

RWANDA

Physical and Social Geography

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The Rwandan Republic, like the neighbouring Republic of Burundi, is distinctive both for the small size of its territory and for the density of its population. Covering an area of 26,338 sq km (10,169 sq miles), Rwanda had an enumerated population of 7,142,755 at the census of 15 August 1991, with a density of 271 inhabitants per sq km. However, political and ethnic violence during 1994 was estimated to have resulted in the death or external displacement of 35%–40% of the total population. Prior to these events, the population had been composed of Hutu (about 85%), Tutsi (about 14%) and Twa (1%). According to the preliminary results of a national census, published in December 2002, Rwanda's population had recovered to about 8.2m., indicating an increase of 12% since the 1991 census. At mid-2005, according to UN estimates, the population totalled 9,038,000, with a density of 343.2 inhabitants per sq km. The official languages are French, English (which is widely spoken by the Tutsi minority) and Kinyarwanda, a Bantu language with close similarities to Kirundi, the main vernacular language of Burundi.

It seems, at first sight, strange that Rwanda has not been absorbed into a wider political entity. Admittedly, the Rwandan nation has long been united by language and custom and was part of a state that won the respect of the east African slave-traders. However, other ethnic groups, such as the Kongo, Luba, Luo and Zande, which were well established in small territorial areas, have not been able to develop into national states. That Rwanda has been able to achieve this is partly the result of developments during the colonial period. While part of German East Africa, Rwanda (then known, with Burundi, as Ruanda-Urundi) was regarded as a peripheral colonial territory of little economic interest. After the First World War it was entrusted to Belgium under a mandate from

the League of Nations. The territory was administered jointly with the Belgian Congo, but was not absorbed into the larger state. The historic separateness and national traditions of both Rwanda and Burundi have prevented their amalgamation, although both countries participate, with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries.

Although the land supports a high population density, physical conditions are not very favourable. Rwanda's land mass is very rugged and fragmented. It is part of a Pre-Cambrian shelf from which, through erosion, the harder rocks have protruded, leaving the softer ones submerged. Thus very ancient folds have been raised and a relief surface carved out with steep gradients covered with a soil poor in quality because of its fineness and fragility. Rwanda's physiognomy therefore consists of a series of sharply defined hills, with steep slopes and flat ridges, which are intersected by deep valleys, the bottoms of which are often formed by marshy plains. The north is dominated by the lofty and powerful chain of volcanoes, the Virunga, whose highest peak is Karisimbi (4,519 m) and whose lava, having scarcely cooled down, has not yet produced cultivable soil.

The climate is tropical, although tempered by altitude, with a daily temperature range of as much as 14°C. Kigali, the capital (779,000 inhabitants at mid-2005, according to UN estimates), has an average temperature of 19°C and 1,000 mm of rain. Altitude is a factor that modifies the temperature (and prevents sleeping sickness above about 900 m), but such a factor is of debatable value for agriculture. Average annual rainfall (785 mm) is only barely sufficient for agricultural purposes, but two wet and two relatively dry seasons are experienced, making two harvests possible.

Recent History

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HUTU ASCENDANCY

Rwanda was not an artificial creation of colonial rule. When Rwanda and Burundi were absorbed by German East Africa in 1899, they had been established kingdoms for several centuries. In 1916, during the First World War, Belgian forces occupied the area. From 1920 Rwanda formed part of Ruanda-Urundi, administered by Belgium under a League of Nations mandate and later as a UN Trust Territory. In 1961 it was decided by referendum to replace Rwanda's monarchy with a republic, to which full independence was granted on 1 July 1962. Political life in the new Republic was dominated by its first President, Grégoire Kayibanda, and the governing party, the Mouvement démocratique républicain (MDR), also known as the Parti de l'émancipation du peuple Hutu (Parmehutu). Tensions between the majority Hutu (comprising about 85% of the population) and their former Belgian-imposed overlords, the Tutsi (14%), which had sporadically erupted into serious violence during 1963–65, recurred in late 1972 and early 1973. These tensions were the seeds of the 1994 genocide, perpetrated by Hutu, of between 800,000 and 1m., mostly Tutsi but also some moderate Hutu.

In July 1973 the Minister of Defence and head of the National Guard, Maj.-Gen. Juvénal Habyarimana, deposed

Kayibanda, proclaimed a Second Republic and established a military Government under his leadership. In 1975 a new ruling party, the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement (MRND), was formed. A referendum in December 1978 approved a new Constitution, aimed at returning the country to normal government in accordance with an undertaking by Habyarimana in 1973 to end the military regime within five years. An unsuccessful coup attempt took place in April 1980, and elections to the legislature, the Conseil national du développement (CND), were held in December 1981 and in December 1983; also in December 1983 Habyarimana was re-elected President.

From 1982 cross-border refugee problems began to affect Rwanda's relations with Uganda, and would later contribute to violence within Rwanda. In October Rwanda closed its border with Uganda after an influx of 45,000 refugees, most of whom were Rwandan exiles fleeing Ugandan persecution. A further 32,000 refugees gathered in camps on the Ugandan side of the border. In March 1983 Rwanda agreed to resettle more than 30,000 refugees, but Ugandan persecution of ethnic Rwandans continued, and in December thousands crossed into Tanzania. In November 1985 it was reported that 30,000 ethnic Rwandan refugees had been repatriated to Uganda. In 1986 the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported

that there were about 110,000 registered Rwandan refugees living in Uganda, while an even greater number of refugees were believed to have settled in Uganda without registering with UNHCR. In July the central committee of the MRND issued a declaration that Rwanda would not allow the return of large numbers of refugees, since the country's economy was incapable of sustaining such an influx. In the same year President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda announced that Rwandans who had been resident in Uganda for more than 10 years would automatically be entitled to Ugandan citizenship. A resurgence of ethnic tensions in Burundi led to the flight, in August 1988, of an estimated 80,000 refugees, mainly Hutu, into Rwanda. With assistance from the international community, the Rwandan authorities were able to address their needs. By June 1989 all but approximately 1,000 of the refugees had been repatriated to Burundi.

During the December 1988 presidential election, Habyarimana, as sole candidate, secured 99.98% of the votes cast. Elections for the CND were held in the same month, and the Government was reorganized in January 1989. During 1989 economic conditions deteriorated sharply, and the introduction of an economic austerity programme in December increased public discontent. In early July 1990 Habyarimana conceded that political reform was necessary and announced that a national commission would be appointed to investigate the matter. The Commission nationale de synthèse (CNS) was duly established in September with a mandate to make recommendations for political renewal. However, these measures did little to alleviate the acute sense of political crisis.

REBEL INVASION AND POLITICAL UPHEAVAL

On 1 October 1990 an estimated force of 10,000 militia, representing the exiled, Tutsi-dominated Front patriotique rwandais (FPR), crossed the border from Uganda into north-eastern Rwanda, where they swiftly occupied several towns. The troops were primarily Tutsi refugees, but they also included significant numbers of disaffected elements of Uganda's ruling National Resistance Army (NRA, now the Uganda People's Defence Force—UPDF). The invasion force was led by Maj.-Gen. Fred Rwigyema, a former Ugandan Deputy Minister of Defence. In response to a request for assistance from Habyarimana, Belgian and French paratroopers were dispatched to Kigali to protect foreign nationals and to secure evacuation routes. A contingent of troops sent by Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo—DRC) assisted the small Rwandan army in turning back the FPR some 70 km from Kigali.

The conflict continued throughout 1991 and into 1992, as the FPR made frequent guerrilla forays into Rwanda. Both sides of the conflict reported thousands of casualties, and many civilians resident in the border regions were killed and as many as 100,000 displaced. Increasing racial tensions, exacerbated by the war, resulted in a series of unprovoked attacks upon Tutsi and prompted accusations of government involvement, particularly in the Bugesera region of southern Rwanda. In late July 1992 it was reported that a cease-fire had been negotiated, providing for the establishment of a 'neutral area'. The cease-fire arrangements were to be overseen by a 50-member African military monitoring team.

The FPR invasion accelerated the political reform process, initiated before the conflict. The CNS published its report and a draft constitution in March 1991, following widespread public discussion of proposals put forward by the Commission in December 1990. In June 1991 the new Constitution, providing for the legalization of political parties, entered into force. Full freedom of the press was declared, leading to the establishment of a number of magazines and newspapers critical of government policy. In April 1992, following a series of unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a transitional government, the composition of a broadly based coalition Government, incorporating four opposition parties (the revived MDR, the Parti social-démocrate—PSD, the Parti libéral—PL and the Parti démocratique chrétien—PDC), together with the Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement (MRNDD—the new party name adopted by the MRND in April 1991), was announced. The new administration was to be

headed by Dismas Nsengiyaremye of the MDR as Prime Minister, a post established by the Constitution. Multi-party elections for municipalities, the legislature and the presidency were to take place before April 1993. In late April 1992, in compliance with a new constitutional prohibition of the armed forces' participation in the political process, Habyarimana relinquished his military title and functions.

The transitional Government and FPR representatives initiated a new dialogue in May 1992 and conducted formal discussions in Paris, France, during June. Further negotiations, in Arusha, Tanzania, in July resulted in an agreement on the implementation of a new cease-fire, to take effect from the end of that month, and the creation of a military observer group (GOM) sponsored by the Organization of African Unity (OAU, now the African Union—AU), to comprise representatives from both sides, together with officers drawn from the armed forces of Nigeria, Senegal, Zimbabwe and Mali. However, subsequent negotiations in Tanzania, during August, September and October 1992, failed to resolve outstanding problems concerning the creation of a 'neutral zone' between the Rwandan armed forces and the FPR (to be enforced by the GOM), the incorporation of the FPR in a Rwandan national force, the repatriation of refugees, and the demands of the FPR for full participation in the transitional Government and legislature.

A resurgence in violence followed the breakdown of negotiations in early February 1993, resulting in the deaths of hundreds on both sides. An estimated 1m. civilians fled southwards and to neighbouring Uganda and Tanzania in order to escape the fighting, as the FPR advanced as far as Ruhengeri and seemed, for a time, on the point of capturing Kigali. Belgium, France and the USA denounced the actions of the FPR. French reinforcements were dispatched to join a small French military contingent, stationed in Kigali since October 1990 in order to protect French nationals. Meanwhile, the Commander of the GOM declared that the group possessed inadequate manpower and resources to contain the advance of the FPR, and requested the deployment of an additional 400 OAU troops.

In late February 1993 the Government accepted FPR terms for a cease-fire in return for an end to attacks against FPR positions and on Tutsi communities, and the withdrawal of foreign troops. Although fighting continued with varying intensity, new peace negotiations were convened in March in Arusha. Later that month France began to withdraw its troops.

Negotiations conducted during April 1993 failed to produce a solution to the crucial issue of the structure of future unitary Rwandan armed forces. In the same month the five participating parties in the ruling coalition agreed to a three-month extension of the Government's mandate, in order to facilitate the achievement of a peace accord. Further talks between the Government and the FPR in the northern town of Kinyira during May produced significant progress, including an agreed schedule for the demobilization of 19,000-strong security forces. In June an agreed protocol outlined the repatriation of all Rwandan refugees resident in Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire, including recommendations that compensation be made to those forced into exile more than 12 years ago. In late June the UN Security Council approved the creation of the UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), to be deployed on the Ugandan side of the border for an initial period of six months, in order to ensure that no military supply lines would be maintained for the FPR.

In July 1993, with improved prospects for a prompt resolution of the conflict, Habyarimana met representatives of the five political parties represented in the Government and sought a further extension to the mandate of the coalition Government. However, the Prime Minister's insistence that the FPR should be represented in any newly mandated government exacerbated existing divisions within the MDR, prompting Habyarimana to conclude the agreement with a conciliatory group of MDR dissidents, including the Minister of Education, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was elected as Rwanda's first female Prime Minister on 17 July. The Council of Ministers was reorganized to replace the disaffected MDR members.

On 4 August 1993 a peace accord was formally signed, in Arusha, by Habyarimana and Col Alex Kanyarengwe of the FPR. A new transitional Government, to be headed by a mutually approved Prime Minister (later named as the MDR moderate faction leader, Faustin Twagiramungu), was to be installed by 10 September. A multi-party general election were to take place after a 22-month period, during which the FPR was to participate in a transitional government and national assembly. In mid-August the Government revoked the curfew in Kigali and removed military road-blocks from all but three northern prefectures. By the end of the month, however, the Prime Minister was forced to make a national appeal for calm, following reports of renewed outbreaks of violence in Kigali and Butare. The failure to establish a transitional government and legislature by 10 September was attributed by the Government and the FPR to the increasingly fragile security situation, and both sides urged the prompt dispatch of a neutral UN force to facilitate the implementation of the Arusha Accord. Meanwhile, relations between the Government and the FPR deteriorated, following the rebels' assertion that the Government had infringed the terms of the Accord by attempting to dismantle and reorganize those departments assigned to the FPR under the terms of the agreement.

UN INTERVENTION

On 5 October 1993 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 872, endorsing the recommendation of the UN Secretary-General for the creation of the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), under the leadership of Canadian Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire, to be deployed in Rwanda for an initial period of six months, with a mandate to monitor observance of the cease-fire, to contribute to the security of the capital and to facilitate the repatriation of refugees. UNAMIR, incorporating UNOMUR and GOM, was formally inaugurated on 1 November, and comprised some 2,500 personnel when fully operational. In mid-December the UN declared that it was satisfied that conditions had been sufficiently fulfilled to allow for the introduction of the transitional institutions by the end of the month.

In late December 1993 UNAMIR officials escorted a 600-strong FPR battalion to Kigali (as detailed in the Arusha Accord), in order to ensure the safety of FPR representatives selected to participate in the transitional Government and legislature. However, dissension within a number of political parties obstructed the satisfactory nomination of representatives to the transitional institutions, forcing a further postponement of their inauguration. On 5 January 1994 Juvénal Habyarimana was invested as President of a transitional Government, for a 22-month period, under the terms of the Arusha Accord. (Habyarimana's previous term of office, in accordance with the Constitution, had expired on 19 December 1993.) While government spokesmen identified the need to resolve internal differences within the MDR and the PL as the crucial expedient for the implementation of the new Government and legislature, a joint statement, issued by the PSD, the PDC and factions of the MDR and the PL, accused the President of having abused the terms of the Arusha Accord by interfering in the selection of prospective ministers and deputies. The FPR repeated this charge in late February 1994, when it rejected a list of proposed future gubernatorial and legislative representatives (tentatively agreed following several days of discussions between the President, the Prime Minister and the five participating parties of the incumbent administration) as the result of a campaign of intimidation and manipulation by the President in order to secure the participation of his own supporters, and thereby prolong his political position and influence. During January and February Dallaire reported that the Habyarimana Government was increasing anti-Tutsi propaganda across Rwanda, stockpiling weapons and training youth militias. Dallaire insisted that anti-Tutsi sentiment was rapidly increasing and that violence against Tutsi was likely in the coming months. In March the Prime Minister-designate, Faustin Twagiramungu, declared that he had fulfilled his consultative role as established by the Arusha Accord, and announced the composition of a transitional Government, in an attempt to accelerate the installation of the transitional bodies.

However, political opposition to the proposed Council of Ministers persisted, and Habyarimana insisted that the list of proposed legislative deputies, newly presented by Agathe Uwilingiyimana, should be modified to include representatives of additional political parties, including the reactionary Coalition pour la défense de la république (CDR, whose participation was strongly opposed by the FPR, owing to its alleged failure to accept the code of ethics for the behaviour of political parties, which proscribed policies advocating tribal discrimination), prompting a further postponement of the formation of a transitional administration.

In April 1994 the UN Security Council (which in February had warned that the UN presence in Rwanda might be withdrawn in the absence of swift progress in the implementation of the Arusha Accord) agreed to extend UNAMIR's mandate for four months, pending a review of progress made in implementing the accord, to be conducted after six weeks.

COLLAPSE OF CIVIL ORDER AND GENOCIDE

On 6 April 1994 the presidential aircraft, returning from a regional summit meeting in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, was fired upon above Kigali airport, and exploded on landing, killing all 10 passengers, including Habyarimana. The President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, two Burundian cabinet ministers, the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan armed forces, and a senior diplomat were among the other victims. In Kigali the presidential guard immediately initiated a brutal campaign of retributive violence against political opponents of the late President, although it was unclear who had been responsible for the attack on the aircraft, and the presidential guard obstructed UNAMIR officials attempting to investigate the site of the crash. As politicians and civilians fled the capital, the brutality of the political assassinations was compounded by attacks on the clergy, UNAMIR personnel and Tutsi civilians and political leaders. Hutu civilians were forced, under pain of death, to murder their Tutsi neighbours, and the mobilization of the Interahamwe, or unofficial militias (allegedly affiliated to the MRNDD and the CDR), apparently committed to the massacre of government opponents and Tutsi civilians, was encouraged by the presidential guard (with support from some factions of the armed forces) and by inflammatory broadcasts from Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines in Kigali. The Prime Minister, the President of the Constitutional Court, the Ministers of Labour and Social Affairs and of Information, and the Chairman of the PSD were among the prominent politicians assassinated, or declared missing and presumed dead, within hours of the death of Habyarimana.

On 8 April 1994 the Speaker of the CND, Dr Théodore Sindikubwabo, announced that he had assumed the office of interim President of the Republic, in accordance with the provisions of the 1991 Constitution. The five remaining participating political parties and factions of the Government selected a new Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda, and a new Council of Ministers (largely comprising the MRNDD) from among their ranks. The FPR immediately challenged the legality of the new administration, claiming that the constitutional right of succession to the presidency of the Speaker of the CND had been superseded by Habyarimana's inauguration in January as President under the terms of the Arusha agreement. The legitimacy of the new Government, which had fled to the town of Gitarama to escape escalating violence in the capital, was subsequently rejected by factions of the PL and MDR (led by Faustin Twagiramungu), and by the PDC and the PSD, which in May announced that they had allied themselves as the Democratic Forces for Change.

FPR Offensives and the Refugee Crisis

In mid-April 1994 the FPR resumed military operations from its northern stronghold, with the stated intention of relieving its beleaguered battalion in Kigali, restoring order to the capital and halting the massacre of Tutsi civilians. Grenade attacks and mortar fire intensified in the capital, prompting the UN to mediate a fragile 60-hour cease-fire, during which small evacuation forces from several countries escorted foreign nationals out of Rwanda. Belgium's UNAMIR contingent of more than 400 troops was also withdrawn, after Hutu militia-

men killed 10 Belgian peace-keepers sent to protect Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana, who was also murdered.

As the political violence incited by the presidential guard and the Interahamwe gathered momentum, the militia's identification of all Tutsi as political opponents of the state promoted ethnic polarization, resulting in a pogrom against Tutsi. Reports of mass Tutsi graves and unprovoked attacks on fleeing Tutsi refugees, and on those seeking refuge in schools, hospitals and churches, elicited unqualified international condemnation and outrage, and promises of financial and logistical aid for an estimated 2m. displaced Rwandans (some 250,000 had fled across the border to Tanzania in a 24-hour period in late April 1994), who were threatened by famine and disease in makeshift camps. By late May attempts to assess the full scale of the humanitarian catastrophe in Rwanda were complicated by unverified reports that the FPR (which claimed to control more than one-half of the country) was carrying out retaliatory atrocities against Hutu civilians. However, unofficial estimates indicated that between 200,000 and 500,000 Rwandans had been killed since early April.

On 21 April 1994, in the context of intensifying violence in Kigali, and the refusal of the Rwandan armed forces to agree to the neutral policing of the capital's airport (subsequently secured by the FPR), the UN Security Council resolved to reduce significantly its representation in Rwanda to 270 personnel, a move that attracted criticism from the Government, the FPR, international relief organizations and the international community in general. However, on 16 May, following intense international pressure and the disclosure of the vast scale of the humanitarian crisis in the region, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 917, providing for the eventual deployment of some 5,500 UN troops with a revised mandate, including the policing of Kigali's airport and the protection of refugees in designated 'safe areas'. In late May 1994 the UN Secretary-General criticized the failure of the UN member nations to respond to his invitation to participate in the enlarged force (only Ghana, Ethiopia and Senegal had agreed to provide small contingents). Further UN-sponsored attempts to negotiate a cease-fire failed in late May and early June, and the FPR made significant territorial gains in southern Rwanda, forcing the Government to flee Gitarama and seek refuge in the western town of Kibuye.

In early June 1994 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 925, whereby the mandate of the revised UN mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR II) was extended until December 1994. However, the UN Secretary-General continued to encounter considerable difficulty in securing equipment and armaments requested by those African countries that had agreed to participate. By mid-June the emergence of confirmed reports of retributive murders committed by FPR members (including the massacres, in two separate incidents in early June, of 22 clergymen, among them the Roman Catholic archbishop of Kigali) and the collapse of a fragile truce, negotiated at a summit meeting of the OAU, prompted the French Government to announce its willingness to lead an armed police action, endorsed by the UN, in Rwanda. Although France insisted that its military presence (expected to total 2,000 troops) would maintain strict political neutrality and operate, from the border regions, in a purely humanitarian capacity pending the arrival of a multinational UN force, the FPR was vehemently opposed to its deployment, citing the French administration's maintenance of high-level contacts with representatives of the self-proclaimed Rwandan Government as an indication of political bias. While the UN Secretary-General welcomed the French initiative, and tacit endorsement of the project was contained in Resolution 929, approved by the Security Council in late June, the OAU expressed serious reservations regarding the appropriateness of French involvement. On 23 June a first contingent of 150 French marine commandos launched 'Operation Turquoise', entering the western town of Cyangugu, in preparation for a large-scale operation to protect refugees in the area. By mid-July the French initiative had successfully relieved several beleaguered Tutsi communities and had established a temporary 'safe haven' for the displaced population in the south-west, through which a mass exodus of Hutu refugees began to flow, encouraged by reports (disseminated by supporters of the

defeated interim Government) that the advancing FPR forces were seeking violent retribution against Hutu. An estimated 1m. Rwandans sought refuge in the border town of Goma, in Zaire, while a similar number attempted to cross the border elsewhere in the south-west. The FPR had swiftly secured all major cities and strategic territorial positions, but had halted its advance several kilometres from the boundaries of the French-controlled neutral zone, requesting the apprehension and return for trial of those responsible for the recent atrocities. (At the end of June the first report of the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Rwanda—appointed in May—confirmed that at least 500,000 Rwandans had been killed since April, and urged the establishment of an international tribunal to investigate allegations of genocide; in early July the UN announced the creation of a commission of inquiry for this purpose.)

THE FPR TAKES POWER

On 19 July 1994 Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, was inaugurated as President for a five-year term. In November a multi-party protocol of understanding was concluded, providing for a number of amendments to the terms of the August 1993 Arusha Accord, relating to the establishment of a transitional legislature. The most notable of the new provisions was the exclusion from the legislative process of members of those parties implicated in alleged acts of genocide during 1994. A 70-member National Transitional Assembly, whose membership included five representatives of the armed forces and one member of the national police force, was installed on 12 December. On 5 May 1995 the new legislature announced its adoption of a new Constitution based on selected articles of the 1991 Constitution, the terms of the August 1993 Arusha Accord, the FPR's victory declaration of July 1994 and the November 1994 multi-party protocol of understanding.

In July 1999 Rwanda announced the end of the five-year transitional Government and its replacement by a four-year national unity Government. The new transitional period permitted the Government to complete the national reconciliation process, restore internal security, improve the economy and social services and establish a democratic system. Critics rejected the unilateral extension of political power and claimed that the Government's action revealed its undemocratic and dictatorial nature.

