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Code Cable from Dallaire to Baril
Re: Military Assessment of the Situation and meetings with
RGF and RPF military officials

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TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK (ONLY)
FROM: DALLAYRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 17 APRIL 1994
NUMBER: MIR-782

SUBJECT: THE MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AS OF 17 APRIL 1994

1. GENERAL. TWO DAYS AGO WE SUCCEEDED IN BRINGING BOTH PARTIES TO AN INITIAL MEETING CHAIRED BY THE SRSG DURING WHICH EXCHANGES OF GENERAL POSITIONS ON THE CURRENT CONFLICT WERE EXPRESSED BY ALL SIDES AND THE DESIRE FOR PEACE WAS RENEWED. THE GOVERNMENT WAS REPRESENTED BY THE INTERIM CHIEF OF STAFF (WHO WAS REPLACED BY A HARDLINER ON THE EVENING OF 16 APRIL 1994) OF THE ARMY AND FOUR SENIOR OFFICERS, ALL OF WHOM ARE CONSIDERED MODERATE AND REASONABLE MEN. THE RPF WAS REPRESENTED BY TWO RELATIVELY JUNIOR OFFICERS (ONE WAS THE BN COMD OF THE CND AND THE OTHER WAS THE UNAMIR\RPF LIAISON OFFICER). IT WAS ONLY THROUGH THE PERSONAL INTERVENTION AND INSISTENCE BY THE FC AT THE CND, THAT THE RPF FINALLY DECIDED TO COME. THEY HAD TACITLY AGREED EARLIER BUT WANTED THEIR MILITARY TO REVIEW THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THEY THEN EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE ON-GOING FIRING IN THE AREA AND SO OPTED FOR A MILITARY DELEGATION ONLY, AND IN THE END (THAT IS UNTIL FC WENT TO THEM PERSONALLY), THEY WERE NOT GOING TO ATTEND BECAUSE OF THESE SECURITY\FIRING CONCERNS. THIS LAST MINUTE RETICENCE BY THE RPF TO ATTEND, EVEN THOUGH THE MEETING SITE IS IN THEIR AREA OF GENERAL CONTROL, COUPLED WITH THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION AT THE MEETING, HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED EITHER THE PARTICULARLY STRONG DESIRE ON THE RPF PART TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE DELEGATION DOES SEEM JUNIOR, THE BN COMD HAS BEEN HERE SINCE THE MOVE TO KIGALI IN DEC AND ENJOYS THE TRUST OF THE RPF MOVEMENT. THEY ALSO BROUGHT THE OFFICIAL POSITIONS OF THE POLITICAL WING WITH THEM IN WRITING.

3. AS FAR AS THE RGF SIDE, THEY CHANGED THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THEIR REPRESENTATION GROUP OF OFFICERS AND NOMINATED THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GENDARMERIE (A SENIOR OFFICER WHO HAS HAD OUR GENERAL RESPECT THROUGHOUT EVEN THOUGH ONE OF HIS HOUSES WAS RENTED BY THE MRND AS THEIR HQ AND THAT THERE WERE WEAPONS IN THIS HOUSE BELONGING TO THE INTERHAMWE) DUE TO HIS SENIORITY. ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT SIGNED THE UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFIRE REQUEST, AS HE WAS OUT OF TOWN, THEY ALL SAID HE IMMEDIATELY SUPPORTED THE PROPOSAL. THE SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS WHO MET WITH MR KANE AND THE FC EARLIER IN THE DAY BEFORE THE MEETING, EXPRESSED THE DESIRE

THAT SOMETHING TANGIBLE BE SHOWN AS A RESULT OF THE MEETING AS THEY WERE MODERATES AND THEY NEEDED SUPPORT IN THEIR CAUSE. THE COS OF THE GENDARMERIE DID NOT ATTEND AS IT WAS FELT BY THEM THAT IT WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE FOR HIM TO ATTEND LATER FOR HIGHER LEVEL MILITARY MEETINGS. THE POSITION OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN ALL THIS IS NOT CLEAR EXCEPT FOR THE FACT THAT HE IS WELL AWARE OF THESE OVERTURES AND HE KNOWS THE RPF WILL NOT RECOGNISE THE NEW GOVERNMENT SO HE CANNOT NEGOTIATE AT ALL. ON THE EVENING OF 16 APRIL IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE COS OF THE ARMY HAD BEEN CHANGED TO A HARDLINER. THIS SIGNIFICANT EVENT MAY IN FACT REPRESENT THE VICTORY OF THE HARDLINERS OVER THE MODERATES IN THE RGF HIGH COMMAND. WE MAY BE WITNESSING THE END OF THE DESIRE OF THE RGF FOR A CEASEFIRE AND A STIFFENING OF THEIR POSITION.

