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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	EUR-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	L-01
	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04	OMB-01	PA-01
	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00
	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/047W			

-----715C7C 121934Z /38

O 121840Z SEP 94  
 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8919  
 INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
 AMEMBASSY NAIROBI  
 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
 AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
 USMISSION GENEVA  
 AMEMBASSY ROME  
 AMEMBASSY DAKAR  
 AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
 JOINT STAFF WASHDC  
 SECDEF WASHDC  
 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC  
 UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE  
 AMEMBASSY ACCRA  
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
 AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003783

WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG;  
 JOINT STAFF FOR J5  
 SECDEF FOR OSD/PKPE, OSD/ISA, RWANDA TASK FORCE  
 STATE FOR A/S MOOSE

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR  
 TAGS: MARR, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, RW, UN,

SUBJECT: RWANDA: GEN DALLAIRE ADDRESSES TROOP

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CONTRIBUTORS

1. CONFIDENTIAL.

2. SUMMARY. FORMER UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER, GENERAL DALLAIRE, ASSESSED UNAMIR OPERATIONS AT A MEETING OF THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS. HE DELINEATED 4 PHASES DURING HIS TENURE AS COMMANDER AND ASSESSED EACH. IN PARTICULAR, HE BELIEVED THAT IF UNAMIR HAD HAD BETTER EQUIPPED TROOPS AND A MORE ROBUST MANDATE, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SAVE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF LIVES. HE REPEATEDLY URGED THAT UNAMIR BE GIVEN THE MANDATE AND RESOURCES TO SECURE THE CAMPS AND MOVE THE REFUGEES BACK TO RWANDA. HE ALSO URGED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE THE AID AND INFRASTRUCTURE WITHIN RWANDA NECESSARY TO DRAW PEOPLE BACK.

3. INTRODUCTION. ON 8 SEPTEMBER, FORMER UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER, GENERAL DALLAIRE ADDRESSED UNAMIR TROOP CONTRIBUTORS. HE ASSESSED UNAMIR OPERATIONS TO DATE  
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DELINEATING 4 PHASES OF OPERATIONS. DALLAIRE OPENED BY PRAISING THE DEDICATION OF UNAMIR FORCES AND EXPRESSING HIS PERSONAL ESTEEM FOR THE DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER.

PHASE ONE

4. DALLAIRE CHARACTERIZED THE PRE-WAR PHASE AS LONG AND DRAWN OUT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ARUSHA ACCORDS SET AN AMBITIOUS TIMELINE, BUT CONCLUDED THAT THE UN DID NOT EVEN COME CLOSE TO MEETING IT. AS A RESULT, CONDITIONS ON THE GROUND CONTINUED TO CHANGE AS TROOPS WERE DEPLOYING. IN THE END, THE INABILITY TO DEPLOY QUICKLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE POLITICAL DETERIORATION.

5. BY THE TIME THE WAR BROKE OUT, UNAMIR HAD JUST REACHED FULL STRENGTH (2500), BUT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT EQUIPMENT. THIS LACK OF EQUIPMENT CREATED SIGNIFICANT RISKS, AND IN SOME CASES THE ILLEQUIPPED TROOPS BECAME A LIABILITY.

PHASE TWO

6. DALLAIRE DESCRIBED THE PERIOD FROM 6 APRIL TO 8 JUNE AS "ONE OF THE DARKEST PERIODS IN MODERN HISTORY." HAVING WITNESSED THE EVENTS OF THIS PERIOD, HE IS NOW

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DEEPLY DISTURBED TO SEE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE UN DEBATES  
DURING THAT TIME.