The increasingly stringent policies of the Kagame regime prompted an increasing number of prominent figures to flee Rwanda. A notable case involved the popular Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly, Kabuye Sebarenzi, who had campaigned for good governance and official accountability. After moving from the FPR to the PL and drawing attention to government ministers accused of corruption, Sebarenzi's fortunes gradually waned. In December 1999 the PL President, Pio Mugabo, postponed the vote for a new party President, reportedly on orders from Kagame. Sebarenzi had been expected to be elected to this post, which would have strengthened his chances of winning the election for the national presidency. In early January 2000 the Transitional National Assembly forced Sebarenzi's resignation on apparently fabricated charges of official misconduct, organizing genocide survivors against the Government and supporting the 'army of the king'. Also in January Sebarenzi, who feared that the Government would assassinate him, fled to Uganda, then to Europe, and finally to the USA. On 23 March President Pasteur Bizimungu resigned and subsequently relocated to the USA. Kagame served as provisional President until 17 April, when members of the legislature and the Government elected, by 81 votes to five, Kagame as the first Tutsi President since Rwanda gained independence from Belgium in 1962. Kagame, who was to serve for the remainder of the transition period, until legislative and presidential elections in 2003, pledged to facilitate political decentralization, expedite the trials of some 125,000 genocide suspects in prison and conduct local government elections.

Corruption pervaded all levels of government. In September 1999 a legislative commission of inquiry implicated several government ministers in cases of corruption. Some of these officials subsequently resigned. A further parliamentary

inquiry discovered that, when he was Minister of Education in 1995, the Prime Minister, Pierre-Célestin Rwigyema, had been implicated in the diversion of funds from a World Bank education programme almost exclusively to his home town of Gitarama. Rwigyema survived a motion of censure in the Transitional National Assembly in December 1999, but he resigned in February 2000. In March 2004 the Auditor-General, Gervais Ntaganda, informed the legislature that some 60 public institutions reported that tenders valued at US \$5.8m. for 2002 had not been processed by the national tender board, as scheduled. Moreover, \$7m. of government spending was unaccounted for during that year and, of 44 cases of alleged embezzlement of government funds, only nine were referred for trial and only two cases had been heard. However, the authorities did dismiss 139 police-officers in March 2004 for a series of crimes, including bribery and corruption, although allegations of corruption among senior government officials remained uninvestigated.

On 29 June 2000 the Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs introduced legislation on decentralization, which aimed to make the district (*akarere*) the principal organ of local government. Apart from providing judicial services, the *akarere* was to assume responsibility for agriculture, extension, forestry and veterinary services. Other *akarere* duties included the stimulation of local trade and small-scale industries and education and teacher training, and the supervision of health, water, fire brigade, co-operatives, roads, land titles and tourism services. A legislative council and an executive committee, aided by an executive secretary, were to govern the *akarere*. The province (*intara*) co-ordinated all services that were to be transferred from the central Government to the *akarere*. This initiative was the most ambitious political scheme ever undertaken in post-independence Rwanda. Its success or failure depended on the availability of donor aid, the authorities' ability to collect taxes and the central Government's willingness to transfer adequate funds to the *akarere*. More importantly, many donors insisted that, in order to receive foreign aid, Rwanda would have to shed its authoritarian culture and near-total concentration of power in the central Government.

On 24 July 2000 former Prime Minister Pierre-Célestin Rwigyema, the leader of the MDR, fled from Rwanda and sought political asylum in the USA, deeply embarrassing the Kagame regime. The Hutu-dominated MDR responded to Rwigyema's self-imposed exile by removing him from the presidency of the movement and denouncing him after he issued a statement in exile that condemned Kagame as a dictator. The MDR elected Célestin Kabanda, who enjoyed considerable support among Rwanda's Hutu population, as its interim President. However, in February 2001 an MDR committee announced that it had removed Kabanda, owing to repeated allegations that he had participated in the 1994 genocide. In October the MDR's political bureau confirmed Kabanda's election as the party President. Désiré Nyandwi, the influential Minister for Local Government and Social Affairs, endorsed the bureau's decision.

In October 2000 Rwanda convened a Summit on Reconciliation and Unity. However, this measure failed to convince opponents of the Government that Kagame was serious about national reconciliation. As a result, political opposition to the Kagame regime continued to grow, largely in Rwandan expatriate communities. In May 2001, for example, Alexandre Kimenyi, a former senior FPR member who relocated to the USA, announced the formation of an opposition party, the Alliance rwandaise pour la renaissance de la nation (ARENA). He maintained that membership of the organization was open to all Rwandans and denied allegations that it was pro-monarchy. Despite its increasing popularity among some expatriates, ARENA lacked the ability to present a credible threat to Kagame's Government.

ELECTIONS AND THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

On 6 March 2001 nation-wide elections for local officials were conducted in Rwanda. A high proportion of eligible voters participated in the polls. President Kagame claimed that the

elections represented a significant measure towards democratization. However, Rwandan government statistics indicated that about 45% of the districts were contested by only one candidate. Moreover, various international human rights organizations condemned the elections as unfair; according to Human Rights Watch, the elections had been marred by irregularities from the beginning. Many voters also indicated that they participated in the polls because they feared receiving fines or other penalties if they did not. In addition, local and international election monitors only received the requisite documentation late on the day prior to the elections, making it impossible to observe pre-election activities, such as registration, and difficult to reach distant polling stations.

On 26 May 2003 some 93.4% of the electorate approved a new Constitution. The European Union (EU) Electoral Observation Mission in Rwanda subsequently reported that the referendum had been conducted in 'satisfactory conditions'. The Constitution mandated a bicameral legislature, which would comprise an 80-member Chamber of Deputies and a 26-member Senate. In May 2003, the Government endorsed a parliamentary report that urged the banning of the MDR for propagating a 'divisive' ideology and the prosecution of 47 of its members and supporters for 'ethnic extremism'. Amnesty International accused the Rwandan authorities of orchestrated suppression of political opposition, and Human Rights Watch maintained that the Government was seeking to eliminate any opposition prior to Rwanda's presidential and parliamentary elections, due to be held in August and September, respectively. On 4 June the new Constitution entered into effect. However, the International Federation for Human Rights claimed that the Constitution would inhibit multi-party pluralism and freedom of expression and recommended that the Rwandan authorities guarantee such rights. Meanwhile, former Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu announced that he would contest the presidential election against Kagame. As most of his supporters were members of the political opposition in exile, prospects of his winning the election were minimal.

On 25 August 2003, at the first election to take place in Rwanda since the 1994 genocide, Kagame was returned to power, with 95.1% of valid votes cast. Twagiramungu won 3.6% of the votes, and the only other opposition candidate, Jean-Népomuscène Nayinzira, 1.3%. Twagiramungu subsequently accused the authorities of electoral malpractice, and submitted a challenge against the official results to the Supreme Court. EU monitors confirmed that irregularities had been noted, although a South African observer mission declared that the poll had been 'free and fair'. In early September the Supreme Court rejected Twagiramungu's appeal, and he announced that he would not pursue the claim further. Kagame was officially inaugurated on 12 September. On 30 September 218 candidates (representatives submitted by eight political parties and 19 independents) contested legislative elections to 53 of 80 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Official figures indicated that some 96% of registered voters participated in the election, although independent observers maintained that the number of voters was less than the presidential poll. The FPR won 33 seats; the PSD secured seven seats, the PL six, the Parti démocrate centriste three, the Parti démocrate idéal two, the Parti socialiste rwandais one and the Union démocratique du peuple rwandais also won one seat. The new Constitution reserved the remaining seats in the Chamber of Deputies for 'special groups' (24 women's representatives, two youth representatives and one representative of disabled persons). On 2 October some 20,000 representatives of provincial women's groups contested the 24 seats reserved for women, while local government officials and academic representatives contested 14 of the 26 Senate seats. On 9 October President Kagame appointed eight senators, as authorized by the Constitution. (A further four senators were nominated by a regulatory body, the Parties' Forum.) The EU assessed, however, that there were serious irregularities in the presidential and legislative elections.

In 2004–05 the Kagame administration sought to silence its growing number of critics by accusing them of promoting the 'ideology of genocide'. In July 2004, for example, the Chamber of Deputies published a report that accused several local civil

society organizations, including the Ligue rwandaise pour la promotion et la défense des droits de l'homme (LIPRODHOR), one of Rwanda's largest human rights organizations, of supporting such an ideology. The report also rebuked some international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Ireland's CARE International and Trócaire Overseas Development Agency, for supporting these groups. The EU condemned the findings, and the Government rejected the legislature's recommendation for a ban on all suspect organizations. Nevertheless, eight LIPRODHOR officials fled to Uganda, apparently believing that they were in danger from government agents. In September LIPRODHOR's general assembly, having been obliged to conduct an internal investigation, issued a statement denouncing some of its members for 'genocide-related acts' and seeking forgiveness from the Government and the Rwandan people. In early January 2005, LIPRODHOR suffered a significant reverse, after the legislature renewed its accusations that it was propagating a genocidal ideology and ethnic divisionism. Several senior LIPRODHOR members then fled Rwanda, while at a general meeting the organization issued an apology to the people of Rwanda. The Government again declined to close LIPRODHOR as the legislature's report had recommended, although it ordered the organization to conduct an internal investigation to expose 'divisionists'. The subsequent chaos forced LIPRODHOR to cease operations in that month. The Kagame Government's suppression of dissension extended to its own ranks. On 28 September 2004 President Kagame dismissed three ministers (responsible for the interior, health, and youth, culture and sports) for poor performance, and accused many other officials of divisionist activities.

POST-GENOCIDE CRIMINAL JUSTICE

On 8 November 1994, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 955, establishing the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), despite the negative vote of Rwanda, which held a non-permanent seat on the Council in 1994. On 22 February 1995 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 977, whereby Arusha, Tanzania, was designated as the location of the ICTR. The ICTR began formal proceedings in late November 1995 and the first trial began in January 1997. When established, the ICTR shared an Appeals Chamber and Chief Prosecutor with the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which is located in The Hague, the Netherlands. In August 2003 the UN Security Council voted to separate the joint Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR into two posts, giving each tribunal its own Chief Prosecutor. The two Tribunals continued to share an Appeals Chamber. At 15 August 2005, the date of the ICTR's most recent annual report, the ICTR had imposed 19 judgments, involving 25 accused. Several of these decisions established important international criminal law precedents concerning the definition of crimes (particularly genocide and rape) and the accountability of perpetrators, regardless of their position.

In February 1996 the Rwandan Prime Minister announced the creation of special courts within the country's existing judicial system. Under these arrangements, Rwanda's Supreme Court Chief Prosecutor began investigations in each of the country's 10 districts, and established three-member judicial panels in each district to consider cases. The panels were to comprise some 250 lay magistrates, who received four months' legal training. Additionally, 320 judicial police inspectors, all of whom had received a three-month training course, compiled dossiers on those detained for allegedly committing genocide. Newly established assessment commissions reviewed possible detentions on the basis of available evidence.

In mid-August 2004 the ICTR Chief Prosecutor, Hassan Bubacar Jallow, who had been appointed by the UN Security Council on 15 September 2003, visited Rwanda to review the Government's proposal that at least some of those convicted by the ICTR of committing atrocities should serve their sentences in Rwandan prisons. The ICTR had initially opposed this strategy as Rwanda employs the death penalty, while the maximum ICTR sentence is life imprisonment. Kagame sug-

gested a compromise whereby Rwanda would retain the death penalty, but waive it for those convicted by the ICTR. Jallow declined to answer questions about whether the ICTR intended to prosecute anyone from the FPR for crimes against humanity, prompting speculation that prosecution of FPR members would end the Rwandan Government's co-operation with the ICTR. In October 2004 unidentified assailants killed an ICTR prosecution witness in the province of Gikongoro. Many suspected that the incident had been related to the testimony that he had provided at the ICTR trial over genocide charges concerning Col. Aloys Simba. In November Jallow revealed that 14 alleged *génocidaires* (perpetrators of the 1994 genocide) had taken refuge in the DRC and accused the Congolese authorities of failing to make any effort to apprehend them. In mid-December the ICTR's Appeals Chamber upheld the convictions of two defendants who had been sentenced in February 2003 to 10 and 25 years' imprisonment, respectively, for their role in the 1994 genocide in the province of Kibuye. In January 2005 Jallow announced that he was ready to proceed with 17 new genocide trials, which would be conducted at the same time as 25 ongoing trials. He also indicated that national courts would conduct some of these trials (for example, in early 2006 the ICTR announced that Norway would become the first non-African state to try a case at the ICTR's request) and that his office had completed investigations into another 16 cases, some of which he claimed concerned alleged FPR atrocities. In mid-2005 the ICTR renewed its demand for prosecutions against members of the FPR for war crimes. The alleged implication of the FPR in shooting down the aircraft of President Habyarimana in 1994 was of particular interest to the Court. In response, Aloys Mutabingwa, Rwanda's ICTR representative, demanded that the ICTR charge French government officials for their role in the events that precipitated the genocide. Despite such declarations, no prosecution of FPR or French officials have occurred.

The Rwandan national courts, operating concurrently to the ICTR, have also played a major role in prosecuting genocide suspects. This has been a difficult undertaking, in view of the decimation of the Rwandan judiciary by the genocide, and, despite significant reconstruction of the judiciary since then, the system has had difficulties in dealing with the immense number of imprisoned genocide suspects awaiting trial. On 1 August 2003 a court in Gikondo convicted 105 people of genocide, sentencing 73 to life imprisonment and 11 to death. The remainder received custodial terms, ranging from one to 25 years, while the court acquitted 37 suspects. By late 2003 Rwandan courts had convicted approximately 6,500 suspects, of which 600–700 received death sentences. To relieve the pressure on its courts and to facilitate a communal dialogue on the root causes of the genocide as a means to reconciliation, the Rwandan Government instituted the *gacaca* community-based judicial system, based partly on a traditional model of participative justice, to deal with the majority of genocide cases. In October 2000 the Transitional National Assembly adopted legislation providing for the creation of *gacaca* courts. On 18 January 2001 the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of the jurisdiction of the *gacaca* courts and announced that they were expected to commence operations throughout the country by September. In October voters elected approximately 260,000 *gacaca* judges, who were to facilitate the community's evidence-gathering process during open-air hearings, to evaluate evidence and to impose judgments on genocide suspects. Suspects who confessed to their crimes early enough were able to benefit from the *gacaca* courts' plea-bargaining structure, which incorporated community service for certain, lower-level genocide crimes. The *gacaca* system was deliberately designed to promote reconciliation, involving the direct dialogue in the process of trials and employing plea-bargaining and community service as forms of punishment that would reintegrate convicted *génocidaires* into the community. The Government pledged that all court proceedings would be publicized and all court decisions subject to appeal.

On 18 June 2002 the authorities formally inaugurated the *gacaca* system. However, for the first three years of operation, *gacaca* trials involved only the community's recording of basic information related to the events of the genocide, rather than specific evidence related to particular genocide suspects. The

community courts, of which 673 commenced operations throughout the country in November, followed by a further 8,258 in March 2003, were designed to expedite the trials of those accused of crimes relating to the 1994 genocide, to reveal the truth about what happened, to end the culture of impunity in Rwanda, and to promote national reconciliation through communal dialogue and the face-to-face engagement of genocide suspects and survivors.

The Government had undertaken to begin trials for 750 genocide suspects in September 2004 using the *gacaca* system, but this process was delayed until 2005. Meanwhile, in December 2004 the Gacaca Commission reported that it would use lists of genocide suspects that the Netherlands-based NGO Penal Reform International had earlier rejected as inadmissible on the grounds that they presumed guilt. Hearings of genocide suspects' cases before nearly 7,000 *gacaca* tribunals ultimately commenced on 10 March 2005. The defendants included several current government officials, and Prime Minister Bernard Makuza and the Minister of Defence, Gen. Marcel Gatsinzi, provided testimony. It appeared that Makuza would not be liable for prosecution, but Gatsinzi, a former commander of the *École des sous-officiers* in Butare, was accused of providing weapons to troops to kill Tutsi. Gatsinzi admitted that some military personnel under his command had been involved in killings, but rejected allegations that he had assisted them.

Since, according to the Rwandan Government, as many as 600,000 might eventually be charged with genocide during *gacaca* hearings, the Prosecutor-General, Jean de Dieu Mucyo, has warned that the Government must change its judicial strategy as the *gacaca* system would be unable to process so many cases. The Kagame Government's refusal to prosecute FPR war crimes through *gacaca* courts also poses difficulties for the institution. In early 2005 thousands of Hutu reportedly fled to neighbouring countries to avoid possible prosecution through the *gacaca* system. In Burundi, for example, UNHCR initially granted refugee status to some 2,000 recently arrived Rwandans. However, after complaints from the Rwandan Government, Burundi released a statement indicating that the Rwandans would not be granted refugee status, that it would urge them to return home and that it would initiate extradition proceedings against those who refused.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND REFUGEE ISSUES

According to the US State Department's human rights report for 2005, released in March 2006, Rwanda's record remained poor, but improvements had been made even over the past year. Specifically, the report claimed that Rwandan authorities continued to commit serious abuses and to restrict the right of citizens to elect a different government. Security forces, such as the Local Defence Forces, committed unlawful killings and employed torture and excessive force. Police often mistreated suspects, and prison conditions remained life-threatening. Arbitrary arrest and detention, particularly of opposition supporters, and prolonged pre-trial detention remained serious problems. Due process or expeditious trials often did not occur. Genocide trials continued to move slowly. There were restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press, and limited freedom of association, assembly and religion. Other problems cited in the report included child labour, trafficking in persons, social violence and discrimination against women and ethnic minorities, particularly the Batwa. Various international human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, expressed similar concerns.

The record of the *Armée patriotique rwandaise* (APR—the FPR's military wing) in eastern DRC has alarmed many international human rights organizations, owing to consistent reports of the APR's executions, rape, forcible removal of people and other abuses. An increasing number of people from the Kivu provinces of eastern DRC, especially those who do not belong to the pro-FPR Banyarwanda group, strongly oppose the APR, largely owing to its harsh treatment of local populations. Many non-Banyarwanda have joined anti-Rwandan *Mai-Mai* militias to combat the APR and its Banyarwanda allies. In May 2000 Human Rights Watch released a report,

entitled *Eastern Congo Ravaged*, which outlined the excesses committed by the APR in the DRC. Soon after, Amnesty International published *Democratic Republic of the Congo: Killing Human Decency*, which indicated that the APR had killed 'hundreds or even thousands' of unarmed civilians in Nord-Kivu province since 1998. In particular, Amnesty International cited the APR's killing of 74 civilians in a church, in the region of Kailenge.

In November 2002 the International Crisis Group (ICG) criticized Rwanda's poor human rights record, particularly related to Rwanda's activities in eastern DRC. In October 2003 Rwanda announced that it would create a commission of inquiry to investigate two cases of alleged resource exploitation in the DRC, but the Government continued to dismiss reports of human rights violations by Rwandan troops in the DRC as uninformed and biased.

REGIONAL CONCERNS

Rwanda's 1997 military intervention in the DRC marked a turning point in Central Africa's history. The Kagame Government justified its actions by claiming that its armed forces sought only to eliminate the Hutu extremist element there. However, it soon became evident that Rwandan troops, together with their Ugandan counterparts, had started a systematic campaign to loot the region's resources. Efforts by the UN and the international community to prevent this illegal exploitation failed. Meanwhile, by 2004 various international human rights organizations believed that more than 4m. had died in eastern DRC, as a result of warfare, disease and inadequate food. In June Col. Jules Mutebutsi, a Congolese Tutsi rebel commander, and a number of his troops had sought refuge in Rwanda, after clashing with personnel of the UN Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in Bukavu. UNHCR also refused to grant refugee status to Mutebutsi and his troops until it received proof that they were no longer combatants. In late August the Rwandan Government sought to placate the UN by moving Mutebutsi and his soldiers from a temporary camp, known as Ntendezi, near the DRC border, to a camp in the remote district of Gikongoro province, known as Coko. However, this measure failed to allay UN fears that Mutebutsi and his followers remain combatants. The UN also accused the Kagame Government of arming dissident militias in the DRC's Ituri district in Province Orientale and operating a military training camp in Kibungo province for abductees from the Kiziba and Gihembe refugee camps. Rwanda denied the allegations. On 13 August 2004 Rwanda blamed the *Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), regarded as the successor force to the former Rwandan army and containing Interahamwe militia members who fled to the DRC after the 1994 genocide, for killing 152 Congolese Tutsi refugees in the Burundian Gatumba refugee camp, near the border with the DRC. The Rwandan Government threatened to deploy troops in the DRC unless MONUC and the Congolese authorities took action, and additionally demanded that MONUC abandon its ineffective, voluntary disarmament programme for the FDLR. MONUC responded that its efforts to disarm the FDLR had failed because Rwanda and its DRC allies continued to carry out military operations in eastern DRC that disrupted its operations. Additionally, MONUC accused Rwanda of using FDLR activities as justification for re-intervention in the DRC.

In September 2004 the UN announced that the Rwandan and DRC Governments had agreed to launch a Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM) to enhance border security. Accordingly, both countries pledged to take reports of fighting to the JVM for verification before they were released to the media. In early November the DRC armed forces and MONUC commenced joint missions in the Walungu district of Sud-Kivu province to persuade the FDLR to disarm and return home. Shortly after, the FDLR launched a rocket attack on Rwanda's Gisenyi province from Nord-Kivu. In November 2004, Kagame warned the AU that Rwandan troops would intervene in the DRC if the armed forces and MONUC failed to disarm the FDLR. The UN, the EU, the United Kingdom, the USA, Belgium, South Africa and other countries cautioned Kagame about intervening in the DRC, while many donors, including

the Swedish Government, suspended aid to the Rwandan Government. On 1 December MONUC reported that there were around 100 Rwandan troops in the Virunga mountains along the Rwanda–DRC–Uganda border. According to the DRC Government, these troops had been fighting the FDLR in Nord-Kivu for at least a week. The Rwandan Government denied that it had any forces in the DRC. In early December DRC armed reinforcements clashed with military units of dissidents loyal to the pro-Rwanda Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) in Kanyabayonga, Nord-Kivu. However, the DRC Government maintained that the incident involved its armed forces and invading Rwandan troops. The JVM investigated the matter, but was unable to confirm whether Rwandan troops had participated in the fighting. Nevertheless, MONUC suspected that Rwanda provided military aid to the pro-RCD DRC government units. On 20 December the Rwandan Government responded to growing international criticism by announcing that it would not intervene in the DRC. On 31 March 2005 the FDLR unexpectedly condemned the 1994 genocide, pledged to co-operate with the ICTR and announced that it was willing to end its armed struggle, begin disarmament on 5 May, and eventually return to Rwanda. These concessions resulted from secret discussions in Rome, Italy, between the rebels and the Roman Catholic Sant'Egidio community. Much of the international community welcomed this initiative. However, the FDLR has since continued its campaign of violence in the Kivus, aimed mainly at the Congolese Tutsi population.

Rwanda-Uganda relations remained tense, primarily since the Ugandan authorities believed that the Rwandan Government was aiding the self-styled People's Redemption Army (PRA), a rebel group that reportedly was linked to an opposition leader until recently in exile, Col Kizza Besigye. The Rwandan Government rejected such accusations. In November 2004 Uganda expelled a Rwandan diplomat, James Wizeye, for espionage and for co-operating with the PRA, which supposedly aimed to overthrow the President Museveni's Government. Rwanda retaliated by expelling a Ugandan diplomat. Shortly afterwards Ugandan security forces arrested three UPDF soldiers for selling information to Wizeye. Rwandan officials denied these charges and accused Ugandan government elements of seeking to damage relations between the two countries. In April 2005 Rwanda announced that it had detained a UPDF officer, Capt. David Mugambe, on espionage charges. Mugambe claimed to be fleeing political persecution in Uganda, but the Ugandan Government maintained that he was sought by the authorities for providing weapons to criminals.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Despite Rwanda's apparently poor record in the areas of governance and human rights, the Government retained the support of much of the international community. In 2004 a noted Belgian academic Filip Reyntjens published an article in *African Affairs*, the journal of the Royal African Society, alleging that Kagame was a brutal dictator who tolerated no dissent, and who had launched a counter-genocide against Hutu in eastern DRC. Reyntjens asserted that Western donors contrived to ignore Kagame's excesses and continued to provide support to his dictatorship.

