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DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C; WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND MOZENA; JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, KDEM, RW, UNSC SUBJECT: WGRWOL: UN SYG LETTER TO SC; RPF THREATS; SC INFORMALS; PROVISIONAL GOVT FORMED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARMON E KIRBY DATE/CASE ID: 06 FEB 2008 200103014

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

SYG LETTER

2. THE SYG WROTE TO THE SC PRESIDENT TO ADVISE THAT EVACUATION OF UN CIVILIAN STAFF AND FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM RWANDA MIGHT BE NECESSARY, IN WHICH CASE UNAMIR WOULD BE HINDERED UNDER ITS PRESENT MANDATE AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. SHOULD UNAMIR BE REQUIRED TO EFFECT SUCH EVACUATION, THE FORCE COMMANDER WOULD NEED 2 TO 3 ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS FOR THAT PURPOSE. COMPLETE TEXT OF SYG'S LETTER BELOW AT PARA 13. THE SYG'S LETTER WAS NOT MADE AVAILABLE UNTIL HALFWAY THROUGH THE COUNCIL'S INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. THE SECRETARIAT INDICATED THAT THE SYG DID NOT/NOT WANT COUNCIL TO TAKE ACTION NOW, BUT MERELY BE INFORMED OF THE POSSIBILITY.

SECRETARIAT BRIEFING TO SC

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- USUN N 01476 01 OF 03 090149Z PAGE 03 3. THE SECRETARIAT BRIEFED THE COUNCIL APRIL 8 ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. MANY RWANDANS HAVE BEEN KILLED AND THE SITUATION IS PRECARIOUS. FOUR UNAMIR PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN WOUNDED, TWO SERIOUSLY. ONE OF THE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED IS URUGUAYAN. OF THE TWO CAPTURED GHANAIANS, ONE HAS RETURNED SAFELY TO UNAMIR AND THE OTHER WAS STILL IN CUSTODY, BUT UNHARMED. TWO BELGIAN CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN KILLED. THE RPF IS OUT OF THEIR CORDONED AREA, AND NOW CONTROL THE APPROACHES TO THE AIRPORT. THE SRSG IS WORKING TO SECURE AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE. THE GENDARMERIE ARE THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE, THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS THE LEAST. A CEASE-FIRE WAS SUPPOSED TO GO INTO EFFECT AT 2 PM, BUT WAS POSTPONED TO 4 PM (LOCAL KIGALI TIME). (COMMENT: THE UN SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD USUN THAT THE CEASE-FIRE WAS POSTPONED UNTIL 6:30 PM 4/9 AT WHICH TIME ALL TROOPS WOULD RETURN TO THEIR BARRACKS WITH THEIR WEAPONS. END COMMENT.) THE FORCE COMMANDER HAD CONVINCED THE RPF NOT TO MOVE OUT OF THE DMZ. THE REST OF RWANDA, OUTSIDE KIGALI, WAS CALM EXCEPT FOR SOME TENSION AROUND THE DMZ.
- 4. THE SECRETARIAT CONTINUED THAT SRSG BOOH-BOOH IS TRYING TO CONSTITUTE AN INTERIM POLITICAL AUTHORITY. HOWEVER, COMMUNICATION IS DIFFICULT WITHIN KIGALI;

PHONES ARE DOWN AND TRAVEL ALONG THE STREETS IS DANGEROUS. THE RPF WOULD JOIN AN INTERIM AUTHORITY, PROVIDED THE ARMY AND GENDARMERIE PROMISE TO PUNISH WHOMEVER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KILLINGS. THE GENDARMERIE AND ARMY APPEAR TO BE NOT OPPOSED TO JOINING AN INTERIM AUTHORITY. THE PRIME MINISTER-DESIGNATE IS SAFE IN UNAMIR HEADQUARTERS.