PHASE THREE

7. THE PERIOD FROM 8 JUNE TO THE GOMA EXPLOSION SAW  
UNAMIR REINFORCED. HE PRAISED THE TIMELINESS OF THE  
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ETHIOPIAN DEPLOYMENT. TROOPS FROM SENEGAL AND THE CONGO  
CONTINUED TO UNDERTAKE VERY DELICATE OPERATIONS EVEN  
THOUGH THEY TOOK CASUALTIES. DALLAIRE HAS ONLY THE  
HIGHEST PRAISE FOR THE FRENCH OPERATION, EVEN THOUGH  
THAT INITIATIVE PUT UNAMIR FORCES AT CONSIDERABLE RISK  
AND FORCED THEM TO COMPLETELY RESTRUCTURE THEIR COMMAND,  
CONTROL AND LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS. COORDINATION AMONG  
UNAMIR AND THE FRENCH FORCES WAS OUTSTANDING. IN  
DALLAIRE'S ESTIMATION OPERATION TURQUIOSE ACHIEVED ITS  
AIM AND SAVED LIVES.

8. ALTHOUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MOUNTED A HUGE  
OPERATION IN GOMA, HE POINTED OUT THAT NO HUMANITARIAN  
SUPPORT WAS PROVIDED IN THE SOUTHWEST OR IN THE REST OF  
RWANDA. AS A RESULT, THE ONLY OPTION FOR THOSE SEEKING  
HELP WAS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY.

PHASE FOUR

9. THE PERIOD FROM GOMA TO THE PRESENT HAS SEEN THE  
STABILIZATION, AND EVEN ENTRENCHMENT, OF REFUGEE CAMPS.  
THE ORIGINAL PLAN WAS TO DRAW REFUGEES BACK BY CREATING

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A NETWORK OF WAY STATIONS AND NODAL POINTS INSIDE RWANDA. THIS HAS NOT BEEN ACHIEVED AND THERE IS NO STRATEGIC PLAN FOR SUCH AN OPERATION.

10. DALLAIRE STRESSED THAT IN ORDER TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM UNAMIR MUST GO INTO THE CAMPS AND CREATE A SENSE OF SECURITY BY SECURING THE BORDER AREAS; BY COMING INTO THE CAMPS WITH OVERWHELMING FORCE; BY IDENTIFYING AND SEGREGATING THOSE WHO ARE INTIMIDATING REFUGEES; BY BROADCASTING THE UN MESSAGE VIA RADIO; AND BY PROVIDING A LARGE FLEET OF VEHICLES THAT CAN TRANSPORT PEOPLE BACK. IN ADDITION, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST WORK TO PROVIDE STABILITY INSIDE RWANDA THROUGH AID AND INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS.

11. UNAMIR MUST NOT SIT INSIDE THE BORDER WHILE FORMER GOVERNMENT SOLDIERS AND LEADERS DESTABILIZE RWANDA.

DALLAIRE BELIEVES THAT IF WE DON'T DEAL WITH THE

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PROBLEM, THE RPA ULTIMATELY WILL. HOWEVER, DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM WILL MEAN MORE SOLDIERS, ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT, AND A ROBUST MANDATE.

## ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

12. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH BENIN AND GHANA CAUTIONED AGAINST TAKING ACTIONS THAT WOULD ALLY THE UN WITH ONE SIDE AND AGAINST THE OTHER. THE GHANA REP NOTED THAT MOST NATIONS REPRESENTED ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE NOT WILLING TO PUT THEIR OWN TROOPS AT RISK. THEREFORE A TRULY PEACEFUL SOLUTION MUST BE FOUND. FRANCE FELT THAT THE REAL ISSUE WAS SEPARATING SOLDIERS FROM REFUGEES, AND THAT THE UN SHOULD LOOK FOR SOLUTIONS WITHIN THE EXISTING MANDATE.

## RIZA'S RESPONSE

13. A/SYG RIZA GENTLY COUNTERED DALLAIR'S ACTIVISM BY CHARACTERIZING HIS PERSPECTIVE AS THAT OF A FORMER COMMANDER AND A PRO-ACTIVE MAN WHO HAD SEEN HORRORS FIRST HAND. HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT IT WAS FIRST THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NATIONS HOUSING REFUGEE CAMPS TO SECURE THE CAMPS AND THEREBY ENCOURAGE RETURNS. THIS WOULD BE THE FOCUS OF THE KHAN MISSION TO ZAIRE. IF

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KHAN DOES NOT SUCCEED THEN OTHER ARRANGMENT'S WILL HAVE  
TO BE CONSIDERED.

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

ALBRIGHT

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