Rwanda's relations with France and Belgium remained uneven, largely owing to the legacies of the 1994 genocide. In March 2004 the French daily newspaper *Le Monde* reported that a French magistrate's study had determined that Kagame had ordered the shooting down of President Habyarimana's plane, which had precipitated the 1994 genocide. In response, Kagame asserted that France 'supplied weapons, and, working alongside Hutu Government extremists, gave orders, to the perpetrators of the genocide'. The French Government maintained that French peace-keeping troops had saved 'several hundred thousand lives' during the killings. In May 2004 Belgium, which earlier had apologized for its failure to intervene to stop the genocide, pledged €75m. over a three-year period for Rwanda's health, education, and development sectors. The Rwandan Government planned to use the funds to improve the country's medical infrastructure, introduce universal primary education and facilitate small-scale, rural income generating activities to reduce poverty levels.

In March 2003 President Kagame met with President George W. Bush and other senior US officials to discuss bilateral relations, trade and development, the effect of HIV/AIDS and peace and security in the Great Lakes region. In December the US Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, visited Rwanda to assess the impact of US aid on Rwanda's HIV/AIDS epidemic.

In June 2003 Rwanda and Burundi agreed to co-operate in bringing stability to the Great Lakes region by supporting peace efforts in Burundi and in the DRC. Kagame promised to convince armed Burundian groups to implement the cease-fire agreements that had been signed with the Government of Burundi. In April 2004 Rwanda deployed troops along its border with Burundi and the DRC, in anticipation of possible attacks from Hutu rebels. Burundi accused Rwandan government forces of invading Ruhororo and Kaburantwa Valley, in the north-western province of Cibitoke, and demanded their withdrawal. The Burundian authorities subsequently announced that Rwanda had complied with the request.

In mid-April 2004 156 Rwandan soldiers arrived in the Darfur region of western Sudan to protect the AU observer mission there (see the chapter on Sudan). These were the first foreign troops to arrive in Darfur, and the Rwandan Government was widely commended internationally for sending them. In his valedictory address to the contingent, Kagame announced that he expected the troops to defend Sudanese civilians as well to as protect AU observers. In November 2004 Rwanda dispatched another military contingent to Darfur, bringing its total personnel strength in the AU mission to around 400 troops. In February 2005 Kagame visited the Rwandan troops in Darfur and met with the Sudanese President, Lt-Gen. Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, for discussions. The Rwandan President maintained that he was acting in co-operation with Sudan to resolve the Darfur crisis, while Bashir declared that the two countries were linked by a 'common concern' for peace. When he returned to Rwanda, Kagame urged the AU to increase the number of troops in Darfur, claiming that, after the experiences of Rwanda in 1994, the international community could not allow another genocide to occur in Darfur.

Economy

FRANÇOIS MISSER

Revised for this edition by PHILIP VERWIMP

INTRODUCTION

Rwanda has two main physical obstacles to economic development: the extreme population density and the distance from the sea. The population problem with its concomitant effect on food resources, is aggravated by soil erosion caused by leaching and other natural factors. In 2004, according to estimates by the World Bank, Rwanda's gross national income (GNI), at average 2002–04 prices, was US \$1,875m., equivalent to \$220 per head (one of the lowest levels in the world). During 1994, it was estimated, Rwanda's gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by some 57%. In 1995 a 25% recovery was recorded, and in 1996 GDP was \$1,330m., according to the World Bank. GDP was estimated to have increased by 12.8% in 1997 and by 9.5% in 1998. In 1999 GDP increased by a lower rate of 5.9%, owing to the adverse effects of low coffee and tea prices on the international market, and of a sharp increase in petrol prices. In the following year GDP growth slowed to about 5.2%, owing to the declining volume of investment. Drought and an increase in international petroleum prices also had a negative impact, adversely affecting revenue from agricultural production. Overall GDP increased, in real terms, at an average annual rate of 7.7% in 1995–2004. In 2001 real GDP increased by 6.7%, despite the decline of coffee prices, owing to a 10-fold increase in the price of columbo-tantalite (coltan) and good tea output. External transfers, equivalent to 11.5% of GDP, stimulated manufacturing, construction, and transportation and communication activities, according to the IMF. Real GDP growth in 2002 increased to an estimated 9.4%, owing to the expansion of the construction sector and to excellent climatic conditions. Owing to late rainfall, growth slowed down to only 1.0% in 2003. The 16% rise of output in the construction sector and the 6.6% expansion of the services sector during that year partially compensated for a 5.3% recession of the manufacturing sector and a 30% decline in cash crop revenue. At the beginning of 2004 the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, Donald Kaberuka, anticipated a 6.5% increase in GDP for that year. In fact, real GDP growth in 2004 recovered to 3.7%, based on strong performance of the construction industry and the services sector (particularly transport, tourism and communications), and despite of poor rains, which caused food production to fall for a second year (by 1%), and electricity shortages. As a result of improved export production (primarily coffee), total agricultural output (by volume, weighted for value) registered positive growth of 0.2%, after a 4.1% decline in 2003. Industrial production (excluding construction), however, suffered from the additional competition caused by entrance into the Free Trade Area of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in January 2004, from the energy shortages and from the high international petroleum price. GDP growth of 6% was estimated by the IMF in 2005.

The Government's three-year programme of rehabilitation and reconciliation for 1996–98 aimed to restore the economy to the level of its 1990 achievements by 1998. However, the Government only considered that GDP had equalized with pre-genocide levels at the end of 2001. In 1990–2001 the average annual rate of inflation was 13.2%. Consumer prices declined by 2.4% in 1999, but increased by 3.9% in 2000 and by 3.4% in 2001. The estimated inflation rate was only 2.3% in 2002. However, consumer prices increased by 7.2% in 2003, owing to a sharp rise in the international price of petroleum and to a deterioration in the exchange rate of the national currency. The inflation rate was estimated at 12.0% in 2004, and a 6.0% rate was projected for 2005, although analysts feared that the target would be difficult to meet, as a result of the soaring international price of petroleum. The actual rate of inflation in 2005 was 9.1%. The Rwanda franc continued to deteriorate in 2004. At the end of May the rate was 562 Rwanda francs = US \$1, compared with 521 Rwanda francs = \$1 one

year earlier. In 2004 the annual average exchange rate was 603 Rwanda francs = \$1 and a further deterioration to 717 Rwanda francs = \$1 was projected by the Banque Nationale du Rwanda. The long-term ambition of the Rwandan authorities, summarized in their 'Vision 2020' development plan, was to achieve an 8%–9% GDP annual average growth rate, which would allow a five-fold increase in GDP in 20 years. This target, combined with strengthened birth control measures aimed at reducing the population growth rate from 2.9% in 2000 to 2.2% by 2020, was expected to result in a four-fold increase in GDP per head, to \$900, by the end of the period.

AGRICULTURE

Agricultural Production

Agriculture's share of GDP was estimated to have decreased to 41.3% in 2003, compared with 51.1% in 1994. Some 87.6% of the labour force were employed in the agricultural sector in 2002. The sector contributed 57.2% of total export revenue (including re-exports) in 2003. About 95% of the total value of agricultural production is provided by subsistence crops. While these have failed to meet the needs of the population, the annual increase in production of subsistence crops broadly kept pace with population growth until 1977. Since then the area of land annually made available for subsistence crops has increased only marginally and, moreover, crop yields are declining in many areas, owing to erosion and the traditional intensive cultivation methods used. (The problem of erosion was exacerbated during 1990–94 by the felling by displaced Rwandans of trees for timber and charcoal.) This resulted in the late 1980s in increasing strains on food production, and consequently in severe food shortages. Attempts to increase the yield of small farm plots have included a recent initiative to cultivate climbing beans. In late 1989 and early 1990 many parts of the country, in particular the south, were affected by famine, following drought and crop failure. The Government first did not recognize the food problem and tried to prevent it gaining attention in the media. Subsequently, the Government had recourse to emergency food aid to avert widespread starvation.

The principal food crops are bananas (the single most important, with production of about 2.9m. metric tons in 1999), sweet potatoes, potatoes, cassava, beans, sorghum, rice, maize and peas, in descending order of importance. Owing to a drought affecting the Kibungo, Gitarama, Kigali and Butare prefectures (now provinces) in the second half of 2000, banana output fell by 25.8%, to 2.2m. tons, in 2000 and further, to 2.0m., in 2001. All other crops performed well, however, and an overall 17.8% increase in agricultural output was recorded in that year. Production of cereals was 191,000 tons in 1998, but only 175,000 tons in 1999, owing to drought and lack of seeds. In 2000 cereals output was 240,000 tons, consisting mainly of sorghum (155,000 tons), but also of maize (63,000 tons) and rice (12,000 tons). In 2001 175,100 tons of sorghum and 92,200 tons of maize were produced. Despite an increase in both maize and rice production levels, however, domestic production was much below local demand and the discrepancy was covered by imports. Owing to increased insecurity in the north-western part of the country, output of dry beans decreased from 189,000 tons in 1996 to 150,000 tons in 1997. In 1998 the improvement of the security situation, combined with larger supplies of fertilizers, prompted a rise in bean production to 154,000 tons, and in sweet potato output, from 742,000 tons to 751,000 tons. In 1999 bean production decreased slightly, to 140,000 tons, but in 2000 it increased again, to 215,000 tons, owing to a combination of factors, including increased security, new production areas in swamps and marshes and favourable climatic conditions in the north and north-eastern parts of the country. Bean production increased to 290,700 tons in 2001. Performances were even

more remarkable for sweet potatoes, of which annual output reached 863,000 tons in 1999, 1.0m. tons in 2000, 1.1m. tons in 2001 and 1.3m. tons in 2002. Potato production increased nearly six-fold, from 176,000 tons in 1999 to 954,000 tons in 2000, while cassava output rose nearly three-fold, from 317,000 tons in 1999 to 812,000 tons in 2000. The increase in cassava production was largely a result of a programme of distribution of 2m. cuttings to farmers by Rwanda's Institute of Agricultural Sciences, assisted by the US non-governmental organization (NGO) World Vision International. In 2001 potato production increased again, to 989,000 tons, but output of cassava declined to 686,000 tons. Output of potatoes and cassava both increased to more than 1m. tons in 2002, and potato production rose further to 1.1m. tons in 2003.

In total, the added value of agricultural production increased sizeably, from 176,200m. Rwanda francs in 1998 to 211,094m. Rwanda francs in 2000. In its February 2001 annual report, however, the Banque Nationale du Rwanda (the central bank) warned against the lack of maintenance of the ageing banana plantations. According to the US agency Famine Early Warning System Network, overall Rwandan crop production was estimated at 3.7m. tons at the end of 2001, compared with 2.9m. tons at the beginning of that year. Import requirements in 2001 amounted to 143,000 tons of cereal-equivalent and were expected to be fully covered by commercial imports. In 2002, for the first time, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) purchased 1,500 tons of maize and beans on the domestic market to supply the regions suffering from a deficit. At the end of June 2003 humanitarian agencies warned that a severe production shortfall in the Bugesera area might result in a rapid deterioration in food security if aid to residents was not increased. Some 70,000 civilians were already experiencing conditions of moderate food insecurity, according to WFP. By early 2004 it was obvious that the agricultural sector would not again be able to sustain the entire population, then estimated at 8.9m. (about 1m. more than in March 1994). In January some 124,000 were entirely dependent on food aid in the Bugesera, Kibungo and Umutara provinces, which were threatened by desertification. At the same time abundant early rainfall in January disorganized agricultural activities. Moreover, the banana plantations were suffering contamination from the Banana bunchy top (BBTV) and *budusiga* viruses. The Rwandan Government was concerned that the per head food availability, which had suffered a constant decline since 1980, could decrease to even lower levels, as the population was scheduled to double by 2015, unless significant productivity gains are made. However, experts from the finance and agriculture ministries believed that the challenge could be met, provided that sufficient investments were made in disseminating the use of fertilizers, limited to 5% of the farmers in 2004, and in increasing loans to the farmers: loans to agriculture indeed represented only 1% of commercial loans. Overall, Donald Kaberuka stated that Rwanda's agricultural potential was underestimated, since the country possessed more arable land than the Nile Delta. The success of the Kabuye Sugar Works, which by the end of 2003 had doubled its 2000 output of 3,500 tons, was viewed as an example of the capacity of the Rwandan agricultural sector to improve its performance.

In 2004 poor rains caused food production to fall by 1%. Nevertheless, performances varied according to products. Outputs of sorghum, beans, soya and cassava declined by 5%, 17%, 8% and 9%, respectively. However, production of maize increased by 12% and rice output by 66%, while production of bananas registered 2.6% growth. By August of that year the outlook was critical in 31 districts of the country, where an estimated population of 250,000–400,000 was expected to rely entirely on the distribution of 25,000 tons of food aid between September and December. The most vulnerable districts were in the south (Bugesera, Gikongoro and Butare), owing not only to drought but also to poorer soils. As a result, by November bean prices were 87% higher than in the previous year, while those of sorghum and maize were 73% and 55% higher, respectively. However, prospects began to improve in December, owing to heavy rains, and the number of people requiring food aid decreased to 110,000. In January 2005 preliminary results recorded by the Rwandan Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock and WFP showed a 10% increase in potato produc-

tion, but an 8% decrease in cassava output, mainly owing to the impact of cassava mosaic virus, in comparison with 2004.

In general terms, production of cereals is strong. Output of both maize and sorghum has been increasing over the first years of the 2000s. However, maize output is hindered by the lack of fertilizer use and soil erosion. Production of maize is estimated at 90,000 metric tons per year, compared with 160,000 tons for sorghum. Rice output remains modest (about 20,000 tons per year) but is increasing rapidly. In early 2005 the Government launched a 10-year rice development programme. Rice was selected as a 'priority crop' by the Government, since it performs well in flood-prone valleys and eases pressure on hillside land for other crops, and also because domestic demand is high. At this time it was grown on approximately 7,455 ha in Butare, Kibungo and Umutara provinces. However, it is planned to increase the cultivated area to 66,000 ha by 2016, by improved management of new areas in the marshlands, with the aim of meeting domestic requirements by 2009 and generating about US \$170m. in export earnings. A sign of improving food security was that market prices of the main staple foods fell in April 2005 in Kigali, Butare and Ruhengeri, while beans were again being exported to Uganda. Confronted with adverse climatic conditions in 2004, the Government has been concentrating on improving service delivery (agricultural extension, seed availability, land conservation education). In 2004 it pursued its tree-planting and environmental awareness campaign, partly through the introduction of monthly *Umuganda* community service to plant trees and improve the environment. In 2005 the Banque Rwandaise de Développement was considering a five-fold increase in its loans to the agricultural sector, which amounted to 2,000m. Rwanda francs in 2004.

Land Reform

The Government argues that land reform, aiming at freezing the dismantlement of agricultural plots and the transformation of marshes and swamps into suitable land for agriculture, will contribute to an increase in food production. Land reforms under consideration in 2004 envisaged encouraging the development of more viable plots: the current average size of less than 0.7 ha was considered too small. Agricultural research performed at Michigan State University of the USA, however, has demonstrated that small farms in Rwanda are more productive (in yield per unit of land) than large farms. In addition, the land reform programme is not only a matter of economics, but has an important political component. Poor Hutu farmers fear that they will lose or have to sell their land to rich urban Tutsi in the process of land consolidation. In 1998, despite an overall increase in food production, there were still occurrences of famine in some areas of the country, such as the southern prefecture of Gikongoro, where 400 persons died of malnutrition between January and May. The lack of agricultural inputs was one of the main causes of this disaster. By early 2001 drought was reported in the southern prefectures of Bugesera, Butare and Gikongoro, and WFP was urged by the Government to distribute 13,219 metric tons of food in the south-eastern part of the country. In general terms, Rwanda was beset by structural problems, such as low agricultural productivity, owing to the failure to make a proper transition to intensive high-value farming. The state policy of displacing a large number of rural poor to government-designated sites, which had been initiated in 1997 and pursued until early 2000, was criticized by foreign human rights organizations in June 2001. The basic aim of the reform was to substitute the dispersed habitat and create larger landholdings in order to boost productivity. However, human rights activists, while agreeing that making agriculture more productive was imperative, considered that such reforms should not be made at the expense of the poor. The US-based organization Human Rights Watch accused military officers and businessmen with government connections of having appropriated large holdings of land from the poor.

Coffee

Until 2000 the major cash crop was coffee, exports of which provided 7,209m. Rwanda francs (60.2% of total export earnings) in 1991, compared with 12,569m. Rwanda francs (82% of total export earnings) in 1986. In US dollar terms, revenue

decreased from \$85m. in 1988 to \$42m. in 1993 and to \$17m. in 1994. However, a rise in world coffee prices and an increase in production contributed to receipts of \$39m. (77% of total export revenue) in 1995. Revenue from coffee fluctuates considerably, and in the late 1980s it declined sharply because of the combined effects of a low level of production, declining international prices and the weakness of the US dollar in relation to the currencies of Rwanda's other major trading partners. Even prior to the catastrophic political events of 1994, it had seemed unlikely that Rwanda would benefit fully from the resurgence in world prices at the end of 1993. The volume of production has been declining for several years, partly owing to price instability. Reduced revenues have also forced farmers to abandon the purchase and introduction of pesticides and fertilizers. The impact of the political and humanitarian crisis was considerable, and production declined from 28,135 metric tons in 1992/93 to 1,994 tons in 1993/94. In 1996/97 output reached 21,051 tons. The Government prioritized agricultural diversification in its three-year investment programme of rehabilitation and reconciliation. In 1995, however, the price payable to growers for parchment coffee was increased, reflecting the Government's continuing commitment to provide incentives to producers.

The Government liberalized the processing, marketing and export of coffee, which enabled farmers to receive higher prices without resorting to subsidies. In mid-1998 the Government announced plans to remove the remaining taxes on coffee exports progressively and to sell three of its coffee factories, in order to accelerate the recovery of the sector. However, despite these efforts, coffee exports dropped to 14,459 metric tons in 1997. According to central bank statistics, coffee exports increased to 14,997 tons in 1998 and 18,532 tons in 1999, but declined again, to 16,098 tons, in 2000, owing to the drought affecting production areas in the southern part of the country, and to inadequate maintenance of the ageing plantations. Meanwhile, owing to a sharp decline in international prices, export revenue from coffee decreased by 40.7%, from 13,650m. Rwanda francs in 1997 to 8,101m. Rwanda francs in 1998. Export revenue increased to 8,875m. Rwanda francs in 1999, partly owing to a 23.5% increase in the volume exported and government efforts to encourage the trade by suppressing the tax on coffee exports. However, export figures do not entirely reflect the critical situation of the sector, owing to the prevalence of the smuggling of Burundian coffee to Rwanda, where producers are offered higher prices. One of the main problems, as the Government acknowledged, is that average yields of about 300 kg per ha are three to four times lower than in the other countries of the region. Lower production levels and a fall from US \$0.84 per kg to \$0.69 per kg of the average international price contributed to a slight decline in the value of coffee exports, to 8,780m. Rwanda francs, in 2000. For the first time, coffee was replaced by tea as the country's leading export product. In 2001 coffee production increased to 18,366 tons, but export revenue decreased to 8,031m. Rwanda francs, accounting for only 21.3% of the value of total exports (including re-exports), owing to a 30% decline in the international price of coffee. The trend was similar in 2002, with total output increasing to 19,426 tons and coffee export earnings falling to 6,860m. Rwanda francs, representing 22.6% of the value of Rwanda's total exports. Nevertheless, sizeable efforts were devoted to improving the quality of Rwandan coffee and promoting the products. In 2002 marketing efforts began to produce results. Small quantities from the Maraba co-operative of producers were sold in the US state of Louisiana and purchased by the British Union Coffee Roasters company. In 2003 some \$400,000 was invested in 10 new washing stations; the Government planned to equip the country with a further 90 stations by 2010, with the target of attaining national output of 35,000 tons by 2010. Both the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Office des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda (OCIR) were involved in the programme, while the European Union (EU) announced that it would finance the modernization of the coffee sector through its stabilization of export earnings (Stabex) scheme. However, output in 2003 was disappointing, registering, at only 14,500 tons, a 25.4% decrease compared with the 2002 crop, owing to a severe drought. However, OCIR—Café projected an increase in

production in 2004 to 20,000 tons, assuming climatic conditions proved favourable, owing to the installation of 10 new washing stations financed by the EU, which would allow a rise, from 315 tons to 1,200 tons, in production of the best quality fully washed coffee, thereby generating revenue gains of \$1.50 per kg. In 2003, owing to slightly higher world prices, revenue from coffee exports was estimated at \$13.9m., demonstrating only a slight decline in value, compared with \$14.0m. recorded for the previous year, despite the sharp decrease in volume of the production.

The long-term objective of the Government was that the coffee and tea sectors should each generate export revenue of US \$100m. by 2010 and, thereby, together with projected revenues of \$100m. from the services sector (in particular tourism), contribute to improving the trade balance. In 2004 output increased beyond expectation, almost doubling, to 27,000 metric tons. Increased use of fertilizers and pesticides and the increase in the area under cultivation were beginning to pay dividends. This, in conjunction with higher world prices, allowed coffee to regain its position as the leading export product, with a total of \$27.5m. in export revenues (accounting for 30.5% of total exports during that year). However, sources at the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock expected output to fall by 7.4% during 2005, owing to cyclical conditions arising from 2004's high production (since coffee trees need time to regenerate).

Tea

Prior to 1994, the Government had attempted to diversify the crops grown for export through OCIR, established in 1964. This concentrated its efforts on tobacco, cotton, pyrethrum, quinquina, forestry and, pre-eminently, tea. Rwanda's output of made tea has increased steadily in recent years, rising from 2,522 metric tons in 1972 to 13,546 tons in 1991. Exports of tea earned 2,796.6m. Rwanda francs, or 23.4% of total export earnings in 1991, and this percentage increased to 32.3% in 1992. However, production declined to 10,493 tons in 1993, and export earnings decreased to US \$16m. (equivalent to 23.5% of the value of total exports), following the occupation of the lucrative Mulindi plantations by forces of the Front patriotique rwandais (FPR). In 1993–94 production collapsed to just 4,902 tons, largely owing to the adverse effects of the war and to the former Government's removal to Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo—DRC) of the Cyangu tea factory. Production in 1995 increased to 5,414 tons, still considerably below the Government's target level. In subsequent years, however, tea output increased dramatically, reaching 14,878 tons in 1998. Tea exports decreased to 12,959 tons in 1999, but increased again, to 14,481 tons, in 2000. Export revenue from tea fluctuated considerably, increasing from 5,040m. Rwanda francs in 1997 (approximately \$16.8m.) to 7,154m. Rwanda francs in 1998 (approximately \$22.8m.). Owing to a sharp decrease in international prices during that year and to a 16% decline in the volume of exports, revenue from tea exports dropped by 17.8% in 1999, to 5,881m. Rwanda francs. This trend eliminated the effects of an increase in the producer price in 1998, initiated by the Government, which simultaneously decided to privatize the tea estates and factories. In 2000, however, the combined effect of a 13.2% increase in tea production and an 18.5% rise in the price of Rwandan tea, from \$1.51 per kg in 1999 to \$1.79 per kg (well above the average world price of \$1.50), contributed to an increase in the value of tea exports, to 9,277m. Rwanda francs. For the first time, tea became the country's principal source of export earnings.