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- 5. COMMENT: THE UN INFORMED USUN LATER THAT A PROVISIONAL POLITICAL AUTHORITY HAD BEEN FORMED, WITH PRESIDENT THEODORE SINDIKUBWABO OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL AND PRIME MINISTER JEAN KAMBANDA OF THE RWANDA DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT PLUS FIVE MINISTERS. THIS WAS NEGOTIATED WITH THE POLITICIANS AND THE ARMY; THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD CONCURRED. END COMMENT.
- THE SECRETARIAT REVEALED THAT FORCE COMMANDER (FC) 6. GEN. DALLAIRE DURING THE NIGHT OF 4/7-8 HAD SPECIFICALLY ASKED UNHO WHETHER UNAMIR COULD HELP IN ANY EVENTUAL EVACUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONS. UNHQ TOLD HIM IT WOULD BE OUTSIDE UNAMIR'S PRESENT MANDATE TO ASSIST AN EVACUATION, AND UNAMIR DID NOT HAVE THE REQUIRED ASSETS. EXISTING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE THAT FORCE CAN BE USED ONLY IN SELF-DEFENSE OR IF UNAMIR IS FORCED TO DEFEND MEMBERS OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. THE SECRETARIAT INDICATED THAT GEN. DALLAIRE HAD GONE A BIT BEYOND THAT AND HAD HIS MEN FIRE INTO THE AIR AS A DETERRENT. DALLAIRE FELT HE DID NOT/NOT NEED REINFORCEMENTS WITH THE PRESENT MANDATE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. IF A CEASE-FIRE HOLDS, IT WOULD BE A PRIORITY OF THE SRSG AND FC TO GET AGREEMENT FROM ALL PARTIES ON THE EVACUATION OF UN CIVILIAN STAFF AND FOREIGN NATIONALS.

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TO AMEMBASSY KIGALI NIACT IMMEDIATE

SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5580

INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

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DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C; WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND MOZENA; JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

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FRENCH VIEWS

7. FRENCH AMBASSADOR MERIMEE EMPHASIZED THAT THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF UNAMIR SHOULD BE TO REESTABLISH SOME SORT OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY. TWO FRENCH CIVILIANS HAD BEEN ASSASSINATED, IN ADDITION TO THE TWO BELGIANS MENTIONED BY THE SECRETARIAT. IF THE SITUATION WORSENED AND EVACUATION WERE NEEDED, THE COUNCIL COULD CONSIDER GIVING UNAMIR A NEW MANDATE TO ALLOW IT TO ASSIST THE EVACUATION AND EVACUATE ITSELF. IF THERE WERE NO DETERIORATION AND A POLITICAL AUTHORITY WAS ESTABLISHED, UNAMIR'S CURRENT MANDATE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. MERIMEE UNDERLINED THAT THE FIRST RESPONSIBILITY OF A GOVERNMENT WAS TO PROTECT ITS NATIONALS. IF FRANCE WERE OBLIGED TO SEND IN A BATTALION, IT WOULD BE EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE PURPOSES OF EVACUATING THEIR NATIONALS, AND WOULD WORK IN COOPERATION WITH UNAMIR.

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8. U.S. DEPUTY PERMREP WALKER CAUTIONED THAT MORE INFORMATION WAS NEEDED BEFORE THE COUNCIL COULD MAKE AN INFORMED DECISION. TAKING A HOSTILE AIRPORT, SECURING ITS PERIMETER, ETC. WOULD BE COMPLICATED. IF THE EVACUATION WERE DONE BY THE UN, INSTEAD OF BY NATIONAL FORCES, A GREAT DEAL OF PLANNING WOULD BE REQUIRED. WALKER ALSO POINTED OUT THAT RESOLUTION 872, OF OCTOBER 5, 1992, GAVE UNAMIR A MANDATE TO "CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE CITY OF KIGALI INTER ALIA WITHIN A WEAPONS-SECURE AREA ESTABLISHED BY THE PARTIES IN AND AROUND THE CITY" AND TO "ASSIST IN THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH RELIEF OPERATIONS". DEPENDING ON INTERPRETATION, THIS MANDATE COULD GIVE THE FC A GOOD DEAL OF LATITUDE.

OTHER REMARKS IN SC

9. RUSSIA AND SPAIN SUGGESTED THAT THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT SPEAK TO THE PRESS. IT WAS AGREED SC

PRESIDENT KEATING (NEW ZEALAND) WOULD TELL THE PRESS THE COUNCIL HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE SYG, AND WAS CONTINUING TO CONSIDER NEXT STEPS. ALSO THAT THE COUNCIL SUPPORTED THE EFFORTS OF THE SRSG AND FC TO ESTABLISH A CEASEFIRE AND A PROVISIONAL POLITICAL AUTHORITY. KEATING WOULD NOT GET INTO DETAILS ON MODALITIES, SUCH AS CHANGING MANDATE, EXPANDING FORCE, ETC.

