on the balance that will be
established, the basis of which should be negotiated in a political agreement.
*
* *
The destruction of President HABYARIMANA's airplane, on April 6, was, in all
probability, the result of an attack. Three direct testimonies (the Chief of Staff, the daughter of
the Head of State, the commander of the Presidential Guard of Kanombe) report gunfire. These
testimories are corroborated by others, which do not always come from circles favorable to
President HABYARIMANA.
No material evidence presently exists to determine the origin of the attack. The RPF
denies responsibility and attributes it to elements hostile to the Arusha Accords, notably the
Presidential Guard.
Certainly, no hypothesis can be definitively rejected. The thesis of responsibility of those
close to President HABYARIMANA is, however, very fragile. It rests on the fact that the shots
came from Kanombe, where a camp of the Presidential Guard is located. But there is no proof
that they came from inside the camp. The disarray of the Rwandan authorities the day after the
attack and their first decisions (designation of an interim Head of State and an interim
government, call to dialogue with the RPF) do not correspond with the idea of a coup mounted
by them. Finally, the death, in the same attack, of the President of the Republic, the Chief of
2 - 168
Security, and the Chief of the Defense Staff, has gravely weakened the Rwandan army, which
could have found a way to sabotage the accords with little cost to itself.
.../...
The responsibility of the RPF, though not proved, is much more likely. Solid indications
are few: persistent rumors that the Front has SAM missiles in Kigali, the departure for Mulindi
of most of the leaders of the RPF in the days before the attack.
Above all, it seems that the RPF has become aware, in the past few months, of the fact
that the transition, planned at Arusha, would not result in it taking power. The accords seemed a
priori very favorable to the Front. It seems that its strategy rested on the following elements:
-
to ally itself with interior opposition parties to obtain a systematic majority of 2/3 in the
Assembly and in the government,
-
to totally replace local administration before the completion of the transition,
-
to discredit President HABYARIMANA and his entourage through trials involving human
rights and corruption affairs, with the probable result of his removal (following the
mechanism planned at Arusha),
And yet, it became clearer and clearer, over the course of weeks, that this strategy's
success was not assured:
-
the interior opposition parties, allied with the RPF during the negotiations of Arusha to take
the Head of State's power away, had the tendency, after having achieved this result, to once
again distance themselves from the RPF, so that it would not be the only beneficiary thereof.
This evolution took place either by the progressive refocusing of the whole party (as in the
case of the PSD, under the influence of Mr. GATABAZI until his assassination) or by the
break-up of parties into factions (as in the case of the PL, divided into two factions neatly
marked by favor for the RPF or the president; in the case of the MDR, where the future
Prime Minister, indulgent with respect to the RPF, was not supported by the majority of his
party, which harkened back to the anti-Tutsi revolution of 1959 and to the Parmehutu),
-
the assassination of President NDADAYE of Burundi, in October 1993, recomposed the
political landscape along ethnic lines, which have clashed sharply. Since then, the language
of the RPF—rejecting ethnic differences and presenting itself as a political movement—was
lagging with respect to Rwandan public opinion. A deep divide no longer separated the
''change'' camps (RPF & opposition) from conservatives (the presidential party), but the
''republicans'' (inheritors of the 1959 revolution which brought the Hutus to power) from the
RPF partisans,
2 - 169
-
Finally, the international operation, which, since the start of the war in October 1990, had
generally shown itself open to RPF ideas, evolved in a direction not always favorable to the
Front, as testified to in the joint declaration of the observer countries and the Special
Representative of the General Secretary of the United Nations which said that the RPF was in
the wrong on the specific question of the entry of the CDR into the institutions of
government.
The RPF thus found itself in an uncomfortable situation: the parliamentary arithmetic no
longer gave it control of the government, obstacles to the implementation of the aforementioned
strategies multiplied, and serious logistical problems (notably supply) started to appear in the
zone it did control.
It seems that a repeat of the January-February 1993 situation was therefore attempted:
push the FAR into the wrong to have a pretext to take back up arms. Several incidents in the
demilitarized zone and assassinations did not, however, suffice to arouse a reaction from the
Rwandan authorities, who, indeed, feared a trap of this kind.
The death of the President and of the leaders of the army and of the security forces, in
triggering the cycle of murderous reprisals exercised by part of the Presidential Guard against the
opposition and the Tutsis, has given a pretext for the military intervention of the RPF.
*
* *
The future of Rwanda is at stake today on the field. The RPF has won military successes,
but FAR resistance has prevented them, for the time being, from taking a decisive advantage.
The nomination of Colonel BIZIMUNGU, commandant of the operational sector of Ruhengeri,
testifies to the determination of the Rwandan army.
The RPF may have a problem with reinforcements resulting from the demobilization of
Ugandan troops. This, along with the supply of both parties with ammunition, will be crucial.
The balance of power which will be established should then be translated into political
terms. In this regard, each party has its problems. For the Rwandan authorities, the problem is to
find a leader who can succeed President HABYARIMANA and unify the Hutus. It does not
seem, at the current time, that there is such a man in the ranks of the MRND (the presidential
party), whose principal leaders are held in esteem for their long loyalty to the former president
rather than for their capability as leaders. Perhaps the MDR, inheritor of 1959, of Parmehutu, and
of the First Republic, whose strongholds are in the south of the country, harbors such a man, but
he would then have to be accepted by the army (a majority of whose members come from the
north).
2 - 170
On the side of the RPF, the essential problem is that of the political transformation of an
eventual military victory. The RPF, alone, reduced to its Tutsi component (despite the presence
of a few Hutu leaders), can hardly hope to hold the country. It must therefore, as it had initially
planned as part of the implementation of the Arusha Accords, find allies. In this, it must confront
a triple difficulty: its own intellectual rigidity, which leads it to preclude any agreement with the
MRND despite the RPF's own recent admission that the presidential party represents a veritable
political force in the country; the death of the majority of the opposition leaders who could have
played a powerful role as backup, having real ability to get things done in the country; and the
probable reticence of Rwandan figures to the idea of allying themselves with a party that is
perceived as the expression of only Tutsis.
In this context, our country's efforts should address the following points:
-
the maintenance of a certain international presence in Rwanda. UNAMIR remains useful,
because it can permit the belligerents to meet on neutral ground when they are ready to
reopen discussions, and because it will be the international guarantor of an eventual
agreement. The disappearance of UNAMIR would no doubt prevent us from obtaining, once
the moment arrives, a new resolution from the Security Council to resuscitate it.
Also, UNOMUR (an observation mission on the Ugandan-Rwandan border) should
be maintained and even reinforced in order to be able to effectively exercise its mandate. Not
only is it only attached to UNAMIR in an administrative fashion (at the express request of
Uganda), but its personnel, deployed only on the Ugandan side, are not in any risk of danger.
The risk of being surprised by the international community in flagrante delicto of
helping the RPF is likely to play a moderating role on President MUSEVENI.
The key to the Rwandan problem is, in fact, partly in the hands of the Ugandans.
Support for the RPF in men (demobilized), in material, and in munitions, comes from
Kampala, and the Front depends on this support. We have the means to put pressure on
Ugandan decisions, by underlining the risk for Uganda of the perpetuation of instability in
Rwanda (very probable in the case of a military victory for the RPF), by placing this question
back into our global political dialogue with Uganda, and by also using financial arguments,
both bilateral (donations from the Treasury) and multilateral (World Bank).
-
the international community should continue to mobilize in favor of a solution to the
Rwandan problems. In particular, the appeals for a cease-fire could be more insistent. It is the
PRF that refuses a cease-fire, like UNITA did in Angola. Its argument, that it will not cease
fighting until the atrocities and massacres stop, reverses the chain of causality. If it is true
that at the announcement of the President's death, the atrocities commenced at once and gave
grounds for the armed intervention of the RPF, today the situation is quite reversed: the
Hutus, as they feel that the RPF is trying to take power, will react with ethnic massacres.
Only a stoppage of fighting would permit a progressive recovery of the situation./.
&2 to{
2 - 171
K O ? 65 a A 5
Ttis ls lbe llnt 6me tbrt I am meetlngwlth ICTR lnverdgrtorr, I rm eble to Eoto Arushr $rd t6dty
only lf theICTR sssur€!meof my personrlrecurlg, cnd tbat of my threc cblldren,
I marrlod my lrte busbrld TLTRATSINZEJeanPl€meAboubskar ln 199()b Sbyoronglrnd we were
leter blerc€dwith tbrcc chlldren. Wben I Errrlsd my hucbro4 be wrl worlbg ru r drlver rt Klblye
Prefecture.He wrr rcturlly drlvbg the Prefectof Klbuyc wbo wrs crled HAKIZtrMANA DoDrt,who
hld jDst beer trrnJf€rrcd from tbe oIIIceofthe Pr€sidctrtlr Klgdi, The Prefcct of Klbuye vrs lrter, I
tblnl ir 191 tranrferred to Xitdi to go and work ln tte Offie of tbe Preridcnt er rn lntelllgcuce
olficer. This wgsthr time tlrt rny busbandwecrlso trrncferrcd to Xlg.ll Wbikt io Kigrll, my
burbrnd *rr worlCngrr r dr{ver ln the Olllce of t[e he8ldeBl, hteligence udt I rm lot 3ure
whe&er my huebendconduueddrlvbg EAKIZIMANA Doort or !o! rltbough tley werc ln tte remc
unit
Wbilgt ln Kigdl, ny lrte busbsDdgot involvedln politics,partlcutarly tbe MRFID prrty, dthough I rn
Dotcrrctly rure ln whlch yerr tllr wer, As dryr went bn my lrte hu8brDdloltl Ee thrt thtre rvcrt
dMrlonr,wltbln the MRND rDd tbrl tbe perty wrr goingto brc|k up lnto two thrt ir orc Erorp from
lb. North @AXIGA) ud Oe otbergroupfmm hlDUG,{.My lrte hnsbruddld not cone ftom uy of
the two wrrrlDg pertieg ard rcoordingto wbat hc told Dc, the Prrty wrs plennlngto commitsone
massrcrtr of pcople,He further told me thrt if be remnlnedwithie the MRND, it woultl mecr tbat he
woold deri by kllllng mg rbd hfumother.BecruscI rm Tutri, rnd hlr motber wrs Tutsl, I u[deBtood
tbb to D€sn ltrrt tbe mlrs8cre3were goiDgto b€rgrlnet tb€Tutd popdrdoL Ar r reeult of ttlr, my
hurbrDdwroter letterof reclgpadonfrom the prrfy. I tblnL that ttls wrs ehberrt the eudof 1993or
tbc begtnrlngof 1994,
In errly 1994,my burbeod tent to Trnzrlh to go eld prcprre wbre we woold go aud stly rnd
strrtcd roEc burhe|J, We wcre bowwer gstdngh toucb' h Febrnery 1994,b. t.nt r E.t!rt! tbfl I
rboold gorvlth the cb0drtn rnd toh hlm, So,I left rrd went to join him h Turenlr. Ee lct!8Dy net
ur rt the Rusumobordcr erosrlngon lbe Trnzrnhn sidc.My lrte bucbrnd hrd frmlly mcmbercIn
TrnzNrh lDd someof tbeo wereRPF mcmbers.There*! tbe o[es wbo condncedEy lrte busbrndto
joln the RlF. My lele busbrndtotd mc rbout hir lntentlonrto loltr rheRPf rDd left abouttso woekc
beforepresidentEABYARIMANA Juvenrl died, Hr rctudly went witb onr SUZUKI motor vehldc.
