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FROM: AF/RA - LTC Anthony Marley
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SUBJECT: Preliminary Peacekeeping Force Options for Rwanda

This memorandum is only a preliminary examination of peacekeeping force options in Rwanda. Its purpose is to serve as a basis for further discussion and analysis. The stated costs for each option are rough estimates only, and assume reimbursement of OAU forces at UN rates.

Background. The Government of Rwanda and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) are soon expected to sign peace accords ending nearly three years of civil war in that central African country. The proposed peace agreement calls for a "Neutral International Force" (NIF) to act as a peacekeeping force during the transitional period. The actual size of the NIF will be dependent on the outcome of a planning survey; current estimates among Arusha participants range up to 2,500 personnel. The costs of the NIF will largely depend on the ultimate size of the force.

The NIF's mandate will include supervision of the encampment and disarming of combatant forces, supervision of the demobilization of excess military forces, monitoring of the integration of forces into the new national army and gendarmerie, and monitoring of internal security to permit the return of up to 1.5 million displaced persons and refugees. The NIF's geographic span of control will encompass the entirety of Rwanda (10,169 square miles, approximately the size of Maryland). NIF peacekeepers would be required for approximately 10-12 months, while observers could expect to remain in Rwanda for the 22 month transition.

The Rwandan Government, the RPF, and the Organization of African Unity have all indicated that they look to the United Nations to provide the NIF peacekeeping force. The Rwandan Government has also indicated that "the people" need to see non-African participation in the peacekeeping force and has made clear that it does not trust the OAU, which it regards as pro-RPF.

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There are currently 50 OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) monitors in Rwanda acting as an interpositional force in the buffer zone. The NMOG may be expanded to a force of 240 personnel in the near future, but its essential mandate is not expected to change. NMOG is charged with monitoring of military activities by the two sides to ensure that they do not conduct offensive military activities, reinforce forward units, or move additional weapons or munitions in the vicinity of the neutral buffer zone.

Options. Six options are currently being considered for a peacekeeping force for Rwanda:

Option 1 - UN-only Peacekeeping Operation. (OAU personnel could form an important part of a UN force, both numerically and in command positions.)

Force composed of approximately 2500 peacekeepers would cost approximately \$2.5 million per month in reimbursable salaries, plus \$375,000 per month in operating costs, plus an estimated \$3 million in round-trip transport costs, or about \$37.5 million for one year. If a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda were conducted on an assessed basis, the estimated cost to the U.S. would be roughly \$11 million for one year.

• Advantages:

- The only force trusted by all parties
- The UN is the most experienced international peacekeeping organization
- Has a PKO planning and management directorate within the Secretariat
- Bureaucratic funding mechanisms exist to finance UN peacekeeping operations (both within USG and other countries)
- Could provide an easy, needed success to UN peacekeeping efforts
- Canada, among others, has reportedly informally indicated a willingness to provide troops for an UN operation in Rwanda
- Would satisfy UN SYG Boutros-Ghali's earlier insistence that if the UN were involved in an operation, it must be in command of the entire operation
- Would allow France to withdraw its troops from Kigali (approximately 350 soldiers to ensure the security of the capital) without losing face

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- Might allow training of OAU Secretariat personnel through seconding them to the UN operation as deputies
- A UN PKO is cost effective when compared to the cost of caring for the displaced population. A successful PKO would allow the displaced to return home, thereby significantly reducing current humanitarian relief costs (estimated at \$100 million this year, with the U.S. pledged to contribute over \$34 million) and obviating the need for future relief.
- Supports USG policy (per PRD-13) of emphasizing the UN as the primary body to conduct peacekeeping

- Disadvantages:

- Russia (and possibly UK) may oppose and possibly veto an assessed UN operation due to financial constraints (neither contributes significantly to the humanitarian aid bill)
- Finding enough contributions for a voluntary UN operation would be problematic
- UN peacekeeping management directorate is already stretched exceedingly thin due to the abundance of current UN peacekeeping efforts worldwide
- May prove difficult to find enough states willing to provide military forces to participate in the operation
- UN peacekeepers could not be in place and operational for an estimated 4-6 months
- DoD does not want to risk having to provide its own resources, as might be required by a UN operation
- Ignores USG policy to promote regional peacekeeping institutions

Option 2 - OAU-only Peacekeeping Operation

An OAU force composed of approximately 2500 personnel, operating independently of the UN, could be expected to cost the international community at least the same amount as a UN operation (approximately \$2.5 million per month reimbursed to donating countries plus \$375,000 per month in operating costs), as it is unlikely that African countries will be willing to provide significant numbers of military troops to the OAU on a continuing basis without being reimbursed at UN rates. Cost for a one year operation, including estimated round-trip transport costs of \$3 million, would be \$37.5 million.