In 2001 production increased again, to a record amount of 17,815 metric tons, while the Director of the Office du Thé du Rwanda expressed satisfaction at the decision by Pakistan to resume its purchases of Rwandan tea. During that year tea export earnings rose to 9,996m. Rwanda francs, accounting for 26.5% of total export revenue. Production of tea decreased to 14,893 tons in 2002. In that year, however, revenue from tea exports increased to 10,373m. Rwanda francs and accounted for 34.2% of the value of the country's total exports, owing to steady international prices. For 2004 OCIR—Thé projected that tea output would remain at the level of 2003 production of 15,483 tons, about 40% above the 1993 level. Accordingly,

output could double by 2020, owing to the extension of the planted area from 12,000 ha to 15,000 ha, the creation of two new processing plants and the increase in yields from 1.5 tons per ha to 2.5 tons per ha—this last as a result of a more intensive use of fertilizers, a 20% increase in the tree population per ha, and more efficient collection techniques. In 2003 tea was a principal export product, generating \$11.9m. and accounting for about 24% of the value of total exports, according to UN figures. Production was lower than expected in 2004, at some 13,000 tons. Owing to stable prices, however, tea export earnings were higher than in the previous year, at \$25.6m., accounting for 28.6% of total export earnings during that year. The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock forecast a slight increase in production in 2005, to 14,000 tons, despite a decline in production in the first quarter of the year

Livestock

By July 1994 the livestock sector was in extreme crisis and the majority of the country's livestock had disappeared (although some cattle were introduced by refugees returning from Uganda). Limited livestock-vaccination programmes were undertaken by FAO and smaller agencies in the north-east, but the main problem remains the overstocking of cattle (and the consequent environmental strain) in this region, while livestock numbers are hopelessly insufficient elsewhere in the country. Between 1998 and 2000 livestock numbers increased from 657,137 to 732,123 head of cattle, from 192,344 to 248,345 sheep, from 481,145 to 756,522 goats and from 120,928 to 177,220 pigs, according to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. In 2001 the situation deteriorated again with an epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease, which affected five of Rwanda's 11 prefectures. The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock claimed that traders who had illicitly imported cattle from Uganda and Tanzania into Rwanda had spread the disease. Owners of large herds in Rwanda's Mutara highlands who also possessed cattle in these neighbouring countries were suspected of having contributed to the contamination of Rwanda's cattle. As a result, in March the authorities declared a quarantine on these areas and prohibited the circulation of cattle, dairy products and meat from this origin.

In an attempt to stimulate dairy production and increase household income, the Government and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) began working with communities in Mutara prefecture. Since 2000 farmers have been encouraged to produce yoghurt, cheese and cooking fat. By early 2005 some livestock numbers were approaching pre-war levels. According to government statistics, the numbers of cattle and poultry had reached 88% and 70% of the levels recorded in 1994, but the proportion was 30% for goats. In order to boost milk output, Rwanda has imported several hundred cows from Germany and South Africa; these are more productive than the local Ankole breed but more vulnerable to disease. In early 2005 an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in livestock herds necessitated the quarantining of six districts in four provinces.

The poultry sector is expanding rapidly. Fish production is also increasing rapidly, owing to the development of fisheries projects in Lake Kivu and in other smaller lakes throughout the country. From 1,300 metric tons in 1994, the total catch increased to 8,427 tons in 2003.

Reconstruction After Conflict

A joint FAO-WFP report estimated that food production in 1994 amounted to just 45% of the 1993 yield. It was also estimated that hundreds of hectares of natural forests had been damaged by displaced persons and that support systems for agriculture were almost completely destroyed. Food aid requirements (mainly grain and pulses) were estimated at more than 150,000 metric tons in 1994 and 116,000 tons in 1995. During the two seasons following the civil war 10,000 tons of beans, maize, vegetable and other seeds, together with 700,000 hoes, were distributed to some 690,000 households. It was estimated that 62% of farmers received seeds, while some 72% received tools. A conference of potential donors, sponsored by UNDP, was convened in Geneva, Switzerland, during January 1995, at which pledges of financial assistance totalling US \$587m. were made, including a substantial share for agriculture recovery programmes. By the end of 1995 pledges amounted to \$1,260m., of which \$189.5m. was to be allocated to

the agriculture sector. At the same time, however, disbursements amounted to just \$28.6m., having been slowed, in part, by the suspension of aid channelled through the Government in the months following the April 1995 massacre of displaced persons by security forces at the Kibeho refugee camp. Disputes involving land tenure were still common in 1997, and discouraged farmers from making long-term investments. However, by the end of 1996 part of the \$500m. pledged to facilitate the return of refugees had been allocated to basic rural and agricultural infrastructures. A programme of reform was also announced at this time. The Government intended to encourage a system of population regroupment called *Imidugu* (grouped habitat), which was believed to reduce social and economic costs by enabling shared use of expensive items and the maximization of water supplies. In 1997 FAO and the Government distributed seeds to approximately 2.3m. persons, including many returnees. The food deficit in that year was 179,000 tons, and the shortfall decreased slightly, to 158,000 tons, in 1998. Apart from the continuing insecurity in the north-west of the country, which particularly affected, until 1998, production of beans and potatoes, some 150,000 persons suspected to have participated in the 1994 genocide remained in prison and were therefore unable to contribute to food production. According to FAO estimates, food production in 1997 was 3.9m. tons, a decline of 14% compared with 1984, while the population had increased by 40% in the same period. By late 1999, after an 11% increase in food production, owing to the improvement of the security situation in the north-west, the authorities were again projecting an increase in the food deficit, as a result of the drought that was affecting most parts of the country. In order to avert this threat in the future and not to rely exclusively on rainwater, the Government planned to encourage the development of irrigation schemes using the country's underground water resources. The situation was also aggravated by competition from foreign imports, which undermined efforts to develop domestic rice production schemes. In March 1998 the African Development Fund disbursed \$1.4m. to finance a feasibility study on the improvement of soil conservation and the utilization of marshes in order to enable the farmers to benefit from new arable land. The World Bank also planned to finance two projects (one in agriculture and one in rural irrigation), with a total value of \$25m., in 2000. In 2001 USAID announced plans to use about \$2.3m. to support agribusiness development; additionally, it was to disburse \$3.4m. to improve data collection, policy analysis and access to financial services and also to promote technology transfers for the benefit of Rwanda's agricultural sector. In December of that year the Rwandan Government inaugurated a \$165m. rural development project, of which some 95% was funded by the World Bank Group, to modernize the agricultural sector. This 14-year project aimed to establish infrastructure and finance research into developing new outlets for Rwandan agricultural products.

Regional Effects of Conflict

Before 1990 the southern provinces were much poorer compared to the northern and eastern provinces. The average income per adult equivalent in Kibungo, the richest province, was three times that in Gikongoro, the poorest province. In 2000 Kibungo was still the richest province, but the average household was only 1.5 times richer than a household in Butare, now the poorest province. Interestingly, Rwanda's high performing provinces prior to the genocide (Kibungo in the east and Ruhengeri in the north) have experienced low, even negative economic growth in the conflict decade. Provinces that were poor, prior to the war and genocide, are still poorer than the Rwandan average, but they have experienced much stronger economic growth than the other provinces. In real terms, the growth of average income was negative in the two richest provinces and was highest in the three poorest provinces. These figures suggest that income convergence has taken place in Rwanda between poor and rich provinces. The reasons behind the convergence of formerly richer and poorer provinces is that they have been differently affected by the four conflict shocks that have hit Rwanda in the course of the nineties: civil war, genocide, mass migration and counter-insurgency.

The Government's 'Vision 2020' strategy emphasized the need for Rwanda to move away from an essentially subsistence agriculture, unable to achieve its self-sufficiency objective, towards a more market-orientated agricultural sector; this would require incentives to increase the specialization of farmers and encourage diversification. The Government's objective for 2020 was to have one-half of arable land given over to modern farms. By then, production of vegetables was targeted to have increased three-fold and dairy production five-fold. A five-fold to 10-fold rise in the value of cash crops on that recorded in 2000, was also projected. Nevertheless, US agronomists emphasized that an important requirement for meeting such an ambitious target was to halt the replacement of crops providing good soil protection, such as bananas, with cassava, which could rapidly have a deleterious effect on soil fertility. Other obstacles to be removed were the lack of fertilizers and the rapid decline in fallow fields. More research was also needed on varietal improvements to increase resistance to disease and yields for selected crops.

Water shortages have become an increasing difficulty, both in rural areas of Southern Gikongoro and Bugesera prefectures, and also in the capital, where 40% of the 600,000 inhabitants had no regular access to drinking water in 2001. The Ministry of Water and Natural Resources aimed to implement plans by 2004 to divert a large volume of water from the Nyabarongo river, 8 km from Kigali, and to increase supplies from 2009 by also pumping water from the Mutobo river, in Ruhengeri province. Resources from the Ninth EDF for 2002–07 were expected to finance the extension of water supply networks in the Bugesera region, which is periodically affected by drought.

INDUSTRY

The industrial sector followed the usual pattern for less developed African states, and food-based industries predominated, with the major companies prior to 1994 being BRALIRWA, the Rwandan subsidiary of a Dutch brewery, the Régie Sucrière de Kibuy (sugar-processing) and the OVIBAR factory, producing banana wine and liquors. By July 1994 the country's political turmoil had suspended economic activity in the sector. Factories and plants (where production had been virtually halted by power shortages earlier in the year) were looted, destroyed or abandoned. By early October, however, the BRALIRWA plant had resumed production. In 1994 manufacturing accounted for an estimated 3% of GDP, while industry provided 9% of GDP in the same year. In 1995, although only 40% of enterprises had resumed production, manufacturing was estimated to have recovered sufficiently to provide 14% of GDP, with industry accounting for 21%. Government officials claimed that the slow disbursement of some US \$72.9m. in international donor aid, allocated to the trade and industry sectors (only \$5.4m. had been released by the end of 1995), together with competition from tax-free imports of goods such as soap and plastics, had seriously hindered the recovery of the sector. By June 1997 69% of the companies existing before April 1994 had resumed their activities. Industrial output grew by 18% in 1996 and by 30% in 1997. However, sectoral growth was hampered by the lack of investment and basic infrastructure. In 1998 the sector was hindered by several factors, including excessive prices for water and energy supplies, insufficient use of installed capacity and competition from cheaper imported products; BRALIRWA and the Utexerwa textile plants, for example, reduced production by 40%. None the less, the Government resisted requests to increase customs duties or impose quotas, but instead was considering in early 1999 the provision of cheaper electricity and water for industry. By the end of 1998 prospects were improving for BRALIRWA, which obtained a contract, valued at 1,000m. Rwanda francs, for the supply of Primus beer to the neighbouring DRC. An additional difficulty for the manufacturing sector was the increase in transport costs of imported inputs as a result of the decision of Kenya and Uganda to limit the maximum weight per axle of trucks in transit on their respective road networks. The Rwandan Government was also concerned at the levels of smuggling of alcoholic beverages, petroleum products and cigarettes. In late 1999 the Govern-

ment announced plans to create export-processing zones along the Congolese border in Cyanguu and other cities, which could bring added value to products imported from the DRC.

In 1999 manufacturing output amounted to 53,061m. Rwanda francs, exceeding the 1994 figure of 28,598m. Rwanda francs. Nevertheless, output in 2000 represented 80% of the 1993 level of production. Performance in some sectors was better than in others: cement output reached a record level of 83,024 metric tons in 2001, compared with 66,291 tons in 1999 and 60,000 tons in 1993. Chemical industry output was also rising, with a 7.3% increase recorded in 1999 and a further 2.7% increase recorded in 2000. However, beer production decreased significantly, from 65.0m. litres in 1998 to 44.2m. litres in 2000, before increasing to 47.9m. litres in 2001. Soft drinks output followed a similar trend, falling from 36.3m. litres in 1998 to 20.7m. litres in 2000 but increasing to 22.8m. litres in 2001. Meanwhile, textile production decreased from 10.3m. m to 9.9m. m in 2000. Cigarettes were one of the strongest performing sectors in 2000: output was 327m., compared with 217m. in 1999. However, overall industrial performance in 2000 varied. Whereas average manufacturing output declined by 4.1%, compared with the previous year, the construction and public works sector demonstrated a 12.7% increase in revenue, from 35,300m. Rwanda francs in 1999 to 39,700m. Rwanda francs in 2000. The GDP of the industrial sector increased by 7.9% in 2002.

The 'Vision 2020' strategy projected growth in the industrial sector of 4.1% in both 2003 and 2004 and of 7.0% in 2005. A continued increase in construction activity was forecast by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning to be the main contributory factor to this growth. In 2002 the Government announced plans to reintroduce a 25% import duty on cement: this had been cut from 40% in 1997 to zero in 2000, since at that time the national producer, Cimenterie du Rwanda (CIMERWA), was unable to meet the strong demand created by government and private housing projects. Between 1995 and the end of 2001 265,229 houses were constructed, under the Government's reinstallation programme for rural inhabitants. As a result of investments made by CIMERWA to increase its capacity, the Government abolished the temporary dismantling of tariffs on cement imports in order to encourage the domestic industry. (Imported cement and raw materials for use in production of cement originating from member states of COMESA were to benefit from a preferential 5% tariff.) Since 2001 CIMERWA has encountered competition from the Kenya-based East African Portland cement corporation. None the less, CIMERWA's annual output was estimated at some 100,000 metric tons in 2003, of which a small proportion of 3,922 tons was exported to the DRC and Uganda. Rwanda also became eligible in March for textile and apparel benefits under the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which allow less developed countries in Africa to use imported fabrics and yarns for the production of items exported to the USA. Meanwhile, in late 2001 the Rwandan Government expressed its intention to amend tax regulations in order to accommodate the parent company of BRALIRWA, Heineken of the Netherlands, which contributed some 13,000m. Rwanda francs annually to the budget and had announced plans to make new investments in the country. In 2002 manufacturing output increased by 5.9%, to a value of 52,327m. Rwanda francs. The food, beer, soft drinks and tobacco industries alone accounted for 82.8% of the total and recorded a 6.2% increase compared with 2001.

Industry as a whole (including mining, manufacturing, power and construction) accounted for 21.3% of GDP in 2003 (of which manufacturing contributed 8.9%). In that year expansion of 16% in the construction sector, to 65,031m. Rwanda francs, contributed to industrial growth of 5.3%, despite a decrease in the manufacturing sector affecting in particular the food, beer, soft drinks and tobacco industries, which declined by 6.9%, owing to the competition on the domestic market of imported products and high input costs. BRALIRWA's output declined from 562,200 hl to 433,400 hl during that year. In 2004, owing to acute energy shortages as well as the impact of foreign imports, the output of Utexerwa, the national textile manufacturer, contracted by 9%. Some important changes were expected in the course of 2005, with

the Government's announcement of the privatization of the national schools printing company, Régie de l'Imprimerie Scolaire (IMPRISCO), of the pharmaceuticals manufacturer LABOPHAR and of four rice factories at Bugarama, Gikonko, Rwamagana and Kabuye.

MINING

Cassiterite (a tin-bearing ore) is Rwanda's principal mineral resource (exports of tin ore and concentrates were valued at 320m. Rwanda francs in 1991), followed by wolframite (a tungsten-bearing ore) and small, known quantities of beryl, columbo-tantalite (coltan) and gold. While tin concentrates (about 1,500 metric tons) were the third-largest export earner in 1985, high transport costs and the sharp decline in international tin prices resulted in the sector becoming virtually inactive in the late 1980s. At the end of 1985 Géomines, the Belgian company with a 51% shareholding in the Rwandan mining company SOMIRWA, went into liquidation; SOMIRWA itself was declared insolvent a few months later. Despite the insolvent state of the company, the Government's annual maintenance costs for SOMIRWA's installations had continued to exceed 70m. Rwanda francs. In 1992 the Régie d'Exploitation et de Développement des Mines (REDEMI) mining concern was established, with state involvement, and began to exploit the SOMIRWA mines in an artisanal capacity. However, the company was reported to be operating on an annual deficit of some 50m. Rwanda francs. In 1996 the Government announced its decision to privatize the company. From 1992 the SOMIRWA smelter resumed activity for six months of the year, processing cassiterite supplied by the ALICOM gold concern. Some efforts were made with EU support to stimulate the artisanal tin sector, and UNDP provided some funds towards an increase in gold production. Mining activities were resumed at a modest level in 1988 by artisans regrouped in COPIMAR, an independent co-operative offering managerial and commercial support. In May 2002 the Niobium Mining Company (NMC), owned by the German KHA international group, announced plans to invest US \$4m. in order to relaunch activity at the Karuruma smelter, aiming at processing both tin from cassiterite and also niobium concentrates for the production of ferro-niobium alloys.

The IMF estimated that Rwanda's exports of gold and diamonds amounted to US \$30m. for the first half of 1998, confirming (particularly in view of the fact that Rwanda has no diamond mines) suspicions that these minerals were originating from the DRC. Belgian statistics for 1998 indicated a dramatic rise in gold imports from Rwanda, from an annual average of \$15m. during 1990-93 to \$35m. in 1997, the first year of Rwanda's military presence in the eastern part of the DRC. In early 1997 a Belgian company established in Burundi initiated talks with the Rwandan Government in order to open a gold-refining plant in Kigali, which would process imports from the DRC. In mid-1998 the Government announced plans to revise the mining code before 2001 to attract investors. REDEMI was also included in the list of parastatals scheduled for privatization in 2001. Meanwhile, the company announced a short-term programme for the rehabilitation of several mining infrastructures, including the underground mines of Makaza, Masoro and Gasambya, and for the development of the Nyamyumba underground mines. All these projects concerned either cassiterite or coltan, or both (since often both minerals are found in the same deposits).

On 12 April 2001 a UN panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of the DRC's natural resources recommended that the UN Security Council impose an embargo against all Rwandan mineral exports. The report alleged that much of Rwanda's exported coltan, cassiterite, gold and diamonds included Congolese products, which were exploited and exported in illicit circumstances. The panel adopted this conclusion by comparing Rwandan official statistics for 1995 and 2000, which demonstrated a dramatic rise in gold exports, from 1 kg to 10 kg, in cassiterite exports, from 247 metric tons to 437 tons, and in coltan exports, from 54 tons to 87 tons. The UN report also found it suspicious that Rwanda exported up to 30,491 carats of diamonds in 2000. Furthermore, the report claimed to have obtained information that the Rwandan army

had organized the shipment of coltan and cassiterite from the Sominki mine in the DRC's Sud-Kivu region to Kigali in November 1998. It was also alleged that many companies involved in the exploitation of the DRC's minerals in the territories under the control of the Rwandan army were owned by close associates of President Kagame. The Rwandan armed forces were reported to have participated directly in the illicit trade in minerals. By the time the report was published, the Armée patriotique rwandaise (APR) had shares in some of these companies and also benefited from receipts from the Rwandan-supported Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) rebels. Other revenue was reportedly generated by taxes collected by the APR's 'Congo desk', which had a department of mineral resources, and from payments by individuals in companies in exchange for the protection of their trade and mining activities in the DRC. The conclusions of this report were rejected both by the Rwandan Government and by the Congolese rebels, which emphasized that neither the exploitation nor the export of these minerals was illegal, on the grounds that the Economic Community of the Great Lake Countries (CEPGL), of which the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi are members, allowed the transit of goods between its member states. It was claimed that the exports were not illicit, since export taxes were paid, accordingly, to the Congolese administration of these territories, namely the RCD, which had obtained recognition by the international community as one of the signatories of the 1999 Lusaka peace agreement. The figures released by the UN panels of experts diverged from those of the Banque Nationale du Rwanda, which reported 365 tons of cassiterite exports in 2000 (compared with 308 tons in 1999), 603 tons of coltan exports (330 tons in 1999) and 144 tons of wolfram exports (84 tons in 1999). According to the central bank, these export figures matched domestic production statistics, which would indicate that the entire output was exported in that year. The increase in the volume of mineral exports and the increase in the coltan price, from US \$14.00 per kg in 1999 to \$18.80 per kg in 2000, contributed to a significant increase in export earnings of minerals, from \$4.6m. in 1999 to \$11.3m. in 2000. As a result, the share of minerals exports increased from 9.5% to 18.2% of the total. In 2001, owing to a 10-fold increase in coltan prices during the first half of the year, total mineral exports accounted for \$40m., a four-fold rise compared with 2000. With new mines commencing production in both Australia and Brazil, however, the international price of coltan began to decline dramatically by the end of 2001. At that time the Rwandan Minister of Finance and Economic Planning emphasized to the international press that the coltan that was exported by Rwanda during 2001 was mined in western parts of the country, where geological properties were similar to those of eastern DRC. As expected, export revenue from coltan decreased sharply, by 62.5%, from 17,368m. Rwanda francs in 2001 to 6,521m. Rwanda francs in 2002, although the volume of coltan exports declined by only 30% during that year, from 1,488 tons to 1,042 tons. Meanwhile, cassiterite exports increased from 553 tons to 690 tons, and wolfram exports nearly doubled, from 163 tons in 2001 to 324 tons in 2002.

During 2002 mineral exports amounted to 7,440m. Rwanda francs, representing 24% of the value of total exports. In 2003 mineral exports totalled 6,307m. Rwanda francs, accounting for 18.8% of the value of total exports, as a result of lower coltan prices and lower volumes of exports. During that period coltan sales amounted to 732 metric tons, worth 3,403m. Rwanda francs. Cassiterite exports totalled 1,457 tons, valued at 2,444m. Rwanda francs, while wolfram exports amounted to 120 tons, valued at 120m. Rwanda francs. Gold exports generated 245m. Rwanda francs during this period. In early 2004 REDEMI expected to improve its performance during the year, as a result of an investment of US \$420,000 provided by NMC, the Hong-Kong-based Niotan, Tradmet (Belgium) and Finmining, to purchase pumps, fuels and drilling material. The objective was to treble the 2003 cassiterite output of 182 tons, to increase coltan output from nine to 30 tons, and to treble the production of wolfram to 234 tons. Relying on higher international tin prices and the sale of some of its concessions, REDEMI envisaged the improvement of its financial situation by 2007. Meanwhile, COPIMAR was anticipating a 15%

increase in its 2003 production levels, which were 60 tons of coltan, 70 tons of cassiterite and 60 tons of wolfram. Rwanda's Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning projected a 54.6% increase of the activity of the mining and quarrying sector for 2004. During that year the Rwandan Government was also seeking financial support from the ADB to finance a prospecting programme, in order to identify new reserves and thereby to compensate for the progressive exhaustion of existing small deposits. COPIMAR and REDEMI contributed about 20% of mineral exports, the rest being provided by dealing houses, which purchase the products of domestic independent miners or those sold by Congolese traders. In 2005 the Government was considering the privatization of REDEMI's concessions. The NMC smelter in Kigali, which has an installed capacity of 2,000 tons, and the Minerals Processing Company smelter in Gisenyi, with a capacity of 1,800 tons, both operate with imported Congolese minerals.

Natural Gas

Another important mineral to be exploited is natural gas, which was discovered beneath Lake Kivu on the border with the DRC. Reserves of an estimated 60,000m. cu m (about one-half of which are in the DRC) are believed to be among the largest in the world. In May 2000 Rwanda's water, electricity and gas parastatal, Electrogaz, initiated talks with the South African company Mossgas to discuss the possibility of exploiting the Lake Kivu methane and gas resources. Two pilot installations, funded by the EU, produce gas, but here again the small size of the potential market casts doubt on the likely profitability of large-scale processing. However, Electrogaz hopes to receive Belgian funding for a programme to increase its daily output of gas from 5,000 cu m to 25,000 cu m. In October 1997 the Governments of Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC agreed to finance a joint feasibility study to exploit the gas reserves of Lake Kivu. In September 1999 the Banque Rwandaise de Développement announced plans to submit a project for the establishment of a further pilot installation to process the Lake Kivu gas resources to the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Commonwealth Development Corporation, the International Finance Corporation and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA). In July 2002 the Israel Electric Corporation negotiated a 'build-own-operate' contract with the Rwandan authorities for the construction of a 25-MW methane power station. The overall electricity generation potential from natural gas resources was estimated at 200 MW by a private consultant and at 700 MW by the Rwandan Government. Plans to supply natural gas to the cement and other industries were also under consideration. In February 1999 the South African oil company Engen purchased the local subsidiaries of British Petroleum and Fina (Belgium), taking control of 25% of the distribution market for petroleum products in Rwanda. In August of that year Shell Oil acquired for \$2.1m. the Petrorwanda distribution company.

