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ZF-02 DED-01 BY-01 ET-01 UG-01 TZ-01 NE-01 AFP-01
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INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 AF-00 AID-00 ARA-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00
C-01 OASY-00 EAP-00 EUR-00 HA-00 N-01 TEDE-00
INR-00 L-00 ADS-00 NEA-00 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OIG-04
OMB-01 PA-01 PC-01 PH-00 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00
SP-00 SR-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00
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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 5721
INFO JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAININGEN GE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001581

DEPT FOR 10-DAS WARD, ALSO RWANDA TASK FORCE;
WHITEHOUSE PASS MSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D. STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E. 0. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: TFRMO: UN RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ACTED UPON 4/15

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE UN SYG PRESENTED TWO OPTIONS FOR THE
FUTURE OF UNAMIR. THE COUNCIL HOPES TO DECIDE BETWEEN
THOSE TWO OPTIONS AND ADOPT A RESOLUTION FRIDAY
AFTERNOON, APRIL 15. MISSION SEEKS URGENT GUIDANCE.
END SUMMARY.

3. THE UN SECRETARIAT PRESENTED RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
SECURITY COUNCIL APRIL 14 ON POSSIBLE WAYS TO PROCEED IN
RWANDA. THE SECRETARIAT CLARIFIED THAT THE SYG WAS NOT
RPT NOT RECOMMENDING TOTAL PULLOUT OF UNAMIR. THEY
TERMED THAT AN INCORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE SYG'S
LETTER OF 4/13. FORCE COMMANDER GENERAL DALLAIRE HAS
REPORTED THAT BOTH THE PARTIES HAVE CONVEYED A DESIRE TO
SEE UNAMIR STAY IN RWANDA. GEN. DALLAIRE WISHES TO USE
THIS DESIRE AS LEVERAGE OVER THE PARTIES TO FORCE THEM
TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. ALSO, IT IS NOT LOGISTICALLY
POSSIBLE TO PULL UNAMIR'S TROOPS OVERNIGHT.

4. PRECONDITION: GEN. DALLAIRE WOULD PRESENT AN
ULTIMATUM TO THE PARTIES. THEY WOULD HAVE 5 DAYS TO ONE
WEEK TO WORK OUT A CEASE-FIRE. GEN DALLAIRE WOULD LET
THE PARTIES KNOW THAT DURING THAT TIME, HE AND UNMO
WOULD BE PREPARING A PLAN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR.

ALSO DURING THOSE 5 DAYS, DALLAIRE WOULD STRENGTHEN
UNAMIR'S PRESENCE AT THE AIRPORT. IF THE PARTIES DID
AGREE ON A CEASE-FIRE WITHIN 5 DAYS, ONE OF TWO OPTIONS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DARIS
DATE/CASE ID: 10 JAN 2006 200103014

5. OPTION ONE: ALL OF UNAMIR, MINUS THE BELGIAN
CONTINGENT, WOULD STAY IN RWANDA, BUT MOVE OUT OF THE
DMZ AND REDEPLOY TO KIGALI. DALLAIRE WOULD SET ANOTHER
DEADLINE FOR THE PARTIES: THEY WOULD HAVE 3 WEEKS TO
RETURN TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO
MEET CERTAIN CONDITIONS -- BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
SECURITY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL, GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT, KEEP THE AIRPORT NEUTRAL. AT FIVE OR SIX DAYS
BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE 3 WEEKS, DALLAIRE WOULD
WARN THE PARTIES THAT THEIR TIME WAS RUNNING OUT, AND
THAT UNAMIR WAS PLANNING FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. IF
NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT RESUMED WITHIN 3 WEEKS, UNAMIR
WOULD WITHDRAW.

6. OPTION TWO: ONCE A CEASE-FIRE WAS REACHED WITHIN 5
DAYS, REDUCE UNAMIR TO A MINIMAL POLITICAL PRESENCE (THE
SRSG, SUPPORT STAFF AND A SECURITY DETAIL OF AT LEAST
150 MEN) FOR AN UNSPECIFIED TIME. THIS WOULD PRESUPPOSE
THAT THE PARTIES WERE NOT HEADED BACK TOWARDS THE ARUSHA
FRAMEWORK QUICKLY.

7. POSSIBLE OPTION THREE: ALTHOUGH NOT FORMALLY
PRESENTED AS ONE OF THE SYG'S OPTIONS, THE SECRETARIAT
SUGGESTED THAT OPTION ONE AND TWO MIGHT BE COMBINED.
NAMELY, AFTER 3 WEEKS HAD PASSED IF NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT
STARTED THE FORCE WOULD BE REDUCED TO THE SIZE OF OPTION

TWO.

