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MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DP3, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C22387

Summary

- President meets with OAU, Tanzanian and Ugandan Reps and conveys Council's strong support for continued OAU/regional efforts.
- Constraints of regional group however mean UN is only organ capable of making realistic progress - question is how?
- President lays out some options for Council.

Action

For information only

Report

2 President met with the PR of Uganda and Charge ai of Tanzania, together with the OAU rep, and secretariat (Riza USG) and (Annabi DPKO) today to follow up Council's decision that its support for regional initiatives and OAU action be conveyed. Following is report of the meeting made orally to Council:

- President followed up Council's decision yesterday to call in the PRs of Tanzania, and Uganda and the representative of the OAU to convey the Council's strong desire to work in partnership with the OAU and with regional leaders
- OAU and Uganda expressed disappointment about UN's decision. President briefed them on the realities of the

events leading up to the Council's decision on Thursday to reduce UNAMIR to a small political presence

- Neither Tanzania nor OAU had received briefings on what happened in Arusha and why the parties did not get together for the talks (national holiday in Tanzania today)
- Tanzania expressed its appreciation for the UN's assistance in putting on a flight to Zaire for the purpose of transporting the government side, who did not in fact show up
- OAU touched on the need for close cooperation between the OAU and the UN, in practice however this is likely to happen most successfully on the ground between the OAU rep and the Sec Gen's Special Rep.
- President urged neighbouring states and OAU to apply whatever political pressure they could to the parties to come to a cease-fire. OAU agreed this was one of their major objectives
- Although there is no immediate timeframe, a very real timeframe exists for 29 July when UNAMIR's mandate expires under Res 909, though the Sec Gen is to report by 6 May on situation)
- Looking ahead there was a need for the OAU to identify which of its members would be prepared to contribute forces in the future when it might be possible to strengthen UNAMIR
- Uganda noted the budgetary constraints for regional states and OAU noted it would not like to see the funding problems encountered in Liberia for example. Uganda also noted it would take a very large contingent, even larger than that contemplated at UNAMIR's peak (2500) to maintain peace in a post conflict situation in Rwanda
- Tanzania noted the historical connection between such strife in one area and the neighbouring states. The situation was quite likely to spill over.
- All agreed that the cease-fire was the critical factor since there was no suggestion at this stage that any sought to send combat troops to Rwanda to wage war on the parties. President emphasised that should this be contemplated it would be important for there to be further discussion with the UN

3 The President then went on to make the following observations.

- The regional countries are willing to help but are limited in terms of capacity (budgetary, organisation

etc),

- Realistically, only the UN has the capacity to coordinate efforts to get the two parties together and the Special Rep and Force Commander are doing this now but extra political weight might be needed,
- The Council might ask the secretariat to begin contingency planning for the strengthening of UNAMIR once conditions on the ground improve sufficiently bearing in mind that stabilising the regions would have to be at least as high a priority as Kigali,
- If there was ever a time when it would be useful to think of a Security Council mission to a troubled area, this would surely merit consideration at this point,
- The suggestions made by Spain yesterday should be pursued with a view to the evidence of genocide and other breaches of international humanitarian law being collected by the secretariat with a view to action which might be taken in the future.

4 Secretariat (Gharekhan) provided a further short briefing on the situation on the ground in respect of which there had been no significant change since yesterday. There had been heavy artillery and mortar fire in Kigali during the last 24 hours and the new element had been that on 2 occasions mortars had struck the airport. There had been some damage of the airport though it was not "significant" and it was still functioning. This fire was attributed to the RPF. (According to Canadians, Force Commander has said that if conditions deteriorate at the airport UNAMIR will hunker down at its HQ).

5 An exodus of displaced persons had been observed travelling north from Kigali. (We know from the Canadians that these people came from the stadium and are travelling along a safe corridor to behind the RPF lines. Canadians advise that the RPF warned them to leave the stadium in preparation for (final?) RPF assault on Kigali and that most have now left).

6 The Force Commander has been very active in continuing to consult both parties. (Secretariat advised during private meeting that he was shuttling between Kigali and Butare in a helicopter and by ground means under extremely dangerous conditions). The Special Rep is presently in Nairobi but is returning to Kigali. (We understand that media have reported RPF as now calling for his resignation though Secretariat are seeking clarification of this.)

7 The very small humanitarian team was able to distribute some medicine and sanitary supplies to people in the stadium under UNAMIR protection. (We understand from Canadians however that with the virtual pull out of ICRC and the

Medecines Sans Frontieres pull out there is now almost no-one distributing humanitarian aid (even though UNAMIR can get some supplies into Kigali). Canadians advise that ICRC stopped distributing food because the food was making the recipients into worse targets for massacre, acting like a magnet for additional problems.

8 There remain 444 UNAMIR personnel in Kigali in total.

9 Our accompanying fax (Wgtn, Ottawa, Paris, Brussels only) contains letter from RPF to President about Council inaction in the face of genocide, together with DHA update report (Wgtn only).

10 There is a real need for UN members to begin to think laterally about what steps can be taken in the face of this continuing tragedy. In this regard it might be useful to canvas the views of Canadians (especially given their experience with Rwanda as a target Canadian aid recipient country, and with providing the Canadian Force Commander), perhaps also with French and Belgians as to what if anything further could be done. At present none of the big players on the Council are particularly seized of the problem and seem unlikely to become so unless public opinion or media attention develop.

11 As to Nigerian position, they noted privately that they are in a "difficult" position now given that they argued forcefully for an increase in UNAMIR's strength at a time when the Council agreed to radically downsize. This accounts for their relative silence for the time being.

End Message