4. THE MEETING. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS SPORADIC GUNFIRE AROUND, THE 1 1/2 HOUR MEETING DID PERMIT BOTH SIDES TO EXPRESS THEIR IDEAS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THEIR DESIRE FOR PEACE. A SHORT RESUME IS ATTACHED. THE RPF PRESENTED A DOCUMENT (ALSO ATTACHED) THAT LAID OUT FOUR PRE-CONDITIONS TO ANY CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS LIST IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME THAT THE FC FACED WHEN NEGOTIATING FOR THE SECURITY MEASURES FOR THE EXPATRIATE WITHDRAWAL, WHICH ENDED UP AFTER THREE DAYS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH ONLY BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THESE ARE SOME ASPECTS OF THE "MOYENS DE VERIFICATION" THAT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED WITH THE SUPPORT OF BOTH SIDES, POSSIBLY EVEN WITH THE FIRING STILL GOING ON. IT WOULD SEEM DIFFICULT FOR OTHERS TO BE SORTED OUT IN A REASONABLY SHORT TIME SHOULD THE RPF INSIST ON THEIR TOTAL COMPLIANCE. THESE PRECONDITIONS REPRESENT A HARDLINE APPROACH THAT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE FLEXIBLE AT THIS TIME.

5. IT IS EVIDENT FROM THE PRE-MEETING BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, AND THE ORIENTATION OF THE DISCUSSIONS AT THE MEETING, THE RGF NEED\WANT URGENTLY A CEASEFIRE OR AT LEAST A STOP TO THE SHOOTING. HOWEVER THE RPF STATE THAT TO STOP THE SHOOTING IS A SIMPLE MILITARY MEASURE, BUT WHAT THEY SEE AS AN URGENT REQUIREMENT IS THE STOPPING OF THE MASSACRES BEHIND THE LINES BY PEOPLE OR GROUPS (EVEN SOME IN UNIFORM) ARMED WITH MACHETES AND OTHER TRADITIONAL WEAPONS. THESE KILLINGS ARE THE WORK OF SOME SOLDIERS\GENDARMES, OF GROUPS OR MILITIAS WHO ARE MORE AND MORE SEEMINGLY ORGANIZING THEMSELVES AND IN FACT CONTROLLING SOME PORTIONS OF THE CITY (EVEN PREVENTING RGF TO ENTER).

6. THERE IS A DIVERGENCE ON BOTH SIDES AS TO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE FIRST. RGF WANT A CEASE-FIRE THEN THEY WILL SORT OUT ALL THESE MURDERERS ETC AS THESE PEOPLE ARE ALL COMMITTED TO FIGHTING THE RPF. THE RPF STATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT FORCES ARE TO SORT OUT THEIR MILITIAS, PRESIDENTIAL GUARD ETC. BEFORE ANY CEASE-FIRE IS TO BE ENTERTAINED. THIS IS A CHICKEN AND EGG SITUATION THAT IS NOT READILY SOLVABLE. THE STOPPING OF THE MASSACRES MAY BECOME MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT AS THE LOCAL GROUPS\MILITIAS ARE BECOMING SEEMINGLY BOLDER (MASSACRES ARE NOT STOPPING AND APPARENTLY ARE SPREADING AS STATED BY THE INTERIM COS OF THE ARMY). AS OF AM 16 APRIL THE RGF OFFICERS HAD STATED THAT THEY NEEDED AT LEAST UNTIL NOON TO ANALYZE THE RPF PAPER SO THEY DID

NOT SEE THE POSSIBILITY TO HAVE ANOTHER MEETING UNTIL THE PM. THE RPF WAS TO BE APPROACHED ONCE THE RGF WAS READY FOR THE MEETING. THE RPF REFUSED TO ATTEND ANY MORE MEETINGS AS THEY STATED THEIR PRECONDITIONS ARE KNOWN AND THE RGF NEED ONLY COMPLY. THE RGF DID NOT ATTEND THE MEETING EITHER.