10. ARGENTINA SUGGESTED THAT THE SYG SHOULD CONTACT CONFIDENTIAL

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THOSE COUNTRIES WITH NATIONALS IN RWANDA WHICH WERE
CAPABLE OF UNDERTAKING AN EVACUATION IN ORDER TO
COORDINATE. EVACUATION SHOULD NOT BE SELECTIVE. THE
CZECH AMBASSADOR ASKED IF TROOP CONTRIBUTORS WERE BEING
KEPT INFORMED. SECRETARIAT REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY AND
SAID A TROOP CONTRIBUTORS MEETING WOULD BE HELD NEXT
WEEK. SPAIN HOPED THE SECRETARIAT WAS DOING CONTINGENCY
PLANNING.

AMB. KEATING INFORMED THAT COUNCIL THAT RPF 11. REPRESENTATIVE CLAUDE DUSAIDI HAD MET WITH HIM APRIL 8. HE REPORTED THAT DUSAIDI SAID THE RPF HAD SHOWN RESTRAINT AND MAINTAINED THEIR POSITIONS. THE RPF WOULD PREFER ANY EVACUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY UNAMIR. DUSAIDI WAS INSTRUCTED TO REQUEST THAT ALL EVACUATION MOVEMENTS BE FULLY DISCUSSED WITH RPF THROUGH UNAMIR IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY HOSTILE ACTION INADVERTANTLY TAKING PLACE FROM RPF.S SIDE- ANY EVACUATION FORCE REMAINING IN RWANDA LONGER THAN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR EVACUATION WOULD BE CONSIDERED HOSTILE FORCES. RPF WAS TOTALLY OPPOSED TO ANY CHANGE IN THE UNAMIR MANDATE WHICH WOULD INVOLVE IT IN A COMBAT ANY INTERVENTION BY UNAMIR (OR OTHERWISE) IN RPF ROLE. MOVEMENTS WOULD RESULT IN THE FORCES BEING CONSIDERED AS HOSTILE. THEY RENOUNCED AGAIN RPF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THE PRESIDENT.S PLANE. THE ENTIRE

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POLITICAL CADRE (10-20 LEADING POLITICAL FIGURES) HAD NOW BEEN ASSASSINATED AND FORMING AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE DIFFICULT. HO WEVER THE RPF WOULD COOPERATE.

SC NEXT MEETING

12. THE SECRETARIAT WILL GIVE THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT AN UPDATE ON SATURDAY, APRIL 9. THE PRESIDENT WILL PASS THE INFORMATION ON TO ALL COUNCIL MEMBERS. IF NECESSARY, THE COUNCIL WILL MEET IN EMERGENCY SESSION APRIL 9.

13. BEGIN TEXT OF SYG LETTER TO SC PRESIDENT:

8 APRIL 1994

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

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THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ARE AWARE OF THE
TRAGIC SITUATION IN RWANDA, AND HAVE BEEN KEPT INFORMED
OF THE REPORTS BEING RECEIVED FROM MY SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE AND THE FORCE COMMANDER OF UNAMIR.

UNAMIR IS ENGAGED IN INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO SECURE AGREEMENT ON A CEASE-FIRE IN KIGALI, AND TO PROMOTE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM POLITICAL AUTHORITY TO FILL THE PRESENT VACUUM UNTIL SOME NORMALITY CAN BE RESTORED. UNFORTUNATELY, SO FAR THESE EFFORTS HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL, BUT ARE CONTINUING.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IN THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL 1994, HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND OF THE FOREIGN COMMUNITIES LIVING IN RWANDA AS WELL AS OF UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL,. I FULLY SHARE THIS CONCERN AND HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE FORCE

COMMANDER OF UNAMIR IN THIS REGARD.

IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN STAFF FROM THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM, AS WELL AS OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS, MIGHT BECOME UNAVOIDABLE, IN WHICH EVENT UNAMIR WOULD BE HINDERED IN PROVIDING ASSISTANCE UNDER ITS PRESENT MANDATE AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT WISH TO GIVE THIS MATTER THEIR URGENT ATTENTION.

SHOULD UNAMIR BE REQUIRED TO EFFECT SUCH AN EVACUATION, THE FORCE COMMANDER ESTIMATES THAT HE WOULD REQUIRE TWO OR THREE ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS FOR THAT PURPOSE.

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PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.
(SIGNATURE) BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT

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