In 2004 the World Bank was also planning to finance consultant support for the Unité de Promotion et d'Exploitation du Gaz du Lac Kivu (UPEGAZ) parastatal, considering that the medium-term development of the power sector was 'inextricably linked' to the exploitation of Lake Kivu's methane reserves. According to Bank sources, a Strategic Social and Environmental Assessment of Power Development Options for Rwanda, Burundi and western Tanzania concluded that power generation from Kivu gas was competitive with comparable hydroelectricity options. Meanwhile, the World Bank was also considering financing the construction of a transmission link to connect potential new generation at Lake Kivu. Recent developments in the sector have included demonstrations of this methane extraction technology to the Government and potential investors by engineers from a South African firm, Murray & Roberts, at a pilot plant near Gisenyi. Cogelgaz, a joint venture between Heineken's subsidiary BRALIRWA and the Banque de Commerce, de Développement et d'Industrie (BCDI), had commissioned the South African company to undertake the technical improvement of its existing gas plant. Rwandan projects planned by Murray & Roberts included the supply of methane gas to urban areas.

ENERGY

Rwanda's electricity needs are supplied almost entirely from hydroelectric sources, as the land relief is ideal for power generation. According to studies undertaken by the CEPGL's *Énergie des Pays des Grands Lacs* (EGL), the Ruzizi river alone offers potential generating capacity totalling 500 MW, of which only a fraction is currently being used. Rwanda imports more than one-half (54% in 1990) of its total electricity requirements. In early 1994 the EIB, together with French and German credit institutions, pledged more than US \$1m. to help rehabilitate the Ntaruka power station, which had been damaged by Front patriotique rwandais (FPR) militia; the project was completed in 1998. By October 1994, as a result of the catastrophic sequence of political events, the Mukungwa power station alone was supplying Kigali, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi with insufficient amounts of electricity. By early 1995, however, following the EU's allocation of ECU 5m. for the rehabilitation of the power sector, the situation had improved vastly, and Butare, Gitarama and all areas of Kigali were receiving adequate power supplies. Further reconstruction enabled the Gibira and Gisenyi power stations and also the Gatsasa thermal installation to resume production. A new 15-MW power station, supplied by Canada, was installed at Gikondo, near Kigali, by January 1996, but one-third of the country's total requirements were still not being met. In April 1997 it was announced that a feasibility study would be conducted into the possibility of aligning the power grids in Rwanda and in Uganda in order to lessen Rwanda's deficit. The Ntaruka diesel power station, completed in 1998, was expected to help reduce the shortfall; in 1997 15 MW (of a total consumption of 39 MW) was provided by neighbouring countries.

Also in early 1996 the Government announced partial privatization plans for Electrogaz, which was to entrust management of network exploitation to private interests. In May 2000 the Government decided that Electrogaz should be restructured and privatized, and that its water and electricity activities should be managed separately from the methane gas sector. However, the privatization process proved more protracted than expected. In September 2001 the management of Electrogaz announced that the first stage of the privatization would only commence in the first half of 2002. The Government planned that the state should continue to own the company for the following five years, but intended to contract a private corporation to manage it. Should Electrogaz's performances be positive during that time, the Government would then sell its shares. Six foreign companies, including SAUR International of France and Manitoba Hydro Roche Ltd of Canada, expressed interest in purchasing the parastatal. One of the Government's aims in this operation was to reduce energy and water prices, in order to increase the competitiveness of the economy and alleviate the burden of charges for consumers. In June 1998 Electrogaz signed a technical co-operation agreement with the Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa (ESKOM).

In 1998 production of electricity increased to 111m. kWh. In 1999 production totalled 127.3m. kWh. In 2000, however, production was only 110.8m. kWh, and Rwanda had to import 94.1m. kWh, equivalent to 46.1% of the country's total consumption in that year. In March 2001 prospects of increasing substantially Rwanda's power-generation capacity improved following an agreement between the BCDI and BRALIRWA to finance some US \$5m. of the first stage of a power station, which was to be fuelled by methane gas from Lake Kivu (see above) and operated by the Gisenyi Electric and Gas Co. The power station was to have an initial modest capacity of 2.5 MW (which might subsequently be extended to up to 10 MW). According to USAID, this improvement in power availability was expected to encourage foreign direct investment in the region. By July 2001 the management of Electrogaz estimated that the company needed US \$200m. to guarantee steady supply to users in urban centres. It also expressed concern that most equipment at power stations required immediate repair to meet the demand. In 2001 electricity production declined further, to 89.3m. kWh. In December 2002 the management of the Ugandan Electricity Generation Company agreed to increase its power supplies to Electrogaz. In February 2003 the Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic

Planning estimated that total future investments in the electricity sector, including methane power stations and the extension of the Nyabarongo and rural electricity projects, which would double the national capacity (42 MW), would amount to \$400m. At the beginning of 2003 Cogelgaz contracted Murray & Roberts to carry out a feasibility study for the construction of a methane-powered electricity plant, with a projected cost of \$20m. In mid-2003 the EIB was considering the extension of the oil pipeline from Eldoret, Kenya, to the Ugandan capital and, in a further stage, to Kigali and eastern DRC.

In accordance with its objective to transform the country into a centre of services and a low cost centre of production for the region, which requires regular power supply as a pre-condition, the Rwandan Government declared 2004 to be 'the year of energy'. The first priority established by Lahmeyer International, which took over the management of Electrogaz by the end of 2003, was to reduce technical losses in the transport and distribution of power. A second objective was to improve Electrogaz's performance, and thus create a favourable context for privatization. By early 2004 the ADB, the World Bank and the OPEC Fund for International Development were considering investing US \$50m. in order to support the Government's energy and water programmes. Electrogaz was also seeking complementary funds in order to improve the distribution networks in Kigali and other urban areas. The state-owned company was also planning to provide Kigali with a strategic reserve of 5 MW of thermal origin. By early 2004 2-MW generators were already being rehabilitated, and Electrogaz was considering the acquisition of generators in order to enable the Gatsatsa diesel station near Kigali to produce the remaining 3 MW. Power cuts resulting from increased demand were becoming more frequent by the end of 2003. After the completion of its rehabilitation, Electrogaz was considering several options to expand its capacity. The most advanced is the project to convert into electricity the methane of Lake Kivu. Electrogaz was trying to interest local companies, which were seeking larger and more secure power supplies, in joint ventures for the construction of small pilot plants with a maximum capacity of 2 MW. Meanwhile, the Government was continuing talks with an Israeli-Norwegian independent power producer, Dane Associates, to develop a 200-MW gas-powered plant. In a first phase, an extraction unit of a 20-MW to 30-MW capacity, split into four units, in order to be compatible with existent installations, was to be established. Electrogaz also planned to restore the capacity of existing hydro-power infrastructures, such as the Ruzizi 1 plant (10 MW), in the neighbouring DRC. In late 2003 the Rwandan company dispatched a team of experts, which estimated the cost of such rehabilitation work at \$1.5m. Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda expressed interest in January 2004 in the development of the Rusumo Falls hydro-power project on the Kagera river, generating capacity of which was estimated at 65–70 MW, at a ministerial meeting held in Kigali, in the framework of the Nile Basin Initiative.

Insufficient rainfall in 2004 aggravated Rwanda's chronic electricity shortfall: Electrogaz's supplies declined by 20%. As an emergency response, in June the Government provided finance for the purchase of 12.5 MW of new diesel generation capacity from Global Power System (Belgium/Germany), for the Jabana substation in Kigali (7.8 MW) and for the 4.7 MW extension of the Gatsatsa power station, at a total cost of €4.3m. In addition, the Government planned to add a 10–15-MW thermal capacity by 2006–07 in order to meet demand. The World Bank was considering extending a US \$13.6m. loan for that purpose through IDA. Other potential investments included funding of \$29m. (of which \$20.8m. from IDA and \$6m. from the Nordic Development Fund) to improve the quality of power supply in the country. The Rwandan authorities and Electrogaz came to the conclusion that reform was necessary to help the company reduce structural deficits. In December 2004 the monthly fuel bill increased to \$1m., excluding duties and taxes, and it was estimated that it could rise to \$1.5m. by mid-2006. Tariffs have halved since 1997 in real terms. The actual revenue collection rate is \$0.04–0.05 per kWh whereas the company purchases electricity at a price of \$0.08 per kWh from SINELAC, the joint venture between Electrogaz and its DRC and Burundi equivalents SNEL and

REGIDESO (which operates the Ruzizi 2 power station in the DRC). Electrogaz, which was obliged to purchase large quantities of fuel and to fund its investment programme, was already burdened by its debts to the Government and to SINELAC. World Bank experts considered that major financial restructuring was required in order to limit electricity price shocks to the economy. It was none the less estimated that in order to cover its operational costs and other expenditures, Electrogaz should increase its tariffs from 42 Rwanda francs per kWh to 131 Rwanda francs per kWh. However, the 2005 budget envisaged increasing the tariff to only 61 Rwanda francs per kWh. Long-term solutions to the problem included the revitalization of regional co-operation in the energy sector. A step in that direction was made in July 2004, when the foreign ministers of Burundi, DRC and Rwanda, meeting in Brussels, Belgium, announced their commitment to reviving the activities of the CEPGL, and, more specially, the rehabilitation of the Ruzizi 1 hydroelectric power station, of which current capacity of 28.2 MW was to be upgraded to 39.6 MW, thereby enabling Ruzizi 1 to sell electricity to Electrogaz. The upgrading of the Ruzizi 2 power station operated by SINELAC was also envisaged. The main customer of the combined Ruzizi 1/Ruzizi 2 capacity is Rwanda, which took 68% of the 187 GWh produced in 2002, followed by the DRC (31%) and Burundi (1%). In the long term, projects may include the construction of Ruzizi 3. The total potential of the river is estimated at some 200 MW. If harnessed, this would enable SINELAC not only to satisfy the needs of the CEPGL members but also to export to other countries in the region. In order to be realized, however, these projects require, on the one hand, the improvement of bilateral relations between Rwanda and the DRC and, on the other, the settlement of the debt owed by Electrogaz to SNEL, which was estimated at \$330,000 in July 2004. Another pre-condition for the revival of CEPGL co-operation was the restructuring of the Banque de Développement des Etats des Grands Lacs (BDEGL), which formerly arranged financing with the EIB, Italy and the World Bank for the \$72m. Ruzizi 2 station. Such reform is necessary if the BDEGL is to fulfil its ambitions to become the vehicle for the implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) projects in the region, including the interconnection between Kigoma (Rwanda) and Rwegura (Burundi), and the interconnection of the CEPGL and Tanzanian grids.

Donors also considered that the Société Commerciale et Industrielle du Gaz (SOCIGAZ), which was created in 1990 by the DRC and Rwanda to develop methane gas projects, was also badly in need of financial and technical support if it was to increase its activities. Some progress, however, was achieved in the projects to develop the Lake Kivu methane reserves for use in energy generation projects. In late 2004 the World Bank was planning to finance consultant support to UPEGAZ (see above). In March 2005 Dane Associates signed an agreement with the Government of Rwanda for a 49-year concession to extract methane gas from the central Kibuye section of Lake Kivu, to be used to generate electricity to be sold to Electrogaz. The two companies established a joint venture called Kibuye Power 1 to manage the operation, which was to require an estimated total investment of \$60m. Meanwhile, in February Cogelgas commenced negotiations for a power purchase agreement with the Government, and it was additionally looking for an operator for the development of its Gisenyi methane gas concession.

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

Internal communications in Rwanda are operated almost exclusively along the relatively well-developed road system (12,000 km in 1999), as there are no railways nor navigable waterways (except Lake Kivu). Asphalted highways link Rwanda with Burundi, Uganda, the DRC and Tanzania. They also connect the principal towns. Tarmac roads extend to just over 1,000 km, which, given the small size of the country, is one of the highest densities in Africa. In early 1999 works financed by IDA for the asphaltting of the 91-km Gitarama–Kibuye road were completed. Moreover, the World Bank agreed to disburse an additional US \$10m. by the end of 1998 for the construction of roads to connect the nearby villages

to the Gitarama–Kibuye road in order to facilitate the transporting of crops.

Rwanda's external trade is heavily dependent on the ports of Mombasa (Kenya), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Matadi (DRC), and about 80% of Rwandan exports and imports pass through Uganda and Kenya. Insecurity caused by the war in the north of Rwanda led to the closure of the northern transport 'corridor' through Uganda. With the Gatuna and Kagitumba roads unavailable, most traffic had to be diverted via the difficult and unreliable route through Tanzania. In 1992 several projects had been approved by the EU and the World Bank to improve road links between eastern Zaire and western Uganda, with the aim of facilitating the passage of Rwandan trade across the border with Zaire, and thereby bypassing the troubled border with Uganda. Following the FPR victory in July 1994, however, the northern transport 'corridor' was immediately reopened. By the end of 1997 some 500 army personnel were deployed permanently to protect one of the country's principal roads, between the prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, from rebel attacks. In January of that year the EU approved funding to upgrade the main road in and around Kigali. By the end of 1997 the EU had committed a total of ECU 34.5m. to rehabilitate 200 km of roads and the national airport of Kanombe and work on the project was under way. In October 2000 the EU agreed to allocate €9.2m. towards the completion of the rehabilitation of the 111-km road between Gitarama and the Burundi border. The OPEC Fund for International Development signed a further \$10m. loan agreement with Rwanda to co-finance upgrading of the Gitarama road in early 2005. Further measures to improve the road network were undertaken in 2005. In July public works companies were invited to bid for the construction of the Kicukiro–Nyamata–Nemba road, to be financed by ADB, and for the rehabilitation of tarmac roads in Kigali, financed by BADEA.

In mid-1998 the Government announced plans to strengthen the management of the road fund and increasingly to contract out road maintenance. Furthermore, the Government planned to encourage the establishment of truck co-operatives in rural areas to improve the distribution of agriculture produce. Feasibility studies have been conducted for a railway network to link Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. The Rwandan business community showed renewed interest in the sector in early 2000, dispatching a delegation to the railway terminal of Isaka (Tanzania) to discuss with the local authorities and the Tanzania Railway Corporation plans to make greater use of this central corridor, combining a road link from Kigali to Isaka (500 km) and the railway line from Isaka to the port of Dar es Salaam (1,300 km). In April 2000 Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania expressed their renewed intention to seek funds to build the railway link between Isaka and Kigali with a possible extension to Burundi. Transport costs have increased sizeably on the northern corridor (Kigali–Kampala–Mombasa), owing to the Ugandan and Kenyan Governments' decision to limit the maximum weight per axle of the trucks passing through their territory. Furthermore, tensions arising from the military clashes between the Ugandan and the Rwandan armies in Kisangani, DRC, in June of that year contributed to a dramatic decline in traffic through the northern corridor between Uganda and Rwanda and prompted the Rwandan Government and business interests to seek alternative access routes to the Indian Ocean.

Prior to the escalation of hostilities in April 1994, a number of international airlines, most prominently Sabena of Belgium and Air France, operated services to Kigali, while the small national carrier, Air Rwanda (scheduled for privatization), operated domestic passenger and cargo services and international cargo flights to Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, the DRC and destinations in Europe. Only Sabena (now SN Brussels Airlines) resumed flights after the FPR took power in July 1994. However, the airport is to be upgraded to meet international standards with the aid of the EU. In early 1998 the national carrier, Air Rwanda, announced plans to buy shares in Alliance Air, a regional carrier owned jointly by the Governments of Tanzania and Uganda and by South African Airways; the creation of a new company, to be known as Air Alliance Rwanda (AAR), was announced at the same time. Jointly owned by the Rwandan Government (51%) and Alli-

ance Air (49%), AAR was to replace Air Rwanda and offer direct flights from Kigali to Johannesburg (South Africa), Entebbe (Uganda), Nairobi (Kenya), Dar es Salaam and Lubumbashi (DRC). In 2002 Rwanda had nine airports, of which only four had paved runways. In 2003 the EIB and EDF announced contributions, of €11m. and €8.5m. respectively, to rehabilitate the runway of Kigali international airport and the supply of air navigation equipment.

By mid-1998 the Government announced it would adopt a regulatory framework to supervise the participation of private companies in the telecommunications sector and to finalize the privatization of Rwandatel. In late 1999 the Government announced that the privatization of the national telecommunications company would take place during 2000. Meanwhile, the private mobile cellular telephone corporation MTN Rwandacell announced the extension of its Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) network, which would henceforth cover three-quarters of Rwanda's territory. Rwandatel's growth is probably the country's greatest commercial success since independence. When it was created in 1993 only 3,000 lines were operating. One year later that figure had increased to 12,000, but the disruption during the 1994 genocide resulted in the near collapse of the system. In 1996 Rwandatel had a network of 7,000 lines, and achieved a turnover of US \$4m. Five years later the network had expanded to 20,000 lines and its turnover had increased five-fold, to \$21m. In 2002 the management of Rwandatel expected to increase the number of lines to 40,000 and its turnover to \$50m. Major innovations planned in that year included the introduction of a prepaid system to improve the recovery of bills and the construction throughout the country of public telephone facilities, including in the most remote rural areas. Meanwhile, the company invested in new technologies. By mid-2002 the country had three internet service providers (Rwandatel, the National University of Rwanda and the Kigali Institute of Science and Technology). Rwandatel's plan was to introduce high-speed and high-capacity asymmetric digital subscriber line (ADSL) connections during 2002, in order to improve services to the private sector and national institutions. Development plans included the construction of new centres, with a capacity of 20,000 lines, to provide telephone services to the inhabitants of the outskirts of Kigali, and to replace old cables outside the capital with fibre-optic ones. The long-planned privatization of the company remained the objective, but the Government took the decision to continue the expansion of the company and, after its capital reached significant proportions, to sell 51% of shares to a private operator. Plans also included the sale of Rwandatel's 26% share in Rwandacell and the creation of the government-owned company's own mobile telephone subsidiary. At the beginning of 2002 the company expanded its activities in the neighbouring DRC, signing a partnership agreement with the management of the parastatal Office Congolais des Postes et des Télécommunications in the part of the country held by the Rwandan-backed RCD, in order to improve telecommunications in both Goma and Bukavu.

The development of telecommunications was part of the national information technology policy. The Government established an Information Technology Commission, headed by the President, in 2001, and created an agency to oversee a five-year plan, with a projected cost of \$500m., to develop the sector, with the assistance of the UN Economic Commission for Africa. The mobile cellular telephone sector expanded even more rapidly. By early 2003 it was estimated that the number of mobile cellular telephones in use in the country was at least double that of fixed telephone lines. In early 2004, however, demand for telecommunication services still exceeded the capacity of the operators, as a result of lack of financing and competition in services provision. It was anticipated that the privatization of Rwandatel would improve its operational and financial performance, as well as its investment capacity. The Government was also considering the sale of its shares in Rwandacell, the market-leader (well ahead of Afritel and Artel, which operate mainly in rural areas). In early 2004 more than 300 secondary schools were provided with internet connectivity. In February 2005 President Kagame stated, at the African Information Communications Technologies conference in Accra, Ghana, that all of the country's secondary schools

were to be connected to the internet by 2017. Kagame also announced that broadband infrastructure was in place in Rwanda, that there was fibre-optic infrastructure in Kigali and most other towns and that the authorities planned to extend this to other areas of the country. Rwanda, like other East and Central African countries, relies on satellite as a sole medium for the international connectivity. However, the Government has, through Rwandatel, subscribed to the future East African Submarine Cable System. The number of internet centres was increasing rapidly in the country. In early 2005, for example, farmers at Maraba were using such facilities to communicate with other coffee producers from the rest of the world.

DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

The members of the CEPGL agreed in 1978 to form a joint development bank, and to co-operate in the development of a transport system and the construction of a hydroelectric power station (the Ruzizi 2 project) on the Rwanda–Congo border, the exploitation of methane gas deposits beneath Lake Kivu and the promotion of a fishing industry. The BDEGL was formerly established in 1980, with its headquarters at Goma, in what was then Zaire. Since the change of regime in the DRC, all the CEPGL states have expressed their desire for continuing regional co-operation. However, the war in the DRC between 1998 and 2003 halted CEPGL activities. It was only in July 2004 that the three countries undertook to resume co-operation within the framework of the CEPGL in the interests of promoting regional stability and economic development. Energy was given priority in the list of joint projects, more specifically the rehabilitation of the Rusizi 1 hydroelectric power station, followed by the restructuring of the BDEGL, the exploitation of the Lake Kivu methane gas reserves, and agriculture and communications projects. However, cross-border raids by Hutu rebels into Rwanda and from the Rwandan Defence Force militia into the DRC at the end of 2004 created a climate of tension, which caused delays in the implementation of these projects.

The Rwandan Government has sought unsuccessfully to limit the overall budget deficit, which reached 19.2% of GDP in 1993, compared with 9% in 1989, despite an 11% increase in tax revenue and a 25% decline in capital expenditure to 1992, and notwithstanding the Government's failure adequately to finance the social contingency fund agreed under the terms of its adjustment programme. Budget expenditure increased in order to finance the war and internal security, and to support producer prices for coffee. The situation deteriorated further in 1993, with revenue declining by an estimated 6%, while expenditure increased by an estimated 5%. By the end of October 1993 foreign reserves were estimated to be insufficient to sustain imports for one week.

The overall budget deficit amounted to 16% of GDP by the end of 1994, and to 12.5% by the end of 1995. By 1997 the budget deficit had decreased to 10% of GDP but an increase, to 13.5%, was expected in 1998, following a temporary acceleration in government investment, and the high costs of structural reforms. Although IMF projections indicated a further decrease by 2000, owing to improved savings and a stabilization of government investments, estimates for 1999 projected a budgetary deficit of 16.4% of GDP. Furthermore, the high level of military expenditure (about one-third of current expenditure in 1997, despite a demilitarization programme which commenced in that year) was a matter of concern for the donors, particularly compared with the share of the social sectors, which declined from 38% to 18% between 1985 and 1995. In November 1998 the Government pledged to limit military expenditure to 4% of GDP and civil service salaries to 3.6% of GDP. In that year the Government announced plans for some 3,600 redundancies within the civil service and for the sale of up to one-half of its vehicles in an effort to reduce expenditure. The Government also announced plans to increase substantially taxes on beer, petrol, soft drinks, cigarettes, wines and spirits, in an attempt to balance the 1999 budget.

In 1999 an overall budget deficit of 25,300m. Rwanda francs (equivalent to 3.9% of GDP) was recorded. This was attributed

to a decrease in earnings from exports of coffee, pyrethrum, and hides and skins, despite the good performance of the tea sector. The 2000 budget of 168,900m. Rwanda francs (including foreign funding, which amounted to 53.7% of the total) was 2,000m. Rwanda francs lower than the budget of the previous year. In order to balance the 2000 budget, the Government decided to maximize its earnings, by introducing a value-added tax on 1 July of that year and by accelerating the privatization process. Apart from the telecommunications company Rwandatel, OCIR, tea-processing plants and plantations have been listed among the assets that are to be privatized, alongside STIR (international transport), Sodeparal (agricultural products), Soporiz (rice) and the water, electricity and gas utility, Electrogaz (see above). The state also plans divestment from three banks (Banque Commerciale du Rwanda, Banque Rwandaise de Développement and Banque de Kigali), the tobacco corporation, Tabarwanda, the flour mill, Etiru, the coffee company, Rwandex, the BRALIRWA brewery, the printing company, IMPRISCO, and the travel agency, Amirwanda. Despite the concerns expressed by donors, defence still remained a priority of the national budget in 2000, absorbing 19.8% of total expenditure. However, the Government confirmed its decision to make 3,600 redundancies and to suspend new recruitment of civil servants. In April 2000 the new Prime Minister, Bernard Makuza, expressed the Government's commitment to curb corruption, following the resignation of his predecessor and parliamentary investigations into embezzlement charges concerning several ministers of the previous administration. An overall budget deficit of 40,200m. Rwanda francs (equivalent to 5.5% of GDP) was recorded in 2001.