7. IN ADDITION, THE CHANGE OF CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY FROM A MODERATE TO A HARDLINER (RUHENGERI SECTOR COMMANDER FOR THE PAST 3 YEARS) MAY INDICATE THAT THE MODERATES HAVE BEEN PUSHED ASIDE BY THE HARDLINERS. FC ORGANIZED A MEETING WITH NEW COS TO FEEL HIM OUT BUT HE WAS STILL IN THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY AND WAS THEREFORE UNAVAILABLE FOR A MEETING.

8. MILITARY SITUATION . OVER THE PAST 24-48 HRS, UNAMIR HAS HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE AND ANALYZE THE BATTLE IN KIGALI. THIS ASSESSMENT OF THE CONFLICT IS BASED ON THAT ANALYSIS AND IS SUBMITTED FOR YOUR REFERENCE AND CONSIDERATION. MEETINGS WERE HELD TODAY WITH THE INTERIM CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY (STILL ON DUTY AND WILL REMAIN THE PRINCIPAL LINK WITH THE RGF AND THE PEACE PROCESS) AND THE COS OF THE GENDARMERIE IN ORDER TO RECEIVE AND REVIEW THE RGF COMMENTS/RESPONSES TO THE RPF FOUR POINT CEASE-FIRE PRECONDITIONS. THEIR POINTS SEEMS TO BE A VERY REASONABLE ATTEMPT TO COMPLY WITH THE RPF DEMANDS BUT THE PROOF WILL BE IN THE RPF'S RESPONSES TOMORROW. THERE STILL SEEMS TO BE A WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE RGF TO GIVE INTO THE RPF EVEN WITH THE CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP. ALSO TODAY, THE RPF WHOM FC MET SEPARATELY SHOWED THEMSELVES TO BE MORE AT EASE YET VIGILANT ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE NEW ARMY HIGH COMMAND AS MANY OF THESE NEWLY PROMOTED OFFICERS HAD NOT SIGNED THE RGF CEASEFIRE DOCUMENT. FC DID NOT MEET MGEN KAGAME TODAY ALTHOUGH HE WAS TOLD THIS WOULD BE ARRANGED. FC IS SERIOUSLY WONDERING ABOUT THE LATTERS WHEREABOUTS.

9. JUST PRIOR TO THE CONFLICT THE FC HAD A CONVERSATION WITH MGEN KAGAME, WITH TWO UNAMIR OFFICERS IN ATTENDANCE, WHICH NOW IN HINDSIGHT WERE VERY PROFOUND IN PREDICTING THE TYPE OF CONFLICT WE ARE NOW WITNESSING.

10. MGEN KAGAME WAS LAMENTING THE ETHNIC KILLINGS WHICH WERE TAKING PLACE AND STATED IF THEY DIDN'T STOP THE RPF MAY " BE FORCED TO SORT IT (RWANDA SITUATION) OUT ONCE AND FOR ALL". IN ADDITION HE STATED "IF IT (THE WAR) STARTED NO ONE MAY BE ABLE TO CONTROL IT THIS TIME".

11. OVER THE PAST 24-48 HOURS IT HAS BECOME APPARENT THE FOLLOWING ARE TAKING PLACE:

- A. THE RPF OFFENSIVE, WHICH STARTED IN BLITZKRIEG FASHION, IS SLOWING DOWN, EITHER DELIBERATELY OR DUE TO RESISTANCE OF THE OPPOSING FORCES.
- B. THE ETHNIC KILLINGS ARE CONTINUING AND IN FACT UNCONFIRMED REPORTS INDICATE IT IS EVEN INCREASING IN SCALE AND SCOPE IN THE AREAS JUST AHEAD OF THE RPF ADVANCE.

- C. THE RPF DO NOT DESIRE A CEASEFIRE UNTIL THEIR PRECONDITIONS ARE MET.
- D. THE GOVERNMENT SIDE APPEARS TO BE FRAGMENTING INTO AT LEAST TWO DISTINCT GROUPS WITH THE HARDLINERS APPARENTLY IN THE ASCENDANCY.

