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PAGE 01 PARIS 34858 161448Z
 ACTION AF-01

RELEASED IN PART
 B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	EUR-01
	HA-09	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SB-00
	SCT-03	SNP-00	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00

/028W

-----86E2AB 161612Z /38

R 161436Z DEC 92
 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7643
 INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
 AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
 AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
 AMEMBASSY KIGALI
 AMEMBASSY DAKAR
 AMEMBASSY LAGOS
 AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 34858

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MARR, FR, RW,
 SUBJECT: A/S COHEN'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH ON
 - RWANDA, DECEMBER 14

REF: KIGALI 5048

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PARIS 34858 161448Z

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AT THE END OF A WORKING BREAKFAST IN PARIS ON DECEMBER 14 LARGELY DEDICATED TO SOMALIA, A/S COHEN BRIEFLY DISCUSSED RWANDA WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S SENIOR ADVISOR ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS BRUNO DELAYE AND WITH JEAN-MARC DE LA SABLIERE, THE QUAI'S DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS.
3. DELAYE NOTED THAT HE BELIEVES THE NEGOTIATIONS AT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER
 CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
 DECLASSIFY AFTER: 18 DEC 2015
 DATE/CASE ID: 04 NOV 2011 201005065

UNCLASSIFIED

ARUSHA ARE RAPIDLY APPROACHING THE END-GAME. RWANDAN PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA IS NERVOUS AND FEELS HE IS IN TROUBLE. HABYARIMANA RECENTLY WROTE TO MITTERRAND ASKED FOR A MEETING AND STATING THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT 90 PERCENT OF THE RPF'S DEMANDS AT ARUSHA -- BUT THAT HE CAN NOT ALLOW THE MRND TO BE MARGINALIZED WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. NO DECISION HAS YET BEEN MADE ON WHETHER TO SCHEDULE A CALL FOR HABYARIMANA, BUT IT IS LIKELY MITTERRAND WILL AGREE TO ONE IN EARLY 1993.

4. ACCORDING TO DELAYE, HABYARIMANA BELIEVES THAT A LONG TRANSITION WILL DESTABILIZE THE COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY IF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS DIVIDED. FOR THAT REASON, HE FAVORS FIRST HOLDING ELECTIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL TO ASSURE A STABLE AND REPRESENTATIVE LOCAL AUTHORITY. HABYARIMANA ALSO WISHES TO BRING EXTREMIST HUTU ELEMENTS INTO THE GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE THEIR TAKING THEIR CAUSE INTO THE STREETS. DE LA SABLIERE SAID THE GOF FOUND THESE TWO POINTS REASONABLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 PARIS 34858 161448Z

5. DE LA SABLIERE ADDED THAT THE QUAI IS NOT CONVINCED THAT THE RPF HAS TOTALLY RENOUNCED A MILITARY SOLUTION,

[REDACTED]

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6. WE REPLIED THAT THE U.S. IS LESS CERTAIN OF RPF INTENTIONS. WE BELIEVE THE THE RPF PROBABLY COULD HAVE CAPTURED MUCH OF THE COUNTRY DURING THE 1992 SUMMER FIGHTING, [REDACTED] THE RPF DIDN'T ADVANCE OR THE CAPITAL AND SINCE THEN HAS RESPECTED THE CEASE FIRE AT LEAST AS WELL AS THE FAR. IN OUR VIEW, THE RPF BELIEVES IT COULD WIN A WAR BUT REALIZES IT CAN NOT GOVERN RWANDA BECAUSE IT REPRESENTS TOO SMALL A MINORITY. WE THINK THE RPF IS NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH BUT IT IS EXASPERATED BY THE WRANGLING BETWEEN THE MNRD AND THE OTHER INTERNAL PARTIES.

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7. [REDACTED]

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8. THIS MESSAGE WAS CLEARED BY A/S COHEN.

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PAGE 04

PARIS 34858 161448Z

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