8. THE SYG PREFERS OPTION ONE. FRANCE ALSO PREFERS
OPTION ONE. NIGERIA ASKED FOR TIME TO CONVENE A MEETING
OF THE NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS TO WORK OUT THEIR POSITION.
OTHERS ASKED FOR TIME TO GET INSTRUCTIONS FROM
CAPITALS. ONE THING WHICH IS UNCLEAR, AND WHICH MANY
MEMBERS OF THE SC, INCLUDING AMB ALBRIGHT, QUERIED WAS
WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF NO CF WAS REACHED WITHIN 5 DAYS.
UN POINTED OUT THAT THE COUNCIL NEEDS TO EXPLICITLY
SPELL OUT WHAT THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNDER OPTION 1 OR 2
WOULD BE. ALL AGREED THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION ON
THE GROUND DEMANDS THAT THE COUNCIL MAKE A DECISION AND
ADOPT A RESOLUTION BY TOMORROW, FRIDAY, 15 APRIL.

9. THROUGHOUT THE DAY, A WORKING GROUP OF THE COUNCIL
HAMMERED OUT LANGUAGE FOR A RESOLUTION, LEAVING ASIDE
THE MOST-CONTENTIOUS ISSUE OF THE FUTURE MANDATE AND
SIZE OF UNAMIR. A FEW BRACKETED ALTERNATIVES REMAIN IN
THE TEXT, WHICH WILL BE SORTED OUT TOMORROW AT THE
AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.

10. SUBSEQUENT TO THE SC INFORMALS, THE PRESIDENT OF
THE COUNCIL, IN CONSULTATION WITH FRANCE AND NIGERIA,
WORKED OUT AN ADDITION TO THE DRAFT TEXT WHICH THEY
HOPED WOULD MEET AMERICAN CONCERNS. THE TEXT WOULD
CLEARLY LAY OUT THE 5-DAY ULTIMATUM, AND PUT OFF ANY
DECISION ON THE TWO OPTIONS UNTIL LATER.

11. BEGIN TEXT OF NEW, KEY OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS:

-- DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES AGREE TO AN IMMEDIATE
CEASEFIRE THROUGHOUT RWANDA.

-- DECIDES THAT, IF WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF THE ADOPTION OF
THIS RESOLUTION, THERE IS AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE IN
PLACE, THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REVIEW THE MANDATE AND
COMPOSITION OF UNAMIR WITH A VIEW TO ASSISTING THE
PARTIES IN A RESUMPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA
ON THE BASIS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT.

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-- FURTHER DECIDES THAT, IF WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION, THERE IS NO EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE IN PLACE, THE COUNCIL WILL RECONSIDER THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UNAMIR IN RWANDA.

END TEXT.

12. COMMENT: THESE PARAGRAPHS WILL NOT ACTUALLY COMMIT THE USG TO MUCH, SINCE "ASSISTING THE PARTIES IN RESUMPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS" MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH A SMALL POLITICAL PRESENCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE THREAT OF PULLING OUT IS IMPLIED BY "RECONSIDER THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UNAMIR". THIS SEEMS A GOOD COMPROMISE FOR NOW. THE FRENCH, OF COURSE, WILL EXERT PRESSURE, IF THERE IS A CEASE-FIRE IN 5 DAYS, TO ACCEPT A LARGE UNAMIR PRESENCE. END COMMENT.

13. BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION: UNH-AGREED LANGUAGE WITHIN DOUBLE PARENTHESES):

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA, IN PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTION 872 (1993) OF 5 OCTOBER 1993 BY WHICH IT ESTABLISHED THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR),

NOTING ITS RESOLUTION 909 (1994) OF 5 APRIL 1994 WHICH EXTENDED THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNTIL 29 JULY 1994 WITH A SIX-WEEK REVIEW PROVISION ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT PROGRESS WOULD BE MADE IN ESTABLISHING THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA AND THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

RECALLING ITS STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL 1994 (S/PRST/1994/16) WHICH, INTER ALIA, REAFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT AND URGED ALL PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT IT FULLY,

STRESSING THAT THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT REMAINS CENTRAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA,

EXPRESSING DEEP REGRET AT THE FAILURE OF THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY THOSE PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE CEASE-FIRE,

WELCOMING THE INITIATIVES OF THE LATE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI TO WORK TOWARDS RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS IN THEIR COUNTRIES THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS AND IN COLLABORATION WITH REGIONAL LEADERS.

