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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	DODE-00	EUR-01	HA-09
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10	SNP-01
	SP-01	SS-01	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	/037W	

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P 031502Z APR 92
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0334
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIGALI 01400

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, RW
SUBJECT: THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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SUMMARY

2. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MULTIPARTY TRANSITION GOVERNMENT OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW EFFORTS TO END THE RPF-RWANDA WAR ON THE RWANDA-UGANDA BORDER. WE RECOMMEND A RENEWED EFFORT TO COOPERATE WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES TO MAKE DEMARCHES TO MUSEVENI AND HABYARIMANA AND TO RESUME THE STALLED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOR AND THE RPF. RECOMMENDATION IN PARAS 15-18. END SUMMARY.

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3. PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA ANNOUNCED APRIL 2 THE APPOINTMENT OF MDR LEADER DISMAS NSENGIYAREMYE AS PRIME MINISTER TO FORM A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT INCLUDING MEMBERS OF ALL KEY PARTIES (MRND, MDR, PL, PSD AND PDC). THE GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE 20 MINISTRIES, NINE EACH FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MRND AND THE THREE OPPOSITION PARTIES, WITH THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE MDR AND ONE SEAT RESERVED FOR THE PDC.

4. THE PURPOSE OF THIS TELEGRAM IS TO ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE WITH THE RPF, AND RECOMMEND DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS TO EXPLOIT THE NEW POLITICAL REALITY.

EXISTING U.S. POLICY

5. AT THE REGIONAL CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE IN BUJUMBURA LAST APRIL, WE RECOMMENDED, INTER ALIA,
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THAT: A) WE UTILIZE THE CRISIS (RPF/RWANDA WAR) TO ENCOURAGE MOVEMENT ON DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND B) WE TELL THE RPF THAT WE SUPPORT THEIR DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL EQUALITY GOALS AND WILL HOLD THE GOR TO ITS COMMITMENTS IN THESE AREAS. WE THUS PUT OURSELVES CLEARLY ON RECORD THAT THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN RWANDA WAS A KEY ELEMENT IN BRINGING AN END TO THE GOR/RPF WAR. IN HIS APRIL 17 PRESS CONFERENCE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY COHEN ADDED "WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES WHO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES SHOULD BE ENSURED BY A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM THAT PROVIDES TO EVERY CITIZEN EQUAL RIGHTS AND DEFENDS HUMAN RIGHTS."

6. ASSISTANT SECRETARY COHEN WENT ON TO SAY "WE CONDEMN ANY USE OF FORCE TO SETTLE THE PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES AND ASK ALL GOVERNMENTS IN THE REGION TO PREVENT ANY USE OF THEIR TERRITORY FOR MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THEIR NEIGHBORS". (ABOVE QUOTES FROM BUJUMBURA 1570 OF APRIL 1991). IN REPORTING ON THE CONFERENCE TO LEADERS IN BURUNDI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY COHEN DESCRIBED OUR CONCLUSIONS AS FOLLOWS: "HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. SEES DEMOCRACY AS THE BEST LONG-TERM PROTECTION FOR THOSE REFUGEES RETURNING TO

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RWANDA.... AMBASSADOR COHEN INSISTED THAT THE RPF SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT OF RETURN TO RWANDA BUT NOT TO POWER SHARING AS IT IS DEMANDING.... COHEN SAID THAT POWER SHARING SHOULD BE ACHIEVED BY DEMOCRACY AND NOT BY FORCE. FOR THIS REASON, MOVING THE GOR TOWARD GENUINE DEMOCRACY IS A KEY ELEMENT OF OUR REGIONAL STRATEGY." (91 BUJUMBURA 16B0).

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7. WE HAVE PURSUED THIS POLICY AGGRESSIVELY FOR THE PAST 11 MONTHS, AND HAVE WELCOMED: THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND POLITICAL PARTIES LAW, THE FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES, THE DRAMATIC LIBERALIZATION OF THE PRESS, AND THE CREATION OF DOZENS OF NEW ASSOCIATIONS. WE HAVE USED AID GRANTS, USIA IV PROGRAMS, SELF-HELP AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECTS AND PRACTICALLY DAILY MEETINGS WITH OPPOSITION PARTY

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P 031502Z APR 92
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0335
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 KIGALI 01400

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LEADERS AND KEY GOVERNMENT ACTORS TO PROMOTE THE
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS. PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA HAS
NOW AGREED TO SHARE POWER. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE
NEW NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT INCLUDES A COMMITMENT
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TO ELECTIONS WITHIN 12 MONTHS.

RPF REACTIONS

8. THE RPF INITIALLY TREATED HABYARIMANA'S MOVES
TOWARD DEMOCRACY AS A FRAUD, A CHEAP TRICK TO
PERSUADE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE
AID TO RWANDA. BUT BEGINNING IN ABOUT SEPTEMBER,
1991, WE BEGAN TO HEAR RPF LEADERS TAKING THE PROCESS
SERIOUSLY. SOMETIME IN THAT TIME FRAME, THEY
DISCOVERED HOW WELL THE TELEPHONE SYSTEM WORKED IN
KIGALI, AND BEGAN CALLING LEADERS OF OPPOSITION
PARTIES. FROM COMPLAINTS OF SOME OF THE PARTY
LEADERS, WE KNOW THAT THEY HAVE CALLED AT ALL TIMES
OF THE DAY AND NIGHT.