- Advantages:

- Avoids adding another peacekeeping operation to the heavily committed United Nations

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- Avoids risking Russian Security Council opposition
- If the operation succeeded, it would provide a confidence building experience to the OAU as an international institution
- Would demonstrate that the OAU and its member states are serious about taking responsibility for solving Africa's problems
- Supports USG policy goal to promote regional peacekeeping institutions (although at perhaps too rapid a pace)

- Disadvantages:

- The Rwandan Government thinks the NMOG is pro-RPF and therefore it opposes an OAU-only force
- The OAU SYG Salim Salim has stated that the OAU will not undertake a peacekeeping mission
- African states will need massive external assistance (materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- The OAU lacks experience in planning large peacekeeping efforts
- The OAU Secretariat is not staffed to supervise/manage major peacekeeping operations
- The OAU lacks the communications equipment required to manage such an operation (Satcom communications, HF radios)
- The OAU is severely resource-constrained and lacks funding mechanisms to support such a major endeavor; funding would be ad hoc, on a bilateral and uncertain basis
- May well lead to a collapse of the peace in Rwanda

Option 3 - Hybrid UN-OAU Peacekeeping Operation (UN Observer Force and OAU Peacekeeping Force)

Estimated costs to the international community of approximately \$3 million per month (70 UN observers at a per diem rate of \$120 per day equals \$252,000; 2400 peacekeepers reimbursed at approximately \$2.4 million per month, plus \$375,000 per month for operating costs), plus estimated round-trip transport of \$3 million. Estimated cost for a one year operation would be \$39 million.

- Advantages:

- Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- A small number of UN observers could probably be deployed more quickly than a full UN peacekeeping operation, and at least a small OAU force would already be on the ground

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- Would provide UN planning expertise to the OAU
- Might minimize Russian opposition (especially if it is conducted as a voluntary rather than an assessed operation)
 - Provides the OAU a UN-supervised peacekeeping learning experience and possible peacekeeping success
 - Active UN involvement, and participation of non-African observers, would probably make this acceptable to both Rwandan parties
 - UN involvement would provide a face saving way for the French to withdraw their forces from Rwanda
 - Would demonstrate the OAU's acceptance of responsibility for addressing Africa's problems
 - Supports USG policy goal of promoting regional peacekeeping institutions

- Disadvantages:

- Might not be trusted by the Government of Rwanda
- The UN has indicated to the OAU that if the UN were involved in a peacekeeping operation, the UN must be in command of the entire operation
 - OAU SYG Salim Salim has indicated that the OAU does not support the concept of a "dual command," and would defer to the UN for operational command.
 - African states will need massive external assistance (materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
 - The OAU is not currently staffed to manage a large peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (no military or peacekeeping directorate)
 - The OAU Headquarters lacks the communications equipment necessary to manage a major peacekeeping operation in Rwanda

Option 4 - Hybrid UN-OAU-Franco-Belgian Force

Combined forces would consist of a 750 man OAU force in the buffer zone augmented by 250 UN troops, paid for through a voluntary fund; retention of the 81 man UN force on the Uganda-Rwanda border which is paid through UN assessments; and an 800 man "International Force" consisting of one Belgian and one French battalion whose costs would be borne directly by the contributors. The costs to the international community would be approximately \$1.1 million per month in reimbursable salaries (for UN and OAU forces), \$225,000 in operating costs per month, and \$1.2 million in UN and OAU round-trip transport, for an estimated total of \$17.1 million for a one year operation. (Note - this option has a total of 1881 personnel rather than 2500, which also has a direct impact on costs.)

