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Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

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FROM:	NEW YORK	C04308/NYK	13-Apr-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTV UNSC	Immediate
CC:	BEIJING	CANBERRA	Routine
	LONDON	WASHINGTON	Routine
	MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
	PARIS	HARARE	Routine
	BRUSSELS		Routine

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C21870

Summary

- Council still favours ongoing presence for UN in Rwanda if at all possible.
- NAM resolution to be discussed tomorrow.
- Ceasefire meeting brokered by UNAMIR.
- Belgian withdrawal gets sympathy.
- Secretary-General's intervention ignored.

Action

For information only (bearing in mind your C21870).

Report

There were two major developments today relating to UNAMIR. First, the Security Council received a letter from the Sec Gen (accompanying fax to Wgtn only refers) which conveys advice that the Sec Gen had met with the Belgian Foreign Minister (in Bonn on 12 April) and been advised that Belgium would be withdrawing its contingent with UNAMIR "at the earliest possible date". Sec Gen went on to make the assessment that it would therefore be difficult for UNAMIR to carry out its mandate and that he had asked his Special Rep and Force Commander "to prepare plans [and make recommendations] for the withdrawal of UNAMIR, should this prove necessary".

2 This letter angered not only the Belgians but all members

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of the Council. It was followed up by a letter from the Belgian Permanent Rep hoping to put something of a "gloss" on the Sec Gen's letter to the effect that the risks for the Belgian contingent were particularly acute and that in the circumstances of anti-Belge sentiment in Kigali, its contribution was more of a hinderance than a help to UNAMIR in carrying out its mandate. That is, it would have to focus more on its own protection than on any carrying out of UNAMIR objectives. Belgium (and UK/France) were particularly put out by the inference in the Sec Gen's letter that it was Belgium's fault if UNAMIR had to withdraw. Similarly the NAM were outraged at the cavalier approach the Secretary-General had adopted. By contrast they expressed understanding and support for the Belgian decision.

3 Second major development was that, following up its indication at informals yesterday, Nigeria on behalf of the NAM and the OAU undertook intensive consultations (including with P3) and tabled a draft resolution at informals which proposed the beefing up of UNAMIR and a revision of its mandate. Draft is in our accompanying fax to Wgtn only.

4 The significance of this latter development is a reflection of the wide spread view amongst UN members that the UN must not "abandon Rwanda in its most desperate hour of need". This sentiment was universally expressed in some form or other by troop contributing countries together with the expression of their real and continuing concern about the safety and security of the force. It was notable, however, that in his introduction of the text Gambari described the proposal in much more open and exploratory terms than the Op would suggest.

5 For the Africans in particular it is not acceptable that the international community can focus exclusively on evacuating foreign nationals and leave the civilian population of Rwanda totally without assistance. For them, the least the UN should do is to continue its efforts to reach a cease-fire and to remain as a channel of communication between the RPF (now largely, though not totally, in control of Kigali) and the remnants of the Government forces (who except for the Defence Minister are in exile in the south).

6 The US has warned us in private that while the delegation agrees with this overall trend they are expecting problems from Washington.

Comment

7 This is not to say that this task must be carried out by UNAMIR as it is presently constituted, but that in some form the UN needs to try to achieve this objective. What we have is something of a dilemma for the international community between what is hoped to be achieved by the UN and what in practical terms can be done now the Belge contingent is to

leave, ie in terms of its numbers, equipment and other resources.

8 The Sec Gen's letter was not in this connection not at all helpful for Council members. Yesterday the Council asked for an assessment from the field on the various "half way" options. Today it was even clearer that no Council member supports either of the two extreme options of either a "pack up and leave" scenario or a full scale "chapter VII, Somalia type operation". The Council has accordingly pressed the secretariat for this kind of assessment focussing on the practicalities of what might be possible and also the strong sentiment that total UN withdrawal would not be particularly welcome.

9 There are essentially two scenarios which can be contemplated at this time. Either the RPF make good on their promises to stop the killing, agree to a cease-fire agreement and move toward the establishment of a broad based transitional authority, or they enter a period of revenge against the horror inflicted by elements of the government forces and the killing continues.

Secretariat Briefing

10 The secretariat briefing at informals (Riza and De Soto) gave some encouraging news. UNAMIR has been continuing its efforts at providing a channel of communication between the two sides and agreement had been reached for them to meet to discuss a cease-fire tomorrow (Thurs) at UNAMIR headquarters in Kigali. The force commander has been doing a particularly good job in this connection.

11 Secretariat also mentioned that news of the Belge pull out and possible UNAMIR pull out had led to a general deterioration in attitudes to the UN in Kigali with ordinary people believing the UN would abandon them. Both sides to the conflict had appealed to the Force Commander for UNAMIR to stay on. UNAMIR was currently engaged in protection of concentrations of civilians (though conditions were expected to get increasingly difficult as regard the provision of food and water to these groups), in escort duties for evacuations, carrying out specific missions to reach individuals in isolated areas, efforts to reach a cease-fire and efforts in relation to establishing the necessary political dialogue between the parties.

Outcome of Meeting

12 President noted at conclusion of informals that there was a long way to go in considering the future of UN involvement in Rwanda. The issue would be returned to again tomorrow. The NAM draft resolution included two types of issues (general issues relating to situation in Rwanda and the specific policy issue of mandate for future of UNAMIR). There would be benefit in a working group meeting tomorrow

morning to consider the non policy issues ie all elements of the DR except Op5. Informals will take up tomorrow the central question of the mandate for UNAMIR in light of the secretariat's advice as to the practicable options available in the afternoon.

13 President spoke to the press along the above lines on behalf of Council members.

End Message