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CCO-00 CIAE-00 C-01 AF-01 INFO LOG-00 AID-01 ARA-01 HA-09 H-01 OASY-00 DOEE-00 EAP-01 EB-01 EUR-01 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 TEDE-00 INR-00 L-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 PA-01 OIG-04 OMB-01 STR-01 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 SS-00 SP-00 SR-00 /050W SNIS-00 NISC-02 PMB-00 RPE-01 SA-01

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5612

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AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY

JOINT STAFF WASHDC

SECDEF WASHDC

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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

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AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

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DEPT FOR TASK FORCE, P/TARNOFF, IO/WARD, AF/MOOSE WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SRICE, DMOZENA CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 USUN N 01503 121743Z JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, PGOV, KDEM, RW, UNSC, CG

SUBJECT: TFRWOL: FUTURE UNAMIR AND FRENCH ROLES IN RWANDA

REFTEL: PARIS 9724

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1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. THE OTHER IMMEDIATE ISSUE IS UNAMIR'S FUTURE. AT CONFIDENTIAL

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USUN N 01503 121743Z PAGE 03 PRESENT THE AIRPORT IS STILL OPEN AND UNDER FRENCH-BELGIAN CONTROL. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO SIGNAL THAT THE UN IS NEARING A DECISION BECAUSE RELATIVE CALM HAS DESCENDED ON KIGALI AND UNAMIR TROOPS ARE NOT PRESENTLY THE TARGET OF HOSTILITIES. YET THIS MIGHT BE A WINDOW OF RELATIVE OPPORTUNITY TO EVACUATE UNAMIR FORCES; THERE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY THAT IT MIGHT BECOME MORE DIFFICULT TO EVACUATE UNAMIR ONCE THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS LEAVE. IN THIS RESPECT, IT IS WORTH CONSIDERING TAKING THE LEAD IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO AUTHORIZE THE EVACUATION OF THE BULK OF UNAMIR, WHILE LEAVING BEHIND A SKELETAL STAFF THAT MIGHT BE ABLE TO FACILITATE A CEASE-FIRE AND ANY FUTURE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS.

4. BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

ALBRIGHT

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