

Your file:

Our file:

18:36 (5788)

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FROM: WELLINGTON

C25408/WN1

06-Jul-1994

TO: NEW YORK

Immediate

CC: WASHINGTON

Priority

BEIJING

BONN

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BRUSSELS

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TOKYO

DEFENCE

Routine

WGTM UNSC

Routine

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3)  
(DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA

DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

U53389: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA : US DEMARCHE

Summary

US Embassy reinforces critical need to get expanded UNAMIR on the ground as soon as possible in order to relieve the French bridging operation. View expressed that there are sufficient troops on offer but insufficient logistics support. US working to encourage "pairing" of countries offering logistics support with those contributing troops (along lines of US equipping of Ghanaian battalion). NZ encouraged to think about a logistics contribution, together with idea of matching up with one particular contingent. We note our capacity to contribute remains under active consideration.

Action

2 For information.

Report

3 In its call on us this morning Embassy (Counsellor, McCormick) said US focus was on what could now be done for the French and to follow up their operation. The French believed the longer they stayed in Rwanda the greater the chances of their becoming involved in confrontation and getting bogged down. French were providing a vital bridge until the arrival of the expanded UNAMIR and were in a difficult and exposed

position. US view was that it was critical to get the expanded UNAMIR on the ground as soon as possible in order to relieve the French. US had done what it could. The impression in Washington was that there were sufficient troops on offer but not sufficient logistics support. Given this imbalance the US was suggesting that there be a "pairing" of countries with logistics support capability with troop contributing countries. US had no intention of contributing troops but had agreed to provide the necessary equipment for the Ghanaian battalion. Delivery of 50 APCs had been completed. US was now looking at how additional equipment needs of the Ghanaians could be met (Embassy was unclear whether US support extended to airlifting them in or provisions etc). It was understood that South Africa might adopt the Zimbabweans in a similar way. Interoperability might well be a practical consideration driving such arrangements.

4 The above lay behind US approach to encourage NZ to think about a logistics contribution, along with the idea of possibly matching up with one contingent.

5 In response we noted that following receipt of an informal Secretariat request for a cargo transport aircraft (and a movement control unit), NZ had been giving serious thought to a possible contribution. The positives that lined up against our peacekeeping criteria had to be put against our actual capability which was limited, particularly in light of other major contributions on-hand (Bosnia). Ministers were currently reviewing the question and we expected to have a decision within the next week or so. On the humanitarian front, we noted the Government had recently given NZ\$500,000 to Rwanda through various UN agencies and NGOs.

6 We took the opportunity to counter any misapprehensions the Embassy might have had about the policy implications of our abstaining on SCR 929. Our abstention was in fact an affirmation of our concern and support for the early and effective deployment of the expanded UNAMIR.

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End Message