Onemontblrter, someof uy lete hulbrod's relrttveswho brd Jolnedthe RPF crmebac but they
di rncd themrelverfron me.WhenI trled to tDqub. sboutdy busband,ttey uted to tell metrt he
rvrr wcll rnd tbat he wrs ln vcry Soodbooh wlth renlor membelt of RPF 8r MUIJNDI Byunbs"
I camcbrclr to Rwrnilr ln Seplember1994.Il r monthI cunot errctly recr[ but towrrdr tbe cnd of
tte yerr, my lrtc motter ln lew, NGUTEGTIREErdlrr told Ee thrt the hed b€cotold.'by Midcter
Abdoul XARIM tbet my hurbrud bad bccu ldled ln brtde- If d vbethcr he lr rurely derd, I dld rot
bury him md I do oot krow bowbe diedand wbere.
The plsturer tbrl I brvc glvel to ICTR invesdgrton rre rbowlng my burband. On ooeplcture' vbere I
eko eppeer,tt wrr ttc occrBlonof glvtng namesto our trh chlldren h Jenurry l99tl' wilht the otbcr
onethrt loolr llke r pr$port pboto,vberc he ls rlolq I got lt fmm hb bcnkbook Tbe thlrd
pbotogr.ph, whlcb lr ! portr.lt ln blacl aad white,ir dto thrt of my bulbrld. I tbiok h wrs trkeu ln
TrnzgDlr,
trtlnally,I would eppreclrte eny hformsdon regerdng thc de+h of ry husbandud poaCblywberehe
could hrve b.el burlcd,
DATE:e-O
Session 3
“Inside the United Nations Security Council:
April – July 1994”
Documents List
Page
No.
Date
Author
3-1
4/11/1994 Bushnell
3-6
4/12/1994 US Geneva
3-10
4/12/1994 Albright
3-12
4/12/1994 IO
3-15
4/12/1994 USUN
3-16
4/14/1994 Dallaire
3-20
4/15/1994 Secstate
3-24
3-31
4/17/1994 Dallaire
4/19/1994 Dallaire
3-35
3-38
4/21/1994 Mujawamariya
Médecins sans
4/24/1994 Frontières
Médecins sans
4/25/1994 Frontières
3-39
4/26/1994 Shattuck
3-42
4/28/1994
3-43
3-46
4/29/1994 Bushnell
5/4/1994 Dallaire
3-59
5/13/1994 Tarnoff
3-64
5/16/1994 Harvin/DoD
3-70
5/16/1994 Grossman
3-37
Title
Source
NSC requested IO to draft resolution to Bushnell Personal
pull UNAMIR
Archive
Freedom of
ICRC Update on Activities in Rwanda
Information Act
Future UNAMIR and French Roles in
Freedom of
Rwanda
Information Act
Freedom of
Approach to UN secretariat on UNAMIR Information Act
Freedom of
Security Council Informals on Rwanda Information Act
Summary of Contingency Options in the
Even to Unilateral Withdraw of the
Belgian Contingent from UNAMIR
ICTR evidence
USUN talking points for UNAMIR
Freedom of
withdrawal
Information Act
The Military Assessment of the
Situation as of 17 April 1994
ICTR evidence
Military Assessment of the Situation
ICTR evidence
Letter to President Clinton from
Freedom of
Monique Mujawamariya
Information Act
Médecins sans
MSF Report on Butare
Frontières
MSF report to Reuters - Article
Meeting with Rwandan Human Rights
Activist Monique Mujawamariya
Presidential Statement on Rwanda
Proposed by Czech Delegation to the
UNSC
DAS Bushnell tells Col. Bagasora to
Stop the Killings
UNAMIR - Future Force Structure
Reuters news
Freedom of
Information Act
Genocide Studies
and Prevention
(Journal)
Freedom of
Information Act
ICTR evidence
Freedom of
Rwanda Security Council Discussions Information Act
Freedom of
Deputies Committe Meeting on Rwanda Information Act
Discussion paper for deptuties
committee meeting on peacekeeping
Freedom of
options in Rwanda
Information Act
Notes
3-1
3-2
3-3
3-4
3-5
3-6
UNCLASSIFIED
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INFO AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
INFO LOG-00
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 03437
ROME FOR FODAG
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PINS, AMR, CASC, PREL, RAID, PREF, RW
SUBJ: TFRWOL: ICRC UPDATE ON ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
GENEVA 03437 01 OF 02 121443Z
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(AS OF APRIL 11)
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
1.
(ICRC) ISSUED THE FOLLOWING UPDATE ON APRIL 11 REGARDING
ITS ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA.
2.
BEGIN TEXT --
-
HEAVY FIGHTING IN KIGALI - ICRC WORKING AMID THE
CHAOS
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 10 MAY 2005 200103014
UNCLASSIFIED
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COMPLETE MAYHEM HAS HIT THE STREETS OF KIGALI,
LEAVING A HEAVY DEATH TOLL AND LARGE NUMBERS OF
WOUNDED. ARMED ELEMENTS ARE ON THE RAMPAGE, GOING FROM
HOUSE TO HOUSE KILLING AND DESTROYING. THE VIOLENCE WAS
SPARKED OFF BY THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT OF RWANDA, THE
PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI AND A NUMBER OF DIGNITARIES OF BOTH
GOVERNMENTS, WHO WERE ALL KILLED AS THEIR PLANE CAME IN
TO LAND AT KIGALI LAST THURSDAY EVENING. SINCE THEN THE
BLOODSHED IN THE CITY HAS STEADILY GROWN IN INTENSITY.
TODAY THE FIGHTING IS STILL FIERCE, AND THE CITY IS
GRIPPED BY GENERALIZED LOOTING AND LAWLESSNESS. ICRC
DELEGATES IN KIGALI HAVE DESCRIBED SCENES OF EXTREME
VIOLENCE, STATING THAT THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF CASUALTIES
LYING IN THE STREETS.
IN THE MEANTIME FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, UNITED
NATIONS AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE
EVACUATING THEIR EXPATRIATES FROM KIGALI.
-
AIMED THE CHAOS, THE ICRC'S 26 DELEGATES IN RWANDA
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
GENEVA 03437 01 OF 02 121443Z
PAGE 03
HAVE BEEN WORKING WITH THE RWANDESE RED CROSS
FIRST-AIDERS, EVACUATING THE WOUNDED TO THE MAIN
HOSPITAL IN KIGALI. THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN PROVIDING THE
HOSPITAL WITH URGENTLY NEEDED MEDICAL SUPPLIES. IN
ADDITION, THE INSTITUTION IS SUPPLYING THE FUEL REQUIRED
FOR THE VEHICLES OF THE NATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICES, WHICH ARE BEING USED TO CLEAR AWAY THE
DEAD BODIES FROM THE STREETS.
-
ICRC STEPS UP INTERVENTION TODAY
THE ICRC HAS BEEN IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH THE
COUNTRY'S AUTHORITIES SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF
HOSTILITIES. THIS MORNING THE ICRC'S HEAD OF DELEGATION
IN RWANDA MET THE REPUBLIC'S NEWLY APPOINTED PRESIDENT,
IN ORDER TO REQUEST A MAJOR EFFORT FROM THE GOVERNMENT
TO ENSURE THAT CIVILIANS ARE RESPECTED, THAT SECURITY IS
RE-ESTABLISHED AND THAT THE RED CROSS EMBLEM IS
RESPECTED.
IN ADDITION TO EVACUATING THE WOUNDED TO HOSPITAL,
THE ICRC PLANS TO EVACUATE ABOUT 100 PATIENTS LATER
TODAY FROM THE MAIN HOSPITAL IN KIGALI TO KABGAYI, 40 KM
SOUTH OF THE CAPITAL.
UNCLASSIFIED
3-8
UNCLASSIFIED
THIS AFTERNOON A PLANE CHARTERED BY THE BELGIAN
RED CROSS WILL BE LEAVING FOR BUJUMBURA. ON BOARD ARE
15 TONS OF MEDICAL MATERIAL DONATED BY THE BELGIAN RED
CROSS AND 2 TONS PROVIDED BY THE ICRC, AND AN ADDITIONAL
ICRC SURGICAL TEAM, COMPOSED OF ONE SURGEON, ONE THEATRE
NURSE, TWO SURGICAL WARD NURSES AND AN ANAESTHETIST
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 04
GENEVA 03437 01 OF 02 121443Z
NURSE. THE TEAM INCLUDES STAFF SECONDED BY THE NATIONAL
RED CROSS SOCIETIES OF THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM. ONCE IN BUJUMBURA THE ICRC WILL TRANSPORT THE
SURGICAL TEAM AND THE MEDICAL SUPPLIES OVERLAND TO
KIGALI TOMORROW. ALSO TOMORROW A FURTHER THREE SURGICAL
WARD NURSES SECONDED BY THE DANISH, FINNISH AND
NORWEGIAN NATIONAL SOCIETIES WILL LEAVE GENEVA FOR
RWANDA.
VIOLENCE REPORTEDLY SPREADING TO SOUTHERN RWANDA
FOLLOWING RUMORS FROM A NUMBER OF SOURCES THAT
MASSACRES AND DESTRUCTION ARE GOING ON IN THE SOUTH OF
UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
UNCLASSIFIED
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3ADC22 121445Z /38
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7474
INFO AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 03437
ROME FOR FODAG
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PINS, AEMR, CASC, PREL, RAID, PREF, RW
SUBJ: TFRWOL: ICRC UPDATE ON ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA
UNCLASSIFIED
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GENEVA 03437 02 OF 02 121443Z
PAGE 02
THE COUNTRY, THE ICRC PLANS TO SEND A TEAM OF DELEGATES
FROM ITS BASE IN BURUNDI AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, IN
ORDER TO INVESTIGATE THE SITUATION.