12. UNAMIR HAS LOST ITS EYES AND EARS OUTSIDE OF KIGALI WITH THE CONCENTRATION OR WITHDRAWAL OF ITS UNMOS, THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE DMZ AND ITS INABILITY, DUE TO SECURITY TASKS IN KIGALI, TO CONDUCT PATROLLING OUTSIDE OF THE KIGALI AREA. WHEREAS IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF THE CONFLICT WE HAD A CLEAR PICTURE OF THE SITUATION THROUGHOUT RWANDA, WE NOW ARE LIMITED TO KNOWLEDGE OF THE KIGALI AREA AND RPF ZONE. WE ARE RAPIDLY ENTERING A PHASE WHERE UN NEW YORK MAY VERY WELL KNOW MORE ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON THAN UNAMIR WITH INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION (SATELLITE, EW ETC) FROM ITS MEMBERS OF THE SITUATION OUTSIDE KIGALI. THEREFORE THIS ASSESSMENT IS VERY MUCH KIGALI CENTRED.

13. THE RPF OFFENSIVE APPEARS TO HAVE SLOWED, ESPECIALLY IN THE KIGALI AREA. THE RPF TACTICS APPEAR TO BE INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH IN LARGE (100) OR SMALL (4) GROUPS, ATTACK UPON A GOVERNMENT POSITION LIKE KACYIRU GENDARMERIE CAMP, VILLAGE OJUGWIRO, PRESIDENTIAL GUARD CAMP OR CAMP KANOMBE BY FIRE, FLANKING MOVEMENTS TO ENVELOP AND ISOLATE THE POSITION FROM ITS LOGISTICS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL, HARASSMENT FOR A PERIOD OF TIME AND A FINAL ASSAULT TO MOP UP (YET TO BE CONDUCTED IN THE FOUR EXAMPLES OUTLINED ABOVE). WHILE THESE ACTIONS ARE WELL PLANNED, EFFECTIVE AND CONDUCTED, THEY ARE SLOW AND BASED ON INFILTRATION AND STRANGULATION. THE QUESTION BECS WHY ARE THE RPF SLOWING DOWN WHEN IT APPEARED LESS THAN THREE DAYS AGO THEY COULD OVERRUN KIGALI IN A MATTER OF HOURS IF NOT DAYS. SPECULATION IS THAT THE RPF, AS HAS LONG BEEN SUSPECTED, IS LOGISTICALLY SHORT OF SUPPLIES (THIS IS CONFIRMED IN THE AREA OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES FOR WHICH THEY HAVE REQUESTED OF UNAMIR AND ENTERED OUR HOSPITAL ON 16 AND 17 APRIL TO TAKE) AND IS HUSBANDING ITS PRESENT RESOURCES FOR A LONGER CONFLICT. IT HAS THEREFORE DEVELOPED AND EMPLOYED TACTICS TO ENSURE ECONOMY. THE SECOND REASON MAY BE THEIR RELUCTANCE TO TAKE CASUALTIES. THEY MAY IN FACT HAVE WHAT THEY BELIEVE IS EVERY POSSIBLE RECRUIT IN UNIFORM AND MAY BE PROTECTING THEIR MANPOWER FOR WHAT THEY BELIEVE WILL BE A LONG CONFLICT. REPORTS SUGGEST THE SAME SCENARIO IS BEING PLAYED OUT IN BYUMBA. THE RPF SEEM TO PREFER MANOEUVRE AROUND THE ENEMY TO DIRECT ATTACKS UPON ENEMY POSITIONS. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT THE RGF RESISTANCE MAY BE STIFFENING AS THIS TURNS FROM A POLITICAL TO AN ETHNIC WAR. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF DESERTIONS, THEY ARE NOT ON A MASS SCALE AND THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTED CASES OF MASS SURRENDERS OR DEFECTIONS. WITH THEIR ABILITY TO DRAW FROM 85% OF THE POPULATION THE RGF IS NOT AND WILL NOT BE SHORT OF MANPOWER FOR A PROLONGED CONFLICT. THEIR LEAST PRECIOUS RESOURCE IS MANPOWER, UNLIKE THE RPF WHO TREAT MANPOWER AS THEIR MOST PRECIOUS RESOURCE. IN ADDITION, THERE APPEARS TO BE A MOBILIZATION OF THE MASSES AGAINST THE RPF. IN RGF AREAS CIVILIANS ARE ARMED AND OUT IN FORCE, SUPPOSEDLY TO DEFEND THEIR HOMES FROM THE RPF. EVEN IN A VICTORY SCENARIO (IF THIS BECOMES

OR IF IT ALWAYS WAS AN ETHNIC CONFLICT) THE RGF CAN FIGHT IT OUT FOR YEARS. OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT THIS MAY BECOME A LONG CONFLICT WITH TACTICAL VICTORIES FOR THE RPF BUT AN OPERATIONAL STALEMATE.