9. WE ALSO KNOW THAT WHEN THE RPF RECEIVED THE GOR
PROPOSALS IN PARIS IN JANUARY, BEFORE RESPONDING TO
THE GOR, THEY CALLED THE OPPOSITION PARTIES IN KIGALI
TO SEEK THEIR VIEWS.

10. MOST RECENTLY SOME RPF SPOKESMEN HAVE SUGGESTED
TO THE PL THAT IT SHOULD BE CAREFUL ABOUT ENTERING
INTO THE UNITY GOVERNMENT. THERE IS ALSO EVIDENCE

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THAT THE RPF IS BECOMING QUITE NERVOUS ABOUT THE
IMPACT OF A UNITY GOVERNMENT ON ITS FUTURE POSITION.

11. BUT THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT THE RPF CONTINUES TO
TELL US THAT THEY WILL NEGOTIATE WITH THE NEW
GOVERNMENT WHEN IT IS FORMED (FOR EXAMPLE, KIGALI
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853). AND, ALTHOUGH WE CAN'T FIND THE REFERENCE, WE
RECALL ONE SOURCE STATED UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THE RPF
WOULD ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE ONCE THE UNITY GOVERNMENT IS
FORMED.

MUSEVENI'S DEMANDS

12. UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI HAS CONSISTENTLY
DENIED ANY CONTINUING ASSISTANCE TO THE RPF AND HAS
CONSISTENTLY DENIED THAT THE RPF WAS OPERATING FROM
UGANDAN TERRITORY.

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13. MUSEVENI HAS ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE PROBLEM IS
CLEARLY NOT A UGANDAN PROBLEM, BUT A PROBLEM IN WHICH
HABYARIMANA MUST COME TO GRIPS WITH HIS
RESPONSIBILITY FOR RWANDAN REFUGEES AND ACCORD THEM
THE RIGHT TO RETURN. HE HAS ALSO SPOKEN OF THE NEED
FOR DEMOCRACY FOR RWANDA AND THE RIGHTS THEREFORE OF
RWANDANS TO BE ACCEPTED IN THEIR COUNTRY AND
RESPECTED THEREIN.

14. MUSEVENI'S BASIC TERMS HAVE NOW BEEN MET.
RWANDA HAS CREATED A MULTIPARTY POLITICAL SYSTEM
WHERE POWER WILL BE SHARED WITH ALL PARTIES,
INCLUDING THE PL, WHICH, BECAUSE OF ITS LARGE TUTSI
FOLLOWING, MANY PEOPLE BELIEVE IS THE INTERNAL

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RWANDAN COUNTERPART TO THE RPF. THE GOVERNMENT HAS

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COMMITTED ITSELF TO THE RETURN OF THOSE REFUGEES WHO
WISH TO RETURN, AND ALL POLITICAL PARTIES ARE JOINED
IN SHARING THAT COMMITMENT.

RECOMMENDATION ON ENDING THE WAR (1)

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15. I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD USE THE FORMATION OF A
UNITY GOVERNMENT IN RWANDA IN WHICH HABYARIMANA
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SHARES POWER WITH ALL MAJOR PARTIES AS THE BASIS FOR
A NEW JOINT APPROACH TO MUSEVENI TO CEASE SUPPORT FOR
THE RPF AND ENCOURAGE THE RPF TO JOIN A CEASEFIRE.

16. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD ENGAGE THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] IN MAKING THIS APPROACH TO MUSEVENI. IN
MAKING THE APPROACH, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT NEED TO
ACCUSE MUSEVENI OF SUPPORTING THE RPF OR EVEN OF
SUPPLYING THEM. WE SIMPLY NEED TO MAKE CLEAR TO HIM
THAT PERMITTING THE CONTINUING RESUPPLY OF A
GUERRILLA FORCE WHOSE LEGITIMATE CLAIMS HAVE NOW BEEN
MET IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. WE CAN REPEAT THE STATEMENT
SECRETARY COHEN MADE IN BUJUMBURA LAST YEAR THAT THE
USE OF UGANDAN TERRITORY FOR THE ATTACK ON A NEIGHBOR
IS UNACCEPTABLE, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE FACT
THAT THE LEGITIMATE DEMANDS OF THE REFUGEE POPULATION
IN UGANDA ARE NOW BEING MET THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS.

17. WE CAN BALANCE THIS DEMAND WITH A STATEMENT THAT
WE INSIST THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA BEGIN
IMMEDIATELY SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF ON
IMPLEMENTING A CEASEFIRE AND PERMANENT PEACE.

RECOMMENDATION ON ENDING THE WAR (2)

18. IN ADDITION TO CONSULTING [REDACTED] ON
DEMARCHES TO MUSEVENI AND HABYARIMANA, WE SHOULD
REOPEN URGENT DISCUSSION [REDACTED] ON PROMOTING
THE RPF/GOR NEGOTIATIONS. IT MAY WELL BE THAT WITH
THE OPPOSITION AS MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE GOR
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AND RPF WILL NOT NEED INTERMEDIARIES. BUT I DOUBT

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IT.

19. IN OUR EFFORTS TO RESTART NEGOTIATIONS, WE SHOULD KEEP THE OAU AND ITS CURRENT PRESIDENT INFORMED, BUT [REDACTED] I BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT DELAY US-EUROPEAN ACTION AWAITING OAU ACTIVITY.

20. KINSHASA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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