AT THE MOMENT THE ICRC HAS NO PLANS TO SET UP A
FIELD HOSPITAL. END TEXT.
3.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SPIEGEL
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TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHDC 0000
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
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AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02
STATE 099440 150430Z
CONFIDENTIALSTATE 099440
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, UN,
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL
A) USUN 1553, B) USUN 1533, C) TELCON IO/UNP-USUN 4/14
1.
CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2.
THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE - SEE BELOW.
3. DEPARTMENT HAS GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE
DRAFT RESOLUTION (REF A) AND TO THE VIEWS OF OTHER
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DARTS
DATE/CASE ID: 15 DEC 2005 200103014
D2 6
UNCLASSIFIED
3 - 21
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC) MEMBERS REGARDING THE STATUS AND
FUTURE OF THE CURRENT UN PEACEKEEFING FORCE IN RWANDA.
THE POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN REASONS PUT FORTH FOR
RETENTION OF UNAMIR ELEMENTS IN RWANDA HAVE BEEN TAKEN
INTO ACCOUNT FULLY IN OUR DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN RWANDA SINCE
PASSAGE OF UNSC RESOLUTION 909 ON AFRIL 5.
4. DEPARTMENT HAS CONSIDERED THE PROSPECT OF ADDITIONAL
WIDESCALE CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN RWANDA, AND THE THREAT
THAT THE RELATIVE IMMUNITY AFFORDED TO REMAINING FOREIGN
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL WILL END ON APRIL 15.
TAKING THESE FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT DEPARTMENT BELIEVES
THAT THERE IS INSUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION TO RETAIN A UN
PEACEKEEPING PRESENCE IN RWANDA AND THAT THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 099440 150430Z
PAGE 03
COMMUNITY MUST GIVE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO FULL, ORDERLY
WITHDRAWAL OF ALL UNAMIR PERSONNEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
5. COGNIZANT THAT FULL WITHDRAWAL MAY NOT BE ABLE TO BE
IMPLEMENTED PRIOR TO THE END OF THE CURRENT DEADLINE SET
Y THE RPF, WE BELIEVE THAT UN NEGOTIATORS SHOULD FOCUS
THEIR EFFORTS ON ENSURING THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR
PERSONNEL IS NOT IMPEDED AND THAT THE WARRING RWANDAN
PARTIES REFRAIN FROM ATTACKING OR THREATENING THESE
PERSONNEL. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT UNAMIR SHOULD TAKE STEPS
TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF RWANDAN CIVILIANS UNDER ITS
PROTECTION, CONSISTENT WITH ITS MANDATE AND PROVIDED THAT
THE SAFETY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL IS NOT JEOPARDIZED.
ACTION REQUESTED
6. DRAWING ON THE FOREGOING, USUN IS INSTRUCTED TO INFORM
NSC COLLEAGUES THAT THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE
FIRST PRIORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS TO INSTRUCT THE
SECRETARY GENERAL TO IMPLEMENT AN ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL OF
ALL/ALL UNAMIR FORCES FROM RWANDA, TAKING THE NECESSARY
STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE WARRING PARTIES IN RWANDA RESFECT
THE SAFETY OF UNAMIR AND OTHER FOREIGN CIVILIAN AND
MILITARY PERSONNEL UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEIR EVACUATION HAS
EEN COMPLETED. MISSION IS ALSO INSTRUCTED TO MAKE CLEAR
TO OTHER UNSC MEMBERS THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT
BELIEVE THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IS NECESSARY TO
IMPLEMENT THIS WITHDRAWAL (THE SYG HAS AUTHORITY TO ORDER
THIS WITHDRAWAL UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES)' AND THAT WE
UNCLASSIFIED
3 - 22
UNCLASSIFIED
WILL OPPOSE ANY EFFORT AT THIS TIME TO PRESERVE A UNAMIR
CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 099440 150430Z.
PAGE 04
PRESENCE IN RWANDA.
7. MISSION MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN PRESENTING
THE U.S. POSITION:
- - THE UNITED STATES SHARES THE SHOCK AND OUTRAGE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE EVENTS IN RWANDA IN
RECENT DAYS.
-- WE CONDEMN UNEQUIVOCALLY THE RENEWED FIGHTING AND
WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE, AND THE ATTACKS ON INTERNATIONAL
FEACEKEEPERS, FOREIGN CIVILIANS, AND INNOCENT RWANDAN
CITIZENS.
-- THE RWANDAN ARMED PARTIES MUST BEAR FULL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TRAGIC SITUATION, AND CONTINUED
VIOLENCE AND INSTABILITY, IN THEIR COUNTRY.
- - IN THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT IN RWANDA, THERE IS NO ROLE
FOR A UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE.
-- THOSE NATIONS THAT CONTRIBUTED TROOPS TO UNAMIR HAVE
ACTED RESPONSIBLY AND TO THEIR UTMOST ABILITY, AND HAVE
EXERTED COMMENDABLE EFFORTS TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN
PROTECTION TO FOREIGN, AS WELL AS RWANDAN, CIVILIANS.
-- THOSE FORCES THAT PARTICIPATED IN UNAMIR ARE TO BE
COMMENDED FOR THEIR EFFORTS IN A HOSTILE AND THREATENING
ENVIRONMENT.
-- WE ENDORSE THE DECISION OF UNAMIR CONTRIBUTORS TO
CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 099440 150430Z
PAGE 05
WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM RWANDA FOR THEIR SAFTEY, HOEING
THAT SUCH WITHDRAWAL WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN AN ORDERLY
MANNER AND THAT MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN TO OBTAIN
COMMITMENTS FROM THE RWANDAN PARTIES TO RESPECT THE SAFETY
OF RWANDAN AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS AFTER THE UN PERSONNEL
HAVE WITHDRAWN.
- - WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE WARRING PARTIES IN RWANDA
ARE LIKELY TO RESPECT UNAMIR'S MANDATE NOR, IN THE PRESENT
ENVIRONMENT, ARE THEY CAFABLE OF ADEQUATELY ENSURING THE
UNCLASSIFIED
3 - 23
UNCLASSIFIED
SAFETY OF UN PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL IN RWANDA.
-- THERE MAY BE A ROLE FOR THE UN TO PLAY IN FACILITATING
EGOTIATIONS AMONG THE WARRING PARTIES BUT THAT IS A ROLE
FOR A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, NOT FOR
UNAMIR. WE APE WILLING TO SUPFORT AND ENCOURAGE A
POLITICAL INITIATIVE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PROMOTE
RECONCILIATION AMONG THE PARTIES.
--- EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT ANY SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS
AMONG THE PARTIES WILL TAKE FLACE OUTSIDE RWANDA;
THEREFORE, UN SECURITY FORCES WILL NOT BE REQUIRED.
-- OUR OPPOSITION TO RETAINING A UNAMIR PRESENCE IN
RWANDA IS FIRM. IT IS BASED ON OUR CONVICTION THAT THE
SECURITY COUNCIL HAS AN OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THAT
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ARE VIABLE, THAT THEY ARE CAPABLE
OF FULFILLING THEIR MANDATES, AND THAT UN PEACEKEEPING
PERSONNEL ARE NOT PLACED OR RETAINED, KNOWINGLY, IN AN
NTENABLE SITUATION.
CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 099440 1504302
PAGE 06
- - THE UNITED STATES HOPES THAT THE PARTIES IN RWANDA,
WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF MEDIATORS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY AS APPROPRIATE, WILL BE ABLE TO END THE VIOLENCE
IN THEIR COUNTRY, MOVE TOWARD RECONCILIATION, AND BEGIN A
PROCESS THAT WILL LEAD TO A DURABLE PEACE.
-- WHEN THE PARTIES DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY ARE WILLING AND
ABLE TO WORK IN THE INTERESTS OF THE RWANDAN PEOPLE TOWARD
A LASTING RESOLUTION OF THEIR CONFLICT, WE WILL BE WILLING
TO RECONSIDER WHETHER A RENEWED ROLE FOR UN FEACEKEEFING
CAN FACILITATE AND BUILD A LASTING FEACE IN THEIR COUNTRY.
-- UNTIL THAT TIME, HOWEVER, FRIORITY MUST BE GIVEN TO
ENSURING THE SAFE WITHDRAWAL OF UN PEACEKEEPERS AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL AND CIVILIANS IN DANGER IN
RWANDA. TO ATTEMPT TO SUSTAIN A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN
THE PRESENT ENVIRONMENT WOULD ONLY UNDERMINE THE SECURITY
COUNCIL'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACEKEEPING. CHRISTOPHER
CONFIDENTIAL
<< END OF DOCUMENT >>
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Fv
(_21RNIVEr
April 21, 1994
President Clinton
The White House
Dear Mr. President:
My country and I have suffered grievously since last
December when you spoke so many kind words about me at the White
House. I am sure that you know that tens of thousands of
Rwandans have been summarily executed over the last two weeks,
since a plane bearing President Habyarimana was shot down in
Kigali, the capital city. These killings have been carried out by
the.PreMidential Guard and by the militia trained by the
president's political party and its allies in government. I
myself barely escaped from Rwanda with my life, wearing only a
single cloth tied around my body.
Although the situation in Rwanda now seems like anarchy, it
is only a small group of extremists around the late President
Habyarimana who have planned and intensified the massacres. They
have been able to cause a catastrophe of this magnitude because
they were carefully organized and very well armed, and because
they were attacking people who had neither organization nor arms.
This slaughter of the defenseless - which continues even today accompanies but is different from the fighting.that has been
going on for some years between the mainly Hutu Rwandan army and
the RPF, the mostly Tutsi rebel movement. Although most of the
victims of the latest massacres are Tutsis, many are children,
women and the elderly, who have never taken up arms against the
government or joined any opposition movement. Among the 1,150
people killed in a church at Musha, 650 were children, according
to the pastor.
The forces of the UN that came to Rwanda to supervise a
ceasefire between the government and the RPF (UNAMIR) are
protecting thousands of Rwandans from a similar fate. They are
guarding 25,000 to 30,000 people in a stadium, a hospital and
other sites in Kigali. These people deliberately sought the
protection of the UN forces, yet the Security Council of the UN
has already withdrawn some soldiers, and is considering
withdrawing those troops who remain in Rwanda. To do so would
deliver these 25,000-30,000 people into the hands of the killers.