In May 2001 the Rwandan Government presented a 'plan of action' for the 2001–10 period at the third UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries, which took place in Brussels. The principal aims were to achieve an average annual GDP growth rate of at least 6%, restrain inflation to below 5% a year, reduce the current-account deficit (excluding official transfers) from 16.8% of GDP in 2000 to 10.7% in 2004, maintain the level of gross official reserves at a level of at least the value of six months of imports, increase the ratio of revenue to GDP by one-half of a percentage point per year, and maintain debt at sustainable levels. In order to meet those targets, the challenge was to diversify the economy, and to increase labour productivity and rural recapitalization in all sectors. To that effect, the 'plan of action' included in its strategy the creation of training opportunities for unskilled young workers and the provision of rural credit, financial services and support to small-scale enterprises. Meanwhile, the Government would also aim to increase tax collection, from 9.7% of GDP at the end of 1999 to 11% by the end of 2001. Positive results were also expected from the elimination of tariffs on regional trade consistent with the Cross-Border Initiative.

In early 2002 the Government announced its objective to increase GDP per head to US \$960 by 2020, as part of the objectives of the 'Vision 2020' development strategy. Emphasis was to be placed on the development of services, which accounted for 34.4% of the country's GDP in 2001. The ambition was to transform Rwanda from an essentially agrarian economy to a knowledge-based society within 20 years, through the development of information technology. To this effect, the Kigali Institute of Science and Technology was inaugurated in July 2002. Meanwhile, efforts were being devoted to integrating the Rwandan banking system further into the global economy, as was demonstrated by the establishment, in April of the same year, by six Rwandan banks of a joint company to promote the use of credit cards and other electronic payment systems. The Government also aimed to encourage development in the tourism sector, which was undergoing a recovery, although its contribution to tertiary sector GDP had not reached pre-war levels by the end of 2001. However, by the end of 2003 the contribution of services to GDP had risen to 36.3%. The 'Vision 2020' strategy also aimed to increase the literacy rate from 48% in 2000 to 100%. By early 2004 internet connectivity was established in more than 300 schools. The long-term objective was to transform Rwanda into a regional centre for services, not least within the framework of a revived CEPGL. The expansion of the coffee and tea industries, of tourism and of new communication technologies were set as

priorities of the 2004 budget. Indeed, Rwanda is endowed with considerable tourism attractions, such as its volcanos and wildlife resources such as mountain gorillas and the zebras of the Kagera National Park. South Africa's Sun Group, which acquired the Meridian Hotel in Gisenyi, together with Kenyan investors and also Rwandan private interests, has contributed significantly to the development of Rwanda's hotel capacity.

Of the 368,000m. Rwanda francs budget for 2005 (of which as much as 57.7% was to be foreign-financed) 27.9% was allocated to development expenditure. Health, education, defence and infrastructure accounted for most of the 9% increase in total budget spending. Some 4,000m. Rwanda francs was designated for the road fund, but total requirements for rehabilitation of the network were estimated at 12,000m. Rwanda francs. Other priorities of the budget were the need to enhance agricultural productivity and improve distribution of seeds and fertilizers, to promote better access to loans for the agricultural sector and to finance land reforms, as well as investments in information technologies. There has been a general trend in increasing government expenditure, which represented 24.1% of GDP in 2003 compared with 21.3% in 2002. Meanwhile, the share of capital expenditure in GDP increased from 4.9% in 2002 to 5.6% in 2003, and to 8.1% in 2004. Defence expenditure declined from 2.9% of GDP in 2002 to 2.7% in 2003.

Rwanda's heavy dependence on foreign assistance (equivalent to as much as 90% of public investment in recent years) has made the economy vulnerable to civil and political instability. By the end of 1995 external assistance was equivalent to 172.5% of imports, or US \$56 per head. Of the \$587m. pledged by donors at the UNDP-sponsored conference, convened in Geneva in January 1995, only \$69m. had been disbursed by June, largely as a result of the Kibeho refugee camp massacre and the Government's failure to accept a broader political and ethnic base. In that month, however, the EU and other donors began the resumption of aid disbursements, and subsequent pledges brought the total amount to \$1,260m., of which \$404m. (32%) had been spent by the end of 1995. With such transfers, by the end of 1995 foreign reserves increased to the value of 3.7 months of imports, compared to that of 1.3 months in 1994. Delays to aid disbursements were not only prompted by security issues, but also by disagreements between the World Bank and the Government regarding the assignment of a procurement of commodities and technical assistance under the World Bank Emergency Recovery Credit. Other delaying factors were the Government's limited capacity to absorb aid, owing to its own limited technical and administrative staff and its unwillingness to accept foreign technical assistance. In June 1996, at a second donors' conference held in Geneva, additional funds of \$617m. were pledged, although, in effect, according to some participants at the meeting, the new money made available amounted to only \$240m. Indeed, the EU attached very stringent conditions for the disbursement of its funds, which were unlikely to be met by the Government in the short term. Such conditions included appropriate measures for the repatriation of refugees from Zaire and Tanzania, and the improvement of the judicial system. In late 1996 accusations were raised that external aid had been used by the Habyarimana Government to purchase weapons. It was also alleged that bank transfers, again used to purchase armaments, had been allowed, even during the genocide.

In 1995, principally as a result of external assistance funds, a surplus on the current account of the balance of payments of US \$65m. was registered. In 1997, however, a deficit on the current account of the balance of payments of \$62.2m. was recorded; the deficit widened to \$118.2m. in 2001. Financial requirements during 1998–2001 were projected at \$1,600m.; this total was expected to be met through capital grants (\$465m.), project loans (\$235m.) and from non-budgetary transfers (humanitarian assistance—\$450m.). The remainder was expected to be covered through IMF disbursements, debt relief from the 'Paris Club' of official creditors, and refinancing and assistance from both multilateral and bilateral creditors. In July 1998 it was announced that the 'Paris Club' had agreed to restructure Rwanda's bilateral debt (then around \$181m.), reducing it by up to 67%. In June of that year Rwanda obtained a \$250m. quick disbursement loan from the World Bank to

support the Government's 1998–2000 reform programme. This was aimed at supporting the country's efforts in the areas of health, education, national reconciliation and administrative reform, and at contributing to the fund for the survivors of the genocide. In June, furthermore, the IMF approved a three-year loan, amounting to \$95m., under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). A trust fund of \$41.7m., managed by the World Bank, was established at the same time to help Rwanda manage its external debt. According to the IMF, Rwanda has made substantial progress in rebuilding its severely damaged infrastructure since 1994; most internally displaced people have been settled, macroeconomic stability has been restored and key structural reforms have been initiated. However, Rwanda's administrative and institutional capacity in the public sector remained weak. Increased amounts of concessional external assistance would, therefore, be required in the long term to finance higher social expenditure and to ensure sustained human resource development. In 2000 91.7% of Rwanda's public investment budget was to be financed by foreign aid.

In 2000, despite criticisms of Rwanda's involvement in the DRC war, donors continued to provide economic and financial support to Rwanda. In March the European Commission announced that it would allocate €110m. to Rwanda under the country's national indicative programme of the Fourth Lomé Convention. The remaining €47m. would be disbursed according to the use of the first tranche. Three-quarters of the funding under the programme was allocated to poverty alleviation projects, with the remainder being allocated to projects aiming at promoting good governance and justice. Meanwhile, the World Bank announced that it would provide assistance during 2000 through two projects, one in agriculture and one in rural water, with a total value of US \$25m. The World Bank was planning to disburse an additional amount of \$125m. for four projects in 2001: one in agriculture; one in human resources development; one in trade and private sector development; and a leveraged insurance facility for trade, a regional facility to guarantee investment against sovereign, but not exchange-rate, risk. In addition, in early 2000 the People's Republic of China announced a grant of 20m. yuan (approximately \$2.5m.) for agriculture, road construction and education projects. In 2000 USAID assistance totalled \$34.7m., supporting Economic Support Funds from the Great Lakes Justice Initiative, Development Assistance and emergency International Development Assistance from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. In 2002 USAID planned to support the three priority areas: development relief and conflict prevention; global health; and economic growth. USAID also announced its intention to increase its efforts to counter HIV/AIDS by expanding awareness activities, working with other donors to prevent mother-to-child transmission and providing counselling and other support to infected persons. In that year USAID was in the early stages of implementing a three-year, multifaceted effort to stimulate agricultural production and promote broad-based economic growth, complemented by a substantial development-orientated Food for Peace programme. Components of the programme included human resource development at the principal agricultural research, training and educational institutions, policy advice to the then Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Resources and Forestry, and the expansion of agribusiness and export opportunities. In 2000 Rwanda was the main recipient of Belgian development aid on the African continent, with a loan totalling 412.5m. Belgian francs.

In January 2001 Rwanda, declared eligible to benefit from the IMF- and World Bank-sponsored initiative for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) in December 2000, obtained debt relief of US \$810m., which was to contribute substantially to the alleviation of the country's debt burden. Total outstanding external debt was estimated at \$1,324m. by the end of 2000, equivalent to 73% of GDP. More than 87% of Rwanda external debt was owed to multilateral partners, principally the World Bank Group, with \$998.4m., followed by the ADB (\$208.4m.). The main bilateral creditors were France (\$35.2m.), the People's Republic of China (\$32.2m.), Saudi Arabia (\$29.8m.), Kuwait (\$29.4m.) and Japan (\$13.6m.). The Government estimated that annual cash flow savings

from this relief would be about \$20m.–\$30m. per year, equivalent to 1.5% of GDP, in 2001–10. In April 2001 Rwanda also completed an interim Poverty Strategy Reduction Paper, which was to serve as the basis for both concessional lending and debt relief under the enhanced HIPC initiative. The debt relief was expected to benefit the health, education, agriculture and infrastructure sectors.

The World Bank intensified its financial support to Rwanda in 2001, with the adoption of a US \$48m. programme to revitalize the rural economy, increase rural income and reduce poverty. The project, which was financed by a credit from IDA, was to focus on the rehabilitation of farmed marshland and hillside areas, the promotion of commercial and export-orientated agriculture, support for agricultural services delivery systems, small-scale rural infrastructure development and the encouragement of off-farm productive activities. By 2005 however, only a very small amount of money in this large project had actually been spent, due to inertia at the Rwandan Ministry of Agriculture and negligence at the World Bank. The appointment of a new Minister of Agriculture and new World Bank staff in 2005 and 2006 was expected to bring about improvements. This project was part of a \$165m. rural development programme, launched in December 2001, which was to be 95% financed by the World Bank. This larger programme, which was to be implemented over a 14-year period, involved the construction of infrastructure and research centres, with the aim of finding new commercial outlets for Rwanda's agricultural products.

In March 2002 the ADB, which approved a \$30m. loan in 2001, opened a permanent office in Kigali in order to intensify its co-operation with Rwanda. In January 2001 President Kagame emphasized the Rwandan Government's achievements since 1994: state revenue, negligible in 1994, reached 70,000m. Rwanda francs in 2000, while the number of Rwandan university students had increased from 3,000 to 7,000 during the same period, and 355 hospitals and health centres were rehabilitated. However, Kagame deplored Rwanda's high levels of infant mortality, low life-expectancy, which was still below 50 years, and the Rwandan population's low purchasing power. By mid-2006 health indicators remained a cause for concern. Women and children were suffering disproportionately, as a result of high fertility rates, a low proportion of births attended by qualified personnel, poor nutrition and high mortality rates. HIV/AIDS remained a serious problem, with prevalence rates estimated by UNAIDS at 5.1% of persons aged 15–49 years in 2003. In that year, however, important progress was made in re-establishing health systems. The expansion in health care expenditure initiated in 2003 was consolidated, with recurrent health expenditure reaching almost 1%. Progress made in the education sector in previous years was consolidated during 2004, with important policy reforms

implemented. The introduction of fee-free education led to a further improvement in primary enrolment.

FOREIGN TRADE

In 2003 exports declined by 8.2%, to US \$61.8m., as a result of lower coffee and mineral export revenues. Tea accounted for 35.5% of total exports, with \$22m., ahead of coffee (\$13.4m., 21.6%). Coltan and other mineral products followed, representing about 18% of the total, ahead of re-exports, hides and manufacturing products. In 2003 imports amounted to \$247.4m., compared with \$233.7m. in the previous year. As a result, the trade deficit increased from \$166.4m. in 2002 to \$185.6m. in 2003. In 2003 the main destinations of exports were Kenya (18.3%), followed by the United Kingdom (16.9%), Switzerland (8.3%), Belgium (4.5%), the DRC (4.0%), Burundi (3.5%), China (2.0%) and Pakistan (1.7%), according to central bank statistics. The main origins of imports in that year were Kenya (22.0%), followed by Belgium (12.2%), the UAE (7.5%), Tanzania (4.3%), Uganda (4.3%), Germany (4.2%), South Africa (3.6%) and Japan (3.2%). In 2004 coffee was the leading export product, generating \$27.5m. of export revenue, followed by tea (\$25.6m.), cassiterite (\$12.9m) and coltan (\$10.6m.). At the beginning of 2004, in view of Rwanda's low underlying growth rate, the Government began to examine export promotion and broader trade issues. An export promotion strategy was adopted in the second half of the year, and a reformed Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency was launched. Export performance in 2004 was promising, reversing previous negative trends. Exports increased in value by 51.4%, largely driven by coffee, cassiterite and coltan. In terms of imports, poor domestic food production and the energy crisis led to higher food and fuel imports. However, this was partly offset by lower imports of industrial goods as a result of the energy crisis and the additional competition caused by entry into the COMESA Free Trade Area. In total, imports increased by 18.9%, more than offsetting the improved export performance. As a result, the current-account deficit on the balance of payments (excluding official transfers) deteriorated marginally from 16.6% of GDP to 16.8%.

In March 2004 negotiations commenced between the EU and the Eastern and Southern Africa group of countries (including Rwanda) for a World Trade Organization (WTO) compatible free trade Economic Partnership Agreement, due to enter force in 2008. With the extension, until 2007, of AGOA, enacted by the USA to extend duty-free and quota-free access to the US market for nearly all textile and handicraft goods produced in eligible beneficiary countries, the Rwandan Government was keen to benefit further from this system. In the mid-2000s Rwandan small-scale cloth and textile handicraft businesses were beginning to export products to the USA.

Statistical Survey

Source (unless otherwise stated): Office rwandais d'information, BP 83, Kigali; tel. 75724.

Area and Population

AREA, POPULATION AND DENSITY

Area (sq km)	26,338*
Population (census results)	
15 August 1991	7,142,755
16 August 2002†	
Males	3,879,448
Females	4,249,105
Total	8,128,553
Population (UN estimate at mid-year)‡	
2003	8,758,000
2004	8,882,000
2005	9,038,000
Density (per sq km) at mid-2005	343.2

* 10,169 sq miles.

† Provisional results.

‡ Source: UN, *World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision*.

PREFECTURES

(1991 census)

	Area (sq km)	Population*	Density (per sq km)
Butare	1,830	765,910	418.5
Byumba	4,987	779,365	159.2
Cyangugu	2,226	517,550	232.5
Gikongoro	2,192	462,635	211.1
Gisenyi	2,395	728,365	304.1
Gitarama	2,241	849,285	379.0
Kibungo	4,134	647,175	156.5
Kibuye	1,320	472,525	358.0
Kigali	3,251	921,050	355.2
Kigali-Ville		233,640	
Ruhengeri	1,762	765,255	434.3
Total	26,338	7,142,755	271.2

* Source: UN, *Demographic Yearbook*.

PRINCIPAL TOWNS

(population at 1978 census)

Kigali (capital)	117,749	Ruhengeri	16,025
Butare	21,691	Gisenyi	12,436

Mid-2005 (incl. suburbs, UN estimate): Kigali 779,000 (Source: UN, *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision*).

BIRTHS AND DEATHS

(annual averages, UN estimates)

	1990–95	1995–2000	2000–05
Birth rate (per 1,000)	43.7	41.4	41.0
Death rate (per 1,000)	41.9	23.4	18.3

Source: UN, *World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision*.

Expectation of life (years at birth, WHO estimates): 46 (males 44; females 47) in 2004 (Source: WHO, *World Health Report*).

ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION

(persons aged 14 years and over, at census of August 2002)

	Males	Females	Total
Agriculture	1,218,181	1,731,411	2,949,592
Fishing	3,374	94	3,468
Industrial activities	3,692	1,636	5,328
Production activities	32,994	10,649	43,643
Electricity and water	2,390	277	2,667
Construction	41,641	1,244	42,885
Trade reconstruction	56,869	32,830	89,699
Restaurants and hotels	4,525	2,311	6,836
Transport and communications	29,574	1,988	31,562
Financial intermediaries	1,560	840	2,400
Administration and defence	22,479	5,585	28,064
Education	22,688	17,046	39,734
Health and social services	7,521	7,054	14,575
Activities not adequately defined	69,042	39,458	108,500
Total employed	1,516,530	1,852,423	3,368,953

Source: IMF, *Rwanda: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix* (December 2004).

Health and Welfare

KEY INDICATORS

Total fertility rate (children per woman, 2004)	5.6
Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births, 2004)	203
HIV/AIDS (% of persons aged 15–49, 2005)	3.1
Physicians (per 1,000 head, 2004)	0.05
Hospital beds (per 1,000 head, 1990)	1.65
Health expenditure (2003): US \$ per head (PPP)	32
Health expenditure (2003): % of GDP	3.7
Health expenditure (2003): public (% of total)	43.5
Access to water (% of persons, 2002)	73
Access to sanitation (% of persons, 2002)	41
Human Development Index (2003): ranking	159
Human Development Index (2003): value	0.450

For sources and definitions, see explanatory note on p. vi.

Agriculture

PRINCIPAL CROPS

('000 metric tons)

	2002	2003	2004
Maize	91.7	78.9	88.2
Sorghum	184.4	171.6	163.8
Potatoes	1,038.9	1,099.5	1,072.8
Sweet potatoes	1,292.4	868.2	908.3
Cassava (Manioc)	1,031.1	1,003.1	765.7
Taro (Coco yam)	122.8	138.8	136.4
Sugar cane*	70.0	70.0	70.0
Dry beans	246.9	239.4	198.2
Dry peas	16.0	17.7	16.8
Groundnuts (in shell)	10.4	10.3	10.8
Pumpkins, squash and gourds*	210.0	210.0	210.0
Plantains	2,784.9	2,407.8	2,469.7
Coffee (green)	19.4	13.8	20.0
Tea (made)	14.9	15.5	14.5

*FAO estimates.

Source: FAO.

LIVESTOCK

('000 head, year ending September)

	2002	2003	2004
Cattle	815.5	991.7	1,003.7
Pigs	207.8	211.9	326.7
Sheep	300.6	371.8	470.0
Goats	919.8	941.1	1,264.0
Rabbits	489	500*	520
Chickens	1,600*	1,800*	2,042

* FAO estimate.

Source: FAO.

LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS

('000 metric tons, FAO estimates)

	2002	2003	2004
Beef and veal	19.8	23.6	23.0
Goat meat	3.2	3.3	4.5
Pig meat	3.9	3.9	6.0
Poultry meat	1.8	2.0	2.3
Game meat	11.0	11.0	11.0
Other meat	2.8	3.1	3.4
Cows' milk	112.0	112.5	121.4
Sheep's milk	1.6	1.8	1.9
Goats' milk	16.0	17.9	24.0
Poultry eggs	2.3	2.3	2.3
Cattle hides	2.9	3.4	3.3

Source: FAO.

Forestry**ROUNDWOOD REMOVALS**

('000 cubic metres, excluding bark)

	2002	2003*	2004*
Sawlogs, veneer logs and logs for sleepers	245	245	245
Other industrial wood*	250	250	250
Fuel wood*	5,000	5,000	5,000
Total	5,495	5,495	5,495

* FAO estimates.

Source: FAO.

SAWNWOOD PRODUCTION

('000 cubic metres, including railway sleepers)

	1997	1998	1999
Coniferous (softwood)	20	21	22
Non-coniferous (hardwood)	54	55	57
Total	74	76	79

2000-04: Figures assumed to be unchanged from 1999 (FAO estimates).

Source: FAO.

Fishing

(metric tons, live weight)

	2002*	2003	2004*
Capture	7,000	7,400	7,400
Nile tilapia	2,750	2,800	2,800
Aquaculture	612	1,027	1,027
Nile tilapia	542	1,000	1,000
Total catch	7,612	8,427	8,427

* FAO estimates.

Source: FAO.

Mining

(metric tons, unless otherwise indicated)

	2002	2003	2004
Tin concentrates*	197	192	300
Tungsten concentrates*	153	78	120
Columbo-tantalite†	96	128	200
Gold (kilograms)*	10‡	2	—
Natural gas (million cubic metres)§	103	314	320

* Figures refer to the metal content of ores and concentrates.

† Figures refer to the estimated production of mineral concentrates. The metal content (estimates, metric tons) was: Niobium (Columbium) 30 in 2002, 40 in 2003, 63 in 2004; Tantalum 20 in 2002, 26 in 2003, 40 in 2004.

‡ Estimate.

§ Figures refer to gross output.

Source: US Geological Survey.

Industry**SELECTED PRODUCTS**

	2001	2002	2003
Beer ('000 hectolitres)	479	539	412
Soft drinks ('000 hectolitres)	228	n.a.	n.a.
Cigarettes (million)	278	391	402
Soap (metric tons)	7,056	5,571	4,456
Cement (metric tons)	83,024	100,568	105,105
Electric energy (million kWh)	89.3	n.a.	n.a.

Source: IMF, *Rwanda: Statistical Annex* (August 2002) and IMF, *Rwanda: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix* (December 2004).**Finance****CURRENCY AND EXCHANGE RATES****Monetary Units**

100 centimes = 1 franc rwandais (Rwanda franc).

Sterling, Dollar and Euro Equivalents (30 November 2005)

£1 sterling = 952.786Rwanda francs;

US \$1 = 551.700 Rwanda francs;

€1 = 649.296 Rwanda francs;

10,000 Rwanda francs = £10.50 = \$18.13 = €15.40.

Average Exchange Rate (Rwanda francs per US \$)

2003 537.658

2004 574.622

2005 555.936

Note: Since September 1983 the currency has been linked to the IMF special drawing right (SDR). Until November 1990 the mid-point exchange rate was SDR 1 = 102.71 Rwanda francs. In November 1990 a new rate of SDR 1 = 171.18 Rwanda francs was established. This remained in effect until June 1992, when the rate was adjusted to SDR 1 = 201.39 Rwanda francs. The latter parity was maintained until February 1994, since when the rate has been frequently adjusted. In March 1995 the Government introduced a market-determined exchange rate system.