14. THE ETHNIC CLEANSING CONTINUES AND MAY IN FACT BE ACCELERATING. BEHIND RGF LINES MASSACRES OF TUTSIS AND MODERATE HUTUS AND SYMPATHIZERS WITH OPPOSITION PARTIES IS TAKING PLACE. BODIES LITTER THE STREETS AND POSE A SIGNIFICANT HEALTH HAZARD. RTLM RADIO BROADCASTS INFLAMMATORY SPEECHES AND SONGS EXHORTING THE POPULATION TO DESTROY ALL TUTSIS (RTLM RADIO WAS DAMAGED BY RPF MORTAR FIRE ON 17 APRIL). EVEN THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, A KNOWN HARDLINER, HAS CONDEMNED THIS PROPAGANDA, BUT HAS NOT CLOSED DOWN THE STATION. IT APPEARS NOW THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD INITIATED THE ETHNIC ATTACKS AND THEN HANDED THIS TASK OVER TO THE MILITIAS LIKE THE INTERHAMWE AND THE POWER AND THEN WITHDREW TO BUTARE AND GITARAMA. IN KIGALI, FREQUENT ROADBLOCKS ARE ESTABLISHED, ID CARDS CHECKED AND TUTSIS EXECUTED ON THE SPOT. IF THE RGF OR GENDARMERIE ARE PRESENT THEY DO NOT INTERFERE. IN FACT IN SOME AREAS THEY ARE PROHIBITED TRANSIT BY THE MILITIAS. THESE MASSACRES HAVE BEEN WITNESSED FROM A DISTANCE BY UN TROOPS. THIS ETHNIC CLEANSING INFURIATES THE RPF WHO HAVE STATED THERE WILL BE NO CEASEFIRE UNTIL THE MASSACRES STOP. THE MAJOR PRESENT QUESTION IS CAN THE GOVERNMENT STOP THE ATTACKS OR HAS THIS PROGRAMME GONE SO FAR OUT OF CONTROL (AS MGEN KAGAME STATED) THAT IT CANNOT BE STOPPED.

15. THE RPF CLEARLY STATE THEY DO NOT WANT A CEASEFIRE UNTIL THE MURDERS STOP. TACTICALLY, THEY MAY NOT WANT A CEASEFIRE UNTIL THEY HAVE SEIZED THE TERRAIN THEY WANT TO CONTROL (IE BYUMBA-KIGALI CORRIDOR, KIGALI OR A MAJOR PART OF IT, AND EASTERN RWANDA (THE ONLY OPEN GROUND LEFT THAT CAN ACCOMMODATE THEIR EXPATRIATE REFUGEES). UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT TAKES DRASTIC ACTION TO STOP THE MASSACRES AND ESTABLISH LAW AND ORDER IN THEIR AREA AND UNTIL THE RPF GAIN THE GROUND THEY NEED, THE CHANCES OF A CEASEFIRE SEEM REMOTE.

16. UNAMIR MILITARY SITUATION. UNAMIR FORCES ARE INCREASINGLY BEING FORCED INTO SELF-PROTECTION TASKS, DEFENCE OF THE AIRPORT, AND RESUPPLY AND SUSTAINMENT ACTIVITIES UNDER ARMED ESCORT. UNMO ACTIVITIES ARE CONCENTRATED IN SAFE AREAS OR ARE CONDUCTED AT CONSIDERABLE RISK. IN ADDITION, THE MORAL DILEMMA OVER WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES WHO HAVE TAKEN SHELTER IN RGF\MILITIA CONTROLLED AREAS AND ARE THREATENED WITH MASSACRE POSES THE DILEMMA OVER HOW TO EXTRACT THEM. THE MILITIAS HAVE DISPLAYED DRUNKENNESS, DRUG ABUSE AND SADISTIC BRUTALITY. THEY DO NOT RESPECT THE UN FLAG, THE RED CROSS OR ANY OTHER HUMAN SYMBOL. THEY WILL NOT HESITATE TO STOP ANY CONVOY AND ATTACK ITS RWANDESE PASSENGERS OR EVEN THE UN GUARDS. WITHIN OUR PRESENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WE ARE CONFRONTED WITH THE DILEMMA OF ENFORCING THE SECURITY OF PERSONS UNDER OUR PROTECTION. WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO "SMUGGLE" OUT SMALL NUMBERS AND HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL TO DATE BUT IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME UNTIL A CONFRONTATION OCCURS. INCREASINGLY WE ARE BEING PRESSURED BY UNNY, NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ETC TO CONDUCT THESE OPERATIONS TO RESCUE SELECTED INDIVIDUALS. NOW HOWEVER, THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE

C.R.O.-124

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IN LOCATIONS WITH HUNDREDS OR THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE. ANY ATTEMPT TO RESCUE LET ALONE EVEN IDENTIFY THE INDIVIDUAL WILL LEAD TO A MOB ATTACK. MOST OF THE LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF THESE REFUGEES ARE IN MILITIA CONTROLLED AREAS. THE RISK MUST BE ASSESSED. DOES UNAMIR RISK AN ARMED CONFRONTATION, FOR WHICH WE ARE NOT EQUIPPED, PROTECTED OR MANDATED, AT CONSIDERABLE RISK TO THE SAFETY OF OUR OWN TROOPS, TO ATTEMPT TO SAVE THESE PEOPLE. OR DO WE LEAVE THEM FOR POSSIBLE EXTERMINATION? RAPIDLY UNAMIR IS BEING DRAGGED INTO A PEACE ENFORCEMENT SCENARIO FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS. NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN FRUITLESS IN THIS AREA BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT\RGF WILL NOT OR CANNOT CONTROL THIS SITUATION OR THE MILITIAS. IT MUST ALSO BE RECOGNIZED THAT IF THESE OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED AND END IN THE INEVITABLE ARMED CONFRONTATION THE THREAT TO UNAMIR WILL SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE. OUR ABILITY TO ESCORT FUTURE HUMANITARIAN OR REFUGEE CONVOYS WILL BE ENDANGERED AND OUR POSSIBLE FUTURE EXTRACTION WILL BE DONE UNDER HOSTILE CONDITIONS. IF THIS MISSION IS TO BE CHANGED INTO A PEACE ENFORCEMENT SCENARIO TO STOP THE MASSACRES AND RESCUE THREATENED CIVILIANS THAN A CHANGE IN MANDATE WILL BE REQUIRED AND THE MISSION MUST BE REINFORCED WITH MEN, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT.

17. ON 16 APRIL INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED THAT THE MILITIAS WERE PLANNING TO MASSACRE THE REFUGEES WHO HAD TAKEN REFUGE AT THE HOTEL MILLES COLLINES. A SECTION OF THIS CONTINGENT WITH TWO UNMO TEAMS WAS DISPATCHED TO PROVIDE A PRESENCE AND HOPEFULLY DETER A MASSACRE UNTIL THE SITUATION COULD BE NEGOTIATED BY THE FC. WITHIN HOURS THE CONTINGENT COMMANDER, IN WRITING TO THE FC, STRONGLY REQUESTED THE WITHDRAWAL OF HIS SECTION AS AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO THE LIVES OF HIS MEN IN DEFENCE OF LOCAL PEOPLES. THIS CONTINGENT COMMANDER HAS CONSISTENTLY STATED HE IS UNDER NATIONAL ORDERS NOT TO ENDANGER HIS SOLDIERS BY EVACUATING RWANDESE. THEY WILL EVACUATE EXPATRIATES BUT NOT LOCAL PEOPLE. HIS JUNIOR OFFICERS HAVE CLEARLY STATED THAT IF THEY ARE STOPPED AT A ROADBLOCK WITH LOCAL PEOPLE IN THE CONVOY THEY WILL HAND OVER THESE LOCAL PEOPLE FOR INEVITABLE KILLING RATHER THAN USE THEIR WEAPONS IN AN ATTEMPT TO SAVE LOCAL PEOPLE. THIS RETICENCE TO ENGAGE IN DANGEROUS OPERATIONS AND THEIR STATED RELUCTANCE TO USE THEIR WEAPONS IN SELF-DEFENCE OR IN DEFENCE OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY HAS LED TO WIDESPREAD MISTRUST OF THIS CONTINGENT AMONG ITS PEERS IN OTHER UNITS AND AMONGST STAFF OFFICERS\UNMOs AT THE HEADQUARTERS WHEN THEY ARE TASKED TO GO WITH THESE MEN ON DANGEROUS MISSIONS.