.,. I understand concerns about the safety of the.UNAMIR troops.
However, there have been no fatalities among them since the first
day of the violence, when ten Belgian soldiers were killed while
defending the Prime Minister. The RPF has specifically stated .
that it hopes the UNAMIR will stay and that it would not
intentionally fire on them. While attacks by Rwandan any troops
can not be excluded, such an attack is only a possibility; this
igiox c7 90 .2///
Cr,re
sitts
t;"'-'99R-17 "/
seakazgAitaisitefefrinvimv
UNCLASSIFIED
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DARTS
fivist'D
DATE/CASE ID: 08 OCT 2003 200203643
3 - 36
UNCLASSIFIED
possibility must be weighed against the near certainty that the
tens of thousands of Rwandans now in their care will be
slaughtered if they leave.
Withdrawal or reduction of UN forces in Rwanda would also
seriously weaken any effort by the international community to
persuade those who are carrying out these massacres that their
strategy for taking power will fail.
The extremists from President Habyarimana's circle know they
must - depend upon international assistance in the future if they
are to survive as a government. All international donors must
therefore forcefully and unanimously convince them that any hope
for such aid is futile. But these declarations will not be
credible if at the same time the UN withdraws or reduces its
troops. Such a withdrawal or reduction will only show that the
international community is willing to turn its back on these
horrendous crimes against humanity and will suggest to the
killers that at some time in the future the killers will be
accepted into that community.
If the UN lacks the will or the courage to maintain its
concrete -resistance against these killers, what is to stop them
from destroying every single person who has ever opposed them and
every single Tutsi in the country. Their campaign is genocide
against the Tutsis. The US, like many other countries, has a
moral and legal treaty obligation to "suppress and prevent"
genocide.
Mr President, I appeal to you to act immediately to ensure a
.
continued and effective peacekeeping force in Rwanda
Sincerely,
Monique Mujawamariya
2
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DRAFTED BY: RA/MLA:JBURT-LYNN:ESF
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406DDB 261806Z /38
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
CONFIDENTIALSTATE 110049
FOR AMB. SPIEGEL FROM JOHN SHATTUCK
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: RW, EAID, AEMR, PREL, PHUM
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH RWANDAN HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST
CONFIDENTIAL
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STATE 110049 261740Z
PAGE 02
MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA
REF: GENEVA 3795
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. ACTION REQUEST IS AT
PARAGRAPH 5.
2. SUMMARY: MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA, A HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST
FROM RWANDA, AND TWO REPRESENTATIVES FROM HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH MET WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS A/S
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 07 JUN 2006 200103014
UNCLASSIFIED
3 - 40
UNCLASSIFIED
JOHN SHATTUCK ON FRIDAY. APRIL 22. MS. MUJAAMARIYA
EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE DEPARTURE OF U.N. FORCES FROM
RWANDA. SHE SOUGHT U.S. SUPPORT IN URGING THE U.N. TO
MAKE A DETERMINATION THAT THE ACTIONS TAKING PLACE IN
RWANDA CONSTITUTE GENOCIDE AND EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO HAVE
JACQUES-ROGER BOOH-BOOH REPLACED AS MEDIATOR OF THE
CONFLICT. THE GROUP MADE A NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS ON WAYS
TO STOP THE FIGHTING IN RWANDA, INCLUDING REQUESTING U.N.
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, JOSE AYALA LASSO, TO
PUBLICLY HIGHLIGHT EVENTS TAKING P LACE THERE. AMB.
SPIEGEL IS REQUESTED TO RAISE WITH AYALA LASSO THE
POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE SITUATION IN
RWANDA. END SUMMARY
3. DURING THE MEETING WITH A/S SHATTUCK, MS. MUJAWAMARIYA
EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE DEPARTURE OF U.N. FORCES. SHE
BELIEVES THAT THERE WILL BE EVEN MORE KILLING SHOULD THAT
APPEN. GIVEN THE NUMBER OF CIVILIANS WHO HAVE ALREADY
DIED IN THE FIGHTING, THE GROUP ASKED A/S SHATTUCK WHAT
THE CHANCES MIGHT BE OF GETTING THE U.N. TO LABEL THE
CONFIDENTIAL
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STATE 110049 261740Z
PAGE 03
EVENTS IN RWANDA AS GENOCIDE SO THAT THERE MIGHT BE A
GREATER CALL TO ACCOUNTING FOR THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE.
A/S SHATTUCK WAS NOT HOPEFUL THAT THIS WOULD OCCUR.
4. ANOTHER CONCERN RAISED BY THE GROUP WAS THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.N . MEDIATOR, JACQUES-ROGER
BOOH-BOOH. THEY BELIEVE BOOH-BOOH SHOULD BE REPLACED, AS
HE HAS COMPROMISED HIS POSITION AND IS TOO CLOSELY
IDENTIFIED WITH THE GOVERNMENT TROOPS WITH WHOM HE HAS
BEEN OPENLY FRATERNIZING . HOWEVER, AFTER THE HASTY
DEPARTURE OF THE MEDIATION TEAM THAT HAD INITIALLY
TRAVELED TO RWANDA TO TRY AND WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT,
FINDING A SUITABLE REPLACEMENT FOR BOOH-BOOH MIGHT BE
DIFFICULT.
5. A NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS WERE OFFERED DURING THE MEETING
ON WAYS TO STOP THE KILLING IN RWANDA INCLUDING CONVENING
A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(UNHRC) AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JOSE AYALA LASSO, THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PUBLICLY HIGHLIGHTING THE
EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN RWANDA IN AN EFFORT TO EXERT SOME
INFLUENCE ON THE WARRING PARTIES
UNCLASSIFIED
3 - 41
UNCLAS SIFIED
6. COMMENT: THE UNHRC IS NOT LIKELY TO AFFECT THE COURSE
OF THE FIGHTING IN RWANDA AT THIS POINT, HOWEVER, IN LIGHT
OF AYALA LASSO'S INTEREST IN BECOMING DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN
MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, INCLUDING THOSE IN RWANDA (SEE
REFTEL), IT WOULD BE WORTH PURSUING THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS
SPEAKING OUT PUBLICLY ON THE NEED TO END THE KILLINGS AND
NEGOTIATE A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TOWARD ESTABLISHING A NEW
GOVERNMENT. END COMMENT
CONFIDENTIAL
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STATE 110049 261740Z
7. ACTION REQUEST: AMB. SPIEGEL IS REQUESTED, AT THE
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, TO URGE HIGH COMMISSIONER AYALA
LASSO TO SPEAK OUT ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. TALBOTT
CONFIDENTIAL
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UNCLASSIFIED
3 - 42
Genocide Studies and Prevention 5:2 August 2010
Appendix: Draft Presidential Statement on Rwanda, Proposed by the
Czech Delegation to the UNSC on 28 April 1994
The Security Council is absolutely appalled and horrified over continuing reports of
indiscriminate slaughter of innocent civilians in Kigali and various other localities in
Rwanda. It notes that according to reliable reports, transmitted to the Council by the
Secretary-General in his Special Report (S/1994/470), the current wave of killings
was started by unruly members of the Presidential Guard, joined by elements of the
Rwandese Government Forces (RGF), over which the interim Government, established
on April 8, had failed to establish its authority. Unruly RGF soldiers were also
responsible for the brutal murders of Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, Prime Minister,
and several other ministers, of the provisional Government that stemmed from the
initial implementation of the Arusha Accords, as well as for the deaths of 10
members of the Belgian contingent serving with UNAMIR.
In addition to information available from the Secretary-General, the Security
Council has considered information available from well-respected NGOs. All this
information points to one thing: the horrors of Rwanda’s killing fields have few
precedents in the recent history of the world. The Security Council reaffirms that
the systematic killing of any ethnic group, with intent to destroy it in whole or in
part constitutes an act of genocide as defined by relevant provisions of international
law.
The Security Council points out that genocide cannot be condoned or tolerated,
let alone justified, under any circumstances: not by civil war, not by the death of a
leader, whatever suspicions surround it, not by past history. The Council further
points out that an important body of international law exists that deals with perpetrators of genocide.
The Security Council warns the interim Government of Rwanda of the responsibility it bears for immediately reining in and disciplining all elements of the RGF
and of the Presidential Guards responsible for the brutalities. The Council calls
upon the interim Government of Rwanda to assure that any group, organization,
movement, militia or individual under its control should cease and desist from all
acts of genocide against any part of the population of Rwanda. The Council also calls
upon the interim Government of Rwanda to investigate all acts of genocide and to
severely punish those responsible for their commission. The Council furthermore
expresses its hope that forces that are currently engaging the RGF and the Presidential Guard will not resort to comparable countermeasures.
218
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INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
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STATE 113672 292327Z
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: MOPS PREL PHUM RW US
SUBJECT: DAS BUSHNELL TELLS COL. BAGASORA TO STOP THE KILLINGS
1. SUMMARY. AF DAS BUSHNELL TELEPHONED RWANDAN MINISTRY
OF DEFENSE CABINET DIRECTOR COL. BAGASORA ON APRIL 28 TO
URGE AN END TO THE KILLINGS. BAGASORA RESPONDED THAT THE
RPF OFFENSIVE IS TRIGGERING THE MASSACRES AND THAT A
CEASE-FIRE IS NEEDED FIRST. DAS BUSHNELL CONFRONTED HIM
WITH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF RWANDAN ARMY COMPLICITY IN
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 07 JUN 2006 200103014
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3 - 44
DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
THE KILLINGS, AND SAID THE WORLD DID NOT BELIEVE THE
INTERIM GOVERNMENT/RWANDAN MILITARY'S PARTY LINE. THIS
SOBERED HIM UP, AND HE PROMISED TO PASS THE MESSAGE TO
THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP TO SEE IF A COMPROMISE WAS
POSSIBLE, AND TO CALL BACK THE FOLLOWING DAY WITH AN
ANSWER. END SUMMARY
2. BAGASORA TOLD DAS BUSHNELL THAT THE FIGHTING BETWEEN
GOR AND RPF FORCES WAS CONTINUING, BUT WAS LESS INTENSE.
HE CLAIMED THAT NO MORE MASSACRES WERE OCCURRING IN
KIGALI AND THAT MOST AREAS WERE CALM, WITH THE EXCEPTION
OF BUTARE AND GITARAMA. HE SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD
TRAVELED TO BUTARE THE PREVIOUS DAY IN AN ATTEMPT TO CALM
THE POPULATION. BAGASORA SAID BUYUMBA AND OTHER TOWNS
TAKEN BY THE RPF WERE "EMPTY".