BUDGET
(*000 million Rwanda francs)

Revenue*	1999	2000	2001†
Tax revenue	60.4	65.3	79.5
Taxes on income and profits	15.2	17.9	23.9
Company profits tax	7.4	10.0	14.4
Individual income tax	6.1	7.5	9.0
Domestic taxes on goods and services	33.6	35.2	41.0
Excise taxes	17.9	18.8	14.2
Turnover tax	12.9	13.8	24.2
Road fund	2.7	2.5	2.6
Taxes on international trade	11.0	11.6	14.0
Import taxes	8.4	9.3	11.1
Non-tax revenue	3.2	3.3	6.7
Total	63.6	68.7	86.2

Expenditure‡	1999	2000	2001†
Current expenditure	86.0	89.2	107.4
General public services	31.5	35.7	53.7
Defence	27.0	25.8	28.6
Social services	21.9	30.5	36.2
Education	17.2	24.0	29.8
Health	3.3	3.8	5.1
Economic services	2.6	2.1	4.9
Energy and public works	0.7	0.4	2.3
Interest on public debt	4.0	1.8	2.8
Adjustment	-1.1	-6.7	-18.8
Capital expenditure	40.8	42.0	50.0
Sub-total	126.8	131.2	157.5
Adjustment for payment arrears§.	2.0	-1.2	31.7
Total	128.8	130.0	189.2

* Excluding grants received ('000 million Rwanda francs): 38.5 in 1999; 63.7 in 2000; 63.3† in 2001.

† Estimates.

‡ Excluding lending minus repayments ('000 million Rwanda francs): -0.4 in 1999; 0.5 in 2000; 0.6 in 2001†.

§ Minus sign indicates increase in arrears.

Source: IMF, *Rwanda: Statistical Annex* (August 2002).

2002 (estimates, '000 million Rwanda francs): *Revenue*: Tax revenue 94.6; Non-tax revenue 6.6; Total 101.2, excl. grants received (70.8). *Expenditure*: Current 123.7; Capital 56.4; Total 180.1, excl. net lending (11.5) (Source: IMF, *Rwanda: First Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and Request for Waiver of Performance Criteria—Staff Report; Staff Statement; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Rwanda—June 2003*).

INTERNATIONAL BANK RESERVES
(US \$ million at 31 December)

	2003	2004	2005
IMF special drawing rights	29.77	30.20	25.91
Foreign exchange	184.93	284.44	379.85
Total	214.70	314.64	405.76

Source: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*.

MONEY SUPPLY
(million Rwanda francs at 31 December)

	2003	2004	2005
Currency outside banks	29,246	36,512	46,277
Demand deposits at deposit money banks	52,220	62,604	82,524
Total money (incl. others)	82,305	99,941	129,326

Source: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*.

COST OF LIVING
(Consumer Price Index for Kigali; base: 1995 = 100)

	2003	2004	2005
All items	112.8	126.4	137.9

Source: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*.

NATIONAL ACCOUNTS
(*000 million Rwanda francs at current prices)

Expenditure on the Gross Domestic Product			
	2003	2004	2005
Government final consumption expenditure	137.1	136.1	152.6
Private final consumption expenditure	775.7	893.0	1,026.8
Increase in stocks			
Gross fixed capital formation	166.8	215.8	245.5
Total domestic expenditure	1,079.6	1,244.9	1,424.9
Exports of goods and services	75.0	108.6	112.9
Less Imports of goods and services	249.4	299.2	374.9
GDP in purchasers' values	905.3	1,054.3	1,162.9
GDP at constant 1995 prices	639.1	667.0	n.a.

Source: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*.

Gross Domestic Product by Economic Activity

	2001	2002	2003
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing	305.2	341.6	373.9
Mining and quarrying	14.5	9.1	5.7
Manufacturing	73.9	80.5	80.3
Electricity, gas and water	3.4	3.4	3.6
Construction	71.2	82.9	103.1
Trade, restaurants and hotels	75.2	82.0	91.7
Transport, storage and communications	55.1	60.7	61.7
Public administration	54.2	55.8	64.8
Other services	101.6	109.0	120.4
GDP at market prices	754.3	825.0	905.3

Source: IMF, *Rwanda: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix* (December 2004).

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
(US \$ million)

	2003	2004	2005
Exports of goods f.o.b.	63	98	125
Imports of goods f.o.b.	-229	-276	-354
Trade balance	-166	-178	-229
Exports of services	76	103	120
Imports of services	-204	-240	-286
Balance on goods and services	-293	-315	-396
Other income received	6	6	15
Other income paid	-37	-39	-43
Balance on goods, services and income	-324	-349	-423
Current transfers received	223	169	350
Current transfers paid	-20	-18	-18
Current balance	-121	-198	-90
Capital account (net)	41	61	93
Direct investment from abroad	5	8	8
Other investment assets	-6	8	-14
Other investment liabilities	-22	-41	-61
Net errors and omissions	83	-205	-146
Overall balance	-20	-368	-210

Source: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*.

External Trade

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES
(US \$ million)

Imports c.i.f.	2001	2002	2003
Food and live animals	46.5	31.7	24.5
Cereals and cereal preparations	24.0	13.5	10.6
Rice	12.2	4.1	3.2
Vegetables and fruit	5.9	6.2	4.2
Sugar, sugar preparations and honey	8.6	5.9	5.0
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	12.5	12.8	15.2
Textile fibres and their wastes	7.7	8.3	10.3
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	39.7	40.7	40.6
Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials	39.5	40.6	40.5
Motor spirit, incl. aviation spirit	17.0	16.5	15.5
Gas oils	9.7	9.6	10.1
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes	8.7	6.7	4.3
Chemicals and related products	23.8	33.8	30.4
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products	8.5	13.7	12.8
Basic manufactures	36.3	37.3	43.8
Iron and steel	11.3	8.9	12.9
Machinery and transport equipment	60.0	63.2	75.0
Telecommunications, sound recording and reproducing equipment	19.2	7.2	10.9
Electric machinery, apparatus and appliances, and parts	8.3	8.6	10.2
Road vehicles	18.4	24.8	31.2
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	46.2	22.4	25.7
Total (incl. others)	276.1	251.2	261.2

Exports f.o.b.	2001	2002	2003
Food and live animals	31.6	25.9	26.2
Coffee	15.0	14.0	13.9
Tea	16.6	11.8	11.9
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	22.7	18.8	15.4
Metalliferous ores and metal scrap	20.9	16.3	11.7
Tin ores and concentrates	2.2	1.4	5.1
Ores and concentrates of other non-ferrous base metals	18.7	14.9	6.0
Ores of molybdenum, niobium, titanium	9.5	14.5	5.6
Total (incl. others)	55.5	46.0	50.4

Source: UN, *International Trade Statistics Yearbook*.PRINCIPAL TRADING PARTNERS
(US \$ million)

Imports	2001	2002	2003
Belgium	55.3	32.9	31.9
Canada	2.4	2.9	4.1
China	6.3	5.0	5.0
Denmark	1.9	5.8	2.8
France (incl. Monaco)	6.1	6.4	7.4
Germany	6.6	7.2	11.2
India	6.4	6.8	9.0
Israel	4.8	2.9	2.0
Italy	7.5	3.1	3.0
Japan	7.2	6.4	8.4
Kenya	61.9	66.7	74.1
Netherlands	7.4	5.7	4.5
Singapore	1.6	0.8	0.6

Imports—continued	2001	2002	2003
South Africa	12.5	11.0	12.9
Switzerland-Liechtenstein	1.3	1.3	1.5
Tanzania	9.6	13.2	14.7
Uganda	8.1	11.1	20.0
UAE	19.5	22.0	19.9
United Kingdom	8.0	6.5	4.3
USA	10.4	6.1	2.0
Viet Nam	4.8	0.9	0.2
Zambia	3.4	2.2	0.5
Total (incl. others)	276.1	251.2	261.2

Exports	2001	2002	2003
Belgium	2.1	2.3	0.8
Germany	2.4	0.3	0.2
Hong Kong	1.3	4.6	0.3
Kenya	24.0	18.1	20.6
Netherlands	1.2	6.5	0.0
Pakistan	0.2	1.3	0.6
Russia	1.4	0.0	0.0
South Africa	6.2	0.3	0.5
Switzerland-Liechtenstein	4.2	7.1	0.8
Tanzania	4.8	0.3	4.1
Uganda	2.5	1.0	13.4
United Kingdom	0.3	0.8	3.1
USA	3.0	1.4	0.1
Total (incl. others)	55.5	46.0	50.4

Source: UN, *International Trade Statistics Yearbook*.

Transport

ROAD TRAFFIC

(estimates, motor vehicles in use at 31 December)

	1995	1996
Passenger cars	12,000	13,000
Lorries and vans	16,000	17,100

Source: IRF, *World Road Statistics*.

CIVIL AVIATION

(traffic on scheduled services)

	1992	1993	1994
Passengers carried ('000)	9	9	9
Passenger-km (million)	2	2	2

Source: UN, *Statistical Yearbook*.

Tourism

(by country of residence)

	2000	2001*
Africa	93,058	99,928
Burundi	20,972	9,455
Congo, Democratic Republic	10,450	28,514
Kenya	2,050	2,243
Tanzania	18,320	18,697
Uganda	38,897	38,472
Americas	2,250	2,785
Europe	6,412	8,395
Belgium	1,866	2,057
Total (incl. others)	104,216	113,185

* January–November.

Tourism receipts (US \$ million, excl. passenger transport): 23 in 2000; 25 in 2001; 31 in 2002; 30 in 2003; 44 in 2004.

Source: World Tourism Organization.

Communications Media

	2002	2003	2004
Telephones ('000 main lines in use)	25.1	25.6	23.0
Mobile cellular telephones ('000 subscribers)	82.4	130.7	138.7
Internet users ('000)	25	31	38

2005: Mobile cellular telephones ('000 subscribers) 290.0.

Radio receivers ('000 in use): 601 in 1997.

Facsimile machines (number in use): 900 in 1998.

Daily newspapers: 1 in 1996.

Sources: International Telecommunication Union; UN, *Statistical Yearbook*; UNESCO, *Statistical Yearbook*.

Education

	Teachers	Students		
		Males	Females	Total
Primary	23,730	644,835	643,834	1,288,669
Secondary:				
general		39,088	38,337	77,425
technical and vocational	3,413	6,859	6,935	13,794
Tertiary	412	n.a.	n.a.	5,678

Source: mainly UNESCO Institute for Statistics.

Adult literacy rate (UNESCO estimates): 64.0% (males 70.5%; females 58.8%) in 2003 (Source: UN Development Programme, *Human Development Report*).

Directory

The Constitution

A new Constitution was approved at a national referendum on 26 May 2003 and entered into effect on 4 June. The main provisions are summarized below:

PREAMBLE

The state of Rwanda is an independent sovereign Republic. Fundamental principles are: the struggle against the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations; the eradication of all ethnic and regional divisions; the promotion of national unity; and the equal sharing of power. Human rights and personal liberties are protected. All forms of discrimination are prohibited and punishable by law. The state recognizes a multi-party political system. Political associations are established in accordance with legal requirements, and may operate freely, providing that they comply with democratic and constitutional principles, without harm to national unity, territorial integrity and state security. The formation of political associations on the basis of race, ethnicity, tribal or regional affiliation, sex, religion or any other grounds for discrimination is prohibited.

LEGISLATURE

Legislative power is vested in a bicameral Parliament, comprising a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate. The Chamber of Deputies has 80 deputies, who are elected for a five-year term. In addition to 53 directly elected deputies, 27 seats are allocated, respectively, to two youth representatives, one disabilities representative, and 24 female representatives, who are indirectly elected. The Senate comprises 26 members, of whom 12 are elected by local government councils in the 12 provinces, and two by academic institutions, while the remaining 12 are nominated (eight by the President and four by a regulatory body, the Parties' Forum). Members of the Senate serve for eight years.

PRESIDENT

The President of the Republic is the Head of State, protector of the Constitution, and guarantor of national unity. He is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Presidential candidates are required to be of Rwandan nationality and aged a minimum of 35 years. The President is elected by universal suffrage for a seven-year term, and is restricted to two mandates. He signs into law presidential decrees in consultation with the Council of Ministers.

GOVERNMENT

The President nominates the Prime Minister, who heads the Council of Ministers. Ministers are proposed by the Prime Minister and appointed by the President.

JUDICIARY

The judiciary is independent and separate from the legislative and executive organs of government. The judicial system is composed of the Supreme Court, the High Court of the Republic, and provincial, district and municipal Tribunals. In addition, there are specialized judicial organs, comprising *gacaca* and military courts. The *gacaca* courts try cases of genocide or other crimes against humanity committed between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994. Military

courts (the Military Tribunal and the High Military Court) have jurisdiction in military cases. The President and Vice-President of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor-General are elected by the Senate two months after its installation.

The Government

HEAD OF STATE

President: Maj.-Gen. PAUL KAGAME (took office 22 April 2000; re-elected 25 August 2003).

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

(August 2006)

Prime Minister: BERNARD MAKUZA.

Minister of Defence: Gen. MARCEL GATSINZI.

Minister of Local Government, Rural Development and Social Affairs: PROTAIS MUSONI.

Minister of Internal Affairs: MUSSA SHEIKH HERERIMANA.

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation: Dr CHARLES MURIGANDE.

Minister of Finance and Economic Planning: JAMES MUSONI.

Minister of Agriculture and Livestock: ANASTASE MUREKEZI.

Minister of Education, Science, Technology and Research: JEANNE D'ARC MUJAWAMARIYA.

Minister of Infrastructure: STANISLAS KAMANZI.

Minister of Commerce, Industry, Investment Promotion, Tourism and Co-operatives: THARCISSÉ KARUGARAMA.

Minister of Lands, Environment, Forestry, Water and Natural Resources: CHRISTOPHE BAZIVAMO.

Minister of Justice: EDDA MUKABAGWIZA.

Minister of Public Services and Labour: MANASSEH NSHUTI.

Minister of Health: Dr JEAN-DAMASCÈNE NTAWUKURIRYAYO.

Minister of Youth, Sports and Culture: JOSEPH HABINEZA.

Minister in the Office of the President: SOLINA NYIRAHABIMANA.

Minister in the Office of the President, in charge of Science, Information Technology and Research: ROMAIN MURENZI.

Minister in the Office of the Prime Minister, in charge of Gender and the Promotion of Women: VALÉRIE NYIRAHABINEZA.

Minister in the Office of the Prime Minister, in charge of Information: Prof. LAURENT NKUSI.

Minister of State for Local Government, Good Governance, Rural Development and Social Affairs: CHRISTINE NYATANYI.

Minister of State for Public Services and Labour: ANGELINA MUGANZA.

Minister of State for Primary and Secondary Education: JOSEPH MUREKERAHO.

Minister of State for Lands and Environment: PATRICIA HAJA-BAKIGA.

Minister of State for Water and Natural Resources: Prof. BIKORO MUNYANGANIZI.

Minister of State for Economic Planning: MONIQUE NSANZABAGANWA.

Minister of State for HIV/AIDS and Other Infectious Diseases: Dr INNOCENT NYARUHIRIRA.

Minister of State for Energy and Communications: ALBERT BUTARE.

Minister of State for Agriculture: DAPHROSE GAHAKWA.

Minister of State for Regional Co-operation: ROSEMARY MUSEMINARI.

Minister of State for Industry and Industrial Promotion: VINCENT KAREGA.

MINISTRIES

Office of the President: BP 15, Kigali; tel. 59062000; fax 572431; e-mail info@presidency.gov.rw; internet www.presidency.gov.rw.

Office of the Prime Minister: Kigali; tel. 585444; fax 583714; e-mail primature@gov.rw; internet www.primature.gov.rw.

Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock: BP 621, Kigali; tel. 585008; fax 585057; internet www.minagri.gov.rw.

Ministry of Commerce, Industry, Investment Promotion, Tourism and Co-operatives: BP 2378, Kigali; tel. 574725; tel. 574734; fax 575465; internet www.minicom.gov.rw.

Ministry of Defence: Kigali; tel. 577942; fax 576969; internet www.minadef.gov.rw.

Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Research: BP 622, Kigali; tel. 583051; fax 582161; e-mail info@mineduc.gov.rw; internet www.mineduc.gov.rw.

Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning: BP 158, Kigali; tel. 575756; fax 577581; e-mail mfin@rwanda1.com; internet www.minecofin.gov.rw.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation: blvd de la Révolution, BP 179, Kigali; tel. 574522; fax 572904; internet www.minaffet.gov.rw.

Ministry of Gender and the Promotion of Women: Kigali; tel. 577626; fax 577543.

Ministry of Health: BP 84, Kigali; tel. 577458; fax 576853; e-mail info@moh.gov.rw; internet www.moh.gov.rw.

Ministry of Infrastructure: tel. 585503; fax 585755; e-mail webmaster@mininfra.gov.rw; internet www.mininfra.gov.rw.

Ministry of Internal Affairs: BP 446, Kigali; tel. 86708.

Ministry of Justice: BP 160, Kigali; tel. 586561; fax 586509; e-mail mjjust@minijust.gov.rw; internet www.minijust.gov.rw.

Ministry of Lands, Environment, Forestry, Water and Natural Resources: Kigali; tel. 582628; fax 582629; internet www.minitere.gov.rw.

Ministry of Local Government, Good Governance, Rural Development and Social Affairs: BP 790, Kigali; tel. 585406; fax 582228; e-mail webmaster@minaloc.gov.rw; internet www.minaloc.gov.rw.

Ministry of Public Services and Labour: BP 403, Kigali; tel. 585714; fax 583621; e-mail mifotra@mifotra.gov.rw; internet www.mifotra.gov.rw.

Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture: BP 1044, Kigali; tel. 583527; fax 583518.

President and Legislature

PRESIDENT

Presidential Election, 25 August 2003

Candidate	Votes	% of votes
Paul Kagame	3,544,777	95.05
Faustin Twagiramungu	134,865	3.62
Jean-Népomuscène Nayinzira	49,634	1.33
Total*	3,729,274	100.00

* Excluding 49,634 invalid votes.

CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

Speaker: ALFRED MUKEZAMFURA.

General Election, 29 September–3 October 2003

Party	Votes	% of votes	Seats
Front patriotique rwandais*	2,774,661	73.78	40
Parti social-démocrate	463,067	12.31	7
Parti libéral	396,978	10.56	6
Others	125,896	3.35	—
Total	3,760,602	100.00	80†

* Contested the elections in alliance with the Parti démocrate centriste, Parti démocratique idéal, Union démocratique du peuple rwandais and Parti socialiste rwandais.

† In addition to the 53 directly elected deputies, 27 seats are allocated, respectively, to two youth representatives, one disabilities representative and 24 female representatives, who are indirectly elected.

SENATE

Speaker: Dr VINCENT BIRUTA.

The Senate comprises 26 members, of whom 12 are elected by local government councils in the 12 provinces and two by academic institutions, while the remaining 12 are nominated (eight by the President and four by a regulatory body, the Parties' Forum).

Election Commission

Commission électorale nationale du Rwanda: BP 6449, Kigali; tel. 501136; fax 501045; e-mail comelena@rwanda1.com; internet www.comelena.gov.rw; f. 2000; independent; Chair. Prof. CHRYSOLOGUE KARANGWA.

Political Organizations

Under legislation adopted in June 2003, the formation of any political organization based on ethnic groups, religion or sex was prohibited.

Front patriotique rwandais (FPR): f. 1990; also known as Inkotanyi; comprises mainly Tutsi exiles, but claims multi-ethnic support; commenced armed invasion of Rwanda from Uganda in Oct. 1990; took control of Rwanda in July 1994; Chair. Maj.-Gen. PAUL KAGAME; Vice-Chair. CHRISTOPHE BAZIVAMO; Sec.-Gen. CHARLES MURIGANDE.

Parti démocrate centriste (PDC): BP 2348, Kigali; tel. 576542; fax 572237; f. 1990; formerly Parti démocrate chrétien; Leader ALFRED MUKEZAMFURA.

Parti démocratique idéal (PDI): Kigali; f. 1991; formerly Parti démocratique islamique; Leader ANDRÉ BUMAYA HABIB.

Parti démocratique rwandais (Pader): Kigali; f. 1992; Sec. JEAN NTAGUNGIRA.

Parti libéral (PL): BP 1304, Kigali; tel. 577916; fax 577838; f. 1991; restructured 2003; Chair. PROSPER HIGORO; Sec.-Gen. Dr ODETTE NYIRAMIRIMO.

Parti du progrès et de la concorde (PPC): f. 2003; Hutu; incl. former members of Mouvement démocratique républicain; Leader Dr CHRISTIAN MARARA.

Parti progressiste de la jeunesse rwandaise (PPJR): Kigali; f. 1991; Leader ANDRÉ HAKIZIMANA.

Parti républicain rwandais (Parerwa): Kigali; f. 1992; Leader AUGUSTIN MUTAMBA.

Parti social-démocrate (PSD): Kigali; f. 1991 by a breakaway faction of former Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement; Leader Dr VINCENT BIRUTA.

Parti socialiste rwandais (PSR): BP 827, Kigali; tel. 576658; fax 83975; f. 1991; workers' rights; Leader Dr MEDARD RUTIJANWA.

Rassemblement travailliste pour la démocratie (RTD): BP 1894, Kigali; tel. 575622; fax 576574; f. 1991; Leader EMMANUEL NIZEYIMANA.

Union démocratique du peuple rwandais (UDPR): Kigali; f. 1992; Leader ADRIEN RANGIRA.

Other political organizations have been formed by exiled Rwandans and operate principally from abroad; these include:

Rassemblement pour le retour des réfugiés et la démocratie au Rwanda (RDR): Mandenmakerstraat 14, 3841 Harderwijk, Netherlands; fax (32) 10455111; e-mail info@rdrrwanda.org; internet www.rdrwanda.org; f. 1995 by former supporters of Pres. Habyarimana; prin. org. representing Hutu refugees; Chair. VICTOIRE UMUHOZA INGABIRE.

Union du peuple rwandais (UPR): Brussels, Belgium; f. 1990; Hutu-led; Pres. SILAS MAJYAMBÈRE; Sec.-Gen. EMMANUEL TWAGILIMANA.

Diplomatic Representation

EMBASSIES IN RWANDA

Belgium: rue Nyarugenge, BP 81, Kigali; tel. 575554; fax 573995; e-mail kigali@diplobel.be; Ambassador MARC GEDOPT.

Burundi: rue de Ntaruka, BP 714, Kigali; tel. 575010; Chargé d'affaires a.i. (vacant).

Canada: rue Akagera, BP 1177, Kigali; tel. 573210; fax 572719; Ambassador BERNARD DUSSAULT.

Egypt: BP 1069, Kigali; tel. 82686; fax 82686; Ambassador SAMEH SAMY DARWISH.

France: rue du Député Kamunzini, BP 53, Kigali; tel. 591800; fax 591806; Ambassador DOMINIQUE DECHERF.

Germany: 8 rue de Bugarama, BP 355, Kigali; tel. 575222; fax 577267; Ambassador Dr HÜBERT ZIEGLER.

Holy See: 49 ave Paul VI, BP 261, Kigali (Apostolic Nunciature); tel. 575293; fax 575181; e-mail nuntrw@rwandatel1.rwanda1.com; Apostolic Nuncio Most Rev. ANSELMO GUIDO PECORARI (Titular Archbishop of Popolonia).

Kenya: BP 1215, Kigali; tel. 82774; Ambassador PETER KIHARA G. MATHANJUKI.

Korea, Democratic People's Republic: Kigali; Ambassador KIM PONG GI.

Libya: BP 1152, Kigali; tel. 576470; Secretary of the People's Bureau MOUSTAPHA MASAND EL-GHAILUSHI.

Russia: 19 ave de l'Armée, BP 40, Kigali; tel. 575286; fax 574818; e-mail ambruss@rwandatel1.rwanda1.com; Ambassador ALEKSEI DULYYAN.

South Africa: 1370 blvd de l'Umuganda, POB 6563, Kacyiru-Sud, Kigali; tel. 583185; fax 511760; e-mail saemkg1@rwanda1.com; internet www.saembassy-kigali.org.rw; Ambassador Dr A. M. MBÈRE.