18. ON 17 APRIL THE EXTRACTION OF OUR BELGIAN CONTINGENT COMMENCED. THESE MEN WERE OUR BEST TRAINED, EXPERIENCED, EQUIPPED AND MOTIVATED PERSONNEL. EVEN THOUGH THEY SUFFERED HEAVILY WITH THE LOSS OF THEIR COMRADES, THEY CONDUCTED THE EVACUATION IN A DETERMINED AND PROFESSIONAL MANNER. THE REMAINING STAFF HAS BEEN CONSOLIDATED IN ORDER TO FILL MOST OF THE EMPTIED POSITIONS BUT SUCH A RADICAL CHANGE OF KEY STAFF AT SUCH A CRITICAL MOMENT IS MOST DISTRESSING AND MAY CAUSE US SOME SERIOUS DEGRADATION OF CONTROL IN THE FORCE.

19. THE SUMMARY OF THESE EVENTS IS THAT UNAMIR MUST BE PREPARED TO DEFEND THE AIRPORT WITH ONE BATTALION AS IT IS OUR AND THE

HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES LIFELINE. THIS LEAVES ONLY 1\2 BATTALION FOR ESCORT DUTIES. THIS 1\2 BATTALIONS RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE IN THESE OPERATIONS CONCLUDES THAT UNAMIR MAY NOT BE ABLE TO CONDUCT HUMANITARIAN RESCUE MISSIONS OR EVEN HUMANITARIAN ESCORT MISSIONS WITHOUT A MAJOR CHANGE IN OUR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, REINFORCEMENT WITH A CONTINGENT THAT IS PREPARED TO USE FORCE AND HAS THE CAPABILITY TO USE FORCE WITHIN LIMITS AND A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL DETERMINE THE NEW TASKS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR THE FORCE. THE FORCE TODAY WAS THE TARGET OF DIRECT FIRE BY SMALL ARMS ON A 4X4 (ONE INJURED) BY THE RPF AND BY AN ASSAULT ON ONE OF OUR APCs BY A MOB AT A ROADBLOCK WHO OPENED FIRE WITH SMGs. THE APC EXTRACTED ITSELF BY FIRING WARNING SHOTS. ONE OF OUR CITY GARRISON POSTS WAS CAUGHT IN AN INTENSE CROSS-FIRE BETWEEN BOTH FORCES BUT LITTLE DAMAGE WAS CAUSED. IT IS BECOMING MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT TO MOVE ABOUT THE CITY DUE TO THE MILITIAS AND SELF DEFENCE GROUPS CONTROLLING IMPORTANT ARTERIES AND AREAS OF THE CITY. THIS IS A THIRD FORCE THAT WAS ALWAYS THERE BUT HAS OVER THE LAST 3 DAYS COME MUCH BOLDER\AGGRESSIVE\BRAZEN EVEN IN THE CITY. THEY HAVE NO PARTICULAR RESPECT FOR ANYBODY AND ESSENTIALLY WORK TO THEIR OWN UNRULY\DRUNK\DRUGGED TUNE. THEY ARE A VERY LARGE DANGEROUS AND TOTALLY IRRATIONAL GROUP OF PEOPLE. FC CONSIDERS THEM TO BE THE MOST DANGEROUS THREAT TO UNAMIR.

20. CONCLUSION. THE PRESENT ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION CONCLUDES:

- A. THE RPF OFFENSIVE HAS SLOWED DOWN TO A METHODOICAL ADVANCE.
- B. ETHNIC CLEANSING IS CONTINUING AND MAY BE ACCELERATING.
- C. THE GOVERNMENT SIDE HAS FRAGMENTED INTO AT LEAST TWO CAMPS, EXTREMIST AND MODERATE, AND IT APPEARS THE HARDLINERS HAVE CONTROL. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF A CEASE-FIRE WILL BE DETERMINED BY THIS GROUP AND THEIR ACTION ON THE MASSACRES.
- D. THE RPF WILL NOT ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE UNTIL THEY HAVE TAKEN THE TERRAIN THEY NEED AND THE MASSACRES HAVE BEEN STOPPED.