3. CONSISTENT WITH THE LINE TAKEN BY OTHERS IN THE GOR
AND RWANDAN ARMY, BAGASORA SAID THE RPF'S OFFENSIVE IS
TRIGGERING THE MASSACRES AND THAT A CEASE-FIRE WAS NEEDED
BEFORE THE KILLINGS WOULD STOP. HE CHARACTERIZED THE
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KILLINGS AS A SPONTANEOUS REACTION BY THE POPULATION TO
THE RPF OFFENSIVE. BAGASORA OBVIOUSLY OBJECTED TO THE
RPF'S CHALLENGE TO THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT'S LEGITIMACY
AND SAID HE OPPOSED THE RPF'S DEMAND THAT THE GOR
DELEGATION TO PEACE TALKS INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
RWANDAN MILITARY.
4. DAS BUSHNELL TOLD BAGASORA THAT THE WORLD DOES NOT
BUY THE GOR'S STORY ON THE KILLINGS AND THAT CREDIBLE
EYEWITNESSES AND RESPECTED ORGANIZATIONS REPORTED RWANDAN
MILITARY COMPLICITY IN THE KILLINGS. SHE SAID THAT, IN
THE EYES OF THE WORLD, THE RWANDAN MILITARY ENGAGED IN
CRIMINALS ACTS, AIDING AND ABETTING CIVILIAN MASSACRES.
SHE REMINDED BAGASORA OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REPEATED
EARLIER STATEMENTS THAT THEY WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO
IMPLEMENT THE PEACE ACCORDS, BUT THAT THIS APPARENTLY WAS
NOT TRUE SINCE THEY WEREN'T EVEN WILLING TO COMPROMISE ON
THE ISSUE OF MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN THE GOVERNMENT
DELEGATION TO THE PEACE TALKS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES,
DAS BUSHNELL TOLD BAGASORA THAT IT WOULD BEHOOVE THE GOR
MILITARY TO SHOW SOME RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP AND A
WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE. SHE EMPHASIZED THAT WE WERE
LOOKING TO HIM PERSONNALLY TO DO THE RIGHT THING.
DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
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DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
5. DAS BUSHNELL'S REMARKS SEEMED TO TAKE BAGASORA BY
SURPRISE AND SOBERED HIM. HE PROMISED TO TALK TO GOR
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF BIZIMUNGU TO SEE IF THEY COULD COME
UP WITH A COMPROMISE. HE SAID HE WOULD CALL DAS BUSHNELL
BACK TOMORROW. HE ALSO ASKED THAT WE TALK TO THE RPF.
DAS BUSHNELL SIMPLY REPLIED THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE
WORKING WITH GENERAL DALLAIRE ON GETTING A CEASE-FIRE IN
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PLACE AND TALKS RESUMED.
6. BUJUMBURA - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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466E22 130544Z /38
O R 130540Z MAY 94
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
INFO SECDEF WASHDC 0000
CJCS WASHDC 0000
CONFIDENTIALSTATE 127262
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
UNSC
TAGS: MARA, PINS, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW,
SUBJECT: RWANDA: SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS
CONFIDENTIAL
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STATE 127262 130541Z
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REF: A) PRETORIA 6682, B) USUN 2015
1.
CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
PROVIDED AS GUIDANCE TO
2. SUMMARY. THE FOLLOWING IS SECURITY COUNCIL THIS WEEK
USUN DURING DISCUSSIONS IN THE CRISIS IN RWANDA. END
ON THE CONTINUING HUMANITARIAN
SUMMARY.
WE HAVE SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT THE UN'S NON-PAPER ON
3.
RWANDA
WHICH ASKS FOR AN EXPANDED UNAMIR FORCE OF AT LEAST
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DARIS
DATE/CASE ID: 21 MAR 2006 20010301 4
G2 4
UNCLASSIFIED
3 - 60
UNCLASSIFIED
TROOPS BASED IN KIGALI WITH A MANDATE TO PROVIDE
SECURITY FOR DISPLACED PERSONS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF RWANDA
AND TO ASSIST IN THE PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN SERVICES TO
THEM. VICE PRESIDENT GORE HAS ALREADY EXPLAINED TO
BOUTROS-GHALI SOME OF OUR SPECIFIC CONCERNS ABOUT BASING A
HUMANITARIAN OPERATION IN KIGALI WHILE A CIVIL WAR AND
GING IN AND AROUND THAT CITY AND ITS
HEAVY FIGHTING ARE RKIGALI-BA SED OPERATION IN CURRENT
AIRPORT (REF A). A
CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD REQUIRE A CHAPTER VII MANDATE, GIVEN
THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF COMMAND AND CONTROL OVER
RENEGADE ARMY UNITS AND EXTREMIST MILITIAS. IT MAY BE
DIFFICULT TO LOCATE ADEQUATE NUMBERS OF TROOPS WILLING TO
SERVE UNDER THESE CONDITIONS. MOREOVER, THE LOGISTIC
REQUIREMENTS OF AIRLIFTING IN THE QUANTITY OF TROOPS AND
OPERATION
HEAVY EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO MOUNT A KIGALI-BASED
ARE DAUNTING. THE U.S. IS NOT PREPARED AT THIS POINT TO
LIFT HEAVY EQUIPMENT AND TROOPS INTO KIGALI.
4. IN ADDITION TO OUR CONCERNS ABOUT A KIGALI - BASED
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MISSION, WE PERCEIVE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS IN THE
SECRETARIAT'S PROPOSED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. IN
ARTICULAR, WE SEE AN INHERENT CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE
SECRETARIAT'S ASSUMPTIONS THAT THERE WILL BE NO CEASEFIRE
AND THE EXPECTATION THAT THIS WILL NOT BE A PEACE
ENFORCEMENT MISSION. SIMILARLY, THAT THE MISSION WOULD
HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO "ENSURE" SAFETY FOR DISPLACED
PERSONS BUT, AS GENERAL DALLAIRE OPINED, OPERATE WITH
#MINIMUM USE OF FORCE". FINALLY, THE MANDATE DESCRIBED BY
THE SECRETARIAT AND CONTAINED IN REF B SEEMS OVERLYROAD
AND WOULD BE MORE MANAGEABLE IF LIMITED TO CREATING A
PROTECTIVE ZONE, PROVIDING SECURITY TO HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
EFFORTS, LIAISON, AND PROMOTING RESTORATION OF A CEASEFIRE
AND RETURN TO THE ARUSHA FEACE PROCESS.
5. AS VICE PRESIDENT GORE HAS INDICATED, WE ARE
INTERESTED IN EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF USING AN
EXPANDED FORCE TO CREATE ONE OR MORE SECURE ZONES IN
RWANDA ALONG THE BORDER FOR THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND
DISPLACED PERSONS IN MOST IMMEDIATE DANGER AND FOR THE
DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO THEM. SUCH A MISSION
COULD NOT ONLY PROVIDE SECURITY FOR SUCH SAFE ZONES AND
THE DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE BUT COULD ALSO
PROVIDE AN ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO REFUGEE REPATRIATION
UNCLASSIFIED
3 - 61
UNCLASSIFIED
AND COULD SERVE IN A PREVENTIVE CAPACITY TO DETER THE
SPREAD OF VIOLENCE TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.
6. UNDER THIS OPTION, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WOULD BE
STORED IN THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND TRANSPORTED INTO
THE SECURE ZONES. THE MISSION WOULD PROTECT THE ZONES'
PERIMETERS AGAINST INCURSIONS AND, WITHIN THE ZONES,
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STATE 127262 130541Z
PAGE 04
ENFORCE SECURITY, INCLUDING SECURITY OF HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE SHIPMENTS AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS. THE
OPERATION WOULD REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES
AND ROBUST RULES OF ENGAGEMENT TO ENSURE PROTECTION FOR
THESE ZONES.
7.
BASED ON KNOWN FLOWS OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS
AND THE LOCATION OF PERSONS MOST AT RISK, THE ZONE OR
ZONES SHOULD BE SET UP AT LEAST INITIALLY ON THE RWADA
BORDER WITH BURUNDI AND, IF REQUIRED, POSSIBLY TANZANIA.
ESSENTIAL TO THIS CONCEPT WOULD BE THE FULL CONCURRENCE OF
THE NEIGHBORING GOVERNMENTS AND THE ASSENT OF THE RWANDAN
PARTIES. OTHER AREAS COULD BE CONSIDERED LATER IF
CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE AND RESOURCES PERMIT.
8. THE MANDATE OF THIS EXPANDED UNAMIR FORCE WOULD BE TO
ESTABLISH SAFE ZONES ALONG THE RWANDAN BORDER FOR REFUGEES
AND DISPLACED PERSONS AND TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE
PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE BY HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES TO THOSE
PERSONS AND SECURITY FOR THE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
EFFORTS. THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF THE ZONES CREATED SHOULD
CORRESFOND WITH THE SIZE AND MANDATE OF THE FORCE.
DEPLOYMENT COULD BEGIN AS SOON AS THE TROOPS, EQUIPMENT.
AND TRANSPORT ARE READY, WHETHER OR NOT A MILITARY
CEASEFIRE IS IN PLACE.
9. IN THE CUMULATIVE, MILITARY ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT
THIS MISSION MAY REPRESENT A REAL DANGER TO THE TROOPS
INVOLVED. EVEN WITH THE TACIT APPROVAL OF THE WARRING
PARTIES, ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURE ZONE IN SOUTHERN RWANDA
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STATE 127262 130541Z
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
HAS THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVOKING CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE
PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, MILITIAS AND ROVING GANGS. TO DATE,
THE GOVERNMENT SIDE HAS BEEN UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO
CONTROL THESE FORCES. THEREFORE, TROOP CONTRIBUTING
NATIONS' FORCES MUST BE EQUIPPED, CAPABLE AND HAVE THE
CLEAR AUTHORITY FOR CONDUCTING WHAT COULD LIKELY BE AN
ACTIVE PROTECTION OPERATION REQUIRING THE USE OF LETHAL
FORCE. MOREOVER, IF THE RPF CARRIES OUT ITS PREVIOUS
THREAT TO PUNISH WHAT IT CONSIDERS ROGUE FORCES IN
SOUTHERN RWANDA, THOSE FORCES MIGHT ATTEMPT TO ENTER THE
DISPLACED PERSON CAMPS IN THE SECURE ZONE, OR TO PASS
THROUGH UN LINES. WITH THE RPF PURSUING THESE FORCES, THE
UN FORCE WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN A
NEUTRAL HUMANITARIAN ROLE. UN SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS
ANALYSIS AS IT CONSIDERS THE MANDATE, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT,
AND WHICH FORCES TO ACCEPT AND HOW THEY ARE EQUIPPED. IN
OUR VIEW, TROOP CONTRIBUTORS WOULD NEED TO COME EQUIPPED
AND PREPARED TO COUNTER POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES AND MEET THE
CHALLENGES DESCRIBED ABOVE.