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• Advantages:

- Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- Requires a greatly reduced manpower requirement on the United Nations (331 peacekeepers versus up to 2500 peacekeepers)
- Would provide UN planning expertise to the OAU
- Bureaucratic funding mechanisms exist to support the UN, which could serve as a conduit to provide funding for the operation
- Might minimize Russian opposition
- Provides the OAU a UN-supervised peacekeeping learning experience and a probable peacekeeping success
- Active UN involvement and participation of non-African observers would probably make this acceptable to the Government of Rwanda
- Supports USG policy goal of promoting regional peacekeeping institutions

• Disadvantages:

- Would probably be rejected by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which considers France an ally of the Government
- France and Belgium might object on fiscal grounds
- France has indicated that it cannot provide voluntary contributions to UN peacekeeping operations
- France has indicated its desire to withdraw its troops from Rwanda
- Belgium has expressed its reluctance to contribute troops to a Rwandan peacekeeping operation due to its colonial association with Rwanda
- African states will need massive external assistance (materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- The OAU is not currently staffed to manage a large peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (no military or peacekeeping directorate)
- The OAU might object to the bilateral aspect of the Franco-Belgian force participating in the operation
- The OAU has been reluctant to accept the peacekeeping role
- OAU SYG Salim Salim has indicated that the OAU does not support the concept of a "dual command"

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Option 5 - Small UN NIF in Kigali/Expanded NMOG in DMZ

Two separate forces: A small UN force of about 300 men to assure security in Kigali for the installation of the joint transitional government and an expanded NMOG of about 240 men with a broader mandate to act as an effective buffer force and provide security in the DMZ. The total cost is estimated at \$620,000 per month, plus round-trip transport of approximately \$725,000, or roughly \$8 million per year.

- Advantages

- Is roughly one-fifth the cost of the other force options actively being considered
- Would allow the post-peace coalition transitional government to begin functioning. If the coalition government works out, the parties' confidence may be high enough to allow force integration without additional deployment of peacekeepers.
- Does not require any command relationship between the UN and OAU, thereby avoiding the bureaucratic resistance of both organizations.
- An expanded NMOG could provide the security necessary for holding of local joint elections in the DMZ and for a gradual return of the displaced to their homes.
- Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the Rwandan PKO, thereby significantly boosting confidence levels
- Could probably be deployed more quickly than a full-scale UN PKO
- Requires far less manpower from the UN
- The small UN force on the ground could evaluate the need for a larger force for the cantonment/disarmament/force integration/demobilization stage of the PKO
- Would allow the OAU to consult with the UN force and benefit from its PKO expertise
- Would probably minimize Russian opposition (particularly if conducted as a voluntary operation)
- Active UN involvement and participation of non-African forces would make this option more acceptable to the Rwandan government.
- UN involvement would provide a face-saving way for the French to withdraw their forces, as the RPF has demanded.
- Would demonstrate the OAU's acceptance of responsibility for addressing Africa's problems.
- Advances the USG's goal of promoting regional PKOs
- Canada, among others, has informally indicated a willingness to provide troops for a UN PKO in Rwanda
- Despite the OAU's limited PKO experience, they may have the capability to fulfill the modest role required of the NMOG

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- Disadvantages

- Deployment of additional peacekeeping forces sometime in the future might well be required to complete the cantonment/disarmament/force integration/demobilization stage.

- The OAU may not have the funding on hand to expand the NMOG and, if additional funding is required, it would have to be on an ad hoc, bilateral basis.

- Even for an operation this small, funding of the UN portion could prove problematic.

- It may be impractical to include troops from more than one country in a UN force this small, and it could prove difficult to find one country willing to accept the responsibility of contributing all 300 UN troops.

- The UN peacekeeping management directorate is already stretched exceedingly thin due to the abundance of current UN PKOs

Option 6 - Conduct No International Peacekeeping Operation:

There would be no cost to the international community for peacekeepers or observers, but humanitarian aid costs would probably continue at or above current high levels (at least \$100 million this year, with the USG pledged to provide \$34 million in humanitarian aid).

- Advantage:

- Reduces peacekeeping costs to international community

- Disadvantages:

- Will perpetuate massive relief costs, which in Rwanda are approximately 3 times higher than the cost of a 2500-man PKO

- Will most likely lead to the collapse of the peace in Rwanda, which risks regional destabilization

- International inaction would highlight the marginalization of Africa

- Would set a bad precedent; other countries in conflict might prove unwilling to accept a negotiated settlement if the international community is unwilling to provide peacekeeping support

- Ignores USG policy goals of conflict resolution and democratization (in Rwanda, the latter is wholly dependent on a successful end to the civil war)

- Nullifies the US investment in resolution of the Rwandan civil war, including more than one year of diplomatic effort

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