

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 186/1/1

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FROM:	LONDON	C04003/LON	20-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Priority
CC:	PARIS		Priority
	BRUSSELS	WASHINGTON	Routine
	BONN	GENEVA	Routine
	MOSCOW	BEIJING	Routine
	TOKYO	DEFENCE	Routine
	CANBERRA	HARARE	Routine
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MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA
 DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)
 DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

U05206: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your U52172, New York's C04641 and our C03998.

Summary

France tells WEU meeting on 17 June that its proposed operation would be WEU coordinated rather than WEU operation as such. Participants at meeting make suitable noises of concern about situation in Rwanda and of sympathy with French good intentions, but little substantial is forthcoming. Matter will be discussed at resumed WEU meeting on 21 June. UK will contribute on logistics side if everyone else does. At discussion in UNSC today, they will be asking a number of questions about the French proposal, including coordination with and impact on UNAMIR. They do not think early expansion of UNAMIR will turn off the French, who are talking about arriving in Rwanda this week. Idea of calling on UNOSOM seems to have gone down the tube.

Action required

For information.

Report

We spoke today with the FCO (McLean, Assistant Head, African Dept (Equatorial)) to get a read out on the 17 June WEU meeting.

WEU meeting

2 McLean, reading from a reporting cable, said that it sounded as if France had had the same problems in the WEU as it had in the UNSC. France had told the meeting it could make 2,000 troops available, with 800 of them arriving in the first few days. Their function would be to provide an interim presence until the expanded UNAMIR was in place. McLean said France did not make it clear how this force would fit in with the existing UNAMIR operation on the ground. France had it in mind that it would be the single leader of a multinational force under a WEU label (ie coordinated by the WEU, but not a WEU operation as such).

3 The consequent tour de table produced expressions of concern about the situation in Rwanda and recognition of France's good intentions. But little concrete. Italy said it might be able to supply some troops, although not nearly as many as France. Belgium said it would consider its position. Germany commented that "not everyone" would be there. The Netherlands said it might be prepared to provide a field hospital outside Rwanda. It warned, however, that any force deployed would find itself in the position of trying to keep the peace. UK representative commented that the WEU should be careful that it was acting in response to the explicit wishes of the UN. In his summing up, the WEU Chair said that what France proposed was not a WEU operation as such, but a WEU-coordinated operation under UN authority. The goals of this operation, its command and control arrangements etc needed further work. It would be premature to report to the UNSC at this stage. The WEU would meet again to discuss this issue on 21 June after consultations with capitals.

4 McLean said Hurd had told Juppe in response to his original approach that the UK would look at providing logistical support if France specified what it needed, although it would not want this to cut across what it was doing with the UN. McLean noted that costs were very tight, and any gesture the UK made would have to be modest. He speculated that Hurd believed France would welcome some modest gesture on the part of a European partner - more a demonstration that the UK was supportive of its approach than of significant practical benefit. The UK would wait and see how other WEU countries responded at tomorrow's meeting. If everyone else was making a gesture, the UK would not want to be left out.

UNSC

5 In New York, UK would be posing a number of questions at today's discussions about the French draft resolution: what would the mandate for the French led operation be; how would it coordinate with UNAMIR; what would its impact on UNAMIR be, including for UNAMIR's credibility if the operation was

short-lived but robust; what was the timetable for deploying the African forces pledged to UNAMIR; what would be the funding arrangements for the operation; what were the Secretary-General's views; was the Secretariat working on recommendations for the UNSG to put to the Council? McLean said UK was somewhat puzzled by the reference to a report by the UNSG in the draft resolution (New York's C04641), thinking that a report from the SG may need to be requested by the UNSC. They would also like the term of the French operation to be specified in the draft resolution - it is "too open-ended" at present.

6 McLean said he doubted the early expansion of UNAMIR could take place soon enough to head off the French initiative - they were talking about going in this week. In response to our question, McLean said he thought the idea of using UNOSOM troops had, for practical reasons, "gone down the tube".

End Message