10.
THIS OPTION DOES NOT ADDRESS THE FATE OF THE SEVERAL
THOUSAND RWANDANS WHO ARE ALREADY UNDER UN PROTECTION IN
KIGALI. WE RECOMMEND THAT THESE AD HOC PROTECTIVE EFFORTS
SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL A SUITABLE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENT
CAN BE ENSURED.
11. WE RECOGNIZE THAT OUR PROPOSAL CONTAINS MANY
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS -- SUCH AS, WHERE WILL THE NEEDED
FORCES COME FROM; HOW WILL THEY BE TRANSPORTED TO THE
RWANDAN BORDER AREA; WHAT IS THE PRECISE ROLE OF THE UN
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STATE 127262 130541Z
PAGE 06
AND NGO AGENCIES, THEIR REQUIREMENTS, AND THEIR
ELATIONSHIP WITH UN FORCES; WHERE PRECISELY SHOULD THESE
SAFE ZONES BE CREATED; COULD THESE ZONES BE RELOCATED TO
RESPOND TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES; WOULD UN FORCES BE
AUTHORIZED TO MOVE OUT OF THE ZONES TO ASSIST AFFECTED
POPULATIONS NOT IN THE ZONES; CAN WE OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF
THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH THESE ZONES NEAR
THEIR BORDER; WILL THE FIGHTING PARTIES IN RWANDA AGREE TO
THIS ARRANGMENT; WHAT MECHANISMS WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO
COORDINATE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES WITHIN
MILITARY OPERATIONS; WHAT CONDITIONS WOULD NEED TO OTAIN
FOR THE OPERATION TO END SUCCESSFULLY? WE ARE PREPARED TO
WORK WITH YOU AND OTHERS TO FIND ANSWERS TO THESE
UNCLASSIFIED
3 - 63
QUESTIONS.
UNCLASSIFIED
12. WE WOULD URGE THE UN TO EXPLORE AND REFINE THIS
ALTERNATIVE AND PRESENT THE COUNCIL WITH A MENU OF AT
LEAST TWO OPTIONS IN A FORMAL REPORT FROM THE SYG ALONG
WITH COST ESTIMATES BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL VOTES ON
CHANGING UNAMIR'S MANDATE. TALBOTT
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UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIF$
)
Au
,A,Lzes
_7.1
vi
RELEASED figtett
ORIG TO WH
COPIES TOO.
United States Department of State
S
TD
Washington, D.C. 20520
9411350
:94 MAY 16 P1 :10
T
May 16, 1994
M
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
S/P
AF
PM
Rp
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY .
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
10
S/RPP
USUN/W
SCP
S/s e
-
S/S-S
OIS
WIIS/
dsm
Subject: Discussion Paper for the'Deputies Committee on
Peacekeeping Options in Rwanda
PDD-25 requires Deputies -Committee-level approval of all
- U.S. votes in the United Stems Security Council to establish
mew peacekeeping operations- 'Tbe Peacekeeping Core Group is to
provide an analysis of the options to aid the Deputies. in their
decision.
'
The proposed expansion of the size and mandate of the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) changes the
operation significantly enough to qualify in effect as a "new mission. The attached discussion paper analyzes three
proposals now before the Security Council in relation to the
decision factors set out in RIDDI-25.
Your assistance in distributing the attached paper to all
members of the Deputies Committee is appreciated.
/2410Ar......
rc Grossman,Marc
ExecutiveSdretay
Attachment:
Discussion Paper on Rwanda
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: PAUL W HILBURN
DATE/CASE ID: 26 JUL 2006 200103014
UNCLASSIFIED
3 - 71
UNCLASSIFIED
RELEAS
CONFIDENTTAL
(DECL: OADR)
RWANDA OPTIONS PAPER
This paper considers three options for bringing humanitarian
assistance to the victims of the conflict in Rwanda. After
describing the options, the paper assesses whether they meet or
do not meet the guidelines in PDD 25, and then sets forth the
resources available from the U.S. Note: In a letter to UN
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, OAU Secretary General Salim
Salim said that his organization would not take the lead in
providing forces for a peace operation in Rwanda.
Briefly, the options are:
-•
1. A UN-proposed military operation based out of Kigali to
- assure the. delivery of humanitarian assistance in Rwanda.
2. a cross-border military Operation to.secareacaes SaJitmaalia
to protect aid. care for those at risk.
3. A humanitarian operation, without the use of force, to
assist Rwandan refugees in the border areas outside Rwanda.
I. The Sigali based option
The UN - is proposing a UN peacekeeping operation based out of
Kigali. UNAMIR Commander Dallaire is asking for'a force of
5,500 troops, with a mandate to use force as necessary to ,
- assure delivery of humanitarian assistance and to protect
persons in threatened enclaves, by, for example, breaking
through roadblocks manned by hoodlums and disarming roving
gangs. Dallaire believes this can be done under Chapter VI
authority. He has requested 150 M-113 armored personnel
carriers to protect his troops. The estimates the costs for
the first six months of such an operation at $115 million.
-
II. The cross border option with force
The second option would be a military operation to
CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: PAUL W HILBURN
DATE/CASE ID: 26 JUL 2006 200103014
UNCLASSIFIED _
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UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
establish secure zones in Rwanda for the protection of persons
at risk and for the delivery of humanitarian relief.
Humanitarian assistance would be stored in neighboring
countries and transported into the secure zones. The mission
would defend the zones' perimeters against incursions and,
within the zones, enforce security, disarm civilians and escort
humanitarian assistance shipments. At the very least this
would be a Chapter Vi-Plus operation. Even if the /nterim
Government of Rwanda and the Rwanda Patriotic Front agree to
the mission, the existence of renegade military units and
civilian militia outside the control of Government authorities
makes Rwanda a semi-permissive environment.
.
-
Based on known flows of refugees and displaced persons and
the location of persons at risk, the zones should be set up on
the Rwanda border with Burundi. The UN force would establish a
secure zone inside Rwanda along the border with Burundi to• .
gmotectrefugees/displaced persons,in most:imwediate desgerand
provide security for the delivery of humanitarian relief to
those personnel. The force would deploy to Burundi, establish
a base of operations in Burundi near the Rwandan border,
conduct cross-border operations to secure and establish
displaced persons camps within Rwanda, and provide continuous
security for the operation of those camps. The force would
establish security for UNHCR-run camps but not transport
displaced persons to the camps. The force would also secure
of communication andSW convoys in the zone_
-
-
Rules of engagement would clearly spell out the authority
of the UN force commander to defend the humanitarian mission,
to include UN forces, camps and displaced persons being
protected.
The concept relies on the following assumptions:
[a] the current UNAMIR force would remain in Kigali to help
negotiate a political settlement and provide the overall
force commander;
(b] well trained, disciplined troops will be available for the
mission;
•
(c] the UN has RPF/RGF permission to establish the zone in
Rwanda, and Burundi permission to establish base operations
in, and allow logistic support of secure zone through,
Burundi;
(d] UNHCR would run the camps, and the UN force would only
provide security; and
LQUIDE11.1181,
UNCLASSIFIED
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CONFIDENTIAL
-
3 -
[e] the UN and the NGOs would be responsible for transportation
and distribution of humanitarian supplies into Rwanda,
while the UN force would provide its own logistic support.
The UN force would debark in Burundi, establish a forward
support base near the Rwandan border, and conduct operations to
establish a secure zone for the displaced persons camps. About
6,000-6,50D UN force personnel per 100,000 refugees/displaCed
persons would be required.
This option does not address the fate of those in enclaves
elsewhere in Rwanda. UNAM1R forces in Kigali would continue
their responsibility for the'safety of persons currently under
their protection.
•
= III'. The operation without force
In the.third option..theHUN:and , varioue MGOI•would •
'facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Rwandan
refugees in neighboring countries and ensure thit they have
safe havens outside Rwanda. This would not involve the use of
troops. The U.S. would probably provide airlift outside Rwanda
on a reimbursable basis, as well as substantial funding.
The international community would see this option as
nothing different from what is already being done. Support for
thit option would probably leave the U.S.. isolated on the
Security Council. This option, like option 2, also would not
address the problem how to rescue those within Rwanda,
including the people in the Kigali stadium and other enclaves.
Analysis of guidelines for U.S. decision to support
1. Whether UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and an
international community of interest exists for dealing with the
problem on a multilateral basis.
For option 1, YES. The U.S. has a general interest - in
the maintenance of peace and stability in the region
and a strong humanitarian interest. Both the UN
Security Council and the OAU are exploring
peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance options.
Neighboring states, led by Tanzania and supported by
the U.S., are pressing for a resumption of the Arusha
peace talks.
alliFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
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For option 2, the same.
For option 3, the same.
OSD agrees with State's assessment. &waver, we
believe sending in 5,000-15,000 troops represents a
commitment which may exceed the U.S.' "general
interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in
the region."
2. Whether there is a threat to or breach of international
peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as
one or a combination of the following: ' (a) international
aggression; (b) urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with
violence; or (c) sudden interruption of established demociadY orgsvilatnofhumrigtscopledwhvinc,or
threat of violence.
For option 1, TES. - The hill:Mott - over 100,000 people
over the past month, with many more continuing to be
et risk, and the need for humanitarian assistance for
up to 500,000 refugees and displaced persons;
constitute a humanitarian disaster coupled with
violence. The death of the Rwandan President and
subsequent assassination of much of Rwanda's political
opposition constituted a sudden and unexpected
interruption of the democratic process. The wholesale
slaughter of civilians constituted a gross violation
of human rights coupled with violence and the threat
thereof.
-
For option 2, the same.
--
, For option 3, the same.
3. Whether there are clear objectives and an understanding of
where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditions;
peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
-- For option 1, NOT YET. We have not seen a clearly
developed concept. Those who have developed the idea
believe that it could be a Chapter VI operation, but
it is hard to see how it could remain that way in a
civil war. A Rigali-hased operation would likely
require a Chapter VII mandate unless the warring sides
were to acquiesce in the UN mission. Even then it
would require a robust Chapter VI mandate, given the
CONFIDENTTAL
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
CONFTDENTTAL
- 5 -
Interim Government's lack of command and control over
renegade army units and extremist militias.