21. UNAMIR ACTIVITIES. WITHIN THE PRESENT SITUATION UNAMIR OPERATIONS MUST FOCUS ON:

- A. MAINTAINING A PRESENCE IN KIGALI.
- B. SECURING THE AIRPORT FOR SELF-SUPPORT, POSSIBLE EXTRACTION ROUTE AND HUMANITARIAN AID DELIVERY.
- C. PROTECTION OF UN PROPERTY AND PERSONNEL WITHIN OUR PRESENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.
- D. CONTINUATION OF SPONSORING AND SECURING JOINT MEETINGS IN ATTEMPTING TO GET A CEASE-FIRE. PROVISION OF

SECURITY FOR DELEGATES TO AND FROM THE MEETINGS MAY BE HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS WHICH WILL REQUIRE NEW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

- E. CONDUCTING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS WITH CONSIDERABLE RISK WHICH WILL REQUIRE A CHANGE OF THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT TO USE FORCE IF NECESSARY TO PROTECT REFUGEES AND PREVENT CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.

22. IF UNAMIR IS TO ENGAGE IN RESCUE MISSIONS THAN UNAMIR WILL CONTINUALLY BE DRAWN INTO CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE MILITIAS THAT WILL REQUIRE ENFORCEMENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. THIS WILL ALSO REQUIRE A CHANGE IN MANDATE. IT MAY ALSO REQUIRE REINFORCEMENT DUE TO THE RETICENCE OF ONE CONTINGENT TO ENDANGER ITSELF IN HUMANITARIAN OR DANGEROUS SITUATIONS.

23. IT MUST BE FULLY RECOGNIZED THAT BY CHANGING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR THAT CONFRONTATIONS WILL BE INEVITABLE AND WILL FORCE UNAMIR TO DEVOTE MORE RESOURCES TO AIRPORT SECURITY AND SELF-PROTECTION AS WE WILL MOST DEFINITELY BE TARGETED BY THE GROUPS WE CONFRONT ON RESCUE AND HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS.

24. THE FC ASSESSES THE SITUATION AS BEING VERY DIFFICULT, DANGEROUS AND EXPLOSIVE ONCE ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER ACTUALLY START TO SMELL VICTORY. THE FORCE SIMPLY CANNOT CONTINUE TO SIT ON THE FENCE IN THE FACE OF ALL THESE MORALLY LEGITIMATE DEMANDS FOR ASSISTANCE/PROTECTION, NOR CAN IT SIMPLY LAUNCH INTO CHAPTER 7 TYPE OF OPERATIONS WITHPOUT THE PROPER AUTHORITY, PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. IT IS THUS ANTICIPATED THAT OVER THE NEXT 24 HOURS OR SO, THE FC WILL EITHER RECOMMEND A THINNING OUT OF THE FORCE DOWN TO A RESPONSIBLE LEVEL NEEDED TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF THE AIRFIELD FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS, THE POLITICAL/MILITARY PROCESS AND THE HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT TASKS. THUS A FORCE OF ABOUT 1300 ALL RANKS BASED ON THE PREFERRED OPTION OF ONE LARGE BATTALION OF 800 MEN (INSTEAD OF TWO SMALL 450 MEN BATTALIONS WITH ALL THEIR OVER HEAD) OR THE FC WILL RECOMMEND OPTION B, IE THE 250 MEN FORCE JUST TO KEEP ALL THE FILES GOING IN A SECURE SITUATION.

25. MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO ON MANPOWER UNDER THESE SEVERE AND ADVERSE CONDITIONS IS WASTEFUL, DANGEROUSLY CASUALTY-CAUSING AND DEMORALIZING TO THE TROOPS. EITHER UNAMIR GETS CHANGES IN ITS PARAMETER OF WORKS IN ORDER TO GET INTO THE THICK OF THINGS (WITH MORE RESOURCES), OR IT STARTS TO THIN OUT IN ORDER TO AVOID UNNECESSARY LOSSES AND REDUCE THE OVERHEAD AND ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN TO THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS FOR A CEASEFIRE AND PEACE.