United States Mission to the United Nations



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799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

> CONFIDENTIAL **MEMORANDUM**

April 14, 1994

TO:

Ambassador Albright

THRU:

Ambassador Walker

FROM:

authority

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POL - John S. Boardman

SUBJECT:

Security Council Informals on Rwanda, Wednesday,

April 14, 4:30 pm

## Summary

The Working Group (as of 2:00 pm) has not gotten through the entire text of the NAM resolution. The WG will resume its work at 3:00 Comments on specific paragraphs are below. The Secretariat told us this morning that they have written up two options to be presented to the SC this afternoon -- (1) keep UNAMIR as is, minus the Belgians, (2) keep a political presence and a UNAMIR rifle company to protect them. The SYG had not yet cleared on the report, so there is a possibility another option might appear. Both of these options are bigger than what Washington might, reluctantly, be prepared to agree to.

## Background

Preamblular Paragraphs: The WG agreed to revisions to the preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution. The last preambular paragraph was not discussed in WG, since it is connected to the question of whether or not the Council goes for a Chapter VII operation, to be addressed by the Ambassadors in operative paragraph 5. One potential problem could crop up in the preambles: the French had asked to change "recalling" resolution 872 in preamb para 1 to "reaffirming". We opposed "reaffirming" during the working group, but the French may try again to insert it. "Reaffirming" would not be particularly desirable, since Resolution 872 is the one which spells out UNAMIR's current mandate, and we might try to get the Council atomic spirits that mandate soon.

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Operative Paragraphs: Operatives 1 and 2 are in brackets. They're a package. We do not have a strong position either way. The UK position has more merit than the Brazilian position

Op 4: Still has brackets, and will be left to the Ambassadors. We want to delete the word "demands", and not just call on the RPF to agree to a CF, but broaden it to include everyone. We want it to read: "Calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and an end to the mindless violence and carnage which are engulfing Rwanda; and in this connection, urges all parties and factions to agree without delay to an effective cease-fire and to return to the positions held by them before the present hostilities;

The WG did not yet get to op para 10, where we want to delete the reference to "in particular the RPF" committing themselves to the peace process. We will attempt to get this change through the WG this afternoon; before the SC informals. Both sides have done horrific things, and neither should be singled out for more blame than the other at this stage.

Op 5: The big questions still remain. If the SYG presents the options laid out above, it will be difficult to get Washington on board for either one. The Russians also want to see UNAMIR as small as possible. They realize the rest of the SC will not agree to any option that's not included in the SYG's report, and suggest that the best we can hope to do is fiddle with the wording of the SYG's second option. Russia will suggest modifying "company" with an adjective such as limited, small, partial, etc. Col. Clontz says there is a military concept of a "Company Minus", which is comprised of only 2-3 platoons, rather than 3-4 platoons. If we could get that idea into op 5, we would be able to limit UNAMIR's presence somewhat, and maximize the number of troops who can be pulled out.

BS

may be better to have an imperfect resolution now (to be revisited in 15 days when the SYG next reports) than to have no resolution at all.

POL:LLShestack 7 44360, 4/13/94, wang 19621

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