For option 2, NOT YET. This is a possible U.S.
proposed alternative to option 1, and, therefore, if
we believe it preferable, we ourselves would need to
develop the mission statement further, and define
where on the peace operations spectrum it should fit.
Since this force is designed to operate outside the
area of maximum confrontation between the governMent
and rebel forces, it would be less likely to . provoke
Major confrontation with either side than option 1,
and would be more likely, therefore, to operate within
a Chapter VI mandate, albeit at the rougher end of the
peacekeeping part of this spectrum.
•
joint Staff believes that the establishment of a
protective zone-would be very likely to provoke major
confrontation with the .presidential Guard, militias
and roving gningn intent on continued slaughter of
moderate Hiatus and Tutsis. Therefore, Chapter VII
rules of engagement and mandate would likely be
required.
For option 3, NO. This would be neither peacekeeping
nor peace enfoicetent. How the mission cbuld operate
without any force component is also unclear.
OSD believes that both options 1 and 2 would be
Chapter VII operations undertaken by African forces
with robust rules of engagement, and that option 3 is
not going to stop the killings.
4. Whether, if UNAMIR is to remain a Chapter VI peacekeeping
operation, a cease-fire is in place; or, if it is to become a
Chapter VII peace enforcement operation, the•threat to
international peace and security is considered significant.
-- For option 1. NO on Chapter VI. No cease-fire is in
place, and, given the lack of command and control
exercised by the Interim Government over renegade
military forces and Hutu militia, it is debatable how
effective a cease-fire would be.
CONFTDRNTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIATt
- 6 -
For option 1, YES on Chapter VII. A significant
threat does exist to international peace and
security. The refugee flows threaten to overwhelm
resources in neighboring states. The violence in
Rwanda also threatens to spill over into neighboring
Burundi.
.
For option 2, NO on Chapter VI. No cease-fire is in
place.. Option 2 is designed to put forces in areas of
minimum confrontation between the warring parties.
The issue whether.Chapter VI is applicable devolves,
therefore, on whether each of the parties is prepared
to accept a UN presence.
Joint Staff believes that agreement of Rwandan
. government to cease-fire proposal could not
necessarily-be considered to.constitute assent by
Presidential Guard, hard-line Hutu militias, and
roving gangs - behind government lines, all of-wham have
been implicated in slaughter. To date, Government
forces unable to control mass killings of Tutsis and
moderate Hutu. Joint Staff position underscores
Option 2 as probable Chapter VII operation, especially
on Rwanda-Burundi border, where possibility of
confrontation with Hutu extremists likely to be
greatest.
For option 2, YES on international. significance.
-- For option 3, NO on the cease-fire.
5. Whether the means to accomplish the mission are available,
including the forces, financing and a mandate appropriate to
the mission.
For option 1, UNCLEAR. The availability of adequate
numbers and quality of troops for this mission is
questionable. Nigeria has offered a battalion, and
Zimbabwean and Ghanaian battalions are said to be available. The UN and OAU are optimistic that
sufficient forces can be found. Experience in Somalia .
suget,howvraChpteVIorainwuld
require a U.S. or Western European combat capability,
which appears unlikely in Rwanda. Sufficient
financing for a Chapter VII mission also is doubtful.
=AL
UNCLASSIFIED
3 - 77
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
•
It may be available for a Chapter VI mission. The UN
Secretariat estimates a cost for the first six months
of $115 million for this option. A hybrid of a
voluntary fund and assessed contributions is possible
in order to access money authorized for the existing
assessment for UNAMIR. The U.S. theoretically could
provide up to $173.3 million in DoD drawdown, PRO and
CIPA assistance. We also have up to $60 million in
reallocation authority, although this will mean
reducing or eliminating other programs.
For option 2, MORE LIKELY. While this option may
require at least as many forces as option 1, the
military character is different and the quality of
forces need not be so high. •
joint Staff believes just the opposite. Forces will
be in peace-enforcement role protecting displaced
Tutsis and moderate Hutus from roving gang, militias,
and Presidential Guard; will require clearing secure .
, (if necessary)
zones,archigdsmn
displaced Rwandans allowed into camps, and then
how.
protecting those camps. Questions about . hodisplaced
Rwandans get to camps have yet to be answered. Any
intent to have UN/OAU forces go out and bring back •
displaced Rwandans to camps will require operations in
territory controlled by Rwandan government troops and
possible direct confrontation with gangs, militias and
Presidential Guard forces.
Moreover, assuming RPF remains true to stated intent
of continuing Southward movement to punish 'rogues"
who have committed slaughter, expect Presidential,
Guard, militias and gangs to retreat in face of
advance and attempt to seek refuge in UN-held camps.
Significant possibility exists for PKO forces to
conflict with either extremist Hutus, or with RPF
should RPF believe extremists are seeking safe haven
•
in camps.
Need to remain neutral
continuously challenge
quality and capability
must be as high as, if
for Option 1.
under above situations will
Option 2 forces. Therefore,
of troops performing mission
not higher than, those posited
CONFIDENTIATt
UNCLASSIFIED.
3 - 78
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
- 8 ,
OST) disagrees with State's analysis for options 1 and
2. We believe "NO" is the correct answer for both.
While option 1 is almost a repeat of the Somalia
experience and is therefore unlikely to generate much
support, State presents a faulty argument for option 2
that may be misleading. State asserts that option 2
may require at least as many forces as option 1, but
that the military-character is different and the
quality of forces need not be so high. We strongly
disagree that forces charged with protection of
displaced persons in only a."semi-permissive"
environment (facing uncontrolled gangs, the
Presidential Guard, and militias) do not need the
training, equipment, or support that a force operating
in a . nen-permissive environment requires.
Furthermore, there is no evidence outside of
Boutros-GhalUs optimism, - that support, forces and
equipment, can be marshaled for any large operative in
Rwanda.
For option 3, N/A.
6. whether the political, economic and humanitarian
consequences of inaction by the international community have
been weighed and are considered unacceptable.
For. option 1. YES The international community
clearly views what is happening in Rwanda as a
humanitarian disaster of the highest magnitude and
considers inaction to be unacceptable.
For option 2, the same.
For option 3, the same. But option 3 may be viewed as
inaction.
OS!) agree,' that inaction is unacceptable, however, we
do not believe that our present activities (or option
3) are "inaction."
CONFIDENTTATk
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
CQNFIDENTIAL
- 9 -
7. Whether the operation's anticipated duration is tied to
clear objectives and realistic guidelines for ending the
operation.
For option 1, NO. The duration of each is tied to a
restoration of sufficient order in Rwanda to allow
return of refugees and the absence of serious threat
to humanitarian efforts. While criteria are clear
enough, the time by which to meet them would be
indeterminate.
,
For option 2, the same.
For option 3, the same.
Welnidolfnms for. LS. patteipetion
On the assumption that - U.S. participation is highly •
unlikely, this paper does not consider the PDD guidelines for
U.S. participation.
Resources available from the U.S.
The U.S. has the following resources available:
-----
$75,000,000 'FAA Sec. 506(a)(1) DoD drawdown $75,000,000 FAA Sec. 506(a)(2) DoD'drawdown
$10,000,000 Unspent UNAMIR CIPA
$13,000,000 Unspent Sec. 551 Haiti PRO account
$ 700,000 Unspent Sec. 552(c)(2) DoD drawdown
--$173.700.000 vonds/nrawdoWn Authority Available
-- $15,000,000 Sec. 552(c)(1) reallocation authority
-- $45,000,000 Sec. 451(a)(1) reallocation authority
-- $60.000.000 Total reallocation authorized
--$233.000.000 Total Funds/Drawdown/Reallocation
CONFIDENTTA;
,UNCLASSIFIED
Session 4
“Lessons from Rwanda”
Documents List
Page
No.
4-1
4-4
Date
Author Title
Quesnot Situation in Rwanda
4/29/1994 Quesnot FRENCH
Quesnot Situation in Rwanda
4/29/1994 Quesnot ENGLISH
4-6
5/5/1994 Pin
4-11
5/5/1994 Pin
4-14
4-15
4-16
4-17
The Situation in Rwanda FRENCH
Source
Mitterand Archive
Mitterand Archive
Mitterand Archive
The Situation in Rwanda ENGLISH
Mitterand Archive
Correspondence of Dr. Théodore
SINDIKUBWABO, Interim President of
5/24/1994 Quesnot Rwanda FRENCH
Mitterand Archive
Correspondence of Dr. Théodore
SINDIKUBWABO, Interim President of
5/24/1994 Quesnot Rwanda ENGLISH
Mitterand Archive
US District Court
New Hampshire
6/1/1994 NGA
Satellite photo of Butare roadblocks
evidence
US District Court
New Hampshire
6/1/1994 NGA
Closeup of logs on road
evidence
Notes
French language
(original)
English language
(translation)
French language
(original)
English language
(translation)
French language
(original)
English language
(translation)
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Bruno Delaye, Christian Quesnot
April 29, 1994
Interview with François Carle.
Situation in Rwanda.
Bruno Delaye:
''We have not yet received many images, but the television crews are going to Rwanda now, and
the images that are going to arrive over the weekend will spoil Sunday evening: it is not a pretty
sight.
The international community does nothing. The United Nations proposes an arms embargo! But
that will not prevent the Rwandan army from having machetes, or the RPF from having heavy
arms.
The countries in the region are trying to impose a cease-fire, each one with its own ulterior
motives.
The main difficulty is the French apathy. I had a devil of a time to convince Matignon to
send humanitarian aid. They must realize, as well, that the Rwandans will call for rescue in
front of the television cameras. These are French speakers; they will not say, ''Help!'' but ''au
secours,'' and public opinion will hear them. When one calls for help in English, in Somali, or in
Ethiopian, no one gives a damn, but in French it will have a certain effect...Matignon eventually
sent 48 tons of aid, but without accompaniment. The NGOs will have to distribute it. That is to
say, nothing has been done.
The French silence is deafening.
The Tutsi organization is excellent; it knew how to raise awareness in favor of the Tutsis, and
to have the others considered a band of pampered assassins, equipped by France. This idea is
dominant everywhere.
The diplomatic colleagues say: we must wait for the UN General Secretary's report, wait for
the results of the UN mission...but nothing will come from the UN! The decision to establish an
embargo is perfectly hypocritical. We could perhaps have a cease-fire, and the dismemberment
of the Rwandan state; the Hutus will crowd into the south—the country is very, very highly
populated—and they will live off of international assistance.