United Kingdom: Parcelle 1131, Blvd de l'Umuganda, Kacyiru, BP 576, Kigali; tel. 584098; fax 582044; e-mail embassy.kigali@fco.gov.uk; internet www.britishembassykigali.org.rw; Ambassador JEREMY MACADIE.

USA: blvd de la Révolution, BP 28, Kigali; tel. 505601; fax 572128; e-mail amembkigali@hotmail.com; internet usembkigali.net; Ambassador MICHAEL RAY ARIETTI.

Judicial System

The judicial system is composed of the Supreme Court, the High Court of the Republic, and provincial, district and municipal Tribunals. In addition, there are specialized judicial organs, comprising *gacaca* and military courts. The *gacaca* courts were established to try cases of genocide or other crimes against humanity committed between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994. Trials for categories of lesser genocide crimes were to be conducted by councils in the communities in which they were committed, with the aim of alleviating pressure on the existing judicial system. Trials under the *gacaca* court system formally commenced on 25 November 2002. Military courts (the Military Tribunal and the High Military Court) have jurisdiction in military cases. The President and Vice-President of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor-General are elected by the Senate.

Supreme Court

Kigali; tel. 87407.

The Supreme Court comprises five sections: the Department of Courts and Tribunals; the Court of Appeals; the Constitutional Court; the Council of State; and the Revenue Court.

President of the Supreme Court: ALOYSIA CYANZAIRE.

Vice-President: Prof. SAM RUGEGE.

Prosecutor-General: MARTIN NGOGAU MUCYO.

Religion

AFRICAN RELIGIONS

About one-half of the population hold traditional beliefs.

CHRISTIANITY

Union des Eglises Rwandaises: BP 79, Kigali; tel. 85825; fax 83554; f. 1963; fmily Conseil Protestant du Rwanda.

The Roman Catholic Church

Rwanda comprises one archdiocese and eight dioceses. At 31 December 2004 the estimated number of adherents represented about 47.8% of the total population.

Bishops' Conference

Conférence Episcopale du Rwanda, BP 357, Kigali; tel. 575439; fax 578080; e-mail cerwanda@rwanda1.com.

f. 1980; Pres. Rt Rev. ALEXIS HABIYAMBÈRE (Bishop of Nyundo).

Archbishop of Kigali: Most Rev. THADDÉE NTHINYURWA, Archevêché, BP 715, Kigali; tel. 575769; fax 572274; e-mail kigarchi@yahoo.fr.

The Anglican Communion

The Church of the Province of Rwanda, established in 1992, has nine dioceses.

Archbishop of the Province and Bishop of Kigali: Most Rev. EMMANUEL MUSABA KOLINI, BP 61, Kigali; tel. and fax 573213; e-mail sonja914@compuserve.com.

Provincial Secretary: Rt Rev. JOSIAS SENDEGEYA (Bishop of Kigali), BP 2487, Kigali; tel. and fax 514160; e-mail peer@rwandatel1.rwanda1.

Protestant Churches

Eglise Baptiste: Nyantanga, BP 59, Butare; Pres. Rev. DAVID BAZIGA; Gen. Sec. ELEAZAR ZIHERAMBÈRE.

There are about 250,000 other Protestants, including a substantial minority of Seventh-day Adventists.

BAHÁ'Í FAITH

National Spiritual Assembly: BP 652, Kigali; tel. 575982.

ISLAM

There is a small Islamic community.

The Press

Bulletin Agricole du Rwanda: OCIR—Café, BP 104, Kigali-Gikondo; f. 1968; quarterly; French; Pres. of Editorial Bd Dr AUGUSTIN NZINDUKIYIMANA; circ. 800.

L'Ère de Liberté: BP 1755, Kigali; fortnightly.

Etudes Rwandaises: Université Nationale du Rwanda, Rectorat, BP 56, Butare; tel. 30302; f. 1977; quarterly; pure and applied science, literature, human sciences; French; Pres. of Editorial Bd CHARLES NTAKIRUTINKA; circ. 1,000.

Hobe: BP 761, Kigali; f. 1955; monthly; children's interest; circ. 95,000.

Inkingi: BP 969, Kigali; tel. 577626; fax 577543; monthly.

Inkoramutima: Union des Eglises Rwandaises, BP 79, Kigali; tel. 85825; fax 83554; quarterly; religious; circ. 5,000.

Kinyamateka: 5 blvd de l'OUA, BP 761, Kigali; tel. 576164; f. 1933; fortnightly; economics; circ. 11,000.

La Lettre du Cladho: BP 3060, Kigali; tel. 74292; monthly.

The New Times: BP 635, Kigali; tel. 573409; fax 574166; monthly.

Nouvelles du Rwanda: Université Nationale du Rwanda, BP 117, Butare; every 2 months.

Nyabarongo—Le Canard Déchaîné: BP 1585, Kigali; tel. 576674; monthly.

Le Partisan: BP 1805, Kigali; tel. 573923; fortnightly.

La Patrie—Urwatubyaye: BP 3125, Kigali; tel. 572552; monthly.

La Relève: Office Rwandais d'Information, BP 83, Kigali; tel. 75665; f. 1976; monthly; politics, economics, culture; French; Dir CHRIS-TOPHE MFIZI; circ. 1,700.

Revue Dialogue: BP 572, Kigali; tel. 574178; f. 1967; bi-monthly; Christian issues; Belgian-owned; circ. 2,500.

Revue Médicale Rwandaise: Ministry of Health, BP 84, Kigali; tel. 576681; f. 1968; quarterly; French.

Revue Pédagogique: Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Research, BP 622, Kigali; tel. 85697; quarterly; French.

Rwanda Herald: Kigali; f. Oct. 2000; owned by Rwanda Independent Media Group.

Rwanda Libération: BP 398, Kigali; tel. 577710; monthly; Dir and Editor-in-Chief ANTOINE KAPITENI.

Rwanda Renaitre: BP 426, Butare; fortnightly.

Rwanda Rushya: BP 83, Kigali; tel. 572276; fortnightly.

Le Tribun du Peuple: BP 1960, Kigali; tel. 82035; bi-monthly; Owner JEAN-PIERRE MUGABE.

Ukuli Gacaca: BP 3170, Kigali; tel. 573327; monthly; Dir CHARLES GAKUMBA.

Umucunguzi: Gisenyi; f. 1998; organ of Palir; Kinyarwanda and French; Chief Editor EMILE NKUMBUYE.

Umuhinzi-Mworozi: OCIR—Thé, BP 1334, Kigali; tel. 514797; fax 514796; f. 1975; monthly; circ. 1,500.

Umusemburo—Le Levain: BP 117, Butare; monthly.

Umwesero: Kigali; independent Kinyarwanda language weekly newspaper; Editor CHARLES KABONERO.

Urunana: Grand Séminaire de Nyakibanda, BP 85, Butare; tel. 530793; e-mail wellamahoro@yahoo.fr; f. 1967; 3 a year; religious; Pres. WELLAS UWAMAHORO; Editor-in-Chief DAMIEN NIYOYIREMERA.

NEWS AGENCIES

Agence Rwandaise de Presse (ARP): 27 ave du Commerce, BP 83, Kigali; tel. 576540; fax 576185; e-mail cbohizi@yahoo.fr; f. 1975.

Office Rwandais d'Information (Orinfor): BP 83, Kigali; tel. 575724; Dir JOSEPH BIDERI.

Foreign Bureau

Agence France-Presse (AFP): BP 83, Kigali; tel. 572997; Correspondent MARIE-GORETTI UWIBAMBE.

Publishers

Editions Rwandaises: Caritas Rwanda, BP 124, Kigali; tel. 5786; Man. Dir Abbé CYRIAQUE MUNYANSANGA; Editorial Dir ALBERT NAMBAJE.

Implico: BP 721, Kigali; tel. 573771.

Imprimerie de Kabgayi: BP 66, Gitarama; tel. 562252; fax 562345; f. 1932; Dir THOMAS HABIMANA.

Imprimerie de Kigali, SARL: 1 blvd de l'Umuganda, BP 956, Kigali; tel. 582032; fax 584047; e-mail impkig@rwandatel1.rwanda1.com; f. 1980; Dir ALEXIS RUKUNDO.

Imprimerie URWEGO: BP 762, Kigali; tel. 86027; Dir JEAN NSENGIYUNVA.

Pallotti-Press: BP 863, Kigali; tel. 574084.

GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING HOUSES

Imprimerie Nationale du Rwanda: BP 351, Kigali; tel. 576214; fax 575820; f. 1967; Dir JUVENAL NDISANZE.

Régie de l'Imprimerie Scolaire (IMPRISCO): BP 1347, Kigali; tel. 85818; fax 85695; e-mail imprisco@rwandatel1.rwanda1.com; f. 1985; Dir JEAN DE DIEU GAKWANDI.

Broadcasting and Communications

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Rwandatel: BP 1332, Kigali; tel. 576777; fax 573110; e-mail info@rwandatel.rw; internet www.rwandatel.rw; national tele-communications service; privatized mid-2005.

MTN Rwandacell: Telecom House, blvd de l'Umuganda, Kigali; f. 1998; provides mobile cellular telephone services; CEO FRANÇOIS DU PLESSIS.

BROADCASTING

Radio

Radio Rwanda: BP 83, Kigali; tel. 575665; fax 576185; f. 1961; state-controlled; daily broadcasts in Kinyarwanda, Swahili, French and English; Dir of Programmes DAVID KABUYE.

Deutsche Welle Relay Station Africa: Kigali; daily broadcasts in German, English, French, Hausa, Swahili, Portuguese and Amharic.

Television

Télévision rwandaise (TVR): Kigali; fax 575024; transmissions reach more than 60% of national territory.

Finance

(cap. = capital; res = reserves; dep. = deposits; m. = million; brs = branches; amounts in Rwanda francs)

BANKING

Central Bank

Banque Nationale du Rwanda: ave Paul VI, BP 531, Kigali; tel. 574282; fax 572551; e-mail info@bnr.rw; internet www.bnr.rw; f. 1964; bank of issue; cap. 2,000m., res 12,423.3m., dep. 103,333.4m. (Dec. 2004); Gov. FRANÇOIS KANIMBA.

Commercial Banks

Following the privatization of two commercial banks, government control of the banking section was reduced from 45% in 2003 to 22% in 2005, although the three largest banks continued to control two-thirds of the system's assets, valued at US \$365m. (equivalent to 34% of GDP).

Banque de Commerce, de Développement et d'Industrie (BCDI): ave de la Paix, BP 3268, Kigali; tel. 574437; fax 573790; e-mail info@bcdi.co.rw; internet www.bcdi.co.rw; cap. and res 3,158.4m., total assets 45,950.9m. (Dec. 2003); Pres. and Dir-Gen. ALFRED KALISA.

Banque Commerciale du Rwanda, SA: BP 354, Kigali; tel. 575591; fax 573395; e-mail bcr@rwandatel1.rwanda1.com; internet www.bcr-rwanda.com; f. 1963; privatized Sept. 20004; cap. and res 2,420.0m., dep. 30,564.3m. (Dec. 2003); Pres. Dr NKOSANA MOYO; Man. Dir DAVID KUWANA; 5 brs.

Banque à la Confiance d'Or (BANCOR): ave du Commerce, BP 2509, Kigali; tel. and fax 575763; fax 575761; e-mail bancor@rwanda1.com; internet www.bancor.co.rw; f. 1995; cap. and res 2,289.0m., total assets 20,840.4m. (Dec. 2005); Pres. NICHOLAS WATSON.

Banque de Kigali, SA: 63 ave du Commerce, BP 175, Kigali; tel. 593100; fax 573461; e-mail bkig10@rwanda1.com; f. 1966; cap. 1,500.0m., res 2,366.0m., dep. 52,903.1m. (Dec. 2004); Pres. FRANÇOIS NGARAMBE; 6 brs.

Caisse Hypothécaire du Rwanda (CHR): BP 1034, Kigali; tel. 576382; fax 572799; cap. 778.2m., total assets 6,966.8m. (Dec. 2003); Pres. FRANÇOIS RUTISHASHA; Dir-Gen. PIPIEN HAKIZABERA.

Compagnie Générale de Banque: blvd de l'Umuganda, BP 5230, Kigali; tel. 503343; fax 503336; e-mail cogebank@rwanda1.com; cap. and res 1,210.8m., total assets 7,297.4m. (Dec. 2003); Pres. ANDRÉ KATABARWA.

Fina Bank, SA (BACAR): 20 blvd de la Révolution, BP 331, Kigali; tel. 574456; fax 573486; e-mail finabank@terracon.rw; f. 1983 as Banque Continentale Africaine (Rwanda); name changed 2005; cap. 1,500m., total assets 17,354.0m. (Dec. 2000); privatized; Chair. DHANU CHANDARIA; Man. Dir JOHN TAYLOR; 5 brs.

Development Banks

Banque Rwandaise de Développement, SA (BRD): blvd de la Révolution, BP 1341, Kigali; tel. 575079; fax 573569; e-mail brd@brd.com.rw; internet www.brd.com.rw; f. 1967; 56% state-owned; cap. and res 4,104.6m., total assets 13,920.7m. (Dec. 2003); Pres. GASTON MPATSWE KAGABO.

Union des Banques Populaires du Rwanda (Banki z'Abaturage mu Rwanda): BP 1348, Kigali; tel. 573559; fax 573579; e-mail ubpr@rwandatel1.rwanda1.com; f. 1975; cap. and res 1,180.5370m., total assets 20,433.8m. (Dec. 2002); Pres. INNOCENT KAYITARE; 145 brs.

INSURANCE

Société Nationale d'Assurances du Rwanda (SONARWA): BP 1035, Kigali; tel. 573350; fax 572052; e-mail sonarwa@rwandatel1.rwanda1.com; f. 1975; cap. 500m.; Pres. FRANÇOIS NGARAMBE; Dir-Gen. HOPE MURERA.

Société Rwandaise d'Assurances, SA (SORAS): BP 924, Kigali; tel. 573716; fax 573362; e-mail sorasinfo@rwanda1.com; f. 1984; cap. 501m. (2003); Pres. CHARLES MHORANYI; Dir-Gen. MARC RUGENERA.

Trade and Industry

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Centre for Investment Promotion: Kigali; f. 1998.

National Tender Board: ave de la Paix, POB 4276, Kigali; tel. 501403; fax 501402; e-mail ntb@rwanda1.com; internet www.ntb.gov.rw; f. 1998 to organize and manage general public procurement.

Rwanda Revenue Authority: Kigali; f. 1998 to maximize revenue collection; Commissioner-Gen. EDWARD LARBI SIAW.

DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS

Coopérative de Promotion de l'Industrie Minière et Artisanale au Rwanda (COOPIMAR): BP 1139, Kigali; tel. 82127; fax 72128; Dir DANY NZARAMBA.

Institut de Recherches Scientifiques et Technologiques (IRST): BP 227, Butare; tel. 30396; fax 30393; Dir-Gen. CHRYSOLOGUE KARANGWA.

Institut des Sciences Agronomiques du Rwanda (ISAR): BP 138, Butare; tel. 30642; fax 30644; for the development of subsistence and export agriculture; Dir MUNYANGANIZI BIKORO; 12 centres.

Office des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda—Café (OCIR—Café): BP 104, Kigali; tel. 575600; fax 573992; e-mail ocircafe@rwandatell.rwanda1.com; f. 1978; development of coffee and other new agronomic industries; operates a coffee stabilization fund; Dir ANASTASE NZIRASANAHO.

Office des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda—Thé (OCIR—Thé): BP 1344, Kigali; tel. 514797; fax 514796; e-mail ocirthé@rwanda1.com; development and marketing of tea; Dir CÉLESTIN KAYITARE.

Office National pour le Développement de la Commercialisation des Produits Vivriers et des Produits Animaux (OPROVIA): BP 953, Kigali; tel. 82946; fax 82945; privatization pending; Dir DISMAS SEZIBERA.

Régie d'Exploitation et de Développement des Mines (REDEMI): BP 2195, Kigali; tel. 573632; fax 573625; e-mail ruzredem@yahoo.fr; f. 1988 as Régie des Mines du Rwanda; privatized in 2000; state org. for mining tin, columbo-tantalite and wolfram; Man. Dir JEAN-RUZINDANA MUNANA.

Société de Pyréthre au Rwanda (SOPYRWA): BP 79, Ruhengeri; tel. and fax 546364; e-mail sopyrwa@rwanda1.com; f. 1978; cultivation and processing of pyrethrum; post-war activities resumed in Oct. 1994; current production estimated at 80% pre-war capacity; Dir SYLVAIN NZABAGAMBA.

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Rwanda: rue de l'Umuganda, POB 319, Kigali; tel. 83534; fax 83532; Pres. T. RUJUGIRO.

INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATIONS

Association des Industriels du Rwanda: BP 39, Kigali; tel. and fax 575430; Pres. YVES LAFAGE; Exec. Sec. MUGUNGA NDOBA.

Federation of the Rwandan Private Sector Associations: POB 319, Kigali; tel. 83538; fax 83532; e-mail frsp@rwanda1.com; f. 1999 to represent interests of private sector; Exec. Sec. EUGÈNE BITWAYIKI.

UTILITIES

Electrogaz: POB 537, Kigali; tel. 572392; fax 573802; state-owned water, electricity and gas supplier; Dir JOSEPH MUJENGA.

MAJOR COMPANIES

BP-Fina Rwanda: BP 144, Kigali; tel. 572428; fax 574998; wholesale trade in petroleum products; Man. Dir GEORGES BOSSERT.

BRALIRWA: BP 131, Kigali; tel. 82995; fax 85693; f. 1959; mfrs and bottlers of beer in Gisenyi and soft drinks in Kigali.

Cimenterie du Rwanda (CIMERWA): Kigali; f. 1984; mfrs of cement; post-war activities resumed in Aug. 1994; 1995 production estimated at 60% of pre-war capacity.

Kabuye Sugar Works SARL: BP 373; Kigali; tel. 575468; fax 572865; f. 1969; privatized 1997.

Office de la Valorisation Industrielle de la Banane du Rwanda (OVIBAR): BP 1002, Kigali; tel. 85857; f. 1978; mfrs of banana wine and juice; post-war activities resumed in Dec. 1994; 1995 production estimated at only 1% of pre-war capacity; activities suspended; Dir ALOYS MUTAGANDA.

Rwigass Cigarettes Co: BP 1286, Kigali; tel. 575535; fax 575516; production of cigarettes; Man. Dir R. ASSINAPOL.

Savonnerie de Kicukiro (SAKIRWA): BP 441, Kigali; tel. 572678; fax 575450; e-mail hram@rwandatell.rwanda1.com; soap and washing powders; Chair. H. RAMJI.

Société Emballage—Rwanda: BP 1009, Kigali; tel. 575705; export of fruit and fruit products; production of soya- and cereal-based foods since 1997.

Société pour l'Hydraulique, l'Environnement et la Réhabilitation: BP 1526, Kigali; tel. and fax 578630; fax 578851; e-mail sher@rwanda1.com; internet www.sher.be; f. 1985; rural development; Chair. and Man. Dir PAUL GAHN.

Société Rwandaise pour la Production et la Commercialisation du Thé (SORWATHE), SARL: Kigali; tel. 75461; f. 1978; tea.

TABARWANDA: BP 650, Kigali; tel. 85539; e-mail tbr@rwandatell.rwanda1.com; produces cigarettes; Dir PTE MUGABO.

Tôlerie Industrielle du Rwanda (TOLIRWA): BP 521, Kigali; tel. 572129; produces sheet metal; Dir-Gen. JAFFER.

TRADE UNIONS

Centrale d'Education et de Coopération des Travailleurs pour le Développement/Alliance Coopérative au Rwanda (CECOTRAD/ACORWA): BP 295, Kigali; f. 1984; Pres. ELIE KATBARWA.

Centrale Syndicale des Travailleurs du Rwanda: BP 1645, Kigali; tel. 85658; fax 84012; e-mail cestrav@rwandatell.rwanda1.com; Sec.-Gen. FRANÇOIS MURANGIRA.

Transport

RAILWAYS

There are no railways in Rwanda, although plans exist for the eventual construction of a line passing through Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, to connect with the Kigoma—Dar es Salaam line in Tanzania. Rwanda has access by road to the Tanzanian railways system.

ROADS

In 1999 there were an estimated 12,000 km of roads, of which 996 km were paved. There are road links with Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Internal conflict during 1994 caused considerable damage to the road system and the destruction of several important bridges. In 1997 Rwanda received a US \$45m. loan to be used for road improvement.

Office National des Transports en Commun (ONATRACOM): BP 609, Kigali; tel. 575564; Dir (vacant).

INLAND WATERWAYS

There are services on Lake Kivu between Cyangugu, Gisenyi and Kibuye, including two vessels operated by ONATRACOM.

CIVIL AVIATION

The Kanombe international airport at Kigali can process up to 500,000 passengers annually. There is a second international airport at Kamembe, near the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There are airfields at Butare, Gabiro, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, servicing internal flights.

Alliance Express Rwanda (ALEX): BP 1440, Kigali; tel. 82409; fax 82417; e-mail aev@aev.com.rw; fax 572562; f. 1998 to succeed fmr Air Rwanda as national carrier; 51% owned by Alliance Air (jty owned by Govts of Uganda and South Africa and by South African Airways), 49% state-owned; domestic and regional passenger and cargo services; Chair. GERALD ZIRIMWABAGABO.

Rwandair Express: BP 3246, Kigali; tel. 577564; fax 577669; f. 1998; privately-owned; operates two passenger aircraft; regional services; CEO PIERRE CLAVER KABERA (acting).

Tourism

Attractions for tourists include the wildlife of the national parks (notably mountain gorillas), Lake Kivu and fine mountain scenery. Since the end of the transitional period in late 2003, the Government has increased efforts to develop the tourism industry. In 1998 there were only an estimated 2,000 foreign visitors to Rwanda, but by 2001 the number of tourist arrivals had increased to 113,185. Total receipts from tourism were estimated at US \$31m. in 2002.

Office Rwandais du Tourisme et des Parcs Nationaux (ORTPN): blvd de la Révolution 1, BP 905, Kigali; tel. 576514; fax 576515; e-mail webmaster@rwandatourism.com; internet www.rwandatourism.com; f. 1973; govt agency.

Defence

As assessed at March 2006, the total strength of the Rwandan armed forces was estimated at 51,000, comprising an army of 40,000, an air force of 1,000, and a paramilitary force of about 10,000. In addition, there were an estimated 2,000 local defence forces. Further restructuring of the army, which was expected to be reduced in size to number about 25,000, was planned.

Defence Expenditure: Estimated at 31,100m. Rwandan francs in 2005.

General Chief of Staff: Gen. JAMES KABAREEBE.

Education

Primary education, beginning at seven years of age and lasting for six years, is officially compulsory. Secondary education, which is not compulsory, begins at the age of 14 and lasts for a further six years, comprising two equal cycles of three years. In 2003, however, the Government announced plans to introduce a nine-year system of basic education, including three years of attendance at lower secondary schools. Schools are administered by the state and by Christian missions. In 1999/2000 97.3% of children in the relevant age-group (males 97.1%; females 97.5%) were enrolled in primary schools, while secondary enrolment was equivalent to only 12.1% of children in the appropriate age-group (males 12.4%; females 11.8%).

The World Bank estimated that 95.4% of children in the relevant age-group were enrolled in primary education in 2003/04. Secondary enrolment was equivalent to 13.9% of children in that age-group in 2002. Rwanda has a university, with campuses at Butare and Ruhengeri, and several other institutions of higher education, but some students attend universities abroad, particularly in Belgium, France or Germany. In 2003 the number of students at the six public higher education institutions was 12,211, with a further 8,182 attending about seven private higher institutions. Estimated total expenditure by the central Government in 2003/04 represented 24.2% of total public expenditure.

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