SHOCKED AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT THAT RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI ON 6 APRIL 1994,

APPALLED AT THE ENSUING LARGE SCALE VIOLENCE IN RWANDA WHICH HAS RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, THE DISPLACEMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THE RWANDESE POPULATION, AND THE SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN REFUGEES TO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES,

DEEPLY CONCERNED BY CONTINUING FIGHTING, LOOTING, BANDITRY AND THE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER PARTICULARLY IN KIGALI,

EXPRESSING ITS DEEP CONCERN ALSO FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL,

AND PERSONNEL OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHO ARE ASSISTING IN IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE PROCESS AND IN DISTRIBUTING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF.

((DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY,))

-- 1. EXPRESSES REGRET AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT IN WHICH THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI LOST THEIR LIVES, AND REITERATES ITS INVITATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS REQUESTED IN ITS STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL 1994;

-- 2. EXPRESSES REGRET ALSO AT THE ENSUING VIOLENCE WHICH HAS CLAIMED THE LIVES OF THE PRIME MINISTER, CABINET MINISTERS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THOUSANDS OF OTHER CIVILIANS;

-- 3. CONDEMNS THE ONGOING VIOLENCE IN RWANDA, PARTICULARLY IN KIGALI, WHICH ENDANGERS THE LIVES AND SAFETY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION;

-- 4. STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE ATTACKS AGAINST UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL LEADING TO THE DEATHS OF AND INJURY TO SEVERAL UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND CALLS UPON ALL CONCERNED TO PUT AN END TO THESE ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND TO RESPECT FULLY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW;

-- 5. CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO THE MINDLESS VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE WHICH ARE ENGULFING RWANDA, AND IN THIS CONNECTION, ((DEMANDS THAT THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) AGREE WITHOUT DELAY TO AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE)) AND THAT BOTH PARTIES RETURN TO THE POSITIONS HELD BY THEM BEFORE THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES;

-- 6. COMMENDS THE ACTIVE ROLE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND OF THE FORCE COMMANDER TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE AND TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT THE EARLIEST RESOLUTION OF THE RWANDAN CRISIS;

-- 7. ((DECIDES, IN THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN RWANDA, TO INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF UNAMIR

AND TO REVISE ITS MANDATE TO ENABLE IT TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;)) ((COMMENT: THE THREE NEW PARAGRAPHS WORKED OUT BETWEEN FRANCE, NIGERIA AND NEW ZEALAND WOULD APPEAR HERE. END COMMENT))

-- 8. REITERATES THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE RWANDAN CONFLICT AND INVITES THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) TO CONTINUE TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS REGARD;

-- ((9. URGES ALL COUNTRIES, IN PARTICULAR THOSE OF THE REGION, TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION THAT WOULD FURTHER EXACERBATE THE SITUATION IN RWANDA;))

-- ((9 ALTERNATIVE. CALLS ON ALL MEMBER STATES, IN PARTICULAR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, ACTING INDIVIDUALLY OR THROUGH REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE OAU TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO THE CRISIS IN RWANDA;))

-- 10. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES IN RWANDA ((IN PARTICULAR

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THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT)) TO RENEW THEIR COMMITMENT
TO ((THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA ON THE BASIS OF)) THE
ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT, AND TO ACCEPT THE FUTILITY OF A
MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE POLITICAL PROBLEM;

-- 11. CALLS ALSO UPON THE PARTIES TO COOPERATE FULLY
IN ENSURING THE UNIMPEDED DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN

ASSISTANCE TO ALL IN NEED THROUGHOUT RWANDA AND IN THIS
REGARD, APPEALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO
PROVIDE INCREASED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COMMENSURATE
WITH THE SCALE OF THE HUMAN TRAGEDY IN RWANDA;

-- 12. AFFIRMS ITS COMMITMENT TO PRESERVING THE UNITY
AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RWANDA;

-- 13. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE TO
MONITOR THE EVENTS IN RWANDA AND TO REPORT FULLY TO THE
COUNCIL ON THE EVOLVING SITUATION AND AT LEAST NOT LATER
THAN FIFTEEN DAYS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;

-- 14. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

END TEXT.

11. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT PLEASE PROVIDE
GUIDANCE ON ABOVE TEXT BEFORE 11:30 AM APRIL 15.

ALBRIGHT

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