In Burundi, each day that passes without crisis is a miracle. Zaire is already fragile: the army has
not been paid, and it pillages for compensation. We are going to see a complete breaking-up. The
4-5
Belgians are totally pathetic—and in fact, the Flemings and Walloons there are like Hutus and
Tutsis. They are incapable of having an African policy. And we are told that we must act with
Belgium, with the international community...this means nothing for Rwanda.
I hope that there will be propositions at the Restricted Council on Wednesday. They are needed,
for humanitarian reasons, and to stabilize Burundi. And we must treat Zaire differently. I will
horrify with my proposal, but we need Mobutu: we must bring him out of his relative isolation.
The real problem is this kind of general sluggishness.
Christian Quesnot:
I know Rwanda. What is going on is abominable. People have told me: these are blacks, not
whites; they can die! In Burundi this will not stand, neither in Zaire, and this will win over
Tanzania. We are also guilty, because the Arusha Accords, to which we actively contributed, and
too imbalanced. We pushed the Hutus to sign, especially the Arusha Accord 4, which gave the
RPF an outrageous advantage in the formation of the future Rwandan army. We pressured the
Hutus to agree to intolerable conditions.
The RPF is the most fascist party I have encountered in Africa. They are like the ''black khmers.''
Belgium is their accomplice. We said that the Hutus attacked Habyarimana's airplane. But that
is wrong. It was mercenaries, recruited by the RPF or from it, who attacked the airplane. And
so, the Presidential Guard, whose head had been killed along with the president and which is
not composed of choirboys, began to massacre: their President had been killed. That is exactly
what the RPF wanted, because President Habyarimana was the only real obstacle to their taking
power.
Behind all this, there is also Museweni (the Ugandan president), who wants to create a Tutsiland
with the objective complicity of the Anglo-Saxons, who believe that Museweni is going to
become the regional leader and ensure stability in the Great Lakes region. They are wrong,
because an ethnic majority of 90% will not accept domination of a Tutsi ethnic minority (10%).
As long as we had about a company of parachutists on the ground to train the Rwandan soldiers,
there were no massacres. Our military presence prevented the RPF from seizing power by force
and allowed the two parties to come to the negotiation table and sign the Arusha Accords. Our
military presence would have stopped the massacres. In Kigali, 2,500 UN soldiers have been
incapable of stopping anything at all. The introduction of multilateralism to Africa is criminal.
We should all be ashamed.''
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Dominique Pin
Notes taken by
Françoise Carle
On
May 5, 1994
The situation in Rwanda:
Rwanda was a small country where one lived fairly well, which was governed well. Since 1973, the
president has been Habyarimana, a Hutu from the north, and his regime was “strong,” but had nothing to
do with corruption.
The Rwanda has been confronted by a double problem:
1. the emergence of an interior opposition developed by the Hutus of the south necessitates democratic
opening;
2. Above all: the Tutsi refugees who went to Uganda in 1959, when the Belgians, supporting the Hutu
majority, tried to instigate a Hutu takeover, have come back in force. In 1959, the Tutsis became
refugees in Uganda (where they were turned into soldiers and mercenaries, says Bruno Delaye). They
have tried to come back since the seventies, but the Rwanda is a very densely populated country.
Therefore, they had no choice but to get involved with Museweni, and to help him take power.
Then, there was a reaction in Uganda against the fact that the Rwandans had an important position in the
army and the high administration. Museweni returned the favor they had done him in 1990, when the
RPF entered Rwanda by force. They arrived armed, have continued their relationship with Uganda, and
have engaged in war against the unorganized Rwandan army.
We have helped the Rwandan army under the guise of sending troops to protect French nationals.
The RPF is within 5 kilometers of Kigali, pushing a million refugees before it. But it fears the French.
Therefore, we have succeeded in slowing the situation down, not to save Habyarimana—who was
nothing like a ferocious dictator, he was a pretty nice, simple guy—but to allow him to begin opening up
his regime.
We said: there is no military solution, you must negotiate. We cannot accept that the opposition, armed
by a neighboring country, has come back to take power by force: otherwise, we are screwing all of
Africa over!
Museweni, for his part, has gotten rid of his English-speaking refugees.
There were negotiations in Arusha, in Tanzania, to build a democratic transition. Some Hutu
representatives among the opposition to Habyarimana caused confusion there: they had thought to hide
among the RPF, but, being in the majority, they realized they could get rid of the RPF when the
elections came around. The Hutu opposition, from the south, thought that Habyarimana was
destabilized, and wanted to contrast themselves with the northern Hutus. The power seemed to be up for
grabs, and they wanted, ultimately, to take it. What they forgot was that the RPF was 20,000 armed men,
who wanted a rump government, but nothing more.
4 - 12
The Arusha Accords were signed, the transitional government was put in place. Each party had a quota
of ministers and deputies in the government and in Parliament, and Habyarimana was recognized as
president. There were also, as planned in the Arusha Accords, quotas in the army, which were
unacceptable but nevertheless accepted: 40% of the military posts would go to the RPF.
Furthermore the RPF insisted, for its own protection, that it would participate in the transition only if it
could keep a battalion of 600 men for its security and on the condition that the French forces left.
We have tried to convince the United Nations that the crisis came from the outside, not the inside, and
that two forces must be deployed, one in the interior of the country, and one along the Ugandan border.
We have obtained a deployment of observers on the border, and 2500 men from UNAMIR, including
many Belgians. This required more than a year: the United States was opposed for financial reasons, the
Russians didn’t want it, Great Britain was not supportive…but at last, we were able to pass it.
During this time, the political blockage became accentuated, and the President’s power was contested. In
Arusha, the RPF had refused to talk about problems of justice and amnesty. Impeachment proceedings
for the president were put in place; these could be countered if Habyarimana had a blocking minority,
both in Parliament and in the government.
We said: democracy must exist, you have your place in the country. They refused. In the process for
designating representatives from each party, each worked for their own aims. The RPF said,
Habyarimana is blocking everything. Habyarimana responded, No, but I don’t want the RPF to have
everything.
In the final negotiation period, Habyarimana seemed to have won: the RPF had too many requirements.
He had obtained an agreement in February which gave him a blocking minority. But the RPF refused,
and there was a new blockage. There was a meeting in Tanzania to try to remove the blockage. It was on
the return from this meeting that the attack occurred.
The president’s entourage accused the Belgians. We don’t know what happened for sure, but this
declaration set off what we feared it would.
I immediately said: there will be massacres of Hutu moderates. The opposition was part of the
government, the Prime Minister was from the moderate opposition, sympathetic enough to the RPF and
trying to negotiate with them. The northern Hutus, supporters of the assassinated President, killed the
moderate Hutus and then turned against the Tutsis.
Within the RPF, everything was ready. An offensive was launched to bridge the gap between the 600
men in the capital and the forces outside it.
So, there were terrible massacres. We cannot even say that it was bestial: animals don’t do things like
this. We saw an unprecedented exodus towards the neighboring countries. The eastern part of the
country is more or less controlled by the RPF. There are between 300,000 and 600,000 people who have
fled the RPF.
4 - 13
We were ready to intervene quickly to rescue our nationals and saved many others as well. This was
planned in two steps: first, to send soldiers to establish a security platform at the airport, then, maybe to
try to calm things down.
We negotiated this with the Rwandan army and it went well. But the Belgians started their evacuation
right away, and the United States evacuated their nationals by road. We were there, we could have done
something; Roussin, Minister of Cooperation, said: we are only here for the French. That is to say: we’re
taking our nationals and clearing out.
The Belgians had left for Rwanda with several airplanes, but the Rwandans did not want to let them
land, thinking them accomplices in the death of the president. The Belgian contingent was nothing in
that affaire, they let the Presidential Guard disarm and massacre them.
So, we evacuate; then the UN decides that there must be a total withdrawal of UN forces, leaving
nothing but a symbolic remainder: they go from 2500 to 270 men.
That’s where we are now. The whole world is watching the massacre, with fine words. The United
States, pressured by CNN, decide to say: the Africans must be helped to finance their own force.
Now, this won’t work any better than it did in Liberia. But, in this way, the United States can stall their
action and toe the line: not one GI will be sent, we will do humanitarian aid and we decide on an arms
embargo. But the weapons being used are machetes, and the Ugandans cannot be controlled. The RPF
will not be able to govern except by a military dictatorship with Hutu collaboration. That will not last,
there will be a long guerrilla war. The United States is pacifying their opinion because of internal
political reasons.
The French government has been culpably apathetic. The speeches were: we retreat back home. And so,
we give the impression of letting go of our friends. If the French and the Belgians had stayed in Rwanda
one month longer, there would not have been any massacres.
We pass our time by pushing the government around and trying to get humanitarian aid. We have
succeeded in sending our ambassador to Kigali (he had returned to France) for an informational mission.
We must deal with Museweni and Mobutu at the same time. We could get involved with negotiations,
but we pass our time hiding behind multilateralism, multinational action. A United Nations Security
Council resolution will not stop the machetes.
We were only able to evacuate from Kigali quickly because François Mitterand asked Joxe to be ready
for such a step. We are obliged to consider the government’s position, we are in a cohabitation situation.
I am personally convinced that if there had been no cohabitation, we would have acted otherwise and
avoided the massacres.
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PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC
May 24, 1994
The General
President’s Chief of Staff
- N O T E ------------to the attention of the President of the Republic
0o0
S U B J E C T:
Correspondence of Dr. Théodore SINDIKUBWABO, Interim President of
RWANDA.
After the Rwandan President’s telephone call on May 22, which I told you about this
morning at11:30, the Rwandan defense attaché in Paris faxed over the attached letter, which I am
bringing to your attention.
On the ground the balance of power, including in Kigali, is more and more in the favor
of the RPF, which has UGANDA’s material, military, and diplomatic aid and the implicit
complicity of all the other powers.
The regional summit is not going to take place and there will not be any real cease-fire
before the RPF takes complete control. This minority, whose goals and organization are not
without comparison to the Khmer Rouge, seizing power is a guarantee of regional instability, and
the consequences have not yet been anticipated by those, including France, who are complicit
and complacent.
The government, following Mr. Douste Blasy’s mission, wants to make our humanitarian
contribution in Burundi and Tanzania more visible. Mr. Juppé, without undue delusion, says he
is ready to make a new diplomatic approach to Mr. Museveni, to have him put pressure on the
RPF to respect a cease-fire. The arrival of 5,500 men from the UN to reinforce UNAMIR is still
problematic, taking into account the lack of enthusiasm from the African states and the American
inertia.
General QUESNOT
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